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SAN Analysis  
Internal Security Strategy for Pakistan

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# Internal Security Strategy for Pakistan

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*“...the first duty of a government is to maintain law and order, so that the life, property and religious beliefs of its subjects are fully protected by the State”*

– Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah<sup>1</sup>

## Introduction

Internal security holds pivotal place in national security policy of any country. Pakistan faces extensive internal threats and challenges to its physical and human security, which arise mainly out of intolerance, extremism, militancy and terrorism – both in the hinterlands and urban areas. Criminal corruption and societal crimes further compound the problem. On the whole, these threats hamper prosperity of the people and progress of the state.

Pakistani state and society have suffered huge social, economic, infrastructural and human cost due to militancy and terrorism. The country is today being considered in line with the countries like Iraq and Afghanistan with regard to internal order. Notions like *the most dangerous place* in the world are oft-appearing in international media. This calls for taking a fresh look at the prevailing internal security situation and formulating a comprehensive strategy that can work to stabilize the situation thereby creating a climate that is supportive of socio-economic activities in the country, brings back the lost atmosphere of peace and leads the people on the path to prosperity.

Internal security remains to be a challenge for each nation dwelling on the globe and so is the case for Pakistan. Crime-corruption nexus adds to the socio-political complexities. Sectarian schisms and ethnic divides do exist in other societies too and so have they persisted in Pakistan as well. Besides, Pakistan has been home to numerous insurgencies and uprisings, crisis in the erstwhile East Pakistan being the worst of all. Nevertheless, rise of terrorism in the aftermath of American attack on Afghanistan in October 2001 has worsened the security situation of the country to an unprecedented degree. Everything has virtually come to a standstill. Internal security of Pakistan has raised numerous questions for all and sundry in the country and abroad. During 2010 alone, there have been 1,986 terrorist incidents, wherein 478 security forces personnel and 1,361 civilians lost their lives while another 1,316 security forces personnel and 3,744 civilians were injured.<sup>2</sup> On the whole, 9,000 Pakistanis have lost their lives since 2001. What’s more, Pakistan’s otherwise slim economy has suffered a loss of US\$ 43 billion since 2001.<sup>3</sup>


## Major Internal Security Threats for Pakistan

Terrorism remains to be the primary threat to internal security of Pakistan. However, crime does have a strong nexus whereby criminal gangs and drug cartels have joined hands with the terrorists for economic gains. Thus terrorism and crime are the main threat with hosts of threat enablers and multipliers as given in the table below:

Threat Enablers	Threat Multipliers
Tribalism and feudalism	Extremism
Political expediencies	Sectarianism
Weak governance	Sub-nationalism

Corruption Socio-economic conditions Incomplete national database Foreign intrusion	Weaponization Militant organizations Urban criminal mafias Afghan refugees
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
The above-mentioned threats, threat enablers and threat multipliers join together to create a complex internal mosaic as shown in Figure-1



### Threat Manifestation

Internal security threats have peculiar manifestation in various regions of Pakistan as given in Figure-2. It may be seen that the main players involved in the internal security environment are: polity, clergy, militants, feudal elite, tribal chieftains and criminal mafias. Foreign players are virtually a rider clause in each case. This all manipulates the religious sentiments and ethnic passions of poor and uneducated segments of Pakistani society.

**Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)** remains to be the principle boiling point and a source of urban terrorism too besides militancy in the hinterlands. It not only exports terrorism to other areas of Pakistan in form of gun-running and suicide bombers but is also a sort of sanctuary for criminal gangs and urban terrorists. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which is often taken as a homogeneous group of militants with religious passions to help Afghan Taliban evict extra-regional forces from Afghanistan, is indeed an umbrella group of various Taliban factions operating mainly in the South Waziristan Agency of FATA<sup>4</sup> but has now expanded its range of activities across the country. According to one estimate, TTP is made up of 28 different groups.<sup>5</sup> List is attached as Annex A.



People often question as to whether it is someone else’s war being fought by Pakistan or it is Pakistan’s own? Certainly, it does have influences from abroad and is linked with the regional situation, especially the presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan. But as for now, it has become a battle for Pakistan. Table 1.2 shows as to what are we fighting for?

**Table 1.2: What are we fighting for?**

Terrorists	State
Change of state	Retention of state
Legitimacy	Writ
Power	Authority
Intimidation of people	Security of people
Destruction of assets	Protection of assets


Contending narratives of TTP and the Government of Pakistan (GOP) given in Table 1.3 further explain the causes of the on-going war.

