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BILL GATES: THE GENE-EDITING REVOLUTION

MAY/JUNE 2018

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

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

















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


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

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

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Archibald Cary Coolidge, Founding Editor
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

The political scientist **YUEN YUEN ANG**'s work focuses on a seeming paradox: How does a country without good governance achieve rapid economic growth? Her prize-winning 2016 book, *How China Escaped the Poverty Trap*, found the answer to that question in an approach that she called "directed improvisation," which mixes top-down orders with bottom-up experimentation. A professor at the University of Michigan, in "Autocracy With Chinese Characteristics" (page 39), Ang explains how a richer China is resisting the pressures of democratization—and questions whether it can do so indefinitely.

Born in Communist-ruled Bulgaria, **IVAN KRASTEV** is a leading authority on eastern Europe's postcommunist transition. In 1996, he headed a research project that led to the introduction of U.S.-style presidential primaries in Bulgaria, and he went on to become executive director of the International Commission on the Balkans, an independent panel of experts. Now chair of the Centre for Liberal Strategies, in Sofia, Krastev argues in "Eastern Europe's Illiberal Revolution" (page 49) that autocratic rulers in Hungary, Poland, and elsewhere offer a glimpse at how authoritarianism could come to the West.

In 2008, 33 years after he co-founded Microsoft, **BILL GATES** left the company to work full time at the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Since its launch in 2000, the foundation has given over $40 billion to a variety of programs in education, global development, and public health. In "Gene Editing for Good" (page 166), Gates explains how CRISPR and related technologies can transform the global fight against poverty and disease.

CAROLINE BETTINGER-LÓPEZ is not just a legal scholar; she also served as the lead counsel in the first case brought before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights by a domestic violence survivor from the United States. From 2015 to 2017, Bettinger-López was the White House adviser on violence against women, and she now teaches at the University of Miami School of Law. In "The Long Arc of Human Rights" (page 186), Bettinger-López reviews Kathryn Sikkink's book about global activist movements and argues that there is good reason to be optimistic.

IS DEMOCRACY DYING?

Centralization of power in the executive, politicization of the judiciary, attacks on independent media, the use of public office for private gain—the signs of democratic regression are well known. The only surprising thing is where they've turned up. As a Latin American friend put it ruefully, "We've seen this movie before, just never in English."

The United States has turned out to be less exceptional than many thought. Clearly, it can happen here; the question now is whether it will. To find an answer, the articles in this issue's lead package zoom out, putting the country's current troubles into historical and international perspective.

Some say that global democracy is experiencing its worst setback since the 1930s and that it will continue to retreat unless rich countries find ways to reduce inequality and manage the information revolution. Those are the optimists. Pessimists fear the game is already over, that democratic dominance has ended for good.

To counsel against despair, Walter Russell Mead uses history, and Ronald Inglehart uses theory. Democracies in general, and American democracy in particular, have proved remarkably resilient over time. They have faced great challenges, but they have also found ways of rising to those challenges and renewing themselves. There is no reason they can't do so once again—if they can somehow get their act together.

Yascha Mounk and Roberto Stefan Foa offer a bleaker view. The collective economic might of authoritarian powers now outweighs that of advanced liberal democracies, they point out, and it is probable that the future will look less like the end of history than a renewed struggle for global ideological supremacy.

Yuen Yuen Ang and Ivan Krastev, finally, explore how the authoritarian resurgence is playing out on the ground in China and eastern Europe, respectively. At least today's enemies of democracy are less violent and aggressive than their fascist predecessors, so war is unlikely. And in China, the autocrats have managed to reform their bureaucracy enough to keep the economy moving forward—for now.

The most pressing dangers for the world's leading democracies, in other words, are not external but internal. The time, resources, and opportunity to turn things around are there; the only things missing are political will and leadership. As Benjamin Franklin walked out of the Constitutional Convention in 1787, a woman asked him, "Well, Doctor, what have we got, a republic or a monarchy?" Franklin replied, "A republic, if you can keep it." Two and a quarter centuries on, not much has changed.

—Gideon Rose, Editor

There is now a pervasive sense of despair about American democracy—a fear that it has reached a point of dysfunction and decay from which it will never recover.

—Walter Russell Mead

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JAMES GILLEARD

The Big Shift

How American Democracy Fails Its Way to Success

Walter Russell Mead

As Americans struggle to make sense of a series of uncomfortable economic changes and disturbing political developments, a worrying picture emerges: of ineffective politicians, frequent scandals, racial backsliding, polarized and irresponsible news media, populists spouting quack economic remedies, growing suspicion of elites and experts, frightening outbreaks of violence, major job losses, high-profile terrorist attacks, anti-immigrant agitation, declining social mobility, giant corporations dominating the economy, rising inequality, and the appearance of a new class of super-empowered billionaires in finance and technology-heavy industries.

That, of course, is a description of American life in the 35 years after the Civil War. The years between the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln, in 1865, and that of President William McKinley, in 1901, were among the least inspiring in the history of U.S. politics. As Reconstruction proved unsuccessful and a series of devastating depressions and panics roiled the economy, Washington failed miserably to rise to the challenges of the day.

WALTER RUSSELL MEAD is James Clark Chace Professor of Foreign Policy and the Humanities at Bard College, the Global View columnist at *The Wall Street Journal*, and a Distinguished Fellow at the Hudson Institute.

Not many Americans can name the drab presidents who drifted ineffectually through the corridors of the White House during those years; fewer still know the names of the senators and representatives with whom they worked. Almost no one not professionally engaged in the study of U.S. foreign policy can remember a diplomatic accomplishment between the purchase of Alaska and the construction of the Panama Canal. When the politicians of those days are dimly remembered, it is more often for scandal ("Ma, Ma, where's my Pa?" went the campaign chant referring to President Grover Cleveland's illegitimate child) than for any substantive accomplishment.

But if these were disappointing years in the annals of American governance, they were years of extraordinary importance in American history. This was the period in which the United States became the largest and most advanced economy in the world. As transcontinental railroads created a national market and massive industrial development created new industries and new technologies, astonishing inventions poured out steadily from the workshops of Thomas Edison and his imitators and rivals. John D. Rockefeller turned petroleum from a substance of no commercial importance into the foundation of global economic development. The United States' financial system became as sophisticated and powerful as that of the United Kingdom.

In hindsight, it was a period in which the United States failed its way to success as the consequences of the Industrial Revolution made themselves felt. The Industrial Revolution began, of course, well before the Civil War, but its full effects were felt only later, as the United States overtook the United Kingdom as



Hello darkness, my old friend: the Panic of 1873

KEAN COLLECTION / GETTY IMAGES

the greatest manufacturing power in the world. The rapid technological, social, and economic changes that the Industrial Revolution brought overwhelmed the institutions that had guided the United States since the American Revolution. It was not just the South that found its old political structures and ideas irrelevant in the wake of the war; in the North, too, the political ideals and the governing institutions of the antebellum world no longer sufficed.

The United States is passing through something similar today. The information revolution is disrupting the country's social and economic order as profoundly as the Industrial Revolution did. The ideologies and policies that fit American society a generation ago are becoming steadily less applicable to the problems it faces today. The United States' political parties and most of its political leaders lack the vision and ideas that could solve its most urgent problems. Intellectual and policy elites, for the most part, are too wedded to paradigms that no longer work, but the populists who seek to replace them don't have real answers, either. It is, in many ways, a stressful and anxious time to be alive. And that anxiety has prompted a pervasive sense of despair about American democracy—a fear that it has reached a point of dysfunction and decay from which it will never recover.

The effects of rapid change are often unwelcome, but the process of transformation is one of growth and development, not of decline and fall. Indeed, the ability to cope with change remains one of the United States' greatest sources of strength. In the nineteenth century, people often compared the United States unfavorably with the orderly Prussian-led German empire. Today, the contrast often drawn is with China's efficient modernization. Yet there is resilience and flexibility in the

creative disorder of a free society. There are reasons to believe that, once again, the United States can find a path to an open and humane society that capitalizes on the riches that the new economy will produce.

LIFE COMES AT YOU FAST

Transitions are painful. In the post–Civil War years, the failure of politics had grave consequences for American life. These were years of mass urbanization in the United States, and government at all levels failed to address the resulting problems. Poor housing, dangerously bad food quality, rampant pollution, high crime, abysmal public health services, inadequate schooling—all blighted urban life in the United States.

Farm policy was also a disaster. The federal government invited pioneers to settle on increasingly marginal lands west of the 100th meridian; many lost everything they had. The use of machinery and artificial fertilizers raised agricultural productivity, but small family farms were poorly placed to compete. Neither the establishment of land-grant colleges to promote scientific farming, nor the distribution of free land after the passage of the Homestead Act, nor the subsidizing of railroads could change the economic forces that were undermining the security of what for centuries had been the foundation of American society: the family farm. The Industrial Revolution was, among other things, a revolution in how people earned their livings. In 1850, 64 percent of the American population earned its living through farming. By 1900, that figure had fallen to 38 percent, and today, it has hit two percent.

The Industrial Revolution also led to a decline in social mobility. Before the Civil War, the line between employee and employer was more permeable than it later became. Young people without capital naturally went to work as artisans in workshops, but many of them would soon start their own businesses. As the small workshop was replaced with larger factories, that was no longer possible. Horatio Alger wrote novels about plucky shoeshine boys who rose out of poverty through hard work and good character, but increasingly, society was divided between workers and owners.

As those dividing lines became harder to cross, the classes grew even further apart. There had been rich and poor Americans in 1800—and nearly one million Americans were slaves—but overall, there was much less poverty in the United States then than in most of the rest of the world. After the Civil War, this changed. A class of superrich entrepreneurs and factory owners emerged, crossing the Atlantic to scour Europe for art treasures. Back home, industrial workers labored for subsistence wages, often working 12 or 14 hours a day, seven days a week, in noisy and dangerous factories.

Financial markets were so poorly regulated that panics and crashes periodically erupted with astonishing ferocity, destroying once flourishing businesses, driving once prosperous families from their homes into the streets, obliterating life savings, and swelling the ranks of the jobless at a time when no social safety net existed to mitigate the horrors of unemployment.

By the end of the nineteenth century, many Americans were haunted by dystopian visions of a future spinning out of control. The decline of the family farm and the rise of large cities filled

with masses of immigrants led many to predict the end of democracy in the United States. Socialists and anarchists agitated for revolutionary change; conservatives feared for the future and saw American values and culture being swamped by immigrants and unfamiliar ideas.

Yet beginning in the early twentieth century, the United States emerged from the crisis of industrialization to build a new kind of economy that ultimately brought prosperity and freedom to the overwhelming majority of the population. The postbellum generation was witnessing not, as many feared at the time, the death throes of the American experiment but the struggle of a butterfly bursting from its cocoon.

NO PAIN, NO GAIN

The adjustment came in three stages. In the first, from 1865 through 1901, Americans struggled to grapple with the forces reshaping their society. Often, the government was too weak or too poorly organized to undertake the complex tasks that the times demanded. The new ideas that well-intentioned people brought into the arena often fell short of what was required. The bimetal monetary standard of the politician William Jennings Bryan and the "single tax" of the economist Henry George could not solve the problems of the day—but neither could the prophets of orthodoxy solve the problems of agricultural decline, racial inequality, and urban poverty.

Still, Americans were learning from their failures and deepening their understanding of the new conditions. Economists developed better statistics and sharpened their analysis of such problems as the business cycle and the instabilities of the banking system. Civil service reform improved the quality of government personnel. Social activists and private philanthropists experimented with new methods and new ideas. Theologians rethought the relationship of social problems to the Gospel. New and more forward-looking coalitions began to take shape in American politics.

The postbellum generation did not solve the new problems that sprang up to confront them, but they laid the foundations for future success. An intellectual, social, and political structure gradually came together that would support a more successful set of policies in what became known as the Progressive era, thus beginning the second stage of adjustment. The Federal Reserve System, regulatory agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration, and reforms such as Prohibition, women's suffrage, the introduction of the income tax, and the popular election of U.S. senators testified to the growing confidence of a new generation better equipped to deal with industrialization.

Yet for all these successes, neither the Progressive era nor the more radical and far-reaching New Deal that followed it solved the problems of industrial society. It would take World War II to launch the third and final stage of adjustment. The rapid development of the wartime economy and the large-scale planning necessary to win the war provided Americans with a template for organizing their society more comprehensively than ever before. Only then could the United States harness the full potential of its industrial productivity and create the stable and prosperous society that appeared to have fixed the most basic

problems of economic and social life in the modern world.

In hindsight, the pattern seems clear: the post–Civil War years transformed the United States into the world's leading industrial economy, and in subsequent decades, Americans would learn how to use the enormous wealth that industrialization created to address the problems that it also brought. By the end of World War II, a rural nation of mostly prosperous small farmers had become an urban and suburban nation of mostly prosperous blue- and white-collar workers. Children went to school, not to factories or mines. The financial upheavals of earlier eras had been largely tamed. The business cycle, if not abolished, had been moderated so that the depressions that shook the industrializing world became a thing of the past. The social safety net protected employees, the elderly, and the infirm from the vicissitudes of life in a market society. Cities had reliable sources of water, gas, and electricity. By the 1970s, the worst of the environmental damage of the Industrial Revolution was being addressed; gradually, the water and the air were getting cleaner, and the slow work of assessing and repairing past environmental damage was under way.

The peak years of industrial society, from 1945 to 1990, saw the development in many countries of an unusually stable form of regulated capitalism closely aligned with the state. Regulated monopolies and oligopolies dominated many industries. In the United States, AT&T operated the telephone system as a monopoly, and the oil, automobile, airline, and steel industries, among others, were oligopolies dominated by a few large producers. In other industries, such as banking, a large number of firms operated under regulations that limited competition. These employers offered their employees stable jobs with good benefits; increasing numbers of workers received defined-benefit pension plans in addition to Social Security. Wages and benefits gradually rose in real terms. Educational opportunity widened. On the whole, each generation enjoyed a higher standard of living than its predecessor.

This transformation was not confined to the United States. Throughout the industrial world, the bitter class conflicts of the early decades of industrialization, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, gradually mellowed. After World War II, both capitalists and workers came to prefer compromise over struggle. Socialist parties became more gradualistic, and market-oriented parties became more socially conscious.

International life also became more stable among the industrial democracies. The restless ambitions of Germany and Japan no longer disturbed the peace. The rise of the European Union and NATO pointed to a new era of deep peace within Europe and in the Atlantic world more generally.

Beyond the frontiers of the industrialized West, international tensions persisted, with the Soviet bloc and across the developing world. But given the peaceful track record of industrial democracies, it appeared that human political development followed a predictable path. As agrarian societies industrialized, they passed through a kind of adolescence, but over time, they matured. The passions and errors of youth burned away, and delusional fantasies from fascism to communism lost their appeal. In the end, like most well-brought-up youth,

these societies grew to become responsible stakeholders in a prosperous world. They led regular lives.

Much remained to be done, and life in the United States and the other mature industrial societies of the late twentieth century was far from perfect. But their achievements were impressive enough to inspire political scientists to hail liberal, industrial capitalism as the highest and final form of human society. And the idea that industrial development was leading inexorably to both social peace at home and international peace abroad was supremely comforting to an era struggling to come to grips with nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Providence, however, had other plans. Liberal democracy in a world of mature industrial economies turned out not to be the end of history, after all, as geopolitical and ideological rivals have undermined the foundations of the liberal world order in recent years. As horrified EU officials in Brussels followed election returns in the United Kingdom, Hungary, Poland, and Italy, and as the Trump administration sought to take U.S. policy in new directions, the foundations of the building seemed to crumble, even as the architects of world order sought to place the finishing touches on the cathedral of peace. No longer were liberal democracies the custodians of a fully developed and stable social system. Increasingly, the masses no longer believed that technocrats could find the right answers to economic and social questions by following the established procedures. In many cases, citizens of democracies around the world today find themselves in the uncomfortable situation of the postbellum generation: facing problems whose

origins cannot be fully understood, and whose solutions will ultimately require intellectual and political architecture that does not yet exist.

INFORMATION, PLEASE

"Industrial revolution" and "information revolution"—the phrases are so hackneyed that they have come to conceal the very scale of change they were once meant to highlight. Such processes alter society even more profoundly than political revolutions. From the family to the state, from the corporation to the classroom, from the altar to the throne, from gender to finance, no social institution emerges unchanged. Political parties shatter and are rebuilt along new lines; new political ideologies, some of them extreme, emerge from the chaos to command widespread support. It is this kind of change that swept the world during the Industrial Revolution and is sweeping it now.

For the United States, this is both a pessimistic diagnosis and an optimistic one. On the one hand, the country could face years, perhaps decades, of upheaval and dysfunction as Americans struggle first to understand and then to master the rules of the emerging information society. On the other hand, the journey on which the country has embarked leads not to decline but to achievement. Just as the mature industrial society of the second half of the twentieth century offered the vast majority of Americans greater prosperity, health, and freedom than anyone has enjoyed since humanity emerged from the prehistoric mists, so can one reasonably hope that the creative forces unleashed by the information revolution will give rise to a new kind of society that will be more conducive to human dignity and freedom than anything ever known.

The information revolution is likely to be even more disruptive than the Industrial Revolution was, and to make matters worse, it is unfolding in an unstable world awash in nuclear weapons. History cannot reveal everything one needs to know about the challenges ahead. Yet as one thinks about how to manage the dangerous period in which the old ways are no longer adequate but the patterns of the new world are not yet clear, reflecting on the last big shift between two forms of economic and social order can offer valuable insights.

The place to begin is where these revolutions are first felt: in the world of work. The rapid decline of agriculture in the U.S. work force caused by the Industrial Revolution has its contemporary counterpart in the collapse of employment in both factory and routine clerical work. Together, these two categories of labor accounted for nearly half the jobs in the American economy as recently as 1980; as a result of automation and globalization, these two categories accounted for only 15 percent of American jobs in 2016.

It appears that these historic shifts are only beginning. The much-feared rise of automation is expected to destroy millions of jobs. Although new ones might appear to take their place, no one knows what these jobs will be—or what kind of education to give young people in preparation.

Meanwhile, the nature of employment has changed for many of the jobs that survive. Lifetime employment was often the norm in the mature industrial economy. In the contemporary world, in which companies can spring up overnight and then disappear almost as quickly, lifetime employment is becoming harder

to find. Outside the government sector, defined-benefit pension plans have largely disappeared. Not only must many workers change jobs and even industries over the course of their careers, but millions of workers also move in and out of the "gig economy," driving passengers for Uber, renting out rooms through Airbnb, selling goods on eBay, and taking on various part-time and temporary assignments.

TIME CHANGE

It will be a very long time before it becomes clear what a mature information economy might look like. If people in the 1860s and 1870s had been told that only two percent of the population would earn its living in agriculture in the twentieth century, they would not have been able to imagine what jobs the displaced farmers could find. That there would one day be "horseless carriages" and even "flying machines" they could perhaps have imagined, but would they have been able to predict that people would get jobs making stickers saying "Baby on Board" that proud parents could place in the rear windows of those carriages? Or that factories would one day grow up to make "travel-size" suitcases that passengers could place in the overhead baggage compartments of the flying machines? Or that health-care professionals would be tasked with writing letters to certify that certain household pets should be designated as "emotional support animals" so that they could accompany their owners on the flying machines?

The Industrial Revolution and the scientific revolution that accompanied it made it possible for ordinary people to live lives of affluence and security that would have astounded the court of Louis XIV. Automobiles, radios, vacuum cleaners, televisions, and so on transformed the material existence of the masses as well as of the elites. At the same time, the revolution in health care brought a multitude of diseases under control, extended life spans by decades, and found new ways to dull the pain of surgery and childbirth.

The information revolution will likely have a similar effect on services as cheap information processing continues to bring sophisticated offerings within the price range of the ordinary consumer. The average person will enjoy the kind of information-based services that today are available only to the very rich. Individualized medicine, first-class legal and financial advice and representation, career and professional consulting will be near universal in an age of smart machines and sophisticated software.

In its early stages, the information revolution has increased the earnings of many knowledge workers. This is likely to change. It was the guild members and tradesmen who suffered the most from the Industrial Revolution. Spinners, weavers, and ironworkers saw their once prestigious and highly paid jobs lose status and income as machines enabled less skilled workers to match their output. If, as seems likely, better software and more powerful computers continue to develop, many of today's learned professionals risk being replaced by machines in much the same way. Bureaucrats and managers face similar threats.

The full consequences of the information revolution will only gradually come into view, and the ideas and institutions suitable to it will emerge as the rising generations learn to use the resources and wealth that an information society

creates to address the problems it also brings. It is likely that before the adjustment is finished, every institution—from the state to the family to the corporation—will have changed in fundamental ways. In the meantime, people must learn to live in a world of forces that they do not always understand, much less control. "We do not ride on the railroad; it rides upon us," wrote Henry David Thoreau in 1854. Today, one might say that we do not so much surf the Web as the Web surfs us.

HOW TO GET THROUGH IT

To the extent that the experience of the last great transition offers some useful lessons, the first would be to remember that however difficult this one may appear, what is happening now is an opportunity, not a disaster. While one can mourn the loss of the stable livelihoods, assembly-line work is not, on the whole, an enriching or fulfilling pursuit. That humanity may soon be able to provide for its material needs without conscripting millions of people into lives of repetitive toil is cause for celebration.

Beyond that lesson, it seems clear that many existing social institutions and policies, however well they used to work, need to be changed. The contemporary approach to schooling was developed in response to the needs of the Industrial Revolution: it provided basic literacy to the whole work force, offered more advanced schooling to a percentage of it, and socialized children into the unique working environment of the industrial age. Whether toiling on the factory floor or in corporate or government bureaucracies, the employees of the industrial era worked in hierarchical organizations that valued order and patience. Increasingly, today's educational system socializes young people into a world that no longer exists.

The rise of large and stable employers made them central to social policy. The corporation collected taxes on behalf of the state, but it also served as the point of intervention for many social goals. Society looked to employers to provide pensions, health insurance, and a host of other benefits. If, as seems likely, the great firms of the new economy, such as Facebook and Google, will employ fewer people directly than such companies as AT&T and U.S. Steel did in their heyday, and if many firms will hire and fire workers more rapidly than in the past, then it is time to rethink the close relationship between employers and the state.

Especially during the transition period, it is likely that many Americans will be self-employed or work for very small enterprises, perhaps on a part-time or freelance basis. Ensuring that these companies, on the one hand, have access to credit and other necessary services and, on the other hand, are not crushed by paperwork and compliance burdens designed for larger enterprises will require many policy changes. Everything from zoning laws (to allow people to run small businesses out of their homes) to rules about employer benefits will need to be reviewed.

One of the most important ways that the information revolution can radically improve the lives of most Americans involves health care. In the future, the human physician may well be a worse diagnostician than a computer program, much as the folk hero John Henry was defeated by the steam drill, or the chess master Garry Kasparov was beaten by

IBM's supercomputer Deep Blue. The characteristic effect of the information revolution on a particular industry is a radical reduction in costs accompanied by a radical enhancement in quality. In health care, then, the primary focus of reform ought to be a shift away from providing a uniform bureaucratic experience to the entire population and toward encouraging the innovation that could someday give every individual American significantly better health care.

Government should also be transformed. The modern civil service is, above all, a product of the Industrial Revolution; the information revolution makes it possible, and perhaps necessary, for government to become much more responsive and effective. Industrial bureaucracies aimed for uniformity: every person who contacted the bureaucracy would ideally be treated in the same way. This works reasonably well when it comes to processes such as granting driver's licenses, but it works much less well when it comes to delivering complex services. In the future, a worker who loses a job may receive a voucher for unemployment benefits and retraining, and be able to choose among competing firms that offer the kinds of specialized services that a conventional bureaucracy simply cannot provide.

Finally, it is becoming increasingly clear that information is one element, and perhaps the most important, of state power. The "revolution in military affairs" that defense analysts spoke of in the early 1990s—the idea that in battle, the advantage goes to the military that can command the "infospace"—was merely a foretaste of what is to come. Given the increasing importance of signals intelligence, cyberwar, and "big data," the power that information will give to states is only going to grow. This raises fundamental questions of sovereignty, security, and, of course, civil liberties that will need to be answered.

The challenge is immense. The foundations of societies are quaking at home, even as the international order threatens to splinter. In the United States, policymakers and politicians now find themselves accountable to a public that may become defensive and antagonistic under the stress of economic and cultural change. The old answers in the old textbooks don't seem to work anymore, the new answers haven't been discovered yet, and those who will someday write the new textbooks are still in primary school. To reflect on the upheavals that accompanied the Industrial Revolution—the most destructive wars and the most unspeakable tyrannies in the history of our species—is to realize just how much peril we face.

Yet humans are problem-solving animals. We thrive on challenges. Americans, for their part, are the heirs to a system of mixed government and popular power that has allowed them to manage great upheavals in the past. The good news and the bad news are perhaps the same: the American people, in common with others around the world, have the opportunity to reach unimaginable levels of affluence and freedom, but to realize that opportunity, they must overcome some of the hardest challenges humanity has ever known. The treasure in the mountain is priceless, but the dragon who guards it is fierce.

The Age of Insecurity

Can Democracy Save Itself?

Ronald Inglehart

Over the past decade, many marginally democratic countries have become increasingly authoritarian. And authoritarian, xenophobic populist movements have grown strong enough to threaten democracy's long-term health in several rich, established democracies, including France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. How worried should we be about the outlook for democracy?

The good news is that ever since representative democracy first emerged, it has been spreading, pushed forward by the forces of modernization. The pattern has been one of advances followed by setbacks, but the net result has been an increasing number of democracies, from a bare handful in the nineteenth century to about 90 today. The bad news is that the world is experiencing the most severe democratic setback since the rise of fascism in the 1930s.

The immediate cause of rising support for authoritarian, xenophobic populist movements is a reaction against immigration (and, in the United States, rising racial equality). That reaction has been intensified by the rapid cultural change and declining job security experienced by many in the developed world. Cultural and demographic shifts are making older voters feel as though they no longer live in the country where they were born. And high-income countries are adopting job-replacing technology, such as artificial intelligence, that has the potential to make people richer and healthier but also tends to result in a winner-take-all economy.

But there is nothing inevitable about democratic decline. Rising prosperity continues to move most developing countries toward democracy—although, as always, the trajectory is not a linear one. And in the developed world, the current wave of authoritarianism will persist only if societies and governments fail to address the underlying drivers. If new political coalitions emerge to reverse the trend toward inequality and ensure that the benefits of automation are widely shared, they can put democracy back on track. But if the developed world continues on its current course, democracy could wither away. If there is nothing inevitable about democratic decline, there is also nothing inevitable about democratic resurgence.

BY POPULAR DEMAND

Over the past two centuries, the spread of democracy has been driven by the forces of modernization. As countries urbanized and industrialized, people who were once scattered over the countryside moved into towns and cities and began working together in factories. That allowed them to communicate and organize, and the economic growth

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Power to the populist: Trump at a rally in Florida, December 2017

CARLO ALLEGRI / REUTERS

driven by industrialization made them healthier and wealthier. Greater economic and physical security led successive generations to place less emphasis on survival and more on intangible values, such as freedom of expression, making them more likely to want democracy. Economic growth also went hand in hand with more education, which made people better informed, more articulate, more skilled at organizing, and therefore more effective at pushing for democracy. Finally, as industrial societies matured, jobs shifted from manufacturing to knowledge sectors. Those new occupations involved less routine and more independence. Workers had to think for themselves, and that spilled over into their political behavior.

Moreover, democracy has a major advantage over other political systems: it provides a nonviolent way to replace a country's leaders. Democratic institutions do not guarantee that the people will elect wise and benevolent rulers, but they do provide a regular and nonviolent way to replace unwise and malevolent ones. Nondemocratic leadership successions can be costly and bloody. And since democracy enables people to choose their leaders, it reduces the need for repressive rule. Both these advantages have helped democracy survive and spread.

For the past few decades, the most striking alternative to the democratic path has come in China. Since its disastrous experience under Mao Zedong, the country has been governed by an exceptionally competent authoritarian elite. That reflects the political genius of Mao's successor, Deng Xiaoping. In addition to guiding China toward a market economy, Deng established norms that limited top leaders to two five-year terms in office and mandated retirement at age 70. He then selected

some of the country's most competent 60-year-olds to run the government and installed a carefully chosen group of 50-year-olds below them. For roughly two decades after Deng's retirement, China was governed by the people he had selected. In 2012, that group chose a new generation of leaders. Despite growing cronyism and corruption, this group also seems competent, but its leader, Xi Jinping, is maneuvering to establish himself as dictator for life, abandoning Deng's system of predictable, nonviolent successions. If Xi succeeds, China's government is likely to become less effective.

Most authoritarian countries, however, are not governed nearly as effectively as contemporary China (nor was China under Mao). During the early stages of industrialization, authoritarian states can attain high rates of economic growth, but knowledge economies flourish best in open societies. In the long run, democracy seems to be the best way to govern developed countries.

FITS AND STARTS

The long-term trend toward democracy has always had ups and downs. At the start of the twentieth century, only a few democracies existed, and even they were not full democracies by today's standards. The number increased sharply after World War I, with another surge following World War II and a third at the end of the Cold War. Sooner or later, however, each surge was followed by a decline.

Democracy's most dramatic setback, which came in the 1930s, when fascism spread over much of Europe, was partially driven by economic decline. Under relatively secure conditions in 1928, the German electorate viewed the Nazi Party as a lunatic fringe, giving it less than three percent of the vote in national elections that year. But in July 1932, with the onset of the Great Depression, the Nazis won 37 percent of the vote, becoming the largest party in the Reichstag, before taking over the government the next year. Each period of democratic decline brought a widespread belief that democracy's spread had ended and that some other system—fascism, communism, bureaucratic authoritarianism—would be the wave of the future. But the number of democracies never fell back to its original level, and each decline was eventually followed by a resurgence.

The defeat of the Axis powers in World War II largely discredited authoritarian parties in the developed world: from 1945 to 1959, they drew an average of about seven percent of the vote across the 32 Western democracies that contained at least one such party. Then, in the 1960s, as the unprecedented prosperity of the postwar era took hold, their support fell even further, to about five percent, and it remained low during the 1970s.

After 1980, however, support for authoritarian parties surged. By 2015, they were drawing an average of more than 12 percent of the vote across those 32 democracies. In Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, authoritarian parties became the largest or second-largest political bloc. In Hungary and Poland, they won control of government. Since then, they have grown even stronger in some countries. In the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the Republican candidate Donald Trump campaigned on a platform of xenophobia and sympathy

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toward authoritarianism, yet he won 46 percent of the vote (and the Electoral College). In Austria's 2016 presidential election, Norbert Hofer, the far-right Freedom Party candidate, narrowly lost with 46 percent of the vote. In France, Marine Le Pen, the leader of the National Front, won 34 percent of the vote in last year's presidential election, almost double her party's previous high. Ever since World War II, Germans have had a strong aversion to authoritarian, xenophobic parties, which for decades never surpassed the five percent threshold required for representation in the Bundestag. But in 2017, the authoritarian, xenophobic Alternative for Germany won 13 percent of the vote, becoming Germany's third-largest party.

THE ERA OF NOT-SO-GOOD FEELINGS

To a large degree, the shifts between democracy and authoritarianism can be explained by the extent to which people feel that their existence is secure. For most of history, survival was precarious. When food supplies rose, population levels rose with them. When food grew scarce, populations shrank. In both lean and fat times, most people lived just above the starvation level. During extreme scarcity, xenophobia was a realistic strategy: when a tribe's territory produced just enough food to sustain it, another tribe moving in could spell death for the original inhabitants. Under these conditions, people tend to close ranks behind strong leaders, a reflex that in modern times leads to support for authoritarian, xenophobic parties.

In rich countries, many people after World War II grew up taking their survival for granted. They could do so thanks to unprecedented economic growth, strong welfare states, and peace between the world's major powers. That security led to an intergenerational shift in values, as many people no longer gave top priority to economic and physical security and no longer felt as great a need to conform to group norms. Instead, they emphasized individual free choice. That sparked radical cultural changes: the rise of antiwar movements, advances in racial and gender equality, and greater tolerance of the LGBTQ community and other traditional out-groups.

