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One Day International Seminar

on

**NEW DIRECTIONS OF PAKISTAN S  
FOREIGN POLICY: GEOPOLITICS,  
SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT**

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and  
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University of Sindh, Jamshoro – Pakistan  
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# **Inaugural Session**

## **Welcome Address**

*Professor Dr Lutfullah Mangi*  
Chairman,  
Department of International Relations  
University of Sindh, Jamshoro

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Honourable Major General Jamsheed Ayaz Khan, the Chief Guest  
Honourable Mazharul Haq Siddiqui, Vice Chancellor, University of Sindh  
Distinguished speakers and participants  
Honourable Members of the print and electronic media

Ladies and Gentlemen:

I feel honoured in according a warm welcome to our chief guest, distinguished speakers and participants on behalf of the honourable Vice Chancellor, University of Sindh, students and the faculty of International Relations department and the Area Study Centre, Far East & South East Asia and on my own behalf. We are particularly grateful to our Chief Guest and distinguished speakers who will contribute to the debate on New Directions of Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Geopolitics, Security and Development .

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Never in the course of human history had the world experienced such dramatic transformations as those in recent times. Advances in Science and technology has made it possible for information around the world to flow effortlessly across borders, giving birth to a new era in which governments can develop foreign policies informed by a truly global vision. In the light of current geo-strategic and geo-economic environments, countries of the world have to be very cautious and careful because ignorance in any area can lead to the disaster that can be of either economic or political nature.

South Asia is still a region where the establishment of peace and an end to bilateral disputes still remains a dream which is yet to be established as a reality. It is in this region that we find the presence of almost all major global players; the United States of America, Russian Federation and People's Republic of China. Unlike other regions which have formed politico-security cooperation frameworks, South Asia lacks any overarching security framework.

Pakistan is located in a part of the world that is the most effected by the changes in structures of global politics. After 9/11 Pakistan has become a pivotal player in the region to the United States and China. We are conscious of the striving for a new security structure in the world moving away from outdated cold war constructs. We are engaged in a process of dialogue and consultation with our friends and partners to help shape a new security environment.

India's engagement with China is developing quite rapidly. China has announced a new strategic partnership with India, an attempt to contain U.S. influence and strategic partnership is the highest level of international partnership that China officially adopts. Both declared 2006 as the year for India China friendship. China has significantly deepened its cooperative diplomatic style with India. On the other hand, many analysts predict conflict between China and India over energy resources in the coming decades. In addition, anti-China lobby, especially in the shape of Times of *India* is very active and advising New Delhi frequently to get closer to Washington D.C.

India U.S. nuclear deal will adversely affect the balance of nuclear deterrence in South Asia. It is an unexpected decision that reverses three decades of U.S. policies designed to deter nations from developing nuclear weapons. As a result, Pakistan will advance its

nuclear programme in order to retain the balance of nuclear deterrence via-a-vis India. The nuclear deal is highly discriminatory agreement which will encourage global nuclear proliferation trends. U.S India relations are at their historical best.

In the west, Pakistan faces a security threat due to Indian ingress in Afghanistan. Indian diplomats are quite active in Afghanistan. Indian government is increasing her influence through the monetary aid in the name of the reconstruction in Afghanistan. Indian consulates in Kundhar and Jalalabad have become hubs of anti-Pakistan activities.

Another change in the Security challenge is the emergence of non-state actors fired by ideologies of extremism and fanaticism. Pakistan U.S. rapprochement in reality is constantly affected by domestic public opinion and politics in Pakistan.

Ladies and Gentlemen this is the perspective in which we need to assess the relevance of the New Directions of Pakistan's foreign policy .

Pakistan and India are discovering the language of cooperation rather than confrontation. In the post-Cold War period the economic globalization has accelerated the pace of geo-economy and the economic factor has become more influential on political security of the state. We have seen that three-year-old Pakistan India peace process is progressing. There is a need for an effective U.S. diplomatic interest in providing a fillip to the on-going Pakistan India peace process. Arms race in South Asia cannot help to address the real problems of poverty and underdevelopment. Non-traditional security challenges such as, terrorism, drug trafficking, unchecked population growth, organized crime, food and energy scarcities, ethnic strife and environmental

degradation should be the focus of growing concerns in South Asia. At this pivotal juncture in history, a sea change is occurring in international affairs from the traditional focus on national security towards a concern with economic matters. Globalization of political economy has made regional cooperation in South Asia an inescapable option. India's hegemonic designs will keep South Asia further away from regional cooperative mechanism. We have seen that conventional approaches to security are incapable of tackling the crisis. Nuclear South Asia needs order and cooperation rather than anarchy and conflict.

In recent years we have witnessed gradual shift from traditional political relations to economic relations between Pakistan and China. Chinese think tanks still rank Pakistan as the friendliest state. Pakistan is the only country in the world where China is cooperating for power generation through the use of nuclear technology. China actively supports SAARC in regional affairs. China is interested in stable South Asia. In any case Pakistan remains very important to China because of its strategic location.

The implementation of India-Pakistan-Iran and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan gas pipelines would lead to transformation of social and political discourse between Pakistan and Iran on the one hand, and will generate economic activity and provide infrastructure linking Central Asia Republics to outside world through Afghanistan/Pakistan on the other. The significance of Pakistan as an energy corridor cannot be discounted.

Pakistan's status has been upgraded to a major non-NATO ally because of its central role in combating terrorism. At the same time the United States has concerns regarding Pakistan such as, nuclear arms race



between India and Pakistan, Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, Kashmir problem and Pakistan-India tensions and human rights protection.

Ladies and Gentlemen:

We hope that our distinguished speakers will discuss the various dimensions of Pakistan's foreign policy in today's seminar.

Finally, the students and the faculty of International Relations department are thankful to the University of Sindh, Jamshoro, the Social Sciences and Humanities Council, Higher Education Commission, Islamabad and the Area Study Centre, Far East & South East Asia, Jamshoro for financial assistance to organize this seminar.

I thank you very much.

## Address

*Professor Dr Rafia A. Sheikh*  
Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences  
University of Sindh, Jamshoro

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Honorable Major General Jamsheed Ayaz Khan,  
Honorable Vice Chancellor, Mr Mazhar-ul-Haq Siddiqui,  
Respected colleagues and Dear students,  
Assalam-o-Alaikum

The world today is probably more dangerous than it has ever been since World War II. The threats to world peace have increased manifold due to the political imbalances created by a unipolar world. The threat posed by world terrorism is very real and unless remedial measures are applied to its root causes, its symptoms will keep popping up on the world stage in one form or another. It is a battle that crosses national lines and, in the long run, has the potential to inflict lasting damage. Terrorist acts are desperate acts undertaken by desperate groups in response to real or perceived grievances. Unless these grievances are addressed in an appropriate manner, the fight will continue to get more lethal. If today terrorism is confined to mostly sections of the Muslim world, tomorrow its methodology can be adopted by disparate groups espousing various political ideologies or religious beliefs. The genie of terrorism has been let out of the bottle and it will not be easily contained. Dealing with it effectively will not only require the requisite force of arms where absolutely necessary, but also a generous amount of political acumen and no small measure of humility.

Pakistan, today, finds itself smack in the middle of just such a battle which threatens not only its political stability but also its security and economic well-being. Threats loom both within and outside the country

raising new issues and compounding old ones. It would require considerable diplomatic agility and a delicate balancing act to keep these threatening forces at bay. These threats are posed not only by problems with neighbouring countries but also from issues outside its gambit and sometimes beyond its control. In today's world of globalization, regional conflicts tend to become global also. The festering wound that is Palestine, e.g., is no longer just a regional problem. Sympathy for its struggle is found throughout the Muslim world which manifests itself into material, political and, sometimes, even in armed support.

Pakistan, in the midst of such a scenario, has not only to appease its extremist factions in certain ways but it has also to resist undue outside pressure to go overboard in crushing all such groups through a force of arms. The price, e.g., in the proliferation of drugs and arms that Pakistan had to pay in helping to oust the Soviets from Afghanistan is there for all to see and these continue to pose a threat to the very fabric of the country even today. Pakistan can no longer afford to succumb to all outside pressures to the detriment of its own interests.

Pakistan has always been a staunch ally of the U.S. which today finds itself in the position of being the sole Superpower in the world. Its conflict with the Muslim world at present is mainly because of its unflinching and all-out support of Israel ignoring all norms of justice and fair-play; and the real, or imagined, perception in the Muslim world that the U.S. is out to colonize and monopolize their natural resources. In my humble opinion, if the U.S. were to incorporate the democratic norms enshrined in its constitution by its founding fathers in letter and spirit in its foreign policy, this would not only be in its best long-term interests but also in the best long-term interests of Israel and the whole of the Middle East.

Pakistan's geo-political location places it near two of the major playgrounds on the world arena today, i.e., Iran and Afghanistan. This forces Pakistan to take an active interest in their political fortunes and in seeing that it endeavours to maintain cordial relationships with their governments wherever possible since it is in its best interests, politically and economically. These countries have the potential to act as a conduit to Central Asia – the proposed pipeline from Iran to India through Pakistan being a prime example. This economic good fortune, if the laying of the pipeline is realized, for all the three countries concerned acts as a motivating force for them to maintain good relations with each other. Obviously, it is in the best interests of Pakistan to douse the flames of potential conflicts with its neighbouring countries and to instead concentrate on diplomatic and political measures that would place it in a position to resolve all disputes, potential or on-going, in a peaceful manner. Thus, at present, Pakistan's foreign policy is geared towards trying to mend fences with Iran, in spite of pressure from the U.S., and in trying to resolve long-standing disputes with India, especially the core issue of Kashmir.

In its fight against terrorism as a staunch ally of the U.S. and the West, it has to make judicious use of the aid pouring in for the economic betterment of its people on the one hand, and on the other hand it has to tread carefully and with political wisdom in dealing with the extremist groups within the country. It has to take actions that it deems fit to safeguard its standing in the comity of nations and to strengthen its security and economic well-being.

Thank you very much ladies and gentlemen.

## **Presidential Address**

*Honourable Mazharul Haq Siddiqui*  
Vice Chancellor,  
University of Sindh, Jamshoro

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Major General Jamshed Ayaz Khan, the Chief Guest  
Distinguished speakers, guests and participants,  
Faculty Members  
My Dear Students,

Assalam-o-Aalikum

I deem it an honour and a privilege to extend warm welcome to our Chief Guest, distinguished speakers and participants of this one-day international seminar on *New Directions of Pakistan s Foreign Policy: Geopolitics, Security and Development* , hosted by the University of Sindh. I would like to commend very highly the initiatives of the faculty of International Relations department, for organizing today s seminar.

Ladies and Gentlemen:

The role of directions in shaping the policy is always foundational and paramount. Its importance can be gauged from the paraphrase that there are hundred ways to go to be wrong; to be right, there is always one direction to go. During the cold war period the field of foreign policy was simplistic in practice, the whole political scenario was given structural form, and the lines of partitions were clearly drawn. Every thing was declarative in nature. In post-Cold War period the field of International Relations has become multi-dimensional. As a result, it has become more complex. Apparently, its one dimension is unipolar

world but, in-fact the world is drifting towards more unification rather towards becoming one world. None-the-less whatever may be the end result it has caused complexities in the domain of foreign affairs or policy planning for each nation of the world. This transformation in behaviour of states has created several dilemmas in bringing new dynamics into play to reshape the new geopolitics paradigms into formation especially, when old geopolitical game is no longer functional. The old factors like distance and space are losing their relevance and new factors like time and speed in decision making process is gaining more significance. Now geopolitics has become more post-modern and a complicated science in making value judgment. A small mistake by policy makers in their assumption is fatal with grievous consequences. Therefore, it is the responsibility of intellectuals and researchers to give their feed back to policy makers in attainment of foreign policy goals.

Unlike other regions, the old mentality of geopolitics is yet riding high in South Asia. The central question before you luminaries is that is it worth candle to adhere with old notion of security? We can see no security community is evolving on the basis of regional identity in South Asia. There is no shared threat perception which can unite them on regional platform. Another friction in security cooperation is structural in the sense that South Asian security order is dominated by a core country India that has adopted unilateral approach in dealing with its entire neighbours. It has made small neighbours of India fearful of its free ride in regional affairs. India not only behaves as a status quo-power but it is posed to use its supremacy beyond its regional frontiers specifically towards Central Asia and East Asia. Instead of having good neighbourly relations, India is faltering to accommodate and pacify the fears of its neighbours. This Indian attitude is hindering the process of cooperative security in South Asia

which has ultimately created strategic instability in this region. With the induction of nuclear arsenal; South Asian security structure has become more fragmented and fragile.

Traditionally, security and development have remained two sub-fields of different disciplines in yester decades, with more emphasis on the military component of security has made it uni-dimensional in its objectives and implementations. In post-Cold War period security conceptualization has gone radical change. Now security studies signify the geo-economic dimension as a core value in pursuit of national security. Security has become more multi-dimensional and open to new variables like human security and cooperative security.

Ladies and Gentlemen:

The challenging question for academicians and policy makers is, in lieu of security structure in South Asia, how to establish the norms of cooperative security environment which must seek increasing levels of cooperation not only among like-minded states but also among potential competitors and adversaries. In the first place it requires reframing of our security objectives in accordance with changing factors of security so that more resources are released for human development.

In this regard, both Pakistan and India needs to coordinate energy cooperation to secure access to oil and gas resources from Iran and Central Asia. Since India has already secured access to energy by accords with the United States, Pakistan should secure nuclear energy cooperation from Washington for meeting its energy needs in the wake of its growing demand in the country. In this regard uneven policy will put Pakistan in disadvantageous position to safe guard its national

interests and hence, it will be having ripple effect on Indo-Pak relations in frustrating the evolution of regional security structure in South Asia. In the wake of nuclearization in South Asia, no military solution could achieve the total victory for both India and Pakistan. Both countries sooner or later will realize the importance of geo-economic factor. Any concrete proposal from this august house for reshaping foreign policy goals on these lines will definitely be acknowledged in our policy planning.

I am confident that the participation of the distinguished speakers and participants will have a very successful seminar. I would like to reiterate with the organizers my sincerest appreciation and gratitude to Major General Jamshed Ayaz Khan, President, Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad for honouring us with his presence. I also would like to thank the speakers from the United States, Lahore, Islamabad and Karachi for accepting our invitation.

I thank you ladies and gentlemen for being with us and fruitful and wonderful seminar to all.

Thank you



## **Keynote Address**

*Major General Jamshed Ayaz Khan (Retd.)*  
President,  
Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad

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### **General**

1. Mr Vice Chancellor (Mr Mazharul Haq Siddiqui), Mr Chairman, Department of International Relations (Dr Lutfullah Mangi), distinguished participants, ladies and gentlemen; it is a privilege and rare honour indeed for me to say a few words about *New Directions of Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Geopolitics, Security and Development*. I am conscious that I am amongst experts and academia. And I am no expert, only a student and a keen observer of International Relations. Most of the waking hours of those at the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad are spent studying the regional and the global situation that impacts security and well being of Pakistan. I am also conscious that I am at a great seat of learning and civilization and culture.

2. I do sense that after nearly 60 years of experience since its birth in 1947, collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union, end of the Cold War and Ushering of the Uni-Polar World, the fact of globalization, media revolution where internal and external affairs are tending to merge, the dawn of new millennium and the dramatic and traumatic events of 9/11 and Post 9/11 have compelled Pakistan to carry out reappraisal of its foreign relations with its immediate neighbours and the world beyond. What is heartening is that not only new directions in the foreign policy are visible but also new directions in the domestic policy are also discernable. It seems if a new Pakistan of Quaid's dream is waking up after a slumber of nearly half a century,

having a fresh look at its past history, its genesis and turning to enlighten moderation by shedding emotionalism, extremism, jingoism, romanticism, adhocism and empty slogan mongering. Mercifully, Pakistan is leaving behind a world of make-belief and entering a world of real politic and pragmatism. Better late than never, our public and elite seems to have shed the syndromes of *Crush India*, *Kashmir baney ga Pakistan*, and *seeking strategic depth in Afghanistan* and *strategy of defiance*.

### **Foundation of Pakistan's Foreign Policy**

3. On 15 August 1947 Quaid-i-Azam had observed:

Our object should be peace within and peace without. We want to live peacefully and maintain cordial and friendly relations with our immediate neighbours and with the world at large. We have no aggressive designs against any one. We stand by the United Nations Charter and will gladly make our full contribution to the peace and prosperity of the world.

And in February 1948, in a broadcast talk to the people of USA, he outlined the following goals of Pakistan Foreign Policy:

Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill towards the nations of the world. We do not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation. We believe in the principle of honesty and fair play in national and international dealings and are prepared to make our utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed peoples of the world, and in upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter.

4. Foreign Policy is always the first line of defense. And how far our policy has been able to achieve regional peace and internal peace, I leave it to you to ponder over it. But the fact of the matter is that Pakistan at its birth inherited a very difficult, somewhat impossible security situation vis-a-vis its powerful neighbour India who showed no sign of reconciliation to it. And forcibly occupied large parts of a contagious overwhelmingly majority Muslim state of Jammu and Kashmir and mobilized its forces in 1951 against West Pakistan. The rest is history. If Pakistan developed a security syndrome or India's obsession, there was certainly a basis for it. We can only quarrel about the degrees and the details. Jinnah's own expectations about peaceful co-existence had been shattered just two months after independence when he had to say that:

it is very unfortunate that vigorous propaganda has been going on that Pakistan is merely a temporary madness and that Pakistan will have to come into the Indian Union as a penitent, repentant, erring son. It is now clear beyond doubt that it was well-planned, well-organised, and well-directed and the object of it all was to paralyse the new-born Dominion of Pakistan.

Thus, Pakistan developed a siege mentality. Thus, a search for an equalizer began and continues till date. And wonder of the wonder is that its powerful neighbour India facing no threat from Pakistan also developed a siege mentality.

5. Before I dialate of the new directions of Pakistan Foreign Policy, I wish to talk about geo-politics a bit.

## **Pakistan Geo-Politics and Geo-Strategic Location**

6. After 1971, Pakistan is what Indus Valley is today or has been through ages an ancient hub of civilization and cultures: a seat of learning, a mixture and synthesis of races, ethnicity, languages, religious beliefs, superstitions, folklores, oral traditions, songs, dances and music. Sufi Saints, throughout ages and throughout its length and breath gave it a distinct colouring of tolerance and coexistence of diversity. Pakistan is the sixth most populous state in the world and second most, after Indonesia, populous Muslim state in the world. With its modern military-strength and harnessing of nuclear technology for peaceful and security purposes has given a new boost to its standing in the Muslim world of over 50 independent countries. We are, comparatively speaking, a young third world developing state, but an ancient society with considerable assets. Indus River runs like a backbone of Pakistan, at once dividing it and uniting it. Culturally, the areas west of Indus gravitate towards Iran and Central Asia, areas east of Indus gravitate towards South Asia, its Northern areas have personality features of Central Asia and China, and its Southern Coastal areas pull towards the Gulf and the Middle East. Thus, Pakistan has a very interesting and challenging personality.

7. Geographically, Pakistan (Post 1971) is a very cohesive unit located in a strategic area with two big neighbours like India and China, both emerging as major powers. China seems to have arrived and India is inching forward. Revolutionary Iran and Turbulent Afghanistan are its other neighbours. Resurgent Russian Federation is over the horizon in the North with historical baggage of the former Soviet Union of the Cold War Era. Pakistan forms a pivot linking populous but nuclear South Asia with strategic West Asia, Central Asia, Western China and the Gulf. Its location at the mouth of Strategic

Persian Gulf Region adds to its significance as it provides the best natural access to sea for several landlocked countries like Afghanistan - Central Asia and Western China. By developing a port at Gwadar and infrastructure in the coastal areas, Pakistan intends to act as a trade and commerce corridor linking South Asia with the neighbouring regions.

8. Pakistan has vast natural and human resources, a sound agricultural base and impressive western oriented elite conducting business of state and commerce in English. Pakistan's world view has no inherent clash with the western human values of fair play and decency. However, political differences on anti-colonialism, anti-hegemonism, unilateralism, regime change and terms of trade and commerce can exist to be resolved through dialogues and negotiations. Pakistan has been an active global player at the United Nations and other international organizations: perhaps, hyper-active.

9. As a moderate Islamic country in a troubled region, Pakistan has not lost its geo-strategic importance after the end of the Cold War. In a Post 9/11 World and emerging Asian environment, Pakistan intends playing a role model to the developing world and particularly the Islamic World.

## **New Directions of Pakistan's Foreign Policy-Neighbourhood Policies**

### **10. Pakistan-India Relations**

- a. It is heartening to note that after more than half a century of acrimony, conflict, confrontation and crisis ridden relations, both the countries seem to have carried out re-appraisal of their policies towards each other. A composite dialogue is in place, though slow and tortuous but both term it as

irreversible. SAARC Summit in January 2004 can be termed as a watershed and turning point in the history of relations between the two highly antagonistic neighbours, when the composite dialogue was instituted.

- b. We all know the history well. But after nuclearization of South Asia in 1998, false start of Lahore Summit February 1999, fallout of Kargil episode May 1999, failure of Agra Summit July 2001, more than a year long (2002-2003) mobilizations of armed forces of India and Pakistan in eye-ball to eye-ball confrontation on the borders, it dawned on the political leadership and elite on both the sides that war and conflict, and not even a proxy war is an option between these two nuclear armed powerful neighbours.
- c. I whole heartedly agree with Ambassador Shahid M. Amin when he says that Any impartial observer would have to hold that the ruling classes of both Pakistan and India must share the blame for the unending tensions and, indeed, confrontation between the two countries since independence. However, behind the actions of the two governments, there has been a certain narrow-mindedness of official and unofficial circles. In particular, from the very hate lobbies in both countries, mostly consisting of right-wing religious parties, demagogues, the super patriots, and rabid nationalists who could only thrive when relations were strained between the two neighbours. The religious parties, incidentally, played a minor role in the creation of Pakistan. Some of them had even actively opposed the division of India for one reason or the other. But after independence, they have assumed the mantle of champions of Pakistan's

integrity and have emerged as the most relentless foes of any softening of stance towards India. Similarly, the Hindu fundamentalist parties in India which have all along thrived on a hate Pakistan motto. Driven by such lobbies, the masses in the two countries have shown both a propensity for emotional frenzies as well as a susceptibility to manipulation by demagoguery. It seems that the intellectuals and scholars have also not been immune to such poison. Then there are powerful vested interests, including some in the military establishment and in the business world who stand to lose in case there is any lessening of tensions. In building the general atmosphere of distrust, sections of the print media in both countries have, more often than not, played a key part by fanning suspicions and hatred through systematic distortion and misrepresentation of facts. The few voices for sanity and compromise, raised periodically in either country, have been drowned in a sea of hatred and misrepresentation. Hopefully, all the above is behind us and part of history and now both the countries have decided that let bygones be bygones. And at times it seems that people of both the countries wanting peaceful relations with each other are ahead of their managers.

- d. Imperatives of a peace in South Asia are overwhelming, since it is the poorest and yet most militarized region in the world. It contains almost half the world poor. India ranked at 142 in terms of per capita income, ranks first in the world in terms of arms imports. Pakistan is not far behind, being ranked 119 in terms of per capita income and tenth in the world in terms of arms imports. These military expenditures whose scale is unprecedented in the developing world are being

undertaken in the name of achieving national security in a situation where the majority of the population in South Asia is living below the international poverty lines (US \$ 2 a day).

- e. Till late both India and Pakistan have taken a narrow and unidirectional view of national security and neglected human security and national integrity through socio-economic development. Hopefully, it is changing in the case of Pakistan as it has de-linked itself from India's arms race and their global aspirations and by emphasizing education, human development through enlightened moderation and rapid economic growth which is essential for nation building and strengthening of the state.
- f. Confidence building measures in both the nuclear and conventional spheres, including social aspects are in place and more such measures to overcome the trust deficit between them are being negotiated. The disputes of lesser gravity than Kashmir like Sir Creek, Salal, Wuller, Baglihar and Kishenganga Projects and Siachen – a dispute within a dispute - are being seriously negotiated. It seems that Year 2007 is a year of hope for them. Pakistan and India are going to launch the fourth round of their composite dialogue on March 13 & 14, 2007. And the general assessment is that the various agreements are waiting to be announced during the forthcoming visit of Indian Prime Minister to Pakistan.
- g. Pakistan seeks a new *modus vivendi* with India, normalization of good neighbourly relations, a peace with honour. It does not mean accepting hegemony.



## Kashmir Policy    New Directions

- a. Chronologically, after 9/11, Pakistan was able to reassess its pro-Taliban policy in Afghanistan, which had completely isolated it internationally, and changed it some termed it as a U-turn. But I would talk first about the changing horizon of the Kashmir policy, because it has a total bearing on relations with India. Kashmir dispute is and has been the biggest stumbling block in the improvement of relations between the two countries. Till date, these relationships have been hostage to the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan's resolute position is that durable peace in South Asia is not possible without its resolution. The Indian, latest position, is that negotiated solution of this dispute is possible without changing of the borders/control lines. Changing of the borders, in the world of today, is not possible especially by the weaker side in the equation.
- b. The people of Kashmir have paid horrendous and incalculable price in lives, in blood and honour for their struggle for the right of self-determination since 1947 and for their slogan for *Azadi* since 1989. Nearly, 80,000 lives have been lost and a million have become orphans and widows the land is littered with destruction of homes and hearth. There is no light at the end of this dark tunnel but the people have become party to the dispute which previously was confined to the two states.
- c. After 9/11, the world at large and more so the western world is not prepared to look at any *Muslim cause* with rational objectivity or in any even handed manner. Legitimacy of

struggle for the right of self determination is being blurred and lumped with Muslim terrorism. Morality, legality and righteous of a cause have hardly played any part in the international system prevailing today or in the past. The commercial and strategic interest with India, are the determining factor both for the western world and the Muslim world, while taking a position on the Kashmir dispute. A nation, like an individual, has to come to terms with harsh realities. But this does not mean that a wrong becomes right.

- d. Pakistan under President, Pervez Musharraf has taken stock of the compelling harsh realities and come to the conclusion that new thinking on the Kashmir dispute is required. Despite, being a core issue the security and well-being of Pakistan should not remain hostage to it, any longer.
- e. Thus, President Musharraf has proposed a four-point formula: envisaging free movement of people across the LoC (rendering it irrelevant) gradual de-militarization of the state, self-governance and a joint supervision mechanism. The involvement of Kashmiri people with this formula should be ensured. There are hardliner on both sides who are not genuinely interested in peace and stability in South Asia. Their aim is to keep the Kashmir pot boiling so that they can extract maximum political capital out of the turbulence in a sensitive area in the South Asian region. Then, there are terrorist groups who wish to derail this process.

## 12. New Afghanistan Policy

- a. Right from the word go 14 August 1947, Afghanistan has been a Bugbear of Pakistan's Foreign Policy. Afghanistan opposed Pakistan's membership to the United Nation and made irredentists claim on its territory West of Indus. Even today Pakistan is being accused by its friends and foes alike that Pakistan is not doing enough to stop the resurgent Taliban crossing over to Afghanistan and preventing them from seeking sanctuaries and training in its tribal belt. All along Pakistan has faced two fronts situation i.e. India and Afghanistan, but today it faces three fronts situation, because internal front tribal belt and Balochistan has been added to them.
  
- b. After Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the country plunged in a bloody civil war among various contenders for power backed by the different foreign powers. Eventually, it was disgust with the internecine blood letting which gave birth to the Taliban movement (1994). Kabul fell to Taliban in September 1996 and Pakistan recognized them in May 1997. Product of the times and the circumstances, Taliban emerged on the scene as a phenomenon and a movement, representing extremely conservative, rigid, puritanical, and anachronistic view of Islam which even Saudi Arabia and UAE found disgusting the only two countries in the world other than Pakistan recognizing them. Eventually, Taliban became a mill-stone around Pakistan's neck ignoring its advice for moderation and in turn exporting its obscurantist views to Pakistani public and their counter parts, giving shelter and training to extremists and

proclaimed offenders and facilitating cross border criminal activities in Pakistan.

- c. After 9/11, and attack by the coalition forces under UN auspices Taliban lost control of the country and dispersed. It was argued that Taliban are not likely to re-emerge in Afghanistan because of the excesses committed by them during their short rule. However, the obtaining situation in Afghanistan is such that Taliban have resurfaced and posing a threat to the Kabul regime and NATO forces. Resurgent Taliban are equally a threat to Pakistan, because Pakistan wishes to create a moderate and tolerant polity out of the chaos of extremism and intolerance that has engulfed Pakistani society during the last three decades of exploitation of Islam for political purposes. And for being a frontline state during Afghan Jihad, after Afghanistan, Pakistan has suffered the most from it. The lingering Afghan crisis of over three decades has had a sinister spill over effect of extremism, Kalashnikov culture and spread of narcotics.
- d. The resurgence of Taliban in Afghanistan and the discontent of the Pashtun population of South and South-East Afghanistan is due to the poor and corrupt administration provided by President Hamid Karzai, role of war-lords and drug mafia and failure of reconstruction efforts and inadequacy of the NATO forces to maintain law and order. Pakistan may have difference of opinion with the United States over Iraq or elsewhere but as far as Afghanistan is concerned, its stability and return to peaceful condition is a common interest. There is a need for joint strategy to seal and monitor the border areas and for their economic and social

rehabilitation. Afghan refugees camps in Pakistan must be shifted to territory, post hast. A joint intelligence centre has been established at Kabul.

- e. Pakistan's obsession with its eastern neighbour and Kashmir has resulted in neglect of its western border lands and Balochistan. It is time we attended to our home-front. As they say, foreign policy is the extension of the domestic policy. Without peace in Afghanistan, all our efforts to reach out to Central Asia and to act as an energy and commerce corridor would come to naught. Despite many serious provocations in the past and the present, Pakistan has exercised patience with Afghanistan. Some retired foreign office mandarins often complain that Pakistan's Foreign Office has little hand in formulation and execution of the Afghan policy. If that be so, their concerns should be addressed to.

### **13. Pakistan and Iran**

- a. The Iranian revolution has not run its logical course and settled down to a moderate world view, thus, difficulties remain. Pakistan and Iran have been on a collision course in Afghanistan and Iran has misgivings about Pak-US relations and its status of a Non-NATO ally. However, despite all difficulties, Pakistan is firmly resolved to have a friendly Iran and has taken a stand that Iran has every right to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as permitted under NPT. The impasse over this issue with EU, USA and the Security Council must be resolved through a dialogue without any threat for use of force.

- b. Pakistan is also committed, despite US objections, to build a gas pipeline from Iran to Pakistan and South Asia.
- c. The President of Pakistan has recently voiced serious concerns of likelihood of outbreak of sectarian violence in Muslim countries as a fall out of the happening in Iraq. Iran with others has a role to play in this serious issue.

### **Pakistan-China Relations A Case Apart**

14. Pakistan-China relations are unique and a case apart in the international relations. As early as 1955, China was appreciative of Pakistan's security predicament and dilemma vis-a-vis India and its efforts to seek equalizer in the western camp. Chinese take a long view of history. This relationship has full backing of every shade of opinion in Pakistan and various generational change over in the Chinese elite. Thus, with each passing day and with each change in the regional and global environment, this relationship is getting stronger, institutionalized and firmer in every aspect.

15. This relationship is not only strategic but has also acquired recently security dimensions. Pakistan is poised to link Western Chinese Regions with the global economy. China is playing a major role in Pakistan's economic uplift through joint ventures, aided projects and through transfer of technology in critical fields.

16. Pakistan would very much like China to join SAARC and help Pakistan in acquiring full membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Council. China fully remembers role played by Pakistan in breaking the isolation of China through PIA flights and in detente with the United States in 1971. Pakistan sees an improvement in Sino-India relations as

a plus point for peace in South Asia. China is likely to help Pakistan in the pursuit of nuclear power generation.

17. Mr Abdul Sattar in his book *Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005 (A Concise History)* notes that: The visit of Premier Wen Jiabao to Pakistan on 5-6 April 2005 marked a new stage in the burgeoning relations between good friends, good neighbours and good partners whose friendship has withstood the test of time and international vicissitudes, and Shaukat Aziz signed the Treaty of Friendship Cooperation and Good Neighbourly Relations, pledging mutual support in defence of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Also twenty-one other agreements were signed to promote closer trade and economic ties, whilst deepening mutually beneficial cooperation across the board. China increased to \$350 million the credit for a second 340 MW nuclear power plant at Chashma. Joint manufacture of JFI7 Thunder fighter aircraft was set to commence during 2005 and Pakistan signed a framework agreement for the construction of four modern frigates by China for an estimated \$175 million each.