**Table 1.3: Contending narratives – TTP : GOP**

TTP	GOP
We are a legitimate movement based on our religious principles. We need to implement Shariah Law	TTP is a banned movement. Pakistan is a moderate Islamic Democratic Republic and its constitution is already Islamic
We will support our Afghan brethren fighting Jihad against the invaders (US/NATO)	GOP cannot allow anyone to intervene in the affairs of other countries on any pretext
We will fight anyone siding with the coalition forces in Afghanistan whether combatants or non-combatants	Terrorism has halted development in the country and killing of innocent people is against the Islamic principles



Enough has been written heretofore on various angles of militancy in Pakistan. Nevertheless, it is imperative to understand the makeup of the ethno-religious ideology that fuels the passions of the militants linked with TTP in FATA. Islamic fundamental of Jihad has been bonded with the Pashtun social code of Pastunwali to make a strong ideology. Makeup of the TTP ideology is given in Figure-3.<sup>6</sup>



**Balochistan**, on the other hand, has different dynamics of militancy. With tribal and sub-nationalist undertones, the issue of Balochistan is as old as is Pakistan itself. There have been five major uprisings in the province since 1947. The *first* argument came up in the aftermath of Balochistan's accession with Pakistan.<sup>7</sup> The *second* conflict erupted after formation of one unit in 1955, followed by other actions in 1965 and 1966. Balochistan's *third* civil war began in 1962 and ended in 1968.<sup>8</sup> The *fourth* uprising turned into a serious revolt in 1973 and ended up in 1977.<sup>9</sup> Balochistan is again caught up in a virtual state of insurgency, which may be described as the *fifth* phase. Militant groups with some 150 training camps in various areas of the province (40 are which are reported to be supported by Indian RAW) housing some 3,000 to 5,000 armed guerrillas,<sup>10</sup> has hitherto bagged hundreds of militant acts. Militant elements in Balochistan are not only targeting the security forces personnel but are also leaving no stone unturned in destroying the state assets.

Insurgency in Balochistan is clearly supported from abroad. There are hosts of foreign players supporting instability in the province due to its resource potential and geo-strategic importance along a future energy route. Indian RAW is certainly playing a negative role. In a statement, Wahid Baloch, President of Baloch Society of North America, said, "We love our Indian friends and want them to help and rescue us from tyranny and oppression. In fact, India is the only country which has shown concern over the Baloch plight. We want India to take Balochistan's issue to every international forum, the same way Pakistan has done to raise the so-called Kashmiri issue. We want India to openly support our just cause and provide us with all moral, financial, military and diplomatic support."<sup>11</sup> It is also of note that the former RAW agent B. Raman had written to Sonia Gandhi, in one of his 2009 papers:

The Balochs had stood by Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress Party during the independence struggle against the British. They had opposed the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan. If India had to be partitioned, they would have preferred an independent Balochistan. The Balochs were the closest to Gandhi's heart. Due to reasons of realpolitik, we let them down during their first War of Independence. The same realpolitik would dictate painful inaction by us now too. But that does not mean we should

hesitate to draw the attention of the international community to the ruthless massacre of the Baloch nationalists by the Pakistan army. We owe our moral support to them. The struggle for an independent Balochistan is part of the unfinished agenda of the Partition.<sup>12</sup>

In February 2010, Chaudhry Ahmed Mukhtar, the Defence Minister of Pakistan, informed the British Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Bill Rammell, during visit by the latter to Pakistan that, “India is involved in sabotaging peace and creating trouble and instability in Balochistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan.”<sup>13</sup>

This evidently shows the Indian hand in terrorism in Pakistan. Christine Fair, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, stated in 2009:

I think it would be a mistake to completely disregard Pakistan's regional perceptions due to doubts about Indian competence in executing covert operations. That misses the point entirely. And I think it is unfair to dismiss the notion that Pakistan's apprehensions about Afghanistan stem in part from its security competition with India. Having visited the Indian mission in Zahedan, Iran, I can assure you they are not issuing visas as the main activity! Moreover, India has run operations from its mission in Mazar (through which it supported the Northern Alliance) and is likely doing so from the other consulates it has reopened in Jalalabad and Qandahar along the border. Indian officials have told me privately that they are pumping money into Balochistan. Kabul has encouraged India to engage in provocative activities... Kabul's motivations for encouraging these activities are as obvious as India's interest in engaging in them.<sup>14</sup>

There is no improvement in security situation in Balochistan despite various initiatives by the government. During 2009, there have been 792 terrorist attacks in the province wherein 1070 people were injured and 386 perished.<sup>15</sup>

**Karachi**, the economic capital of Pakistan, has hitherto faced numerous tides of instability and is currently again faced with a strong wave of insecurity. Persistent security issues in Karachi are that of street crimes, car snatching, burglary, larceny, kidnapping for ransom, land grabbing and murders are not new to Karachi. While each act of crime is deplorable and cannot be endorsed, the true problem of Karachi is different and goes much beyond the social crimes. More than the crimes, it is processional religiosity and agitational politics that stops the wheel of life in the cosmopolitan. There are over 15,000 industries in Karachi's five industrial zones that are compelled to halt their work due to the law and order situation every now and then. The city generates the lion's share of 67% for the national exchequer and 35% of the GDP. Deteriorating the law and order situation stops the wheels of industry and disturbs the trading circles, incurring colossal losses of Rupees 3 billion to Rupees 5 billion per day and it takes 4 to 7 days for normalizing the situation.<sup>16</sup> Certainly, all that happens in Karachi directly affects the economic activities across the country. Thus, Karachi needs a different kind of treatment in internal security campaign of the country.