Those shifts provoked a reaction among older people and those holding less secure positions in society (the less educated, the less well off) who felt threatened by the erosion of familiar values. During the past three decades, that sense of alienation has been compounded by an influx of immigrants and refugees. From 1970 to 2015, the Hispanic population of the United States rose from five percent to 18 percent. Sweden, which in 1970 was inhabited almost entirely by ethnic Swedes, now has a foreign-born population of 19 percent. Germany's is 23 percent. And in Switzerland, it is 25 percent.

All this dislocation has polarized modern societies. Since the 1970s, surveys in the United States and other countries have revealed a split between "materialists," who stress the need for economic and physical security, and "postmaterialists," who take that security for granted and emphasize less tangible values.

In the U.S. component of the 2017 World Values Survey, respondents were asked a list of six questions, each of which required choosing which of two goals

was most important for their country. Those who chose things such as spurring economic growth, fighting rising prices, maintaining order, and cracking down on crime were defined as materialists. By contrast, those who gave top priority to things such as protecting freedom of speech, giving people more say in important government decisions, and having greater autonomy in their own jobs were designated postmaterialists.

In recent U.S. presidential elections, this split has had a major influence on voting patterns, dwarfing the effects of other demographic traits, such as social class. Consider the 2012 election: those who gave priority to materialist values in all six of their choices were 2.2 times as likely to have voted for the Republican candidate, Mitt Romney, as they were for the Democratic candidate, Barack Obama, and those who gave priority to postmaterialist values in all six choices were 8.6 times as likely to have voted for Obama as they were for Romney. This relationship grew even stronger in 2016, when Trump, an openly racist, sexist, authoritarian, and xenophobic candidate, ran against Hillary Clinton, a liberal and cosmopolitan one, who was also the first woman nominated by a major party. Pure materialists were now 3.8 times as likely to vote for Trump as they were for Clinton, and pure postmaterialists were a stunning 14.3 times as likely to vote for Clinton as they were for Trump.

Economic insecurity can exacerbate these cultural pressures toward authoritarianism. In 2006, the Danish public was remarkably tolerant when protesters burned Danish embassies in several Muslim-majority countries in response to a cartoon of the Prophet Muhammad published by a Danish newspaper. At the height of the crisis, there was no Islamophobic backlash in Denmark. The next year, the anti-Muslim Danish People's Party won 14 percent of the vote. But in 2015, in the wake of the Great Recession, it won 21 percent, becoming Denmark's second-largest party. A backlash against the European migrant crisis was the immediate cause of the party's support, but rising economic insecurity strengthened the reaction.

FOR RICHER, FOR POORER

Economic insecurity need not take the form of absolute hardship to undermine democracy. In the vast literature on democratization, researchers disagree on many issues, but one point draws almost unanimous acceptance: extreme inequality is incompatible with democracy. Indeed, it is not surprising that the rise in support for authoritarian parties over the last three decades roughly parallels the rise in inequality over the same period.

According to data compiled by the economist Thomas Piketty, in 1900, in France, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, the wealthiest ten percent of the population took home 40 to 47 percent of total income before taxes and transfers. In the United States, the figure was 41 percent. By around 1970, things had gotten better, and the share going to the top ten percent in all five countries fell to levels ranging from 25 percent to 35 percent. Since 1980, however, income inequality has risen in all five countries. In the United States, the top ten percent now takes home almost half of the national income. In all but one of the countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development for which data are available, income inequality rose from 1980 to 2009.

Although inequality in almost all developed countries has followed a U-shaped pattern, there are striking differences between them that reflect the effects of varying political systems. Sweden stands out: although it had substantially higher levels of inequality than the United States in the early twentieth century, by the 1920s, it had lower income inequality than the other four countries in Piketty's study, and it has maintained that to this day. The advanced welfare state introduced by Sweden's long-dominant Social Democrats is largely responsible for the country's low inequality. Conversely, the conservative policies implemented by U.S. President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s weakened labor unions and sharply cut back state regulation, leading to higher levels of income inequality in the United States and the United Kingdom than in most developed countries.

As long as everyone was getting richer, rising inequality did not seem to matter much. Some people might have been rising faster than others, but everyone was going in the right direction. Today, however, everyone isn't getting richer. For decades, the real income of the developed world's working classes has been declining. Fifty years ago, the largest employer in the United States was General Motors, where workers earned an average of around $30 an hour in 2016 dollars. Today, the country's largest employer is Walmart, which in 2016 paid around $8 an hour. Less educated people now have precarious job prospects and are shut out from the benefits of growth, which have overwhelmingly gone to those above them.

Rising inequality and a stagnant working class are not the inevitable results of capitalism, as Piketty claims. Instead, they reflect a society's stage of development. The transition from an agrarian to an industrial economy creates a demand for large numbers of workers, increasing their bargaining power. Moving to a service economy has the opposite effect, undermining the power of organized labor as automation replaces humans. This first reduces the bargaining power of industrial workers and then, with the transition to a society dominated by artificial intelligence, that of highly educated professionals.

THE MACHINE AGE

The problems of cultural change and inequality in rich democracies are being compounded by the rise of automation, which threatens to create an economy in which almost all the gains go to the very top. Because most goods in a knowledge economy, such as software, cost almost nothing to replicate and distribute, high-quality products can sell for the same price as lower-quality ones. As a result, there is no need to buy anything but the top product, which can take over the entire market, producing enormous rewards for those making the top product but nothing for anyone else.

It is often assumed that the most important part of the knowledge economy, the high-tech sector, will create large numbers of well-paid jobs. But that sector's share of all jobs in the United States has remained flat since statistics first became available about three decades ago. Canada, France, Germany,

Sweden, and the United Kingdom show the same pattern in their high-tech sectors. Unlike the transitions from an agrarian economy to an industrial economy and then to a knowledge economy, the move toward artificial intelligence is not generating large numbers of secure, well-paid jobs.

That is because computers are fast reaching the point where they can replace even highly educated professionals. Artificial intelligence has already made huge strides toward replacing human labor in analyzing legal documents, diagnosing patients, and even writing computer programs. As a result, although U.S. politicians and voters often blame global trade and offshoring for their country's economic difficulties, between 2000 and 2010, over 85 percent of U.S. manufacturing jobs were eliminated by technological advances, whereas only 13 percent were lost to trade.

Although artificial intelligence is rapidly replacing large numbers of jobs, its effects are not immediately visible: the global economy is growing, and unemployment is low. But these reassuring statistics conceal the fact that in the United States, 94 percent of the job growth from 2005 to 2015 was among low-paid security guards, housekeepers, janitors, and others who report to subcontractors. Moreover, the top-line unemployment figure hides the large numbers of people who have been driven by dismal job prospects to drop out of the work force altogether. The U.S. unemployment rate is 4.1 percent. But the percentage of adults either working or actively seeking a job is near its lowest level in more than 30 years. In 2017, for every unemployed American man between 25 and 55 years old, another three were neither working nor looking for work. Work rates for women rose steadily until 2000; since then, those have also declined.

Life as a labor-force dropout is not easy. Working-age men who are out of the labor force report low levels of emotional well-being, and a 2016 study by the National Bureau of Economic Research found that nearly half of all working-age male labor-force dropouts—roughly 3.5 million men—took pain medication on a daily basis. Not surprisingly, they tend to die early. From 1999 to 2013, death rates rose sharply for non-Hispanic white American men with high school degrees or less, the group most likely to have left the labor force recently. So-called deaths of despair—suicides, liver cirrhosis, and drug overdoses—accounted for most of the increase. From 1900 to 2012, U.S. life expectancy at birth rose from 47 to 79 years but then leveled off, and in both 2015 and 2016, life expectancy at birth for all Americans declined slightly.

GETTING DEMOCRACY RIGHT

Whether this latest democratic setback proves permanent will depend on whether societies address these problems, which will require government intervention. Unless new political coalitions emerge in developed countries that represent the 99 percent, their economies will continue to hollow out and most people's economic security will carry on declining. The political stability and economic health of high-income societies require greater emphasis on the redistributive policies that dominated much of the twentieth century. The social base of the New Deal coalition and its European counterparts is gone, but the reappearance

of extreme wealth concentrated in the top one percent has created the potential for new coalitions.

In the United States, taking a punitive approach to the top one percent would be counterproductive, as it includes many of the country's most valuable people. But moving toward a more progressive income tax would be perfectly reasonable. In the 1950s and 1960s, the top one percent of Americans paid a much higher share of their income in taxes than they do today. That did not strangle growth, which was stronger then than now. Two of today's wealthiest Americans, Warren Buffett and Bill Gates, advocate higher taxes for the very rich. They also argue that the inheritance tax is a relatively painless way to raise badly needed funds for education, health care, research and development, and infrastructure. But powerful conservative interests are moving the United States in the opposite direction, sharply reducing taxes on the rich and cutting government spending.

From 1989 to 2014, as part of the World Values Survey, pollsters asked respondents around the world which statement better reflected their views: "Incomes should be made more equal" or "Income differences should be larger to provide incentives for individual effort." In the earliest surveys, majorities in 52 of the 65 countries polled at least twice supported greater incentives for individual effort. But over the next 25 years, the situation reversed itself. In the most recent available survey, majorities in 51 of the 65 countries, including the United States, favored making incomes more equal.

The rise of automation is making societies richer, but governments must intervene and reallocate some of the new resources to create meaningful jobs that require a human touch in health care, education, infrastructure, environmental protection, research and development, and the arts and humanities. Governments' top priority should be improving the quality of life for society as a whole, rather than maximizing corporate profits. Finding effective ways to achieve this will be one of the central challenges of the coming years.

Democracy has retreated before, only to recover. But today's retreat will be reversed only if rich countries address the growing inequality of recent decades and manage the transition to the automated economy. If citizens can build political coalitions to reverse the trend toward inequality and preserve the possibility of widespread, meaningful employment, there is every reason to expect that democracy will resume its onward march.

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The End of the Democratic Century

Autocracy's Global Ascendance

Yascha Mounk and Roberto Stefan Foa

At the height of World War II, Henry Luce, the founder of *Time* magazine, argued that the United States had amassed such wealth and power that the twentieth century would come to be known simply as "the American Century." His prediction proved prescient: despite being challenged for supremacy by Nazi Germany and, later, the Soviet Union, the United States prevailed against its adversaries. By the turn of the millennium, its position as the most powerful and influential state in the world appeared unimpeachable. As a result, the twentieth century was marked by the dominance not just of a particular country but also of the political system it helped spread:liberal democracy.

As democracy flourished across the world, it was tempting to ascribe its dominance to its inherent appeal. If citizens in India, Italy, or Venezuela seemed loyal to their political system, it must have been because they had developed a deep commitment to both individual rights and collective self-determination. And if Poles and Filipinos began to make the transition from dictatorship to democracy, it must have been because they, too, shared in the universal human desire for liberal democracy.

But the events of the second half of the twentieth century can also be interpreted in a very different way. Citizens across the world were attracted to liberal democracy not simply because of its norms and values but also because it offered the most salient model of economic and geopolitical success. Civic ideals may have played their part in converting the citizens of formerly authoritarian regimes into convinced democrats, but the astounding economic growth of western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s, the victory of democratic countries in the Cold War, and the defeat or collapse of democracy's most powerful autocratic rivals were just as important.

Taking the material foundations of democratic hegemony seriously casts the story of democracy's greatest successes in a different light, and it also changes how one thinks about its current crisis. As liberal democracies have become worse at improving their citizens' living standards, populist movements that disavow liberalism are emerging from Brussels to Brasília and from Warsaw to Washington. A striking number of citizens have started to ascribe less importance to living in a democracy: whereas two-thirds of Americans above the age of 65 say it is absolutely important to them to live in a democracy, for

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example, less than one-third of those below the age of 35 say the same thing. A growing minority is even open to authoritarian alternatives: from 1995 to 2017, the share of French, Germans, and Italians who favored military rule more than tripled.

As recent elections around the world indicate, these opinions aren't just abstract preferences; they reflect a deep groundswell of antiestablishment sentiment that can be easily mobilized by extremist political parties and candidates. As a result, authoritarian populists who disrespect some of the most basic rules and norms of the democratic system have made rapid advances across western Europe and North America over the past two decades. Meanwhile, authoritarian strongmen are rolling back democratic advances across much of Asia and eastern Europe. Could the changing balance of economic and military power in the world help explain these unforeseen developments?

That question is all the more pressing today, as the long-standing dominance of a set of consolidated democracies with developed economies and a common alliance structure is coming to an end. Ever since the last decade of the nineteenth century, the democracies that formed the West's Cold War alliance against the Soviet Union—in North America, western Europe, Australasia, and postwar Japan—have commanded a majority of the world's income. In the late nineteenth century, established democracies such as the United Kingdom and the United States made up the bulk of global GDP. In the second half of the twentieth century, as the geographic span of both democratic rule and the alliance structure headed by the United States expanded to include Japan and Germany, the power of this liberal democratic alliance became even more crushing. But now, for the first time in over a hundred years, its share of global GDP has fallen below half. According to forecasts by the International Monetary Fund, it will slump to a third within the next decade.

At the same time that the dominance of democracies has faded, the share of economic output coming from authoritarian states has grown rapidly. In 1990, countries rated "not free" by Freedom House (the lowest category, which excludes "partially free" countries such as Singapore) accounted for just 12 percent of global income. Now, they are responsible for 33 percent, matching the level they achieved in the early 1930s, during the rise of fascism in Europe, and surpassing the heights they reached in the Cold War when Soviet power was at its apex.

As a result, the world is now approaching a striking milestone: within the next five years, the share of global income held by countries considered "not free"—such as China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia—will surpass the share held by Western liberal democracies. In the span of a quarter century, liberal democracies have gone from a position of unprecedented economic strength to a position of unprecedented economic weakness.

It is looking less and less likely that the countries in North America and western Europe that made up the traditional heartland of liberal democracy can regain their erstwhile supremacy, with their democratic systems embattled at home and their share of the world economy continuing to shrink. So the

SHAMIL ZHUMATOV / REUTERS

The dictator's dividend: a monument in Astana, Kazakhstan, September 2016

future promises two realistic scenarios: either some of the most powerful autocratic countries in the world will transition to liberal democracy, or the period of democratic dominance that was expected to last forever will prove no more than an interlude before a new era of struggle between mutually hostile political systems.

THE WAGES OF WEALTH

Of all the ways in which economic prosperity buys a country power and influence, perhaps the most important is that it creates stability at home. As the political scientists Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi have shown, poor democracies often collapse. It is only rich democracies—those with a GDP per capita above $14,000 in today's terms, according to their findings—that are reliably secure. Since the formation of the postwar alliance binding the United States to its allies in western Europe, no affluent member has experienced a breakdown of democratic rule.

Beyond keeping democracies stable, economic might also endows them with a number of tools to influence the development of other countries. Chief among these is cultural clout. During the apogee of Western liberal democracy, the United States—and, to a lesser extent, western Europe—was home to the most famous writers and musicians, the most watched television shows and movies, the most advanced industries, and the most prestigious universities. In the minds of many young people coming of age in Africa or Asia in the 1990s, all these things seemed to be of a piece: the desire to share in the unfathomable wealth of the West was also a desire to adopt its lifestyle, and the desire to adopt its lifestyle seemed to require emulating its political system.

This combination of economic power and cultural prestige facilitated a great

degree of political influence. When the American soap opera *Dallas* began airing in the Soviet Union in the 1980s, for example, Soviet citizens naturally contrasted the impossible wealth of suburban America with their own material deprivation and wondered why their economic system had fallen so far behind. "We were directly or indirectly responsible for the fall of the [Soviet] empire," Larry Hagman, one of its leading stars, boasted years later. It was, he claimed, not Soviet citizens' idealism but rather "good old-fashioned greed" that "got them to question their authority."

The economic prowess of Western democracies could also take on a harder edge. They could influence political events in other countries by promising to include them in the global economic system or threatening to exclude them from it. In the 1990s and the first decade of this century, the prospect of membership in organizations from the European Union to the World Trade Organization provided powerful incentives for democratic reforms in eastern Europe, Turkey, and parts of Asia, including Thailand and South Korea. Meanwhile, Western sanctions that prevented countries from participating in the global economy may have helped contain Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in the years following the Gulf War, and they were arguably instrumental in bringing about the fall of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic after the war in Kosovo.

Finally, economic power could easily be converted into military might. This, too, did much to enhance the global standing of liberal democracies. It ensured that other countries could not topple democratic regimes by force and raised the domestic legitimacy of such regimes by making military humiliation a rarity. At the same time, it encouraged the spread of democracy though diplomatic leverage and the presence of boots on the ground. Countries that were physically located between a major democratic power and a major authoritarian power, such as Poland and Ukraine, were deeply influenced by the greater material and military benefits offered by an alliance with the West. Former colonies emulated the political systems of their erstwhile rulers when they gained independence, leaving parliamentary democracies from the islands of the Caribbean to the highlands of East Africa. And in at least two major cases—Germany and Japan—Western military occupation paved the way for the introduction of a model democratic constitution.

In short, it is impossible to understand the story of the democratic century without taking seriously the role that economic power played in spreading the ideals of liberal democracy around the world. This also means that it is impossible to make informed predictions about the future of liberal democracy without reflecting on the effects that the decline in the relative economic clout of the democratic alliance might have in the years and decades to come.

THE DANGERS OF DECLINE

At first glance, the conclusion that affluence breeds stability seems to bode well for the future of North America and western Europe, where the institutions of liberal democracy have traditionally been most firmly established. After all, even if their relative power declines, the absolute level of wealth in Canada or France is very unlikely to fall below the threshold at which democracies tend to

fail. But absolute levels of wealth may have been just one of many economic features that kept Western democracies stable after World War II. Indeed, the stable democracies of that period also shared three other economic attributes that can plausibly help explain their past success: relative equality, rapidly growing incomes for most citizens, and the fact that authoritarian rivals to democracy were much less wealthy.

All these factors have begun to erode in recent years. Consider what has happened in the United States. In the 1970s, the top one percent of income earners commanded eight percent of pretax income; now, they command over 20 percent. For much of the twentieth century, inflation-adjusted wages roughly doubled from generation to generation; for the past 30 years, they have essentially remained flat. And throughout the Cold War, the U.S. economy, as measured by GDP based on purchasing power parity, remained two to three times as large as the Soviet economy; today, it is one-sixth smaller than China's.

The ability of autocratic regimes to compete with the economic performance of liberal democracies is a particularly important and novel development. At the height of its influence, communism managed to rival the ideological appeal of liberal democracy across large parts of the developing world. But even then, it offered a weak economic alternative to capitalism. Indeed, the share of global income produced by the Soviet Union and its satellite states peaked at 13 percent in the mid-1950s. Over the following decades, it declined steadily, falling to ten percent by 1989. Communist countries also could not provide their citizens with a lifestyle that would rival the

comfort of the capitalist West. From 1950 to 1989, per capita income in the Soviet Union fell from two-thirds to less than half of the western European level. As the German writer Hans Magnus Enzensberger put it, playing off the title of an essay by Lenin, Soviet socialism proved to be "the highest stage of underdevelopment."

New forms of authoritarian capitalism may eventually suffer similar types of economic stagnation. So far, however, the form of authoritarian capitalism that has emerged in Arab Gulf states and East Asia—combining a strong state with relatively free markets and reasonably secure property rights—is having a good run. Of the 15 countries in the world with the highest per capita incomes, almost two-thirds are nondemocracies. Even comparatively unsuccessful authoritarian states, such as Iran, Kazakhstan, and Russia, can boast per capita incomes above $20,000. China, whose per capita income was vastly lower as recently as two decades ago, is rapidly starting to catch up. Although average incomes in its rural hinterlands remain low, the country has proved that it can offer a higher level of wealth in its more urban areas: the coastal region of China now comprises some 420 million people, with an average income of $23,000 and growing. In other words, hundreds of millions of people can now be said to live under conditions of "authoritarian modernity." In the eyes of their less affluent imitators around the world, their remarkable prosperity serves as a testament to the fact that the road to prosperity no longer needs to run through liberal democracy.

AUTHORITARIAN SOFT POWER

One of the results of this transformation has been a much greater degree of ideological self-confidence among autocratic regimes—and, along with it, a willingness to meddle in Western democracies. Russia's attempts to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election have understandably drawn the most attention over the past two years. But the country has long had an even greater influence on politics across western Europe. In Italy and France, for example, Russia has helped finance extremist parties on both sides of the political divide for decades. In other European countries, Russia has enjoyed even more remarkable success in recruiting retired political leaders to lobby on its behalf, including former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and former Austrian Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer.

The big question now is whether Russia will remain alone in its attempt to influence the politics of liberal democracies. The answer is almost certainly no: its campaigns have proved that outside meddling by authoritarian powers in deeply divided democracies is relatively easy and strikingly effective, making it very tempting for Russia's authoritarian peers to follow suit. Indeed, China is already stepping up ideological pressure on its overseas residents and establishing influential Confucius Institutes in major centers of learning. And over the past two years, Saudi Arabia has dramatically upped its payments to registered U.S. lobbyists, increasing the number of registered foreign agents working on its behalf from 25 to 145.

If the changing balance of economic and technological power between Western democracies and authoritarian countries

makes the former more susceptible to outside interference, it also makes it easier for the latter to spread their values. Indeed, the rise of authoritarian soft power is already apparent across a variety of domains, including academia, popular culture, foreign investment, and development aid. Until a few years ago, for example, all of the world's leading universities were situated in liberal democracies, but authoritarian countries are starting to close the gap. According to the latest *Times Higher Education* survey, 16 of the world's top 250 institutions can be found in nondemocracies, including China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Singapore.

Perhaps the most important form of authoritarian soft power, however, may be the growing ability of dictatorial regimes to soften the hold that democracies once enjoyed over the reporting and dissemination of news. Whereas the Soviet mouthpiece *Pravda* could never have dreamed of attracting a mass readership in the United States, the clips produced today by state-funded news channels, including Qatar's Al Jazeera, China's CCTV, and Russia's RT, regularly find millions of American viewers. The result is the end of the West's monopoly over media narratives, as well as an end to its ability to maintain a civic space untainted by foreign governments.

THE BEGINNING OF THE END?

During the long period of democratic stability, the United States was the dominant superpower, both culturally and economically. Authoritarian competitors such as the Soviet Union quickly stagnated economically and became discredited ideologically. As a result, democracy seemed to promise not only a greater degree of individual freedom and collective self-determination but also the more prosaic prospect of a vastly wealthier life. As long as these background conditions held, there seemed to be good reason to assume that democracy would continue to be safe in its traditional strongholds. There were even plausible grounds to hope that an ever-growing number of autocratic countries would join the democratic column.

But the era in which Western liberal democracies were the world's top cultural and economic powers may now be drawing to a close. At the same time that liberal democracies are showing strong signs of institutional decay, authoritarian populists are starting to develop an ideological alternative in the form of illiberal democracy, and outright autocrats are offering their citizens a standard of living that increasingly rivals that of the richest countries in the West.

It is tempting to hope that Western liberal democracies could regain their dominance. One path toward that end would be economic. The recent economic success of authoritarian countries could prove to be short lived. Russia and Saudi Arabia remain overly reliant on income from fossil fuels. China's recent growth has been fueled by a soaring debt bubble and favorable demographics, and it may end up being difficult to sustain once the country is forced to deleverage and the effects of an aging population hit home. At the same time, the economic performance of developed Western economies could improve. As the residual effects of the Great Recession wear off and European and North American economies roar back to life, these bastions of liberal democracy

could once again outpace the modernized autocracies.

Projections about the exact speed and degree of the shifting power balance between democratic and authoritarian countries should therefore be taken with a large grain of salt. And yet a cursory glance at Western GDP growth rates for the past three to four decades shows that, due to demographic decline and low productivity growth, Western economies were stagnating long before the financial crisis. Meanwhile, China and many other emerging economies have large hinterlands that have yet to experience catch-up development, which suggests that these countries can continue to make considerable gains by following their current growth model.

Another hope is that emerging democracies such as Brazil, India, and Indonesia may come to play a more active role in upholding an alliance of liberal democracies and diffusing their values around the world. But this would require a radical change in course. As the political scientist Marc Plattner has argued, these countries have not historically thought of "the defense of liberal democracy as a significant component of their foreign policies." Following the Russian annexation of Crimea, for example, Brazil, India, and South Africa abstained from voting on a resolution in the UN General Assembly that condemned the move. They have also opposed sanctions against Russia. And they have tended to side with autocratic regimes in seeking a greater role for states in regulating the Internet.

To make things worse, emerging democracies have historically been much less stable than the supposedly consolidated democracies of North America, western Europe, and parts of East Asia. Indeed, recent democratic backsliding in Turkey, as well as signs of democratic slippage in Argentina, Indonesia, Mexico, and the Philippines, raises the possibility that some of these countries may become flawed democracies—or revert to outright authoritarian rule—in the coming decades. Instead of shoring up the dwindling forces of democracy, some of these countries may choose to align with autocratic powers.

Hopes that the current set of democratic countries could somehow regain their erstwhile global position are probably vain. The most likely scenario, then, is that democracies will come to look less and less attractive as they cease to be associated with wealth and power and fail to address their own challenges.

It's conceivable, however, that the animating principles of liberal democracy will prove deeply appealing to the inhabitants of authoritarian countries even once those peoples enjoy a comparable standard of living. If large authoritarian countries such as Iran, Russia, and Saudi Arabia undertook democratic reforms, the aggregate power of democracies would be boosted significantly. If China were to do so, it would end the era of authoritarian resurgence in a single stroke.

But that is just another way of saying that the long century during which Western liberal democracies dominated the globe has ended for good. The only remaining question now is whether democracy will transcend its once firm anchoring in the West, a shift that would create the conditions for a truly global democratic century—or whether democracy will become, at best, the lingering form of government in an economically and demographically declining corner of the world.

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Autocracy With Chinese Characteristics

Beijing's Behind-the-Scenes Reforms

Yuen Yuen Ang

"Sooner or later this economy will slow," the *New York Times* columnist Thomas Friedman declared of China in 1998. He continued: "That's when China will need a government that is legitimate. . . . When China's 900 million villagers get phones, and start calling each other, this will inevitably become a more open country." At the time, just a few years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Friedman's certainty was broadly shared. China's economic ascent under authoritarian rule could not last; eventually, and inescapably, further economic development would bring about democratization.

Twenty years after Friedman's prophecy, China has morphed into the world's second-largest economy. Growth has slowed, but only because it leveled off when China reached middle-income status (not, as Friedman worried, because of a lack of "real regulatory systems"). Communications technology rapidly spread—today, 600 million Chinese citizens own smartphones and 750 million use the Internet—but the much-anticipated tsunami of political liberalization has not arrived. If anything, under the current regime of President Xi Jinping, the Chinese government appears more authoritarian, not less.

Most Western observers have long believed that democracy and capitalism go hand in hand, that economic liberalization both requires and propels political liberalization. China's apparent defiance of this logic has led to two opposite conclusions. One camp insists that China represents a temporary aberration and that liberalization will come soon. But this is mostly speculation; these analysts have been incorrectly predicting the imminent collapse of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for decades. The other camp sees China's success as proof that autocracies are just as good as democracies at promoting growth—if not better. As Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad put it in 1992, "authoritarian stability" has enabled prosperity, whereas democracy has brought "chaos and increased misery." But not all autocracies deliver economic success. In fact, some are utterly disastrous, including China under Mao.

Both of these explanations overlook a crucial reality: since opening its markets in 1978, China has in fact pursued significant political reforms—just not in the manner that Western observers expected. Instead of instituting multiparty elections, establishing formal protections for individual rights, or allowing free expression, the CCP has made changes below the surface, reforming its vast bureaucracy to realize many of the benefits of democratization—in particular, accountability, competition, and partial limits on power—without giving up single-party control. Although these changes may appear dry and

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apolitical, in fact, they have created a unique hybrid: autocracy with democratic characteristics. In practice, tweaks to rules and incentives within China's public administration have quietly transformed an ossified communist bureaucracy into a highly adaptive capitalist machine. But bureaucratic reforms cannot substitute for political reforms forever. As prosperity continues to increase and demands on the bureaucracy grow, the limits of this approach are beginning to loom large.

CHINESE BUREAUCRACY 101

In the United States, politics are exciting and bureaucracy is boring. In China, the opposite is true. As a senior official once explained to me, "The bureaucracy is political, and politics are bureaucratized." In the Chinese communist regime, there is no separation between political power and public administration. Understanding Chinese politics, therefore, requires first and foremost an appreciation of China's bureaucracy.

That bureaucracy is composed of two vertical hierarchies—the party and the state—replicated across the five levels of government: central, provincial, county, city, and township. These crisscrossing lines of authority produce what the China scholar Kenneth Lieberthal has termed a "matrix" structure. In formal organizational charts, the party and the state are separate entities, with Xi leading the party and Premier Li Keqiang heading up the administration and its ministries. In practice, however, the two are intertwined. The premier is also a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, the party's top body, which currently has seven members. And at the local level, officials often simultaneously hold positions in both hierarchies. For example, a mayor, who heads the administration of a municipality, is usually also the municipality's deputy chief of party. Moreover, officials frequently move between the party and the state. For instance, mayors may become party secretaries and vice versa.

The Chinese public administration is massive. The state and party organs alone (excluding the military and state-owned enterprises) consist of over 50 million people, roughly the size of South Korea's entire population. Among these, 20 percent are civil servants who perform management roles. The rest are street-level public employees who interact with citizens directly, such as inspectors, police officers, and health-care workers.

The top one percent of the bureaucracy—roughly 500,000 people—make up China's political elite. These individuals are directly appointed by the party, and they rotate through offices across the country. Notably, CCP membership is not a prerequisite for public employment, although elites tend to be CCP members.

Within each level of government, the bureaucracy is similarly disaggregated into the leading one percent and the remaining 99 percent. In the first category is the leadership, which comprises the party secretary (first in command), the chief of state (second in command), and members of an elite party committee, who simultaneously head key party or state offices that perform strategic functions such as appointing personnel and maintaining public security. In the second category are civil servants and frontline workers who are permanently stationed in one location.

Managing a public administration the size of a midsize country is a gargantuan

Work in progress: repainting in Jiaxing, China, May 2014

CHANCE CHAN / REUTERS

task. It is also a critical one, since the Chinese leadership relies on the bureaucracy to govern the country and run the economy. Not only do bureaucrats implement policies and laws; they also formulate them by tailoring central mandates for local implementation and by experimenting with local initiatives.

REFORM AT THE TOP

When Mao's successor, Deng Xiaoping, unleashed reforms, he maintained the CCP's monopoly on power. Instead of introducing Western-style democracy, he focused on transforming the Chinese bureaucracy into a driver of economic growth. To achieve this, he injected democratic characteristics into the bureaucracy, namely, accountability, competition, and partial limits on power.

Perhaps the most significant of Deng's reforms was a shift in the bureaucracy away from one-man rule toward collective leadership and the introduction of term limits and a mandatory retirement age for elite officials. These changes con-

strained the accumulation of personal power and rejuvenated the party-state with younger officials. Lower down, the reformist leadership changed the incentives of local leaders by updating the cadre evaluation system, which assesses local leaders according to performance targets. Since Chinese officials are appointed rather than popularly elected, these report cards serve an accountability function similar to elections in democracies. Changing the targets for evaluating cadres redefined the bureaucracy's goals, making clear to millions of officials what they were expected to deliver, as well as the accompanying rewards and penalties.

Breaking from Mao's fixation on class background and ideological fervor, Deng, ever the pragmatist, used this system to turn local leaders into more productive economic agents. From the 1980s onward, officials were assigned a narrow list of quantifiable deliverables, focused primarily on the economy and revenue generation. Tasks unrelated to the economy, such as environmental protection and poverty relief, were either relegated to a lower priority or not mentioned at all. Meanwhile, the goal of economic growth was always paired with an indispensable requisite: maintaining political stability. Failing this requirement (for instance, allowing a mass protest to break out) could cause leaders to flunk their entire test in a given year.