### **Pak-US Relations    The Single Most Important Relationship**

18. The US was a super power and leader of the western world, during the Cold War and now the sole super power after the demise of the Soviet Bloc. In fact, it is the hyper super power bent upon following the policies of pre-emption, unilateralism and regime change through use of brute military power. Since 1954, Pakistan has a checkered history of sometime close and sometime distant relationship with the United States. Ups and downs apart (the most sanctioned ally), this relationship has, added to the security and economic wellbeing of Pakistan because the United States exercises influence over the western

and the Japanese aid and the international donor agencies like the World Bank and the IMF. Till recently, the United States who is the largest trading partner of Pakistan, now perhaps it has been replaced by EU. Despite, Pakistan's difference with US Global Policies, especially towards the Muslim World, in my view Pakistan's relationship with the United States is the *single most important relationship*. In the coming years, Pak-China relationship may attain that importance.

19. Pakistan is a strategic ally of the United States with the status of non-NATO ally. Today, on the top of a common agenda is the struggle against global terrorism. Pakistan is part of the international coalition against terrorism because of its own high national interest. Pakistan has been victim of terrorism since 1975 with Sardar Dawood taking over power in Kabul.

20. The United States forces, in strength, are present in the Gulf region, Afghanistan with bases in Central Asia and having a global strategic reach. Thus, the United States has almost become a neighbour of South Asia with an evolving strategic relationship with India, having nuclear dimension. The coming decade would expose full hand of the United States in this region, as a crisis in the Middle East is pregnant of unsavory results. What the morrow hold, is hard to tell.

21. Despite US preference of India over Pakistan, Pak-US relationship has acquired maturity because Pakistan knows its limitations and the short attention span of the United States. For its own security Pakistan has to totally rely on its own resources. Some analysts charge Pakistan as if it is a dependency of the United States but the following events would counter that formulation and prove that Pakistan despite being most allied ally of the United States has always retained its autonomy of the decision making.



- a. Pakistan did not participate in the Korean War
- b. Pakistan was not in the Vietnam Conflict
- c. Pakistan followed independent China policy
- d. Pakistan attained nuclear capability despite opposition and sanctions by United States.
- e. All along Pakistan followed an independent policy towards the Muslim countries.
- f. Pakistan championed the causes of the Third World and the South in the UN and International Forums.
- g. Pakistan, though facilitated, but did not take part in operation in Afghanistan with the United States.
- h. Pakistan is not militarily involved in Iraq War.
- i. Since combating terrorism, besides use of force, also means winning minds and hearts of the adversary. Thus, Pakistan is pressing the United States and the West to change their anti-Muslim stance and follow a policy of enlightened moderation. And the basic causes which have led to terrorism must be addressed for a long term solution to this curse.

### **Pakistan and the Muslim World**

22. Pakistan, since its inception, has championed the causes of the Muslim World regardless of the consequences on its national interest and without caring for a quid-pro-quo. After 9/11, Pakistan has moved fast for a new look OIC where extremism is shunned and enlightened moderation is practiced at home and in foreign relations. In this endeavor, moderate and progressive Muslim countries like Malaysia,

Indonesia and Turkey are in the forefront with the blessing of Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries.

### **Pakistan and European Union**

23. Pakistan places a great deal of premium on its relations with EU countries. Pakistan is not seeking aid but level playing fields in trade and commerce and also looking for their investment and transfer of technology to Pakistan. EU now stands as the biggest trading partner of Pakistan.

24. Pakistan has traditionally very cordial relations with UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and other major European countries and former Eastern European countries, like Poland and Romania. With NATO forces deeply involved in Afghanistan for at least for another decade, Pakistan and the European relationship is bound to be strengthened by daily cooperation of the two sides working for a common cause in Afghanistan. EU tilts towards India because of economic gains but it cannot ignore Pakistan for its geo-strategic location and links with the Islamic World.

25. With the passage of women rights bill and the coming general elections, the European concerns for human rights and democracy deficit would be suitably addressed. A better future of mutual interaction is ahead of us.

### **Pakistan and the Russian Federation**

26. Despite the historic baggage of the Cold War and the Afghan struggle, Pakistan and the Russian Federation relations are on the mend. Now it is the turn of the Russian top leadership to pay a return

visit to Pakistan because President Musharraf has been to Moscow. The Russian Federation seems to have got their act together and is becoming more assertive in the global affairs and in the Central Asian affairs. There are bright prospects of Russian investment in oil and steel industry in Pakistan. New Delhi remains a preferred destination of the Russian.

### **Pakistan's Look East Policy**

27. Because of trade and economic concerns Pakistan has strengthened its relations with ASEAN and wishes to become a full member.

28. Japan is a major economic power house turning to become a major military power as well, thus, Pakistan maintains a close relationship with Japan to attract Japanese investment and transfer of technology to Pakistan's industries and agriculture.

### **Pakistan and UN and the Rest of the Globe**

29. Pakistan despite being a developing country and a part of South Asia, it is a very active member of the United Nations and its various organs. It also reaches out to major African countries and Latin American countries as well. And it enjoys prestige because of its anti-apartheid and anti-colonial track record.

### **Concluding Remarks**

30. Pakistan is endeavoring to re-mould itself to the vision of the Quaid—a moderate, progressive, democratic and dynamic country where Islamic values prevail. Now Pakistan's priorities are peace within

and peace without. That is why you see....

- New directions in the age-old confrontational policy with India are visible because composite dialogue process is making slow but steady progress and India has come around to discuss Kashmir in a serious manner.
- Afghan policy was changed after 9/11 and the present day realities in Afghanistan and global are compelling Pakistan to find tune its policy in the Tribal areas.
- Pak-Afghanistan relations are under stress and needs priority attention.
- Pakistan needs peace to put its house in order, to shun extremism and embrace moderation, enlightenment, gender equality and values of human decency and dignity.

Thank you for your patient hearing

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# **Session I**

*New Directions of Pakistan's Foreign Policy  
(Geopolitical and Security Dimensions)*

# FOREIGN POLICY OF PAKISTAN: BASIC DETERMINANTS

*Dr Ross Masood Hosain\**

## **Executive Summary**

The foreign policy of any country constitutes an endless dialogue between the powers of continuity and the powers of change. Within this deterministic matrix, every nation has to determine its objectives in the light of the power actually and potentially available to it for the pursuit of its objectives. It is this concept of national interest defined in terms of power which is the motive force in a country's foreign policy. Pakistan is no exception. Its concept of national interest is in turn determined by various factors such as:

- (a) Geo-political setting: Pakistan's location, size and population.
- (b) Historical legacies and traditions: History of Pakistan's emergence, two-nation theory, problems of partition etc.
- (c) Domestic milieu: Pakistan's political culture, internal conflicts, socio-economic conditions, decision-making process etc.
- (d) External environment: International and Regional scenario and pressures, great power relations, security threats etc.

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- (e) Psychological Environment: the dreams, images as well as beliefs and motivations of decision-makers which lead to their perception of situations.

Together all these constitute the basic determinants of the foreign policy of Pakistan.

Within this system again, the geographical situations of the different states and their space relations with one another remain on the whole changeless, though politics and technology may shift the implications of physical factors. That Russia, with its global and regional interests, is a vast land mass straddling Europe and Asia; that China borders Pakistan in one of the most strategic and sensitive areas of the world; that the United States, today a superpower armed with its doctrine of preemption, is to an extent more involved in Asia than in Europe; that Pakistan has for its neighbour a sworn rival that aspires to destroy the subcontinental system and replace it with one in its own image and under its own dominance; that Pakistan is a land anchored in a politically restless sea the sharks and whales of which from time to time threaten to unite without, if not against, Pakistan – all these factors and more shape the approach of successive governments to the tasks of determining its international relations and formulating its foreign policy.

The geostrategic factor, perhaps more than any other, has acquired for Pakistan's foreign policy a special significance, particularly after the sundering of Pakistan into two in 1971. In the international relations of Asia, Pakistan today occupies a central position of enormous strategic significance. Once, again – a century after the era of what Kipling called the Great Game – the territories that constitute present day Pakistan



are playing a historic part as one of the key elements in the determination of the Asian balance of power. Underlying patterns of international rivalry, in which regional and extra-regional powers have their own general and particular interests, involve Pakistan into a natural intercourse with the nations of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in South Asia, with the nations of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in North and Northeast Asia, and with the Economic Cooperation (OIC) in West Asia. The skill and the manner in which Pakistan may take advantage of interaction with the many who come her way is a matter of concern not merely to India, Iran, Afghanistan and other neighbours but also to the United States of America and the two contemporary great powers of Asia China and Russia. The parameters of Pakistan's foreign policy have to be tailored to meet these formidable geopolitical challenges of the times.

It is the task of foreign policy of determine in these changed conditions its own hierarchy of interests. Perhaps the most difficult problem in formulating an appropriate hierarchy of national interests in a rapidly changing world is that of assessing and reassessing interests in order to ensure that they accord with newly emerging realities and compulsions. It is clear that certain interests have to be defended at all costs; others to be safeguarded under particular circumstances; and certain others, however desirable, may be difficult to defend. At the top comes self-preservation, that is, the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Pakistan and the preservation of its hard won independence followed by the economic wellbeing of its people. To this interest, all else has to be subordinated on the principle *salus populi supremum lex*. A security threat from India was perceived right at the outset and this perception, coupled with the bitter history of the relationship that followed partition, largely conditioned Pakistan's foreign policy. From the initial alliances of the 1950s (SEATO and CENTO) to non-alignment and the current relationship with the United

States, Pakistan's quest for security has involved many trials and tribulations, including three wars, countless border clashes, arms race and the inevitable diversion of funds from butter to guns.

To sum up, the problem for foreign policy formulation in Pakistan is one of devising a framework of new ideas in terms of which the multitudinous and varied pressures could be handled, of moving with the tide of affairs, and of weaving policy into the positive volition of other states rather than pitting Pakistan against their resistance. This is so because the roots of Pakistan's foreign policy have a dual dimension. Its fundamental hallmark is embedded in our historical and spiritual faith predating the birth of Pakistan. The second dimension originated, grew and developed under the pangs of the state's birth and the strains and stresses of its geopolitical environment, having to wage a constant and ceaseless battle for survival. Coupled with this has been a natural urge for economic development and consequently the search for friends and allies. It is thus that the interplay of bilateral relations with other states becomes a challenge under the crossfire of conflicting pressures. What the country needs in foreign policy making is a historic vision and an imaginative leadership – a leadership that possesses the talent to capture the public imagination, the wisdom to sense the essential needs of society, and the political acumen to pursue these effectively. This is a tall order, sometimes difficult for today's policy-makers to fill.

# A STRATEGY FOR REMOVING THE DEADLOCK IN THE PEACE PROCESS BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN\*

*Saeed Ahmed Rid*

## **I. Introduction:**

Zulfi (Zulfi was the nick name of the former Prime Minister of Pakistan Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto), I know that we must find a solution for Kashmir. But we have got caught in a situation which we cannot get out of without causing damage to the system and structures of our respective societies.<sup>1</sup>

..Jawaharlal Nehru, November 1961, London

Fourth year into the current phase of the peace process between India and Pakistan, which started in October 2003 with Vajpai s offer of twelve Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), analysts on both sides of the Wagah border are still seeing the signs of continued deadlock. This is despite the fact that both sides agree that relations have improved over these years to such an extent that the environment has never been so friendly before. In February 2006, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh commenting on the current state of relations between two warring South Asian neighbours said, Look at the sea change that has come about in our people to people contacts. But his very next statement contained the signs of a deadlock. In the same news conference Indian PM said he was for pragmatic , practical solutions between India and Pakistan including the issue of Jammu

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and Kashmir. He was quoted saying, "However, I have no mandate to negotiate the transfer of Indian territory."<sup>2</sup>

President Musharraf tried to address this concern of the Indian PM indirectly, in March 2006, at a conference in Islamabad organized by a Washington-based think-tank, Pugwash. While renewing his offer of demilitarization and self rule, which was originally made in October 2004, he said, "And such a solution would neither require re-drawing of borders, nor make the Line of Control (LoC) permanent; however, it will make the LoC irrelevant."<sup>3</sup> Well is it really so easy? Then what made them fight for so long and why many observers of South Asia still say there is a deadlock in the peace process.

This is a study about locating the deadlock in the peace process between India and Pakistan and studying the nature of this deadlock. Analyzing the nature of the peace process and statements of the leadership of two countries in the light of the history of relations between two countries, an attempt is made to locate the exit strategy for two countries to come out of this deadlock.

The paper revolves around the argument that complex issues like Kashmir, which involve strong popular sentiments and have historical roots in community memory, cannot be resolved at the negotiations table alone during one-to-one, official, track one negotiations. Before entering the track one negotiations stage and start searching the specific solutions, people of the two countries and Kashmiris themselves who are the important party in the conflict but often unrecognized by the traditional peace building approaches, need to be prepared for a negotiated settlement. Preparing people for a negotiated settlement means to create a willingness in public opinion to accept concessions for the other side because no negotiated settlement is possible unless all parties in the conflict are willing to give concessions and modify their official stated positions.

## II. Where is the deadlock?

When we see President Musharraf's statement at the Pagwash conference at Islamabad in the light of PM Manmohan Singh's statement in November 2004, the situation gets even more complicated. The Indian PM was quoted as saying: India believes that there should be a free flow of ideas, people and trade between the two parts of Kashmir. In this increasingly borderless world, a day may also come in Kashmir when borders would not matter. It would be then immaterial where the Kashmiris live.<sup>4</sup> Indian defense and strategy expert C. Raja Mohan said a similar thing in clearer tones: "It is not where the line is but what the character of the line is, and we should focus on that. If we imagine a borderless Kashmir, then it doesn't matter where the line is."<sup>5</sup> Well, does it really not matter where the line is?

The Baglihar Dam (a dam proposal of India, which Pakistan claims violates water treaties between the two countries), Siachin Glacier (a glacier between two ranges Karakoram in the east and Saltora in the west, is the highest war frontline in the world) and Sir Creek (a border point between the two countries in the common waters), are three minor border disputes between India and Pakistan which many analysts expected would be resolved amicably during the talks over these years. But bilateral negotiations on all three have failed to produce a positive result despite a series of deliberations on each.

The talks on Siachin were the real test case because Siachin is considered the least contentious among all three and the two sides were almost near an amicable solution in 1989. In the negotiations on Siachin, Pakistani delegation pushed for an agreement on disengagement, redeployment and demilitarization mechanisms. However, the Indian side made it clear that any forward movement or agreement on the issue would be conditional to authentication of the existing positions<sup>6</sup>. The Siachin talks indicated how New Delhi was looking at the LoC and

border issue along Kashmir in general. New Delhi viewed any territorial concession to Pakistan along LoC, even if that territory was once on Pakistani side of the LoC, as actually Siachin was before 1984, would in other words mean accepting, Pakistan had a locus standi in Kashmir which negates Indian position that whole Kashmir is the integral part of India. Some reports suggest that finally two sides are near an agreement on Siachin but history tells us unless an agreement is actually signed there is always a possibility of retreat.

The Siachin talks give an indication of Pakistan's readiness (which will be explored further in coming pages) for a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute based on give and take and alterations in the current borders along the Line of Control (LoC) whereas Indian position appears to be more of making the LoC and the current position a permanent International border. Sir Kreek and Baglihar dam do not involve LoC or Kashmir directly but the stand-off on these two is also related to the bigger question of Kashmir. Hence, we can say contrary to the statements mentioned earlier about making the LoC irrelevant, after three years of a ride on the bumpy road of the peace process the status of LoC is emerging as a major irritant in the peace process.

### **III. Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and Kashmir:**

In October 2003 when Yashwant Sinha first offered twelve point Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) to Pakistan it was really seen as a diplomatic bombshell by the Pakistani foreign office. The twelve point CBMs included the bus service between Indian and Pakistani capitals of Kashmir, Muzafarabd-Srinagar bus service, Munabo (Rajsthan, India) - Khokhrapar (Sindh, Pakistan) rail service, Mumbai-Karachi ferry, and steps like restoration of sporting ties and opening of visa offices in more cities. Riaz Khokhar, then foreign Secretary of Pakistan welcoming the new initiative of CBMs added, India "could be doing it for public relations"<sup>7</sup>. The cautious welcome indicated a degree

of mistrust in Pakistani camp about the CBMs. Traditionally Pakistan had opposed the CBMs and had always pushed for the Kashmir first<sup>8</sup> policy because Islamabad had always seen any New Delhi offer of CBMs as the Indian design to freeze the Kashmir issue. In fact two sides entered into the regime of CBMs and people-to-people contact with very divergent interests and expectations.

India has always been supportive of the CBMs with Pakistan. In the short run, India hoped that it would help them to normalize relations with Pakistan and more importantly bring down the scale of violence in Kashmir and put the Kashmir dispute on the back-burner. In the long run it hoped with time Pakistan would realize the futility of fighting over Kashmir and thus accept the status quo as a final solution-accepting LoC as an international border between the two countries.

On the other hand Pakistani leadership accepted the offer of CBMs rather cynically as is evident from the above mentioned statement of the foreign Secretary, Riaz Khokhar. The similar offers of CBMs were rejected by President Musharraf during the Agra Summit in May 2000, when two sides failed to move ahead on Kashmir. But this time considering the international situation after 9/11 and realizing the futility of the idea of wresting Kashmir by force (probably learning from the failure of the Kargil war 1999 and a year long military stand-off in 2001-2002), President Musharraf's government decided to accept this offer with a hope that on one hand it would not only ease the tensions with India such that President Musharraf would be able to focus on war against terrorism, but it would also bring some gradual development towards the peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute.

President Musharraf remarked in one of his statements, "Success of the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) would largely depend upon progress on the resolution of Kashmir issue between Pakistan and India. Hence both need to move at tandem".<sup>9</sup> This shows initially

President Musharraf did not consider CBMs of much help for resolution of the Kashmir conflict in itself and considered resolution of the Kashmir dispute as a separate issue. His position becomes even clearer from his later statement on marking the 65<sup>th</sup> anniversary of *Pakistan Resolution*<sup>10</sup> on 23<sup>rd</sup> March, 2005, "If progress is not made on the resolution of the real problems (Kashmir he meant), the confidence-building measures will lose their impact."<sup>11</sup>

In the long run President Musharraf was looking for an amicable solution of the Kashmir dispute on the basis of some kind of a territorial compromise with India. This is why he immediately started showing unilateral flexibility by emphasizing that Pakistan was ready to go beyond the UN resolutions on Kashmir and the stated position. This was an indication that Pakistan no longer considered the UN resolutions regarding the plebiscite as the only solution of the Kashmir dispute. Later on he gave a series of proposals for the final resolution of the Kashmir dispute in a meeting with media on October 25, 2004. This included the proposal of dividing Kashmir into seven zones, demilitarizing it and then deciding which part was to become part of India or Pakistan.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, however, foreclosed any consideration of such proposals by asserting that the state of Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India and there would be no redrawing of the international boundaries or realignment of regions that would smack of communal dimensions<sup>12</sup>. The Indian claim over the whole area of Jammu and Kashmir, including Pakistani administered Kashmir, was reiterated again in March 2006 by the Indian government's official protest over the proposed construction of the Bhasha dam in the territory which comes under the Pakistani controlled part of Kashmir.<sup>13</sup>



If we combine Musharraf's proposal of self-governance and demilitarization with Manmohan Singh's open borders and self-rule, we can observe a lot of common ground, subtle differences, however, are also visible<sup>14</sup>. By self-governance and self-rule probably both leaders meant the same thing--giving greater autonomy to both parts of Kashmir. The doctrine of open borders or soft borders was explained by Manmohan Singh as making LoC a porous border so that there could be free flow of ideas and people between the two parts of Kashmir which will, according to him, one day make LoC irrelevant.

Musharraf explained his demilitarization regime during the Pagwash conference again but this time he did not mention his earlier proposal of dividing Kashmir into seven regions. In Pagwash conference, he only spoke about demilitarization in general and even showed his willingness to discuss proposals of troop pullout with India. But the Indian government gave the cold shoulder to the demilitarization proposal on the grounds that first of all it was a matter of internal security for India to decide whether to reduce or not to reduce the presence of military personnel within Indian held Kashmir. Secondly there could be no demilitarization unless Pakistan completely dismantle the network of terrorism, that is alleged to exist in Pakistan and which in Indian perceptions is the real cause of unrest in Kashmir.

Both governments need to deal the issue of terrorism very carefully because it has the potential of jeopardizing the whole peace process. Pakistan government and the mainstream separatist Kashmiri leadership has rightly distanced themselves from any such actions by condemning them as pure terrorist acts of violence which had nothing to do with the freedom struggle. But Indian government does not seem to be impressed with this. Indian defence minister Pranab Mukharjee demanded from Pakistan government, I request Pakistan to adhere to its commitment that its land will not be used for cross-border terrorism

because as per our information 59 training camps are still functioning in Pakistan.<sup>15</sup>

There seems to be a lack of trust between the two sides on this issue. The supreme commander of Hizbul Mujahideen, the largest militant group fighting against Indian rule in Kashmir and the chairman of the United Jihad Council Syed Salahuddin was quoted by a local Kashmiri news agency as saying, 'Armed confrontation would automatically recede as the dialogue process moves forward,'<sup>16</sup> Pakistan government also seems to agree with this view that the issue of militancy is connected with the larger question of Kashmir and movement along the resolution would surely help in dismantling this infrastructure.

Apart from differences over demilitarization the bigger hurdle in making LoC irrelevant is that India considers this decision should be the ultimate solution of the Kashmir dispute where as Pakistan considers this as one of the very important confidence-building measure. At the Pagwash conference President Musharraf described it as a great confidence building measure which would provide relief to Kashmiris and would help in discouraging militancy.

Making LoC irrelevant, without agreeing on any territorial adjustment, and accepting this as a final solution of the Kashmir dispute, in other words would mean accepting the status quo. Such an outcome could not be acceptable to Pakistan as it would mean in other words Pakistan completely gives up its case on Kashmir. The offer to make Ceasefire Line (CFL)<sup>17</sup>, a predecessor of LoC, an international border was made for the first time in 1955 when then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru offered his Pakistani counterpart Mohammad Ali Bogra to make CFL a permanent international border which received outright rejection by then Pakistani government<sup>18</sup>.

Most of the analysts of the South Asian politics would agree that the two countries have come a long way in their relationship since the peace process was started with CBMs in 2003. When one just imagines the environment of a year long military stand-off in 2001-2002, even the talk of making LoC irrelevant by the leadership of the two countries, by no means is less than a miracle. The CBMs have served the short term goals of both countries to a great extent by achieving some normalization and reducing the scale of violence in the Kashmir valley. But to achieve permanent peace and reach at an amicable solution of the Kashmir dispute, both sides need to be ready for a territorial compromise, an understanding or a give and take on Kashmir along the LoC which does not necessarily mean dividing the territories on communal lines. If two sides enter the negotiations with the spirit of compromise and accommodation several options of mutual gain and win-win solutions, other than the division on communal lines can be invented.

On the contrary, there can be no progress in the peace negotiations if one side enters negotiations asserting its unwavering stand on its territorial integrity. To be ready for give and take here means before entering the real negotiation stage, there should be a willingness on both sides to renegotiate the status of Jammu and Kashmir and there should be visible readiness to go beyond historically stated positions.

The Pakistan government appears to be ready for a give and take and a territorial compromise on Kashmir to the extent that it is altering its historical stance through public statements. President Musharraf gave up the historical Pakistani stance of seeking the plebiscite for Kashmiri people according to the UN resolutions even before entering into the negotiation-stage. He did welcome Manmohan Singh's proposals of self rule and open borders as well. On the contrary, the Indian government has so far failed to respond, in the same spirit, to any of the proposals initiated by President Musharraf.

In this regard, Pakistani authorities must take Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's statement seriously that he was not given the mandate to change the geography of Kashmir by the people of India. Surely this mandate has to come from the people of India. Sumit Ganguli summarized the prevailing odds of a territorial compromise over Kashmir for any Indian government in his book *The Crisis in Kashmir* in 1997:

No government in New Delhi, at least not in the foreseeable future, will be able to muster the political support necessary to pursue this option. Despite the enormous human and material costs that New Delhi has incurred in Kashmir, conceding the valley to its principal adversary is politically indefensible. Any government that seriously entertained this proposal would be writing its own death warrant. In effect, this option fails the important test of political feasibility.<sup>19</sup>

Most of the analysts of Indian politics would agree that Indian people are not ready yet for any give and take along the LoC or a territorial compromise on Kashmir. Public opinion in India is still like "Pakistan stops terrorism, we give Kashmir a degree of autonomy and the problem is solved." In other words, in Indian public opinion Kashmir is purely an internal problem of Indian union, while Pakistan is just playing a role of a spoiler. To remove this deadlock over Kashmir, this public opinion has to undergo a change. With this public opinion Manmohan Singh is not in a position to make any concessions to Pakistan on Kashmir. Therefore, to involve India in serious negotiations on Kashmir, territorial compromise on Kashmir has to be made politically feasible in India.

#### **IV. Strategy for removing the Deadlock:**

This must be realized that complex issues like Kashmir, which involve strong popular sentiments and historical roots, cannot be resolved just

by track-one diplomacy- the official negotiations approach. Multi-track diplomacy and people-to-people contact must be a very important component of any conflict resolution in such cases<sup>20</sup>. The value of such unofficial contacts is that they can often de-escalate a conflict before any meaningful official negotiations can take place. These contacts can build bridges between people, increase trust, and foster mutual understanding.

Since independence, people in Pakistan and India are consistently told that they are each other's enemies. The enemy image is carefully constructed through biased history teachings, hawkish political statements and media hype. Furthermore, for more than last fifty years the two people has been kept so far apart that, despite sharing the same cultural roots, they know very little about each other. Stereotypes and prejudices go so deep that people are not open to the other side of the story. That makes it hard for the public opinion to see the other side as equally human and to give any concessions to their perceived enemies.

The further movement along the peace process between India and Pakistan is going to be an uphill task unless these unfortunate community memories , stereotypes and prejudices are challenged internally within the two communities. Professor Beth Roy of the University of California, Berkeley, USA, explains community memory in her book *Some Trouble with Cows* as, a shared culture of memories, a sort of stew of stereotypes and prototypical incidents about which everybody talked but which nobody in particular had witnessed . At the time of the partition of India, one of the biggest migrations in the history of humankind took place. This led to one of the worst blood baths perpetrated by the opposite community against each other. That has given the community memory of all this a special place in the minds and hearts of the two people ever since. This community memory associated with the partition of the sub-continent is now closely associated with the Kashmir issue. In fact, the memories

of partition constitute one of the key factors behind people's sentimental association with Kashmir. The attachment of the Kashmir dispute with the ideological conflict of One Nation versus Two Nations and secularism versus Islam are the signs of this emotional attachment.

This community memory has created an implicit ideology for both communities, which is making it difficult for two communities to reconcile with the new realities and understand the mutual need for peace. Professor Roy has defined implicit ideology in the same book as, a body of ideas internalized early in life such that they form a set of assumptions about the nature of the world and one's responsibilities and capabilities in it. She explains that by the word internalized she meant, they are ideas which are learned and then forgotten as ideas; they appear instead in the form of emotions and truths, a sort of common-sense understanding of the world so ingrained as to be beyond question and much of the time, outside of consciousness--lying outside the realm of scrutiny and debate. Kashmir is the integral part (atoot ang) of India and Kashmir is the jugular vein of Pakistan are part of the implicit ideology of Indian and Pakistani communities respectively.

During interviews with the author, the signs of this implied ideology were shared by Pakistani peace marchers in their stories about the Indo-Pak People's Peace March, which was held from New Delhi to Multan from 23<sup>rd</sup> March to 11<sup>th</sup> May, 2005. This was a unique event in the context of India-Pakistan relations as it was for the first time in their history that people of Pakistan and India were directly involved in any peace initiative.

The peace marchers from India and Pakistan had planned to march together by foot all the way from New Delhi India to Multan, a city of sufi saints in Southern Punjab in Pakistan. However, because of the strange, nonsensical visa regime between the two countries, only nine

marchers from Pakistan could join from Amritsar, the capital of Indian Punjab. In Pakistan peace marchers were even not allowed to march by foot and were only taken to two cities, Lahore and Multan, in buses. But still they managed to meet with many people and collected ten thousand signatures for their three point charter of demands which included solving all disputes between India and Pakistan through dialogue and resolving the Kashmir issue in accordance with the wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir.

A woman peace marcher from Pakistani Punjab told the author that people in Indian Punjab were pleasantly amazed to meet with her and find out that she was not clad in a big burqah (a cloth women use to cover their face and body) that she was just like them. They told her that they had heard a lot of bad things about Pakistan and Pakistanis. In a similar kind of story about the stereotypes about Pakistanis in India, a peace marcher from Hyderabad Sindh told the author that during his stay in India when he was having tea in a dhabba (small restaurant) in India with an Indian friend, one man there was saying some bad things about Pakistanis and Muslims. When he was informed that one Pakistani Muslim was amongst them he could not believe it. Even when that peace marcher was specifically introduced to him, he refused to accept, that he could be a Pakistani.

When the author asked one of the Indian peace marchers about similar experiences of stereotyping, he was told that the Indian peace marchers had no such experience in Pakistan. This does not mean Pakistanis do not have stereotypes about Indians. One religious minded Pakistani friend, having migrant parents, settled in the US for last fifteen years, always used to tell the author, My father told me you can trust a Jew but never a Hindu Indian and my experience tells me he was correct . When the person was pushed to share his personal experiences, he could only recall a story that might be true of a person of any religion or nationality.

However, this was confirmed by most of the peace marchers from both sides that an average Pakistani has a better opinion about an Indian than an average Indian has about a Pakistani. One Indian peace marcher blamed Bhartya Janata Party (BJP) and extremist Hindus for this anti-Pakistan bias in India. He said this bias was increased by Hindu extremists during the time of the demolition of Babri mosque 1992 and of the Gujarat massacre 2001.

However, history tells us that anti-Pakistan bias in India is deep rooted and its roots go far beyond these two particular very recent events. On the other hand, for this difference in the public perception about the other country, we must give credit to the Indian Film industry, Indian government and electronic media for reaching out to the Pakistani public in some way. The impact of Indian electronic media on Pakistani society is quite profound. Indian films, Indian music and Indian TV channels reach every single Pakistani home which has access to a TV set. On the other hand Pakistani government and media have never felt a need to reach out to the Indian masses and improve the image of Pakistan and Pakistanis before the Indian public.

Professor Roy asserts that, what aids the survival of community memories and keeps them powerful is that they speak to a truth that is personally experienced. But in the context of current Indian-Pakistani relations personal experience is gradually disappearing, as the generation which experienced the migration is dying and the new generation does not have any direct personal experience of that community memory. In this context the absence of contact is primarily responsible for the survival of this unfortunate community memory. We have seen in the stories shared by the Pakistani peace marchers that how easily they were able to improve the image of a common Pakistani in the minds of their Indian compatriots. They might not have changed the thinking of Hindu extremists but they surely challenged the stereotyped image of Pakistan and Pakistanis in the



minds of a common Indian who had direct interaction with them.

Roger Fisher and William Ury in their book *Getting to Yes- Negotiating without Giving In* wrote: Understanding the other side's thinking is not simply a useful activity that will help you solve the problem. Their thinking is the problem. Conflict lies not in objective reality, but in people's heads. This is exactly what must be understood by the policy-makers in Pakistan. Changing public opinion in India and making it at least less hostile to Pakistan is necessary to get a better deal from the Indian government over Kashmir. To understand and influence the other person's thinking you need to engage and interact with him more often.

Hence, the people-to-people contacts and increased civic interaction between two communities would be an important tool to loosen the shackles of implied ideology and community memory. We have observed during the course of the last three years of the peace process that CBMs and people-to-people contacts are immensely useful in normalizing the situation and starting a healthy debate within the two communities. They prepare people to give concessions to the other side which are necessary to reach at a final settlement.

*Getting to Yes- Negotiating without Giving In* is a very useful book in the context of India-Pakistan relations. It suggests important tools to negotiate complicated conflicts like Kashmir by proposing methods and steps in negotiation, which lead to a win-win solution. Fisher and Ury have suggested four methods in this book, which could be very helpful in the negotiations on the Kashmir dispute. Each point deals with a basic element of negotiation, and suggests what should be done about it.