**Madrassas**, or religious seminaries, too have a role in internal order in the country, which is also linked with the situation in FATA and political expediencies. Purely sect-based religious education in madrassas leads to intolerance for other sects.<sup>17</sup> This adds to extremism in the society. Certainly, madrassas are the largest chain of NGOs in the country providing a unique kind of social protection to poverty-stricken masses. They provide free education, feeding and lodging.

Starting with about 189 in 1947, Pakistan today has thousands of madrassas but no one knows the exact number; estimates range from 12,000 to 40,000. According to government records, there are at least 15,148 madrassas in Pakistan with more than two million students – around five percent of the 34

million children in formal education.<sup>18</sup> In 2005, the government had demanded that madrassas expel all of their foreign students by 31 December 2005. Of an estimated 1,700 foreign madrasa students, 1,000 had reportedly left Pakistan by 1 January 2006. In August 2006, the government announced to deport some of the remaining 700 foreign students if they did not obtain permission to remain in Pakistan from their home governments. The visas of those with permission reportedly were extended.<sup>19</sup>

The state needs to harness the strength of madrasa system by integrating them with education mainstream of Pakistan in a phased manner.

**Militant organizations** are yet other but persistent threat for internal security of the country. The government has heretofore proscribed 28 organizations and has held one on watch list. Besides, three are enlisted under UNSCR 1267 (2008). List is given as Annex B.<sup>20</sup> The real issue is that proscribed organizations have not ceased to function. Some of these organizations have re-emerged with new names and the remaining ones are carrying out their pursuits with the same name. Proscription remains to be procedural rather than penal, thus the threat remains to be even more challenging.

### Internal Security Strategy

The government is doing everything possible to restore internal order thereby bringing back peace and prosperity in the country. Thousands of our brave soldiers, policemen and civilians have been martyred in pursuit of peace in recent years. Infrastructural damages have been enormous and economic loss has been unbearable.

### Whole-of-Nation Approach

It is recommended that restoration of internal order in the country should be taken as a package. The government should launch an internal security campaign taking the entire nation on board and integrating all instruments of statecraft. For this purpose, a national dialogue is required to be initiated in and out of parliament, on media and in intellectual circles. Thus, it should be an effort by the nation rather than the government alone or any segment thereof.

### The Means

The Ministry of Interior should spearhead the internal security campaign, as it is doing now, with renewed vigour and planning. The means available in the realm of security are as under:

- Ministry of Interior with Subordinate Agencies.
  - Civil Armed Forces to include Pakistan Rangers (Punjab), Pakistan Rangers (Sindh), FC (KPK), FC (Balochistan) and Capital Police.
  - Department of Immigration & Passport.
  - National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA).
  - National Alien Registration Authority (NARA).
  - Federal Investigation Agency (FIA).
- Provincial security mechanisms including police, constabulary and other departments.
- Other Instruments of Statecraft to include military, intelligence, economic, diplomatic, information and education.<sup>21</sup>

**The Ends**


The ends envisaged for internal security campaign are as given in table below:

Table 1.4

State	Society	FATA	Militants
<i>To gain...</i>	<i>To attain...</i>	<i>To be...</i>	<i>To be...</i>
Writ	Security	Secured	Militarily defeated
Stability	Prosperity	Developed	Ideologically rejected
Economic progress	Harmony	Integrated	Futuristically ineffective

**The Way**


**7-D Strategy:** In order to align the means with the ends, 7-D Strategy, given in Figure-4, is recommended to be put into action.



While first two components of 7-D Strategy i.e. D-1 (Defeat) and D-2 (Defend) call for kinetic-dominated response, the remaining elements i.e. D-3 to D-7 primarily need non-kinetic response i.e. employment of non-military instruments of statecraft.

**Strategic Framework:** In order to put 7-D Strategy into action, internal security campaign should be conducted in three distinct phases as shown in the Strategic Framework given in Figure-5. Timeline is desired and not fixed. In Short-Term Phase, which is kinetic dominated, Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) should conduct operations in line with Kinetic Strategy discussed in succeeding paragraphs. However, non-kinetic instruments of statecraft should start playing their role from the start. Likewise, in Medium-Term Phase, which is non-kinetic dominated, kinetic element should keep playing selective role. Success of D-1 and D-2, by employment kinetic means, is imperative for immediate security of the state and society from the threat of terrorism. It is also crucial for building up the confidence of people in the capacity of the state to defeat the militants. Success in D-3 to D-7 is fundamental to sustained peace and consolidation of accomplishments in the last phase of internal security campaign.





### Success Metrics

The following will serve as success metrics in various phases of the internal security campaign:-

#### **Short-Term Phase**

- Number of terrorists killed, captured or de-radicalized.
- Reduction in number of terrorist attacks.
- Reduction in number of casualties, both civilians and security forces personnel.
- Reduced ideological appeal of terrorists and enhanced population support.
- Flow of intelligence from locals.
- Improved border control.

#### **Mid-Term Phase**

- Improved socio-economic conditions of masses.
- Rehabilitation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) after kinetic operations.
- Reformation of madaris.