In short, during the early decades of reform, the new performance criteria instructed local leaders to achieve rapid economic growth without causing political instability. Reformers reinforced this stark redefinition of bureaucratic success with incentives. High scores improved the prospects of promotion, or at least the chances of being laterally transferred to a favorable office. Local leaders were also entitled to performance-based bonuses, with the highest performers sometimes receiving many times more than the lower performers. The government also began publicly ranking localities. Officials from the winning ones earned prestige and honorary titles; officials from those at the bottom lost face in their community. In this culture of hypercompetition, nobody wanted to be left behind.

Newly incentivized, local leaders dove headlong into promoting industrialization and growth. Along the way, they devised strategies and solutions that even party bosses in Beijing had not conceived. A famous example from the 1980s and 1990s are township and village enterprises, companies that circumvented restrictions on private ownership by operating as collectively owned enterprises. Another, more recent example is the creation of "land quota markets" in Chengdu and Chongqing, which allow developers to buy quotas of land from villages for urban use.

Through these reforms, the CCP achieved some measure of accountability and competition within single-party rule. Although no ballots were cast, lower-level officials were held responsible for the economic development of their jurisdictions. To be sure, Deng's reforms emphasized brute capital accumulation rather than holistic development, which led to environmental degradation, inequality, and other social problems. Still, they undoubtedly kicked China's growth machine into gear by making the bureaucracy results-oriented, fiercely competitive, and responsive to business needs, qualities that are normally associated with democracies.

STREET-LEVEL REFORMS

Bureaucratic reforms among local leaders were critical but not sufficient. Below them are the street-level bureaucrats who run the daily machinery of governance. And in the Chinese bureaucracy, these inspectors, officers, and even teachers are not merely providers of public services but also potential agents of economic change. For example, they might use personal connections to recruit investors to their locales or use their departments to provide commercial services as state-affiliated agencies.

Career incentives do not apply to rank-and-file public employees, as there is little chance of being promoted to the elite level; most civil servants do not dream of becoming mayors. Instead, the government has relied on financial incentives, through an uncodified system of internal profit sharing that links the bureaucracy's financial performance to individual remuneration. Although profit sharing is usually associated with capitalist corporations, it is not new to China's bureaucracy or, indeed, to any premodern state administration. As the sociologist Max Weber noted, before the onset of modernization, instead of receiving sufficient, stable salaries from state budgets, most public agents financed themselves through the prerogatives of office—for example, skimming off a share of fees and taxes for themselves. Modern observers may frown on such practices, considering them corrupt, but they do have some benefits.

Before Deng's reforms, the Chinese bureaucracy was far from modern or technocratic; it was a mishmash of traditional practices and personal relationships, inserted into a Leninist structure of top-down commands. So when Chinese markets opened up, bureaucratic agents naturally revived many traditional practices, but with a twentieth-century capitalist twist. Within the vast Chinese bureaucracy, formal salaries for officials and public employees were standardized at abysmally low rates. For instance, President Hu Jintao's official salary in 2012 was the equivalent of only about $1,000 a month. An entry-level civil servant received far less, about $150 a month. But in practice, these low salaries were supplemented by an array of additional perks, such as allowances, bonuses, gifts, and free vacations and meals.

And unlike in other developing countries, supplemental compensation in China's bureaucracy was pegged to financial performance: the central government granted local authorities partial autonomy to spend the funds they earned. The more tax revenue a local government generated and the more nontax revenue (such as fees and profits) that party and state offices earned, the more compensation they could provide to their staff members.

What emerged was essentially a variant of profit sharing: public employees took a cut of the revenue produced by their organizations. These changes fueled a results-oriented culture in the bureaucracy, although results in the Chinese context were measured purely in economic terms. These strong incentives propelled the bureaucracy to help transition the economy toward capitalism.

A profit-oriented public bureaucracy has drawbacks, of course, and throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Chinese complained endlessly about arbitrary payments and profiteering. In response, from the late 1990s on, reformers rolled out a suite

of measures aimed at combating petty corruption and the theft of public funds. Central authorities abolished cash payments of fees and fines and allowed citizens to make payments directly through banks. These technical reforms were not flashy, yet their impact was significant. Police officers, for example, are now far less likely to extort citizens and privately pocket fines. Over time, these reforms have made the Chinese people less vulnerable to petty abuses of power. In 2011, Transparency International found that only nine percent of Chinese citizens reported having paid a bribe in the past year, compared with 54 percent in India, 64 percent in Nigeria, and 84 percent in Cambodia. To be sure, China has a serious corruption problem, but the most significant issue is collusion among political and business elites, not petty predation.

Although none of these bureaucratic reforms fits the bill of traditional political reforms, their effects are political. They have changed the priorities of government, introduced competition, and altered how citizens encounter the state. Above all, they have incentivized economic performance, allowing the CCP to enjoy the benefits of continued growth while evading the pressures of political liberalization.

THE LIMITS OF BUREAUCRATIC REFORM

Substituting bureaucratic reform for political reform has bought the CCP time. For the first few decades of China's market transition, the party's reliance on the bureaucracy to act as the agent of change paid off. But can this approach forestall pressure for individual rights and democratic freedoms forever? Today, there are increasing signs that the bureaucracy has come close to exhausting its entrepreneurial and adaptive functions. Since Xi took office in 2012, the limits of bureaucratic reform have become increasingly clear.

The Xi era marks a new stage in the country's development. China is now a middle-income economy with an increasingly educated, connected, and demanding citizenry. And the political pressures that have come with prosperity are, in fact, beginning to undermine the reforms that propelled China's rapid growth.

The cadre evaluation system has come under particular stress. Over time, the targets assigned to local leaders have steadily crept upward. In the 1980s and 1990s, officials were evaluated like CEOs, on their economic performance alone. But today, in addition to economic growth, leaders must also maintain social harmony, protect the environment, supply public services, enforce party discipline, and even promote happiness. These changes have paralyzed local leaders. Whereas officials used to be empowered to do whatever it took to achieve rapid growth, they are now constrained by multiple constituents and competing demands, not unlike democratically elected politicians.

Xi's sweeping anticorruption campaign, which has led to the arrest of an unprecedented number of officials, has only made this worse. In past decades, assertive leadership and corruption were often two sides of the same coin. Consider the disgraced party secretary Bo Xilai, who was as ruthless and corrupt as he was bold in transforming the western backwater of Chongqing into a thriving industrial hub. Corrupt dealings aside, all innovative policies and unpopular decisions entail political risk. If Xi intends

to impose strict discipline—in his eyes, necessary to contain the political threats to CCP rule—then he cannot expect the bureaucracy to innovate or accomplish as much as it has in the past.

Moreover, sustaining growth in a high-income economy requires more than merely constructing industrial parks and building roads. It demands fresh ideas, technology, services, and cutting-edge innovations. Government officials everywhere tend to have no idea how to drive such developments. To achieve this kind of growth, the government must release and channel the immense creative potential of civil society, which would necessitate greater freedom of expression, more public participation, and less state intervention.

Yet just as political freedoms have become imperative for continued economic growth, the Xi administration is backpedaling. Most worrying is the party leadership's decision to remove term limits among the top brass, a change that will allow Xi to stay in office for the rest of his life. So long as the CCP remains the only party in power, China will always be susceptible to what the political scientist Francis Fukuyama has called "the bad emperor problem"—that is, extreme sensitivity to leadership idiosyncrasies. This means that under a leader like Deng, pragmatic and committed to reform, China will prosper and rise. But a more absolutist and narcissistic leader could create a nationwide catastrophe.

Xi has been variously described as an aspiring reformer and an absolute dictator. But regardless of his predilections, Xi cannot force the genie of economic and social transformation back into the bottle. China today is no longer the impoverished, cloistered society of the 1970s. Further liberalization is both inevitable and necessary for China's continued prosperity and its desire to partake in global leadership. But contrary to Friedman's prediction, this need not take the form of multiparty elections. China still has tremendous untapped room for political liberalization on the margins. If the party loosens its grip on society and directs, rather than commands, bottom-up improvisation, this could be enough to drive innovation and growth for at least another generation.

CHINA AND DEMOCRACY

What broader lessons on democracy can be drawn from China? One is the need to move beyond the narrow conception of democratization as the introduction of multiparty elections. As China has shown, some of the benefits of democratization can be achieved under single-party rule. Allowing bureaucratic reforms to unfold can work better than trying to impose political change from the outside, since over time, the economic improvements that the bureaucratic reforms generate should create internal pressure for meaningful political reform. This is not to say that states must delay democracy in order to experience economic growth. Rather, China's experience shows that democracy is best introduced by grafting reforms onto existing traditions and institutions—in China's case, a Leninist bureaucracy. Put simply, it is better to promote political change by building on what is already there than by trying to import something wholly foreign.

A second lesson is that the presumed dichotomy between the state and society is a false one. American observers, in particular, tend to assume that the state is a potential oppressor and so society must be empowered to combat it. This

worldview arises from the United States' distinct political philosophy, but it is not shared in many other parts of the world.

In nondemocratic societies such as China, there has always been an intermediate layer of actors between the state and society. In ancient China, the educated, landholding elite filled this role. They had direct access to those in power but were still rooted in their communities. China's civil service occupies a similar position today. The country's bureaucratic reforms were successful because they freed up space for these intermediate actors to try new initiatives.

Additionally, observers should drop the false dichotomy between the party and the state when reading China. The American notion of the separation of powers is premised on the assumption that officeholders possess only one identity, belonging either to one branch of government or another. But this doesn't hold in China or in most traditional societies, where fluid, overlapping identities are the norm. In these settings, whether officials are embedded in their networks or communities can sometimes matter more than formal checks and electoral competition in holding them accountable. For example, profit-sharing practices within China's bureaucracy gave its millions of public employees a personal stake in their country's capitalist success.

Challenging these unspoken assumptions sheds light on why China has repeatedly defied expectations. It should also prompt the United States to rethink its desire to export democracy around the world and its state-building efforts in traditional societies. Everyone everywhere wants the benefits of democracy, but policymakers would be dearly mistaken to think that these can be achieved only by transplanting the U.S. political system wholesale.

As for other authoritarian governments keen to emulate China, their leaders should not pick up the wrong lessons. China's economic success is not proof that relying on top-down commands and suppressing bottom-up initiative work. In fact, it's the exact opposite: the disastrous decades under Mao proved that this kind of leadership fails. In Deng's era, the CCP managed a capitalist revolution only insofar as it introduced democratizing reforms to ensure bureaucratic accountability, promote competition, and limit the power of individual leaders. The current Chinese leadership should heed this lesson, too.

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

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

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

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

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Eastern Europe's Illiberal Revolution

The Long Road to Democratic Decline

Ivan Krastev

In 1991, when the West was busy celebrating its victory in the Cold War and the apparent spread of liberal democracy to all corners of the world, the political scientist Samuel Huntington issued a warning against excessive optimism. In an article for the *Journal of Democracy* titled "Democracy's Third Wave," Huntington pointed out that the two previous waves of democratization, from the 1820s to the 1920s and from 1945 to the 1960s, had been followed by "reverse waves," in which "democratic systems were replaced . . . by historically new forms of authoritarian rule." A third reverse wave was possible, he suggested, if new authoritarian great powers could demonstrate the continued viability of nondemocratic rule or "if people around the world come to see the United States," long a beacon of democracy, "as a fading power beset by political stagnation, economic inefficiency, and social chaos."

Huntington died in 2008, but had he lived, even he would probably have been surprised to see that liberal democracy is now under threat not only in countries that went through democratic transitions in recent decades, such as Brazil and Turkey, but also in the West's most established democracies. Authoritarianism, meanwhile, has reemerged in Russia and been strengthened in China, and foreign adventurism and domestic political polarization have dramatically damaged the United States' global influence and prestige.

Perhaps the most alarming development has been the change of heart in eastern Europe. Two of the region's poster children for postcommunist democratization, Hungary and Poland, have seen conservative populists win sweeping electoral victories while demonizing the political opposition, scapegoating minorities, and undermining liberal checks and balances. Other countries in the region, including the Czech Republic and Romania, seem poised to follow. In a speech in 2014, one of the new populists, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, outlined his position on liberalism: "A democracy is not necessarily liberal. Just because something is not liberal, it still can be a democracy." To maintain global competitiveness, he went on to say, "we have to abandon liberal methods and principles of organizing a society." Although Orban governs a small country, the movement he represents is of global importance. In the West, where the will of the people remains the main source of political legitimacy, his style of illiberal democracy is likely to be the major alternative to liberalism in the coming decades.

Why has democracy declared war on liberalism most openly in eastern Europe? The answer lies in the peculiar nature of the revolutions of 1989, when the states of eastern Europe freed themselves from the Soviet empire. Unlike previous

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revolutions, the ones in 1989 were concerned not with utopia but with the idea of normality—that is, the revolutionaries expressed a desire to lead the type of normal life already available to people in western Europe. Once the Berlin Wall fell, the most educated and liberal eastern Europeans became the first to leave their countries, provoking major demographic and identity crises in the region. And as the domestic constituencies for liberal democracy immigrated to the West, international actors such as the EU and the United States became the face of liberalism in eastern Europe, just as their own influence was waning. This set the stage for the nationalist revolt against liberalism seizing the region today.

PEOPLE POWER

Many have found the rise of eastern European populism difficult to explain. After Poland's populist Law and Justice party (known by its Polish abbreviation, PiS) won a parliamentary majority in 2015, Adam Michnik, one of the country's liberal icons, lamented, "Sometimes a beautiful woman loses her mind and goes to bed with a bastard." Populist victories, however, are not a mystifying one-off but a conscious and repeated choice: the right-wing populist party Fidesz has won two consecutive parliamentary elections in Hungary, and in opinion polls, PiS maintains a towering lead over its rivals. Eastern Europe seems intent on marrying the bastard.

Some populist successes can be attributed to economic troubles: Orban was elected in 2010, after Hungary's economy had shrunk by 6.6 percent in 2009. But similar troubles cannot explain why the Czech Republic, which enjoys one of the lowest unemployment rates in Europe, voted for a slew of populist parties in last year's parliamentary elections, or why intolerance is on rise in economically successful Slovakia. Poland is the most puzzling case. The country had the fastest-growing economy in Europe between 2007 and 2017, and it has seen social mobility improve in recent years. Research by the Polish sociologist Maciej Gdula has shown that Poles' political attitudes do not depend on whether they individually benefited from the postcommunist transition. The ruling party's base includes many who are satisfied with their lives and have shared in their country's prosperity.

The details of eastern Europe's populist turn vary from country to country, as do the character and policies of individual populist governments. In Hungary, Fidesz has used its constitutional majority to rewrite the rules of the game: Orban's tinkering with the country's electoral system has turned his "plurality to a supermajority," in the words of the sociologist Kim Lane Scheppele. Corruption, moreover, is pervasive. In a March 2017 article for *The Atlantic*, the writer David Frum quoted an anonymous observer who said of Fidesz's system: "The benefit of controlling a modern state is less the power to persecute the innocent, more the power to protect the guilty."

Poland's government has also sought to dismantle checks and balances, especially through its changes to the constitutional court. In contrast to the Hungarian government, however, it is basically clean when it comes to corruption. Its policies are centered less on controlling the economy or creating a loyal middle class and more on the moral reeducation of the nation. The Polish government has tried

Rally 'round the flag: at a far-right march in Warsaw, November 2017

AGENCJA GAZETA / REUTERS

to rewrite history, most notably through a recent law making it illegal to blame Poland for the Holocaust. In the Czech Republic, meanwhile, Prime Minister Andrej Babis led his party to victory last year by promising to run the state like a company.

Yet beneath these differences lie telling commonalities. Across eastern Europe, a new illiberal consensus is emerging, marked by xenophobic nationalism and supported, somewhat unexpectedly, by young people who came of age after the demise of communism. If the liberals who dominated in the 1990s were preoccupied with the rights of ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities, this new consensus is about the rights of the majority.

Wherever they take power, conservative populists use the government to deepen cultural and political polarization and champion what the American historian Richard Hofstadter termed "the paranoid style" in politics. This style traffics heavily in conspiracy theories, such as the belief, shared by many PiS voters, that the 2010 plane crash that killed President Lech Kaczynski—the brother of the PiS leader Jaroslaw Kaczysnki—was the product of an assassination rather than an accident. This paranoia also surfaces in Fidesz's assertions that Brussels, aided by the Hungarian-born billionaire George Soros, secretly plans to flood Hungary with migrants.

Eastern Europe's populists also deploy a similar political vocabulary, casting themselves as the authentic voice of the nation against its internal and external enemies. As the political scientist Jan-Werner Müller has argued, "Populists claim that they and they alone represent the people," a claim that is not empirical but "always distinctly moral." Fidesz and PiS do not pretend to stand for all

Hungarians or all Poles, but they do insist that they stand for all true Hungarians and all true Poles. They transform democracy from an instrument of inclusion into one of exclusion, delegitimizing nonmajoritarian institutions by casting them as obstacles to the will of the people.

Another common feature of eastern European populism is a Janus-faced attitude toward the EU. According to the latest Eurobarometer polls, eastern Europeans are among the most pro-EU publics on the continent, yet they vote for some of the most Euroskeptical governments. These governments, in turn, use Brussels as a rhetorical punching bag while benefiting from its financial largess. The Hungarian economy grew by 4.6 percent between 2006 and 2015, yet a study by KPMG and the Hungarian economic research firm GKI estimated that without EU funds, it would have shrunk by 1.8 percent. And Poland is the continent's biggest recipient of money from the European Structural and Investment Funds, which promote economic development in the EU's less developed countries.

Support for illiberal populism has been growing across the continent for years now, but understanding its outsize appeal in eastern Europe requires rethinking the history of the region in the decades since the end of communism. It is the legacy of the 1989 revolutions, combined with the more recent shocks delivered by the decline of U.S. power and the crisis of the EU, that set in motion the populist explosion of today.

LIBERTY, FRATERNITY, NORMALITY

Although eastern European populism was already on the rise by the beginning of the current decade, the refugee crisis of 2015–16 made it the dominant political force in the region. Opinion polls indicate that the vast majority of eastern Europeans are wary of migrants and refugees. A September 2017 study by Ipsos revealed that only five percent of Hungarians and 15 percent of Poles believe that immigration has had a positive impact on their country and that 67 percent of Hungarians and 51 percent of Poles think their countries' borders should be closed to refugees entirely.

During the refugee crisis, images of migrants streaming into Europe sparked a demographic panic across eastern Europe, where people began to imagine that their national cultures were under the threat of vanishing. The region today is made up of small, aging, ethnically homogeneous societies—for example, only 1.6 percent of those living in Poland were born outside the country, and only 0.1 percent are Muslim. In fact, cultural and ethnic diversity, rather than wealth, is the primary difference between eastern and western Europe today. Compare Austria and Hungary, neighboring countries of similar size that were once unified under the Habsburg empire. Foreign citizens make up a little under two percent of the Hungarian population; in Austria, they make up 15 percent. Only six percent of Hungarians are foreign-born, and these are overwhelmingly ethnic Hungarian immigrants from Romania. In Austria, the equivalent figure is 16 percent. In the eastern European political imagination, cultural and ethnic diversity are seen as an existential threat, and opposition to this threat forms the core of the new illiberalism.

Some of this fear of diversity may be rooted in historical traumas, such as the disintegration of the multicultural Habsburg empire after World War I and

the Soviet occupation of eastern Europe after World War II. But the political shock of the refugee crisis cannot be explained by the region's history alone. Rather, eastern Europeans realized during the course of the refugee crisis that they were facing a new global revolution. This was not a revolution of the masses but one of migrants; it was inspired not by ideological visions of the future but by images of real life on the other side of a border. If globalization has made the world a village, it has also subjected it to the tyranny of global comparisons. These days, people in the poorer parts of the world rarely compare their lives with those of their neighbors; they compare them instead with those of the most prosperous inhabitants of the planet, whose wealth is on full display thanks to the global diffusion of communications technologies. The French liberal philosopher Raymond Aron was right when he observed, five decades ago, that "with humanity on the way to unification, inequality between peoples takes on the significance that inequality between classes once had." If you are a poor person in Africa who seeks an economically secure life for your children, the best you can do for them is to make sure they are born in a rich country, such as Denmark, Germany, or Sweden—or, failing that, the Czech Republic or Poland. Change increasingly means changing your country, not your government. And eastern Europeans have felt threatened by this revolution.

The great irony is that although eastern Europe today is reacting with panic to mass migration, the revolutions of 1989 were the first in which the desire to exit one's country, rather than to gain

a greater voice within it, was the primary agent of change. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, many in the former communist bloc expressed their wish for change by immigrating to the West rather than staying home to participate in democratic politics. In 1989, eastern Europeans were not dreaming of a perfect world; they were dreaming of a normal life in a normal country. If there was a utopia shared by both the left and the right during the region's postcommunist transition, it was the utopia of normality. Experiments were forbidden. In 1990, Czech Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus (who later became prime minister and then president) said of finding a middle ground between capitalism and socialism, "The third way is the fastest way to the Third World." Eastern Europeans dreamed that European unification would proceed along the same lines as German reunification, and in the early 1990s, many Czechs, Hungarians, and Poles envied the East Germans, who were issued German passports overnight and could spend the deutsche mark immediately.

Revolutions as a rule cause major demographic disruptions. When the French Revolution broke out, many of its opponents ran away. When the Bolsheviks took power in Russia, millions of Russians fled. But in those cases, it was the defeated, the enemies of the revolution, who saw their futures as being outside their own country. After the 1989 revolutions, by contrast, it was those most eager to live in the West, those most impatient to see their countries change, who were the first to leave. For many liberal-minded eastern Europeans, a mistrust of nationalist loyalties and the prospect of joining the modern world made emigration a logical and legitimate choice.

As a result, the revolutions of 1989 had the perverse effect of accelerating population decline in the newly liberated countries of eastern Europe. From 1989 to 2017, Latvia lost 27 percent of its population, Lithuania 23 percent, and Bulgaria almost 21 percent. Hungary lost nearly three percent of its population in just the last ten years. And in 2016, around one million Poles were living in the United Kingdom alone. This emigration of the young and talented was occurring in countries that already had aging populations and low birthrates. Together, these trends set the stage for a demographic panic.

It is thus both emigration and the fear of immigration that best explain the rise of populism in eastern Europe. The success of nationalist populism, which feeds off a sense that a country's identity is under threat, is the outcome of the mass exodus of young people from the region combined with the prospect of large-scale immigration, which together set demographic alarm bells ringing. Moving to the West was equivalent to rising in social status, and as a result, the eastern Europeans who stayed in their own countries started feeling like losers who had been left behind. In countries where most young people dream of leaving, success back home is devalued.

In recent years, a rising desire for self-assertion has also caused eastern Europeans to chafe at taking orders from Brussels. Although during the 1990s, the region's politicians, eager to join NATO and the EU, had been willing to follow the liberal playbook, today, they wish to assert their full rights as

members of the European club. Eastern Europe's integration into the EU mirrors at a national level the experience of integration familiar from the stories of immigrants around the world. First-generation immigrants wish to gain acceptance by internalizing the values of their host country; second-generation immigrants, born in the new country, fear being treated as second-class citizens and often rediscover an interest in the traditions and values of their parents' culture. Something similar happened to eastern European societies after joining the EU. Many people in those countries used to view Brussels' interference in their domestic politics as benevolent. Over time, they have started to see it as an intolerable affront to their nations' sovereignty.

THE RETURN OF GEOPOLITICS

The final ingredient in eastern Europe's illiberal turn is the deep current of geopolitical insecurity that has always afflicted the region. In 1946, the Hungarian intellectual Istvan Bibo published a pamphlet called *The Misery of the Small States of Eastern Europe*. In it, he argued that democracy in the region would always be held hostage to the lingering effects of historical traumas, most of them related to eastern European states' history of domination by outside powers. Poland, for instance, ceased to exist as an independent state following its partition by Austria, Prussia, and Russia in the late eighteenth century; Hungary, meanwhile, saw a nationalist revolution crushed in 1849, before losing more than two-thirds of its territory and one-half of its population in the 1920 Treaty of Trianon.

Not only did these historical traumas make eastern European societies fear and resent external powers; they also, Bibo argued, secured these countries in the belief that "the advance of freedom threatens the national cause." They have learned to be suspicious of any cosmopolitan ideology that crosses their borders, whether it be the universalism of the Catholic Church, the liberalism of the late Habsburg empire, or Marxist internationalism. The Czech writer and dissident Milan Kundera captured this sense of insecurity well when he defined a small nation as "one whose very existence may be put in question at any moment." A citizen of a large country takes his nation's survival for granted. "His anthems speak only of grandeur and eternity. The Polish anthem however, starts with the verse: 'Poland has not yet perished.'"

If one effect of eastern Europe's post-1989 emigration was to kick-start the demographic panic that would later take full form during the refugee crisis, another, equally important effect was to deprive countries in the region of the citizens who were most likely to become domestic defenders of liberal democracy. As a result, liberal democracy in eastern Europe came to rely more and more on the support of external actors such as the EU and the United States, which over time came to be seen as the real constraints on the power of majorities in the region. Bucharest's desire to join the EU, for instance, was primarily responsible for its decision to resolve a long-running dispute with Hungary about the rights of ethnic Hungarians in Romania. And the EU's eligibility rules, known as the Copenhagen criteria, make legal protections for minorities a precondition for membership in the union.

The central role of the EU and the United States in consolidating eastern Europe's liberal democracies meant that those democracies remained safe only so long as the dominance of Brussels and Washington in Europe was unquestioned. Yet over the last decade, the geopolitical situation has changed. The United States had already been hobbled by expensive foreign wars and the financial crisis before the election of Donald Trump as its president raised serious questions about Washington's commitment to its allies. In Europe, meanwhile, the consecutive shocks of the debt crisis, the refugee crisis, and Brexit have called the future of the EU itself into question. This came just as Russia, under the authoritarian government of President Vladimir Putin, was beginning to reassert itself as a regional power, seizing Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 and backing a secessionist insurgency in the country's east.

Huntington predicted in 1991 that a strong, nondemocratic Russia would pose problems for the liberal democracies of eastern Europe, and the rise of Putin's Russia has in fact undermined them. For eastern European leaders such as Orban, already fed up with liberalism, Putin's combination of authoritarian rule and anti-Western ideology has served as a model to emulate. For many Poles, the return of the Russian threat was one more argument to vote for an illiberal government that could protect the nation. In other eastern European countries, such as the Baltic states, Russia has simply acted as a spoiler by attempting to spread disinformation. Across the region, the return of geopolitical insecurity has contributed to the fading attractiveness of liberal democracy.

AN ILLIBERAL EUROPE?

Eastern European populism is a recent phenomenon, but it has deep roots in the region's politics and is unlikely to go away anytime soon. "The worrying thing about Orban's 'illiberal democracy,'" according to the Hungarian-born Austrian journalist Paul Lendvai, is that "its end cannot be foreseen." Indeed, illiberal democracy has become the new form of authoritarianism that Huntington warned about more than two decades ago. What makes it particularly dangerous is that it is an authoritarianism born within the framework of democracy itself.

The new populists are not fascists. They do not believe in the transformative power of violence, and they are not nearly as repressive as the fascists were. But they are indifferent to liberal checks and balances and do not see the need for constitutional constraints on the power of the majority—constraints that form a central part of EU law. The main challenge posed by eastern European populism is therefore not to the existence of democracy at the level of the nation but to the cohesion of the EU. As more countries in the region turn toward illiberalism, they will continue to come into conflict with Brussels and probe the limits of the EU's power, as Poland has already done with its judicial reforms. Eventually, the risk is that the EU could disintegrate, and Europe could become a continent divided and unfree.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Xi has matched the dramatic growth of his personal power with an equally dramatic intensification of the Chinese Communist Party's power in society and the economy.
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

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China's New Revolution

The Reign of Xi Jinping

Elizabeth C. Economy

Standing onstage in the auditorium of Beijing's Great Hall of the People, against a backdrop of a stylized hammer and sickle, Xi Jinping sounded a triumphant note. It was October 2017, and the Chinese leader was addressing the 19th Party Congress, the latest of the gatherings of Chinese Communist Party elites held every five years. In his three-and-a-half-hour speech, Xi, who was appointed the CCP's general secretary in 2012, declared his first term a "truly remarkable five years in the course of the development of the party and the country," a time in which China had "stood up, grown rich, and become strong." He acknowledged that the party and the country still confronted challenges, such as official corruption, inequality in living standards, and what he called "erroneous viewpoints." But overall, he insisted, China was headed in the right direction—so much so, in fact, that he recommended that other countries draw on "Chinese wisdom" and follow "a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind." Not since Mao Zedong had a Chinese leader so directly suggested that others should emulate his country's model.

Xi's confidence is not without grounds. In the past five years, the Chinese leadership has made notable progress on a number of its priorities. Its much-heralded anticorruption campaign has accelerated, with the number of officials disciplined for graft increasing from some 150,000 in 2012 to more than 400,000 in 2016. Air quality in many of China's famously smoggy cities has improved measurably. In the South China Sea, Beijing has successfully advanced its sovereignty claims by militarizing existing islands and creating new ones outright, and it has steadily eroded the autonomy of Hong Kong through a series of political and legal

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Party of one: Xi at the 19th Party Congress, Beijing, October 2017

maneuvers. Across Asia, it has enhanced its influence through the Belt and Road Initiative, a massive regional infrastructure plan. All the while, the Chinese economy has continued to expand, and in 2017, GDP grew by 6.9 percent, the first time the growth rate had gone up in seven years.

But Xi's ambitions extend beyond these areas to something more fundamental. In the 1940s, Mao led the communist revolution that created the contemporary Chinese party-state. Beginning in the late 1970s, his successor, Deng Xiaoping, oversaw a self-proclaimed "second revolution," in which he ushered in economic reforms and the low-profile foreign policy that produced China's economic miracle. Now, Xi has launched a third revolution. Not only has he slowed, and, in many cases, reversed, the process of "reform and opening up" set in motion by Deng, but he has also sought to advance the principles of this new China on the global stage. Moreover, in a striking move made in March, the government eliminated the constitutional provision limiting the president to two terms, allowing Xi to serve as president for life. For the first time, China is an illiberal state seeking leadership in a liberal world order.

THE REVOLUTION BEGINS

Xi began his revolution as soon as he took power. For more than three decades, the Chinese political system had been run by a process of

THOMAS PETER / REUTERS

collective leadership, whereby decision-making authority was shared among officials in the Politburo Standing Committee, China's top ruling body. But Xi quickly moved to centralize political authority in his own hands. Within the first few years of his tenure, he assumed leadership of all the most important committees overseeing policy, such as those concerning cyber issues, economic reform, and national security. He secured public pronouncements of loyalty from top officials, such as People's Liberation Army generals and provincial party secretaries, as well as from the media. And he has used an anticorruption campaign to root out not just self-serving officials but also his political enemies. In July 2017, for example, Sun Zhengcai, a rising star within the CCP who served as party secretary of the municipality of Chongqing, was charged with corruption and removed from office; months later, a senior official announced that Sun had plotted with others to overthrow Xi.

For the first time, China is an illiberal state seeking leadership in a liberal world order.

At the 19th Party Congress, Xi further cemented his hold on CCP institutions and consolidated his personal power. His name and his ideology—"Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era"—were enshrined in the party's constitution, an honor previously granted only to Mao. More allies of his were added to the CCP's 25-member Politburo and its seven-member Standing Committee, such that more than half of each group is now composed of Xi loyalists. Then came the change that left open the possibility that Xi could serve as president indefinitely.

Xi has matched the dramatic growth of his personal power with an equally dramatic intensification of the CCP's power in society and the economy. The China scholar David Shambaugh once noted, "If one of the hallmarks of the Maoist state was the penetration of society, then the Dengist state was noticeable for its withdrawal." Now, under Xi, the pendulum has swung back toward a greater role for the party. No element of political and economic life has remained untouched.

In the political sphere, the CCP has taken advantage of new technology and put greater pressure on the private sector to restrict access to forbidden content online, sharply diminishing the vibrancy of China's virtual public square. Even privately shared humor can trigger police action. In September 2017, authorities detained a man for five days

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

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

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

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

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after he sent a joke about a rumored love triangle involving a government official to a group over the messaging app WeChat. The government is also developing a massive biometric database that, thanks to state-of-the-art voice- and facial-recognition technologies, could be married to its vast telephone and video surveillance network and used to identify and retaliate against party critics. By 2020, Beijing plans to have rolled out a national system of "social credit," integrating information from online payment and social media apps into a database that would allow it to punish or reward citizens based on their supposed trustworthiness. Those whose behavior falls short—defaulting on a loan, participating in a protest, even wasting too much time playing video games—will face a range of consequences. The government might slow their Internet connections or restrict their access to everything from restaurants to travel to jobs, while giving preferred access to those who abide by the CCP's rules.