1. **People:** Separate the people from the problem.
2. **Interests:** Focus on interests, not positions.

3. **Options:** Generate a variety of possibilities before deciding what to do.
4. **Criteria:** Insist that the result be based on some objective standard.

The book says, A basic fact about negotiation, easy to forget in corporate and international transactions, is that you are dealing not with abstract representatives of the other side, but with human beings. They have emotions, deeply held values, and different backgrounds and viewpoints; and they are unpredictable. In case of the India-Pakistan conflict, emotions, not only those of the negotiators but also of the bulk of the population from the two nations are involved. Therefore, before working on the substantive problem, the people problem should be disentangled from it and dealt with separately. The people-to-people contact approach already discussed in detail can be very helpful in dealing with the people problem.

Fisher and Ury wrote in the same book, Emotions typically become entangled with the objective merits of the problem. Taking positions just makes this worse because people's egos become identified with their position. They now have a new interest in saving face - in reconciling future action with past positions - making it less likely that an agreement will wisely reconcile the parties' original interest. This is exactly what is happening now to the Indian government. The current Indian government persists with the rhetorical unwavering stand on Indian territorial integrity and does not accept the disputed status of Kashmir in open, just to satisfy the hard-line Indian public opinion. Indian sensitivity with the no internationalization of the Kashmir conflict and no further geographical division is a result of taking this position for so long. A new interest in saving face before the Indian public opinion is attached now with these two positions. Considering the Indian electoral politics it would be very difficult for any government to back track now on these two positions. Indian rejection of all kinds of mediation offers of international organizations,

individuals like Nelson Mandela, and individual nation-states without giving them a try can only be explained by the 'saving face' argument.

Fisher and Ury's second method would help in resolving this problem: focus on interests, not positions. The basic problem in a negotiation lies not in conflicting positions, but in the conflict between each side's needs, desires, concerns, and fear. Such desires and concerns are interests. Your position is something you have decided upon, your interests are what caused you to so decide. Therefore, focusing on interests, not positions would be a wiser course because ultimately it matters how much one gains from a compromise rather than how much one has compromised on his past position. Fisher and Ury claim reconciling interests rather than positions works for two reasons. First, for every interest there usually exist several possible positions that could satisfy it. Hence the wiser course for India and Pakistan would be to focus on their interests and find out other possible positions which might satisfy their respective interests jointly. Pakistan may ask India about their fears, concerns and desires behind their position that the geographical division of Kashmir is non-negotiable and then two sides may attempt addressing those fears and concerns jointly.

Secondly, focusing on interests would work because behind opposed positions lie shared and compatible interests as well as conflicting ones. These compatible interests need to be explored and exploited. Both India and Pakistan would like the peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute for the stability of the region which would be politically as well as financially beneficial for them. It will allow them to concentrate more vigorously on their development by reducing their defence costs. Both would surely not like the Kashmiris to suffer forever. Both have a mutual interest in a closer friendly relationship with their closest neighbour. Manmohan Singh rightly says, 'We can choose our friends, but we have no choice with neighbours'<sup>21</sup>. The Indian claim for a permanent seat in the UN would also get a boost.

All these interests are sacrificed for the conflicting interests that both countries are not very clear about except the fact that they both want Kashmir. When Kashmir is detached from the rhetoric, emotions and sentiments one can ask both Indian and Pakistani leadership what interests this status quo is serving for them? Would not any kind of resolution be more beneficial for them economically and politically than to keep fighting over Kashmir? They need to ask themselves, what interests in their realistic assessment they expect to achieve from Kashmir and what fears and concerns they exactly have from any territorial compromise on Kashmir?

If Pakistan and India can address their fears and concerns, then the merely territorial component of Kashmir conflict should not hinder their path to peace, considering the possible mutual gains from a compromise. Each side must understand the fears and concerns of the other side with clarity and objectivity. The two sides need to explain their fears and concerns clearly to each other and try to help each other in addressing those fears and concerns.

To find out an amicable solution for the fate of the Kashmir valley acceptable to all parties, Fisher and Ury suggest, Before trying to reach an agreement, invent options for mutual gain- Invent first, decide later . President Musharraf should be given the credit for starting the process of invention by putting all those proposals before Indian leadership. Except for the proposal of open borders and self-rule made by PM Manmohan Singh, India does not seem ready for new proposals on Kashmir. Fisher and Ury are absolutely right: If the first impediment to creative thinking is premature criticism, the second is premature closure. By looking from the outset for the single best answer, you are likely to short-circuit a wiser decision-making process in which you select from a large number of possible answers.

On Kashmir there has been no dearth of proposals and solution formulae coming from the Kashmiri leaders, United Nations representatives, politicians, thinkers, intellectuals, writers and research institutions. In the early phase, the United Nations tried its best to resolve this dispute through professional mediators and arbitrators. But the proposals made by the UN representatives, General McNaughton, Sir Owen Dixon and Frank P. Graham during early fifties failed to satisfy the two contending parties.<sup>22</sup> Later on the search for proposals slowed down considerably as the internal politics in Kashmir took different turns and Kashmir could not feature in India-Pakistan dialogue because of the Indian insistence on integral part and no internationalization of the Kashmir conflict.

However, during the last decade or so a search for the resolution proposals have intensified and several new proposals have come on the surface. Various formulae and models have been discussed in the academic and political circles based on individual and collective research and successful conflict resolution formulae tried in different parts of the world. There is a long list but the prominent among them are, Andorra model, Aland Island model, South Tyrol solution, Northern Ireland model, Trieste-like solution, Chenab formula (supported by Sardar Sikandar Hayat Khan, the former Prime Minister of Pakistani controlled Azad Kashmir), Maximum Autonomy (Omer Abdullah of pro-India National Conference supports this formula), Sumantra Bose proposals and Dr. Mubashir Hassan formula (former Pakistani politician and a peace activist)<sup>23</sup>.

Discussing all these proposals is beyond the purview of this paper. However, here it would suffice to say Andorra model has so far received the biggest support from different circles in both India and Pakistan and international groups. The crux of the Andorra plan is give the self rule to both parts of Kashmir controlled by India and Pakistan and carve out an autonomous entity whose existence is

guaranteed jointly by India and Pakistan. The US based *Kashmir study group* (KSG) based in New York in collaboration with the *Centre for Strategic and International Studies* (CSIS) in Washington, presented its proposal based on Andorra model in their report *Kashmir- A way forward 2005* in February 2005<sup>24</sup>. Some reports suggest that Andorra formula has a tacit support of President Musharraf and Musharraf proposals are very much in line with Andorra.<sup>25</sup> The four point solution of Kashmir dispute suggested in President Musharraf's *NDTV* interview in December 2006 is also in line with Andorra plan<sup>26</sup>. This surge in resolution formulae on Kashmir, over the last few years, is a positive sign for the peace process. It gives a hope that a way out is possible in this otherwise intractable dispute.

The final method of Ury and Fisher, which could be the key suggestion in the final outcome is this: if trying to settle differences of interest where costs are very high for both sides, as it is true in Kashmir case, the solution is to negotiate on some basis independent of the will of either side- that is, on the basis of objective criteria- the agreement must reflect some fair standard independent of the naked will of either side. In the case of Kashmir that objective criterion could be one of the demands made by the Indian and Pakistani Peace Marchers that the Kashmir issue should be resolved in accordance with the wishes of the people of Jammu & Kashmir.

Whatever options India and Pakistan finally decide to use and whatever the minimum interests and concerns they would like to ensure, they can agree on the objective standard that the final decision must be acceptable to the people of Kashmir, free from the will of either Pakistan or India. The Plebiscite according to the UN resolutions might not be feasible and practical in the current scenario but Pakistan and India need to agree on a point that Kashmir belongs to Kashmiris and in any final solution their wishes must be determined in fair and transparent manner. Both India and Pakistan can work together on

various options and different ways and means to determine the will of the people of Kashmir. The time frame can also be decided upon by the two countries when to go through such an exercise. Accepting the will of the people of Kashmir as an objective criterion would surely make the job of interlocutors easy to find an amicable solution acceptable to all the parties concerned.

## **V. Conclusion:**

During the course of this paper we argued that Indian public opinion is going to be one of the deciding factors in the exit strategy for the current deadlock in the peace process. Indian public opinion does not appear to be ready for any concessions along LoC to reach at an amicable solution of the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan. In such a situation Indian PM Manmohan Singh is not in a position to go beyond making LoC irrelevant and he himself has expressed this in clear terms by stating that he does not have the mandate to change the geography of Kashmir if the situation should reach to that stage.

Hence, it is imperative for the government of Pakistan to take serious steps to bring a positive change in Indian public opinion vis-à-vis Pakistan and its government. In this regard multi-track diplomacy and people-to-people contact can be a very useful tool. To do this the government of Pakistan will have to change its approach towards people-to-people contact and stop considering it a concession to India. It should be considered as an integral part of the conflict resolution on Kashmir. The nonsensical visa regime between two countries must give way to a more liberal visa policy on both sides.

Pakistan has nothing to lose from a people-to-people contact approach and has everything to gain from it. The People-to-People contact approach has a great potential for peace-building in the sub-continent. It is very useful in shaking the implicit ideology and removing the

stereotypes and mutual bias in the two communities. Increased people-to-people contact will reduce the pressure on both Indian and Pakistani governments and provide them the extra leverage they need to make concessions at the negotiation table.

The four methods suggested by Fisher and Ury in *Getting to Yes* could be very useful in negotiations in the context of the current deadlock in the peace process between India and Pakistan. Focusing on interests rather than positions would make the fruitful and result oriented negotiations possible. The Indian government must realize the fact that by insisting on its position that the geography of Kashmir is non-negotiable and negotiations can only be held about the Pakistani part of Kashmir, they are not helping the cause of peace. Sticking to just one position will not serve their interests. They must reconsider and figure out their practical interests behind this position, explain their fears and concerns to the Pakistani government and ask for assurances from Pakistani and Kashmiri leadership directly in clearer terms.

The bottom line is there is no easy solution of the Kashmir dispute possible. To reach at an amicable solution the structure of the two societies has to undergo a change. The former Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpai was accurate in January 2002, when he said, 'Mindsets will have to be altered and historical baggage jettisoned'<sup>27</sup>. Kashmir has to be freed from the historical and ideological burden to make peace possible. The public opinion on the both sides of the Wagah border has to be made ready for giving concessions to the other side. Their thinking is the problem. Conflict lies not in objective reality, but in people's heads.



## Notes and References

- <sup>1</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru as quoted in Kuldip Nayar, *The Familiar Script*, *Dawn*, September 17, 2005.
- <sup>2</sup> *Dawn*, India Desires Pragmatic, Practical Solutions: Singh, February 2, 2006.
- <sup>3</sup> *Dawn*, Musharraf Renews Demilitarization, Autonomy Proposals, March 11, 2006.
- <sup>4</sup> Sudhir Chadha, Manmohan Comes Out With Proposed Kashmir Solution - "Self-Rule", "Open Borders" in Both Kashmirs, *Indian Daily*, November 20, 2004.
- <sup>5</sup> Iftikhar Gilani, Spring in Kashmir, *Hard News Media*, New Delhi, December 2004.
- <sup>6</sup> *Dawn*, Siachin talks inconclusive, May 28, 2005.
- <sup>7</sup> Daily *The News*, Islamabad, October 30, 2003.
- <sup>8</sup> A Kashmir First Policy means there can not be any forward movement in relationship with India unless India is ready to go ahead on Kashmir resolution.
- <sup>9</sup> *The Tribune*, Chandigarh, India, April 27, 2004.
- <sup>10</sup> On 23<sup>rd</sup> March 1940 Muslim League, for the first time had passed a resolution demanding a separate homeland for the Muslims of the sub-continent. This resolution is now known as the Pakistan Resolution.
- <sup>11</sup> Partly reported in *Dawn*, March 24, 2005. See full text on [www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk/FilesSpeeches/SpecialDays/322200522952PMPakday2005.pdf](http://www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk/FilesSpeeches/SpecialDays/322200522952PMPakday2005.pdf) >
- <sup>12</sup> Op.Cit.
- <sup>13</sup> For detailed reports see daily *Dawn*, 8 and 9 March, 2006.
- <sup>15</sup> For detailed study of Manmohan Singh plan see Chadha, ref. 5
- <sup>16</sup> *Dawn*, No Troops Cut Until Militancy Ends: India, May 10, 2006.
- <sup>17</sup> *Dawn*, Hizb chief hints at ceasefire, March 31, 2006.
- <sup>18</sup> CFL was the Ceasefire Line which ended 1948-49 India-Pakistan war and divided Kashmir into Indian held Kashmir and Pakistani controlled Kashmir. This line was converted into LoC in 1972 after Simla agreement.
- <sup>19</sup> Sumantra Bose, *Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2003, p. 72.
- <sup>20</sup> Sumit Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir*, Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press., 1997, p.140.
- <sup>21</sup> The terms "track two" or "multi-track" diplomacy refer to unofficial contacts between people usually ordinary citizens which can later pave the way for official "first track" or "track one" diplomacy. The term "multi-track diplomacy" refers to private citizens negotiating topics that are usually reserved for official negotiations the formal resolution of an ongoing conflict or arms reductions, for example. It

includes back door channels, trade, communication, sports and all other people-to-people contacts.

<sup>22</sup> *Dawn*, India desires pragmatic, practical solutions: Singh, February 2, 2006.

<sup>23</sup> For detailed study see S. M. Burke, and Lawrence, Ziring, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990 (2nd Ed.), pp. 34-38, Alastair Lamb, *Incomplete partition-The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute 1947-1948*, Roxford Books, Hertingfordbury, Hertfordshire, UK, 1997, p.

<sup>24</sup> To study these proposals see, Alastair Lamb *ibid.*, pp. 298-354, Muzamil Jamil, A guide to Kashmir peace plans, *The Guardian*, UK, January 22, 2006, Iftikhar Gilani, A little piece of Kashmir, *www.hardnewsmedia.com*, February 2006. For Sumantra Bose proposals see Bose ref. 18, For Dr. Mubshir Hassan proposals see, Settling the Kashmir issue, *The Henry L. Stimson Center*, Washington USA, April 26, 2005.

<sup>25</sup> Kashmir Study Group, Kashmir- A way Forward-2005, February 2005, <http://www.kashmirstudygroup.net/>

<sup>26</sup> *The Times of India*, Musharraf reopens the Andorra's box, October 26, 2004.

<sup>27</sup> President Musharraf's interview to NDTV's Dr. Prannoy Roy on December 4, 2006, <<http://www.ndtv.com/template/template.asp?fromtimeline=true&id=20880&callid=0&template=Indopakfaceoff>>.

<sup>28</sup> The statement is taken from Bose, ref.18, pp.1.

# SECURITY CHALLENGES AHEAD OF PAKISTAN: A GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

*Seema Kumari Wadhvani*

A broader definitional conceptualization of security is necessary. Ensuring the security of any state or region implies for the creation of constructive conditions contributing to politico-social consolidation and the territorial integrity of the countries concerned, culminating the impulses of stability and cooperative relations to guarantee the existence and survival of states and civil societies. This requires the protection of the freedom of options and capacities of the countries concerned i.e. national interest and sovereignty, to survive in persistently changing volatile international environment subject to competing and conflicting international interests.

Prospects of security, therefore, are not limited to strategic and military factors. It encompasses political, economic, social, technological and environmental factors, space exploration, nuclear energy, human rights activities are also integral factors impinging on overall prospects of security.<sup>1</sup>

Traditional concept of security as prevention of foreign aggression and preparedness to protect national boundaries is undergoing a fundamental transformation. Security of people is now the dominant concern and it is increasingly interpreted as:

- Security of people, not just of territory.
- Security of individuals, not just of nations.
- Security through development, not through arms.

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However, in fact the situation is still *vis versa* (still works in reverse order):

- Security of territory.
- Security of nations.
- Security through arms.

A preoccupation with the state-centered security i.e. National Security has since long been at the heart of foreign policy makers.<sup>2</sup>

National security rests on two pillars, a nation's military strength and its economic strength, where as it is threatened externally as well as internally. National security is the ability of any nation to be fully sovereign to defend its vital interests of preserving physical integrity thereby maintaining inter-state relations on the basis of sovereign equality having protected its institutions of governance from external damage.<sup>3</sup>

Security and sovereignty are to be conceived realistically. As total and absolute security can never be achieved, like wise total sovereignty is also an illusion. Given to the interdependence among countries of the world, sovereignty of any country is determined by its economic and military strengths and the level of dependence on others. Therefore, an economically weak nation can never aspire for full sovereignty. Besides, while operating within the world power equation, certain limitations to the sovereignty of smaller countries have to be accepted sometimes.<sup>4</sup>

The supreme national interest thus is to ensure the national security. There are two types of interests, vital national interests that are never to be compromised and are defended by all means if challenged or threatened. To Pakistan cause of Kashmir is such a vital national interest, as the strategic assets provide national security from external

threat and hence can not be compromised. All other interests are subjected to change according to internal and external politico-economic environment. One maintains its interests while moving along the lines of world order, in response to the changing global and regional environment thereby preserving its national interests accordingly.<sup>5</sup>

Well defined national interests determine national aims and objectives, to be attained through prudently designed policies and strategies. All strategies and all policies are streamlined in accordance with the national interests.<sup>6</sup>

Brief view of foreign policy options for Pakistan during the current situation and the implications of different strategies adopted accordingly.

Although there are manifold challenges in the path of survival in this complex international system, here are the key areas as identified by the President Pervez Musharraf to reflect the foreign policy options ahead of Pakistan in accordance with the contemporary international system bearing implications on the strategies adopted so far.

They are mainly political disputes, terrorism, proliferation, poverty, hunger, disease, economic disparities, migration and refuge, unemployment, environmental degradation and natural disaster. Besides these areas of common concern for whole world, there are certain vital concerns, indispensable for the country's survival.

- Security of the country from external as well as internal threats
- Economic revival as is demanded by globalized world
- Protection of strategic nuclear and missile assets
- Justifiable solution to the cause of Kashmir<sup>7</sup>

## **A Brief Overview of Pakistan's Security Concerns in the Past**

Pakistan's security concerns are still as fragile as they were at the onset of the newly independent state in 1947. Traditionally, Pakistan's external security perspective has been influenced by the fundamental inequalities prevailing within South Asia, in terms of Indian defensive capabilities, surpassing those of Pakistan in the sphere of air, and naval power. Pakistan has remained engaged into an ongoing conflict with India mainly over Kashmir, however other issues like Siachen, and Sir Creek further complicate the to already sore relations, potentially capable of erupting a nuclear war given to escalation of tension between the two.<sup>8</sup>

On Pakistan's western border, Afghanistan, its Muslim neighbor, has maintained irredentist claims against Pakistan, being willing to collude with India, and also with the USSR against Pakistan's security. The problem of Afghanistan remained like a sleeping volcano. Although Pakistan has been over occupied with security threats from east, nevertheless on the west (Afghan) the situation gradually was drifting from bad to worse. It is today, that it has manifested itself into full-fledged hot volcano emitting lava that could slowly eat up the northern/ western areas of Pakistan bordering with Afghanistan, partly due to increasing hold of Talibanized factors, and partly the use of force by government to curb that.<sup>9</sup>

The expansionist posture of Communism coupled with Old Russian aspiration of seeking access to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea also posed a distant but serious threat to Pakistan's security having a narrow stripped border with Pakistan via Kazakhstan, the then Soviet Republic, which manifested in the event of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.<sup>10</sup>

Thus to ensure Pakistan's security amidst these challenges, the prime concern of the foreign policy makers has since then been to equalize the power balance in the region so that Pakistan's national interests may not be marginalized on any ground. This preoccupation with the quest for security has driven Pakistan through various phases i.e. from looking towards United Nations, British Commonwealth, exploring Pan Islamism to seeking alliance with the United States through (SEATO & CENTO) leading to the position of frontline state in American proxy war in Afghanistan.<sup>11</sup>

Since early 1980s, internal peace and security has become a problem in Pakistan. It has been three decades that Pakistan is bearing immense cost for its frontline state role in contending Soviet invasion of Afghanistan resulting in the flow of hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees on Pakistani soil, bringing along the drug and Kalashnikov culture, increased corruption, stronghold of military rule, rising Islamist extremism and low literacy rate and health standards. Religious extremists became active through providing educating and other services to the poor, resulting in the radicalization of areas of the country.<sup>12</sup> This has taken the worst turn especially after 9/11, which put Pakistan at frontline once again in the war against terrorism.

### **International Scenario and Trends of Global Politics: U.S. Foreign Policy (Security V/S Terrorism and Energy Demands V/S Oil and Other Resources)**

The contemporary global order is characterized by two prominent politico-economic dimensions. Parallel to each other are the superpower phenomenon and an all embracing phenomenon of globalization. The emergence of a single world power, without whose active involvement no major crisis could be resolved in the world nor any significant global initiative taken,<sup>13</sup> in the post-Cold War era and

responses of nation states to this phenomenon has engendered a unique international system, unprecedented since the collapse of the Roman Empire.<sup>14</sup>

Where as the globalization with its ever expanding economic dimension generates the centripetal force intermingling, if not merging, the diverse socio-cultural and political systems of the world. To counter these forces of integration, there has surfaced a new phenomenon of international terrorism that threatens to cause chaos and disintegration into the global order.<sup>15</sup> Two parallel forces i.e. economic integration and political fragmentation thus came into operation in the post-Cold War era. These two forces, compounded with course of terrorism, have been competing with each other for future world order.<sup>16</sup>

In the post 9/11 era, there has taken place a drastic transformation of world state of affairs, previously driven by geo-economic fervors in the immediate post Cold War era, is once again in the fold of geo-political currents. In the increasingly integrating world of economy and multilateralism, although challenged by the U.S. unilateralism and preemption, international terrorism has enfolded almost whole world. This unfortunate phenomenon is happening involving Muslim countries mainly, which many seek to explain in accordance with the theory of Clash of Civilizations, giving rise to drastic misperception. The successor of communism was sought in the Muslim world by the neo-conservatives rightist Republicans with President George W. Bush assuming the leadership of the U.S.<sup>17</sup>

As the Muslims feel offended on the account that religion of Islam is being targeted threatened, and the West misperceiving the religion of Islam as a religion of extremism and fundamentalism. At the bottom of these misperceptions lie the neglected issues like Afghanistan, Palestine, Kashmir, Iraq, etc. The instability prevailing in these areas has given birth to international terrorism, as these decomposed



territories become alienated in the international system.<sup>18</sup> Persisting political injustice in many parts of the Muslim world and the resort to state terrorism by Israel, India and Russia coupled with economic inequalities created tensions and anguish with subsequent resort to suicidal terrorism, engendered by the failure of International system to seriously address these problems. President Bush remains convinced that the western-dominated world faces a long-term threat from the Muslim world in which Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations have increased their influence after 9/11. All out reliance on the military to achieve victory in this war or terror, might result in zero sum game, bringing to the reality the doomed class between the civilizations of such proportion, i.e. the entire Islamic World and the West.<sup>19</sup>

The strategy to confront terrorism must be comprehensive to eliminate this phenomenon right from its roots. Therefore, the international community must undertake resolute efforts to resolve the conflicts, afflicting the Islamic world. Without ending foreign occupation and suppression of Muslim peoples, terrorism and extremism will continue to find recruits among alienated Muslims in various parts of the world. Need is also to bridge the growing divide between the Islam and Western world to end racial and religious discrimination against Muslims and to prohibit defamation of Islam.<sup>20</sup>

However, this conceptual ground could be contradicted, provided with the geo-political historical background of these territories, as having settled their borders in early 19<sup>th</sup> century, European colonial empires, while contesting in the regions of Africa, Asia, and particularly Middle East created arbitrary distorted borders in the inter-War and post-War periods, fashioned according to their wishes mainly driven by self-interests. Having inherited the legacy of unjust borders from the imperial West, the African frontier are bleeding from within causing

the deaths of millions of local inhabitants, whereas the situation in the Middle East, is rather more alarming as the troubles taking place in there generate a kind of centripetal force that is gradually causing the international community to be imbued with this blood shade, whose implications are no more restricted to local domain inside borders.<sup>21</sup>

Instead of religious extremism, which is widely pronounced as a major problem of the political failures, it is dysfunctional international boundaries that are deadly defended by the diplomats in political fronts and by soldiers in the battle fields. In an effort to comprehend the region's political collapse, the greatest responsibility is attributed to the dysfunctional borders causing most of the problems in the region.<sup>22</sup>

After closely analyzing the reasons, why educated youth consents to be part of these deadly acts, one can not help identifying reasons into many decomposed territories facing protracted conflicts, to name a couple of those, Palestine and Afghanistan, along with new campaigns of military interventions, like the latest Israeli aggression against Lebanon, and the U.S. invasion of Iraq, serve as breeding grounds for extremists and terrorists due to deep sense of deprivation, desperation, and injustice caused by indiscriminate bombings, civilian casualties, torture, human rights abuse, racial slurs, and discrimination. Continual prevalence rather escalation of these elements further complicates the challenge of defeating terrorism.<sup>23</sup>

The two important trends of Globalization i.e. rapid economic growth and corresponding scarcity of energy resources have become determining factors in international politics because economic growth is directly proportional to the demand for energy resources. Therefore, a global competition to acquire the share of resources is gaining pace.

American security expert Michael T. Klare in his book *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict*, actually predicted that

future conflicts would be not over ideology but over resources a kind of global scramble for essential materials, such as oil, timber, minerals and water. <sup>24</sup>

The rising demand for energy resources worldwide has reached an estimated level of 7 million barrels per day since 2000, parallel to West and China, Japan and Asia Pacific emerging as the largest consumers in this respect. It is estimated that by 2025 energy consumption in non-OECD Asia will surpass the combined figure for the US and OECD Europe.

An energy Information Administration (EIA) report, *International Energy Outlook 2006*, released in June 2006 predicted that demand for energy in the Non-OECD (organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) Asia, which includes all East Asian countries except Japan and South Korea, would nearly triple over the projection period from 2003-2030. <sup>25</sup>

This over-dependence on single source of oil makes modern industrialized economies vulnerable to price shocks and supply interruptions posing direct threat to the progress of economies. It is due to these trends of demand and supply that the energy security has become a sensitive issue in shaping the foreign policies of major world powers for the supply diversification, who have been hunting the alternative suppliers.

It would be pertinent to refer here the Mackinder's theory of geopolitics aimed at controlling the *Heartland* for ultimate power and dominance in international system, to describe the nature of the U.S. Oil-Politics. The *Heartland*, at present, could be identified as the Middle East and the Caspian Basin, rich in oil and other energy resources that has become the core to international politics.

Former U.S. National Security adviser Henry Kissinger declared recently that the world's strategic centre of gravity has shifted from the Atlantic to the Asia Pacific.<sup>26</sup> To this core of the international politics, lies in the periphery i.e. the regional politics, as attempts are being made to assimilate the region adjoining the heartland i.e. the South Asia in coherence with global politics. Thus the regional politics of the South Asia including Afghanistan is running on the line that may facilitate the perusal of heartland by the world's sole superpower. The major policy vehicle in this respect is War on Terrorism. In this venture Pakistan is making a substantial contribution.

Conventionally, the strategic location of South Asia makes the region an area of pivotal importance in the world system. Given to its proximity with the Gulf and its borders with Iran, Pakistan is as much a part of South West Asia as it is of the South Asia. Besides, it has strong Islamic ties with important Muslim nations of the Gulf region. It is also a neighbor of Afghanistan, historically, guarding the invasion routes from Central Asia to the Indo-Genetic plains of India. Besides Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka look to the South Asia and the South East Asia for trade and cultural ties. Naturally, politically hegemonic powers, including the United States and China are expected to have deep rooted, long-term interest in the region.<sup>27</sup> Struggle for acquiring power and resources in the region given rise several strategic economic and political issues. The Americans, the Europeans, the Chinese and the Russians are all interested in expansion of their influence to exploit the trade opportunities that the region offers.<sup>28</sup>

The tragedies in Balkans, instabilities in Yugoslavia, Middle East and Africa and also today's South Asia, signaled the increasing struggle for spheres of influence, resources and markets. Further the problems of nuclear weapons and non-proliferation have taken on a new urgency with the original members of the nuclear club bearing much of the blame for it. All this has given rise to the dangers of a new division of

the world.<sup>29</sup>

These trends significantly affected Pakistan's foreign policy, which has most of been asserting its geo-political significance in world politics. Shift in American foreign policy objectives evident in the conduct of war against terrorism has revived Pakistan's stand in world politics as a front line state. Pakistan has traded the image of moderate Islamic country with the potential of playing significant role at global level, engaging itself into big commitments extending from regional to international level that has resulted in surmounting expectations worldwide, even beyond rational capacity of its national power. Within the contemporary state of affairs, the security environment (external as well as internal) concerning Pakistan has become rather more strenuous.<sup>30</sup>

### **Geo-Political Position of Pakistan**

Historically, geo-politicians emphasized the role of geographical constraints and opportunities in the conduct of foreign policy. Geopolitics was also received as part of constructing territorial state identity and protecting that identity by significant arrangements including force.<sup>31</sup>

Geographical realities are the prominent determinants in shaping the contours of foreign policy. Pakistan's geographical proximity with the Central Asian and the West Asia, adjoining South Asia with the two, gives it a distinct strategic importance. One ideally positioned to serve as a corridor for the influx of inter-regional trade and exploration of energy resources. However, unlike the bright economic prospects, such unique geography puts equally pressing demands on Pakistan in the political and security dimension, not only at home but vis-à-vis these regions are well.<sup>32</sup>

The geo-strategic location of Pakistan puts it at the centre stage in global trade and energy transfer because Pakistan is the only state in the world which can connect all four important regions, namely East Asia, Central Asia, Middle East and South Asia, providing an economic base for a rising Pakistan.<sup>33</sup> The geo-strategic location of Pakistan is such that it provides some of the shortest land routes between the gas and oil resources of the Caspian Basin and the warm waters.<sup>34</sup>

Thus the first priority of government is to have more access to the world's most prosperous markets for Pakistani products. For this purpose, President Musharraf emphasized that Pakistan is also shaping up a trade and energy corridor in the region.<sup>35</sup> Pakistan aspires to utilize its unique geo-strategic position to bridge trade, energy, communication linkage serving as a junction amidst South Asia, West Asia, and Central Asia and China. Such integration will accelerate economic growth and prosperity in these parts of Asia and even beyond. Hence, Pakistan is firmly determined to build the environment of peace and stability in the region. To materialize which Pakistan has entered into peace process with India, aimed at confidence building and resolving contending issues.<sup>36</sup> Maj. Gen. Jamshed Ayaz Khan said:

Pakistan can become a transit route for India to the energy-rich Gulf region and the Central Asian republics, and similarly India can provide Pakistan easy access through roads and railways to Myanmar and East Asia at large.<sup>37</sup>

In this regard, the energy-rich Caspian Sea basin/Central Asia, consisting of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, is a viable option for ensuring regional energy security, having second largest untapped reserves after the Persian Gulf, presently producing 2 percent of world oil in comparison with 28 percent of Middle East. Among Central Asian states, Kazakhstan holds the largest recoverable crude oil reserves and

accounts for approximately two-third of the Caspian Sea Region's overall oil output currently.<sup>38</sup>

The Land-locked Caspian basin region and East Asian countries need an energy and trade corridor which can link them with each other. This would provide the growing East Asian economies a much needed supply diversification option and would address their energy security concerns. It is here that Pakistan gets into the scene. Energy supply diversification requires a solid energy triangle between East Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East. When we look at the geo-strategic location of Pakistan, it is perhaps the only country which can qualify for being a part of an energy triangle that connects East Asia with both Middle East and Central Asia. Pakistan can capitalize on this excellent opportunity by emerging as a trade and energy corridor connecting the energy-rich Caspian basin and the Gulf region with the rising East Asia.<sup>39</sup>

President Musharraf, during his visit to South-East Asia in April 2005, highlighted:

An emerging centre of trade for landlocked Central Asia, South Asia, fast-developing Western China and the Gulf and any trade among them has to take place through Pakistan.<sup>40</sup>

Similar assertions were made by Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz in one of his articles in *South Asian Journal* in these words:

Our Seaports are equidistant from Europe and the Far East. We are, therefore, paying special attention to becoming an important transshipment point for flow of goods and resources, especially energy we are conscious of our geo-strategic significance. <sup>41</sup>

Pakistan also has the potential of rising as a centre of the Asian gas grid as Mani Shankar Aiyar, former Indian minister for petroleum and natural gas, proposed in 2005 to link the Caspian gas to Lebanon and Egypt on the one hand to Japan, Korea, China and India on the other, through a series of pipelines e.g. Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline (IPI), Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan gas pipeline (TAP), Gulf-South Asia gas pipeline and Qatar-Pakistan-India gas pipeline.<sup>42</sup>

Pakistan's emergence as an energy corridor would also provide China with transit facilities, giving it access to Central Asian markets and energy sources. However, to actualize this opportunity Pakistan would need a highly developed infrastructure of ports, roads, and rail links, along with cordial bilateral cooperative engagements in these regions. Pakistan looks towards China, potential enough, to contribute constructively to meet these objectives. Under this consideration, Gwadar deep-sea port is being constructed that has immense geo-strategic significance as it provides China with a strategic foothold in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean and integrates Pakistan into the Chinese economy.<sup>43</sup>

According to Asian Development Bank's Ports Master Plan, Gwadar offers most advantageous location for an alternative of the Gulf port for capturing the transit trade of the Central Asian Republics (CARs) along with providing trans-shipment trade for the entire region. As president Musharraf pointed out in February 2005 at Beijing that Gwadar provides the shortest route for oil-producing Central Asia to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea and is strategically located as it is quite close to the Strait of Hormuz, through which 60 per cent of the world's oil supplies pass.<sup>44</sup>

Besides, a whole network of road links connecting Afghanistan and China to Karachi and Gwadar ports, several important projects are also underway in almost all parts of Pakistan with Chinese assistance to



create the basic infrastructure in Pakistan. (e.g. Karakorum Highway, Indus Highway, Heavy Mechanical Complex (Textile) Sandak Project in Baluchistan, the Pakistan Aeronautic Complex (Kamra), Guddu Thermal Power Station., Jamshoro Power Station etc.