#### **Long-Term Phase**

- Sustainability of success.
- Economic development.


### Kinetic Strategy

Kinetic strategy calls for employment of military forces in aid of civil power in FATA and PATA along with Frontier Corps (FC) and Tribal Lashkars (Tribal Militias). The operations are already being conducted wherein the military forces have attained success that even the extra-regional forces in Afghanistan could not dream. Military forces are conducting operations with the same vigour and velocity. Police and Civil Armed Forces (CAF) should be employed in remaining parts of Pakistan (Figure-6). Ministry of Interior should integrate the efforts of intelligence agencies. Based on the reliable intelligence, LEAs need to conduct proactive operations. The role of police is more important than any other agency, particularly in settled areas of Pakistan. There is a need for police intelligence network using locals across the country. Police operations based on patent information are vital for successful campaign. It would make possible to deal with a threat locally before it turns into a monster wherein employment of military forces becomes inescapable.


Operations in settled areas should be conducted against the irreconcilable militant elements with the objectives shown in Figure-7. The state forces must maintain strategic initiative so as to gain the confidence of population, besides creating conditions for employment of non-kinetic instruments of statecraft. For this, there is a need for perpetual development of capacity of the security forces.

**Developmental Strategy**

For successful employment of kinetic instruments of statecraft, constant development and capacity-building of LEAs is imperative. Pakistan’s LEAs are



**Figure-6: Kinetic strategy – Employment of Forces**



**Figure-7: Kinetic Operations**

considerably battle-inoculated and have done commendable job in counter-terror operations. However, capacity-building is a continuous process that must not stop.

**Military Forces:** Military forces are well-equipped, well-trained, well-inoculated and highly motivated to conduct operations in aid of civil power, something that they have amply displayed during the recent years. However, there is always a room for improvement. While they have devoted a part of their training period to anti-terror operations, they do need to further develop the capacity in terms of anti-terror gear and means of mobility. Armed Forces are direly in need of more transport / gunship helicopters and armed drones. Pakistan has progressed well on the way of indigenous development of drones and fighter jets (JF-17 Thunder) in collaboration with China. The government must pursue for acquisition of drone technology, preferably from the United States or make efforts for indigenous development.

**CAF and Police:** Capacity-building is particularly important for CAF and Police. Major areas of consideration are completion of the manpower deficiencies, reorganization, training, and anti-terror gear to include weapons and equipment to accomplish security-related tasks. Manpower of CAF is shown in Table 1.5.<sup>22</sup>

**Table 1.5:** Manpower of CAF

Force	Approved Manpower	Existing Manpower
Pakistan Rangers (Punjab)	19,487	19,185
Pakistan Rangers (Sindh)	24,061	24,097
FC (KPK)	49,874	45,635
FC (Balochistan)	45,227	44,683
Punjab Constabulary	25000	18,134
Frontier Constabulary (KPK)	21,588	19,387
Pakistan Coast Guards	4,067	3,832
Northern Areas Scouts	3,679	2,477
Total	192,983	177,430

It may be seen that CAF are deficient of over 15,000 personnel. Critical deficiencies may be found in FC (KPK), which is undergoing active operations. Deficiency in other forces e.g. in Punjab Constabulary too cannot be ignored these days when the country is faced with urban terrorism. Thus, completion of manpower is the first step to be taken on the way of capacity-building of LEAs. To boot, they need military-equivalent small arms and equipment for conduct of counter-terror operations on the one hand and police-equivalent training for law-enforcement tasks that they are often assigned with.

**Police:** Current manpower (Table 1.6) is sufficient, if well trained and better organized. In present milieu, police in Pakistan is not performing satisfactory due to hosts of reasons including political infringements, partial implementation of Police Order - 2002, lack of training and need for re-organization.

**Table 1.6:** Manpower of Police in Pakistan

Jurisdiction	Manpower	Police Stations
Punjab	170,031	637
Sindh	70,133	440
KPK	52,650	218
Balochistan	32,119	84
Capital	10,333	13
Total	335,266	1392

Against the UN prescribed norm of 222 policemen per 100,000 people,<sup>23</sup> Pakistan has average police strength of 186 per 100,000 people; one cop per 445 people.<sup>24</sup> The strength is good enough if managed well. Number of police stations is indeed a bigger issue than the manpower. Each of the 1,392 police stations in Pakistan covers an average area of 572 square kilometres and a population of 129,310. Ideally, a police station in Pakistan should not cover a population more than 50,000 people and should have 3600 police stations. Secondly police forces in Pakistan have always been short of training. Of late, due to the threat of terrorism, alongside security forces, accent of police forces has also shifted to counter-terrorism rather than law-enforcement. There is a need to strike balance between the two. This denotes that police forces on the one hand need training to deal with the threat posed by the terrorists including bomb blasts, gun running, bomb disposal and post-blast operations. On the other, there is a dire need to continue with the training in criminology, intelligence (*mukhbari* system supported by modern intelligence techniques), detection, investigation and interrogation. The most important of all is complete implementation of Police Order 2002. While a few aspects (virtually 10% to 15%) of the Police Order have already been implemented e.g. establishment of women police stations and counter terrorism department (CTD) etc, several feature of Police Order remain unimplemented e.g. separation of Investigation and Watch and Ward components, establishment of Public Safety Commissions, education and training, use of information technology, research and development, welfare of police personnel, enhancement of means of mobility, and cutting down political infringement in police affairs. It is considered that full implementation of Police Order 2002 can take care of all these aspects thereby moving fast on road to capacity building of this vital component of security.