On the economic front, Xi has defied expectations that he would accelerate market-based reforms. He has strengthened the position of state-owned enterprises, assigning them a leading role in economic development campaigns, and he has empowered the party committees that sit inside every Chinese firm. In recent years, those committees had only ill-defined roles, but thanks to a new requirement under Xi, management must seek their advice—and, in some cases, their approval—for all major decisions. The CCP has called for similar rules to apply in joint ventures with multinational corporations. Even private companies are no longer outside the party's purview. In 2017, Beijing announced plans to expand an experiment in which the party takes small stakes in media and technology companies, including such giants as Alibaba and Tencent, and receives a degree of decision-making power.

AMBITIONS ABROAD

While Xi has limited political and economic openness at home, on the international stage, he has sought to position himself as globalizer in chief. At a meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation in November 2017, for example, he proclaimed, "Opening up will bring progress, and those who close down will inevitably lag behind." Such rhetoric is misleading. In fact, one of the most distinctive elements of Xi's rule has been his creation of a wall of regulations designed to control the flow of ideas, culture, and even capital between China and the rest of the world.

Although restrictions on foreign influence are nothing new in China, they have proliferated under Xi. In January 2017, Beijing enacted a stringent new law requiring nongovernmental organizations in China to register with the Ministry of Public Security, obtain permission for every activity they engage in, and refrain from fundraising within China. By March 2018, only 330-odd groups had registered, about four percent of the total that had been operating in China before the law. Meanwhile, Beijing has begun the process of formally blocking foreign-owned virtual private networks that allow users to circumvent China's so-called Great Firewall.

A similar pattern has emerged in the economic realm. In 2015, in order to prevent China's currency from depreciating and its foreign reserves from plummeting, Beijing placed strict controls on Chinese citizens' and corporations' ability to move foreign currency out of the country. That same year, the government launched its "Made in China 2025" program, a self-sufficiency drive that sets out ten key industries, from materials to artificial intelligence, in which Chinese firms are expected to control as much as 80 percent of the domestic market by 2025. To ensure that Chinese companies dominate, the government not only provides large subsidies but also puts in place a variety of barriers to foreign competition. In the electric car industry, for example, it has required Chinese automakers to use batteries made in Chinese factories that have been operating for more than a year, effectively eliminating the major Japanese and South Korean competitors.

Meanwhile, Xi has moved China further away from its traditional commitment to a low-profile foreign policy, accelerating a shift begun by his predecessor, Hu Jintao. Under Xi, China now actively seeks to shape international norms and institutions and forcefully asserts its presence on the global stage. As Xi colorfully put it in a 2014 speech, China should be capable of "constructing international playgrounds"—and "creating the rules" of the games played on them.

Xi's most notable gambit on this front is his Belt and Road Initiative, a modern incarnation of the ancient Silk Road and maritime spice routes. Launched in 2013, the undertaking now encompasses as many as 900 projects, more than 80 percent of which are contracted to Chinese firms. But the effort goes far beyond mere infrastructure. In Pakistan, for example, the plan includes not only railroads, highways, and dams but also a proposal to develop a system of video and Internet surveillance similar to that in Beijing and a partnership with a Pakistani television

channel to disseminate Chinese media content. The Belt and Road Initiative has also given China an opportunity to advance its military objectives. Chinese state-owned enterprises now run at least 76 ports and terminals out of 34 countries, and in Greece, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, Chinese investment in ports has been followed by high-profile visits from Chinese naval vessels. Beijing has also announced that it will be establishing special arbitration courts for Belt and Road Initiative projects, thereby using the plan to promote an alternative legal system underpinned by Chinese rules.

Indeed, China is increasingly seeking to export its political values across the globe. In Ethiopia and Sudan, for example, the CCP is training officials on how to manage public opinion and the media, offering advice on what legislation to pass and which monitoring and surveillance technologies to use. Perhaps the most noteworthy effort is China's campaign to promote its vision of a closed Internet. Under the banner of "cyber-sovereignty," Beijing has promulgated the idea that countries should be allowed to, as one official document explained, "choose their own path of cyber development, model of cyber regulation and Internet public policies." It has pushed for negotiations about Internet governance that would privilege states and exclude representatives from civil society and the private sector, and it hosts an annual conference to convince foreign officials and businesspeople of its view of the Internet.

China also dangles access to its massive domestic market to coerce corporations to play by its rules. In 2017, for example, Apple was convinced to open a data center in China in order to comply with new rules requiring foreign firms to store certain data inside the country (where it will presumably be easier to monitor). That same year, the company removed from its app store hundreds of programs that helped people get around the Great Firewall.

Ironically, for all the talk of sovereignty, part of Xi's more assertive foreign policy involves unquestionable violations of it. The government's Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms, which purvey Chinese language and culture abroad, have come under increasing scrutiny in the United States and elsewhere for spreading CCP propaganda, although they probably pose a lesser threat to U.S. interests than is commonly thought. More challenging is China's effort to mobilize its overseas communities, particularly students, to protest visits by the Dalai Lama, inform on Chinese studying abroad who do not

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follow the CCP line, and vociferously represent the government's position on sensitive issues such as Hong Kong and Taiwan. This effort contributes to a climate of intimidation and fear within the Chinese overseas student community (not to mention the broader university community), and it threatens to tar all Chinese students as representatives of the Chinese government. Of even greater concern, Chinese security officials have on several occasions abducted former Chinese nationals who are now citizens of other countries. After a Chinese Swedish bookseller was snatched from a train in China and detained earlier this year, the state-supported *Global Times* editorialized, "European countries and the U.S. should educate their newly naturalized citizens that the new passport cannot be their amulet in China."

RETHINKING XI

Many observers view Xi as an economic reformer who has been thwarted by powerful opposition, as the best hope for positive global leadership, as overwhelmingly popular among the Chinese people, and as committed to stability abroad in order to focus on affairs at home. In fact, such assessments miss four fundamental truths about him.

First, Xi is playing a long game. His preference for control over competition often leads to policies that appear suboptimal in the short run. For example, his centralization of power and anticorruption campaign have slowed decision-making at the top of the Chinese political system, which in turn has led to paralysis at local levels of governance and lower rates of economic growth. Yet such policies have a long-term payoff. Chinese leaders tolerate the inefficiencies that come with nonmarket policies—say, slow Internet connections or money-losing state-owned enterprises—not only because the policies enhance their own political power but also because they afford them the luxury of making longer-term strategic investments. Thus, for example, the government encourages state-owned enterprises to invest in high-risk economies in support of the Belt and Road Initiative, in order to gain controlling stakes in strategic ports or set technical standards, such as railway track gauges or types of satellite navigation systems, for the next wave of global economic development. Decisions that may appear immediately irrational in the context of a liberal political

system and a market economy often have a longer-term strategic logic within China.

Second, although he harbors ambitions on the global stage, Xi has only rarely demonstrated true global leadership, in the sense of showing a willingness to align his country's interests with—or even subordinate them to—those of the broader international community. With a few exceptions, such as when it comes to UN peacekeeping contributions, China steps up to provide global public goods only when doing so serves its own short-term interests or when it has been pressured to do so. Moreover, it is increasingly seeking to ignore established norms and set its own rules of the road. In 2016, when the International Court of Arbitration rejected Chinese claims to wide swaths of the South China Sea, Beijing simply dismissed the ruling and carried on with its land-reclamation and militarization efforts there.

There may be more pushback against Xi than is commonly thought.

Third, Xi's centralization of power and growing control over information make it hard to assess how much consensus there really is in China about the direction in which he and the rest of the Chinese leadership are taking the country. There may be more pushback against Xi than is commonly thought. In academic and official circles, a wide-ranging debate over the merits of many of the regime's policies rages, even if it is less robust than during previous times. Many of China's wealthiest and most talented citizens, concerned about the state's heavier hand, have moved their money and families abroad. Chinese lawyers and others have condemned many of Xi's initiatives, including the recent move to eliminate term limits. Even his signature Belt and Road Initiative has generated criticism from scholars and business leaders, who argue that many of the proposed investments have no economic rationale.

Finally, Xi has eliminated the dividing line between domestic and foreign policy. There may have been a time when the political and economic implications of China's authoritarian system were confined largely to its own society. But now that the country is exporting its political values—in some cases, to buttress other authoritarian-leaning leaders, and in others, to undermine international law and threaten other states' sovereignty—China's governance model is front and center in its foreign policy.

CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE

At the heart of Xi's revolution is a values-based challenge to the international norms promoted by the United States. The Trump administration must now advance an equivalent challenge to China—one that begins with a forceful assertion of enduring American principles. This means not only maintaining a strong military presence in the Asia-Pacific but also demonstrating a continued commitment to free trade and democracy. At the same time, the United States must mount a vigorous defense at home. Because it can no longer count on China to continue the process of reform and opening up, it should stop sacrificing its own economic and political security. In the past, Washington tolerated a degree of intellectual property theft and unequal market access because it believed that China was making some progress toward market principles and the rule of law. With that logic off the table, there is no reason the United States shouldn't adopt more restrictive policies toward China.

Keeping up with Xi's many new initiatives is not easy, and it is tempting to respond to each one as it arrives. In March, for example, reports that Djibouti—home of the U.S. military's only permanent base in Africa—was planning to give China control over a port prompted senior U.S. officials to sound alarm bells and press Djibouti to reverse course. Yet the United States offered no constructive alternative, such as an economic development package. More important, nor did it put forth a broader U.S. strategy to address China's ambitions in Africa and other places covered by its Belt and Road Initiative. (As events played out, Djibouti awarded management of the port to a Singaporean company.) Such a reactive and piecemeal approach will do little to respond to the longer-term challenge posed by Xi's revolution. At the other extreme, although it may be tempting to react to Xi's changes by demanding that Washington come up with an entirely new China strategy, what is actually required is not an outright rejection of the past four decades of U.S. policy but a careful rethinking of that policy so as to incorporate what works and reevaluate what does not.

An effective China policy must rest on a robust demonstration of the United States' commitment to its own principles. Despite U.S. President Donald Trump's protectionist impulses and praise for autocrats, recent moves suggest that the White House has not entirely forsaken its commitment to liberal values in Asia. On his trip to the

region in November 2017, the president articulated his support for a "free and open Indo-Pacific" and revived the quadrilateral partnership with Australia, India, and Japan, a dormant grouping of like-minded Pacific democracies that could start pushing back against Chinese aggression in the region. Indeed, the administration's National Defense Strategy calls for placing a renewed emphasis on alliances to counter "revisionist powers."

As a useful first step toward making good on its word, the administration should elaborate on the substance of the renewed quadrilateral partnership and establish how it will work in conjunction with other U.S. partners in Asia and elsewhere. One potential area of collaboration centers on high-stakes security issues. That could mean undertaking joint freedom-of-navigation operations in the South China Sea, providing alternative sources of investment for countries with strategically important ports, or supporting Taiwan in the face of Beijing's increasingly coercive strategy.

Trump should also reopen discussions about the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Although he withdrew the United States from the deal days after his inauguration, more recently, he has expressed a willingness to consider a modified version of it. A revived agreement would not only promote market-based reforms in countries with largely state-dominated economies, such as Vietnam, but also provide a beachhead from which the United States could advance its own economic interests over the long term.

To compete with the Belt and Road Initiative, the United States should draw on its strengths in urban planning and technology. In the field of "smart cities," many of the world's top corporations and most innovative start-ups are American. Washington should partner with developing countries on urban planning for smart cities and help finance the deployment of U.S. firms' technology, just as it did in 2014, when it worked with India on an ambitious program to upgrade that country's urban infrastructure. Part of this endeavor should include support for companies from the United States—or from U.S. allies—to help build up developing countries' fiber-optic cables, GPS, and e-commerce systems. Doing that would undercut China's attempt to control much of the world's digital infrastructure, which would give the country a global platform for censorship and economic espionage.

China's push to shape other countries' political systems underscores the need for the Trump administration to support U.S. institutions that

promote political liberalization abroad, such as the National Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute, and the Asia Foundation. These institutions can partner with Australia, Japan, and South Korea, along with European allies, to help build the rule of law in quasi-authoritarian states and buttress nascent democracies. Legal, educational, and structural reform programs can provide a critical bulwark against Chinese efforts to project authoritarian values abroad.

Of course, strength abroad begins with strength at home. China's willingness to subordinate its short-term economic interests for longer-term strategic gains means that Washington must redouble its investment in science and technology, support the universities and national labs that serve as a wellspring of American innovation, and fund the development and deployment of new technologies by U.S. firms. Without such support, U.S. companies will be no match for better-funded Chinese ones, backed by Beijing's long-term vision.

China is eager to restrict opportunities for outsiders to pursue their political and economic interests within its borders, even as it advances its own such interests outside China. Accordingly, it's time for the Trump administration to take a fresh look at the notion of reciprocity—and do unto China as China does unto the United States. U.S. policymakers have long considered reciprocity a lose-lose proposition that harms relations with China without changing its behavior. Instead, they have acted under the assumption that if the United States remains true to its democratic values and demonstrates what responsible behavior looks like, China will eventually follow its lead. Xi has upended this understanding because he has stalled, and in some respects reversed, the political and economic reforms begun under Deng and has transformed the United States' openness into a vulnerability.

Reciprocity could take a number of forms. In some cases, the punishment should be relatively light. For example, the Trump administration could bar China from establishing additional Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms in the United States unless China permits more American Centers for Cultural Exchange, organizations funded by the U.S. government on Chinese university campuses. Currently, there are fewer than 30 such centers in China and more than a hundred Confucius Institutes and over 500 Confucius Classrooms in the United States. U.S. universities, for their part, could refuse to host Confucius Institutes or forge other partnerships with Chinese

institutions if any member of their faculty is banned from travel to China—a punishment Beijing has often meted out to critical scholars.

Washington should also consider constraining Chinese investment in the United States in areas that are out of bounds for U.S. businesses in China, such as telecommunications, transportation, construction, and media. That might take the form of limiting Chinese stakes in U.S. companies to the same level that Beijing permits foreign firms to have in Chinese companies. More provocatively, the United States could tacitly or explicitly support other Asian countries' efforts to militarize islands in the South China Sea in an effort to raise the costs for China of doing the same. Reciprocity need not be an end in itself. Ideally, in fact, a reciprocal action (or even just the threat of one) would bring China to the negotiating table, where a better outcome could be reached.

While Xi poses new challenges for the United States, he also offers a distinct new opportunity: the chance for Washington to hold him publicly accountable for his claim that China is prepared to assume greater global leadership. In 2014, the Obama administration achieved some success in leveraging Xi's ambitions when it pressured China to adopt limits on its carbon emissions and to increase substantially the amount of assistance it provided African countries struck by the Ebola crisis. Similarly, the Trump administration successfully pushed China to adopt tougher sanctions to try to rein in North Korea's nuclear program. More such moves should follow. The administration should call on China to play a bigger role in addressing the global refugee crisis, particularly the part of it taking place in the country's own backyard. In bordering Myanmar, more than 650,000 refugees from the Rohingya ethnic minority have fled to Bangladesh, overwhelming that impoverished country. China has offered to serve as a mediator between the two countries. But it also blocked a UN Security Council resolution to appoint a special envoy to Myanmar and has downplayed concerns about the plight of the Rohingya, focusing more on protecting Belt and Road Initiative projects from the violence in Myanmar. The United States and others should say it loud and clear: with global leadership comes greater global responsibility.

WILL XI SUCCEED?

Does China's third revolution have staying power? History is certainly not on Xi's side. Despite a weakening of democratic institutions in some

parts of the world, all the major economies—save China—are democracies. And it is possible to map out, as many scholars have, potential paths to a Chinese democratic transition. One route is through an economic crisis, which could produce a demand for change. China's economy is showing signs of strain, with Chinese household, corporate, and government debt as a proportion of GDP all having skyrocketed since the 2008 global financial crisis. Some Chinese economists argue that the country faces a sizable challenge from its rapidly aging population and massively underfunded pension system, coupled with its persistently low birthrate, even after the end of the one-child policy.

It's also conceivable that Xi could overreach. At home, discontent with his repressive policies has spread within large parts of China's business and intellectual communities. The number of labor protests has more than doubled during his tenure. Moreover, although often forgotten in China's current political environment, the country is not without its champions of democracy. Prominent scholars, activists, journalists, retired officials, and wealthy entrepreneurs have all spoken out in favor of democratic reform in the recent past. At the same time, Xi's move to eliminate term limits stirred a great deal of controversy within top political circles. As Chinese officials have admitted to the press, there have even been coup and assassination attempts against Xi.

Abroad, Beijing's aggressive efforts to expand its influence have been met with frequent backlashes. In just the past year, widespread protests against Chinese investments have erupted in Bangladesh, Kazakhstan, Kenya, and Sri Lanka. As China presses forward with its more ambitious foreign policy, more such instances will undoubtedly crop up, raising the prospect that Xi will been seen as failing abroad, thus undermining his authority at home.

Nonetheless, there is little compelling evidence that Xi's revolution is in danger of being reversed. Many of his accomplishments have earned him widespread popular support. He has survived past crises, such as a major stock market crash in 2015, and at the 19th Party Congress, his consolidation of institutional power and mandate for change were only strengthened. For the foreseeable future, then, the United States will have to deal with China as it is: an illiberal state seeking to reshape the international system in its own image. The good news is that Xi has made his revolutionary intentions clear. There is no excuse now for the United States not to respond in equally unambiguous terms.

Fresh Prince

The Schemes and Dreams of Saudi Arabia's Next King

F. Gregory Gause III

It is not often that a Ritz-Carlton becomes a detention facility. But last November, when a large slice of the Saudi elite was arrested on accusations of corruption, the luxury hotel in Riyadh became a gilded prison for hundreds of princes, billionaires, and high-ranking government officials. Behind this crackdown was the young crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, also known as MBS, who is attempting to remake the kingdom's economy and social life, and even the House of Saud itself.

At only 32, MBS is already the most powerful figure in contemporary Saudi history, having sidelined other members of the ruling family with the full support of his father, King Salman. His concentrated authority and evident will to shake up the system make it possible for him to do great things. But he has also removed the restraints that have made Saudi foreign and domestic policy cautious, conservative, and ultimately successful amid the crises of the modern Middle East. Whether the crown prince can pull off his high-stakes gamble, which the Middle East expert Bernard Haykel terms a "revolution from above," without destabilizing his country and adding to the region's chaos remains an open question.

Conventional wisdom has it that the Saudi regime rests on a social compact among the ruling family, the religious establishment, and the economic elite. The system is lubricated by enough oil wealth to also fund a substantial welfare state. But that view is only half right. Over the decades, oil wealth has lifted the ruling family above its partners and the governing princes above the other members of the extended House of Saud. Religious elites are now state bureaucrats, not equal

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partners in governing. The business community is also a junior partner, more of a lobby than an independent actor. The crown prince's campaign is further redefining the role of the regime's traditional pillars of support while also appealing, in a most unmonarchical way, to an inchoate Saudi public opinion. So far, MBS appears to be popular among many Saudis (although accurate measures of public opinion are notoriously hard to come by in authoritarian regimes). The problem is that public opinion is fickle. The institutional interests of elites, as conservative and self-interested as they may be, are a much more reliable basis for monarchical rule.

The crown prince's most ambitious goal, which he outlined in his Vision 2030 plan, is to diversify the Saudi economy and reduce its dependence on oil. The collapse of oil prices in 2014 convinced him that the kingdom could no longer support the welfare state that has been in place since the 1970s. He has already reduced subsidies on utilities such as water and electricity, which were practically free in the past, and has imposed a five percent value-added tax (VAT) on many commercial transactions. The private sector is key to the plan's success. Right now, the vast majority of Saudi workers are employed by the state. Vision 2030 calls for the private sector to invest more in the economy and become a greater source of employment. The privatization of five percent of the state oil company Saudi Aramco—the most publicized element of Vision 2030—aims to generate revenue for the government's Public Investment Fund, which will invest both at home, in the local private sector, and abroad, as a sovereign wealth fund.



All of this made the Ritz-Carlton roundup even more puzzling. Why did the crown prince arrest the pillars of the private sector—the very people he needs to make Vision 2030 work? Saudi officials contend that a dramatic, public strike

against high-level corruption will help level the playing field and encourage greater investment going forward. But the crackdown's opaque and arbitrary methods—detentions without public charge, financial settlements negotiated for unspecified crimes, and the alleged use of brutal coercive tactics—could lead the country in the opposite direction.

The long-term effect of the crown prince's gambit will hinge on what kind of leader the crown prince really is. If he is like Chinese President Xi Jinping, he will use the anticorruption campaign not

only to settle political scores but also to actually reform the economy. In that case, a reconstituted and chastened private sector might, with the right incentives and sound government policy, become an engine of growth. On the other hand, if MBS is more like Russian President Vladimir Putin, he will simply replace the old oligarchs with new ones of his own choosing. That path is certainly open: the Saudi government has obtained a substantial interest in at least one major company, the construction giant the Saudi Binladin Group, in exchange for releasing its chief executive, and it might be doing the same with the Middle East Broadcasting Center. This approach would solidify the crown prince's power but undermine the potential for meaningful reform.

Equally troubling, he might be more like King Henry VIII. Faced with mounting expenses from fighting wars overseas and consolidating his rule at home, the king of England took over monasteries and other religious endowments when he declared himself head of the Church of England. But rather than maintaining these institutions as a steady source of income, he sold most of them for a one-time infusion of funds. There is some indication that MBS is feeling similar fiscal pressures. *The Wall Street Journal* reported that King Salman had unsuccessfully implored leading businesspeople to contribute to the government's coffers before the November roundup. The wolf is hardly at the door: the government has around $500 billion in reserves. But some of the crown prince's more ambitious plans, such as building a futuristic city dubbed "Neom," have not excited much enthusiasm from the Saudi business elite. Shaking down business leaders would yield money for pet projects, but this tactic can be used only once. If foreign investors and domestic business elites think that they are perpetually at risk of being arrested or having their assets seized, they will be much less likely to invest in the country.

At a minimum, the crown prince has redefined what corruption means in the kingdom. The problem is that observers, both domestic and foreign, are not yet clear on what the new definition is. The path that MBS chooses in the aftermath of the Ritz-Carlton crackdown will determine his country's future.

CHANGE AT LAST

On the social front, the crown prince has already made bold decisions. In September, he tackled the most fraught Saudi social issue by declaring that, as of June 2018, Saudi women will have the right to drive. This decision has elicited barely a peep of domestic opposition.

As education levels rose and more Saudis experienced life abroad, the argument that the kingdom was "not ready" or "too conservative" for this change rang increasingly hollow. And the objections of some clerics that driving would endanger Saudi women's moral standing were risible, given that the alternative was for Saudi women to be driven by male drivers (either in taxis or in their families' cars) who were not members of their families. Saudi society had been ready for this change for some time; the country's leaders had simply lacked the political will to pull the trigger. The crown prince has that political will, in spades.

Having women behind the wheel will bring enormous changes to the country. More women will be able to join the work force. Hundreds of thousands of foreign workers employed as drivers will no longer be needed. Men will not lose productive hours transporting their wives, mothers, and sisters to doctor's appointments and other meetings. It is hard to underestimate the impact of this decision.

The crown prince has publicly talked about "going back to how we were, to the tolerant, moderate Islam that is open to the world." Although this interpretation of Saudi history is questionable, his commitment to change is real. In addition to deciding to allow women to drive, he has limited the powers of the religious police and opened up Saudi social life. Musical concerts, movie theaters, female attendance at soccer matches, and a greater number of public social events will help make the country more "normal," at least for those Saudis who have lived or visited abroad. Undoubtedly, some in more conservative religious circles will object to all of this, and there might be isolated instances of a violent backlash, as there were when the country introduced television and education for girls in the 1960s. But history has shown that these changes will soon become normalized. The wives of clerics will be among the first behind the wheel.

The path that MBS chooses in the aftermath of the crackdown will determine his country's future.

All this social change gives a more accurate picture of the relationship between the religious establishment and the ruling family. Ultimately, the religious elites are state employees who take orders from above, not equal players with a veto over government policy. During every major crisis in modern Saudi history, the religious establishment has supported the government's decisions, including the

implementation of social changes in the 1960s, the retaking of the Grand Mosque in Mecca from millenarian zealots in 1979, the invitation of foreign troops into the kingdom during the Gulf War of 1990–91, and the crushing of local al Qaeda elements in the early years of this century. Religious elites may not like the crown prince's policies, but they are not leading a charge against them. Religious opposition to the regime comes from outside official circles, from radical groups such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State (or ISIS) and from Islamist populists who call for both greater adherence to Islamic law and more political freedom. The state has been able to suppress these movements for the last century. There is no reason to think that has changed.

For now, the crown prince's path to ultimate power seems secure.

UNCHALLENGED AUTHORITY

Equally audacious but less noticed abroad has been the crown prince's consolidation of power within the ruling family. Since the 1960s, the kingdom has been ruled by a de facto committee of senior princes—all sons of King Ibn Saud, the founder of modern Saudi Arabia—with the king as first among equals. Some kings were stronger than others, but all of them sought consensus on important decisions among their family members who held the key ministries and governorships across the country. This style of government had all the vices of rule by committee: it was ponderous, conservative, and not readily able to seize opportunities. But it also had its virtues: its decisions were well considered, there were checks on bad ideas, and everyone important was on board once a decision was made. As the sons of the founding king grew old, some observers questioned how the system would be sustained. Most Saudi watchers, myself included, assumed that the sons of that generation would take the places of their fathers and reconstitute committee governance. We were wrong.

When King Salman assumed the throne in 2015, he originally appointed his half brother Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz to be crown prince, keeping the succession in his own generation. But the king jettisoned Prince Muqrin a few months later in favor of one of his nephews, Mohammed bin Nayef. MBN, as he is known, is part of the Saudi royal family's third generation, the son of the former interior minister, who had inherited the leadership of that ministry from his father. MBN

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also became the main point of contact for U.S. officials in the burgeoning intelligence and counterterrorism partnership that had developed between the two countries after the 9/11 attacks. MBN was a safe choice to become the first king of his generation—experienced in government, successful in maintaining internal security against threats from al Qaeda and ISIS, and well known and respected in Washington.

But in June 2017, King Salman removed MBN from his position as crown prince and from his ministerial post and elevated his favorite son to become the heir apparent. The new crown prince's ascent was remarkably fast—MBS had become a minister only two years before, when he succeeded his father as minister of defense. At that time, the king had also appointed him to head a cabinet committee overseeing economic and social policy (MBN was in charge of a similar committee on security issues). With the cashiering of MBN, the new crown prince became the focal point for all major decisions in the government. Although some saw the Ritz-Carlton roundup as a consolidation of power, MBS had already secured his position by then. To be sure, a number of princes were involuntary guests at the Ritz. The most important of these was Miteb bin Abdullah, a son of the former king, who served as the commander of the National Guard. After his November arrest, he was stripped of that position and removed from the cabinet. But no one questioned that MBS was in charge, even before November 2017.

Today, the Saudi cabinet contains fewer members of the ruling family than at any time since the 1950s. The king is still the prime minister, and the crown prince is both the defense minister and the deputy prime minister, but the only other ministerial position filled by a family member is minister of the interior, which is held by a young nephew of the former crown prince MBN and thus a member of the family's fourth generation. (There are also two royal ministers of state, one of whom is another son of King Salman, but both lack a portfolio.)

In effect, the crown prince has cut out a large number of his older cousins, many of whom had previously held high positions in government and were looking to inherit their fathers' seats at the decision-making table. This has occasioned more than a little grumbling in family circles, some of which has seeped out into the Western press. But there are no indications, at least not publicly, of a serious mobilization inside the House of Saud to block MBS from eventually succeeding his father. Dangerous splits in the family have happened before, most recently in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when King Saud and Crown Prince

Faisal contended for power. But the signs of that split were clear and public. People were fired from jobs and then returned when their man was on top, the protagonists took extended leaves outside the country after they lost a skirmish, and family councils were called to adjudicate the conflict. In the end, the family deposed King Saud in 1964. Nothing approaching that kind of open contest for power is occurring now.

It is possible that MBS will face familial opposition when his father dies. The House of Saud famously tries to keep family business out of the public eye, so there could be things going on that outsiders do not know about. Perhaps in anticipation of a move against him, the crown prince has been appealing to younger family members, particularly in the fourth generation, who are below him in the hierarchy but close to him in age, by appointing many of them to subcabinet positions in Riyadh and positions of authority in the regional governorates. They could become his supporters if trouble arises. For now, his path to ultimate power seems secure.

AN UNPREDICTABLE PRINCE

The crown prince now stands at the top of the Saudi decision-making process. He answers only to the king, who has granted him wide-ranging powers, allowing him to make difficult decisions that were previously kicked down the road, such as pursuing economic reform and allowing women to drive. But it also means that there are few checks on an ambitious and aggressive leader who may not fully calculate the second- and third-order consequences of some of his actions.

Some recent Saudi foreign policy decisions suggest a certain amount of recklessness. In November 2017, for example, as the Ritz-Carlton roundup was under way, the Lebanese prime minister, Saad Hariri, made an unscheduled visit to Riyadh. A few days later, he announced his resignation from the Saudi capital, under obvious pressure from MBS. This was clearly a Saudi power play meant to put pressure on the Lebanese political system in hopes of dealing a blow to Hezbollah, Iran's ally in Lebanon. Instead, the move backfired, as the United States and Saudi allies in Europe told the kingdom to back down. A few weeks later, Hariri returned to Lebanon and rescinded his resignation. Likewise, in the summer of 2017, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates led a number of other Arab countries in a boycott of Qatar, accusing the Qataris of supporting Islamist groups, backing terrorists, and meddling in the domestic politics of their neighbors. But far from knuckling

under, Qatar has withstood the pressure and drawn support from Iran and Turkey. In both cases, Saudi Arabia did not achieve its objectives.

Many would classify the Emirati-Saudi military offensive in Yemen as another example of an aggressive and unsuccessful MBS policy. Undoubtedly, the Saudis and their partners assumed that the operation, which began in 2015, would swiftly drive back the rebel Houthi militants and restore the Saudi ally Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi to the presidential palace in Sanaa. It did not turn out that way, and international pressure on Riyadh is mounting as the human toll of the campaign has reached alarming levels. But unlike the Lebanese and Qatari gambits, the Yemeni campaign touches more directly on what most Saudis see as their national security. One can argue about the extent to which the Houthis are tied to Iran, but Saudi Arabia considers Houthi control of Yemen as tantamount to allowing Iran a base of influence on the Arabian Peninsula. No Saudi government would have stood by and allowed that to happen. The war in Yemen is a drain on Saudi resources and a blot on the country's international reputation, but it still enjoys broad support among Saudi elites. The question now is how to bring it to an end.

Unlike past Saudi leaders, MBS can make dramatic and unilateral decisions. But this freedom of action also means that he can engage in foreign policy adventures that would not have moved forward under previous rulers. He may be learning from his mistakes, but given his ambition and impulsiveness, the world should expect more surprises.

THE PRINCE AND THE PEOPLE

The crown prince has few checks on his decision-making power from within the Saudi political system, but he still has to respond to public demands. More than any other recent Saudi leader, MBS has cultivated public support, especially among younger Saudis.

In January, responding to public grumbling about the increased prices of water, electricity, and gasoline and the imposition of the five percent VAT that took effect in mid-2017 and early 2018, MBS restored an annual pay raise for government employees that had been suspended as part of earlier austerity moves, and he granted government employees a bonus of about $250 per month for "cost of living." The crown prince also established a "citizen's account," which directly transfers cash to Saudis in the middle and lower economic strata. Saudi officials are now saying that the money recovered from those held in the Ritz-Carlton will be used to support this fund.