Thus, Pakistan's strategic relations with China are vital to its objective of rising as an energy and trade corridor.<sup>45</sup>

### **Foreign Policy of Pakistan with Respect to its Contemporary Security Concerns, Widely Shaped by Peripheral Political Trends (Global and Regional)**

The secession of power by General Pervez Musharraf, through military coup d'eta on October 12, 1999, was widely condemned by international community, resulting in Pakistan's expulsion from the Commonwealth in 1999. However the non-democratic regime in Pakistan was much favored soon after September 11, 2001. It was mainly because of the War on Terror that significant concessions were made towards Pakistan, as the US was desperate to bring about forceful regime change in Afghanistan, an immediate neighbour to Pakistan.<sup>46</sup>

Pakistan was asked to support the U.S. in this campaign. Mainly three important forms of support were demanded by the U.S. Firstly to furnish exchange of intelligence information; second was to help the U.S. by allowing it to use Pakistani air space and thirdly to help in maintaining logistic support.<sup>47</sup>

The geographical contiguity of Pakistan with Afghanistan brought before Pakistan, two difficult choices:

either to retain its sympathies with Taliban or side with the superpower and prevent an axis of evil stretching

uninterrupted from Tehran to Kabul .<sup>48</sup>

The obvious choice in the interests of national security was to side with the superpower, especially when the warning like 'be prepared to be bombed to go back to the stone-age' .<sup>49</sup>

Taking this decision was not so easy, as the negative consequences of this would endanger Pakistan's integrity and solidarity thereby undermining the critical concerns, as identified by the President.

However the choice was made with optimism of emerging politically as a responsible and dignified nation with the hope of minimizing all the difficulties following 1998 nuclear tests.<sup>50</sup>

Much in accordance with the optimistic hopes, the US cooperated with military government in Pakistan without any ample condition other than substantial actions against terrorism. In addition, plethora of aid dollars and military hardware came in, supplemented with cancellation of \$ 1 billion of debt and promise of \$ 3 billion over five years. Also other international channels opened their doors to Pakistan, including the European Union and Japan, to mention specifically. Pakistan's image as a failed state of 1990s converted into a responsible member of international community forging all possible cooperation to contend terrorism across the world with an image of a moderate Islamic country, eclipsing even the charges of nuclear proliferation with international community's increasing demand/ pressure to play more effective role in this respect to prove to be constructive unit of international system.<sup>51</sup>

Currently Pakistan is a front line state in the war against terror to overcome serious threats of extremism and fundamentalism to support the U.S. for countering terrorism and maintaining peace and stability in the South Asia, thereby providing all possible logistic support to the

U.S. government to defeat Taliban movement in Afghanistan. Consequently, Pakistan government faced many challenges i.e. pressure from the masses and the opposition parties for curbing Taliban forces in Afghanistan and providing air bases to American forces in Pakistan. Nevertheless, Pakistan continued to do so.<sup>52</sup>

International terrorism is perceived as a common threat endangering security of all in the international system. Pakistan, due to its geographical peculiarity is bound to play a vital role in this war on terror. Although, at a heavy cost, i.e. its national security and ultimately integrity, Pakistan has been instrumental in dismantling the nefarious structures of global terrorism in its vicinity, mainly in the desolate mountains along the Afghani borders in an ongoing quest of combating terrorism.

Pakistan's efforts to fight terrorism are not limited only to the region of South Asia, rather it has engaged itself into interregional cooperation aimed at combating terrorism in this global war on terror. Pakistan being prominent among all the players in the US-led Global War on Terror, is taking advantage of its key role thereby forging ties with the East Asian countries. In this respect, Pakistan has signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with regional countries stretching from Japan in the north to Australia in the South. These efforts are aimed at enhancing cooperation in combating terrorism and extremism along with fostering close trade and commercial links with countries of the East Asian region.<sup>53</sup>

Pakistan signed a Memorandum of Understanding on combating terrorism with Thailand and Singapore in April 2004 and June 2005 respectively. Since, the Southeast Asian region is widely regarded as the second front in the US-led War on Terrorism as movements supporting radical view of Islam are active in many parts of region.

Also the top leadership of many of the groups is having their roots in Afghan Jihad as they fought against Soviets during the 1980s. These include mainly Abu Sayyaf group, Jamaah Islamiah, Lashkar-i-Jihad, etc. having their strong holds in Mindanao, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Brunei respectively.<sup>54</sup> This over stretched involvement might prove costly as it will make more strenuous the war engagements.

Despite being an ally and providing all out support even against the national interest to solve the problem of extremism and terrorism, yet Pakistan is regarded among those who are causing this minas.<sup>55</sup> Despite Pakistan's virtually unconditional support and assistance in order to contribute substantially in war against terrorism, especially in curbing Taliban forces in Afghanistan, the international criticism is looming larger on Pakistan for not doing enough in this respect.<sup>56</sup> Although the criticism in this respect is lauded by nonofficial, mainly American, channels, yet endorsed with the U.S. official demands to do more .

John Negroponte, in his testimony before the U.S. senate select committee on intelligence, referred to Pakistan as a partner in war on terror , and acknowledged the role of Pakistan in this war, yet he condemned that Al-Qaeda leadership was running its operations from secure hideouts in Pakistan, implying that despite several years of anti-terror operation by Pakistan's armed forces, including the deployment of nearly 80,000 troops and the loss of some 600 soldiers, Al-Qaeda operational headquarters remained strong, effective, and dangerous. not only is Pakistan the headquarters but also the place where Al-Qaeda remains critical sanctuaries . This was a clear reference to deny Pakistan's vital role in the war on terror on the account of its inability to destroy and eliminate Al Qaeda's training camps and recruiting centers.

Nevertheless, he admitted that Pakistan's military operations were aggressive but expressed the fear that these had the potential for sparking tribal rebellion and a backlash by sympathetic Islamic political parties. He also acknowledged that there is widespread opposition in Pakistan to the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq.<sup>57</sup>

The U.S. official stance reveals a different picture as in contrast to Negroponte, President Bush has claimed that he is tight with Musharraf and that the Pakistani leader had been extremely helpful to the U.S. in the war on terror. Condoleezza Rice, the U.S. secretary of state, while opining on Negroponte's charges of supporting Al-Qaeda leaders by providing secure hideouts to maintain worldwide operations there from, appreciated Pakistan as an excellent ally in the war against terrorism. Yet she maintained that Pakistan should do more. In response to Negroponte's testimony the foreign office of Pakistan asserted that in breaking the back of Al-Qaeda, Pakistan has done more than any other country in the world .<sup>58</sup>

In contrast with Negroponte's remarks, Michael Scheuer, a former senior CIA official remarked:

History will show that America has seldom, if ever had an ally more willing than General Musharraf to take action to further US interests, which in no way served Pakistan's own. Virtually none of the many things Musharraf has done to assist the US in Afghanistan has been in Pakistan's national interest, indeed by sending the Pakistani army into the Pashtoon region he brought his country to the brink of civil war.

Remakes made by either of the two have made no good to mend the fragilities that Pakistan is due to face as being the part of war on terror, because the former discouraged Pakistan and damaged its image

thereby virtually negating all the costly contributions it has made to further the global war on terror, whereas the latter could potentially aggravate the already surmounting opposition and pressure among Pakistanis against government's for pursuing policies that promote American interests rather than Pakistan's.

The actual irony that Pakistan faces is that the more it does the greater is demanded from it to be done in this context. This is specifically true in Washington's claimed friendship with Pakistan since all unequal relations are inherently imbalanced and inequitable.

The mounting pressure on Pakistan to do more virtually conveys the impression that all the nations, lesser in power are not to act in accordance of their national interests, as Pakistan, despite doing relatively more than any other coalition member, is yet criticized skeptically despite the heavy costs it has suffered, risking the national security and integrity by using force even against its own people.

That all nations must follow their own interests is not something readily recognized by the people who make policies in powerful countries.<sup>59</sup>

If there is no voice of concern, the US will continue to pressure individual countries and use them willingly or unwillingly, for its objectives.<sup>60</sup>

A paper entitled as "Fine Tuning US Relations with Pakistan" by Lisa Curtis, the Heritage foundation, called upon President Bush not to shy away from straight talk on terrorism issues and to coax further cooperation from Islamabad in denying safe haven to individuals and groups that threaten both Pakistan and international community. The paper did however acknowledge President Musharraf's leadership role within the Islamic world in calling for promotion of a moderate,

progressive society.<sup>61</sup>

Another paper of the Heritage Foundation in October, called upon Islamabad not only to enforce the Waziristan deal but claimed that this may require President Musharraf to punish lower level individuals within his own intelligence and security services who have helped Taliban leaders evade capture by the U.S. forces in the past, coupled with a reminder that US laws require sanctions against states that support terrorist groups.<sup>62</sup> There is growing credibility gap between Washington and Islamabad, regarding an issue as critical as the war on terror. It is eminently possible, failing positive developments that the new congress will oppose the annual waiver on the grounds of the law prohibiting assistance to a military regime that came into power by overthrowing a legally elected government, and make it impossible for the Bush administration to continue to provide the promised military and economic assistance to Pakistan.<sup>63</sup>

Pakistan is also subjected to four dangerous misperceptions:

- All that is happening in Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda and Taliban, is happening from Pakistan
- All that is happening in Kashmir, Indian held, is from Pakistan
- All the proliferation that has taken place in the world nuclear is from Pakistan.
- The Pakistani society is terrorist, extremist intolerant society.<sup>64</sup>

These misperceptions, based on half truths, have exposed Pakistan to the face of storm, as these convey a negative image of Pakistan to the comity of nations.

The truth is, on the western borders, certainly everything is not happening from Pakistan but something is happening, to stop which necessary measures are being taken. Al-Qaeda or ex-Taliban supporters have their own agenda and political issues, with whom so ever; their agenda is not agenda of Pakistan or agenda of Islam. Pakistan will not tolerate the misuse of its territory for projecting their agenda. The president in his speech confessed that proliferation did take place from Pakistan, but necessary steps are being taken to correct the house to ensure no proliferation in future could take place from here. Lastly, Pakistani society is most moderate Islamic state.<sup>65</sup>

Nevertheless, one cannot deny the fact that the Taliban are knocking at Pakistan's door, as some elements of extremism, are being nurtured in the northern areas signaled by the passage of *Hasba bill*<sup>66</sup> in NWFP but those should be seriously checked and corrected in time.

The fact that the militants, resisting the American and NATO forces in Afghanistan, are there in the tribal areas is confirmed by the increasing degree of violence. Pakistan's inability to neutralize their presence has negatively affected its image suffering from the charges of not doing enough to check terrorism while being accused by the militants of being in the American camp.

A new legislation, already endorsed by the House of Representatives, calls for stopping the U.S. military assistance to Pakistan if Islamabad fails to halt the resurgence of Taliban inside its territory. Three countries have been singled out in the proposed legislation: Pakistan, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia. The new provisions form part of the Implementation of 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act, 2007, aimed at revamping the U.S. national security and foreign policy apparatus to address challenges post-9/11.<sup>67</sup>



The proposed legislation urges the U.S. president to certify that Islamabad is making all efforts to prevent Taliban from operating in areas under its sovereign control, including in the cities of Quetta and Chaman before releasing any funds or approving licenses for enhancing its military capability. The response to this US legislation by Pakistani Ambassador Mahmud Ali Durrani, was:

We are already standing on our head, what else we could do, he asked. They should not blame us for their failures. <sup>68</sup>

Uprooting the training camps and stopping cross-border infiltration is complicated by the difficult terrain of porous borders over 2,500 kilometers between Pakistan-Afghanistan border. The agreement entered into with tribal elders of North and South Waziristan was meant to prevent misuse of Pakistani territory by Taliban for conducting attacks on Afghani side. Many argue that this agreement by government in fact allowed Taliban to freely operate from tribal areas. Like many tribes, ideology straddles the Durand Line, Afghanistan is also plagued by the Islamist militants based on Afghan territory. It is not that Pakistan alone can root out the problem. A concerted effort with closer cooperation at the strategic and geopolitical level is to be taken.<sup>69</sup>

America is disinclined to use force against Pakistan on the ground that any political turmoil in the country could slip the nuclear assets in to extremist forces, therefore, although half heartedly, the U.S. has maintained this partnership which is gradually drifting away.

### **Internal Threat Perception**

Internal security is the realm where the policymakers need to really focus on because without peace and security trade and development is

not possible.

The territorial integrity and unity of the multinational states like that of Pakistan remains sensitive to the ethno-centric forces, hence the acts of coercion ultimately let loose the social, political, and ethnic bonds of society. To let live the spirit of fraternity within, the tethers of a multinational state could be cemented by the kind of social contract made up of consensus, acquiescence of liberty, equality, equity, based upon mutual respect, trust, and fair play to guarantee peace and prosperity. Such social contract was envisaged for the Pakistan, the then created, consisted of Punjabi, Baloch, Pashtun, and Bengali people on the basis of Pakistan Resolution. But the curbing of Balochistan dissent by force at the dawn of independence, revealed the virtual absence of such a social contract. The pluralist society with multi-lingual, multi-ethnic and multi religious orientation, generating centre-fugal forces due to a sense of inadequacy in nation-building efforts is engaged in national consolidation by creating a cohesive identity amidst the internal imbalances regarding sphere of political power and economic development coupled with the problem of critical population growth.<sup>70</sup>

So far security from within is concerned, the major internal threat to Pakistan even as far back as 1999 has been terrorists, as Pakistan was to be declared a failed state on the pretext of being a terrorist country. However at present although to be declared a failed state is a matter of past, yet good governance coupled with political restructuring is a bottle neck, to further complicate these matters, recent (developments) events, taken place in Balochistan and NWFP pose rather more severe internal threats to national security. The internal threat dimensions are still alive.<sup>71</sup>

Abandoning of support to Taliban regime in Afghanistan resulted in the loss of support among Pakhtoons for Pakistan for becoming strong ally of the U.S during the war against terror. It affected negatively upon

the domestic and external policies of Pakistan.<sup>72</sup> In retaliation, terrorists targeted almost all major cities of Pakistan. The acts of terrorism were specifically meant to undermine Pakistan economy, affecting Karachi at worst is intentional to create unrest in the commercial hub of country. Then targeting Chinese engineers in Gwadar was meant to damage Pakistan's relations with close friend China and undermine several projects continuing with Chinese help for uplifting Pakistan's economic base. Any massive foreign investment would not pour in unless the investor is confident enough about the internal security situation in Pakistan.<sup>73</sup> The Institute of Peace Studies, Pakistan, identified in its findings that increasing terrorist attacks in Pakistan are quite appalling. 907 deaths and 1,543 injured in some 657 attacks reported in 2006 at the institute. The areas worst hits took place in two politically most sensitive areas, namely, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) lost 379 lives in 144 attacks,, and Balochistan suffered 403 assaults causing 277 deaths. The facts affirm the volatility of these areas in an environment short of normalization. The mounting violence reveals the gradual decrease in government's control of border areas. This reflects lack of effectiveness in anti-terror strategy of government and may cause serious implications on Pakistan's foreign policy, both internally as well as externally.<sup>74</sup>

While adhering to all treaties and agreements entered into between the tribes and the British, in April 1948, Mr Jinnah, as Governor-General of Pakistan assured the tribesmen that the government of Pakistan would maintain the special status of tribal areas and continue. But due to pressing demands by the U.S., Pakistan had to deploy military forces in FATA, for the first time in country's history, to halt the sanctuaries gained by Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the North and South areas bordering with Afghanistan including FATA, where the Taliban and Al-Qaeda moved in the wake of US-led war against terror, initiated against Afghanistan. In a bid to satisfy US demands to do more for

abating the fuelling insurgency in Afghanistan, Pakistan resorted to use force on its own territory on the pretext of strategic necessity, giving rise to increasing discontent domestically on government's policies, which instead of safeguarding long-term national interests, is tide more to oblige US interests.<sup>75</sup>

Apart from terrorism related with al-Qaeda and the search operations for Taliban and al-Qaeda leadership in North-Western areas of Pakistan bordering with Afghanistan, sectarian and ethno-lingual terrorism has also been on the rise for the last five years or so. Due to the involvement of people with Pakistani identity in terrorist acts, the Western media portrays Pakistan as a breeding ground for terrorism that has badly damaged its image.<sup>76</sup>

This gradual breakdown of national consensus was demonstrated by a grand *jirgas* of Baloch sardars in Quetta on September 21, 2006 and October 2, 2006. The *jirgas*, summoned by Khan of Kalat, affirmed the virtual disengagement of Balochistan from Pakistan in the protest of violation of Balochs' rights ensured by a tripartite covenant, signed by Khan of Kalat, the British government and the government of Pakistan. They also announced to resort to International Court of Justice in this regard.

Short of the use of force unlike Balochistan and the NWFP, the situation in Sindh is also not satisfactory. Core issues like the Kalabagh Dam, leasing of islands to foreign companies, etc, are protested by the entire province.<sup>77</sup>

Actions taken in Bajour were a kind of clear manifestation of government's resolve to rely on force for dealing with militants:

Does it mean that the government has abandoned the policy of dialogue and conciliation with the tribal elders that had been so

forcefully defended by the president during his recent visit to the U.S.?

Does it mean a reversal back to policy of open war with tribal areas?

Have we undertaken this policy shift on our own or have we become willingly tools of the US? <sup>78</sup>

Instead of resolving contentious issues amicably to build mutual trust amid the provinces of Pakistan, the resort to use of force, to subdue political turmoil and anti-state sentiments, is gradually shattering all remaining semblance of unity and cohesion. The destruction of Madrassah/terrorist training camps in Bajaur indicates that the present government has little credibility among Pakistanis.<sup>79</sup> Military operations against those who are merely suspected of pro-Taliban sentiments are dangerous and counter-productive. The solution is to be found in dialogue and engagement.<sup>80</sup>

Pakistan's integrity has become more vulnerable today and the threat mainly is generated from the West (Afghanistan) rather than the East (India), which has been haunting Pakistan over half a century since its establishment.

This shift in threat perception vis-à-vis Pakistan's security and integrity is also due to Pakistan's geo-strategic peculiarity, I would not call it significance, because the recent developments reveal that Pakistan's geo-politics has caused Pakistan to bear more cost than to benefit the objectives of national security or national power. Pakistan's commitment to further the US foreign policies and national interests in this part of the region are being maintained by putting at stakes the national integrity and ultimately security of Pakistan.

Pakistan's leadership's firm resolve to tackle the issue of terrorism by means of force on its own territory would certainly deepen the splits of already fragile national integrity, as the present policies are developing a sense of neglect and alienation among these provinces resulting in resentment of population of north-western areas engendering pro-Taliban fervor.

Somewhat similar circumstances had prevailed within USSR, which was also much busy with its external politics and hence had to lose its republics.

Political issues cannot be resolved by military means, there is a rise in the incidents of violence is a manifestation of the political unrest. This has serious implications for a country which lost half its people in 1971 when they seceded complaining that they were being discriminated against and robbed of their natural resources. Ironically, the Baloch have similar complaints. It is important that this critical situation is addressed in earnest and the violence checked immediately.<sup>81</sup>

The history of international relations is full of such examples of use of force by states on its own population, resulting in insurgency and civil wars in the revolt against state authorities. Pakistan has already lost its eastern wing given to such ill-calculated policies. Having learnt from the lessons of our own past, Pakistan must undertake pragmatic but prudent policies to maintain a balance in between external commitments and internal responsibilities/expectations.

### **Contemporary Urgencies: Emitting Heat from Pakistan's Immediate Neighbours**

Although Pakistan's past security scenario has been briefly discussed earlier in this paper. Attempt is made in this part of the paper to highlight contemporary security urgencies pressing hard on Pakistan's

security scenario, mainly affected by the Pakistan's increased involvement in US-led War on Terror, vis-à-vis Pakistan's neighbouring countries, which constitute inalienable part of Pakistan's security concerns. It is given to the fact that people are either divided or united by international borders. The carving of frontiers may or may not satisfy those who are bound to limit their existence in or out side of these frontiers. The fact that the borders so determined may not justifiably satisfy those who are brought together or set apart due to the frontiers, causes drastic implication upon the inhabitants. These divisions could either bring them freedom, develop tolerance, in an environment of rule of law, or it might push them into the face of oppression, atrocity, and terror. In other words, the peace and the war situations mainly are determined and influenced by the level of content over the distribution of territories in terms of borders.<sup>82</sup>

Being permanently exposed to two difficult neighbors with un-abating variance, Pakistan's geo-politics, thus makes its national security permanently vulnerable. To counteract these vulnerabilities Pakistan resorted to International Politics which identified Pakistan's geo-strategic significance potential enough to contribute in decisively to big-power political game. Pakistan took this as an asset, unmindful of the costs that are being paid in the name of geo-strategic significance.<sup>83</sup>

#### **a. India**

Following President Pervez Musharraf's assuming power, many moves to normalize the relations with India, initiated by unilateral demobilization of forces, were made. Yet, while Pakistan was considering the choices given by the United States, mean while, India offered all out support to the U.S., providing all its military facilities and bases along with full logistic support, despite realizing that fact that India had no such geographical proximity that could logically

validate the use of Indian platform in the U.S. campaign inside Afghanistan.

It was thus obvious that India intended to join the U.S. alliance to suffocate Pakistan. As the ultimate objective of India in any adventure involving Afghanistan would have been to ensure a pro-India government/regime in Afghanistan, with anti-Pakistan posture. Besides, entering into such an alliance with the United States could also be aimed at keeping Pakistan out and ultimately get it declared as a terrorist state.<sup>84</sup>

In the aftermath of 9/11, and subsequent War on Terror, there has developed a relative degree of cooperation between the two, probably given to their common alignment to the United States, but yet the prospects of this cooperation are uncertain. The U.S. may cause war and destruction to other areas of the world, but to this region, what best serves the U.S. interests is the stability and peace. If peace be provided by any means, it ought to be grasped, since the progress of Pakistan particularly and the region as whole is hostage to the perpetual state of hostilities.<sup>85</sup>

Having concluded even the 3<sup>rd</sup> round of talks in July 2006, the two have still stood at the point where from they initiated the Composite Dialogue in February, 2004. Nevertheless, it has helped to reduce tensions like that of the 1999, and 2001-2002 climate, being almost at the verge of all out war. Still they have not overcome even the peripheral debatable issues. Despite the commitment of Islamabad and New Delhi to sustain the dialogue, no radical change to come out of it is yet foreseeable. Comprehensive regional cooperation in the South Asia has been hostage to tensions and conflicts, largely due to unresolved Kashmir issue and Indian quest for strategic domination, as India has by fact, a tendency to maintain a sort of hegemony over its smaller neighbouring countries.<sup>86</sup> Although, if international community,



especially the United States genuinely supports the peace process, it is most likely that the two could be persuaded to reach at certain compromise. But the asymmetry in the interests and goals of the two pulls them apart and contend the move towards any major breakthrough. Therefore, the need of the hour is to keep on maintaining a cold peace till the conducive environment, to facilitate a practical/realistic solution to the contended issues, above all Kashmir, could be created.<sup>87</sup> The government of Pakistan has emphasized over solution of Kashmir, where as India is hinging over the prior need to Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) create environment favorable to have stable peace, in the long term to resolve the issues.

Having maintained the policy of restraint and responsibility in nuclear matters, Pakistan has entered into the composite dialogue with India in the pursuit of peace with dignity, honour and sovereign equality, despite the denial of India to observe strategic restraint in South Asia.<sup>88</sup> Pakistan maintains that the core of the problem between the two is Kashmir dispute without seeking solution on which any move to establish lasting peace in South Asia would be a water bubble. The resolution of Kashmir dispute itself could prove to be the biggest CBM, ushering an era of peace, stability and socio-economic progress.

Such a solution to guarantee lasting peace must be in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir. Where as India, is reluctant to address the Jammu and Kashmir issue seriously, substantively, and purposefully.<sup>89</sup>

However, present international environment seems to be conducive for culminating improved relations between the two inherently hostile neighbours, which is the essential parameter of sound security and peace in South Asia. To guarantee which, Pakistan has suggested strategic restraint regime along with minimum nuclear deterrence

and parity in conventional forces, thereby avoiding resort to entangle in exhaustive arms race, yet reserving the right without compromise to acquire nuclear technology for power generation to meet energy needs under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.<sup>90</sup>

Announcement of a new strategy towards South Asia as a region, regarded as vital to future of the U.S., signals degree of significance it has assumed in the U.S. Foreign Policy, leading to a formal agreement on comprehensive the U.S. cooperation with India in the nuclear field. The U.S. is trying to get a strong foothold in the area in order to achieve its multiple objectives, including the containment of China as an emerging power.<sup>91</sup> Driven by the unilateral approach, President Bush repudiated major accords, such as the Kyoto Protocol, and International Criminal Court thereby announcing to launch Ballistic Missile Defense plan, supposedly to counter rogue states but really to achieve total hegemony and to contain China's rise, and now has concluded the Civil Nuclear Deal with India in violation of the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).<sup>92</sup>

Pakistan's major concerns regarding US-India nuclear deal is that it is disturbing balance of power in the South Asian region. It might also lead to encourage trends of nuclear proliferation in the region. Through this deal India can continue more fast-breeding reactor programme independently, thereby getting access to all the facilities and technology available to declared nuclear powers in the NPT regime without signing its, even without committing India to CTBT.<sup>93</sup>

Thus without being subjected to any obligation to abide by not producing fissile material, India can continue its nuclear programme. On the contrary, Pakistan has been facing sever criticism against its nuclear programme. More over, there is no provision in the deal between India and America that may bind India to place its nuclear devices or reactors under International Atomic Energy Agency's

(IAEA) supervision. In fact this situation has destabilized the status quo in South Asia.<sup>94</sup>

Despite Pakistan's all out support in WOT, America prefers India and showered its blessings upon her in the form of civilian nuclear deal along with support in energy sector. Although the U.S. is continuously forcing Pakistan for doing more to crush Taliban thereby furnishing all possible support to America in WOT, but it has out rightly rejected to play any assertive role in peace process between India and Pakistan . America has not pressurized India for resolving these issues to promote regional security and stability. President Musharaf pointed out the need for civil nuclear deal for strong defense of Pakistan to maintain balance of Power in the South Asian region. In response to that President Bush stated, Pakistan and India are different countries with different needs and different histories. So as we proceed forward, our strategy will take in effect those well-known differences .<sup>95</sup>

Although the peace process is going on between Pakistan and India and there is much ray of optimism in this respect, yet the nuclear cooperation entertained by India, from three different channels i.e. United States, Russia and China<sup>96</sup> as well, has added more weight on the Indian side in the prevailing equation of regional power balance. This signifies a realignment of the balance of power in Asia.<sup>97</sup>

As India maintains world's fourth largest armed forces, rapidly expanding, upgrading and modernizing, causing a serious imbalance in the equation of power in South Asia. The gap is more likely to grow further under the US-India nuclear cooperation.<sup>98</sup>

Even more disturbing is the fear of a nuclear arms race in the region. The US-India Nuclear cooperation may probably setoff a new (nuclear) arm race in the region. When security becomes the prime concern for a

region, then economic and social development takes a back seat and regional cooperation becomes elusive.<sup>99</sup> Pakistan is reluctant to react to this process by indulging in an ongoing arms race, both nuclear and conventional, due to limited economic resources making it unsustainable in long term, with grave consequences for the entire region.<sup>100</sup> The people of South Asia ought to apprehend the costs of maintaining giant armies and caches. Thus, flexibility is required to approach the matter by sliding away from the hard-line slogans like *atoot ang* or *Kashmir banega Pakistan*, as these may cause the peace process to dash soon.<sup>101</sup>

Therefore, Pakistan pragmatically prefers to invest the resources upon developmental needs of the people, and proposes the same for India, as the poverty ratio in India is at an alarming level.

The fragile peace process could easily collapse if any of the two lost its patience or commitment to this sensitive/delicate move towards normalization of relations.

In accordance with international and regional reality, Pakistan has certainly changed more than has India, which remains far more a prisoner of its self-esteem than its neighbour. India has yet to make compromise on Kashmir, Siyachin and other issues. Whether New Delhi's tough line is really changing is not clear. India has to understand that it needs to adopt a wider view of the region and trust its neighbours.<sup>102</sup>

## **b. Afghanistan**

Being the only country to have desisted with the Pakistan's membership of the United Nations, has always maintained a cold-indifferent or outright hostile attitude in response to Pakistan's overtures of friendly cooperative neighbour, thereby maintaining an

ongoing claim of the entire trans-Indus territory stretching from Durand Line up to Attock. In this bid, Afghanistan engendered the separatist Pushtoonistan movements.<sup>103</sup> Regrettably, the Durand Line has been a source of friction between Pakistan and Afghanistan since 1947. Afghanistan has since then refused to acknowledge the Durand Line as the international border between the two countries and have demanded the integration of Pashtu-speaking inhabitants on the Pakistani side of the frontier in Afghanistan or an autonomous, perhaps even independent, Pakhtoonistan.<sup>104</sup> Since then Afghanistan's provocative behaviors has continued till today as has been revealed during Prime Minister Shoukat Aziz's visit to Kabul.

The current phase of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan is characterized as that of the lowest ebb. While denying Pakistan's all positive moves taken to contain cross-border incursion by the anti-US forces of Taliban, Afghan President Hamid Karzai seeks an escape from his own responsibility while governing the Afghan territory by shifting all the blames to Pakistan for increasing instability in the country especially in the East and South due to insurgency of Taliban activists. Regardless of the fact that his own policies are flawed as he relies upon support of warlords for controlling the territory outside of Kabul, where they, by cultivating poppy, give boost to drug trafficking to generate finances for maintaining their military capabilities.<sup>105</sup> Lacking the indigenous security forces to ensure peace stability, Afghani President Hamid Karzai, depends greatly upon the U.S. and NATO forces, which unfortunately are half-hearted to carry on fighting.<sup>106</sup> It is noteworthy that although there was no division within the NATO alliances on the war against the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, most NATO countries were reluctant to allow their forces to engage in the combat against the Taliban in the south and east, leaving the British, Canadian, Dutch, and American forces severely under pressured. Due to these conditions, the U.S. has to put more pressure upon Pakistan for doing

more. It is not certain, whether the U.S. will engage more troops in war zone (Afghanistan) or will continue in the region by other means. NATO Force, given to their limitations, cannot effectively fight Taliban. It is only whenever Taliban attack, then NATO can defeat them after sustaining enormous collateral damage.<sup>107</sup> They cannot hold the territory they clear and they also have not been able to make any progress in winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan people with developmental work at a standstill, unemployment stalking the land and a sense of insecurity prevailing every where.<sup>108</sup>

Frustration caused by fear of losing authority due to ineffective leadership compelled President Hamid Karzai to lay all blame on Pakistan, denying the fact that no other country could be responsible, for the lawlessness and administrative corruption coupled with power sharing with warlords, some of the wrongs of his regime, which compels the Afghans to continually enter Pakistan. Pakistan, nevertheless, have been suffering enormously for being helpful to Afghanistan, be it the helping hand in the event of Soviet invasion, or in terms of welcoming Afghan refugees, and yet is observing political restraint despite thankless, inimical attitude of the Karzai government towards Pakistan.<sup>109</sup>

Afghanistan maintains that the Pashtuns living on both sides of the Durand line should not be split apart by this artificial boundary that Britain, a colonial power, drew to serve its imperial interests. Underpinning this stance is the actual intent of Afghanistan to bring the entire Pashtun community in Afghanistan, or to create a politically separate Pushtunistan extending to the right bank of the Indus River. Thus for over 60 years, Kabul continues to campaign for establishment of Pashtunistan, resulting in sour Pak-Afghan relations, siding with India, which if develop a full-fledged strategic cooperation could sandwich Pakistan.