**Prisons Department:** Prisons are administered under Prisons Act – 1894, Pakistan Prisons Rules – 1978 and Juvenile Justice System Ordinance – 2000<sup>25</sup>. It is one of the most neglected security components since 1947. Prisons abroad, for instance in the United States, are known as House of Correction in that they perform a role of rehabilitation of criminals. Conversely, prisons in Pakistan rather contribute to crimes indirectly for none of their fault but due to general neglect of the department by the state. Main issues facing prisons and prisoners in Pakistan are overcrowding, lack of training and equipment and issues related to prisoners’ rights and rehabilitation.

### Non-Kinetic Strategy

Skilful employment of non-kinetic ways and means alone can ensure lasting peace. This denotes that a strong civilian backup is crucial for ultimate security. Military forces and law enforcement agencies have hitherto performed remarkably, yet the threat persists because of inadequate consolidation by civil agencies.

Lasting peace comes – that is, lasting victory – comes through *conciliation*. This is achieved first by military actions involving minimum violence through an emphasis on conservative but effective tactics, and, second, by a political program focussed on splitting the revolutionary elite from their followers: that is, attending the legitimate popular grievances, and offering the possibility of reintegration into society and a peaceful method for the adjustment of dispute.<sup>26</sup> As early as 1896, C.E. Callwell had put it, “Expeditions to put down revolt are not put in motion merely to bring about a temporary cessation of hostilities. Their purpose is to ensure a lasting peace.”<sup>27</sup> Even before, 2.5 millennia BC, Sun Tzu had articulated, “To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”<sup>28</sup> Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer, who had successfully led the British counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya, mathematized the use of kinetic and non-kinetic responses in these words, “The shooting side of the business is only 25% of the trouble and the other 75% lies in getting the people behind us.”<sup>29</sup>





Thus kinetic response should be limited and be employed with the concept of minimum use of force. This is imperative to avoid collateral damage and not to alienate the innocent civilian population who may otherwise be neutral in the conflict. In case of excesses by the kinetic instruments of the state, the militant organizations would certainly win over the silent and neutral majority of population, which would be disastrous for prospects of peace in the long run.

**Combating Religious Extremism:** Extremism is acting as core enabler of terrorism, which is gravest threat to the internal security of Pakistan. More to the point, extremism is a state of mind rather than physical entity and thus needs different kind of response. Numerous measures recommended to combat extremism are as under:-

**Madrasa Reforms:** With other reasons, madrassas have inadvertently become a cause of extremism in the society due to purely sect-based religious curriculum and lack of non-religious education. Reformation of madrassas can turn them into a potent arm of education sector in the country.

Following are proposed:

- Registration of all madrassas with the Ministry of Education. Unregistered madrassas should not be allowed to function.
- Registration of students with the Ministry of Education.
- Review of madrasa curriculum by the Ministry of Education. For this purpose, a board of scholars needs to be formed.
- Low-down of teachers and database of students to be prepared by National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), Ministry of Interior.
- Ban on foreign students without permission from the host government.
- Ban on foreign support without knowledge of Ministry of Education and Ministry of Interior.
- Fund auditing of all madrassas through Auditor General of Pakistan.
- Integration in mainstream education system. Madrassas without general education to be gradually banned.

**Other Measures:** Other measures recommended for combating extremism are as under:-

- Ban on public fund raising by madrassas and religious groups.

- Ban on publication of hate material against other sects and religions.
- Ban on delivery of hate speeches in the places of worship or public places.
- Religious activities should best be restricted to places of worship. Where inescapable, rallies and procession must be regulated by the government.
- Ban on patronization of madrassas by political parties, failing which the political parties may be banned to contest election. Madrassas should be patronized by government alone on the basis of religio-sectarian equality.
- It is recommended that de-radicalizations centres should be established at provincial level and run by the Ministry of Interior. The government should engage the local and international experts and scholars to evolve comprehensive de-radicalization and rehabilitation programs which best suit to local socio-cultural realities.