These new benefits could be read as a move away from the goals of balancing the state budget and making public-sector jobs less attractive, but it is better seen as a necessary reaction to placate public opinion. Two years of rising oil prices have made it difficult to impose austerity. Sacrifices that might have been acceptable to Saudis when oil was $30 per barrel seem less so with oil above $60 per barrel. Although the crown prince may be headstrong and aggressive, he still realizes that he needs the people behind him. But to transform the Saudi system, he will also have to inculcate a new understanding of what the state is going to provide its citizens. Reducing the welfare state without turning the public against him will be his most daunting challenge.

LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

Perhaps nowhere have the crown prince's moves produced more curiosity, hope, and fear than in Washington. In U.S. President Donald Trump, MBS has an enthusiastic backer—at times too enthusiastic. The fact that MBS became crown prince just a few weeks after Trump's visit to Saudi Arabia in May 2017 left the impression that Washington had something to do with the change, and the White House was far too quick to imply that MBS had explicit U.S. backing. The president's excessive friendliness has already had consequences. In June, Trump tweeted his support for the Emirati-Saudi boycott of Qatar, stating that isolating the country might be "the beginning of the end to the horror of terrorism." This created tension with the Gulf state, which is a crucial base for the U.S. military's air operations in the Middle East, and undercut moves by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Secretary of Defense James Mattis to bring about a quick end to the imbroglio. The sense that the Saudis (and the Emiratis) can appeal directly to the White House through the president's son-in-law, Jared Kushner, has also made it more difficult for the regular organs of U.S. foreign policy to bring the Gulf standoff to a diplomatic conclusion.

Although Trump's close public embrace of the crown prince might not serve either's interest in the long term, it has undoubtedly given Washington considerable leverage with Riyadh in the short term. The administration should think carefully about how to use this influence. Bringing the Saudis on board for a new effort to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would make sense, but only if the Trump plan has a real chance of success. The administration should not play the Saudi card on the peace process if it is not going anywhere—and there is

little reason for optimism. When it comes to Syria, Trump has shown little interest in a new peace initiative, so there is no reason to engage the Saudis there. Riyadh is already in agreement with a more confrontational policy toward Iran. And the administration has successfully pushed the Saudis to reengage with the government of Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, which is a positive step in the long-term effort to stabilize Iraq and reduce Iranian influence there.

The place where Trump could most productively use his close relationship with the crown prince is Yemen. The administration should continue its efforts to push the Saudis to address the human catastrophe through more effective aid and more discriminate military action. The Houthis also have much to answer for regarding the suffering of Yemeni civilians, and international pressure should focus as much on them as on the Saudis. Any diplomatic initiative to end the fighting will require that the United States decide whether it wants to see the redivision of the country into two states, as was the case before 1990. It will also involve sophisticated outreach to Iran, the only regional power with any influence over the Houthis. This can be accomplished even as the Trump administration works to contain and roll back Iranian influence in the Arab world. Oman has acted as a conduit to Iran before, and European countries can also deal directly with the Iranians. If Tehran is at all chastened by the antiregime protests that broke out across Iran in January, it might be open to reducing its involvement in the regional conflict that least affects its interests. Stabilizing Yemen will not be easy, but such an effort would give Saudi Arabia a desperately needed exit ramp from a costly campaign and alleviate one of the world's most searing human tragedies.

Meanwhile, Washington should pay close attention to how the crown prince handles the aftermath of his anticorruption campaign. If MBS becomes his country's Xi, then the United States should maintain its pragmatic alliance, which is based on mutual benefit rather than shared values. But if MBS turns out to be more like Putin or Henry VIII, privileging political cronies and treating the private sector as his personal ATM, then the longer-term prospects of the kingdom in a world where oil prices are unlikely to return to the historic highs of the early years of this century will be much less certain. In that case, the United States will need to look elsewhere for a partner in stabilizing the region.

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The Right Way to Coerce North Korea

Ending the Threat Without Going to War

Victor Cha and Katrin Fraser Katz

When it comes to North Korea, U.S. President Donald Trump's policies have been whiplash inducing. On February 23, he appeared to be gearing up for a conflict when he said that if sanctions against Pyongyang didn't work, Washington would have to move to "phase two," which could be "very, very unfortunate for the world." But just two weeks later, Trump abruptly changed course and accepted an invitation to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un—a decision that caught even his own White House and State Department by surprise.

Trump's newfound enthusiasm for diplomacy has temporarily lowered the temperature on the Korean Peninsula, but it also underlines a bigger question: Does the United States have a strategy for North Korea, or are these twists and turns merely the whims of a temperamental president? In the past, rash and uninformed decisions by U.S. officials on the peninsula—such as acquiescing to Japan's occupation of Korea in 1905 and excluding Korea from the U.S. Cold War defense perimeter in 1950—have had grave consequences. The United States cannot afford a similar outcome today.

Trump's unpredictability has had some upsides. His self-proclaimed "madman" behavior may have played a role in bringing the North Koreans to the table, and the Trump administration's policy of applying, in the White House's words, "maximum pressure" has yielded some impressive results. An unprecedented summit between the U.S. and North Korean leaders could indeed bring lasting peace to Asia. But it could also go wrong: if negotiations fail, the administration might

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conclude that a military strike is the only way forward, greatly increasing the chance of war.

The Trump administration must ground its summit diplomacy and overall approach to North Korea in a strategy of comprehensive coercion that clearly defines U.S. objectives, leverages Washington's most effective diplomatic and military tools, and aligns its Korea policy with the broader U.S. strategy in Asia. Failure to do this would only benefit Kim and increase the likelihood that the United States will get "played," as Trump has characterized past negotiations. After a year of saber rattling, and with North Korea likely to be just months away from possessing the capability to launch a nuclear attack on the continental United States, the stakes could hardly be higher. In the not unlikely event that talks break down, the United States will need a strategy that prevents the parties from sliding into a disastrous war.

WHIPLASH

During Trump's first year in office, North Korea conducted more than twice as many ballistic missile tests (20) as it did during the first year of Barack Obama's presidency (8). The result was a constant exchange of recriminations between the United States and North Korea. After North Korea tested its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), in July, Trump promised to rain "fire and fury" on Pyongyang. After North Korea threatened a nuclear attack on "the heart of the U.S.," Trump's national security adviser hinted that a preventive attack was becoming increasingly likely. Meanwhile, rumors swirled that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and U.S. Pacific Command were drawing up plans for a limited military strike to give Kim a "bloody nose." Combined, we have decades of experience working on this problem, and one of us, Victor Cha, was once under consideration for U.S. ambassador to South Korea, before the Trump administration withdrew his candidacy. Never before have we witnessed more discussion about possible military escalation than in the past year.

But 2018 has brought a dramatic shift. The government of South Korean President Moon Jae-in, who is much more open to engagement with North Korea than his predecessor, decided to capitalize on what it perceived as toned-down language in Kim's New Year's address. In January, it achieved a reopening of the long-suspended inter-Korean dialogue channels and facilitated an all-expenses-paid invitation for the North Korean team to attend the Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang. While briefing Trump on the phone about these developments, Moon recalled

From Pyongyang with love: a North Korean ICBM test, July 2017

KCNA / REUTERS

Trump's campaign pledge to have a hamburger with Kim. Ultimately, Moon managed to elicit a promise from Trump to consider meeting the North Korean leader—a message that Seoul dutifully conveyed to Pyongyang. At the Olympics, despite exchanging little more than icy stares with U.S. Vice President Mike Pence, Kim's younger sister presented a letter to Moon that suggested her brother's interest in improving relations with the United States.

In early March, shortly after the Olympics concluded, Kim warmly welcomed a group of South Korean envoys to Pyongyang, led by the South Korean national security adviser, Chung Eui-yong. After two days of meetings, Kim agreed to cross into the South for an inter-Korean summit by the end of April. He also promised a moratorium on missile and nuclear testing contingent on dialogue with the United States. According to the South Koreans, Kim said that the "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" was possible if the U.S. threat to his country were removed.

Not to be outdone, on March 8, Trump scrapped his daily White House schedule to host the South Korean national security adviser in the Oval Office soon after his delegation landed at Dulles Airport (Chung was supposed to brief the president on his recent North Korean trip the next day). Trump called for an immediate summit with Kim (which he was eventually persuaded to push to May) and, in a dramatic moment

recalling his television show *The Apprentice*, made an impromptu visit to the White House briefing room to tease an imminent "major announcement" on North Korea, which he later let the South Koreans deliver in front of the West Wing. Shortly afterward, he conveyed his enthusiasm for diplomacy in a flurry of optimistic tweets.

WINGING IT?

The South Korean government deserves credit for turning an impending crisis into an opportunity. It is possible that a face-to-face meeting between Kim and Trump, who are both fond of making surprise decisions, could bring progress on one of the world's most dangerous problems. But it is easier to understand Seoul's and Pyongyang's motives for engaging in diplomacy than Washington's.

For South Korea, the imminent threat of North Korean aggression during the Winter Olympics, as well as long-term concerns about a renewed campaign of North Korean missile and nuclear tests after the conclusion of the Paralympics in late March, made engineering some form of détente a strategic imperative. Meanwhile, North Korea's apparent change of heart likely stems from the economic bite of Trump's maximum-pressure campaign, which has cut oil imports and coal exports, dried up hard-currency inflows, and made commodity prices spike in the country. According to Trump administration officials, the sanctions have caused North Korean gas prices to triple and have reduced the country's exports by more than $2.7 billion. Today, paper is so scarce in the North that the state-run newspaper has been forced to cut its circulation. There have even been reports in South Korean media that North Korea used telephones, rather than global VSAT communications, to speak with South Korean air traffic controllers when coordinating the arrival of high-level North Korean delegations for the Olympics, since the state had lost access to satellite networks after defaulting on payments. The news that the Trump administration was seriously considering a military strike may also have contributed to this turnaround.

But Kim also has other motivations for reengaging. A pause in weapons testing at this point would do little to set back Pyongyang's nuclear program. Moreover, a meeting with Trump would give the rogue leader the all-important recognition that he craves and, depending on what Trump relinquished in exchange for a freeze in North Korea's weapons testing and development, could advance the North's long-standing goal of getting the United States to accept the country as a nuclear power.

What about the United States? Although there is an internal logic to North and South Korean actions, inconsistencies abound in the U.S. approach. After spending most of 2017 discussing military options, the administration backpedaled in January and denied that such plans even existed. Officials have said that the sanctions campaign is designed to compel the North Korean regime to return to the negotiating table, but the amount of attention Trump's National Security Council and State Department have paid to preparing for negotiations pales in comparison to the considerable effort devoted to developing sanctions and military strike options. The administration's diplomatic strategy to date has amounted to little more than a list of don'ts: don't reward talks, don't let up on sanctions, don't make the mistakes of past administrations.

Furthermore, because Trump has jettisoned the interagency process, which brings in experts and policymakers from across the U.S. government to advise the president, negotiations will occur amid ominous conditions. Trump will be flying blind into meetings with Kim, acting on little more than his gut instincts, without the advice of experienced foreign policy and Asian affairs experts, who would undoubtedly counsel him to avoid verbose but meaningless summit statements and to press Kim on making tangible steps toward denuclearization. Meanwhile, the North Koreans are probably only a few tests away from gaining the capacity to reach the continental United States with nuclear-tipped ICBMs. The moratorium on testing that Pyongyang offered the South Korean envoys will merely maintain the status quo. Since the pause is contingent on talks, Pyongyang will be able to resume testing the day the talks end, and it will likely continue covertly working on its programs all the while. Finally, there is no reason to believe that North Korea has changed its long-standing aims of achieving recognition as a nuclear power, ejecting U.S. forces from South Korea, and undermining the U.S. defense commitment to South Korea.

To counter these negotiating traps, Trump might offer incremental energy and economic assistance and sanctions alleviation in exchange for a freeze in and the eventual dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons and long-range ICBM programs. North Korea's missile program, in particular, has not been the topic of negotiations in almost two decades, and Trump could score a victory on this count. Or he might choose a bolder path that would put much bigger carrots on the table, including the normalization of relations or even a peace treaty formally ending the Korean War. It would be ironic if Trump, an avowed hawk on North

Korea, adopted an approach to diplomacy that doves have advocated for years, but it is not out of the question.

WHAT TRUMP SHOULD DO

Regardless of how talks do or do not play out, the United States must base its policy going forward on a set of sound principles. North Korea's effort to develop nuclear missiles capable of reaching the United States demands an urgent response. Past behavior suggests that Kim will try to share these weapons with other states and nonstate actors. Down the road, he might use them in an attempt to intimidate the United States into offering concessions or even withdrawing its troops from South Korea, which would leave the country vulnerable to an invasion. More broadly, North Korea's acquisition of these weapons, if left unchecked, could undermine the global nonproliferation regime. The United States must keep North Korean denuclearization at the top of its strategic priorities. Accepting North Korea as a nuclear power and building a new relationship from that basis would legitimize its pursuit of nuclear weapons and send a dangerous signal to other countries that are considering starting their own programs.

Trump's pursuit of a diplomatic solution has the best chance of success if it is bolstered by a strategy that ramps up the regional and international pressure on North Korea. The Trump administration's approach to North Korea thus far has involved swings between confrontation and engagement without a clear link to broader U.S. strategic objectives in the region. A comprehensive coercive strategy for denuclearization diplomacy would build on the strengths of the maximum-pressure campaign while more fully leveraging the support and resources of regional allies and partners in pursuing shared long-term goals. This strategy would involve five key components.

First, Washington must continue to strengthen the global coalition that it has mustered in its highly successful sanctions program. Unlike the so-called smart sanctions campaign 13 years ago, Trump's effort has the backing of ten UN Security Council resolutions, which grant the United States virtually unlimited authority to punish violators. Moreover, compliance with the sanctions has increased because the Trump administration is more willing than past administrations to share intelligence information with third parties to help them stop sanctioned activities in their countries.

Second, the United States should buttress this sanctions campaign with a statement on nonproliferation. This message should signal unambiguously to North Korea and any recipients or facilitators of its nuclear

weapons that the United States will hold accountable any state, group, or individual found to be complicit in a transfer of nuclear material—if necessary, through the use of force.

Third, the United States must upgrade its alliances with Japan and South Korea. Militarily, that means improving capabilities regarding integrated missile defense, intelligence sharing, antisubmarine warfare, and conventional strike missiles to deter North Korean threats. The political scientists Michael Green and Matthew Kroenig have outlined a useful wish list: adding more missile defense systems in the region, deploying B-1 and B-2 bombers to new locations, undertaking cyber-operations to impede North Korea's missile program development, and encouraging South Korea to purchase shorter-range missile defense systems (similar to Israel's Iron Dome) to defend against North Korean artillery. The United States should also remain open to additional conventional strike capabilities for Japan and South Korea, the use of which would require U.S. sign-off.

The United States must keep denuclearization at the top of its strategic priorities.

At the political level, the United States should push for a joint statement with Japan and South Korea that pledges that an attack on one will be treated as an attack on all. Affirming collective defense is important because North Korea's long-term strategy is to decouple South Korea's security from Japan's and the United States'. Indeed, one of the purposes of North Korea's long-range missile tests last year was to reduce South Korea's confidence in the U.S. commitment to deterring an attack against South Korea and raise doubts in Japan and the United States about their willingness to trade Tokyo or Los Angeles for Seoul in the event of war. In order to convey a clear deterrent message to Pyongyang, the collective-defense statement should commit all three allies to the use of force in response to a North Korean attack.

These military and political measures should be complemented by diplomatic and economic strategies that treat U.S. alliances more holistically. For example, the United States should approach updates and adjustments to the existing free-trade agreement with South Korea or U.S.–South Korean defense cost-sharing negotiations with an awareness that tension in one area of these relationships can make progress elsewhere more difficult, if not impossible, particularly if the Japanese public or the South Korean public is paying attention and anti-U.S. sentiment has been rallied.

Although the North Korea problem is immediate, the longer-term strategic competitor in Asia is China, whose challenge to U.S. preeminence has been augmented by Russia's spoiler role across the globe. Bolstering U.S. alliances would strengthen Washington's hand against these threats, as well, by significantly improving military defense capabilities, counterproliferation efforts, and diplomatic coordination among U.S. allies and partners in East Asia. Reinforcing the U.S. military posture in the region would also increase the costs to China and Russia of subsidizing the Kim regime, not complying with sanctions, or undertaking other problematic behavior.

Fourth, although Washington may seek an assurance from Pyongyang that it will not proliferate, the Trump administration must also push for the establishment of a counterproliferation coalition that shares intelligence about maritime nuclear smuggling and cooperates on law enforcement. Japan's and South Korea's port authorities, coast guards, and navies, along with the United States' considerable assets, should work together to prevent nuclear material from leaving the country. Most of this enforcement activity would likely take place in ports, but the allies should be prepared to carry out interceptions at sea as needed. The United States should also approach China and Russia about the possibility of building a five-party counterproliferation regime in Northeast Asia. Beijing and Moscow should see benefits to stopping any North Korean loose nukes, but if they are not willing to participate, then they should be prepared to face the diplomatic and economic consequences of allowing North Korean proliferation across their borders.

Finally, the United States must continue preparing both diplomatic and military plans for North Korea. This is critical to, on the one hand, upholding deterrence against Pyongyang and, on the other, creating a credible off-ramp for the regime. Washington should maintain its existing high-tempo military exercises in the region, preposition ammunition stocks for a possible conflict, and rotate strategic assets such as B-52 bombers, stealth warplanes, nuclear submarines, and aircraft carriers regularly to the peninsula. All these steps should prevent North Korea from spreading its nuclear weapons, threatening the United States, or taking offensive actions in the region.

Given the limited amount of time to prepare for a Kim-Trump summit, the meeting is unlikely to bear immediate fruit beyond some grandiose statements about a normalization of relations, a peaceful end to the Korean War armistice, and denuclearization, statements that

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the leaders would then authorize their governments to begin negotiations over. This outcome would itself be significant, but it should not lead to a lifting of sanctions unless North Korea backs up its promises with actions.

Whether the summit succeeds or not, the United States must move beyond broad statements and invite Pyongyang to reiterate the denuclearization pledges it made during the six-party talks in 2005 and 2007. The documents outlining these pledges are the only place where North Korea has ever been forced to dump its noncommittal and vague formulations about a "nuclear-free peninsula" in favor of specific and written commitments to "abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs." These agreements are also of value to North Korea (and China) because they state that the United States will not attack North Korea with conventional or nuclear weapons, the only written security assurance that addresses North Korean concerns about "hostile" U.S. policy. Washington should also compel the regime to improve its human rights record as a good-faith demonstration of the authenticity of its diplomatic intentions. North Korea will undoubtedly have its own long list of wants, but for the United States, the summit must establish zero tolerance for any plutonium- or uranium-based nuclear weapons stockpiles or the deployment of long- or intermediate-range ballistic missiles and call for substantial reductions in the stocks of short-range ones. Absent the preservation of these core security interests, neither summit diplomacy nor working-level agreements will be worth much.

Following this overall strategy would enhance the credibility of Washington's negotiating position, while also securing U.S. interests in the event of failure. Broadly speaking, comprehensive coercion would get the United States out of crisis management mode and demonstrate U.S. resolve without unnecessarily risking war. It would also strengthen U.S. alliances in Asia for the long term, directly address the proliferation threat, increase the costs to those who subsidize Pyongyang, and complement the United States' regional commitments.

WHAT NOT TO DO

When it comes to North Korea, the only American voice that really matters is Trump's. By agreeing to meet with Kim, Trump has improved his media ratings, but he has also inadvertently increased the chances of war. If his latest diplomatic gamble doesn't pay off, the administration may come away from negotiations more determined to use the military option.

Indeed, even amid talk of negotiations, some senior officials in the Trump administration have continued to contemplate using a limited military strike to prevent North Korea's development of a long-range nuclear missile. The rationale is that a strike on North Korea's nuclear and missile facilities, perhaps after its next test, would give Kim a "bloody nose" painful enough to compel him to begin the process of denuclearization, but not so damaging as to start a wider war on the peninsula.

The logic behind a limited military strike is that North Korea will be undeterrable once it acquires the ability to hit the continental United States with a nuclear weapon—because the regime is unpredictable, economically desperate, and has used chemical weapons against a civilian target as recently as last year. If Kim can strike the continental United States, the argument goes, then Washington will not be able to prevent nuclear proliferation or nuclear blackmail. A strike would constitute an immediate, decisive action to prevent that outcome. It would also demonstrate the capability and willingness of the United States to employ all options to stop North Korea's nuclear program, a message that would no doubt resonate beyond the region.

Trump cannot solve the problem of a nuclear North Korea with a preventive military strike.

Yet this logic is flawed. If Kim would be undeterrable if he had nuclear weapons able to reach the continental United States, then why would a limited military strike deter him from responding in kind? And if Kim did respond militarily, then how could the United States prevent the crisis from escalating given that Kim would have just proved himself not to have a clear and rational understanding of signals and deterrence?

Some Americans argue that the risks are worth taking because it's better that people die "over there" than at home. That, too, is a misguided sentiment. On any given day, there are 230,000 Americans living in South Korea and another 90,000 or so in Japan. Evacuating them would be almost impossible. The largest American evacuation in history was about 60,000 from Saigon in 1975. An evacuation from South Korea would be infinitely more difficult. Even if the State Department tripled the number of consular officers in South Korea, the process would likely take months. Moreover, the normal evacuation points south and east of the peninsula would not be feasible to use in a war scenario because of the North Korean missile threat, which would mean that the only way out would be through China.

But in a crisis, the waterways around the peninsula would be clogged with a million Chinese seeking to leave, as well.

Under a rain of North Korean artillery, American citizens in the region would most likely have to hunker down until the war ended. Although those in Japan might be protected by U.S. missile defense systems, the U.S. population in South Korea would not be as lucky. To be clear: by launching a preventive strike, the president would be putting at risk an American population the size of that of Cincinnati or Pittsburgh, not to mention millions of South Koreans and Japanese, all based on the unproven assumption that an undeterrable and unpredictable dictator would be cowed into submission by a demonstration of U.S. power.

Some may argue that U.S. casualties and even a wider war on the peninsula are worth risking if a preventive strike would preserve the post–World War II regional and international order in the long term. But this proposition is highly problematic. A military strike would only delay, not stop, Kim's missile and nuclear programs. Washington does not know where all of North Korea's nuclear installations are, and even if it did, many are hidden deep underground and in the side of mountains, beyond the reach of even large "bunker buster" weapons. Furthermore, a limited strike would not stem the threat of proliferation. In fact, it would only exacerbate it, turning what might be a moneymaking endeavor for the Kim regime into a vengeful effort to equip actors arrayed against the United States.

This strategy also risks fracturing the impressive coalition that the Trump administration has brought together for its maximum-pressure campaign. A unilateral military attack would undercut what has so far been a successful bid to deplete the currency reserves North Korea has been using to build its programs. Finally, a strike could harm key U.S. alliances. Japan and South Korea insist that they must be consulted before the United States considers a strike. Going it alone is always an option, but doing so could fracture, if not end, the very alliances that the Trump administration has declared it seeks to strengthen in the face of a rising China.

Ultimately, Trump cannot solve the problem of a nuclear North Korea with a preventive military strike. This assessment is widely shared by former members of the intelligence community, the National Security Council, the State Department, and the Defense Department who served in both Democratic and Republican administrations. As Steve

Bannon, Trump's former chief strategist, put it in an interview: "Until somebody solves the part of the equation that shows me that ten million people in Seoul don't die in the first 30 minutes . . . there's no military solution here, they got us."

THE BEST OF LOUSY CHOICES

Going forward, Washington should build on the maximum-pressure campaign, embed negotiations in a broader regional strategy, and forgo a military strike in favor of new efforts to strengthen regional deterrence and counterproliferation through close cooperation with U.S. allies. Such a strategy could deliver the same potential benefits as a limited strike without the costs. And if the Kim-Trump summit fails, it could also keep the two countries from immediately going to war.

China and Russia would not like this approach, but from their perspective, it is preferable to a military strike, which could lead to a U.S.–North Korean nuclear exchange in their neighborhood. Moreover, few states, including China, are comfortable with the proliferation risk posed by a nuclear North Korea. In fact, under this strategy, China and Russia may decide to participate in counterproliferation efforts or even in an enduring multilateral security institution.

Some in the global community fear that China and North Korea could frame certain actions, such as an embargo to prevent proliferation, as an act of war. To counter this, the United States and its allies should, to the extent possible, seek legal authorization for their actions through UN Security Council resolutions keyed to the next set of North Korean provocations or to proliferation.

Doves may argue that this strategy would generate insecurity in Pyongyang that would further justify the regime's pursuit of weapons. They may think that a better alternative would be to throw a diplomatic Hail Mary—as Trump may well do—such as declaring peace on the peninsula and pulling U.S. troops out of South Korea. Over the long term, a peace treaty might be possible, but first, the facts on the ground must change. The regime's intention to pursue nuclear-tipped ICBMs presents grave new threats to the U.S. homeland and allies in the region that must be addressed. The pressure of sanctions must be maintained, but that doesn't mean there is no room for subtlety in efforts to shape North Korean behavior. The sanctions campaign, if handled carefully, might be designed to target the regime while leaving space for market development, information dissemination, and humanitarian assistance

among ordinary people. Still, a Hail Mary without tangible North Korean actions toward denuclearization might be great for TV ratings, but it would also give Kim what he wants (nuclear recognition) while offering the United States nothing but empty promises.

Finally, critics might argue that a strategy of comprehensive coercion would simply take too much time, and time only plays into North Korea's hands as the country continues its nuclear sprint. This critique is not unwarranted; in recent decades, sensitive historical and domestic issues have hampered Japanese–South Korean military cooperation, which could impede defense planning among U.S. allies. In the past, however, crises involving North Korea have led to security cooperation between Japan and South Korea in a timely and prompt fashion. In addition, although the push for a Kim-Trump summit is dramatic, it may have shifted the play to a longer game, as bold statements by leaders who love flair and drama will have to be translated into action by policy minions in painstaking detail over weeks and months, if not years. The United States should use this time to invest in its alliances and strengthen its position in the region.

Coordinating and developing the capabilities needed for security cooperation with Japan and South Korea will take time, but it will put the United States in a better position in the long run. It's important to distinguish between strategy and tactics. Tactical responses are always possible in the near term, but tactics without a strategy can lead one down undesirable paths. As former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre has argued, recent U.S. claims that "time has run out," which were designed to pressure the North Koreans, have only pushed Washington further into a corner, under pressure to carry out a threatened military attack, and they have done nothing to advance a strategy outlining what the United States should be doing before, during, and after any negotiations.

In the land of lousy options, no plan is perfect. But some are demonstrably better than others. A comprehensive coercion strategy for denuclearization diplomacy would significantly increase the pressure on North Korea. It would strengthen U.S. alliances in Asia against threats not just from North Korea but also from China and increase the costs to Beijing of subsidizing the Kim regime. It would not risk hundreds of thousands of American lives with a preventive military attack. And it would strengthen the United States' hand at the negotiating table in a way that primed Washington for success, but also prepared it for failure.

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Perception and Misperception on the Korean Peninsula

How Unwanted Wars Begin

Robert Jervis and Mira Rapp-Hooper

North Korea has all but completed its quest for nuclear weapons. It has demonstrated its ability to produce boosted-fission bombs and may be able to make fusion ones, as well. It can likely miniaturize them to fit atop a missile. And it will soon be able to deliver this payload to the continental United States. North Korea's leader, Kim Jong Un, has declared his country's nuclear deterrent complete and, despite his willingness to meet with U.S. President Donald Trump, is unlikely to give it up. Yet Washington continues to demand that Pyongyang relinquish the nuclear weapons it already has, and the Trump administration has pledged that the North Korean regime will never acquire a nuclear missile that can hit the United States. The result is a new, more dangerous phase in the U.S.–North Korean relationship: a high-stakes nuclear standoff.

In March, U.S. and South Korean officials announced the possibility of a Kim-Trump meeting. But regardless of whether diplomacy proceeds or the United States turns its focus to other tools—sanctions, deterrence, even military force—the same underlying challenge will remain: the outcome of this standoff will be determined by whether and how each country can influence the other. That, in turn, will depend on the beliefs and perceptions each holds about the other. The problems of perception and misperception afflict all policymakers that

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deal with foreign adversaries. But when it comes to relations between Washington and Pyongyang, those problems are especially profound, and the consequences of a miscalculation are uniquely grave.

Any U.S. strategy toward North Korea involves using a combination of threats and promises to persuade Pyongyang to bend to Washington's will. But whether the United States can actually persuade Pyongyang depends not just on which tools it chooses to use but also, more fundamentally, on how it is viewed by North Korea. How do North Korean leaders interpret the signals Washington sends? Do they see Washington's threats and promises as credible? And how do U.S. policymakers perceive their counterparts in Pyongyang? How do they differentiate plausible threats from mere bluster? The American debate about whether Kim is "rational"—that is, capable of making means-ends calculations and providing for his own survival—barely scratches the surface of necessary considerations.

Ultimately, the effectiveness of any threat or promise is in the eye of the target; the adversary has the final say in whether a particular approach succeeds. Analysts often compare international politics to chess, a bilateral contest in which players view the entire board and know all the possible moves. In this case especially, a more apt analogy is *Rashomon*—the Japanese film that depicts the same story from several vantage points, each character viewing what happened differently.

If any U.S. strategy toward North Korea is to have a chance of succeeding (or even of just averting catastrophe), it must be guided by an accurate sense of how Kim's regime thinks, what it values, and how it judges its options. Washington must understand not just North Korean objectives but also how North Korean officials understand U.S. objectives and whether they consider U.S. statements credible. If it fails to do so, perceptual pitfalls could all too easily provoke a downward spiral in relations and lead to the worst conflict since World War II.

YOU CAN'T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT

It has long been clear what the United States wants from North Korea. For years, Washington has sought to denuclearize the country—that is, to achieve the complete, verifiable, and irreversible disassembly of its nuclear arsenal—and to deter major military action on its part. More recently, Trump has added that North Korea cannot be allowed to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM, capable of reaching the continental United States. Washington has also long called for,

Seeing like a state: Kim watching a military drill, Pyongyang, November 2014

KCNA / REUTERS

but never actively pursued, the reunification of the Korean Peninsula under the democratic control of the South. Yet as North Korea has moved toward a complete nuclear and ICBM capability, such goals have become harder to achieve. They no longer require simply preventing North Korea from taking certain steps. Now, they require persuading it to reverse course and give up capabilities it has already developed, even in the face of significant opposition, a much bigger concession.

Accordingly, the more urgent question today is less what the United States wants than what it can reasonably live with—that is, what it needs. As North Korea nears the end of its nuclear quest, concessions that would have once looked attractive, such as a freeze in further development, no longer look as desirable. What, then, would it take for the United States to live with a nuclear North Korea? If Washington can strengthen its alliances and military presence to effectively deter Pyongyang and prevent it from resorting to nuclear blackmail, would minimum American needs be met?

What North Korea wants from its nuclear and missile programs has also become fairly clear. Above all, the regime wants to ensure its survival and deter a U.S. attack. Beyond that, it also appears to consider nuclear weapons to be a source of prestige and thus wants acceptance as a de facto nuclear state, much as Pakistan has. Nuclear weapons also

help advance other long-standing North Korean desires, such as reunification of the peninsula under Pyongyang's control and the undermining of U.S. security guarantees for South Korea and Japan.

The harder question to answer is whether the Kim regime now sees a nuclear capability as inextricable from its own survival—that is, whether it thinks it needs to keep nuclear weapons under any circumstances. If it does, then there is no security assurance that Washington can offer Pyongyang that will convince it to give them up. The only steps that would work are ones that U.S. diplomats would almost certainly never take—say, renouncing the U.S. treaty with South Korea and withdrawing all U.S. troops from the peninsula.

Both the United States and North Korea have bluffed in the past.

The needs and wants of other actors are also relevant. South Korea's objectives largely align with those of the United States. But because a conflict would inevitably spill onto its own soil, South Korea is more likely to privilege political solutions over military ones. Some differences in U.S. and South Korean positions can be managed, but if they diverge too much, North Korea may have reason to doubt Washington's security guarantee to Seoul. China, meanwhile, has traditionally preferred to have a stable, if irksome, North Korean buffer state along its border rather than to push for denuclearization at the risk of regime collapse. But Chinese–North Korean relations have been deteriorating for years, and it is now an open question how much Beijing values its client.