To avoid being sandwiched in between two hostile neighbors, at both fronts, one in east and the other in the west, Pakistan sort to ease the western front by supporting Taliban regime, in the dismay that by creating a pro-Pakistan establishment, Pakistan would entertain a degree of influence inside Afghanistan thus envisaging a kind of strategic depth in the event of escalation of conflict with India, to use it as a military reserve.<sup>110</sup>

No doubt the reign of Taliban provided Pakistan with a sigh of relief as it was the only period during which Pakistan felt secure on its North-Western frontiers. In the wake, but due to Taliban's political blunder, Al-Qaeda, fundamentalist activists to asylum in there and launched Jihad against United States. Ultimately the U.S. in the aftermath of the biggest ever military attack against America on September 11, 2001, went on to hunt Al-Qaeda. Meanwhile Pakistan was forced by the United States to join the anti-Taliban coalition. Ultimately the Taliban regime was over-thrown giving way to a US-backed pro-West authority instituting secular order in the country.<sup>111</sup>

In spite of evolving cordiality, this new regime in Kabul reiterated the past distrust and bitterness in Afghan-Pakistan relations. Despite the genuine convergence of interests between the two over the common challenge of rising religious extremism, the two are lacking the degree of cooperation essentially required to tackle the remnants of Taliban who are rapidly reasserting their presence in the southern district of Afghanistan, threatening the security, not only of the two neighbours but also of the world as a whole.<sup>112</sup>

President Hamid Karzai's anti-Pakistan posture is so obvious as India supported Northern Alliance against Taliban regime throughout 1996-2001, meanwhile Pakistan fully supported the Taliban regime, neglecting the possible negative fallouts in the event of shifting power

to the anti-Taliban northern Alliance, who thus become a sworn enemy of Pakistan, fully backed by America, Europe, and also India. Therefore, his outrageous allegation over Pakistan for being responsible for the failure of his regime is more than obvious.<sup>113</sup> India is steadily increasing its influence in Central Asia, which has a crucial place in India's security calculus, as a number of military initiatives have been taken to forge strategic relations, e.g. Training Tajik army to take hold of air bases in Tajikistan, and stationing of MiG-29 fighters at the Ayni Basis. Indian determination and ability to counter religious terrorism both in the South Asia and the Central Asia is signified by the attempts of power projection in these regions.

It is in recognition of the geo-strategic position of Afghanistan as a gateway to the energy-resource rich Central Asia, India is investing to promote stability in Afghanistan by assigning a considerable sum of aid and assistance to Kabul. A total of \$600 million for infrastructure and development projects has been provided so far along with an additional \$25 million given for Afghan Parliament building construction in Kabul. To promote great trade and investment, a facility of \$50 million credit is also granted. Besides, Manmohan Singh made an announcement of an annual award of 500 scholarships for Afghan students for university education in India and 500 short-term Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation programmes for Afghan nationals. Further, India has consented to adopt 100 Afghan villages for rural development with solar electrification and rainwater harvesting technologies. It has also gifted three Airbus planes to the Afghan airline *Ariana*.<sup>114</sup>

Pakistan cannot disregard Indian diplomacy in Afghanistan as it ultimately counteracts Pakistani influence in there. Also, the intelligence agencies of Pakistan hold responsible the Indian consulates in Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif for provoking turbulence across the border in Balochistan and the NWFP.<sup>115</sup>



Besides the Pak-Afghan tension could furnish political gains for India thereby sporting out Pakistan on the pretext of supporting Taliban, as

Enemy Number one, not only of Afghanistan but virtually of the rest of the civilized world as the patron saint of the Taliban and prime source of global terrorism. <sup>116</sup>

In his anti-Pakistan tirade, he even neglected the fact that Pakistan has given shelter to some two-three million Afghan refugees, who could then be viewed as potential security threat to Pakistan as Afghan spies. Such blunt statements by Afghan President ultimately risk the security as well as prosperity of these two-three million refugees on Pakistani Soil, denying them this decades old safe heaven. <sup>117</sup>

The presence of over three million Afghan refugees on the soil of Pakistan further complicates Pakistan's difficulties in its efforts to curb extremism and terrorism as some of these refugees are nevertheless supporters and sympathizers of Taliban and some what of Al-Qaeda as well. The flow of refugees on the bordering areas makes it difficult to control the move of pro-Taliban supporters and results in international and Afghan hue and cry on Pakistan for not stopping support to Taliban from across the border.

It is, therefore, essential to make arrangements of repatriation of Afghan refugees back to their country. The international community and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees need to facilitate this process.<sup>118</sup> The bitter statement, 'This tyranny against our people is not by the nation of Pakistan, it is by the government of Pakistan', is potential enough to antagonize Pakistani government to the extent that it demands their immediate eviction from Pakistan back to Afghanistan.<sup>119</sup>

Pakistan can not remain disregarded of the happenings taking place concerning Afghanistan. Pakistan has always accorded special importance to its relations with Afghanistan given to Indian long-term animosity, it was natural for Pakistan to closely monitor the developments in Afghanistan, which is essential factor for Pakistan's strategic depth.<sup>120</sup>

Pakistan's vital interests are entwined with Afghanistan's security and peace in the region as Pakistan's plans to connect South Asia with energy-rich Caspian Basin are to be channeled through this important link.<sup>121</sup> But peace has since long been an illusion to this unfortunately war-torn territory, where the rule of tribal chieftains has remained paramount limiting central government's injunctions within the capital only. The Central, South and West Asia region has been volatile for decades. Through Afghan war and subsequent civil in fighting among different tribal factions, calling in the foreign troops led by NATO, there has taken place no stability inside Afghanistan.<sup>122</sup>

The level of militancy has increased following the resurrection of Taliban is pinpointing the failure of US-led International Coalition in Afghanistan that has virtually shattered the already devastated infrastructure. Its been five years to the US-led Coalition's attacks on Afghanistan, yet peace and stability are far from reality. Despite all the big claims of the U.S. to rehabilitate the country, chaotic conditions spillover the entire state. Instead of eradicate the network of warlords, their arrangements have further strengthened, giving impetus to drug trafficking by cultivating Poppy crop to generate finances for maintaining military capability.<sup>123</sup>

Along with other politico-economic and security challenges confronting Afghanistan, resurgence of Taliban is a major threat hanging over Pakistan as well, urging intensified efforts against extremism and terrorism, which, in fact, is a joint responsibility share by not only of the

two neighbors along with the International community, especially the US-led Coalition, fighting against terrorism.<sup>124</sup>

There has developed a huge credibility gap between Pakistan and the international community over skepticism for Pakistan's role and efforts to halt infiltration across the borders in India and Afghanistan, who allegedly claim that Pakistan serves as a nursery for global terrorism, hence, growing criticism on Pakistan's role for not doing enough in the War on Terror has substantially damaged Pakistan's credibility internationally, accusing Pakistan for turning a blind eye to Taliban activities as it would counter Indian influence in Afghanistan.<sup>125</sup>

Richard Boucher, the US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, noted that the Taliban were able to use tribal areas for sanctuary and for command and control and for regrouping and supply.<sup>126</sup>

The demands made on Pakistan to use force excessively to restrict cross-border movement will not wholly serve the purpose as it would provoke Pakistan to seal the Durand Line with a proposed plan of mining and fortifying the border by raising a physical barrier in the form of wall, as has been announced in December 2006. Pakistan proposed this plan to wipeout all grounds of criticism over the claims lauded by Afghanistan that Taliban were reestablishing themselves, provided sanctuaries established in Pakistan, to allow them to penetrate inside Afghanistan. All this will ruin Kabul's long-standing demand for not ripping away the community of Pashtuns.<sup>127</sup>

To wipe out any accusations for not being able or intended to restrict militant Taliban activities allegedly being carried out from the *Sanctuaries* in Pakistan, Pakistan has announced the fencing of the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan with a web of landmines, not being the party to the mine ban treaty of 1997 along with US and India,

to contain unauthorized movements across the border. Doubtless it is to say here that the fencing proposal is flawed and inconsistent with the nature of complex mountainous terrain for a border of more than 2400 km of bordering area can not be effectively sealed by any means. Afghanistan, having raised grave reservations to this plan, warned to resist to the proposed plan through every method on the pretext that such measures will ultimately limit the Afghani split the Pashtuns on both sides of the border. This state of affairs would certainly deteriorate further the relations between the two countries and will. The international community, the UN, and human rights organizations has also expressed severe apprehension on the mined fencing of border, as Afghanistan is already a worst victim of land mines that have killed thousands of civilians over the years.<sup>128</sup>

The mined fencing of the border will ultimately deteriorate the already grim state of relations between the two. Indicative of the widening gap in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, Afghan President Hamid Karzai disregarded the value and effectiveness of international diplomacy, the crux of international relations. Having stated that such high profile visits did not serve any purpose, he in fact shut-off all possibilities of cooperation by questioning the rationale of Prime Minister's visit to Kabul.<sup>129</sup>

President of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, however, argued that prior to condemn Pakistan, efforts must be taken for the settlement of problems on Afghan side that Kabul has created itself, such as, willingly working with the warlords once again to bring security to some of the troubled provinces. Many warlords recruited for service in the evolving political system are using the cultivation of and trade in drugs to enrich themselves and their supporters.<sup>130</sup>

The reasons why Pakistan is widely subjected to these blames could be sought into two popular presumptions, i.e. the un-abating attraction of Pakistan's intelligence services, mainly those forged during ten years of Jihad, towards the goals of Islami extremists; and the threat perception surmounting with New Delhi's increasing influence in Afghanistan, intimidating Pakistan's security.<sup>131</sup>

The possibilities of the presence of Taliban on Pakistan soil enjoying the support of the locals can not be disregarded. Nevertheless, locating and deporting them may be difficult.<sup>132</sup>

To have a clear breakup with Taliban forces in and around Afghanistan has become vexed due to somewhat symbolic relationship between extremist religious organizations and state agencies of Pakistan, forged during the ten years *Jihad*, as the pro-Taliban fervors created meanwhile have continued to find place in certain minds who look upon Taliban as a means of influencing if not capturing the power in Kabul. Although Pakistan has successfully eased some of such minds but still many are around who are reluctant to fully disengage Pakistan from Afghanistan, as President Pervez Musharraf admitted at London that retired intelligence offices may still be involved in assisting Taliban.<sup>133</sup>

Even though marginally, but Pakistan's attempts to seek out a negotiated settlement to halt religious militancy did bring certain degree of peace to the tribal belt, leaving behind the room for extended moves in that direction, as the West too intends to incline towards such deals to cease fighting areas e.g. Helmand province. Also, the British commanders in Afghanistan keep on maintaining a open line of communication with the Taliban. Despite bitter criticism heralded by Media, the Bush administration admits to have relative understands Pakistan's position.<sup>134</sup>

In the aftermath of the US-led War on Terror, no significant change has so far taken place. In fact, the U.S. backed regime of President Hamid Karzai is weak, ineffective and corrupt. It has failed to fulfill Afghan expectations. It also suffers from stigma of being perceived as a foreign-installed regime and is dependent on the support of powerful warlords. The security situation in the country is deteriorating rapidly.<sup>135</sup>

*Los Angeles Times* in its editorial earlier this week warned that we are on the brink of losing Afghanistan to the resurgent Taliban .<sup>136</sup>

Therefore, no signs of sustainable peace therein are seemingly present. President Karzai is head-on to inflict subsequent responsibility on Pakistan for all this mess in Afghanistan. This situation poses a great challenge to Pakistan. As not only it is significant for internal peace and security of Pakistan, but is a precondition for serving as a trade and energy corridor, but it also multiplies international pressures on Pakistan for doing more to curb any Taliban and Al Qaeda resurgence.

Pakistan, therefore, cannot afford to do anything causing instability in Afghanistan. However, these circumstances compel Pakistan to look for substitute (routes) such as, Karakorum Highway to carry trucks from Kyrgyzstan, to transfer energy from the Central Asian Republics, to China and from China to Pakistan, by passing the Afghanistan route.<sup>137</sup> Regarding Afghanistan, two different perception are prevailing. One customary view is that to safeguard Pakistan's long-term national interests, Pakistan should maintain strong influence in Afghanistan, much like that of India today is striving to generate. On the other hand there are those who look at Afghanistan as a genuine foreign policy issue rather than extending Pakistan's influence in there.<sup>138</sup>

The *Financial Times*, editorial, called upon NATO to rethink its strategy, pointing out that insurgencies are over come by winning hearts and

minds not stacking up corpses. <sup>139</sup> Surely, there is merit in argument that Pakistan has a vital stake in a stable and peaceful Afghanistan. But this objective can be served by treating Afghanistan as a genuine foreign policy issue, rather than as an extension of Pakistan's domestic policies.

Instead of allegedly condemning Pakistan for helping and supporting Taliban in regaining power resulting in growing instability caused by rising Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan, the two must engage in concerted efforts in root-out the elements of religious extremism with synergy.

## Notes and Reference

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<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, pp.62-63

<sup>3</sup> Address by President General Pervez Musharraf, at the Inaugural Session of 3<sup>rd</sup> National Security Workshop held at National Defense College, Islamabad, February 12, 2004, *Foreign Affairs Pakistan (A collection of Foreign Affairs related Papers)*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, Vol. XXXI, Issue: 11, February 2004, p.13

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<sup>96</sup> It is very recent that China consented to forge civilian nuclear cooperation with India. During his visit to India, Chinese President, Hu Jintao, in a meeting with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agreed to promote cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear energy, along with accelerating efforts to settle their boundary dispute in fair and peaceful manner, with the acknowledgement that they are not rival but partners for mutual benefit. Hu declared that Sino-Indian cooperation would make the 21st century an Asian Century, to which Manmohan Singh affirmed confidence in irreversible India-China cooperation having global significance *Dawn*, Nov. 22, 2006, China-India to forge Civilian Nuclear Cooperation .

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## **Session II**

*New Directions of Pakistan's Foreign Policy  
(Security and Development)*

# THE FUTURE OF US-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: ENCHAINED ALLIES TAMING DEMONS? OR RESOURCEFUL PARTNERS IN CONSTRUCTING SECURITY AND PROSPERITY?

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## **Introduction**

In examining the future of US-Pakistan relations, one must admit that the crystal ball is cloudy. It is a challenge to discern where we are headed. Our contemporary environment is volatile due to the problems the U.S. and its coalition partners have experienced in post-war Iraq, and due to the ongoing war on global terrorism. Having overthrown Saddam Hussain and supported the election of a new government, the war continues in Iraq in a different form an insurgency coupled with terrorism against the occupation, and a Sunni-Shi a conflict in Iraq that continues to grow and that could branch out into neighboring countries.

Meanwhile, the Taliban in Afghanistan has regrouped and is destabilizing the Karzai government, with indications that some Taliban support originates in Pakistan. In the neighboring region, US-Iranian relations are tense and brittle. Pakistan, for its part, is on an economic lift which is really good news, but troubled domestically in Baluchistan and the Afghan borderland, and nervous about where US-Indian relations are going. As part of the Muslim world, Pakistan is also deeply concerned about the negative effects of the strife in Iraq. Many Pakistanis, probably a sizeable majority, share in the anger and anxiety common elsewhere in the Muslim world that feeds on the perception that the United States is not only pursuing terrorists but deliberately attacking Muslims and inflaming the very scourge it seeks to eradicate.

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We are both wrestling with demons that stem from terrorism and its ravages. In the United States which had for a long time seen itself as invulnerable to anything but strategic nuclear attack 9/11 had a profound effect. The 9/11 attack brought mega-terrorist violence into the American homeland and vastly altered American mindsets about future priorities in its relations with Africa, the Middle East and Southwest Asia. Pakistan is, and has been, a victim of terrorism, too, but is wrestling with the same demons in a different way, since the organizers of most contemporary *mega*-terrorism happen to be part and parcel of the Muslim world including Pakistan. It is true of course that this long-distance form of terrorism we associate with al-Qaeda also has some roots in the anti-Soviet jihad, where guerrilla warfare with Islamic appeals was used to repel Soviet power from Afghanistan, and it has emerged in other forms to support Pakistan's interests in Kashmir.<sup>1</sup>

### **Permit me to make two other points at the outset**

First, US-Pakistan relations have had a series of ups and downs. The high periods were a product of genuine cooperation against Soviet imperial pressures on the region, and Pakistan also contributed signally to the reopening of US relations with Communist China. That was an important turning point in how the Cold War was prosecuted by the West. But there have also been down periods. In the past, these have usually resulted from conflict between India and Pakistan, on which the US has tried to be impartial. The other cause of down periods has been nuclear proliferation. Terrorism as the West understands it has a similar potential. So far counterterrorism has been a basis for US-Pakistani strategic cooperation, but it would be less than honest to say that it could not have a serious downside, because each side sees the phenomenon of terrorism in different rather than identical terms.



Second, there are two different ways, clinically speaking, for scholars and experts to address US-Pakistan relations. One way is to objectively analyze the factors that bear on the relationship, as political scientists are wont to do, to satisfy explanatory objectives—such as, why do things happen the way they do, and to focus on what conditions must be altered to move in a particular direction. That is an entirely legitimate enterprise. Often though, it is done at a theoretical level that divorces it from reality and therefore makes it unrealistic. The other way is to do the analysis as concretely as possible, and even as an advocate, or as a policy guru. That is harder for Pakistanis and Americans (or anyone) to do in an objective fashion because it is about matters of national interest, to which we are all likely to be attached yet from one nation's point of view. Advocacy analysis can be productive, if done in a civilized spirit, and may come closer to what policy makers can actually do to make things better. But advocacy can, and often does, lead to impassioned expressions of conflicting perspectives. My point here is to try to recognize the difference between analysis that seeks objectivity in a scientific sense, and advocacy is not necessarily so detached but that seeks, rather, to lead in a particular direction. I plead guilty to both approaches, but hope to be clear about which is which.

### **Possible Impact of Forthcoming Elections**

On the subject of elections, I thought it useful to make some points on the most recent US elections to Congress, and on Iraq policy, which was a focal point. On this subject, my approach is frankly in an advocacy mold. I was not asked to vote on whether to invade Iraq in 2003. If I had had a vote, it would have been against launching a military occupation, rather than persisting longer in United Nations and other diplomatic measures, until they had run their course. Certainly it would have been against an intervention on the ground before at least gaining significant support from moderate Arab states and, preferably, much wider international support generally. These efforts would have

required a longer and much deeper preparation for the consequences that were foreseeable inside Iraq, but might have mitigated them, if war was ultimately chosen as an instrument. The turmoil that has arisen in Iraq, the loss of life, both Iraqi and that of the occupying powers, and the entrenchment of al-Qaeda elements inside the Sunni insurgency, has exacted a huge price. It has also given Iran an unwarranted influence there.

These results, so much at odds with what the Bush administration had expected and promised, finally shifted American public opinion deeply and brought the Democratic Party back to power in Congress, though narrowly in the U.S. Senate. This now constrains the administration. The shift in American politics does not necessarily auger for a precipitous pullout, which could invite chaos in the region, but it sets the stage, most likely, for a calibrated military pullback and troop withdrawal over time. How well Iraq does under those circumstances depends substantially, I believe, on what interested powers in the region, including Pakistan, themselves do to bolster the national sentiment in Iraq as a means of overcoming sectarian strife, and to mitigate the potential for further chaos. It would depend on well administered reconstruction and employment creation programs. It may also depend substantially on whether the US and Europe seriously pursue a territorial settlement and other peace efforts in the Israeli-Palestinian arena. Fortunately, the Bush administration now appears to be moving in that direction.

Now, back to the clinical mode: Does the Democratic gain in the 2006 Congressional elections signify a likely Democratic win in the next US presidential elections in 2008? Can one guess at whether this will help, or hurt, US-Pakistani relations? As an American, my best guess is that the Democrats are more likely than not to win back the Presidency and strengthen their position marginally in the Senate. That is a best guess. It cannot be regarded as a certainty, since there are no certainties in

politics. We do know that if the Democrats maintain their current momentum, the current front runner, Hillary Rodham Clinton, may well win the nomination and the presidency. Barack Obama is a credible campaign partner. There are others who could come to the fore, including John Edwards.<sup>2</sup> If other events strengthen Republican prospects, the front runner so far appears to be Senator John McCain, and others are in the wings.<sup>3</sup> John McCain's prospects are closely linked to developments in Iraq, where he has been deeply critical of past policies but advocates bringing more troops to bear and staying the course.

If the Democrats win the presidency in 2008, will this change the course of U.S. policy towards Pakistan (or India)? My estimate is that the Bush administration and leading Democrats are not far different on likely policies towards South Asia. The Democrats would be equally interested in Pakistan's effectiveness in controlling terrorism internally and in its denial of support for the Taliban armed insurgency in Afghanistan. The Pashtun have legitimate rights to participate in Afghan politics in proportion to their numbers, but not in this new era to use guerrilla warfare and terrorism to bring the country to its knees.

Certainly the Democrats who might win the presidency would not want unilaterally to disrupt relations with Pakistan. The main difference that one might expect if the Democrats recapture the White House would be a stronger Democratic emphasis after the next election, than the Bush administration had, on public criticism of the military's (i.e., President and COAS Musharraf's) hold on the presidency and political power in Pakistan. Recent Democrat-sponsored initiatives in Non-Proliferation legislation may have several motivations, but one would be to turn up the heat domestically on President Bush and at the same time on Musharraf as a military political leader. But even these differences probably would be marginal over time in Washington. This is not to say that they would not have serious domestic political

repercussions in Pakistan.

As far as relations with India are concerned, the Democrats under President Clinton paved the way for better relations with India, including the so-called de-hyphenation of US policies toward India and Pakistan. The Democrats are more likely to push the relationship with India forward than to try to undo what the Bush administration has done with India barring unforeseen circumstances. The Bush administration itself adopted the tilt toward India and has even deepened US-India initiatives, but has done so with Democratic support – one area of bipartisanship that has held firm over the last 12 years, and is the main reason why the controversial departure in civilian nuclear cooperation policy was ultimately sustained by Congress.

On forthcoming Pakistani national elections this year, I will be more cautious about venturing views. My best guess, however, is that President Musharraf will seek to stay in the office of the presidency, and will work for a National Assembly election outcome congenial to his continuation. Although Pakistan has made significant economic gains under the Musharraf government, the conventional political leaders of most of the major political parties appear to be unhappy with the dominance of the Army in politics. The outlook of the much larger body of ordinary citizens may be different. They may be more appreciative of Musharraf's accomplishments and more supportive of his staying in power.

Not surprisingly, there is speculation about exiled political leaders, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, making a deal with Musharraf that allows them to reenter politics in Pakistan. Back in the West, they are circling toward deals with each other to put up more of a united front. The only forecast that I could make on how Pakistani elections could have a seriously negative effect on relations with the United States is if

the Islamist parties gain ground and win a large share of power in governing Pakistan. Evidently, the Islamist parties in Pakistan are not democratic in their own practices, do not believe in authentic parliamentary institutions and are eager to displace secular law with some form of Shari'ah. They seem to exploit the opening that parliamentary-based democracy affords to advance themselves. Many believe they would shut down an open system if they gained power and were able to impose their outlooks. This is not to say the major Islamic parties would easily cooperate with each other if voted into power and obliged to try to consolidate power under the current Constitution.

Whether the Democrats return to power or the Republicans continue to hold the White House, the two paramount issues that the United States is caught up with today – the **future of Iraq**, and the **future of the War on Terrorism**, are the ones that are most likely to shape Washington's views of its relations with Pakistan. Pakistan's reactions to Washington's policies in these two areas are also likely to shape the relationship, and may add further strains. These two issues are also closely connected with whether progress toward political stability and economic growth is sustained in **Afghanistan**, or whether instead conditions in Afghanistan deteriorate. These issues of the future of Iraq and of the War on terrorism also involve how to deal with challenges from Iran. A third issue that has taken a back seat to the War on Terrorism, in American priorities, but which may return as an issue of contention is that of **nuclear proliferation**. A fourth issue that could affect US-Pakistan relations going forward is how **US-India relations** evolve, and whether this helps improve Pakistan's security and contributes to better India-Pakistan relations, or instead seems to cause greater threats to Pakistan's security or increases Pakistan's perceived isolation.

## The Iraq Issue

There is no doubt that the US-led invasion of Iraq and the course of its post-war involvement in Iraq has greatly strained US relations with the Arab and Muslim countries and severely damaged US prestige and reputation for principled leadership and democratic values in world affairs. Ordinary Americans were only beginning to be aware by January 2007 of how deeply the deteriorating situation in Iraq has aroused deep feelings of frustration and damaged US international leadership. The reaction is most deep-seated and could be longest-lasting in the Arab and Muslim countries. But the deepest damage of all has been to Iraq itself, and to the stability of the surrounding region. This damage perhaps would not have been deep or lasting if the overthrow of Saddam Hussain had been quick, if security had been maintained in Iraq by the occupation forces, if restoration of authentic Iraqi government had occurred, and if reconstruction moved forward rapidly. Reservations many in the international community had before the invasion in March 2003 would have been swallowed if the intervention had a quick and decisive outcome. They might have conformed to the old adage that nothing succeeds like success. But this is not how things turned out.

How will things now evolve in Iraq, and what difference will that make to our concerns here about US-Pakistan relations? In his address to the nation and then State of the Union message in January, 2007, the Bush administration confirmed that it intends to try to retrieve some value from the situation in Iraq working for a viable if not, as first envisioned, a fully democratic and efficient national government and programs of reconstruction and rebuilding. The Bush administration is not only committing more troops but making tactical adjustments under changed military leadership switching from General Casey to Gen. Petraeus as commander in Iraq, and from Gen. Abizaid to Admiral Fallon in CENTCOM, and slightly different military objectives

and procedures within Iraq. Renewed emphasis will be put on reviving industries and raising citizen employment. Messages to the Maliki government indicate for the first time that the US will not continue its full support and engagement in Iraq unless measureable progress is made on so-called benchmarks, such as deploying newly trained Iraqi security forces to take up the primary burdens of internal security, and restraining the militias, together with measures of political accommodation between Shi'ites and Sunnis in the domestic political process needed to defuse the Sunni insurgency and dampen sectarian violence.

These measures might make a positive difference measurable after six to nine months. Some in the Middle East and Pakistan believe that a measurable difference in defusing the sectarian violence could be better achieved if the militias are convinced that the United States will withdraw and not take sides. In that case, the US and coalition forces may be able to begin a phased but gradual withdrawal as Iraqi security forces step in to assume responsibility in each sector of Baghdad and in one province after another. But if positive progress is not achieved, the Bush administration may then begin to trim its losses by reducing the U.S. forces inside the center of Iraq anyway, perhaps postponing any final reckoning until after another American administration is elected in 2008 and takes charge in early 2009. The Bush administration has shied away from the Iraq Study Group recommendations thus far, but might be forced to retreat to them, *de facto*, if Iraq does not begin to settle down.

There are radically uncomfortable questions about the future of Iraq. If the US begins to withdraw, should it side with only the Kurds and Shi'ites and accept a bloody Shi'ite repression of the Sunnis. Should the U.S. instead push for something close to a tripartite breakup of Iraq with three sovereign or near-sovereign states emerging in the aftermath? There are advocates of those positions in the United States,

some even in the administration, but I personally doubt they will be accepted as mainstream policy. The mainstream policy probably still will seek to avoid taking sides in a sectarian conflict. The Iraq Study Group and some others advocate that if the fighting in Iraq does not subside, the U.S. should retreat tactically, withdrawing from Baghdad and the cities in the center and south to defend Iraq's borders, while concentrating rapid-reaction forces in the Kurdish region where the militia is not hostile to Americans. But in the event of prolonged sectarian warfare which grows into a true civil war -- other neighboring states may try to take sides: Iran with the Shi'ites; and Saudi Arabia and Jordan (and probably Egypt) with the Sunnis. Syria might have a more complicated policy because of its alignment with Iran, the concentration of governing power in an Alawite elite, and the fact that the country's population is predominantly Sunni Arab and therefore harbors strong internal sympathy for the underdog Iraqi Sunnis. Turkey may also adopt preventive measures against the effects of a powerful self-governing Kurdish region in Iraq since it fears that this would incite and fuel secessionist moves from Turkey's Kurdish minority.

Pakistan has wisely kept its distance from this conflict which stemmed from US and European choices and did not come about as a war of necessity. But what will Pakistan do if Iraq descends into civil war and the US withdraws to the borders, allowing that war to continue? What will the sentiment of the majority of Pakistanis be? What will the al Qaeda elements try to do with that situation? What will Pakistan's primarily Sunni Islamist political parties attempt to do in that event? Conditions in Iraq are bad, but they still could get much worse. Alternately, would Pakistan have an opportunity here to adopt a strategy not of intervention but rather of international community leadership -- formulating concepts and policies that follow a high road -- ideas that promote Shi'a-Sunni reconciliation and the material rehabilitation of Iraq, and that would serve as a basis for discussion and



guideposts for the regional states, the United States, and the international community to develop meaningful initiatives around? A lot of Pakistani talent could be put to good use in Iraq if it were done through an internationally legitimated framework.

It would be politically unrealistic to expect the current Musharraf government or any politically elected government of Pakistan in the foreseeable future to step out front and openly seek to deflect (or help absorb) the international criticism that has accumulated around the US-led coalition in Iraq. However, even an outsider well acquainted with Pakistan could imagine that Pakistan would find it in its interests to help conceive of a way forward that could be expected to restore stability in Iraq and in the Gulf region. In that context, positive Pakistani statements and diplomatic initiatives befitting new circumstances could help the US find a better approach. If these were carefully calibrated positions and initiatives couched in the interests of Pakistan and leading regional states, they could lead to better atmospherics, and encourage a climate of US-Pakistani cooperation better than now exists. Needless to say, pumping up vitriolic statements from the most irrevocably anti-American sectors of Pakistani society would act as a drag on US inclinations to broaden the relationship with Pakistan and undermine the efforts of those who would seek to solidify long term commitments in that relationship.

Are there areas of positive Pakistani opportunity to contribute to rehabilitation and rebuilding projects in Iraq? Certainly there are large talents and energy resident in Pakistan that could help Iraq get back on its feet, if there were a way to channel them in a fashion that Iraqis see as in their interests. Today the situation in Iraq is murky and perhaps seems non-receptive to Pakistani overtures. But if the situation clears and international and Iraqi efforts get underway to rehabilitate the infrastructure or develop new facilities in water sources, oil and gas recovery and transmission, refineries, electricity production and

distribution, hospitals and medical facilities, universities, police training and the rebuilding of national military and security forces one could imagine Pakistani intellectual and organizational talents, and even Pakistani engineering and construction labor, being put to good use. Of course, there are significant unutilized Iraqi resources and displacement of Iraqi population to neighboring countries that needs to be put back in place too, and that will naturally be seen as the first priority. That said, there would be good sense in Pakistan forming a task force of its own to analyze what Iraq will need and what contributions Pakistan could offer and make, if they were desired in Iraq or deemed desirable as part of UN- or World Bank-sponsored projects. Although it would have to be done with diplomatic sensitivity, the thinking that might emerge from a Pakistani reconstruction task force for Iraq could be explored with countries in the region, such as Iraq's neighbors and the larger Arab countries, as a stimulus to multilateral engagement on the rebuilding of Iraq.