**Border Control:** Pakistan shares 6,774 kilometres of border with other countries; 2,430 kilometres with Afghanistan, 523 kilometres with China, 2,912 kilometres with India and 909 kilometres with Iran, besides 1046 kilometres of coastline. Amongst these, porous and volatile border with Afghanistan poses the greatest threat in form of illegal movement, smuggling of arms / stolen vehicles, and drug trafficking. 10,000 to 30,000 people cross Chaman and Torkham border points daily, which include legal immigrants, traders, personnel from NGOs and NATO assets. Besides, 5000 to 6000 illegal crossings take place daily using frequented and unfrequented routes. This happens despite the fact that there are some 821 border posts held by Pakistan's security forces on Pakistani side of the border and around 120 NATO and Afghan posts on Afghan side. The greatest threat along Pak-Afghan border is from movement of militant elements and drug traffickers. To increase control on Pak-Afghan Border, official immigration points along the border should be increased. There is a need to have at least one immigration point for each province so as to check the tendency of illegal crossing. Besides, biometric system needs to be installed at all official immigration points. Fencing should be carried out in selected areas with electronic sensors, night surveillance capability and vertical checking by establishing posts along the roads leading from border to built-up areas and involvement of community in urban centres.

**International Cooperation:** Like any other country of the world, internal security of Pakistan too has international linkages in today's globalized world. This calls for strong cooperation to and from. In first place, we need to guard against foreign intrusion in internal security issues of Pakistan, especially the oft-discussed Indian interference in Balochistan and FATA using its consulates in Afghanistan. Indian hand in terrorism in Pakistan must be exposed at every international forum. Media needs to play special role in this regard. International cooperation is also required in blocking financial support to militant organizations from abroad. Pakistan already has extradition treaties with some countries e.g. with China, Saudi Arabia, UAE and the United States. Extradition treaties also need to be signed with Iran, Afghanistan and European Union so as to get back Pakistani absconders seeking refuge therein. Other areas of international cooperation are: collaboration in War on Terror, intelligence sharing by Intelligence Coordination Cell of Ministry of Interior, border management, training exchanges, capacity-building of LEAs and further collaboration with Interpol.

**Deweaponization:** There are approximately 18 million illegal weapons in Pakistan, of which 4 to 5 million are estimated to be held with people and organization of FATA and KPK. Illegal weapon factories are located right within FATA. There are some 1,500 small workshops and 50 medium-scale manufacturing units in tribal areas, wherein some 6,000 gunsmiths and artisans are working to produce various types of weapons. 1,200 gun shops are selling arms in Darra Adam Khel alone.<sup>30</sup> Above and beyond, there is a constant supply of illegal weapons from Afghanistan, which also include interdiction

of NATO Supplies and weapons snatched by Taliban from foreign forces during operations against them.

Weaponization is one of the core threat multipliers. Thus, dewateronization is a gigantic task facing the state. All arms licenses in the country need to be digitized besides linking license and weapon number with NIC of the license-holder so as to guard against possession of more than one weapon on one license. Weapons buy-back programme can help minimize the number of illegal weapons to some extent.<sup>31</sup> There are two main steps that can really help minimize the number of illegal weapons from Pakistani society: disarming the militant organizations besides militant wings of political parties, and elimination of sources of supply. Strict check is needed on smuggling of weapons from Afghanistan. Illegal weapon factories need to be banned. The skilled artisans of illegal weapons factories located in FATA may be employed e.g. in Pakistan Ordinance Factories.<sup>32</sup> All said, dewateronization can come true only through a sustained process rather than an event.

**Reconciliation:** Reconciliation process is the key to success in internal security campaign. It is particularly required with and amongst political parties for peace in Karachi and with sub-nationalist elements for peace in Balochistan. It is also imperative to initiate reconciliation process with militant organizations ready to de-militarize.

**Devolution and Development:** As Thomas O'Neill and Gary Hymel put it, "all politics is local,"<sup>33</sup> law and order issues can best be handled at local level by local stakeholders. There is a need to devolve power, besides law and order responsibility, to local bodies. Devolution process in remaining part of the country must also be extended to FATA in form of Agency Councils. Process of social sector development should be carried out through local bodies. Local democratic institutions should be made partners in internal security (in conjunction with federal and provincial government).

**Security of Industrial Zones:** For sustained economic growth and uninterrupted economic activities, industrial and economic zones need to be provided with security by the state. Security of zones remains the primary responsibility of police. Number of police stations in and around the industrial areas should be enhanced in coordination with Federation of Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI). CAF should be re-located to support police operations in case of security threat to major industrial zones like Karachi, Lahore, Faisalabad, Sialkot, Peshawar, Gujranwala and Hattar. Security of industrial units remains to be the private responsibility of owners. However, government needs to assist each industrial unit during emergency situations.

**Law and Order in Karachi:** Dynamics of law and order in Karachi and their socio-economic consequences have already been discussed. Karachi has police strength of 28,000 personnel. This is in addition to several wings of Pakistan Rangers (Sindh) present in the city. Besides, some 80,000 private security personnel are employed with people, groups and companies. Increase in number of security personnel is not an answer to the situation in Karachi. Political reconciliation is the first step that can ensure peace in the cosmopolitan. Conciliation would be considered successful only if target killing in the city is stopped and the processional-cum-agitational politics comes to an end. This should be aided with increase in number of police station, introduction of cosmopolitan policing, use of modern means by police including IT, enhanced means of mobility and preparation / maintenance of database of complete city. Non-politicized community involvement in line with Citizen Police Liaison Committee can also help maintain peace to some extent.