CREDIBILITY IS IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER

No matter what strategy it is using at any given moment, the United States relies on a combination of threats and promises to change North Korean behavior. Those threats and promises must go together: a threat only works if it is coupled with a promise not to carry out the threatened action if North Korea complies with a demand. And both the threat and the promise must be credible. Washington has to signal to Pyongyang what actions it can take to avoid punishment, as well as what actions it can take to produce better outcomes.

In discussions of international politics, credibility is often treated as a characteristic inherent to a given state and its signals. In fact, credibility is in the eye of the beholder: a threat or a promise is credible

only if the target sees it as such. The target makes that determination by assessing its opponent's interests, its previous behavior, the nature of its regime, and whether its leaders have lived up to prior commitments. Accordingly, any U.S. attempt to exert influence over North Korea necessarily leaves the decision to comply in the hands of North Korean leaders. They, not officials in Washington, make the cost-benefit calculation of the value of compliance and noncompliance.

The question of how to establish credibility is especially fraught in this case. The United States and North Korea face major hurdles to persuading each other that their intentions are genuine. Because they do not have formal diplomatic relations, they are basing their views on an impoverished set of interactions and data points. In the last two decades, state-level exchanges have taken the form of nuclear negotiations. With the exception of those leading to the 1994 Agreed Framework, which stayed in place for six years, all these negotiations resulted in failure. As a result, each side distrusts the other.

Moreover, the two sides interpret history differently. Kim looks at past agreements with the United States that his father and grandfather struck and likely infers that Washington seeks to make Pyongyang less secure and will renege on its commitments. He looks at the U.S. invasions of Iraq and Libya and likely concludes that nuclear weapons are a far stronger guarantor of survival than any U.S. promise. He sees Trump's threats to pull out of the Iran nuclear deal and likely worries that U.S. arms control agreements cannot be trusted. And when evaluating the prospect of U.S. military action, he may consider prior instances in which U.S. leaders have contemplated bombing nuclear sites in North Korea or elsewhere—and conclude that since the United States has always refrained from doing so in the past, it will again.

Making credibility even harder to establish, both states have bluffed in the past. Perhaps more than any other state, North Korea has a tendency to use incendiary rhetoric that does not result in action. It threatened to turn Seoul into a "sea of fire" in 1994, and it calls nearly every new round of international sanctions "a declaration of war." After the UN Security Council approved sanctions in 2013, a North Korean spokesperson said, "We will be exercising our right to preemptive nuclear attack against the headquarters of the aggressor."

Although Washington's bluffing has typically been less brazen, the effect is similar. Washington has called North Korea's nuclear

development "unacceptable" but then gone on to accept it. It promised to hold Pyongyang accountable for proliferation but took no action when it sold a nuclear reactor to Syria in 2007. In August 2017, Trump threatened to unleash "fire and fury like the world has never seen" against North Korea if it made more threats, only to do nothing when the country conducted more missile tests. He even prides himself on his ability to backtrack. When *The Wall Street Journal* asked him about his combative tweets against Kim, he replied, "You see that a lot with me and then all of a sudden somebody's my best friend. I could give you 20 examples." Although no single bluff completely erodes a state's credibility, habitual empty threats degrade it over time.

North Korea may be more likely to treat a U.S. threat or promise as credible under certain conditions: when the United States has previously demonstrated the capability to act as it says it will, when the costs to the United States of action are low, when it has a significant incentive to act, and when there are not less costly ways of carrying out a threat. To increase the credibility of a threat, Washington can make it more specific, detailing which precise conditions would trigger which precise responses. Doing so might mean issuing an ultimatum, one of the strongest types of threats in international politics. In the case of military threats, Washington could send costly signals of imminent action, such as evacuating American personnel from Seoul or sharing prospective military plans with allies in the hope that they will leak them. Such moves, in addition to causing public alarm and giving up the advantage of a surprise attack, would make it harder for the United States to step back from the brink.

THE DIFFICULTIES OF DIPLOMACY

Pyongyang's perception of U.S. credibility will determine the success or failure of any U.S. strategy. Whether the Trump administration is relying on diplomacy, pressure, deterrence, or force, it and North Korean leaders will interpret the same actions differently, and neither will fully understand the other's view. Misperception afflicts all policy options, with different risks in each case.

Diplomacy—whether a Kim-Trump summit or lower-level exchanges—presents its own difficulties and dangers. Each side views the other's behavior in a different light. The United States sees North Korea as an insincere actor that has reneged on countless commitments in the

past, whereas North Korea sees the United States as intent on threatening its existence. For both parties to come to the negotiating table, they must believe that the potential upsides of diplomacy outweigh the costs, including the likelihood that the other side will agree to and then scuttle a deal.

The United States faces what might be called a "time-technology dilemma" in diplomacy. North Korea is close to reaching its technical goals, making it all the more important for Washington to secure significant enough concessions quickly enough to make the gambit worthwhile. The more time that passes, the less the United States will be able to gain from negotiations, and the more North Korea will be able to secure for itself. Pyongyang may, for example, get away with making minor concessions in exchange for significant sanctions relief or security assurances, strengthening its hand without meaningfully improving the security situation for the United States and its allies.

Given these perceptual dynamics and the likelihood that they will cause diplomatic failure, why would the United States pursue diplomacy at all? After all, many argue that it can deter, contain, and manage the North Korean threat without talks. Any progress on constraining Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs, no matter how modest or unlikely, will require concessions that can be made only at a negotiating table. Just as important, engagement can reduce the risks of misperception and miscalculation in the bilateral relationship, which is especially important given how few other ties exist between Washington and Pyongyang. That said, ill-conceived diplomacy may lead each side to its worst-case assessment of the other. If it does, tensions will only spiral.

YOUR ECONOMY OR YOUR NUKES

Similar perceptual problems affect other U.S. policy options—including the tool of choice in recent years, financial sanctions. Whatever the economic impact of sanctions, their effectiveness in achieving a broader political objective still depends on North Korean perceptions of U.S. intentions. Sanctions are meant to decrease North Korea's ability to pursue its weapons programs and to inflict pain on the regime without raising the risk of direct military conflict. Because they are usually applied reactively and episodically, however, their influence is only incremental.

The United States and the UN tend to apply new sanctions after North Korea has taken a prohibited action. Because this has been the



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

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

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

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

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pattern for years, North Korea can anticipate new sanctions before it makes a given move and decide whether the benefits will outweigh the costs. Moreover, because sanctions are applied only after the fact, the regime has time to adjust to the new economic circumstances it will face after it takes the action. Indeed, because it chooses when next to conduct a nuclear test, it actually has some control over whether and when it will get hit with another round of economic measures, even if the exact contents of the sanctions package are a surprise. In other words, what international actors view as resolute and punishing steps may not actually do much to affect Pyongyang's preferences.

The United States hopes that its sanctions will send a message that forces North Korea to choose between its economy and its nuclear weapons. But the incremental nature of the financial punishment may instead signal that it will continue but the pain will be tolerable, encouraging North Korea to hurry up and complete its nuclear program so that it can start negotiating the sanctions away. This represents another instance of the time-technology dilemma: North Korea has few technical hurdles left to cross, yet new sanctions take time to bite. Still, international financial pressure has inherent credibility, because multilateral sanctions include the participation of countries on which North Korea depends, such as China and Russia. Moreover, it is difficult to draw conclusions about how multilateral sanctions against Pyongyang are affecting its political behavior. Did Kim seek a summit with Trump because he is desperate for sanctions relief and willing to make concessions or because he seeks the prestige of a presidential summit and de facto recognition of North Korea as a nuclear power? American observers may assume the former, whereas Kim may believe the latter, leading to a yawning gap in diplomatic expectations.

MAKING DETERRENCE WORK

One of the foremost questions that has occupied U.S. policymakers is whether North Korea can be deterred. But the better question is what North Korea can be deterred from doing and what it can be compelled to do differently. It is one thing for the United States to deter the use of nuclear weapons or a major attack—since the end of the Korean War, North Korea has not tried to invade the South because the U.S. threat to destroy the North Korean regime in such a circumstance is credible, thanks to U.S. conventional and nuclear military superiority.

But it is another thing entirely to deter lower-level provocations. When North Korea makes such moves, as it did when it sank a South Korean warship in 2010, it presumably estimates how the United States will respond and then selects actions and targets that limit U.S. options. The United States and South Korea may be able to deter some North Korean provocations through their conventional force posture and military doctrine, but they are unlikely to be able to prevent them all.

Further complicating matters, U.S. goals have gone beyond deterrence to compellence—that is, seeking to change what the North is already doing. Coming only when deterrence has failed, compellence—in this case, getting North Korea to abandon a mature nuclear arsenal—is even harder to achieve. As behavioral economists have demonstrated, decision-makers are more willing to pay costs and run risks to avoid losing something they already possess than they are to get something they don't yet have. Even growing U.S. pressure is unlikely to alter this; it may just reinforce Kim's belief that he needs nuclear weapons to deter Washington. Similarly, it is possible that U.S. threats only heighten Kim's perceived need for a better deterrent—meaning that Washington's messaging around deterrence undermines its own objectives.

After all, deterrence goes both ways, and so U.S. policymakers must also consider what their messages tell Kim about his ability to deter an American attack. When Washington declares that a North Korean ICBM capability would pose an unacceptable threat to the United States, it is in effect admitting to Kim that the United States is easily deterred by such a capability. Similarly, drawing a sharp distinction between threats to the American homeland and threats to U.S. allies is deeply problematic, because extended deterrence requires demonstrating that allies are as valuable, or nearly as valuable, as the homeland itself. Both South Korea and Japan should be concerned that Washington appears preoccupied with weapons aimed at it and relatively unconcerned about the weapons aimed at them. Understandably, they might worry that Trump's "America first" stance means a weaker nuclear umbrella.

THE FOG OF WAR

Of all the ways in which perceptual pitfalls could come into play on the Korean Peninsula, the most consequential would involve the use of military force. The United States is unlikely to wage a campaign of total destruction against North Korea now that Pyongyang's nuclear arsenal is advanced enough to stave off utter defeat. If war did break out, the

United States would be more likely to use military force as a form of coercion. But even that would be unlikely to achieve denuclearization. The mere fact that the United States possesses superior military capabilities would not guarantee that it would prevail, since each country's resolve would help determine the outcome. That is why U.S. officials must consider North Korea's willingness to run risks and pay high costs.

After an attack, North Korea's perception of the initial military campaign would determine whether Pyongyang complied with U.S. wishes. For the United States to get its way, it would have to send signals that it would continue to use force if North Korea refused to comply, but also that it would cease to use violence if North Korea cooperated. In particular, the United States would have to indicate that the leadership in Pyongyang had a clear pathway to survival. If Kim believed that the United States was bent on his destruction no matter what, he would have no choice but to mount an all-out counterattack. The United States would find this balance difficult to achieve. If Kim anticipated some form of U.S. military action but the strike was less destructive than feared, he might actually be bolstered in his refusal to comply with U.S. wishes. In either case—a devastating attack or an underwhelming one—the United States should expect to face significant retaliation, at least until Kim figured out whether compliance or resistance made more sense in the long term.

The prospect of a meeting between Kim and Trump has raised hopes that, if dashed, could make war more likely.

How third parties and domestic actors reacted to a strike could influence any additional U.S. efforts to use violence coercively. If the domestic audience vehemently supported a strike, the United States could more credibly claim that it would attack again if Pyongyang failed to cooperate. If international parties expressed outrage and condemned the strike, as seems plausible, the U.S. threat to launch a devastating follow-on strike would become less potent, and Pyongyang would have far less motivation to comply. U.S. leaders would also have to contemplate the signals they sent beyond the military strike itself. What message would Trump deliver to accompany the use of force? Would he demand full denuclearization? Throughout the history of warfare, once one side has resorted to violence, emotions play a larger role in leaders' calculations and states become prone to gamble,

willing to accept greater risks and take bigger chances to prevent major losses. North Korea is unlikely to be an exception.

A PERFECT STORM OF MISPERCEPTION

The greatest risk is that the perceptual challenges that afflict all these approaches could build into a perfect storm of misperception. It is all too easy to imagine how such a crisis might develop—no less amid a flurry of diplomacy than amid a volley of threats.

In fact, the prospect of an unprecedented meeting between Kim and Trump has raised hopes that, if dashed, could make war more likely. There is a real danger of a *Rashomon* situation: Washington might believe that sanctions and military threats made Kim realize that his nuclear program could lead to his demise, whereas Pyongyang might believe that Trump's willingness to meet without demanding substantive concessions indicates that the United States is finally ready to accept North Korea as a nuclear state. Even the same words may mean different things to the two sides. For the United States, "denuclearization" is the North giving up nuclear weapons; for North Korea, it may mean an arms control agreement in which the two sides bargain over each other's force levels. Well-intentioned mediation by South Korea could postpone the day of reckoning but make it worse when it comes, by encouraging both Washington and Pyongyang to believe that the other is ready to make major concessions. If face-to-face talks reveal that neither is in fact willing to do so, the hostility will be magnified.

It is not difficult to imagine how this scenario could come to pass. Following North Korea's reasonably good behavior during the Winter Olympics, the United States' postponement of military exercises, and South Korean President Moon Jae-in's efforts at diplomacy with the North, a diplomatic window has opened. Imagine that Kim and Trump arrive at the summit only to discover that they hold radically different views of the commitment to "denuclearize": Trump believes that Kim is willing to negotiate away his arsenal for sanctions relief, whereas Kim believes that full denuclearization also requires the removal of U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula and an end to the U.S.–South Korean alliance (a possibility that was reinforced by comments Trump made in March that appeared to threaten to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea unless the U.S.–South Korean trade deal was renegotiated). After it becomes clear that Trump will not move forward on Kim's

terms, Kim is outraged and renews his August 2017 pledge to test missiles over Guam.

Both Washington and Pyongyang now think the other is responsible for derailing diplomacy. Out of a desire to induce the United States to drop its denuclearization demands, Kim decides to show that his willingness to negotiate does not mean his will has been broken, and he proceeds with his missile launch. Much as the Japanese did before they attacked Pearl Harbor, he hopes that a missile test over Guam—a U.S. territory but not a state—will unnerve the United States enough to persuade it to accept his nuclear program, but not so much as to bring a full-scale war.

But then, one of his missiles expels debris over Guam. Fragments from the reentry vehicle strike the island itself, killing a few residents—who are, after all, U.S. citizens. Trump declares this "an act of war" and gives Kim 48 hours to issue a formal apology and a pledge to denuclearize. Kim does not comply, and the United States dusts off one of its plans for a limited military strike. It attacks a known missile storage facility, believing the limited nature of the target will induce Kim's cooperation and minimize the risk of retaliation. Instead, Kim views the strike as the beginning of a larger effort to disarm him and as a prelude to regime change. Following his conventional bombardment of Seoul, the United States begins to attack other known weapons sites and command-and-control facilities to neutralize the threat. Kim launches nuclear weapons the following day.

The purpose of this vignette is not to suggest that war on the Korean Peninsula is inevitable, likely, or totally beyond the control of the parties involved. Rather, it is to illustrate how the forms of misperception now ingrained in the U.S.–North Korean relationship may interact with a situation that is already unfolding to invite a catastrophe that neither side wants.

KNOW THYSELF

There is no set of policies that can eliminate these risks. But there are steps U.S. policymakers can take to sharpen their own perceptions of North Korea; better understand how U.S. actions and signals affect the perceptions of their North Korean counterparts; and, perhaps most important, recognize the assumptions behind American beliefs.

The Trump administration should start by deepening its assessment of Pyongyang's aims and bottom line. There are a handful of former

U.S. officials who have experience negotiating with the North Koreans and who could help current policymakers more accurately read North Korean signals. Even if it has arrived at a diplomatic opening by accident, the administration must now work with these experts to devise a strategy for diplomacy, including coming up with objectives that are more limited than full denuclearization. U.S. policymakers should also press the intelligence agencies not only to offer their best assessments of North Korean intentions but also to be explicit about the gaps and shortcomings in them.

Policymakers should also work with the intelligence community to examine how existing U.S. policies may look from Pyongyang. They should consider how those perceptions (or misperceptions) serve to reinforce or undermine U.S. objectives and how future changes in policy may be viewed. There is an all-too-human tendency to assume that an action will be seen as it is intended to be seen; intelligence analysts should help policymakers actively counter this tendency, especially when it comes to potential military strikes.

In addition to trying to understand the assumptions of North Korean policymakers, U.S. policymakers must work to understand their own. They should go back and examine them, carefully mapping the causal logic of any move they might make. By recognizing the flaws or weaknesses in their own assumptions, they will be better prepared to react nimbly to unexpected North Korean concessions or to manage the situation if engagement abruptly fails. Diplomatic encounters are not likely to unfold according to script, and if the United States and North Korea are not willing to be surprised and learn, they can neither take advantage of opportunities nor avoid making worst-case inferences that would rule out further discussions.

The prospect of grave misperceptions should instill a degree of caution in U.S. officials and prompt them to insert the equivalent of speed bumps into the policy process, above all in a moment of crisis. If the U.S.–North Korean relationship begins to deteriorate further and escalate toward conflict, they should pause to consider the problems of perception. Why did North Korea enter into direct talks if it didn't intend to denuclearize? What assumptions were made about the North that must now be interrogated? Such questions may seem basic, but they too often go unasked. Simply by considering them, U.S. policymakers can reduce the risk that flimsy credibility and hazardous misperceptions will bring about an unnecessary war.

Opioids of the Masses

Stopping an American Epidemic From Going Global

Keith Humphreys, Jonathan P. Caulkins, and Vanda Felbab-Brown

In 2016, nearly 50,000 people died of opioid overdoses in the United States, and, per capita, almost as many died in Canada. From 2000 to 2016, more Americans died of overdoses than died in World War I and World War II combined. Yet even these grim numbers understate the impact of opioid abuse, because for every person who dies, many more live with addiction. The White House Council of Economic Advisers has estimated that the epidemic cost the U.S. economy $504 billion in 2015, or 2.8 percent of GDP.

This public health story is now common knowledge. Less well known is the growing risk that the epidemic will spread across the globe. Facing a backlash in the United States and Canada, drug companies are turning their attention to Asia and Europe and repeating the tactics that created the crisis in the first place. At the same time, the rise of fentanyl, a highly potent synthetic opioid, has made the outbreak even deadlier and begun to reshape the global drug market, a development with significant foreign policy implications. As a result, the world is on the cusp of a global opioid epidemic, driven by the overuse of legal painkillers and worsened by the spread of fentanyl, that could mark a public health disaster of historic proportions.

Yet in the face of this terrifying possibility, the world has remained largely complacent. Governments and international organizations

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urgently need to learn the lessons of the North American crisis. The first and most important of those is that the more opioids flood the market, the bigger the problem will be—and so governments must couple efforts to treat addicted individuals with efforts to curb supply. That will require them to crack down on pharmaceutical companies that abuse their positions and to take aggressive steps to regulate the sale and marketing of opioids. And the rise of synthetic opioids means that governments must rethink the role that fighting drug trafficking plays in their foreign policies.

THE PRESCRIPTION AND THE DAMAGE DONE

Opioids derived from the opium poppy have long been used successfully to relieve short-term pain from surgery and to comfort patients with terminal conditions, including cancer. Problems can arise, however, when they are prescribed for prolonged periods to treat nonterminal chronic pain. Extended use raises the risk of addiction and increases tolerance, meaning that patients need more and more of the drug to achieve the same effect. Opioids are so dangerous because the difference between a lethal dose and a normal one is only a modest multiple. Worse still, a dose that works today can kill tomorrow, especially if the patient has taken other drugs, such as alcohol or benzodiazepines (a class of drugs that includes Valium and Xanax). And because an overdose kills by depriving the body of oxygen, even those who survive risk serious organ damage.

Opioids are widely misused for three reasons. First, clinicians can't objectively measure pain in the way they can body temperature or blood pressure, so they rely on patients' accuracy and honesty in judging pain severity. Second, opioids are highly prized, even by healthy people, because of the euphoria they create. And third, anyone without scruples can sell prescription opioids on the black market.

After several epidemics involving legal medications in the nineteenth century, in 1914, the U.S. government banned most distribution of opioids. For nearly 50 years after that, North America saw few opioid-related problems besides heroin use in a few U.S. and Canadian cities. In the late 1960s and 1970s, heroin spread to more cities, but then stalled. From the 1970s to the mid-1990s, the number of dependent users was fairly stable.

All of that changed in the mid-1990s. Several pharmaceutical companies began aggressively marketing opioids to treat chronic, not just acute,

pain, claiming they carried little risk of addiction. The most infamous was Purdue Pharma, the maker of OxyContin, but other companies rolled out similar products. As the *New York Times* journalist Barry Meier and the psychiatrist Anna Lembke have documented, their tactics were nearly as ruthless as those of any drug dealer. During the period of mostly uncritical enthusiasm for prescription opioids, the largess of manufacturers flowed to virtually every organization that should have been protecting the public, including health-care regulators, professional medical societies, medical school education programs, elected officials, patient advocacy groups, medical opinion leaders, and state medical boards.

A study by the Center for Public Integrity and the Associated Press found that from 2006 to 2015, the pharmaceutical industry spent $880 million on campaign contributions and lobbying state legislatures, 220 times as much as the amount spent by groups trying to limit opioid use. In 2013, the marketing expenditure of each of the ten largest pharmaceutical companies exceeded the entire budget of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.

The resulting lax regulatory environment, coupled with a sincere concern that many patients were living with unacceptable levels of pain, released a tsunami of opioid prescriptions. Consumption in the United States quadrupled from 1999 to 2014, peaking at 250 million



prescriptions per year. By 2010, the U.S. health-care system was dispensing enough opioids each year for everyone in the country to be medicated round the clock for a month.

In 2007, federal prosecutors secured a guilty plea from Purdue Pharma for knowingly deceiving doctors and patients. The courts fined the company $600 million and required it to more accurately describe the risks and benefits of OxyContin. Still, that fine is dwarfed by the estimated $35 billion of revenue that Purdue has earned from the drug, and the three executives who pled guilty avoided jail sentences. By contrast, someone convicted of selling 100 grams of heroin—worth between $2,500 and $15,000—faces a federal mandatory minimum sentence of five years. Other fines paid by opioid manufacturers and distributors in the United States and Canada have mostly been under $25 million—small enough that companies could treat them as just a cost of doing business.

A recent scandal reveals the extent to which the industry has captured regulators. In 2016, Eric Eyre, a determined West Virginia journalist, discovered that drug companies had shipped nearly nine million opioid pills to a pharmacy in Kermit, West Virginia, a town with fewer than 400 residents. The Drug Enforcement Administration was already investigating why the companies that distributed these opioids did not report or stop the suspicious shipments. But the opioid distributors responded by hiring away DEA officials, many of them from the division responsible for regulating the industry, and by lobbying friendly politicians. In 2016, Congress passed legislation curtailing the DEA's ability to pursue any such cases.

One of the leaders in that effort, Tom Marino, a Republican congressman from Pennsylvania and a recipient of extensive campaign donations from the industry, was even nominated by President Donald Trump to serve as the director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Marino withdrew when *The Washington Post* and *60 Minutes* broke the story of his involvement with the bill, but his nomination showed that the administration was willing to put its drug policy in the hands of a creature of the industry. And despite Marino's withdrawal, the pro-industry policy created by Congress remains firmly in place.

SELLING NIRVANA

The liberalization of painkiller prescriptions has fueled a black market thanks to a straightforward economic calculus. The black market pays about $1 per milligram for oxycodone pills. A typical daily dose for a long-term opioid patient is 100 milligrams, or $36,500 worth of pills a year. Thus, a patient with a $30 copay for a 30-day prescription pays $1 a day for medicines that can then be sold for $100. Those skilled at working the system can obtain prescriptions for hundreds of milligrams a day, either from one doctor or by doctor shopping.

Although most patients are not criminals, many criminals pretend to be patients. Furthermore, even otherwise honest people can be tempted into crime when the payoff is that great. Just by lying about a medical condition that doctors cannot verify with any objective test, a patient can obtain prescriptions worth tens of thousands of dollars.

Even for those who truly need the drugs, the black market offers attractive opportunities. A single milligram of pure heroin usually sells for under $1, slightly less than the price that a milligram of oxycodone commands, even though heroin is roughly three times as potent. Selling prescription pills and buying heroin thus lets the user more than triple his or her opioid consumption or, alternatively, keep the same rate of consumption and buy groceries or pay the rent.

This creates a vicious cycle: addicted people obtain prescriptions, which they sell to others, who become addicted and seek their own prescriptions, which they then sell in turn, addicting still others. This process has driven a boom in demand. Heroin use, which had stayed stable for many years, surged as people who had become addicted to prescription opioids shifted to black-market alternatives.

Beginning around 2014, black-market fentanyl compounded matters. Fentanyl did not create the crisis: prescribed opioids were already killing tens of thousands of people. But it threw gasoline on the fire. Dealers began cutting heroin with cheap diluents and then adding fentanyl—which is less expensive and more potent than other opioids—to raise the strength of the mixture before selling it as heroin. Deaths in the United States from synthetic opioids other than methadone (the category that includes fentanyl) jumped from 3,105 in 2013 to 20,145 in 2016.

A WORLD OF PAIN

So far, this dynamic has been most pronounced in the United States and Canada. The United States has an unusually corporate-friendly

policy environment, but Canada has a stronger tradition of state regulation. So other countries would be foolish to assume that something similar could not happen to them.

U.S. pharmaceutical companies are already working to expand foreign sales. The Sackler family, which owns Purdue Pharma, also owns Mundipharma, a worldwide network of pharmaceutical companies that is not constrained by the U.S. federal court decision against Purdue. As detailed by the *Los Angeles Times*, Mundipharma is active in Australia, Brazil, China, Colombia, Egypt, Mexico, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, and Spain and is using the same aggressive sales tactics that Purdue Pharma employed in the United States. It runs training seminars in which representatives encourage doctors to overcome their "opiophobia." It sponsors ad campaigns that promote pharmaceutical treatment for pain. It has hired consultants, local opinion leaders, and an army of sales representatives to promote its products.

The *Los Angeles Times* reported that Mundipharma consultants have claimed that OxyContin presents only a small risk of addiction, the assertion for which Purdue Pharma was fined in the United States. As David Kessler, a former U.S. Food and Drug Administration commissioner, told the *Los Angeles Times*, Mundipharma's strategy is "right out of the playbook of Big Tobacco. As the United States takes steps to limit sales here, the company goes abroad."

In May 2017, a bipartisan group of 12 members of the U.S. Congress wrote to the director general of the World Health Organization (WHO) to warn against the predations of Mundipharma. But it is not clear that the world heard the message. Already, several countries appear to be falling into the trap of opioid use. In Germany, prescription rates have risen to nearly the Canadian level. In Australia, OxyContin prescriptions have increased sharply, and Mundipharma has contributed funding to the development of national pain-management strategies. In much of the developing world, where states are weaker and drug manufacturers have a freer hand, the outlook is even worse.

A NEW PRESCRIPTION

To prevent the North American crisis from growing into a global one, several steps must be taken now, before it is too late. First, jurisdictions that decide to liberalize their prescription opioid policies must plan to spend more on drug treatment and other services for those struggling

with opioid addiction, rather than playing catch-up after the problem has grown. But just treating addicted people will not solve the problem. Governments must also address the incentives pharmaceutical companies have for profiting from oversupplying and overpromoting opioids.

A simple, although radical, policy would be to ban for-profit companies from selling prescription opioids for extended home use, allowing only the government or nonprofit organizations to do so. A less extreme idea would involve a ban on branding. Regulators could require pharmacies to sell only generic products or, at the least, prevent manufacturers and retailers from advertising their drugs. Although such bans are largely unconstitutional in the United States, many countries do have the power to restrict advertising. (The restrictions on promotion that have worked in the United States have come primarily from legal settlements such as those imposed on the tobacco industry, not legislation.)

Legal drugs can bring death on a scale vastly surpassing the effects of illegal ones.

A more complex alternative would be to develop a distinct and more stringent set of regulations for opioids that would recognize the unique challenges they pose. Whereas for most drugs it makes sense for regulators to consider only whether the drugs are safe and effective for patients when used as directed, that standard is woefully inadequate for drugs that are as easily and widely abused as opioids. Regulators should take all foreseeable consequences into account, not just those likely to follow from the proper use of prescribed opioids.

Tighter regulation could also include new ways of calculating fines for drug companies that break the law. There is little evidence that one-off penalties change corporate behavior. But agreements that made fines contingent on outcomes might. If opioid manufacturers faced, say, a $1 million fine for every overdose involving one of their products, they would have an enduring incentive to regulate themselves.

The WHO and the United Nations could help in two ways. Many low- and middle-income countries face the opposite problem of rich ones: they do not use enough opioids, a shortfall that leads to unneeded suffering, particularly for the terminally ill. Rather than let profit-seeking corporations exploit that opportunity and push the needle too far in the other direction, the WHO or another UN agency should provide generic morphine to patients in those countries as a humanitarian

priority. The WHO and the UN should also warn their members against pharmaceutical companies with expansionist visions and questionable ethics. Just as pharmaceutical companies send their sales representatives to promote their drugs, the WHO and other public interest groups could send representatives to explain how and why the current opioid epidemic started and escalated.

TURNING OFF THE TAP

Drug policy experts often dismiss attempts to cut down on supply, arguing that governments cannot arrest their way out of drug problems. That is largely correct when it comes to street dealers. Locking up people who are easily replaced does little to stem the flow or use of most drugs. Furthermore, prisoners who depend on opioids lose their tolerance while in prison, and some then die of overdoses when they are released.

Luckily, there is a wide space between the two extremes of waging war on drug dealers and users and turning over the keys of public health and safety to rapacious companies that profit by pushing addictive drugs. Authorities can stop a doctor who prescribes illegally or irresponsibly just by revoking his or her license, no expensive prison cell needed. The tactic works because the black market cannot replace those doctors. This practice is already used, but such investigations should be given greater resources. Targeting corporations is even cheaper, since the resulting fines are often larger than the costs of investigation and prosecution. To make these investigations easier, Congress should repeal the law it passed in 2016 that restricted the DEA's power. Other countries should make sure that their law enforcement agencies are empowered to investigate and prosecute gross corporate malfeasance.

A key lesson of the current epidemic repeats one from the history of tobacco: legal drugs pushed by corporations can bring death on a scale vastly surpassing the effects of illegal ones. Calls to legalize recreational opioids that fail to grapple with this reality do not deserve to be taken seriously.

Governments will also need to recognize a central lesson of public health research: epidemics cannot be ended simply by managing individual cases of the disease. Take Vancouver, British Columbia, which has thoroughly embraced the idea that providing health and social services can solve drug problems. Residents have access to universal health care, drug treatment programs, syringe exchanges, supervised

rooms in which they can use drugs, the overdose rescue drug naloxone, and opioid substitution treatments, including government-provided heroin. The city and the province have positioned themselves as world leaders in this harm-reduction approach. Yet the overdose death rate in the Vancouver health service delivery area rose by 36 percent in 2016, reaching 53.8 deaths per 100,000 residents last year. That is similar to the rate in West Virginia, which has few services and is the U.S. state that has been the hardest hit, where 52 people died of overdoses for every 100,000 residents in 2016. Services for people addicted to opioids are essential. But the lesson of Vancouver is that expanding health and social services without addressing opioid supply is akin to emptying an overflowing bathtub with a thimble without turning down the tap.

FUEL ON THE FIRE

The rise of fentanyl is both making the North American crisis worse and complicating efforts to forestall the emerging global one. For drug traffickers and dealers, fentanyl offers many advantages and could reshape the global opioid market in ways that would have important consequences for foreign policy and international relations, not just public health. Traditional illicit drugs, such as heroin and cocaine, flow through long distribution chains that include as many as ten transactions between the farmer and the user. Parts of those chains, especially the links crossing international borders, often favor large criminal organizations that can intimidate or co-opt authorities. Fentanyl, by contrast, can be produced secretly anywhere there is a chemical industry, not just where poppies grow.