### **The Issue of Afghanistan**

Today one of the burning issues in US-Pakistan relations centers on how to arrest the revival of Afghan Taliban forces that are striking at the fragile security, economic and infrastructural development of Afghanistan, jeopardizing the effective utilization of international financial and technical assistance, and destabilizing the elected government of Afghanistan. In the near term, raising the quality of US-Pakistan relations depends heavily on progress in this sector. These issues are intimately linked in American minds, of course, with continued Pakistani cooperation against the al-Qaeda network. But they are inseparable from developments in the Pashtun borderland spanning western Pakistan and eastern and southern Afghanistan, where sponsorship and sanctuaries for Taliban attack in Afghanistan appear to exist in the madrassah infrastructure and in Pashtun communities, both in the relatively undeveloped tribal areas and in the

settled areas neighboring Peshawar.

It should be noted that the Musharraf government of Pakistan has made impressive efforts of its own, and some with help from US intelligence sharing, to track down and arrest known al-Qaeda leaders and operatives who infiltrated Pakistan after they were driven out of Afghanistan in the winter of 2001. Pakistan has uncovered and turned over into US custody more than a dozen top leaders and scores of al-Qaeda operatives. There has been no doubt about the consistent commitment and effectiveness of this cooperation against al-Qaeda. These operations put Pakistani officials at personal risk—as is clear from several assassination attacks on Musharraf himself, and others against Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and senior military officials. Despite some disparaging clamor in the West in certain think tanks and media organizations, the courage that this Pakistani counter-terrorist cooperation has required is considerable, and has been forthcoming. Fortunately, President Bush and cabinet figures in the United States have been emphatic in recognizing the quality of this cooperation against al-Qaeda, as indeed have their British counterparts.

What is more difficult for Pakistan to do, and also, therefore, for US and coalition partners in Afghanistan to tolerate, is to prevent cross-border support for the Taliban. Beginning in the fall of 2005, there was evidence of the revival in Afghanistan of Pashtun-based Taliban insurgent activities as well as evidence that this was supported from across the border in Pakistan, particularly in the NWFP, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and Quetta in Baluchistan. One can easily imagine that the Pakistani support for the Taliban arises mainly in Pashtun communities, where it is easy to appeal to tribal kinsmen for support and not among Pakistanis as a whole.

It is noteworthy that the Musharraf government committed up to 80,000 regular troops to the Afghan border regions and that Pakistani

military forces took heavy casualties – losing upwards of 700 men – in operations chasing al-Qaeda fugitives in South and North Waziristan in 2003 and 2004. But there was a rising concern in Washington in the second half of 2006 that the Pakistani government had not been able to choke off the movement of Pakistani Pashtun groups to give aid to the Taliban across the border in Afghanistan, and recognition that this made the efforts of U.S. and ISAF troops to provide security in Afghanistan much more difficult. Questions were raised in the press about the level of Pakistani commitment to reign in Taliban supporters on its side of the border. Musharraf's negotiation of agreements with Pashtun tribal leaders in South and North Waziristan in September, and in Bajaur later, had promised to withdraw regular Pakistani forces on condition that the tribal leaders turn in any foreigners (e.g., Arabs, Chechens) who remained active as terrorists, and prevent Pashtun groups crossing the border in support of the Taliban. Soon after these agreements went into effect, however, the number of crossings by armed militias from Pakistan to Afghanistan appeared to be on the rise, leading to suspicion in Washington regarding Musharraf's motives and speculation that the Pakistan government might be playing a double game.

It was well known that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate had operated proactively in the region earlier – to support guerrilla fighters against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, and later, supported the rise of the Taliban as the new rulers of Afghanistan between 1994 and 2001. Pakistan had banked on the Taliban as a unifying force in Afghanistan and as a means of vaccinating Afghanistan from the infiltration of Iranian and Indian influence. Pakistani leaders had hoped that Taliban rule would ensure that Afghanistan remained a friendly state, and as such could provide Pakistan with a measure of strategic depth. Dropping the Taliban as an ally in 2001 was a difficult thing to do, and there was speculation that the ISI wanted to preserve the Taliban as an asset in Afghanistan.

Truth is, it is extraordinarily difficult for the government of Pakistan, even for an Army-led government, to seal off the Pashtun peoples in the tribal areas from interaction with their kinsmen in Afghanistan. The tribal areas were given a special dispensation of self-governing autonomy under British rule, in exchange for peaceful conditions. After independence in 1947, the Pakistan government left this arrangement largely intact. For Musharraf now to use military force in these areas against the tribes, who are citizens of Pakistan, would not only inflame that region and risk civil war but would arouse sympathy for the tribes elsewhere in Pakistan and strengthen the opposition to Musharraf's government in the national elections coming later this year. It is not surprising therefore that Musharraf might compromise or look for a way to finesse this issue until after the elections are over. It is also paradoxical that some Americans expect, and call for, forceful measures in Pakistan that go beyond those that a constitutional state can carry out under the rule of law.

At the same, the need to stabilize Afghanistan suggests that firmer action by Pakistan in the tribal borderland is in order, in Pakistan's national interest, not just in the interests of the West and those of Afghanistan. An opportunity is being presented to Pakistan to integrate the Pashtun areas more directly into the governmental framework of Pakistan. Using military means may be a necessary component of an integration strategy, especially under present circumstances. But an integration strategy would be more likely to succeed if it was combined with an economic development strategy for the Pashtun tribal region, on both sides of the Durand Line, the de facto border. This would require substantial resources, but those resources would be much less than those being spent today on military efforts to stabilize Afghanistan, seal off the border, or, as has been proposed, to build a wall between the two countries in that region.

It would contribute directly to a broadening of US relations with Pakistan if the US could, for security reasons, undertake commitments to help modernize the Pakistani tribal region and provide a good chunk of the resources that would be needed for this purpose. This would have to be a long term effort, as is already the case for reconstruction in Afghanistan, but Pakistan should not lose time in developing plans for the modernization of the tribal areas and their phased integration into the constitutional and governmental framework of Pakistan. Such an approach would not guarantee that all terrorist activity in that region will be eradicated quickly, but it is just such an approach that would offer the means of altering the social, economic and political conditions that make militancy so easy to generate in that region today.

### **Nuclear and Missile Proliferation**

The nuclear and missile conditions in the subcontinent changed rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s. Less than a decade has elapsed since India and Pakistan tested and demonstrated nuclear weapons. Both sides have further developed nuclear delivery systems since that landmark event. Pakistan has since become reasonably satisfied that it has a secure deterrent force. In the region today, it is Iran that is in the spotlight as an aspiring nuclear state. The disclosures of sensitive nuclear activity in Iran since 2000 were deepened by the uncovering of the nuclear black market network operated by Abdul Qadeer Khan for some two decades, during which uranium centrifuge enrichment technology was made available to Libya and Iran and probably to North Korea.

While the United States has backed off sanctions on Pakistan triggered by its earlier proliferation as a nation state, the A. Q. Khan Network disclosures in 2002 contained the potential for this issue to disrupt US-Pakistan relations. That potential was held back by the paramount importance on the U.S. side of an effective response to 9/11 and by Pakistan's willingness to join the War on Terror. Pakistan cut off

relations with the Taliban, and made facilities on its territory available to the United States to support coalition operations in Afghanistan. When public exposure of the A.Q. Khan network occurred, the United States essentially went along with President Musharraf's arrangements to put A.Q. Khan under house arrest and to conduct the investigation wholly on Pakistani soil. Musharraf's government has allowed written questions posed by the IAEA and presumably by some other governments to be answered after inquiry of A.Q. Khan, but he has not allowed direct interrogation of A.Q. Khan by foreigners. Musharraf has also granted A.Q. Khan a complete pardon, taking him beyond further prosecution under Pakistani law. This has left discomfort in the West that the network's operations may not have been fully uncovered and shut down. Nevertheless, the Bush administration had accepted this position for the time being, and has otherwise been preoccupied with the war in Iraq.

But new legislation began working its way through the US Congress in January 2007 that appears to be intended to reopen the A.Q. Khan Network issue. This undoubtedly is at the initiative of Democrats after gaining a majority in both houses. The legislation would, in effect, authorize the US president to demand that A. Q. Khan be made available for interrogation. If that demand were refused by Pakistan, according to the legislation Pakistan could be deemed uncooperative and if the US President so decided Pakistan would be subject to new sanctions that would bar the sale or delivery to Pakistan of major defense items, such as the promised sale of F-16 fighter aircraft.

This development poses a potential for disruption of the present quality of US-Pakistan relations even if sanctions are averted because public acrimony could be stirred by US inquiries based on this legislation. President Musharraf has indicated publicly before that A. Q. Khan will not be turned over to the United States or to the IAEA for independent interrogation. He has indicated that A.Q. Khan is revered in Pakistan as

a hero for providing the means for Pakistan to obtain atomic weapons and that any move to subject him to outside prosecution would generate enormous political opposition and unrest. There may be other reasons that the Pakistani governing elite would have for opposing a full investigation. In any case, if demands of this kind are pursued by the United States, they are likely to lead to an impasse and posturing by either side would have negative repercussions for other areas of cooperation. Pakistan has ridden out sanctions before, as in the case of Pressler sanctions, and almost certainly would do so again if it had no other choice.

The decade of sanctions was also the decade in the Taliban took hold in Afghanistan and al-Qaeda acquired sanctuary there. Warnings that disruption of relations with Pakistan could have other strategically damaging consequences for the United States, whether in the War on Terrorism as we understand it today, or in Pakistan's role on the nuclear ambitions of Iran, which is now on the radar screen, could be invoked to avoid an impasse and emotional political escalation that damages relations. But this is one of those areas where it is difficult to foresee clearly what actually will happen.

To think forward on the nuclear and missile proliferation problem, one should be clear that the underlying concern in the West is that Pakistan may become the source of nuclear proliferation elsewhere in the Middle East and also a source of missile proliferation, now that it has developed some mastery of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. The Musharraf government has provided assurances in these areas in the course of strategic dialogue with the United States, but it is not surprising that governments in the West would be wary of how events might unfold. Political changes in who governs Pakistan might usher in new compulsions. In fact, there is a growing apprehension in the West that Pakistan may some day, even through elections, be taken over by Islamist political parties and that radical views may come into place.



From a Western standpoint, there is ample precedent of this in Iran since its Islamic revolution in 1979, and the failure of elections in Iran to correct extremist agendas pursued, for example, through Hizbollah.

### **The India Issues**

The U.S. courtship of India over the last fifteen years has been difficult for the Pakistani establishment to watch. The 1998 nuclear tests temporarily set back US efforts to win India over to a new relationship. That India would be responsive to American overtures became clear only after the Kargil mini-war of 1999, but that event created a fairly big change in the minds of Indian political leaders about US intentions. The progressive lifting of sanctions by the West made it possible for the relationship to move forward. It should be emphasized that the US view of India has never been deeply negative. From the US standpoint, what kept the two apart were four factors: (1) close Indian ties with the Soviet Union, particularly in the area of arms transfers; (2) India's socialist pattern of economic modernization and barriers to trade with the West, and to Western investment; (3) India's congenitally deep suspicion of US intentions; and (4) India's secret desire to join the nuclear club and therefore de facto defiance of the nonproliferation regime based on internationally negotiated nuclear nonproliferation instruments.

US policy motivations for the relationship with India are expressed in terms of strategic cooperation, including helping India become a counterweight to China. Underlying motivations have much to do with expanding trade and investment in both directions. India's economic liberalization after 1991 was a critical turning point in India. And expatriate Indian success in the computer and information technology business fields in the United States and Western Europe were platforms for new initiatives in US-India relations.

What is noteworthy however is the maturity of Pakistani foreign policy and defense policy leadership in adjusting to the evolution of the new US-Indian relationship. The most sensitive part of this new relationship is US willingness to open up high technology transfers to India, with specific opening of cooperation in civilian nuclear technology. The same disposition to open up such technology cooperation with Pakistan is not present. Nevertheless, Pakistani leadership has been very practical about working on those areas that did open up as a result of US relaxation of sanctions in the economic and military equipment fields. In fact, Pakistan has done very well economically since 2001 with the forgiveness and rescheduling of international debt and with trade in its own right. This is highly commendable. Pakistani leaders have also made it clear that they do not need to compete with India militarily in numerical capabilities – tanks, aircraft, missiles, or what have you – but can rely on a proportionate defense capability related to their own circumstances.

Pakistani leaders since 1999 have also made significant headway in establishing a foundation for detente with India and for the adjustment of areas of contention, to reduce the likelihood of war. These steps include restraining Pakistani involvement with the insurgency in Kashmir. They include Musharraf's pledges not to allow terrorists to operate from Pakistani soil against any country. These areas of improvement of relations with India remain a work in progress, of course, but they are encouraging evidence that a new US-India relationship need not be threatening specifically to Pakistan.

The rising power of India does have some implications for Pakistan's relationship with China as its most reliable supplier of defense equipment. This is not a new relationship and it is broadening, even in a strategic sense, as with Chinese assistance in financing, designing, and engineering for the construction of, the new port at Gwadar, and plans for sharing in overland energy flow from the Middle East. The

Pakistani relationship with China today is a healthy one. It should be noted that China's backing of Pakistan has been qualified in certain areas that affect India, on Kashmir, for instance, and on Afghanistan. China is also concerned about the tendency of radical Islam to be the platform for secessionist activity in its far western province, particularly Xingiang.

India's rise as a regional power beyond the subcontinent will take time but the areas of immediate concern for Pakistan may well be India's gradually increasing naval importance. Naval exercises with the United States, Western European naval powers, and with Russia, give India's Navy new links with these foreign military services and increase the opportunities for coordinated action. These action areas include preventing piracy and keeping the flow of trade protected in the Indian Ocean and passages to the Pacific Ocean. They are also likely to work that way, if India's preferences are met, in the Arabian Sea and even the Persian Gulf. Pakistan's Navy has a potential importance in this same region in broader maritime security objectives, and in facilitating international energy security, and these are areas that may need more attention and resources than Pakistan has devoted to the Navy in the past.

### **Implications and Conclusions**

Pakistan and the United States are chained together in battling their respective demons. For the U.S., this requires an understanding that its current demon, Islamic terrorism, is actually strengthened by an overly heavy-handed and unilateral approach to Muslim countries overseas. This demon is also empowered by U.S. failure to use its influence energetically to help resolve the Israel-Palestinian problem. U.S. policy makers and legislators have yet to grasp how deeply recent U.S. actions, particularly in Iraq, have provoked a sense of rebellion against U.S. power and influence in the mainstream populations of Muslim

countries, and that this outcome was avoidable. Overcoming those feelings is an imperative, but will not be done overnight and will require a kind of patience and forbearance, as well as nuanced foreign policy that has been missing in recent years.

For Pakistan, the current demon might be defined as Islamic extremism, which would be broader than but inclusive of Islamic terrorism. This demon is the basis for a level of hostility to the West that creates turbulence within Pakistani society and that could lead to an unnecessarily defiant posture toward Western interests—a posture that could be as self-defeating as the effects on U.S. reputation of the intervention in Iraq. This demon is particularly difficult for Pakistan, or any Muslim country, to deal with because it arises in some sense from the faith and way of life, even though, arguably, it is a distorted version of that faith and way of life. Moreover, today it is a force that is strong throughout society, including the rising middle classes whose aspirations for modern amenities are also very strong. It is therefore not a force that can be disregarded or manipulated into submission.

The primary challenges for the future US-Pakistan relationship that have been reviewed here are several. The first was the likely impact of elections in both countries. The second concerned how the US and Pakistan can orient themselves in a fresh way to the repercussions of the War in Iraq, as popular attitudes to that enterprise have shifted in the US Congress and American public opinion. The third was how to deal with the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The fourth was nuclear and missile proliferation. The fifth was the issues generated for Pakistan by a new US-India relationship.

The return of Democrats to a majority in Congress at the end of 2006 could be followed in 2008 by a Democrat winning the Presidency. Pakistanis have tended to believe Republicans are closer to Pakistan than Democrats, and to some degree this may be true. But the

differences on this part of the world are not wide, and Democrats in power will not be eager to disrupt relations with Pakistan. The key to avoiding damage from electoral changes in America is to avoid getting tangled in showmanship and posturing. As for Pakistani elections in 2007, the expectation is that Musharraf will remain in power at the top but that the non-Islamist parties will gain ground, which could help the tenor of relations.

On the repercussions of the Iraq war, while the US presence will not disappear there overnight, it is likely to recede and revive a modicum of American maneuvering room in the region. For Pakistan, the issue is not how it could help the US salvage its reputation but rather how Pakistan could offer leadership among the Muslim countries in helping to rehabilitate a unified Iraq. This could be an opportunity also for Pakistan to find outlets for its expertise in technical areas of infrastructure and construction in an oil-producing state. That in itself could be very positive for US-Pakistani relations.

The challenge of helping advance stability in Afghanistan means not only continuing to ferret out al-Qaeda elements but also taking firm measures to restrain support for the revived Taliban insurgency from the Pashtun tribal areas of Pakistan. High US expectations in this are understandable and many US functionaries may not appreciate how difficult the problem is. The best approach to solutions, coupling economic development initiatives with limited complementary use of force, may take time to work. But time should not be lost in moving the economic and political initiatives forward.

On the issue of nuclear and missile proliferation and the specific problem of A.Q. Khan, it seems highly likely that new US pressure and threats of sanctions will be brought to bear on Islamabad. Cool and consistent positions here may avert sanctions, especially if Pakistan can strengthen its existing assurances that it will not be a party to nuclear or

missile proliferation to other countries. If the threats in emerging US legislation lead to actual sanctions, the effect will be disruptive for US-Pakistan relations but since the US may be the bigger loser in the end, a better way may be found through the maze.

Developments in US-India relations have the potential to increase national security threats to Pakistan. In this light, Pakistani responses have been surprisingly mature and devoid of overreactions. This makes good sense for how Pakistanis can manage their problems with India while keeping the US on a positive track with regard to Pakistani interests. Pakistan's persistence in seeking an improved relationship with India is noteworthy. Fortunately, India is responding positively to Pakistani overtures, albeit at a slow pace. Ultimately, better relations with India will be good for Pakistan in many ways. So if this path is maintained, it could contribute to greater stability in the future of US-Pakistan relations.

## References

<sup>1</sup> There is, as yet, no universally accepted legal definition of terrorism, nor is it likely that there will be one soon. If one is dealing with the subject of terrorism strictly as an academic matter, discussion may or may not produce agreement on terms, definition, and to whom they apply, and if there is no agreement the academic discussion goes on inconclusively. Some academics can afford that inconclusiveness, but policy makers cannot. In the policy context of US-Pakistan relations, to which the conference and this paper speak, the author assumes that there is a modicum of agreement – a common ground -- among participants on what terrorism is and that it could be useful, on that basis, to discuss cooperative measures that could produce mutually beneficial results and in due course strengthen the relationship. This paper has been prepared in that spirit.

That said, it may be worth stating what this author assumes are the behaviors that fall under the general rubric of terrorism and that may be relevant to policy: (1) Terrorism is violence perpetrated against victims for political ends, usually to intimidate citizens or authorities in order to generate leverage on the policies or actions of the government in the host state. This violence is outside the legal system and is by definition illegal. Most contemporary terrorism takes this form, and is perpetrated by non-state actors against states and their citizens. (2) Mega-terrorism, characteristic of our era of globalization, is violence perpetrated by non-state actors on a large scale, often at considerable distance, using contemporary means of lethality, travel and communications to achieve results that may be regarded as strategically significant or disabling to a targeted country. (3) Terrorism can also take the form of violent actions by states against their own citizens, to maintain the power of the state or of its rulers – this type being referred to as state terrorism. State terrorism may use a state's legal institutions to pursue its ends. Functioning democracies abhor state terrorism. State terrorism is regarded as illegitimate by most of the international community. (4) Terrorism is not war between states and combat between their military forces, as interstate war is classically understood, although some states at war have been known to use terrorist means or techniques as a part of their arsenal of offensive or defensive measures against their opponents. (5) Guerrilla warfare is not synonymous with terrorism, but insofar as guerrilla fighters use terrorist violence as a technique (e.g., against civilians), there is considerable overlap with terrorism. (6) State-sponsored terrorism is a form of state terrorism outside a state's national borders clandestinely organized against the authorities or citizens of another society or in a disputed area.

Where this paper focuses on terrorism as one area of cooperative action among several in US-Pakistan relations, it deals with terrorism by non-state actors as defined primarily in categories 1 and 2, and, when applicable, category 6, above. The category 1 and 2 phenomena in South Asia with global linkages or implications have already been addressed by US-Pakistani counter-terrorist cooperation since September 2001. This paper does not deal with state terrorism, terrorism in interstate war, or guerrilla warfare in the classical sense. Rather it concentrates on how the US and Pakistan can cooperate to contain and reduce terrorism perpetrated by non-state actors. In the wake of 9/11, and from an American perspective, this primarily means cooperation against the perpetrators of long-distance terrorism and measures to deny them sanctuaries. Inasmuch as Afghanistan was a sanctuary and now is the focus of an international effort to rebuild the country, it also focuses on terrorist groups and actions that would destabilize that country or create sanctuaries there or in ethnolinguistically adjacent areas of Pakistan.

<sup>2</sup> The other Democrats who have announced, formed exploratory committees, or are talked about as candidates for the presidency in 2008 include: Senators Joe Biden (Delaware), Chris Dodd (Connecticut), and John Kerry (Massachusetts, and the party's candidate in 2004); former Vice-President Al Gore; Governors Tom Vilsack (Iowa) and Bill Richardson (New Mexico); and Congressman Dennis Kucinich (OH). Senator John Kerry announced on January 23 that he would seek reelection in the Senate in 2008 and would not seek the Democratic nomination for the presidency.

<sup>3</sup> Republicans who have announced or are regarded as plausible candidates for the presidency in 2008 include: former New York City mayor, Rudolph Giuliani; former Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich (Georgia); former Governors Mitt Romney (Massachusetts), Jim Gilmore (Virginia), and Tommy Thompson (Wisconsin); Senator Sam Brownback (Kansas); and Congressmen Duncan Hunter (R-California), Ron Paul (R-Texas), Tom Tancredo (R-Colorado).



# ISLAM, SECULARISM AND DEMOCRACY PAKISTAN: A CASE STUDY

*Ambassador Mansoor Alam*

## **Introduction**

I believe that the subject of my paper "Islam, Secularism and Democracy Pakistan: A Case Study" has an important bearing on the current situation in Pakistan and the larger world of Islam. It is so because in my view only secularism and democracy can lead to religious peace and political stability in Pakistan and in other Islamic countries. Moreover, progress, prosperity and modernity of the entire Islamic world and the fulfillment of the cherished desire of Muslims to regain their lost power and prestige depends on the adoption and practice of these two systems. Muslims, therefore, need to look at these concepts with an open mind rather than reject them out of hand, simply because they have been adopted by the West in the last two hundred years. The view of this research paper is that far from being a threat to Islam, these concepts are deeply rooted in its teachings. Since this is contrary to the commonly held view among Muslims as well as non-Muslims, we need to look first at what is understood by secularism in Muslim countries and what it denotes in the West.

The common and prevalent translation of the word "secularism" in Urdu, Arabic, Persian and Turkish dictionaries, the four main languages of Muslims, is "ladeenia" or "ghair-manhabee"<sup>1</sup>, which means without religion or non-religious, therefore, by implication, un-Islamic. The Muslim orthodoxy in Islamic countries is unanimous in its opposition to the very mention of this word in Islamic countries and considers its advocacy for an Islamic country close to blasphemy. However, if we look at the meaning and definition of this word in Western languages, it becomes obvious that in none of them does this word mean anti-religion. The Webster International Dictionary gives three meanings:

(1) Of or relating to the world or temporal as distinguished from the spiritual, (2) of or relating to the state as distinguished from the Church and (3) not formally related or controlled by a religious body.

The Oxford English Dictionary defines the word as:

(1) Concerned with the affairs of the world, not spiritual and (2) not concerned with religion or religious belief.

The same definition is given in French, German, Italian, Spanish as well as dictionaries of other Western languages. Thus, no Western language defines secularism as anti-religious or anti-God.

In practice, all Western countries allow complete freedom of religion to each and every individual or group of individuals living within their national boundaries. This has become such an integral feature of their polity that no country claiming to be secular is regarded as secular unless its constitution guarantees complete freedom of religion to its residents including foreigners, its government remains neutral in the matter of religion, gives equal religious rights to all, uses the power of the state to protect this freedom and its courts safeguard it as an inalienable fundamental human right.

To sum up, the basic meaning and characteristics of secularism as understood and practiced in the West are:

(a) Total religious freedom to all citizens and residents (b) non-interference by the state in religious matters, (c) non-interference by the Church in the functioning of the state, i.e., separation of the state and the church, (d) incorporation of this principle in the constitution and (e) protection of religious freedom by the judiciary as an inalienable

fundamental right of every citizen.

Consequently, we see that today, in all Western Christian countries, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists and followers of all other religions are free to build their places of worship and preach and practice their faith so long as they do not denounce any other religion. In short, secularism in the West is not laideenism or irreligiousness as interpreted in Islamic countries. What the word secular really means is that a secular state has no right to determine the faith of its citizens or discriminate between them or adopt the religious laws of any faith as the laws of the state to be applied to the followers of other religions. Thus, complete freedom to all people to believe or not to believe in any religion and maintenance of strict neutrality and attitude of non-discrimination between various religions and their sects is the essence and core of secularism.

Nevertheless, ulemas in general and Pakistani ulemas in particular feel such antipathy for this concept that they threaten to come out in the street and use violence even at the very mention of this word in the context of Pakistan. The fact is that they confuse secularism with communism. Therefore, we need study the teachings of Islam as given in the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the prophet of Islam (saw).

All Muslims believe that the first source of Islamic laws, morality, politics and economy and ethics is the Holy Quran and the second source the Sunnah (practice) of the Prophet (saw), provided they are authentic. As such, the injunctions of Quran on religious freedom and the practice of the Prophet (saw) should be our two most authentic and permanent guides on the subject. Therefore, I will quote here a few verses of the Quran on the subject, which are repeated in the Quran in many other verses. For the sake of authenticity, I have taken most of these quotations from the English translation of Quran by Dr Muhammad Taqi-ud-Din Al-Hilali, former Professor of Islamic Faith

and Teachings, Islamic University Al-Madinah and Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan, former Director, University Hospital of the same University, published by The King Fahd Complex for the printing of the Holy Qur'an and manuscripts.

The first quotation is from the Surah Al-Baqara or the Cow which is the second Surah of the Qur'an. This is a Madani and most important Surah, because it was revealed after the migration of the Holy Prophet (saw) to the city of Madinah in 622 CE (beginning of the Islamic calendar) and the establishment of the first Islamic State under his leadership. It is also the longest Surah and considered by Islamic scholars as a summary of the holy Book of Islam. I start with three passages from this Surah:

One): 2:62 Those who believe and those who are Jews and Christians and Sabians, (star worshippers), *whoever believes in Allah and the Last Day and does righteous deeds shall have their reward with their Lord. On them will be no fear nor shall they grieve.*

Two): 2:136 Say (O Muslims) we believe in Allah and that which has been sent down to us and that which has been sent down to Ibrahim, Ismail, Ishaq, Yaqub, and the tribes, (his 12 sons) and that which has been given to Musa and Isa *and that which has been given to (all) the Prophets from their Lord. We make no distinction between any of them.*

Three): 2:256 La Ikraha fid Din , or *there is no compulsion in Religion*

Four): 109 Surah Al-Kaferoon, Say (O Prophet) to these disbelievers; I worship not that which you worship, nor will you worship that which I worship, and I shall not worship that which you are worshipping, nor will you worship

that which I worship, *To you be your religion and to me my religion.*

Five): 6:104 Surah Al-Anam, "verily proofs have come unto you from your Lord, so whosoever sees, will do so for (the good of) his own self, and whosoever blinds himself will do so to his own harm, and I (Prophet saw) am not a watcher over you, .

Six): 42:6 Surah Al-Shura, and as for those who take as guardians others besides Him, Allah is watcher over them, and *you (O Muhammad) are not a guardian over them.*

Seven): 6:107 Surah Al-An am, Had Allah willed, they would not have taken others besides Him in worship. And We have not made you a watcher over them nor are you a trustee over them.

Eight): 5:48 Surah Al-Ma'idah to each among you we have prescribed a law and a clear way. *If Allah had so willed, He would have made you one nation.*

These verses clearly and unambiguously set the principles of 1) religious freedom, 2) personal responsibility of every person for his/her own acts and deeds and 3) assign to the Prophet (PBUH) the job of only conveying the message of Allah to people and not to impose his religion on them. It needs to be noted that these verses grant religious freedom not only to the people of the Book or Ahl Al-Kitab i.e., Jews and Christians but also Sabians, who worshiped planets and stars<sup>2</sup>, which puts them in the category of Mushrekeen, (those who associate other things with God) and to the Kuffar or non-believers (Surah Al-Kaferoon). It also needs to be noted that the Qur'an repeatedly tells the Prophet (PBUH) that he was only a messenger of

Allah, sent to convey His message and not to act as a guardian over the non-believers because there is no compulsion in religion .

Accordingly, the Prophet (PBUH) implemented these injunctions during his lifetime as the undisputed and all-powerful leader of the very first Islamic state that he established in Madinah in 622 CE and of which he remained the leader and the ruler until his death in 632 CE. The first practical example of religious freedom he granted to all persons living in the city at that time was Mithaq Al-Madinah , or the Covenant of Madinah in which he defined the rights and obligations of Muslims inter-se as well as of Muslims and Jews. The document is carefully preserved in the book of Al-Hisham and the following passage, which relates to Jews, is taken from *The Spirit of Islam* by Ameer Ali:

The Jews who attach themselves to our commonwealth shall be protected from insults and vexations, they shall have an equal right with our own people to our assistance and good offices. The Jews of various branches shall form with the Muslims one complete nation. *They shall practice their religion as freely as Muslims*, their allies and clients shall enjoy security and freedom<sup>3</sup>.

The Jews continued to enjoy this freedom and protection until the three Jewish tribes of Bani Qanuqa, Bani Nadir and Bani Qurayzah each broke their treaty with the Muslims and were expelled from their land and some of them executed<sup>4</sup>.

The second example of tolerance for others' faith, including one's worst enemies, was set by the Prophet (saw) when he entered the city of Makkah as a conqueror in 630 CE. On that occasion, he granted complete amnesty to all its residents, who were mostly kuffars (non-believers). He forbade his followers from harming any one except in self-defense and also ordered them to take particular care of the elderly, the women and the children. Moreover, he issued a special decree

declaring the house of Abu Sufian, who had led the army of the Kuffars of Makkah in the battles of Badr and Uhud, as a sanctuary for all no matter how great an enemy of Muslims and Islam he might have been before the city surrendered to the Prophet (saw). It was an unprecedented act of magnanimity by any conqueror in history before and after him.

The Prophet (saw) maintained the same policy of tolerance during the remaining two years of his life. Although he was now the unchallenged ruler of the whole of Arabia and could have adopted a policy of forced conversion of non-Muslims, he did not do that. This was in keeping with various Qur'anic injunctions such as (2:256) and others quoted above. The example of the Prophet was followed by many other Muslim conquerors and rulers after him. Here this paper draws attention to the following few of the well known historical facts of religious tolerance and freedom shown to people of other religions by victorious Muslim commanders and rulers.

One) while Umar (RA), the second pious caliph after the death of Prophet Muhammad (saw), was visiting Jerusalem following the most peaceful and bloodless conquest of that city<sup>5</sup> and the time for prayer came, he was invited by the Patriarch of Jerusalem Sophronius to offer prayers in the Church of Sepulcher. Caliph Umar, however, declined the offer saying that it might set a precedent and result in the conversion of the church into a mosque by latter Muslims<sup>6</sup>.

Two) when the commander of the Muslim army, which conquered Egypt, reached St. Catherine's Monastery in the foothills of Mount Sinai and was about to enter it, the High Priest showed him a letter from the Prophet (saw) with his seal on it giving complete protection to the Monastery. Once the authenticity of that letter was established, the commander turned away and till today, St. Catherine's monastery remains a protected church.