**Security of Foreigners:** Security of foreigners is a sensitive issue in Pakistan. Foreign investors, officials and NGOs need to be provided with guaranteed security. For this, database of all foreigners should be maintained by the Federal Ministry of Interior and provincial Home Departments. In addition, information on location, movement and activities must also be maintained. Special squad of police and CAF should be deputed to ensure fool proof security of foreigners.

**Legislation:** To clothe the dream of internal security, it is imperative to improve upon the existing laws and enact new ones. Key ones are as under:-

- Protection of Judges and Witnesses Law.
- Anti-Terrorist Act (taking out legal lacunae hampering dispensation of justice).
- Evidence Act to be amended to support modern day crime trials.
- Madrasa Reforms Law to be made penal rather than procedural alone.
- Proscription Law to ensure implementation of proscription orders and imposition of penalties for violation, defiance or re-emergence.
- Review of Parole and Probation Law to take care of the conjugal rights of prisoners.

**Digitization of Crime Data:** Pakistan has moved well on the path to digitization. NADRA is one of the success stories in the country with one of the largest human data banks. It is recommended that a crime data bank should be maintained by National Counter Terrorism Authority (Ministry of Interior) with the help of NADRA. Various ministries, departments and agencies that should be linked with the Central Data Bank are given in Figure-9.



**Figure-9:** Crime Data Net



### **Implementation Timeline**

Following implementation timeline is suggested for various features of internal security strategy:-

- Legislation process	-	one year
- Registration of madrassas	-	two years
- Madrasa reforms	-	five years
- Provincial de-radicalization centres	-	one year
- Implementation of Police Order 2002	-	five years
- Immigration mechanism	-	two years
- Extradition treaties	-	three years
- Digitization	-	three years
- Capacity building of LEAs	-	five years
- Deweaponization process	-	to continue
- Reconciliation process	-	to continue

### **Conclusion**

Security is a shared responsibility of state and society. However, it is primary obligation of the state not only to ensure security using all instruments of statecraft but also to take on board all segments of the nation. The kind of complex internal security environment that we live in today cannot be patched up without breaking foreign nexuses. This makes a case of stronger exterior manoeuvre and international cooperation. Yet again, internal security can be mathematized as 90% internal expression and 10% external influence. If we put our house in order internally, we cannot fear of external manipulations. We need to move beyond a general state of denial both as a state and society. The first step is diagnosis of the problems persisting within the edifice of our society and next comes the remedial therapy. This all is possible only if we carry out bold analysis of internal issues facing Pakistan and employ a multi-pronged strategy transparently. If done, the dream of a secure, stable and prosperous Pakistan can certainly come true.

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## Annex A

### COMPOSITION OF TTP

Serial	Name of group	Tribe	Area of Concentration
	Baitullah Group	Mehsud	South Waziristan Agency
	Shehryar Group	Mehsud	South Waziristan Agency
	Said Alam Group	Mehsud	South Waziristan Agency
	Mullah Nazir Group	Ahmedzai Wazir	South Waziristan Agency
	Abbas Group	Ahmedzai Wazir	South Waziristan Agency
	Noor Islam Group	Ahmedzai Wazir	South Waziristan Agency
	Haji Sharif Group	Ahmedzai Wazir	South Waziristan Agency
	Haji Omar Group	Ahmedzai Wazir	South Waziristan Agency
	Ghulam Jan Group	Ahmedzai Wazir	South Waziristan Agency
	Javed Group	Karmazkhel Wazir	South Waziristan Agency
	Awal Khan Group	Bhittani	South Waziristan Agency
	Angaar Group	Bhittani	South Waziristan Agency
	Bhittani Group	Bhittani	South Waziristan Agency
	Gul Bahadar Group	Utmanzai Wazir	North Waziristan Agency
	Daur Group	Daur	North Waziristan Agency
	Khaliq Haqqani Group	Daur	North Waziristan Agency
	Wahidullah Group	Utmanzai Wazir	North Waziristan Agency
	Saifullah Group	Utmanzai Wazir	North Waziristan Agency
	Abdul Rehman Group	Daur	North Waziristan Agency
	Manzoor Group	Daur	North Waziristan Agency
	Haleem Group	Daur	North Waziristan Agency
	Maulvi Faqir Group (TNSM)	Mamond	Bajaur Agency
	Tehrik-i-Jaish-i-Islami	Bajaur	Bajaur Agency
	Karawan Naimatullah	Bajaur	Bajaur Agency
	Dr. Ismael Group	Bajaur	Bajaur Agency
	Maulana Abdullah Group	Bajaur	Bajaur Agency
	Omer Group	Qandhari	Mohmand Agency
	Shah Sahib Group	Mohmand	Mohmand Agency