Fentanyl is also far less labor-intensive to make than heroin, so its sponsors gain significantly less political capital by providing jobs than do the sponsors of illegal poppy cultivation. Disrupting fentanyl production is therefore less politically costly and has fewer negative side effects for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts than eradicating drug crops. And fentanyl is so concentrated that it can be mailed a kilogram at a time. That radically reduces transportation costs and the role and power of organizations whose comparative advantage lies in smuggling large shipments across international borders.

These factors will drive down prices, raising consumption. But the consumption of opioids tends to rise in smaller proportion to the fall

in prices. (A ten percent decrease in the price, for example, leads to an increase in use of less than ten percent.) Hence, fentanyl will tend to depress producers' revenues and power. In countries that allow drug companies to market opioids aggressively, however, that effect will likely be more than offset by an intensifying demand for black-market opioids.

Fentanyl also has the potential to alter the balance of power among drug-trafficking organizations. Mexico's Sinaloa cartel, for example, which has long dominated the distribution of heroin and cocaine in the United States, could well lose market share to its rival Jalisco New Generation, which embraced fentanyl early, back in 2014. That is not necessarily good news, because the Sinaloa cartel has traditionally been less violent than Jalisco New Generation. If that group challenges Sinaloa's dominance north of the Mexican border, drug-related violence within the United States could well increase, both among dealers and against law enforcement and public officials.

The largess of manufacturers flowed to virtually every organization that should have been protecting the public.

Sinaloa has begun to adapt by moving aggressively into the distribution of fentanyl, at least on the eastern coast of the United States. It is a major supplier of the drug to New York City, for example, where drug overdose deaths last year were four times as many as homicide deaths. That's a worrying trend, but at least Sinaloa continues to shun violence in the United States. For example, it sometimes employs nonviolent, middle-aged couples without prior criminal records to distribute fentanyl, sending them on one-time drug runs by train or car. That makes stopping them harder, but it keeps violence down.

Fentanyl's rise could also split the global drug market. In affluent places where heroin is expensive, including Canada, the United States, and Europe, users might switch to cheaper synthetics. That would leave countries that grow poppies, such as Afghanistan and Myanmar, primarily supplying neighboring countries with high addiction rates, such as China, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia. Synthetics are less likely to make inroads in those countries because they are close to heroin production areas and have lax law enforcement and porous borders, so heroin is far cheaper.

All of this could reshape international relationships. If U.S. consumption shifts from plant-based to synthetic drugs, Washington's interest in eradicating drug crops could wane, removing a decades-old source of tension between the United States and Latin American countries. From 2001 to 2009, U.S. programs to eradicate poppy fields in Afghanistan, where a large proportion of the economy depends on drugs, drove farmers to embrace militant and terrorist groups. Abandoning that approach, a major policy breakthrough of the Obama administration, has helped with counterinsurgency and nation building. The Trump administration should not resurrect it. If synthetic opioids replaced cocaine consumption or a synthetic cocaine analogue were developed, the coca-producing countries of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru could see similar effects.

It will be much harder to persuade larger and more powerful synthetic-drug-producing countries, such as China and India, to crack down on manufacturers. And because U.S. and Canadian relations with China and India cover far more issues than those with South American countries, drug control efforts would have to compete against other interests.

A bifurcation in international drug markets would exacerbate splits over global drug policy, heightening differences between the interests of hawkish countries in Asia and the Middle East and those of more liberal ones in Europe and Latin America. International drug control would likely climb up the agendas of countries whose populations still relied on plant-based drugs, especially China and Russia. Russia, which is suffering from an opioid epidemic revolving around Afghan heroin, might well continue pressuring the United States to eradicate poppy fields in Afghanistan and even take it upon itself to do so. Moscow would likely view controlling drug supplies as more important than limiting the political capital the Taliban can gain from fighting to protect poppy fields. Already, Russia is courting the Taliban, perceiving the group as a lesser danger in Afghanistan than the Islamic State (also known as ISIS). Washington would be wise to engage Beijing and Moscow to educate them on the mistakes the United States has made in its fight against drugs that they should avoid and the successes they should replicate.

Drug control is becoming an increasingly important aspect of the U.S.-Chinese relationship. In March 2017, China banned the production of four variants of fentanyl, largely in response to engagement from

the Obama administration. But the Trump administration has failed to expand that dialogue. It needs to work with China to curb the illegal shipment of fentanyl to the United States and the common practice of producing new, slightly altered drugs to avoid legal restrictions.

Drug control discussions with India—an equally large producer of precursors of illegal drugs and, increasingly, of synthetic ones—are far less advanced. That's because India remains in profound denial about its part in the global drug trade. It refuses even to acknowledge its role in the supply of illegal precursors, let alone of synthetics, and has failed to adequately crack down on the factories that illegally produce and distribute them. In any event, the production of synthetic drugs won't remain confined to the developing world. Already, many are made in rich countries, especially in western Europe. If this trend continues, drug-consuming countries, which tend to be wealthy and powerful, may no longer need to pressure producing countries, which tend to be neither, because the problem will have moved closer to home.

From a foreign policy perspective, although the rise of synthetic opioids presents new dangers, it will give countries opportunities to improve important international relationships. But when it comes to public health, the picture is consistently grim: a burgeoning opioid supply—either of prescription pain medications or of black-market opioids—could create a global pandemic, subjecting millions of people to disabling and potentially lethal addiction. That outcome is still avoidable, but only if the world's governments stop sleepwalking toward disaster.

Globalization Is Not in Retreat

Digital Technology and the Future of Trade

Susan Lund and Laura Tyson

By many standard measures, globalization is in retreat. The 2008 financial crisis and the ensuing recession brought an end to three decades of rapid growth in the trade of goods and services. Cross-border financial flows have fallen by two-thirds. In many countries that have traditionally championed globalization, including the United States and the United Kingdom, the political conversation about trade has shifted from a focus on economic benefits to concerns about job loss, dislocation, deindustrialization, and inequality. A once solid consensus that trade is a win-win proposition has given way to zero-sum thinking and calls for higher barriers. Since November 2008, according to the research group Global Trade Alert, the G-20 countries have implemented more than 6,600 protectionist measures.

But that's only part of the story. Even as its detractors erect new impediments and walk away from free-trade agreements, globalization is in fact continuing its forward march—but along new paths. In its previous incarnation, it was trade-based and Western-led. Today, globalization is being driven by digital technology and is increasingly led by China and other emerging economies. While trade predicated on global supply chains that take advantage of cheap labor is slowing, new digital technologies mean that more actors can participate in cross-border transactions than ever before, from small businesses to multinational corporations. And economic leadership is shifting east

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Printed-out kicks: a sneaker produced by a 3-D printer, Germany, March 2018

MICHAEL DALDER / REUTERS

and south, as the United States turns inward and the EU and the United Kingdom negotiate a divorce.

In other words, globalization has not given way to deglobalization; it has simply entered a different phase. This new era will bring economic and societal benefits, boosting innovation and productivity, offering people unprecedented (and often free) access to information, and linking consumers and suppliers across the world. But it will also be disruptive. After certain sectors fade away, certain jobs will disappear, and new winners will emerge. The benefits will be tangible and significant, but the challenges will be considerable. Companies and governments must prepare for the coming disruption.

THE NEW ERA

The threads that used to weave the global economy together are fraying. Beginning in the 1980s, the falling costs of transportation and communication, along with a raft of new multilateral free-trade agreements, caused international commerce to swell. Between 1986 and 2008, global trade in goods and services grew at more than twice the pace of global GDP. For the last five years, however, growth in trade has barely outpaced global GDP growth. A weak and uneven recovery from the Great Recession explains part of the trade slowdown, but structural

factors are also to blame. Global value chains, which gave rise to a growing trade in manufactured parts, have reached maturity; most of the efficiency gains have already been realized. Although the location of production will continue to shift among countries in response to differences in wages and the prices of other factors of production—from China to Vietnam and Bangladesh, for example—these shifts will merely change the patterns of trade. They will not increase its overall volume.

Cross-border financial flows—which include purchases of foreign bonds and equities, international lending, and foreign direct investment—grew from four percent of global GDP in 1990 to 23 percent on the eve of the financial crisis, but they have since fallen to just six percent. Trade in services, meanwhile, has increased, but it is growing slowly and is unlikely to assume the role that trade in goods has played in driving globalization. That's because most services simply cannot be bought and sold across national borders: they are local (dining and construction), highly regulated (law and accounting), or both (health care).

The movement of data is already surpassing traditional physical trade as the connective tissue in the global economy.

This is where digital flows come in, from e-mailing and video streaming to file sharing and the Internet of Things. The movement of data is already surpassing traditional physical trade as the connective tissue in the global economy: according to Cisco Systems, the amount of cross-border bandwidth used grew 90-fold from 2005 to 2016, and it will grow an additional 13-fold by 2023. The number of minutes of all Skype calls made now equals approximately 40 percent of all traditional international phone call minutes. Although digital flows today mostly link developed countries, emerging economies are catching up quickly.

This surge in the movement of data not only constitutes a huge flow in and of itself; it is also turbocharging other types of flows. Half of all trade in global services now depends on digital technology one way or another. Companies can cut losses on goods in transit by installing tracking sensors on shipments—by 30 percent or more, in McKinsey's experience. They can also reach consumers around the world without going through retail shops. AliResearch (the research arm of the Chinese online shopping company Alibaba) and the consulting

firm Accenture project that by 2020, cross-border e-commerce will reach one billion consumers and total $1 trillion in annual sales.

The countries that led the world during the last era of globalization may not necessarily be the same ones that thrive in the new one. Consider Estonia, which has a population of just 1.3 million but has emerged as a giant in the digital era. Its pioneering e-government initiative allows Estonians to go online to vote, pay taxes, and appear in court, all with a digital identity card. Once an economy based heavily on logging, Estonia is now home to the founders of Skype and other technology start-ups, and it has historically been one of the fastest-growing economies in the EU.

Digital flows are also upending the corporate world. Giant multinational firms have long dominated the trade in goods and services, but digital platforms have made it easier for smaller firms to muscle their way in. So-called micro-multinationals can use online marketplaces to reach far more customers than ever before; Amazon hosts two million third-party sellers, and Alibaba hosts more than ten million. Some 50 million small and medium-sized enterprises use Facebook for marketing, and nearly 40 percent of their fans are foreign. Digital platforms and marketplaces such as these are creating vast new opportunities for small businesses, which form the bedrock of employment in most countries.

THE RISE OF THE REST

As globalization has gone digital, its center of gravity has shifted. As recently as 2000, just five percent of the companies on the Fortune Global 500 list, the world's largest international companies, were headquartered in the developing world. By 2025, by the McKinsey Global Institute's estimate, that figure will reach 45 percent, and China will boast more companies with $1 billion or more in annual revenues than either the United States or Europe. The United States continues to produce the majority of digital content consumed in most parts of the world, but that, too, will likely soon change, as Chinese Internet giants such as Alibaba, Baidu, and Tencent rival Amazon, Facebook, and Google. China now accounts for 42 percent of global e-commerce transactions by value. The country's investments in artificial intelligence, while still lagging behind those of the United States, are more than double Europe's. In 2017, China announced an ambitious investment plan designed

to turn the country into the world's leading center for artificial intelligence research by 2030.

The geography of globalization is even changing within the developing world. The McKinsey Global Institute predicts that roughly half of global GDP growth over the next ten years will come from some 440 rapidly expanding cities and regions in the developing world, some of which Western executives may not be able to find on a map, such as the city of Hsinchu in Taiwan or the state of Santa Catarina in Brazil. Moreover, as many as one billion people in these places will see their incomes rise above $10 a day, high enough to make them significant consumers of goods and services—at the same time that tens of millions of Americans, Europeans, and Japanese will enter retirement and reduce their spending.

The world economy is already adapting to this new reality. Today, more than half of all international trade in goods involves at least one developing country, and trade in goods between developing countries—so-called South–South trade—grew from seven percent of the global total in 2000 to 18 percent in 2016. So open is Asia that the region more than doubled its share of world trade (from 15 percent to 35 percent) between 1990 and 2016. Remarkably, more than half of that trade stays within the region, a similar proportion to that found in Europe, a much richer region with its own free-trade zone.

As Washington pulls back from global trade agreements, the rest of the world is moving forward without it. After the United States withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the remaining 11 countries negotiated their own pact, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was signed in March. This version left out 20 provisions that were important to the United States, including ones concerning copyright, intellectual property, and the environment. Separately, a number of Asian countries are negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a trade deal that includes all the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—but not the United States. If ratified, this agreement would cover about 40 percent of global trade and nearly half of the world's population. Meanwhile, the EU has struck new bilateral trade arrangements with countries including Canada and Japan, and it is negotiating one with China. So busy is the EU making such deals,

in fact, that its agricultural, environmental, and labor standards may soon become the new benchmarks in global trade.

One notable aspect of this realignment is that China has gained a greater voice as a champion of globalization. To provide a counterweight to Washington-based economic institutions, Beijing has launched numerous initiatives of its own, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which has attracted 57 member nations, many of them U.S. allies that joined over the objection of the United States. Together with Brazil, India, and Russia, China was a driving force behind the creation of the New Development Bank, an alternative to the World Bank. The China-Africa Investment Forum, an annual meeting begun in 2016, is gaining momentum as a platform for deals in Africa. Then there is the Belt and Road Initiative, China's $1 trillion plan to add maritime and land links in Eurasia. Although still at an early stage, it could prompt a major shift in the pattern of global investment, spurring faster economic growth across Asia and connecting many countries that the last era of globalization left behind.

THE COMING DISRUPTION

Although it will lead to countless new opportunities, the new era of globalization will also present considerable challenges to individuals, companies, and countries. For one thing, because openness will be so rewarded, developing countries now at the periphery of global connections risk falling further behind, especially if they lack the infrastructure and skills to benefit from digital trade. With global trade tensions mounting, it is essential to recognize that countries will reap economic gains not from export surpluses but from both inflows and outflows. In fact, as in the past, it is precisely the countries that open themselves up to foreign competition, foreign investment, and foreign talent that stand to benefit the most in the new era.

One consequence of openness has been immigration. In the past 40 years, the number of migrants worldwide has tripled. Today, almost 250 million people live and work outside their country of birth, and 90 percent of them do so voluntarily to improve their economic prospects, with the remaining ten percent being refugees and asylum seekers. Economic migrants have become a major source of growth. According to the McKinsey Global Institute, they contribute approximately $6.7 trillion to the world economy every year, or nine percent

of global GDP—some $3 trillion more than they would have produced had they stayed in their home countries.

But for some workers, the rapid expansion of trade has led to stagnant wages or lost jobs. As the economists David Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon Hanson have found, of the roughly five million U.S. manufacturing jobs lost between 1990 and 2007, a quarter disappeared because of trade with China. And as the economist Elhanan Helpman has concluded, although globalization explains just a small part of the rise in inequality over the last few decades, it has still contributed to it, by making the skills of experts and professionals more valuable while lowering the wages of workers with less education and more generic skills. Globalization has its winners and losers, and in theory, the gains should be big enough to compensate the losers. But in practice, the benefits have rarely been redistributed, and the communities and workers harmed by globalization have turned to populism and protectionism.

The new era of globalization will also prove disruptive, in that it will intensify competition; indeed, it already has. New ideas now flow around the world at an astonishing speed, allowing companies to react to demand faster than ever before. Fashion retailers such as H&M and Zara can take a trendy idea and turn it into clothing on the rack in just weeks, rather than the months it used to take. The flip side is that the period during which a company can profit from an innovation before competitors copy it has shrunk dramatically. As a result, product life cycles have become shorter—by 30 percent over the past 20 years in some industries. Meanwhile, the variety of products is exploding, and many industries are adopting "mass customization," using technology to produce built-to-order goods without sacrificing economies of scale.

The growing economic clout of developing countries is also changing the rules of competition. Companies from emerging economies are taking a growing share of global revenue, and their governance structures differ from those of companies in the United States and other developed countries. In emerging markets, firms are more often state- or family-owned and less often publicly traded. They therefore face less pressure to hit quarterly profit targets and can make longer-term investments that take time to pay off. Developing-world companies also tend to enjoy lower costs of capital, lower taxes, and lower dividend payouts, enabling them to sell goods and services at smaller profit

margins compared with U.S. and European companies. The balance sheets reveal the difference: for companies in advanced economies, improvements in overall profits stem largely from growing margins, whereas for companies in emerging markets, they come from growing revenues.

Because the rise of digital flows is increasing competition in knowledge-intensive sectors, the importance of intellectual property is growing, generating new forms of competition around patents. One example is the development of "patent thickets," clusters of overlapping patents that companies acquire to cover a wide area of economic activity and impede competitors. Another is the practice of "patent fencing," whereby firms apply for multiple patents in related areas with the intention of cordoning off future research in them. The smartphone industry and the pharmaceutical industry have been particularly hard hit by these tactics.

In the new era, digital capabilities will serve as rocket fuel for a country's economy.

As digital flows grow, some governments have turned to digital protectionism. Invoking concerns about cybersecurity, China enacted a new law in 2016 that requires companies to store all their data within Chinese borders, pass security reviews, and standardize the collection of personal information, effectively giving the government access to vast amounts of private data. A similar law went into effect in Russia in 2015. Rules requiring companies to build data servers in each country where they operate threaten their economies of scale and increase their costs. Not surprisingly, these and other forms of digital protectionism inhibit economic growth—reducing growth rates by as much as 1.7 percentage points, according to the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation.

Digital technologies are also affecting companies' decisions about where to locate their factories. For most manufactured products, digitally driven automation is making labor costs less relevant, reducing the appeal of global supply chains premised on low-cost foreign workers. Today, when multinational companies choose where to build plants, they more heavily weigh factors other than labor costs, such as the quality of the infrastructure, the distance to consumers, the costs of energy and transportation, the skill level of the labor force, and the

regulatory and legal environment. As a result, some types of production are shifting from emerging markets back to advanced economies, where labor costs are considerably higher. (In 2015, for instance, Ford moved its production of pick-up trucks from Mexico to Ohio.) Three-dimensional printing could have a similar effect. Already, companies are using 3-D printers to produce parts for tankers and gas turbines in the locations where they are needed. These trends are good news for the United States and other developed countries, but they are bad news for low-wage countries. It's now far less clear that other developing countries in Africa and Asia will be able to follow the path that China and South Korea did to move tens of millions of workers out of low-productivity agriculture and into higher-productivity manufacturing.

BE PREPARED

In the new era, digital capabilities will serve as rocket fuel for a country's economy. Near the top of the policy agenda, then, should be the construction of robust high-speed broadband networks. But governments should also create incentives for companies to invest in new digital technologies and in the human capital they require, especially given how low productivity growth has stayed. Since digital literacy will be even more essential than it already is, schools will have to rethink their curricula to emphasize digital skills—for example, introducing computer coding in elementary school and requiring basic engineering and statistics in secondary school.

When negotiating trade agreements, policymakers will need to make sure that issues such as data privacy and cybersecurity figure prominently. Currently, rules vary widely from place to place—the EU's new data regulations that are scheduled to come into effect this year, for example, are far more restrictive than those in the United States—and so governments should seek to harmonize them when possible. The trick will be to strike the right balance between protecting individual rights and remaining open to digital flows. Negotiators should also seek to remove tariffs and other barriers that have hampered trade in computer hardware, software, and other knowledge-intensive products. Laws requiring data to be stored locally are particularly burdensome in the era of cloud storage. And to make it easier for smaller companies to ship smaller quantities of goods globally, customs regulations will need to be revamped to do away with much of the red tape that exists. The World Trade Organization's Trade Facilitation

Agreement, which came into effect in 2017, has helped simplify the import-export process, but there is room to broaden it.

In order to maintain political and societal support for digital globalization, governments will have to make sure that its benefits are distributed widely and that those who have been harmed are compensated. (Indeed, it was partly the failure to do this during the last era of globalization that led to the populist backlash rocking the United States and other countries today.) To help those displaced by globalization both old and new, governments should offer temporary income assistance and other social services to workers as they train for new jobs. Benefits should be made portable, ending the practice of tying health-care, retirement, and child-care benefits to a single employer and making it easier to change jobs. Finally, governments should expand and improve their worker-training programs to teach the skills needed to succeed in the digital era, a move that would reverse the decline in spending on worker training that has taken place over the past decade in nearly all advanced countries.

Work-force training alone will not solve the problems faced by smaller communities built on declining industries; what's also needed are initiatives to revitalize local economies and nurture new industries. At the same time, governments should recognize that the geography of employment is changing. In the United States, for example, the jobs are moving from smaller Midwestern cities to faster-growing urban areas in the South and the Southwest. So the goal should be to make it easier for people to move to where the jobs are—for example, by offering one-time relocation payments to help defray the costs of moving.

The era of digital trade will also pose considerable challenges for the private sector. Setting aside the serious problem of cyberattacks, companies will need to invest more in digital technologies, including automation, artificial intelligence, and advanced analytics, in order to remain competitive. That will mean developing their own digital capabilities and partnering with, or acquiring, digital players. Successful global companies, whether large or small, will also need to compete strenuously in the global battle for talent, especially for top managers who have both an understanding of technology and an international perspective. Firms can gain an edge in this battle by spreading their research and development and other core functions across the world, a shift that would tap talent from different places, thus ensuring diversity of thinking.

Corporate strategy will also need to be reset: no longer will companies be able to rely on highly centralized approaches to producing and selling their goods now that consumers around the world expect customized products to meet their tastes. Increasingly, companies will need a strong local presence and a differentiated strategy in the markets where they compete. That will require strong relationships with governments and a commitment to corporate social responsibility.

Globalization is not in retreat. A revamped version of it, with digital underpinnings and shifting geopolitics, is already taking shape. In its last incarnation, globalization became a battleground for opposing forces: on one side stood the political and business elites who benefited the most, and on the other stood the workers and communities that suffered the most. But while debates raged between these two groups about the effects of globalization, globalization itself proceeded apace. Today, the same debates about globalization's effects on employment and inequality continue, even as its new, digital form is gaining momentum. Rather than relitigating old debates, it is time to accept the reality of the new era of globalization and work to maximize its benefits, minimize its costs, and distribute the gains inclusively. Only then can its true promise be realized.

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Where Myanmar Went Wrong

From Democratic Awakening to Ethnic Cleansing

Zoltan Barany

Late last year, when news broke that Myanmar's military had been systematically killing members of the country's Muslim Rohingya minority, much of the world was shocked. In recent years, Myanmar (also known as Burma) had been mostly a good news story. After decades of brutal dominance by the military, the country had seen the main opposition party, the National League for Democracy, score an all-too-rare democratic triumph, winning the 2015 national elections in a landslide. The NLD's leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, an internationally celebrated dissident who had received the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize for her efforts to democratize Myanmar, became Myanmar's de facto head of state. Many analysts and officials concluded that the county was finally on the path to democratic rule. Support poured in from Western democracies, including the United States. Myanmar had long been isolated, relying almost exclusively on China, which was content to turn a blind eye to human rights abuses. Now, many hoped, Suu Kyi would lead the country into the Western-backed international order.

But such hopes overlooked a fundamental reality, one that was brought into stark relief by the slaughter of the Rohingya: Myanmar's generals continue to control much of the country's political and economic life. Suu Kyi must strike a delicate balance, advancing democratic rule without stepping on the generals' toes. Her government has no power over

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the army and can do little to end the military's brutal campaign against the Rohingya—which, in any event, enjoys massive popular support. Yet Suu Kyi has taken the bad hand she was dealt and made it worse. She has adopted an autocratic style. She has failed to make progress in the areas where she does have influence. And she has alienated erstwhile allies in the West.

CITIZENS OF NOWHERE

Myanmar, which has a population of 54 million, officially recognizes 135 ethnic groups—but not the Rohingya. In fact, Myanmar authorities, including Suu Kyi, refuse to even use the term "Rohingya." But the Rohingya are indisputably a distinct group with a long history in Myanmar. They are the descendants of people whom British colonial authorities, searching for cheap labor, encouraged to emigrate from eastern Bengal (contemporary Bangladesh) to the sparsely populated western regions of Burma in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Today, there are around 2.5 million Rohingya, who constitute the world's largest stateless population. But fewer than half a million currently reside in Myanmar; the rest have fled decades of official repression and exclusion, often crossing the border into Bangladesh, where they inhabit sprawling, squalid refugee camps. Those who have remained in Myanmar are a subset of the country's Muslim community. The majority of Myanmar's Muslims live in urban areas, speak Burmese, have Burmese names, and are Myanmar citizens. The Rohingya are different: most speak a dialect of Bengali, have traditionally Muslim names, and have never received citizenship. The Rohingya in both Bangladesh and Myanmar have led unusually difficult lives even by the region's humble standards, marked by poverty, the absence of legal status, and multifaceted discrimination. Owing to their lack of resources and extreme vulnerability, the Rohingya have largely failed in their attempts at political mobilization, which have generated further resentment against them. For instance, the 1950–54 Rohingya resistance movement, which demanded citizenship and an end to discriminatory policies, was eventually crushed by the army.

Perhaps not surprisingly, a militant Rohingya faction also emerged: the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, which formed in 2013. Most of the ARSA's leaders are from Bangladesh or Pakistan, and some of them have received training from jihadist veterans of the wars in Afghanistan. (The group's chief leader was born in Pakistan and later became an

Scorched earth: houses burning after sectarian clashes in Sittwe, Myanmar, June 2012

STAFF / REUTERS

imam in Saudi Arabia.) ARSA likely has fewer than 600 active members. But Myanmar officials consider it a dangerous organization. In the early morning hours of August 25, 2017, for example, about 150 ARSA militants staged coordinated attacks on police posts and an army base in Rakhine State. The confrontation ended with the deaths of 77 ARSA fighters and 12 police officers and touched off a crackdown by Myanmar's army, which burned down scores of Rohingya villages, murdered dozens of civilians, and launched a campaign of rape against Rohingya women and girls, according to Human Rights Watch. The UN labeled the operation ethnic cleansing, and others, including French President Emmanuel Macron and eight Nobel Peace Prize laureates, have described it as an act of genocide.

By the end of 2017, 650,000 Rohingya had fled to neighboring Bangladesh, joining approximately 200,000 more who had escaped earlier waves of discrimination and violence in recent years. The large-scale forced migration seemed to have stopped by the end of last year. And last November, bowing to international pressure, Myanmar signed a Chinese-brokered agreement with Bangladesh for the tentative repatriation of the refugees to newly constructed villages. The fulfillment of this plan is at best questionable, however: it calls for Myanmar authorities to verify that each refugee did, in fact, reside in Myanmar

before he or she can return. But most Rohingya have no documents to prove their prior residency. More important, few of them wish to return to a country that has persecuted them for generations.

DAUGHTER OF THE REVOLUTION

Myanmar's government, and especially its army, known as the Tatmadaw, has earned worldwide condemnation for the campaign against the Rohingya. Last September, the UN's top human rights official, Zeid Ra'ad al-Hussein, denounced the army's "brutal security operation" as a "textbook case of ethnic cleansing." Critics singled out Suu Kyi for at best inaction and at worst providing political cover for the army's atrocities. Regardless of how one interpreted her motives, it was hard to square her actions with her status as a human rights icon. Suu Kyi is the daughter of Aung San, the revered Burmese revolutionary who shepherded his country to independence from the United Kingdom in the 1940s. In the 1990s, "the Lady," as she is referred to in Myanmar, led the NLD to victory in national elections. But the military nullified the results and placed her under house arrest for 15 of the next 21 years, before releasing her in 2010 as a gesture meant to highlight the government's nascent liberalization program. The disappointment in her lack of action to stop the bloodshed—or, worse, her complicity in it—has been profound. Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa, one of numerous Nobel Peace Prize laureates who have expressed their disillusionment, lamented the silence of his "dearly beloved sister" and said that it was "incongruous for a symbol of righteousness to lead such a country."

But Suu Kyi's response should not have come as a great surprise. She has a long record of downplaying the Rohingya's plight. In March 2017, Suu Kyi's office dismissed detailed descriptions of Rohingya women suffering sexual violence at the hands of Myanmar's armed forces as "fake rape." Once a defender of press freedom, Suu Kyi has remained mum about the case of two Reuters journalists who were arrested by the military last December after investigating the military's involvement in the killing of ten Rohingya civilians. Suu Kyi's government did create a commission, headed by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, to study the Rohingya issue, and has promised to implement its recommendations. But last January, Bill Richardson, a former U.S. ambassador to the UN and a longtime Suu Kyi supporter, quit a separate ten-member international advisory board on the Rohingya crisis that

the Myanmar government had set up, calling it "a whitewash" and "a cheerleading squad for the government." As for Suu Kyi, Richardson said, "I like her enormously and respect her. But she has not shown moral leadership on the [Rohingya] issue."

Suu Kyi deserves a great deal of criticism. But in faulting her for not publicly confronting the military, let alone restraining the generals, some critics have ignored two fundamental realities of contemporary Myanmar. First is the intensity of anti-Rohingya sentiment in the country. Hatred of the Rohingya is widespread and deep-seated, stirred up by influential extremist Buddhist monks who are the military's political allies and who have incited violence against Rohingya. The ugly truth is that the vast majority of Burmese, including most of the NLD's supporters, approve of the anti-Rohingya campaign. Making pro-Rohingya statements and gestures would be tantamount to political suicide for Suu Kyi and her government and would only strengthen the army's public support.

Aung San Suu Kyi deserves a great deal of criticism. But some of her critics ignore the fundamental realities of contemporary Myanmar.

Second, the civilian-led government has no control over the armed forces nor any means of reining them in. Even if Suu Kyi wanted to limit the military's campaign against the Rohingya, it would be almost impossible to do so. Myanmar's constitution, crafted by the military in 2008, ensures that the military remains far and away the country's strongest political institution. Amending the constitution requires more than 75 percent of the votes in the legislature—and 25 percent of parliamentary seats are set aside for armed forces personnel, which ensures that no changes can be made without the military's cooperation. In addition, the constitution reserves three key ministries for the armed forces: Defense, Border Affairs, and Home Affairs. The last of these oversees the General Administration Department, the administrative heart of the state, which is responsible for the day-to-day running of every regional and state-level government and the management of thousands of districts and townships. The constitution further safeguards the army's interests by allowing its commander in chief to name six of the 11 members of the National Defense and Security Council, a top executive body.

The army also sets its own budget and spends it without any civilian oversight: in 2017, the budget amounted to $2.14 billion, representing 13.9 percent of government expenditures—around three percent of the national GDP and more than the combined total allotted to long-neglected health care and education. Perhaps just as consequential as the military's political dominance is its economic clout. By some estimates, active and retired military officers and their associates control over 80 percent of the economy.

Drafting the constitution and then holding a referendum to gain the public's endorsement represented two important steps in the military's long-term plan to manage and control a cautious move toward a "disciplined democracy," in its words, and to transfer responsibilities over day-to-day politics to a civilian government. Having shed the burden of governance, military elites focused on their own interests: modernizing the army and tending to their business empires. They gave up little that was dear to them, and the changes they have permitted remain easily reversible. No further democratization will occur unless the generals relinquish their constitutionally granted privileges.

IRON LADY

Suu Kyi has been unable to alter this basic dynamic. Following the 2015 elections, she failed to persuade the military brass to amend the constitution by removing its prohibition against anyone who has family members who hold foreign passports from serving as president. This clause directly targets Suu Kyi, whose late husband, Michael Aris, was British and whose two children are British citizens. In March 2016, the NLD-controlled legislature elected a confidant of Suu Kyi's, Htin Kyaw, as president; he has served a mostly ceremonial role. Suu Kyi created and took the position of "state counselor," giving herself a role akin to that of a prime minister—a fully defensible workaround to the military's move to block her from becoming president.

Less justifiable are the autocratic inclinations Suu Kyi has demonstrated since taking office and the extraordinary degree to which she has centralized power in her own hands. In addition to serving as state counselor, she also heads the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and retains the presidency of the NLD. As party chief, she has personally chosen every member of the party's Central Executive Committee—a violation of party rules. She is a micromanager who finds it difficult to delegate;

most consequential decisions require her approval, which has led to bottlenecks. She sits on at least 16 governmental committees, all of which seldom produce concrete decisions. In November 2017, the government established a new ministry, dubbed the Office of the Union Government, just to help Suu Kyi cope with her workload.