Three) when Muhammad bin Qasim conquered Sindh (then called Daibul), in 713 CE, he addressed its residents saying: *All human beings are created by Allah and are equal in His eyes*. In my religion, only those who are kind to fellow human beings are worthy of respect. Cruelty and oppression are prohibited in our law. We fight only those who are unjust. Later, the following treaty was drawn up with the locals:

On behalf of the commander of the faithful, I, Habib bin Muslim, grant amnesty to all the people of Daibul and hereby ensure their personal safety, security of their temples, women, children and property<sup>7</sup>

Four) I quote this passage from Karen Armstrong's book, *The Battle for God* :

The Spanish reconquistas of the old Muslim territories of Al-Andalus was a catastrophe for the Jews. In Islamic state, the three religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam had been able to live together in relative harmony for over six hundred years. The Jews in particular had enjoyed a cultural and spiritual renaissance and they were not subject to pogroms that were the lot of Jewish people in rest of Europe<sup>8</sup>.

These are just a few examples of religious tolerance demonstrated by Muslims during the time of their ascendancy. It does not mean that no excesses were ever committed by Muslim rulers, conquerors and armies in the name of Islam, but they were few and far between and against the letter and spirit of the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet (PBUH). On the whole, it can be said without any fear of contradiction that:

(1) Islam advocates religious freedom as a fundamental tenet of its belief system. (2) It considers the prophets of all religions as equal, which means that no religion can claim superiority over the other, (3) it believes in the diversity of religions and nations because the Qur'an says: *If Allah had so willed, He would have made you one nation* (5:58).



The position taken by the Qur'an and implemented by the Prophet (saw) were in sharp contrast to the teachings of the Torah (The Old Testament), the Bible (New Testament) and the history of Jews and Christians, when they were in power. The examples given below is not to denigrate them in any way but to show that of the three related monotheistic religions of the Levant and Arabia, Islam stands out as the strongest proponent and practitioner of religious tolerance and freedom, the two concepts which are at the heart of secularism.

The following passages are from Deuteronomy, in which Moses, just before his death, conveys to Joshua, who succeeded him as the leader of the Jews, the Lord's commands before he leads the Israelites across the Jordan River into the Promised Land:

#### Deuteronomy:

(31:3): The Lord, thy God, He will go over before thee, and He will destroy these nations from before thee, and thou shalt possess them ; (31:4) , And the Lord shall do unto them as He did to Sihon and to Og, kings of the Amorites, and unto the land of them, whom He destroyed<sup>9</sup>.

#### Joshua:

And they utterly destroyed all that was in the city, both man and woman, young and old, and ox, and sheep, and ass, with the edge of the sword , (6:21): And the Lord said unto Joshua, Fear not, neither be thou dismayed: take all the people of war with thee, and arise, go up to Ai: see I have given into thy hand the king of Ai, and his people, and his city, and his land. (8:1). And thou shall do to Ai and her king as thou didst unto Jericho and her king , (8:8) And it shall be, when ye have taken the city, that ye shall set the city on fire: according to the commandment of the Lord , (8:2). And, it came to pass, when Israel had made an end of slaying all the inhabitants of Ai in the field, in the wilderness wherein they chased them, when they were all fallen on the edge of the sword, until they were consumed, that all the Israelites returned unto Ai, and smote it with the edge of the sword , (8:24)

And so it was, that all that fell that day, both of men and women, were twelve thousand, even all the men of Ai (8:25)<sup>10</sup>.

The same fate was meted out to the rest of the cities of Palestine; the Hittite, the Canaanite, the Perizzite, the Hivite and the Jebusite that the Israelites captured with the help of their God the Lord. The Jewish golden period continued and culminated in the reign of Prophets David and Solomon (AS), but after them the Jewish Kingdom got divided into Israel and Judah, which began to fight and conspire against each other. This ultimately resulted in their destruction and captivity by the Assyrians and Babylonians for over 50 years, from 597 until 547 BC, when they were set free by another Babylonian king.

Later in their history, during the period of Roman rule over them, what the Jews did to Jesus Christ (AS) is well known and is described in great detail in the New Testament or Bible. But even after the crucifixion of Christ (AS), the Jews, because of their religious beliefs, continued to incite the Romans to treat the early Christians with harshness as a result of which the latter suffered cruelty, persecution and executions for almost three hundred years until the Roman emperor Constantine converted to Christianity in 323 CE.

While some may dismiss the above as ancient history, the harsh treatment of the Palestinians by Israel since its creation in 1948 cannot, however, be ignored as a thing of the past. The fact is that successive Israeli governments have indiscriminately killed tens of thousands of Palestinian men, women and children, terrorized most of them forced millions into exile and occupied their lands forcefully simply on the basis that the Holy Land of Judea and Samaria is promised in the Torah by God their Lord to their ancestors Abraham, Isaac, Jacob (AS) and their offspring, the Israelites. And it is not only the ultra orthodox Jews who believe in the absolute validity of the Torah till today but a majority of Israelis also find in the Torah a justification for the occupation of Palestinian land and for their inhuman treatment.

As for the Christians, the teachings of Jesus Christ (AS) and the Bible, unlike that of the Torah, are the most humane. Nowhere do they preach religious intolerance towards others. To the contrary, instead of an eye for an eye, as inscribed in the Torah, the Bible tells the Christians to turn the other cheek. Here, I quote from Mathew 5:43-44, which quotes the words of Jesus Christ (PBUH):

*Ye have heard that it hath been said, thou shalt love thy neighbor, and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you<sup>11</sup>.*

And yet, history is full of the cruelest treatment that the Christians practiced on the Jews once they gained power. I have already quoted above a passage from Karen Armstrong's book, *The Battle for God* regarding the condition of Spanish Jews under Muslim rule. Here is what Armstrong writes about the collective punishment that was given to them by King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella, after the last Muslim Kingdom of Granada had fallen to them in 1492:

As the Christian armies gradually advanced through the peninsula., conquering more and more territory from Islam, they brought this anti-Semitism with them. In 1378 and 1391, the Jewish community in both Aragon and Castile were attacked by Christians, who dragged Jews to the baptismal fonts and forced them on pain of death to convert to Christianity. Further on, she writes: When Ferdinand and Isabella conquered Granada in 1492, they signed the Edict of Expulsion and Spanish Jewry was destroyed. About 170,000 Jews converted to Christianity; the remaining 130,000 went into exile. The loss of Spanish Jewry was mourned by the Jews all over the world as the greatest catastrophe since the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem in 70 CE<sup>12</sup>.

The final chapter of Christian persecution of European Jews for nearly 2000 years came to an end only with the horrors of the Holocaust and the defeat of Hitler by the Allied Powers in 1945. The excesses committed by the Crusaders against the Muslims and the Jews alike are also well known and stand in stark contrast with the humane treatment given to the Christians by Salahuddin Al-Ayubi when he re-conquered Jerusalem in 1187. The same tradition of tolerance and religious freedom continued to be practiced by the Ottomans and the Moghuls, two of the most powerful empires of the world from 14th to 18th centuries, who allowed almost complete religious freedom to their non-Muslim subjects until their collapse. On the other hand, the history of inquisitions and religious wars in Europe before and after the birth of Protestantism in 1517, when Martin Luther proclaimed his 95 Theses, till the eve of the French Revolution in 1789, is too well known to be recounted here.

It was only after the Christians of various sects had done enough mutual killings without solving the basic problem of which sect held the absolute truth that they realized that the only answer to the perennial problem of internecine sectarian bloodshed lay in religious freedom, tolerance for others' faith and separation of the state and the church. Thus, unlike Islam which preaches religious freedom, secularism was born in the West as a result of the futility of religious and sectarian wars among the Christians that had made their lives nasty, brutish and short, to use Hobbes' description of the situation that prevailed in the Christian West before Western countries adopted secularism and democracy as two basic elements of their political system.

So we need to examine the riddle as to why (1) all orthodox Muslims and most others reject the concept of secularism, though, as shown above, it is in keeping with the letter and spirit of Islam? (2) Do Muslims have an alternative to it, particularly in this time and age?

The view of this paper is that orthodoxy's opposition to secularism is result of misperception that the decline of the Church in the political affairs of western world happened in the wake of the birth of Protestantism and Reformation, which were the harbingers of secularism in the West. The American and French revolutions that finally buried the formal role of the Pope (i.e., the Church) in the affairs of the state firmly and formally made secularism a cornerstone of the political edifice of the new Europe. The most symbolic display of this was given by Napoleon when he took the crown from the hands of the Pope and put it on his head in 1803. And even before that the US had adopted secularism as a principle of its constitution.

It was about this same time that the Ottoman Empire's decline as a world power had begun. As for the second Muslim power, the Moghul Empire of India, it had begun to disintegrate soon after the death of Emperor Aurangzeb in 1707 and had practically ceded control of most of the territory to the British by 1756. By then, the Moguls were in such disarray that even their own governors had begun to defy them and become rulers of their satrapies and assume the titles of Sultans, Nawabs and Rajas. The decline of these two Muslim world powers and their replacement by the emerging Christian states of Britain, France and Russia, who began to occupy and colonize Muslim populations and territories coincided with the gradual transformation of European states from Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox Christian countries into secular democratic republics. This created a perception among the Muslim intelligentsia that secularism and democracy were responsible, together with modern scientific education, not only for the termination of the role of the Church in the affairs of western states but also for the decline and downfall of Muslim powers. As a result, they developed an antipathy for every thing western, politics, economics, science and technology. It is well known that the Saudi orthodoxy violently opposed the advent of both the telephone and the television in the

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as late as 1950s.

An equally, if not, more important reason for the rejection of secularism by orthodoxy seems to be the radical transformation of western societies' moral values from Victorian prudishness to liberal ethos, particularly women's emancipation and their increased participation in the social, economic and political life in the west. This was anathema to Muslim orthodoxy in spite of the fact that of the three monotheistic religions Islam was the most progressive in raising the status of women some 1400 years ago almost to that of men in the present day west. For instance, Islam gave women the right to marry, divorce, inherit property, do business and so, but the orthodoxy began to misinterpret the injunctions of the Qur'an and examples of Sunnah regarding woman's chastity (Hijab) and economic dependence on man to assert man's domination over woman. Very soon they reduced the status of women close to that of chattels and slaves.

Till today a majority of women in most Islamic countries are confined within the four walls of their houses without education, legal rights and under the domination of men. As orthodoxy had played a major role in the degeneration of women's status, it naturally opposed any tendency that was likely to result in the liberation of Muslim women from the perverted tribal, feudal and Mullah dominated culture to an individual with equal rights. Since they thought that secularism was one of the reasons responsible for the weakening of Christianity's hold in the west and emancipation of western women, they opposed secularism as anti-Islamic.

Another development that seems to have created antipathy for secularism among the Muslims especially the orthodoxy was the rise of Nationalism and Communism in the west, both of which were contrary to the two fundamental concepts of Islam: a) brotherhood of Muslims (Ummah) and b) the existence of God. Communism negated the latter

and nationalism the former. Since the Muslim orthodoxy saw secularism to be the mother of both, it naturally created revulsion against it. The opposition of Indian religious leaders to the creation of Pakistan was based on the belief that Islam does not believe in territorial nationhood.

Finally, the abolition of Khilafat in Turkey in 1922 which had assumed religious sanctity for the Muslims and its replacement by a secular republic, were additional reasons why Muslim Orthodoxy developed a negative attitude towards secularism. Moreover, Kemal Ataturk who held the Turkish ulema along with the aristocracy responsible for the degeneration and backwardness of Turkey and its decline as a world power treated them harshly and many of them eliminated. Consequently, this caused the Muslim orthodoxy everywhere to further hate secularism as anti-Islamic.

Thus, the widespread political, social, economic, cultural and scientific developments in the West which led to the decline of religious influence of the Church and its definitive exclusion from the affairs of the state created a collective antipathy among the Muslim orthodoxy against secularism. This happened particularly after kamal Ataturk declared Turkey to be a secular country and completely ended Islam and Turkish Ulema's official role in affairs of the state. It was very difficult for them to accept that Islam which was the last and most perfect divine religion and their adherence to the outdated interpretation of its scripture and laws was the real cause of the decline of Islamic civilization. The real cause they thought and still think lay in Muslims' deviation from the true path and division of Ummah on the basis of ethnicity, clans and tribes.

Their response to the challenges posed by the ascending secular West was to try to revive in the Muslim masses the same Islamic spirit which existed during the time of Prophet Muhammad (saw) and the four

pious Caliphs and had resulted in the spectacular triumph of Islam from Persia to Spain. In other words, they tried to resort to the measures and hopes that all self-appointed guardians of waning ideologies try to do in the first instance; revive the old spirit and reunite the believers.

The leading Muslim traditionalists or Salafis starting with Sheikh Mohammed Ibn Abdul Wahab of Saudi Arabia<sup>13</sup> and Shah Waliullah of India<sup>14</sup> in the 18<sup>th</sup> century to Abul Ala Maudoodi and Sheikh Hasan Ali Banna in the 20<sup>th</sup>, each one worked for the revival of fundamentalist Islam. Another response came from reformers like Jamaluddin Afghani and his followers who preached Pan-Islamism as the first pre-requisite of Islamic renaissance. Though neither of the two responses succeeded, they left a strong tradition of conservatism and belief that if the Muslims could only become true Muslims and one Ummah again, they would re-emerge as a world power and be able to counter western domination in all walks of life. But while the Muslim orthodoxy could not stop the influx of western machines and technologies and even adopted them readily after initial opposition, it succeeded in creating a misperception about the political technologies of the west, i.e., secularism and democracy along with science and modernization, as anti-Islamic. Hence, it opposed not only secularism but also scientific education in general. For instance, the teaching sciences philosophy and all modern subjects are disallowed in the traditional Islamic seminaries called Madrassah.

The failure of the great revolt of 1857 against the British in India and the defeat of Turkey in the World War One that led to the abolition of the institution of Caliphate in 1922, struck a fatal blow to Muslim orthodoxy's first attempt to free themselves from the domination of the West and for the revival of Islam. But they did not bring about any change in their basic approach to the challenge posed by the continued domination of the West. A new batch of fundamentalist leaders with



the same bent of mind as Sheikh Abdul Wahab and Shah Waliullah came forth. The leader of this second wave in India was Mawlana Abul Aala Mawdoodi who founded a party called Jamat-e-Islami in India, which opposed Quaid-e-Azam and the creation of Pakistan. It is now part of the MMA, a coalition of religious parties in Pakistan, which is headed by the present day leader of Jamat-e-Islami.

The Jamat-e-Islami remains wedded to its original mission of challenging western domination of the world and bringing about an Islamic revival on the basis of fundamentalism and reuniting all the Muslims into one Ummah. However, it has failed to achieve these objectives even within Pakistan because the reality is that Muslims have been irreversibly divided on national, ethnic and sectarian lines. Moreover Islam's golden past cannot be revived any more than the golden past of Greek and Roman Empires could be by orthodox Christians in their Dark Age.

The history of decolonization of Islamic states clearly shows that the only idea that appealed to the Muslim masses during the latter period of colonization and continues to do so till today is that of territorial nationalism. That is why instead of following the conservative Mullahs of India they followed a liberal, educated and modern leader like Mohammad Ali Jinnah for the creation of Pakistan. Similarly from Indonesia to Algeria, all the leaders of freedom movements, like Sukarno and Boumediene, were liberal and modern in their outlook and appealed to the territorial nationalism of the masses rather than Islam's golden past to win independence.

The current wave of terrorism by Al-Qaeda in the name Jihad is nothing but a continuation of the same failed approach adopted by the traditionalists of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. Consequently, it too will neither reunite the Muslims into an Ummah nor revive in them the Islamic spirit of the first generation Muslims that led to their

domination of the world in a short period of fifty years.

### **Is there an alternative to secularism for the Muslims of today?**

In the opinion of this study, there is no alternative to it and sooner the Muslims recognize this reality the better it will be for them. Those who are opposed to secularism need to understand that soon after the death of the Prophet (saw), the Muslims ceased to be an Ummah and have steadily got more and more polarized into sects, nations and states on political, religious, territorial and linguistic bases. These states have also steadily moved away from being Shariah-based-states to ones in which the rulers and governments have been drafting the laws and interpreting the Shariah to suit their own purposes. This process started as early as the reign of the first four Caliphs (Khulafa Al-Rashideen), who were companions of the Prophet (saw). Since then the polarization among Muslims has only grown stronger and irreversible. Moreover, the ever changing condition of Muslims with the acquisition of more territories and subjugation of non-Muslims having their own culture and history compelled the Muslim caliphs, emperors and kings to find new responses to the challenges of assimilating the new population in the body politic of their states. These inevitably led to growing chasm between the rulers and the Ulemas (state and church). The fact that no consensus existed among the Imams/Ulemas/ Muftis on various issues of Shariah law, and that they frequently disagreed with each other violently, made their position even weaker vis-a-vis the rulers. The natural consequence of this process was that the shariah of the Qur'an and the Prophet (saw) was gradually reduced to the shariah of various sects, with each claiming its own version to be the right one.

There was, however, nothing new or peculiar in this situation. The ever increasing polarization of the followers of a faith/religion is a constant phenomenon of human history. A study of history reveals that a purely religious or theocratic state, i.e., where one man decides both the

spiritual and the temporal affairs, has existed only during the lifetime of three Prophets David, Solomon and Muhammad (PBUT) who were prophets as well as became rulers of their nations. All other prophets mentioned in the Torah, the Bible and the Qur'an were Prophets but could not become the rulers.

As for the three states of Prophets David, Solomon and Muhammad (PBUT), their followers they were not impervious to the natural law of polarization and transformation. The reason being that with their death died The Authority which alone was chosen by God to receive, interpret and implement His messages. Hence their death severed the direct link of the community with the Divine and left it on its own to find the right answers to new problems and challenges. Consequently, it did not take very long for the community to get divided into sects, sub-sects and sects within sects with each claiming to understand the true meaning of the original message. The process soon degenerated into violent sectarian disagreements and conflicts, which kept on aggravating with the passage of time never to revert to the unity that existed during the times of these Prophets.

Another cause of religious division arises from the fact that human nature prevents the followers of one religion from accepting the prophets of any other. For instance, while the Jews believed in the appearance of a Messiah, they rejected Jesus Christ (AS) in spite of the fact that he was born a Jew, possessed even more powerful miracles than Moses (AS) himself and demonstrated those miracles over and over again. But his miracles were not enough to convince the High Priests to give up their old laws and accept Jesus as a new prophet. Similarly, when Prophet Muhammad (saw) appeared, both the Jews and the Christians rejected him even though the Qur'an confirmed the Torah and the Bible as divine books and ordained some of their laws and ethics into the Islamic Shariah.

What happened to Jews, Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, Zoroastrians and others also happened to Muslims, in spite of the fact that the Qur'an tells Muslims to hold fast, all together, by the rope which Allah (stretches out) and be not divided among yourselves (Surah Al-Imran 3:103) and to conduct their affairs by mutual consultation, (Surah al-Shurah, 42:38). Muslims feel bewildered by their internal divisions and decline as world power in the face of the fact that the Holy Qur'an remains a written, protected and unchanged book and will remain so till the Day of Judgment. They do not realize that while the Qur'an remains the same the Prophet who alone could give an authentic interpretation of its various verses, was no longer with them in person. Therefore, differences over the meaning of Qur'anic verses and Prophet's Sunnah were bound to appear and deepen with the passage of time and to sects and sub-sects, each believing its own interpretation and practices to be the only right ones.

Consequently, sectarian strifes, murders and even wars among Muslims, more or less on the same lines of religious wars, killings and persecution among Jews and Christians before, have been taking place throughout Islamic history. Today the situation has degenerated into a condition which is aptly summed up by Anwar Sayed, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, USA, in these words:

An extremist believer goes out and kills another believer, one who wears a proper beard, prays and fasts as required, rejects Western culture, keeps his women at home and above all is a religious scholar and preacher. He is killed because some of his beliefs and practices are a bit different from those of his assassin. The latter insists that all other be like him in all respects. He has no use for diversity and pluralism; he will settle for nothing less than complete uniformity even if it has to be forced upon the people<sup>15</sup>.

The irony is that Muslims refuse to learn from their own history or from that of others. The lesson to be learnt by Muslims in general and Pakistani ulemas in particular is that with the passage of time the schism in a community on religious issues grows bigger instead of narrowing and the appearance of highly pious and learned religious scholars only tends further the chasm. Hence the only way to end the sectarian strife and violence and achieve peace and harmony in the community is to allow freedom of belief to all sects. The fatwa of Kufr and blasphemy by one against the other only leads to more division, violence and debilitation of the nation.

In other words, secularism is the only antidote to the problems caused by the natural process of polarization of an ideology-based nation. The Christians learnt this lesson after a few hundred years of internecine bloodshed. However, the Muslims remain embroiled in sectarian divide and conflicts by rejecting secularism, even though the Holy Qur'an clearly states that the use of force to impose one's own religion on others is not the right path. And since the Prophet (saw) did not force the Jews of Madinah to convert nor forced the non-believers in Makkah to become Muslims, no sect today should claim the right to declare another as Kafir and incite its adherents to resort to violence to impose its version on them.

Those who believe that the Qur'anic injunction of *amr bil ma roof wal nahee anil munkar* gives them a justification to do that should remember that all the sects believe their version to be the right one and adhere to it at all cost. Therefore, if all the sects were to use the above injunction the country was bound to plunge into bloodshed of the kind that Shias, Sunnis and other sects have indulged in Pakistan for the last 30 years and which has made the mosques, the Imambargahs and even the cemeteries unsafe places to visit.

In view of situation what is the alternative before a state but to allow all its citizens equal religious freedom and itself become neutral? Muslims in general and Pakistanis in particular have only two choices if they are to achieve unity, prosperity, progress and prestige as a respectable nation (1) grant equal religious freedom to all or (2) self-destruct through futile and unending sectarian murders and killings.

To conclude, secularism does not mean *ladeeni* and Islam is not opposed to it. On the contrary, it clearly and strongly advocates religious freedom and tolerance. The history of Jews, Christians and other religious communities shows that peace, progress political stability and economic prosperity is only achieved by separating the state from the church, making the state neutral in religious affairs and allowing equal religious freedom to all citizens.

By prevents internal sectarian conflicts secularism provides the government and the people an opportunity to concentrate on the issues and problems in a rational and pragmatic manner. Allah has made man *Ashraful Makhlooqat*, the best of His creations, by giving him the power of reasoning and ability to distinguish between right and wrong. It is also reason that makes him responsible for his actions. And, more than any other nation, Muslims are required to be rational because, unlike other Prophets who were given the power of miracles by God to convince their people to become believers, the Prophet of Islam (saw) was given only the power of reason and the *The Qur'an* to convince the non-believers to become believers.

Change is a law of nature, like gravity and the speed of light, and man cannot escape from it no matter to which race, religion or creed he belongs. In this situation only reason enables him to successfully respond to the challenges of a constantly changing world. In the absence of a prophet who receives the divine guidance all the time to deal with the ever changing state of affairs and human conditions, man

has only one option to cope with these challenges, rely on his reason.

### **Democracy and Islam**

A general perception prevails in the West that Islam and democracy are incompatible because hardly four out of 57 members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference can claim to be democracies. Moreover, a strong group of people in Islamic countries believe that democracy is a Western concept and not in conformity with the teachings and history of Islam. This is not correct and contrary to historical facts. The fact is that Islam does not prescribe any political system for the selection of a leader or government of the community. The Holy Qur'an is absolutely silent on the subject and so is the Hadith. The Prophet (saw) himself was chosen freely by the people of Madinah as its leader and left it to them to choose his successor rather than nominate one, as Moses (AS) did before his death in selecting Joshua as the leader of Israelis on the guidance of the Lord his God.

Although Prophet Muhammad (saw) ruled over the first Islamic state of Madina for ten years he never anointed himself King not even after he had conquered Makkah and most of Arabia had accepted him as their leader. Then at the time of his death too he did not nominate his successor as he could have easily done as the supreme leader of the Muslims nor Allah told him to nominate a successor as he had done in the case of prophet Moses (AS)<sup>16</sup>. Consequently, the Muslims of Madinah freely chose Hazrat Abu Bakr (RA) as the next leader and continued to do so until the fourth Caliph Hazrat Ali. It was only after him that the democratic system of selection of the leader by the Muslims was altered and the roots of a dynastic system were planted in the body politic of Islam by Hazrat Muawwiya.

Thus Islam and democracy are not incompatible. On the contrary, among the three monotheistic religions Islam is the only one which laid

the foundations of a nascent democracy by letting the people choose their first four Caliphs. As such Islamic countries will do well to adopt democracy as the best possible political system so far devised by man to govern himself.



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# PAKISTAN S FOREIGN POLICY IN CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS

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## **Introduction**

According to the Penguin s Dictionary of International Relations international System is another way of referring to the state system. At all the levels of the state, groups and interests within, it may be regarded as sub-system. Foreign Policy is made against an external environment, which is the international system because the activity of making and implementing Foreign Policy will have a significant effect upon the system. The system is some times referred to as sub-system dominant. Traditional analysis of the international system has tended to place particular emphasis upon the goals and orientations of great powers as being highly influential upon process and out comes. In systemic terms a great power is state actor of such significance that its removal from the system would change the structure like from bipolar to unipolar and multipolar <sup>1</sup>.

With reference to the stated orientation, its comprehensible that the rise or fall of great powers as well as dangers to their security yield to renovate states external policies that are anyhow partners to the great powers superiority game or an active source of their policy implementation process. Current international scenario is unique in this sense that its fabrication of two great occurrences of history like removal of a leading world power USSR from the international scenario in 1990 that changed the world from bipolar to multipolar, and threat to the security of leading superpower USA in 2001, which provided it chance to outline a broad new phase in US policy that places greater emphasis on unilateral actions.

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After the disintegration of USSR the new world order was to be influenced by the sole super power USA with the collaboration of European countries and Japan which shared its Policies and undertaken responsibilities this engagement ascribed to the debate in international community either the system was unipolar or multipolar.<sup>2</sup>

International system retains various dimensions like political security economic and cultural. The outlook of international politics reflects the hold of a sole power USA over the policies of other states. Besides it's the single power attempting for world hegemony. While the multi polar system indicates the collective security system and developed infrastructure, which is not under the possession of the single USA but shared by other powers as well, which turned down the US desires and claims for unipolar world. Thus the demise of the Soviet Union has led to a drastic restructuring of super power priorities in the International system.<sup>3</sup>

However, the post-Cold War era was expected to be the era of the implementation of International rules and orders and the old rivalries and tension between the two super powers had lapsed and some old regional rivalries had worked out. Meanwhile, some new territorial disputes, ethnic strife and religious differences left over alleviated from the history but disguised by the bipolar structure started to re surface and intensify in some areas, causing serious turmoil and even bloody conflicts, war and attacks.<sup>4</sup>

No doubt the major political security issues in the post Cold War era are the result of sole super powers in discriminatory, neo-conservative approach that consequently met the end in the shape of 9/11 attacks.<sup>5</sup>

In the post-September 11 era the global peace and stability are facing manifold Political and security challenges, such as; clash of civilization,

international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and high-tech conventional weapons and delivery systems.<sup>6</sup> Foreign occupation, foreign military bases, the use or threat of use of force, interference in internal affairs and coercive sanctions, and assistance from superpowers to Most Favored Nations (MFN) for their own interests setup irritation and troubles for the developing counterparts. Developing countries remain under pressure to confirm to an agenda, which is being defined and driven by others.<sup>7</sup>

Pakistan is one of such countries, which are bitterly influenced by the dangers of this current international scenario. During and after the Cold War the Foreign Policy of Pakistan has remained under changes because of unreliable attitude of Neighboring states, its geographical value to powers that are interested in to acquiesce or deny access to this region which impose constraints and opportunities on Pakistan's foreign policy. Therefore, security plays the role as a first determinant of Pakistan's foreign policy against internal and external challenges.<sup>8</sup>

This paper focuses the present challenges to the foreign policy of Pakistan resulting from changing international scenario of Post-9/11 events. In this regard the following major challenges are highlighted in this paper

- (i) Pakistan's war on terrorism and uneasy relations with Afghanistan
- (ii) American tilt towards India
- (iii) Emerging Inclination of China in the direction of India
- (iv) Anticipated Military action against Iran.
- (v) Kashmir issue as an old concern with innovative preferences

## **Pakistan's War on Terrorism and Uneasy Relations with Afghanistan**

Immediately, after September 11 events being a counterpart of Afghanistan Pakistan faced a grave challenge of its history, It was left with two options either to join United States in its war against terrorism or to stay committed supporting Taliban and to be shattered as a terrorist state. Understanding the severity of the situation the leadership of Pakistan decided rationally to support the American led international coalition in war on terrorism.

Pakistan's timely and rational decisions defended Pakistan's territorial integrity. But, at the same time, it erected several big challenges in the way of its external course of action. Indeed, these challenges are out come of Pakistan's geo-political significance for world powers and feeble internal political structure.<sup>9</sup>

The main issue, which somewhat indicates flaw in our foreign policy and has been regionally and globally a matter of concern that is role of Pakistan in war against terrorism and uneasy relations with Afghanistan.

In fact, Pakistan is playing a significant role against terrorism for the global security but the insecure neighboring territory of Afghanistan and its allegations against Pakistan as a threat to the current regime raises variety of questions as to the transparency of its continued campaign against terrorism and our interest in Afghanistan. Since the emergence of new regime in Afghanistan relations between the two countries were expected to be conducive due to the participation of Pakistan in Afghan rehabilitation campaign and anti-Taliban struggle, but unlike anticipated expectations their relations have always been looming in the feeling of suspicions and doubts. Foremost reason for these negative results is Pakistan's image as a supporter of the Taliban

and trans-border terrorism. Since Pakistan has signed peace deal with the tribal elders of North Waziristan in September 2006 and neighboring South Waziristan in April 2004 Pakistan is alleged as a Boss of Taliban which is supporting escalating cross border penetration and suicide attacks in Afghanistan. Secondly, so far Afghan working regime imagine Pakistan as anti-India that means to dish up its well being against India giving a way to Non-Pashtun regime. In face of these realities that a pro-Taliban group does exist in Pakistan's tribal areas and some segments of Pashtun population in Baluchistan, the NWFP and Fata are emotionally attached with their ethnic brethren in Afghanistan it's quite tough for Pakistan to convince Afghanistan regime for any kind of deliberation in favor of Pakistan.

On its own part in order to normalize the situation between the two countries, since very beginning Pakistan is emphasizing upon diplomatic policies. Through high-tech formal visits in the month of December, Pakistan had two elevated visits to Kabul. Firstly the Foreign Minister Kurshid Kasuri took a trip to Afghanistan underlining Pakistani government's claim that militants' infiltration from Pakistan to Afghanistan is undertaken by Afghan refugees, he proposed a swift repatriation of more than 2.5 million Afghan refugees currently living in Pakistan.<sup>10</sup>

Later Prime Minister Shaktu Aziz also rushed to Kabul to revive the confidence in Afghan government in Pakistan's support to Afghan regime but after a tense round of three hours talk and the experience of bitter hospitality both the counterparts could just agreed to start the stalled repatriation process of three million Afghan people living in Pakistan and the naming of a Pakistan commission to arrange (along with its Afghan counterpart) joint Jirga as a positive outcome. Islamabad increased financial aid to the strife-torn country from \$50 million to 300 millions. Prime Minister of Pakistan could not convince

the restive Afghan leadership in his favor. Still, President Karzai pointed the finger to Pakistan for many unfriendly actions, including patronizing the Taliban militants to destabilize his government and the killing of Afghan children and bombing of schools by Pro-Pakistan basics. As a consequence, President Karazi himself declared visits as fruitless.<sup>11</sup>

The intensified infiltration from Pakistan to Afghanistan and Afghan government's repeated allegations against Pakistani government in the involvement of anti-Karzai regime actions, have started to discredit Pakistan's movement and participation in the war on terrorism. In addition, Pakistan is facing same pressures, queries and demands.

Notwithstanding, Bush administration's confidence in Pakistan's bounded assistance to American policy toward Afghanistan, some extraordinary statements and reactions were expressed in the month of January, which left Pakistanis bewildered and apprehensive. One of them is the testimony of John Negroponte, the outgoing US intelligence chief before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Recognizing Pakistan as an active partner in its war on terror, he has written that Al Qaida is cultivating stranger operational connections and relationships that radiate out ward from their leaders, whose secure hideouts are in Pakistan which is a major source of Islamic extremism that affiliates throughout the Middle East, North Africa and Europe. Alongside, the Negro Pont's statement was under the discussion and government was trying to set clarifications to recover from the shock of these remarks, US secretary of State Condoleeza Rice in an interview to BBC Arabic, answering about the truth of Negroponte's charges lauded Pakistan's role in the war on terrorism besides she urged upon Pakistan to do more in this regard which indicated shortage in the efforts of Pakistan's policies.<sup>12</sup>

Recently, Negro Ponte's charges are assured by the US legislation calling to stop US military assistance to Pakistan in case if Islamabad fails to halt the resurgence of Taliban inside its territory. The legislation does also acknowledge the efforts of the government of Pakistan as an important partner in helping the United States to remove and combating international terrorism in the frontier provinces of Pakistan. But there are still a number of critical issues that threaten to disrupt the relationship between the United States and Pakistan besides undermine international security and destabilize Pakistan.