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## Annex B

### PROSCRIBED (BANNED) ORGANIZATIONS IN PAKISTAN

1. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ)
2. Sepah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP)
3. Jaish-e-Muhammad (JM)
4. Khuddam-ul-Islam (ex JM)
5. Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT)
6. Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)
7. Millate-e-Islamia Pakistan (ex SSP)
8. Tehreek-e-Jaafria Pakistan (TJP)
9. Islami Tehreek Pakistan (ex TJP)
10. Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM)
11. Tehreek-e-Islami
12. Al-Qaeda
13. Jamiat-ul-Ansar
14. Jamiat-ul-Furqan
15. Hizb-ul-Tehrir
16. Khair-un-Naas International Trust
17. Islamic Students Movement of Pakistan
18. Lashkar-e-Islam
19. Ansar-ul-Islam
20. Jaji Namdar Group
21. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
22. Lashkar-e-Balochistan (LeB)
23. Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)
24. Balochistan Republican Army (BRA)
25. Balochistan Liberation United Front (BLUF)
26. Balochistan Musalla Defah Tanzeem (BMDT)
27. Sunni Tehrik (Watch List)
28. Enlisted under UNSCR 1267 (2008)
  - a. Jamaat-ul-Dawaa
  - b. Al-Akhtar Trust
  - c. Al-Rashid Trust

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- <sup>2</sup> Statistics pertain to events from 1 January to 6 December 2010. Data obtained from Ministry of Interior.
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- <sup>6</sup> Conceptualized by the writer. ESP stands for economic, social and political.
- <sup>7</sup> The then Khan of Kalat, Ahmed Yar Khan signed the instrument of accession on 27 March 1948, which was accepted by Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah on 31 March 1948. Nizamuddin Nizamani, "Conflict in Dera Bugti," *Dawn*, Islamabad, 15 April 2005.
- <sup>8</sup> Stephen Philip Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2005), 154.
- <sup>9</sup> Hostilities ceased after promulgation of martial law by General Zia in 1977, when he released all imprisoned Baloch nationalist leaders and wrapped up the special tribunal, which was trying them in Hyderabad jail. Amir Usman, "Genesis of Balochistan Crisis," *Dawn*, Islamabad, 23 May 2005.
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- <sup>14</sup> "What is problem with Pakistan?" *Council on Foreign Relations*, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/roundtables/whats-the-problem-with-pakistan> (accessed on November 27, 2009).
- <sup>15</sup> "Pakistan Security Report 2009," *Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies*, January 2010: 13.
- <sup>16</sup> Ali Ousat, "Strike causes Rs 5b loss to Karachi's industry," *The Nation*, Karachi, 21 November 2010.
- <sup>17</sup> Madaris are being patronized by five different wafaqs (religious education boards) as follows: Wafaqul Madrassahs Arabia (Deoband); Tanzeemul Madrassahs (Barelvi); Wafaqul Madrassahs Al Salfia (Ahle Hadith); Wafaqul Madrassahs – (Shia); and Rabitatul Madrassahs (Jamaat-e-Islami). Besides, some of them are being patronized by various religio-political parties too e.g. Deobandi Madrassahs JUI and JI, Barelvi Madrassahs by JUP and Shia Madrassahs by TNFJ.
- <sup>18</sup> "Madrasa reforms in tatters," *Dawn*, Islamabad, 16 July 2009.
- <sup>19</sup> Christopher M. Blanchard, "Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas: Background," *CRS Report for Congress*, 23 January 2008: 5.
- <sup>20</sup> Data obtained from the Ministry of Interior, Islamabad, Pakistan.
- <sup>21</sup> No country of the world perhaps considers education as an instrument of statecraft despite the fact that each knows its value and all are endeavouring to move towards a knowledge-based economy. It is considered that education should receive as much importance as do the other instruments of statecraft.

<sup>22</sup> Ministry of Interior.

<sup>23</sup> "Burking of Crime – A Credibility Issue," Network for Improved Policing in South Asia (NIPSA), [http://nipsa.in/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=79&Itemid=125](http://nipsa.in/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=79&Itemid=125) (accessed 18 December 2010).

<sup>24</sup> Calculated against 180 million population.

<sup>25</sup> Juvenile Justice System Ordinance – 2000 deals with the affairs of juvenile prisoners. In keeping with the ordinance, a Borstal Institution & Juvenile Prison is required to be established in each District. However, so far we have only two in the Punjab, one each at Bahawalpur and Faisalabad.

<sup>26</sup> Anthony James Joes, *Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency* (Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, August 2004), 9.

<sup>27</sup> C. E. Callwell, *Small Wars* (London: Greenhill, 1990 [orig. 1896]), 41-42.

<sup>28</sup> Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 77.

<sup>29</sup> Quoted in John Cloake, *Templer" Tiger of Malaya* (London: Harrap, 1985).

<sup>30</sup> UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian News and Analysis, 28 November 2010.

<sup>31</sup> Weapon buy-back programme was launched by the government a few years ago also but was not pursued vigorously.

<sup>32</sup> During the year 2000, some of the gunsmiths had been employed in POF but this did not make a real headway in the process of dewatering owing to petite number of persons breaking away from their illegal manufacturing bases.

<sup>33</sup> Thomas Tip O'Neill and Gary Hymel, *All Politics is Local and the other rules of the game*, (Holbrook, Massachusetts: Bob Adam, Inc, 1994), xv.