It's true that Pakistan has cooperated with the United States in a number of ways then even these repeated terms such as; if, but, more and more have put forth some supposition regarding unambiguous situations, its assumed by some analyst that its a way of Pakistani government to commit US for long term involvement in Pakistani development because the aid will dry up once the US is satisfied that terrorism is contained and converted. Some other factors assume this policy as a result of anti-Indian sentiments that are instigated in Afghanistan with the help of Pakistan to sustain anti-India factor in Afghanistan, so that India could not easily get regional global interests through Afghanistan.<sup>13</sup>

In fact, the question of stability of Afghanistan has been a tremendous challenge for Pakistan. Nevertheless it can be averted reconsidering our Afghan policy with reference to certain realities.

The substantial realities concerning this matter are:

- (I) Presence of Taliban in Pakistan
- (II) Strong support to Taliban from some Pakistan based extremist religious groups



- (III) Presence of Afghan refugees in Pakistan
- (IV) Pakistan's apprehensions as to the increasing involvement of India in Afghanistan
- (V) Involvement of military in Political affairs of Pakistan.

In the face of increasing criticism against Pakistan's policies towards Afghanistan, Pakistan could do with some options to revitalize its image as strong supporter to Afghanistan because its stability depends upon the peace and solidity of this region

Below-mentioned opportunities can be effective in terms of reforming relations with Afghanistan:

1. Islamabad should sever all links with the Taliban and refrain from looking at them as an alternative source of superiority.
2. Pakistan should crack down on the militants, shutting their training camps and ending the flow of money and weapons to them.
3. We should encourage the Afghan refugee to return to their country in this case to convince the international body as well to understand the problems that are emerging because they exist in Pakistan.
4. Pakistan leadership should try to convince international community and Afghanistan for a border at Durand line not necessarily with the mines if it does not match with the international rules.<sup>14</sup>

5. Pakistan should caution Kabul's friends that the Afghan president too has to show courage and leadership at home and not try to blame Pakistan for all its failure
6. Pakistan should induce International community and especially sympathizers of Kabul that crosses border movement is at both ways. It is not just Pakistan's responsibility to check the militant movement across the Durand Line, it is a joint responsibility of Pakistan, Afghanistan and ISAF and Afghan security forces the Kabul government should also block the pathway of Afghan refugees who continue to enter Pakistan feeling sense of insecurity in Karzai's regime. Besides, being a leader of Afghanistan Mr Karzai should also take courageous steps for internal peace and security.<sup>15</sup>

### **Anticipated Military Action against Iran**

Pakistan's relations with Iran are unique in sense of close historical, cultural, religious and strategic attachment. Iran's significance for Pakistan is too evident to call for enlightenment. Iran was the first country to recognize Pakistan after independence taking into account its manifold linkages with it.

It was first time in post 1979 era that strategic divergence together with the sectarian elements created rifts in Pak-Iran relations. The relations were severely strained following the Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and for the most part after the fall of Najibullah regime in 1992, because of the mounting sectarian pressures and the clash of their Afghanistan policies in which Iran was on the side of Northern Alliance while Pakistan was directly pro-Taliban.<sup>16</sup>

Iran used to blame Pakistan to support Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Iran, like Pakistan, adopts a proactive role in Afghanistan, and intensifies support to Shia groups and the Northern Alliance. In the past Iran's limited financial means necessitated coordinating its assistance to anti Taliban Afghan factions with Russia, India and Central Asian states, as it also provided Iran with an opportunity to improve its relations with these countries. Therefore, the more Pakistan involves in supporting activities to Taliban, the more Iran turns towards India.<sup>17</sup>

The gap in Pak-Iran relations would have been widened if the 9/11 events would haven't forced Pakistan for changing its pro-Taliban policy. Therefore, turns toward post 9/11 developments in Afghanistan provided an added opening to Iran and Pakistan to put back together their linkages.<sup>18</sup>

Presently, the unsatisfied Afghan approach towards Pakistan and allegations against Pakistan can have negative impact on Pak-Iran relations but as this time the political and strategic situation of Iran is far different than past so it seems inclined to diverge all kind of relations with Pakistani government in this regard recently after the slap of UNSC nuclear related sanctions. Tehran offered transit facilities to Islamabad for export to Russia and Central Asian republics and sought a similar facility from Pakistan for its exports to China. Nevertheless, still there are certain apprehensions as a challenge to the healthy growth of Pak-Iran relations, such as, Iran's aloofness from international community on nuclear and ballistic missile program resulting in its isolation. American strained relations with Iran especially if it attacks on Iran.

Being an American ally in the war on terrorism, it would be decisive phase for Pakistan's Policy makers to support or leave alone Iran. However, in his interview to one Arab though generally analyzed that in any such situation Pakistan would remain neutral. Though, any such

American action can not be predicted in the near future because of American engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq, and then even Pakistan should have clear policy and techniques to face any such tremendous situation.

Pakistan should try to keep open some options on the matter of its relations with the strategic counter part. In this regard, Pakistan should never allow its territory to be used against Iran for military strike on its nuclear installations or regime change. This may lead to a serious resentment and active dissent within the armed forces from Islamist and Shia elements.<sup>19</sup>

### **American Tilt Towards India**

During the Cold War era U.S and India were having no straight conflict of interests, nevertheless, it took a decade for the United States to tilt towards India and turn from Estranged democracies of the cold war to Engaged democracies. In the post Cold War era, U.S developed a comprehensive and institutionalized relationship with India, covering broad fields such as economic ties, political dialogue and military exchanges the tilt can be seen as under:

First, the demise of the Soviet Union, removed the principal obstacle of US-Indian relationship.

Second, India was observed and lauded as an active democracy.

Third, India's economic expansion developed it as an important trade and investment partner of the United States.

Fourth, its well-built information technology industry fortified India's position on the world economic scene.

Fifth, as a result of the United States economic interests and involvement in India, it became the largest recipient in South Asia of U.S. development and food aid.

Sixth, US began to collaborate with New Delhi as a good care taker of its global affairs for increasing strategic importance of Indian Ocean, which connects the Oil-rich Persian Gulf with growing energy markets in East Asia. Lastly, the US view India as a counter balance to emerging China in Asia.<sup>20</sup>

Taking into consideration the strong strategic and economic position of India in Asia, US recognize its leading position in South Asia as well as its extending role as global power. In addition, it pledges to provide her variety of assistance in order to consolidate its present position.

When George Bush became the President of the U.S in January 2001, his Republican Administration continued the Clinton policy of engagement in South Asia with a special emphasis on US-Indian relations giving a cool welcome to Pakistan. But the sudden terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, pushed US for some fundamental changes towards South Asia especially with regard to have good relations with both India and Pakistan.<sup>21</sup>

At that juncture, the security field was the main beneficiary of transforming U.S-Indian relations.<sup>22</sup> In the wake of September 11 the new global realities brought certain chief amendments in US perspectives about South Asia now it comes into sight that the US has three main goals in South Asia to avoid pinning concerns and have long term global objectives.

- (i) For the short term, it is making efforts to prevent an all-out war between India and Pakistan and engage them in the

peaceful settlement of issues to involve the region directly in anti-terror campaign and promotion of American global interests. Keeping Washington's bilateral relations with the two nations on a positive course.

- (ii) For the medium term, the U.S is interested in preventing the Indo-Pakistan conflict from erupting into a nuclear exchange ensuring that nuclear weapon related material in South Asia is not obtained by terrorists or other organizations that would confound nonproliferation efforts.
- (iii) For the long term, the US seeks a possible solution of Kashmir problem to break hold of sanctuary for extremist's Islamic militants in the region.<sup>23</sup>

### **US-India Nuclear Deal**

Since US recognize India as leader of South Asia and best supporter for the achievement of its global interests therefore, it undertakes the responsibility to strengthen its economic and military infrastructure by all the ways. In this context, President George Bush signed the landmark US-India nuclear deal on December 18, 2005 and declared that India and the United States were natural partners.

The act allows nuclear commerce between Washington and New Delhi after 30 years, amending the law that forbids such trade. The law includes an exemption that allows Washington to engage in civilian nuclear trade with New Delhi. The accord offers India US enriched uranium for civilian nuclear power reactors; and sell of dual-use civilian nuclear reactors; under the deal US will help India in space and missile technology. In addition, all the members of the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) are urged to endorse this arrangement.

This agreement has reversed the United States 30 years policy of non cooperation with India that she adopted in 1974, the year India conducted nuclear tests .The Bush administration has upturned the policy in violation of NPT and is trying to justify it on the grounds that India needed an alternative source of energy to reduce its rapidly growing demand for fossil fuels, thereby the agreement would prevent their policies from rising to unacceptable level as well as produce less global warming gases.

However, on American part this deal aims at containing China by means of efficient and strong India, which is an old enemy of China and willing to abreast with China in the fields of economy, military, information technology and space technology. At Indian end this deal carries grand opportunities including pressurizing China for kind of cooperative dealings, keeping Pakistan under constant threats, to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and achieve the status of world power.<sup>24</sup>

Despite all the vivid policies of the US in South Asia the growing US quantitative and qualitative engagement with India is a matter of concern for Pakistan especially in the backdrop of accomplished American campaign in Afghanistan and the windup of third round of Pak-US engagement.

American interests in India are undiminished while Pakistan is significant for her as a strategic partner at a time of crisis. Therefore taking advantage of current US engagement with Pakistan it should keep other options open.

Before discussing the options, here is given a brief account of fresh American interests in Pakistan. Since 9/11, the United States has revealed converted interest in Pakistan that go away ahead of its policy of 'war on terror'. Even a superficial look of Bush policies give an impression that his government wants Pakistan to serve its specific regional and global interests such as:

1. The US seeks help of Pakistan to prolong War on Terror
2. It wants Pakistan to serve in future as American detective in Central and South West Asian region.
3. The US also needs Pakistan to extend logistic support to American and NATO forces stationed in Afghanistan and to fully cooperate with the US Central Command in implementing American agenda for the region.
4. Considering Pakistan as feasible base it will ask her to help the American led military operation to destroy Iran's nuclear installations or support for regime change.
5. It will force Pakistan to harmonize its policy with India for the projection of American interests against China.

### **Options for Pakistan as a US Ally**

In case of above-mentioned situation if Pakistan goes in cooperation with the United States to become its regional detective, it is to be expected to receive substantial economic and financial assistance as well as assured conventional defense capabilities and defence from India threat. Simultaneously, to have power over nuclear material falling into the hands of the terrorists Pakistan would be expected to freeze its nuclear program, accept American role in command and control system of its nuclear assets.



It would be forced to convert its status from moderate to secular state. These are assumptions that are driven by the arrangement of current US engagement in Pakistan.

Pakistan should never surrender itself for the long term US policies for 'containment' of China. So far China has worked together with Pakistan as an all weather partner and never demanded Pakistan to turn down American demands for its short-term interests. Besides, it retains very vital strategic interests in Pakistan and can be relied upon in hour of need. Even in future Pakistan can rely upon Chinese Policies to foster its regional interests.<sup>25</sup>

### **Emerging Inclination of China in the Direction of India**

Although China and India have remained engaged for the most part of history as adversarial and competent allies yet in the post Cold War era both the countries were seen engaged in the third category of relations that retains partnership potential. Under this category the two giant powers keep a common image of the world under multipolar structure with capacity for diplomatic options and sovereignty. This partnership dealing adjoined to the dimension of cooperation in the post 9/11 contexts when they have an opportunity as partners in the war on terrorism.

Taking into consideration, India's nuclear status, stable economic development and the fast improving Indo-US strategic relations, China attempts to cooperate with India for working towards a multipolar world, and building an Asian stability and peace which is not dependent upon or completely underwritten by the US has been the two most important factors contributing to this change.<sup>26</sup>

In fact, India and China are motivated collectively for the partnership by the common need to look for more energy resources to meet with the deficiency of energy to sustain rapid industrial expansion. After 9/11, India and China established a bilateral mechanism for consultation about cross-border violence. The first meeting of this case was held in April 2002.

The recent conciliatory and pragmatic approach in Sino-India relations reveals prospects for a main conversion in the regional political backdrop. Recently, the visit of President Hu Jintao affirmed the conclusion of earlier distrust and renewal of confidence and cooperation.<sup>27</sup>

Thus signing of 13 agreements covering economic relations, trade, cooperation in education, science and technology and cultural exchanges reproduce the wide variety of cooperation that the two countries are seeking. China did also announce that it would also be not an obstacle to India's bid for permanent membership in the UN Security Council.

These gestures indicate a shift of the balance of power in Asia.<sup>28</sup>

However, since 1960, Pakistan has found China as a reliable friend provider of military hardware and technology, and there exists significant project for defense cooperation between the armed forces of the two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation binding them to commitments, which they do not have with any other country.

In the case of Pakistan, China is witnessed as all weather friend. It was security imperative arising from the hostility of a bigger and strong neighbor, which brought it close to China. While, it was recognition of

Pakistan as Islamic republic and later as a US ally besides, appreciation of the many bold initiatives taken by Pakistan to provide China a window on the world, while actively lobbying on its behalf in various forums, including the UN.<sup>29</sup>

China has been extending generous economic assistance to Pakistan since early 1960s as well as it is playing important role for the development of its infrastructure. In November 2003, Pakistan and China signed a preferential trade agreement to promote economic and trade relations between the two countries. This was followed by the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good-Neighboring Relations.<sup>30</sup>

Apprehensions of Pakistani nation were considerably detached during the course of Hu Jintao's visit when many agreements and understandings were signed between the two counterparts. They covered a multitude of subject matter that included the landmark Free trade Agreement, unprecedented five-year plan to enhance economic ties, while their new heights for defense cooperation. Hu confirmed that China would continue to help Pakistan in the field of nuclear power and provide assistance in the sectors of hydroelectricity, coal and alternative sources of energy.

Despite the company of all pragmatic incentives for cordial relations Pakistan must be dealing on regional and global level not to give any chance to China to reconsider its relations toward Pakistan. On war on Terrorism China supports world forum. Given that now its Pakistan's responsibility to remove all Chinese suspicions regarding Pakistan's linkage with Taliban regime since China has observed resurgence in Xinjiang. Additionally, Pakistan will have to be cautious in American alignment so that it could not harm any Chinese interest.

## **Opportunities to Reinforce Pak-Sino Linkage**

Despite the presence of all mature incentives for the proper growth of cordial relations there are concerns on both the ends regarding each others changing policies under the influence of changing international scenario. Two issues continue to worry the Chinese. One is the continuing ability of radical Islamists to disturb the peace in muslim areas of China. The other is alarming scale of our cooperation and collaboration with NATO. Though China does not speak out publicly, yet it is keeping it on a side might be in the wait of Pakistan's future policy.

The implications of growing Sino-Indian relations on Pakistan are obvious. We must consider the position of China in this shifting scenario which is not only regional power but a global power too, that is facing rivalry of super powers. In the fast changing international scenario, economic and commercial links alone provide a strong element in bilateral relations. We need to have a more practical worldview and must reshape our foreign policy based on a realistic assessment of our potential and anchor our relations on the mutuality of interests and economic interaction.

Above and beyond, being a good strategic partner of China we ought to show concern for the promotion of legitimate Chinese interests which would be defensive for Pakistan in future, in this respect, we should try to provide transit facilities for its imports and exports through Pakistani territory via the ports of Gawadar and Karachi to reject any role in the United States policy directed at the containment of China. Pakistan should try to normalize its relations with India so that the two countries could rely less on the United States.

### **Kashmir Issue: an Old Concern with Innovative Preferences**

The issue of Indo-Pak relations almost depends upon the solution of Kashmir issue, For Pakistan Kashmir has not been just a territory or a disputed state; it was a matter of the ideological sentiments between the two countries. This issue has remained a cause for years of hostility with India and prime basis of 1948 and 1965 wars and several other clashes, including Kargil, between the two countries. Pakistan has made great sacrifices and supported the cause of Kashmir in every possible ways, diplomatically, politically and by encouraging insurgency. Pakistan's foreign, domestic and defense policies are significantly influenced by the Kashmir factor.

But now in the consideration of changing global and regional geopolitical situation, which have dramatically changed in the last two decades besides US tilt towards India and the tight-lip policy of USA, Russia, Japan and even China on Kashmir issue indirectly goes against the position and claims of Pakistan on Kashmir issue. None of these states intends to annoy India questioning her about the rights of Kashmiri people. The impact of 9/11 events on the South Asia and Pakistan's front line role in the war on terror inhibits its ability to support the insurgency in Kashmir.

Furthermore, Kashmir has been costly for both India and Pakistan terms of development and fighting poverty by switch over of resources to defense. Globalization demands cooperation more willingly than confrontation so as to sustain high economic growth rate. Consequently, Pakistan will have to maintain peaceful borders.<sup>31</sup> For India too, Kashmir issue is a great challenge. It puts a ceiling on the realization of her dream to play the role as an influential world power being a permanent member of UNSC Moreover; Kashmir question is still a major cause of misgivings in International community against

India.

It is a ripe time for the resolution of Kashmir issue, which is just possible by the mutual consensus of both the countries in coordination with the sentiments, wishes of Kashmiri nation. We should not be hesitate to go with the suggestion for the autonomy and demilitarization of occupied Kashmir at the same time as these are welcomed by Indian Prime Minister and all Parties Hurriyat Conference too, which represents the vast majority of Kashmiris.<sup>32</sup>

In Pakistan, the popular conventional wisdom is that without the solution of the Kashmir dispute, economic tilt toward India is impossible. Contrary to these orthodox conceptions it needs to be realized that it is unrealistic to expect to achieve over night a perfect solution of this half a century long conflict since both the countries have to deal with hawkish elements in their ranks, as well. For that reason, the Indian and Pakistani leaders should look for the realistic solution of the problem to bring the lasting peace in the sub continent.

## **Conclusion**

Since the establishment, Pakistan is at the menace from neighboring countries. Therefore, the main objective of Pakistan's foreign policy has ever been to win the sympathy and assistance of international community so as to deter the security threats and overcome the abrupt damages in the consequence of any external aggression. The geopolitical significance of Pakistan for great powers forever results an adventurous and bewildering circumstances for this country, under the influence of changing international scenario. Albeit, history witnesses that in the face of international challenges, Government of Pakistan has, until the end of time, attempted to make better use of the exploitation of their territory's location and geopolitical significance in favor of

security and economic advantages. Such as; American led war in Afghanistan against USSR and the American led attack over Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks. Subsequently, Pakistani administration faced both the tremendous challenges rationally considering the military and monetary rewards.

Nevertheless, since Pakistan is a state of disintegrated region (South Asia) therefore it needs to maintain a sound and rational policy on regional and global level. The first and foremost parameter of its external policy should be maintenance of balanced relations in connection with America and a special relationship with China.

Meanwhile, government of Pakistan should try to exterminate all the rudiments of mistrusts and misgivings with Afghanistan to avoid escalation of ill will between two in future. Taking into consideration the regional circumstances, the government should try to make effective all possibilities to create connectivity with her significant neighboring counterpart India and try to facilitate cooperative security in South Asia. Besides, it needs to uphold brotherly relations with all Islamic states to maintain reputable place in Islamic world.

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# **CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN CHANGING DYNAMICS OF NATIONAL POWER: CHALLENGES FOR PAKISTAN**

*Dr Abdul Latif Tunio*

## **Introduction**

The security and development has been always remained the core value of foreign policy of each country. The traditional security was more state-centric focusing more on territorial security. This type of security analysis invariably ignored the sources of internal insecurity with the shrinking of distances; there is a paradigm shift in security studies. Now security studies are liberated from old traditions. The changing dynamics of security are people-centric. New proponents of security argue that anything that generate anxiety and threaten the quality of life in some respects is labeled as security problem. Security has become a condition in which nations free themselves from all kinds of fears and threats. It has ultimately set into motion a revolution of expectations of people for a better life.

Contemporary security thinkers have realized the significance of socio-economic development as a core value in the pursuit of national security. Now security has become more horizontal and open to new variables like human development as a crusade for emancipation. The human development equips people to defend themselves in adverse situation.

This transition in emerging security scenario has raised the stakes of established security communities especially for countries at development stage of Pakistan like previous economic system, geo-

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economic order is also hierarchical in creating a core and peripheries. The world wide conditions operate as determinant force and hold the view that nation-state level analysis is no longer the useful category for studying the developmental conditions.

The role of state as provider of security is on decline, the ability of all developing countries to monitor and manage socio-economic problems has diminished as their natural frontiers are open to global networks of communications, trade and capital flows. These flows have created their own dynamics at the international level it is changing the concept of national power which is uni-dimensional. It is changing attributes in critical strategic resources. Apart of this external restraint, Pakistan is wrestling with internal constraint of satisfying its nationals in maintaining the same pace of development especially on eastern border. In fact, at domestic level conditions that are supportive for human development have been reduced to such an extent that there is virtually no condition in a minimum sense. It is eroding the legitimacy of government to trickle down benefit to the people on receiving end.

Having comparative disadvantage in production of knowledge, resources and power, Pakistan should not strive to create the conditions of balance of power that will put it in a crisis situation. And India with strong division of labour will be the beneficiary in the final countdown. On the contrary, Pakistan should bring balance of power as a outcome by raising its capabilities through establishing strategic interdependence with India. It is a situation where all states suffer from terminating their relationship. Sooner or latter, the logic of cost / benefit theory will prevail on the policies of both states to come on terms to each other. Instead of fighting on one cake, both can bake more cake together to share. Thus, it is more prudent for Pakistan to adopt capability based approach vs. threat based approach in its future defence policy in determining the foreign goals. It is a safe security calculation. Pakistan can not afford more security risks like creating

strategic depth which is bound to backfire as being witnessed on western border. By avoiding crisis situation on the frontier, more development could be achieved because in normal periods states concentrate on developmental goals as economic progress and social welfare.

At the same time Pakistan should continue with playing the same old role of 1970s and 1980s in bridging the gap between Sino-American relations. It will give Pakistan free ride from geo-political compulsions. Any conflict between two giants will not serve the national interests of Pakistan. In similar fashion, Pakistan's security community can show the way to United States in bringing a logical end to present security scenario in Afghanistan. After all Pakistan has a long experience of dealing with Afghan people. But it should be on new terms of reference. The political stability in Afghanistan will definitely provide Pakistan like with Central Asia.

## **Conclusion**

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century developing countries like Pakistan cannot remain aloof from the web of new international security structure based on human security and development. The economic insecurity cause social alienation among people which ultimately result in political instability. By raising the economic capabilities, Pakistan can turn its socio-political weakness in to strength.

For achieving that purpose, Pakistan should continue to recalibrate its national power in accordance with changing international environment and engage itself with the new trends of security focused on human security / development so as to translate its national capabilities in equation with changing patterns of power.

Towards that fruition, Pakistan needs relative peace on its borders to achieve the primary goal of capability lifting to strengthen the foundation of its power. At the same time Pakistan has to bring qualitative change in its force structure to remain a key player in international affairs at large and in regional standing in particular. For it Pakistan needs to bring a new synergy in its core values of foreign policy – military security and development.

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> Equal Ahmed, *Between Past and Future Selected Essays Expectations on South Asia*, Edited by Dohra Ahmed and et al., Oxford University Press, Karachi

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# **Concluding Session**

## RECOMMENDATIONS

*Dr Ross Masood Hosain*

It is the general sense of the seminar.

1. that, based on the guidelines of peace within and peace without laid down by the Quaid-e-Azaim. Pakistan's foreign policy needs to be moderate, progressive, enlightened, pro-active rather than reactive, and in consonance with the core Islamic values of peace, tolerance and fair-play;
2. that, in the circumstance of becoming subject to conflicting pressures, Pakistan needs to resist succumbing to extraneous pressures which could be detrimental to our supreme national interest;
3. that, there is an imperative need for a reappraisal of our foreign policy on the lines of giving precedence to the logic of geo-economics over the compulsions of the old, traditional and outdated factors;
4. that, without compromising on principle, Pakistan should seek to resolve contentious issues through dialogue and negotiation rather than through conflict and confrontation, thus enabling diversion of funds from security to development;
5. that Pakistan must not put all its foreign policy eggs in one basket but should explore other geo-political options with a view to balance its position in international affairs; and
6. that Pakistan should lay greater emphasis on non-traditional aspects of security thus enabling it to work out with its neighbours a regional security regime with common human security objectives.

## VOTE OF THANKS

*Dr Azra Sarwar Kandhar*

On behalf of Department of International Relations and Area Study Centre, Far East & South East Asia, University of Sindh, Jamshoro, I convey thanks to all distinguished speakers for their participation in this conference. We are grateful to Major General Jamsheed Ayaz Khan, President, Regional Studies, Islamabad that despite his pressing engagements he has agreed to preside over this program. We are also thankful to Dr Rosool Bux Rais, Ambassador Mansoor Alam, Dr Ross Masood Hussain, Mr Saeed Ahmed Rid and our sweet young colleagues Miss Ishrat and Miss Seema for presenting their respective papers on this occasion. Our special thanks go to Dr Rodney W. Jones who made a long journey to acquaint us with his expertise. We are thankful to all participants in taking keen interest in the deliberations of the conference. We are also thankful to Engineer Abu Adil Sahib for providing accommodation to our distinguished guests at the Thermal Power House, Jamshoro. We also acknowledge the services of Dr Lutfullah Mangi who was linchpin in conducting this seminar.

Finally, the Department of International Relations and the Area Study Centre are grateful to the worthy Vice Chancellor for his full support in making this conference a real success.

Thank you



# **Conference**

*(Rationale / Schedule)*

## Rationale

The post-Cold War period has brought structural changes in the fabric of international politics. The collapse of the Soviet Union introduced the qualitative change in the patterns of power. One of the striking features of new era is ascendancy of Asian power. In the wake of power vacuum in international political system, Asia is struggling to a new security destiny. New alignments are in the making to shape the security structures in Asia. The old geo-politics is melting. South Asia being a sub-system is also witnessing the fluidity of new geo-strategic map.

During the Cold War period Asia was divided into three security systems Far East Asia, South East Asia, and South Asia. The establishment of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 1997 has combined the first two security structures into one; but South Asian security order, being a unique and distinctive in character, still retain independent in its own right. It has been guarded from the Eurasian power by the massive wall of the Himalyas, Hindukish and Karakorum ranges. The irony of South Asian states is that the strategic map of the region is uni-centred. The Indian failure to pacify the fears of its neighbours has created a strategic storm in the regional politics of South Asia. India stands determined to pursue its national goals, often overriding the

interests of its neighbours and sometimes interfering in their domestic affairs. India's Forward Policy to protect its interests beyond geo-graphical boundaries has taken it in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, alarming the security community in Pakistan. India behaves as a status quo power in regional relationship. It has adopted bilateral approach in handling the problems with its neighbours. This mind-set has oftenly affected the promotion of regional structures in South Asia, and threat perception looms large in the national policy of Pakistan. So far, Pakistan has played the role of balancer in South Asia. This role to some extent has diluted the Indian drive for hegemonic order in the region. This action-reaction approach has arrested the process of common security and precedence of geo-economic factors in their relationship.

The logic or shadow of connectional security based on military power has put the region in Cold War mentality of zero-sum game. It has made this region a nuclear flash point threatening the very survival of the life. The nature of U.S. China relations will determine the shape of strategic environment in South Asia. Any polarization between these powers will lead to the difficult choices for countries of South Asia. There are apprehensions that this great power rivalry will mark in more destabilization of

regional politics. With the upswing of nuclear accord between India and the United States, presence of NATO forces in Afghanistan and ongoing war on terrorism has made the regional security scenario more fragile and full of upheavals.

This conference is aimed to give a wake up call for South Asian states, especially India and Pakistan to re-apprise their geopolitical consideration compatible to their common interests and security. Reliance on foreign alliance whether in case of India or Pakistan is not panacea to regional peace and security. As a matter of fact, the conflicts in South Asia are rooted primarily in the regional factors historical, political and cultural.

The purpose of this conference is to explore the different avenues of cooperation for the attainment of strategic stability in South Asia. It is essential that Pakistan should redirect new orientation of policy/strategy compatible with changing dynamics of security aspects encompassing the components of common and human security.

Today's South Asian security order is excessively militarized. But all empirical studies suggest that no military solution is possible in case of Indo-Pakistan relations. It would be shortsighted view

on the part of India to keep Pakistan aloof from the security order in South Asia. No amount of nuclear race can help them to address the real problems of poverty and under-development. The significance of Pakistan as energy corridor cannot be discounted. It is worth considering that unless majority of regional states tap their energy resources and integrate energy cooperation, the grand scheme of development will not be fully viable.

In the nuclear age security is mutual and depends on accommodation not on confrontation. At the same time since Pakistan's strategic picture is volatile and murky it needs to focus on priorities in accordance with its capability and possibility of national power. Any ideological pursuit in foreign affairs will be self-defeating. The centrality of Pakistan's geo-politics is self-obvious.

## Objectives

- ✓ To work out the security order which uphold the common interests of neighbouring states and bring out stability on our frontiers on the lines of common security objectives.
- ✓ To explore the possible geo-political options for Pakistan to consolidate its position in foreign affairs.
- ✓ To invoke the support of world community not at the cost of Pakistan s neighbours.
- ✓ To consolidate its economic position on the logic of geo-economics.

### **Professor Dr Lutfullah Mangi**

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# Programme

February 1, 2007

- **Registration**.....09:30 10:00 hrs
- **Inaugural Session**.....10:00 11:00 hrs
  - Recitation from The Holy Quran
  - Welcome Address by Dr Lutfullah Mangi  
Chairman, Department of International Relations
  - Address by Professor Dr Rafia Ahmed Sheikh  
Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences
  - Address by Mr Mazharul Haq Siddiqui, Vice Chancellor, University of  
Sindh, Jamshoro
  - Keynote Address by Chief Guest  
Major General Jamshed Ayaz Khan (Retd.),  
President, Institute of Regional Studies Islamabad.
- **Declaration of the Opening of Seminar**
- **Tea**..... 11:00 11:30 hrs

## WORKING SESSION I

11:30 13:30 hrs

### NEW DIRECTIONS OF PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY: **(Geopolitical and Security Dimensions)**

Chair:.....Dr Rodney W. Jones

- |                              |   |
|------------------------------|---|
| <b>Dr Ross Masood Hosain</b> | Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Basic Determinants  |
| <b>Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais</b>  | Search for Common Ground: Pakistan's New<br>Partnership with the United States          |
| <b>Mr Saeed Ahmed Rid</b>    | A Strategy for Removing the Deadlock in the Peace<br>Process Between India and Pakistan |
| <b>Ms Seema Kumari</b>       | Security Challenges ahead of Pakistan: A Geopolitical<br>Perspective                    |

#### **Discussion**

**Lunch**..... 13:30 14:30 hrs

# WORKING SESSION II

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## NEW DIRECTIONS OF PAKISTAN S FOREIGN POLICY: **(Security and Development)**

**Chair:..... Major General Jamshed Ayaz Khan (Rtd.)**

**Dr Rodney W. Jones**                      Future of U.S.    Pakistan Relations: Enchained Allies  
Taming Demons

**Ambassador Mansoor  
Alam**    Islam, Secularism and Democracy

**Ms Ishrat A. Abbasi**                      Pakistan s Foreign Policy in Changing International  
System: Challenges and Options

**Dr Ishtiaq Ahmed  
Chudhry**    Foreign Policy and Internal Compulsions: A Case  
Study of Pakistan

**Dr Abdul Latif Tunio**                      Correlations between Security and Development in  
Changing Dynamics of National Power: Challenges  
for Pakistan

### **Discussion**

**Tea**..... 16:30    17:00 hrs

**Concluding Session**..... 17:00 hrs

Chair by: **Mr Mazharul Haq Siddiqui**,  
Vice Chancellor, University of Sindh, Jamshoro

**Recommendations by: Dr Ross Masood Hosain**

**Vote of Thanks: Dr Azra Sarwar Kandhar**



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