Suu Kyi has also decided to act as her own spokesperson, but she has done a poor job of communicating her administration's policies. She prefers limited transparency: according to several NLD members of parliament with whom I have spoken, she has instructed them to not ask tough questions during parliamentary sessions and to avoid speaking to journalists. Her preference for personal loyalty over competence was illustrated by her appointment of several cabinet members with scant qualifications.

Suu Kyi is in her early 70s yet has no apparent successor, and her party is dominated by other septuagenarians who enjoy her trust but lack the energy, imagination, and skills necessary to carry out the comprehensive renewal the country needs. Although Suu Kyi has been exceedingly critical of the constitution, she has used its antidemocratic provisions when they have suited her purposes. For instance, she appointed two NLD members as chief ministers in Rakhine and Shan States, both of which are home to large minority ethnic communities—even though in both places, a candidate from a local party that represents those groups had won the popular vote.

The complex political situation in which Suu Kyi operates requires a leader with a firm hand and a clear sense of purpose. She remains very popular among ordinary Burmese, who admire her tenacity, respect her authority, and consider her the one indispensable leader. Her autocratic style and silence on the Rohingya crisis might be less troubling if her government had made significant progress on economic reform or on reconciliation with other ethnic minority groups. But it has not.

WORDS AND DEEDS

Although the NLD has been Myanmar's main opposition group since 1988, it has never formulated a policy program beyond vague promises of democracy, the rule of law, and economic reform. One might argue that it did not need detailed proposals to succeed as an opposition party: it had an iconic leader, and it stood against the army. But even after two years in power, major questions remain about the government's economic

policies, positions on ethnic and religious issues, and plans for persuading the military to leave politics. Notwithstanding its limited room to maneuver, the government should have accomplished much more since taking office.

Decades of military control of the economy have turned Myanmar into a desperately poor country. In 2017, its per capita GDP of $1,300 was the lowest in Southeast Asia, about half of that of Laos and one-fifth of Thailand's. GDP grew by more than six percent in 2016 and 2017, but that was a slower rate of growth than the country enjoyed in the early years of the decade. Inflation has been nearing double digits, commodity prices have increased, and the job market's expansion has been anemic. Millions of Burmese have been forced to find employment abroad, mostly in so-called 3D jobs: tasks that are dirty, dangerous, and demeaning.

Reforming the economy should be the NLD government's most critical task, but it waited until July 2016 to present its first major statement on the issue. The document turned out to be little more than a wish list, a general outline that identified neither policy instruments nor specific objectives to achieve within a given time frame. So far, the government's main economic achievement has been the partial modernization of the legal framework governing investment. In January 2016, the legislature passed an arbitration law intended to boost investor confidence. Last year, it passed new rules on investment that are designed to simplify and harmonize existing regulations and that specify the privileges that will be granted to domestic and foreign investors. But the NLD has offered scant details on how the new rules will be implemented. The arrival of the NLD government had fueled hopes of increased foreign direct investment, but partly as a result of its lack of action, such investment has actually tapered off since 2015.

Suu Kyi's record on other pressing economic issues has been even less impressive. Agriculture represents 37 percent of Myanmar's GDP and employs, directly or indirectly, about 70 percent of the country's labor force. But farmers tend to be extremely poor, and farming profits are among the lowest in Asia. The government must find a way to provide farmers with what they most need to increase their earnings: high-quality seeds and fertilizers, improved water control and irrigation facilities, and access to affordable credit.

Farmers also suffer from a lack of land rights. For several decades, the military expropriated hundreds of thousands of acres from helpless

peasants, offering little or no compensation. In 2016, groups of farmers sent letters to the army's commander in chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, requesting the return of their land. The military's response was to threaten the farmers and their lawyers with defamation lawsuits. Suu Kyi's government has said that dealing with the landownership issue is a priority, but she has done little.

The military regime also grossly neglected the country's infrastructure. Roads, railways, and public transportation systems all lie in a pitiful state of disrepair. Even more serious is the shortage of electricity: only one-third of the population has access to it, and blackouts are frequent, even in Yangon's luxury hotels. Economic growth will put even more pressure on the electricity supply, and shortages will likely get worse. These weaknesses affect every economic sector and scare off potential investors. But Suu Kyi's government seems to have realized the importance of infrastructure only recently. A number of plans have been drawn up, and the government has held some summits on the issue. But on this, too, there has been little action to match the government's rhetoric.

A DOUBLE BIND

Despite the lack of progress, relations between the civilian government and the military have settled into what Suu Kyi has described as a "normal" routine. The most charitable interpretation of Suu Kyi's accommodation of the military is that she hopes that, over time, the generals will conclude that their interests would be best served by leaving politics. The army appears to be taking its time: Min Aung Hlaing has said that the Tatmadaw intends to reduce its presence in parliament, but he has refused to set a timetable.

Part of the problem is that the military has two conflicting goals. The generals want to transform the army—which is plagued by obsolete equipment, archaic training methods, and poor morale—into a professional force comparable to its counterparts in other countries in the region. In order to do that, the military needs help from more developed, powerful countries—help that, in the case of Western governments, is conditioned on the military leaving politics. But Western governments also insist that the government must do more to resolve its many conflicts with ethnic minority groups. In September 2017, the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence announced that it would suspend educational courses it provided for the Tatmadaw, citing

ongoing violence and human rights abuses. Similarly, the following month, the Trump administration announced the withdrawal of U.S. military assistance from officers and units participating in the operations in Rakhine State and rescinded invitations to senior members of Myanmar's security forces to U.S.-sponsored events. Then, in November, a bipartisan group of U.S. representatives introduced the Burma Act of 2017, which, among other things, would reinstate sanctions against the Tatmadaw that were lifted the year before to reward the country for its putative progress and to incentivize more steps in the direction of democracy. That legislation has yet to be put to a vote. In December, however, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution condemning "the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya," and the Trump administration imposed new sanctions on Major General Maung Maung Soe, who has overseen the brutal campaign against the Rohingya.

Compared with Beijing, Washington today has little sway over Myanmar.

But the military's troubling treatment of minorities extends far beyond the Rohingya. Several ethnic communities have been at war with the government for long periods—in some cases, ever since Burma proclaimed its independence in 1948. Together, these conflicts form something like a low-level, multifaceted civil war. Some ethnic groups bear long-held grudges against others, sometimes related to overlapping land claims. Individual ethnic communities themselves are often divided by sectarian differences. Aside from causing thousands of deaths and displacing millions, ethnic violence has prevented the consolidation of central authority over the country, as well as the formation of a shared national identity.

For decades, the military has prolonged ethnic conflicts in a bid to justify its continued rule. The fighting has also given cover to generals who profit from the drug trade (Myanmar is a major source of opium) and from the illegal export of gems, gold, and timber. But in recent years, the Tatmadaw has appeared more determined to end the civil war. In October 2015, prior to Suu Kyi's electoral victory, eight ethnic armed organizations and the government signed the National Ceasefire Agreement, brokered by the military, although some of the largest and most influential ethnic groups stayed away.

During her campaign, Suu Kyi repeatedly identified achieving ethnic peace as her number one priority. After the realization of that objective,

she was to pursue the creation of a federal system of the sort first promised by her father in the 1940s. There is no agreement on what precise shape that system would take, except that it would grant more autonomy to ethnic groups but stop short of giving them the right to secede. Suu Kyi's promise to pursue ethnic peace was a tactical mistake, however, since she has little influence over how the military wages its wars against ethnic armed organizations, and the idea of a federal system is anathema to the generals. Nevertheless, her administration organized conferences in August 2016 and May 2017 with the aim of persuading more ethnic armed organizations to sign the National Ceasefire Agreement; the talks brought together armed groups, the military, and the government. Predictably, the meetings achieved little besides providing a forum for grand speeches and gestures, and in the aftermath of the conferences, the fighting actually intensified in several regions. In February 2018, two additional rebel groups signed on to the ceasefire amid much fanfare. But the groups that represent four-fifths of all the ethnic armed personnel in the country remain as opposed to signing as ever. Meanwhile, the generals adamantly refuse to create a federal army that would represent the country's ethnic groups and regions, which is one of the ethnic armed organizations' key demands; the military falsely contends that the armed forces are already inclusive and fair. At the same time, the armed groups have refused to disavow secession—a position that the military insists they must take as part of any final agreement.

Optimists believe that the ethnic armed organizations' chief objective is to maximize their gains on the ground in preparation for eventual peace negotiations. In reality, their ultimate goal is the establishment of a federal system. Such a system represents a redline for the Tatmadaw: although military elites have adopted an increasingly pragmatic approach toward negotiation with the ethnic armed organizations, they continue to see federalism as the first step toward the country's disintegration. The word "federalism" is no longer taboo in public discourse, as it had been for decades, but the top brass are unlikely to relax their long-standing opposition to a federal system anytime soon.

BEIJING BECKONS

In the face of Western opprobrium over Myanmar's treatment of the Rohingya, there are signs that the military might abandon its relatively recent quest to placate Western governments and instead return to a

strategy of reliance on its traditional patron, China. China has always been Myanmar's top trading partner and biggest investor, and for decades, Beijing was the main sponsor of Myanmar's military junta. Suu Kyi's first major trip abroad as state counselor, in August 2016, took her to Beijing. Her discussions there centered on business and trade issues, especially a few large infrastructure projects, such as a $7.2 billion deep-sea port in Rakhine State that China plans to build to give Chinese ships access to the Indian Ocean. Since then, the relationship between Myanmar and China has improved; in November 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping described this moment in Chinese-Myanmar military relations as being the "best ever." It helps that Chinese officials, unlike Western ones, do not admonish Suu Kyi and her government for their human rights violations.

Obama wanted to reward Myanmar's progress; in hindsight, that was likely a mistake.

But the Chinese are pressing for progress on the civil war. Chinese leaders have endorsed negotiations between the Myanmar government and the country's ethnic armed organizations, and Beijing facilitated the participation of some recalcitrant groups in the May 2017 conference. China has played a complex role in the civil war for decades, backing the government but also providing shelter, weapons, and training to some of the belligerent groups; such contacts have allowed China to extract natural resources (mostly illegally), such as jade, gold, and timber, from regions where militants operate. But it now seems that the Chinese want the violence to end because the rebels' objectives have shifted from merely resisting government forces to improving their status within Myanmar, an aim that is more conducive to internal stability, and because the fighting has impeded economic development and trade. What's more, the Chinese want to be seen as peacemakers in a region where they have long been regarded as a destabilizing presence.

Compared with Beijing, Washington today has little sway over Myanmar. That is a recent development: the Obama administration, in one of its undisputed foreign policy successes, managed to convince the country to take steps toward democracy. The United States was a steadfast supporter of Suu Kyi for years before she took office, and both President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made historic visits to Yangon. When Suu Kyi visited Washington in

September 2016, she asked Obama to lift most of the remaining U.S. sanctions on Myanmar in order to help her government grow the country's economy. Obama obliged her; in hindsight, that was likely a mistake. Obama wanted to reward progress. But lifting the sanctions robbed Washington of precisely the kind of leverage it now needs. Indeed, democratic activists in Myanmar and elsewhere had hoped that the sanctions would stay in place until the antidemocratic features of the 2008 constitution were abolished.

Since the Rohingya crisis erupted last year, there have been few official interactions between the United States and Myanmar. Under the Trump administration, Myanmar has lost the special place it enjoyed on Washington's foreign policy agenda during the Obama years. Then U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson made a five-hour visit to Myanmar in November 2017. In meetings with Suu Kyi and the army chief, Min Aung Hlaing, he raised concerns about ethnic violence. At a news conference, Tillerson said that there had been "crimes against humanity," but he did not back the idea of new economic sanctions against Myanmar. Pope Francis visited the country a few days later and called for peace and mutual respect. But neither Tillerson nor the usually outspoken pope used the term "Rohingya" during his discussions with Myanmar officials or in his public statements, likely out of a fear that doing so would aggravate an already highly charged situation and, in the case of the pope, out of a fear that it could endanger Myanmar's small and vulnerable Catholic community.

Admittedly, the United States has few appealing policy options for stopping the ethnic cleansing. Restoring the sanctions or placing more new ones on the generals would likely just drive the military further into the welcoming arms of the Chinese, who are keen to fill the vacuum left by Washington's flagging interest. Denunciations from Washington and other foreign capitals have failed to affect the government's position on the Rohingya and have actually increased domestic support for the Tatmadaw, as evidenced by a number of major pro-military rallies held throughout Myanmar last fall.

Still, there are ways for the United States to push for progress. For starters, it should suspend all military-to-military engagement with Myanmar and expand assistance to a number of sophisticated but underfunded nongovernmental organizations, such as Mosaic Myanmar, a civil society group that promotes tolerance between the majority Buddhist community and Christian and Muslim minorities.

Furthermore, the United States should establish or sponsor programs in Myanmar focused on health care, educational opportunities, and cultural exchanges. In a country that tends to be at best cautious of foreigners' intentions, the United States is generally held in high regard, according to Asian Barometer surveys of public opinion—a sharp contrast to the suspicious attitudes toward China and India that prevail throughout Myanmar. There are few societies where prudent U.S. democracy promotion could find more fertile ground or where it would be more gratefully accepted. Finally, in lieu of public expressions of indignation, Washington should communicate its displeasure privately—especially through politicians with long histories of supporting Suu Kyi and Myanmar's democratization, such as Clinton and Republican Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky.

As for Suu Kyi, her reduced stature abroad might further reduce her already limited leverage with the generals. She is boxed in to a degree that many critics fail to appreciate. But she has made her own situation worse through poor management and a lack of focus on issues that are under her administration's control: improving the economy, shoring up infrastructure, and revamping the health-care and educational systems. The government should adopt a personnel policy that emphasizes merit and accomplishment instead of personal loyalty to Suu Kyi. Instead of alienating ethnic minorities and their political parties and ignoring civil society organizations, Suu Kyi ought to open a meaningful dialogue with them with a view to forming a big-tent political and social coalition that might, in time, challenge the military's political supremacy. Suu Kyi and her administration should reverse their attacks on media freedoms. And even though the government cannot control the military, it must stop denying and defending the Tatmadaw's atrocities and start actively protecting those who have suffered so terribly from the army's repression.

Most important, Suu Kyi must shift gears quickly. International patience with her is almost extinguished. If she does not change course soon, she will lose what little goodwill remains.

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

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

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



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

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THE GENE-EDITING REVOLUTION



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The Ultimate Life Hacker

A Conversation With Jennifer Doudna

At the age of 12, Jennifer Doudna read James Watson's *The Double Helix* and got hooked on science in general and genetics in particular. Four decades later, she is a molecular biology professor at the University of California, Berkeley, an investigator with the Howard Hughes Medical Institute, and a researcher at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. One of the discoverers of CRISPR, a powerful new technology for gene editing, Doudna tells the story of the current genetics revolution in her gripping new memoir, *A Crack in Creation* (written with Samuel Sternberg). She spoke with *Foreign Affairs*' editor, Gideon Rose, in her office in Berkeley in February.

You've described CRISPR as a Swiss Army knife and said that it may cause a fundamental break in human history. How can a Swiss Army knife cause a break in human history?
Because it's a disruptive technology. CRISPR is an efficient, effective tool for editing genomes—changing the code of life, the DNA in cells.

Humans have been modifying the genetics of various plants and animals for ages, so why is this new?
What makes this different is that the tool is precise and programmable. We can now change a single letter in the three billion base pairs of the human genome, for example. Ever since the discovery of the structure of DNA in the 1950s, scientists have been dreaming about being able to rewrite that code. What if you could correct mutations that cause disease or introduce new and beneficial traits into a species? Now we have a tool that can do that. And it's getting cheaper and more accessible all the time.

Instead of breeding creatures by trial and error over many generations to get the traits you want—and not even knowing what the actual code is for the DNA responsible for those traits—now you can simply splice in a trait for a bigger nose, disease resistance, better nutrition, whatever. You can do it precisely in one generation and get exactly what you want. This is changing the way modern biology is being practiced, in everything from medicine to agriculture.

How quickly is this all happening?
This technology is only a few years old, and there are already several clinical trials moving forward to test CRISPR-based gene editing in patients with cancer and other diseases. Agricultural products altered using CRISPR are already coming to market. Animals have already been altered using CRISPR—heavily muscled pigs, micro pigs, hornless cattle. Several CRISPR-related companies have been founded and already have market caps in the billions of dollars.

The description in your book of how the field of gene editing evolved, with different researchers building on each other's work and propelling knowledge forward, makes it seem like the scientific community is a model of the Enlightenment in action.

This interview has been edited and condensed.

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Doudna in Berkeley, California

In the early days, it wasn't even a field. There were a few people working on bacterial immune systems. We used to have these meetings here at Berkeley, and there'd be 40 people there, and that would be essentially everybody in the world working on anything to do with CRISPR. Jillian Banfield organized the meetings. A lot of important work done in the early days of CRISPR came from women scientists. Emmanuelle Charpentier, of course, was my collaborator. It was really an incredible time. I've never experienced anything else quite like it in my scientific career. There wasn't this competitive sort of culture that we see now. Everybody knew each other, and absolutely none of us expected the field would go where it did.

It seems to be a story of several different failed technologies, research on each of which paved the way for the later ones that ultimately turned out to be successful.
Yes, but I wouldn't call them failed technologies. They were successful technologies. They just had flaws, aspects that made them difficult to implement widely. Those earlier methods for gene editing worked very well when they worked, but they were accessible only to the rich and patient.

So CRISPR is part of the democratization of gene editing?
Absolutely. And that's one of the beautiful things about it. Somebody can be working in a lab in India, and they can decide that they want to use gene editing to do something. And for the cost of reagents, they can get the CRISPR editing materials and start doing experiments. They don't have to get a huge amount of money together. They don't have to have a huge amount of special expertise. They can just do it.

Why is germline editing a special problem?
One kind of important near-term clinical work is called "somatic cell editing." This involves making changes to cells in a person that are already fully differentiated. Those changes can't be passed on to future generations.

Germline editing is different, because that means making changes so early in an organism's development that the changes become part of the DNA of the entire organism and can be transmitted to future generations. With that kind of editing, you could remove the traits that cause genetic diseases and get rid of them forever.

There's a lot of sci-fi-type appeal to that, but it is doubtful whether it will become a reality anytime soon. Still, that's the sort of question we will have to grapple with. Gene-editing technology is moving very quickly toward a time when it will be technically feasible to edit embryos or even germ cells, like sperm or eggs. Then it's no longer a question of can we do this; it's should we do this.

Are we talking years, decades, or generations?
I think we're talking years.

Is using CRISPR to fix a gene that is damaged in an otherwise healthy creature conceptually the same as taking an otherwise healthy creature and editing its genome to improve performance?
I have a hard time answering that question. And the reason is that for the most part, I would wager that it's very

hard to come up with an absolute definition of traits that way. Let me give you a real-world example. There's a gene that's been identified as important for cholesterol levels in people, and a few people have a natural mutation in this particular gene that gives them very low cholesterol—so effectively, they never suffer from heart disease or cardiovascular disorders. Imagine you had a way to introduce that genetic change into the entire human population, so that you could make people immune to heart disease. Should we do it? Is that fixing a health problem or providing an enhancement?

Have you interacted with people who have actually benefited directly from the use of CRISPR technology, or soon will? Absolutely. It's profound to think about being able to alter DNA so as to help someone suffering from a genetic disease. I can't tell you how many people have e-mailed or visited me to discuss genetic disease in their family. I remember one gentleman who came to talk to me in my office here at Berkeley. He had met one of my postdocs on a plane and during the course of the flight had come to realize the potential of the new gene-editing technology. He told us he had watched his father and grandfather die of Huntington's disease, and two of his sisters had the trait and were approaching the age when symptoms would start appearing. He wanted to know how the technology worked and how he could help advance it. That's a common experience for me right now—people who come forward saying, "I want to be involved." It's very exciting.

There are several players in this with various interests—scientists, politicians and government officials, investors and

private companies, the public at large. Who or what is coordinating everything so that the field moves forward constructively?

We need help with that. When new scientific ideas come along and turn into exciting and disruptive technologies, it's often the case that those technologies race forward ahead of the capacity of regulatory agencies and governments to control them. Artificial intelligence is a great example. Gene editing is in a similar category. The science and technology is advancing so rapidly that there are already well over a thousand scientific publications on it, in every field imaginable. Perhaps the most excitement stems from the possibility that it may be a very effective way of curing genetic diseases. All of that is moving forward, globally, for the most part without coordination.

There are some exceptions. Francis Collins, the director of the U.S. National Institutes of Health, recently announced a $190 million call for proposals that would bring together teams from different medical disciplines to figure out how to advance the technology responsibly. But that's not really happening in other areas, such as agriculture.

There has been a huge amount of controversy in recent decades over genetically modified organisms. Is CRISPR going to follow the path of GMOs?

Boy, let's hope not. The controversy around genetically modifying food resulted from a poorly managed effort to explain to people what it meant and how it affected agriculture and the environment. With CRISPR, there's an active effort to spur discussions about what this technology involves, what potential it has, and what constitutes responsible use.

People have been breeding plants for millennia. The way it's currently done is that mutations in DNA are introduced randomly by chemical treatments or radiation, usually with seeds, and then the seeds grow into plants, and you select for desirable traits. Who knows what mutations are happening where? Wouldn't it be better to have a tool for precise DNA alteration, one that could manipulate a single gene without changing anything else? Of course it would. So the question is, How do you explain that? I think you have to make an effort to engage the public and try to explain why this technology is valuable and what it can let us do that we couldn't do before.

You've said that a lot is riding on how regulators and the public define the term "genetically modified" in coming years. What do you mean by that?

In the United States, regulatory agencies define genetic modification based on whether the modified organism includes any foreign DNA. In Europe, it's defined by the use of gene-editing technology to achieve the result. So right now, the same organism can be considered genetically modified in Europe but not in the United States.

What do you think the definition should be based on, the technique by which the organism was modified or the substance of the modification?

The substance of the modification. Something that has been edited to fix one problem on a gene should not be considered the same as something containing foreign genetic material. To be clear, CRISPR can be used to do both kinds of editing. But in terms of regulation, people should focus less on how the editing is

being done and more on what changes are being introduced.

Are the development and exploitation of CRISPR taking place more rapidly in darker shadows of the world, beyond the reach of regulators and the media?
I suspect so, but I don't really know. I think we may be moving toward that in particular areas.

Members of your lab team have been approached by people trying to make CRISPR babies.
Definitely. Does that mean somebody out there is actually making CRISPR babies? Probably not yet. But you could certainly envision that kind of work going on in parts of the world where there's less oversight and less regulation.

So who needs to do what, now, to make sure that the positive benefits of this flow and the negative consequences are contained?
It's got to be a combination of things. The National Institutes of Health's effort to bring scientists and clinicians together with regulatory agencies here in the United States is a very important step forward. There are international efforts to bring stakeholders together to grapple with issues such as the differing definitions of genetically modified organisms, for example, right now—it's critical to come up with a unified guideline.

We're not in a complete wasteland with respect to regulation. In the United States, there's actually a very good set of guidelines for dealing with embryo research and any kind of clinical use of technologies, and CRISPR work falls largely under that. What we don't have, though, is any kind of coordination regarding what happens with in vitro fertilization. That was something I was very surprised to learn about when I got into all of this. It turns out that IVF clinics are largely regulated at the state level, without much coordination. So people can go to IVF clinics in one part of the country and have access to different kinds of services than they can get in other parts of the country.

The advances that are happening right now in science and technology are being driven by people's fundamental interests. Sometimes that's commercial, but the most fundamental advances are really driven by curiosity and passion. So the question is, How do you take a curiosity-driven research culture and map onto it some kind of framework for making authoritative choices about what kinds of work can proceed? Earlier in my scientific career, that question would never have occurred to me. I never would have imagined that I would see value in having guidelines for what should and shouldn't be done in science.

What is the appropriate level of regulation? Local, national, regional, global?
There has to be some combination. There might be things that are so critical that we want to have national-level or even international-level guidelines around them—but other uses that are less significant, more discretionary, and can be regulated more locally. So it depends on what you're talking about.

Should the United States spend more on scientific research?
Undoubtedly. People should appreciate that two kinds of science produce real value. One is targeted science: aiming to cure cancer or solve a known practical problem. But there's also incredible

value in doing curiosity-driven research. We need to continue to invest strongly in the second type of work as well as the first—because the ideas and technologies stemming from it have reshaped the American economy over the last half century. You could double the budget of the National Institutes of Health and still find good things to spend the money on. There are many, many worthy projects going unfunded.

China is investing heavily in all this. CRISPR is huge in China. It's one of several technologies, including DNA sequencing, that are very rapidly being adopted there for a broad range of applications. Now there's a technology not only for reading and writing DNA but also for rewriting it and manipulating the sequence precisely. China's already a huge player, both academically and commercially. If the United States doesn't do something similar, we will definitely be behind.

Of all the crazy things that we hear about CRISPR, one of the craziest is that something like *Jurassic Park* might become a reality. Is that actually true?
I think it would be very hard. Bringing back the woolly mammoth and things like that are interesting ideas but mostly a fantasy. The technical challenges to doing that are very large. But it's important to recognize that we do now have the power to control evolution.

It's one thing to say we can make better corn that's less resistant to disease. It's another to say we can produce pigmen, like Kramer worried about on *Seinfeld*. The corn is happening now. How far off are the pigmen?
Probably pretty far off. Genes play together in ways that we don't understand right now. We can't just say, "I'd like humans to have the ability to fly, so let's put genes for wings into the human genome." It will be quite a while before we have pigmen or any other weird chimeras.

After you've genetically engineered them, which would you rather fight—one horse-sized duck or a hundred duck-sized horses?
I think the horse-sized duck would be easier to deal with.

When you were sitting there as a kid on the beach in Hawaii, reading the beat-up copy of *The Double Helix* your dad gave you, did you ever dream of writing a sequel?
Never! It was the farthest thing from my mind.

I want to come back to the regulation issue. Who now is managing the balance between risk and reward in this area? Are there any structures setting out authoritative guidelines?
No. Not really.

So the risks are being weighed by each individual actor?
Yeah.

Which means that we're entirely dependent on the outcome of those individual researchers' choices?
Yes.

Which is not really a proper way to collectively think about the deployment and management of a new technology that could affect human evolution.
Right.



Tug of War: Negotiating Security in Eurasia

Fen Osler Hampson and Mikhail Troitskiy, Editors

Conflicts in Eurasia, such as that over the Crimea, have been receiving significant attention in the last few years in the media and in the foreign affairs departments of major Western countries. Regional controversies in Eurasia often affect relations among the great powers on a global scale. *Tug of War*, edited by two global security experts from Canada and Russia, examines negotiations that continue after the "hot phase" of a conflict has ended and the focus becomes the search for lasting security solutions. This volume tackles the overarching question: how useful has the process of negotiation been in resolving or mitigating different conflicts and coordination problems in Eurasia, compared to attempts at exploiting or achieving a decisive advantage over one's opponents?

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

Complexity's Embrace: The International Law Implications of Brexit

Oonagh E. Fitzgerald and Eva Lein, Editors

An unprecedented political, economic, social and legal storm was unleashed by the United Kingdom's June 2016 referendum vote and the government's response to it. Brexit necessitates a deep understanding of the international law implications on both sides of the English Channel, in order to chart the stormy seas of negotiating and advancing beyond separation. *Complexity's Embrace* looks into the deep currents of legal and governance change that will result from the United Kingdom's departure from the European Union. The contributing authors articulate with unvarnished clarity the international law implications of Brexit, providing policy makers, commentators, the legal community and civil society with critical information needed to participate in negotiating their future within or outside Europe.

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Gene Editing for Good

How CRISPR Could Transform Global Development

Bill Gates

Today, more people are living healthy, productive lives than ever before. This good news may come as a surprise, but there is plenty of evidence for it. Since the early 1990s, global child mortality has been cut in half. There have been massive reductions in cases of tuberculosis, malaria, and HIV/AIDS. The incidence of polio has decreased by 99 percent, bringing the world to the verge of eradicating a major infectious disease, a feat humanity has accomplished only once before, with smallpox. The proportion of the world's population in extreme poverty, defined by the World Bank as living on less than $1.90 per day, has fallen from 35 percent to about 11 percent.

Continued progress is not inevitable, however, and a great deal of unnecessary suffering and inequity remains. By the end of this year, five million children under the age of five will have died—mostly in poor countries and mostly from preventable causes. Hundreds of millions of other children will continue to suffer needlessly from diseases and malnutrition that can cause lifelong cognitive and physical disabilities. And more than 750 million people—mostly rural farm families in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia—still live in extreme poverty, according to World Bank estimates. The women and girls among them, in particular, are denied economic opportunity.

Some of the remaining suffering can be eased by continuing to fund the development assistance programs and multilateral partnerships that are known to work. These efforts can help sustain progress, especially as the world gets better at using data to help guide the allocation of resources. But ultimately, eliminating the most persistent diseases and causes of poverty will require scientific discovery and technological innovations.

That includes CRISPR and other technologies for targeted gene editing. Over the next decade, gene editing could help humanity overcome some of the biggest and most persistent challenges in global health and development. The technology is making it much easier for scientists to discover better diagnostics, treatments, and other tools to fight diseases that still kill and disable millions of people every year, primarily the poor. It is also accelerating research that could help end extreme poverty by enabling millions of farmers in the developing world to grow crops and raise livestock that are more productive, more nutritious, and hardier. New technologies are often met with skepticism. But if the world is to continue the remarkable progress of the past few decades, it is vital that scientists, subject to safety and ethics guidelines, be encouraged to continue taking advantage of such promising tools as CRISPR.

BILL GATES is Co-Chair of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

Lend me your ears: genetically modified corn in Beijing, February 2016

KIM KYUNG-HOON / REUTERS

FEEDING THE WORLD

Earlier this year, I traveled to Scotland, where I met with some extraordinary scientists associated with the Centre for Tropical Livestock Genetics and Health at the University of Edinburgh. I learned about advanced genomic research to help farmers in Africa breed more productive chickens and cows. As the scientists explained, the breeds of dairy cows that can survive in hot, tropical environments tend to produce far less milk than do Holsteins—which fare poorly in hot places but are extremely productive in more moderate climates, thanks in part to naturally occurring mutations that breeders have selected for generations. The scientists in Scotland are collaborating with counterparts in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, and the United States. They are studying ways to edit the genes of tropical breeds of cattle to give them the same favorable genetic traits that make Holsteins so productive, potentially boosting the tropical breeds' milk and protein production by as much as 50 percent. Conversely, scientists are also considering editing the genes of Holsteins to produce a sub-breed with a short, sleek coat of hair, which would allow the cattle to tolerate heat.

This sort of research is vital, because a cow or a few chickens, goats, or sheep can make a big difference in the lives of the world's poorest people, three-quarters of whom get their food and income by farming small plots of land. Farmers with livestock can sell eggs or milk to pay for day-to-day expenses. Chickens, in particular, tend to be raised by women, who are more likely than men to use the proceeds to buy household necessities. Livestock help farmers' families get the nutrition they need, setting children up for healthy growth and success in school.

Similarly, improving the productivity of crops is fundamental to ending extreme poverty. Sixty percent of people in sub-Saharan Africa earn their living by working the land. But given the region's generally low agricultural productivity—yields of basic cereals are five times higher in North America—Africa remains a net importer of food. This gap between supply and demand will only grow as the number of mouths to feed increases. Africa's population is expected to more than double by 2050, reaching 2.5 billion, and its food production will need to match that growth to feed everyone on the continent. The challenge will become even more difficult as climate change threatens the livelihoods of smallholder farmers in Africa and South Asia.

Gene editing to make crops more abundant and resilient could be a lifesaver on a massive scale. The technology is already beginning to show results, attracting public and private investment, and for good reason. Scientists are developing crops with traits that enhance their growth, reduce the need for fertilizers and pesticides, boost their nutritional value, and make the plants hardier during droughts and hot spells. Already, many crops that have been improved by gene editing are being developed and tested in the field, including mushrooms with longer shelf lives, potatoes low in acrylamide (a potential carcinogen), and soybeans that produce healthier oil.

For a decade, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation has been backing research into the use of gene editing in agriculture. In one of the first projects we funded, scientists from the University of Oxford are developing improved varieties of rice, including one called C4 rice. Using gene editing and other tools, the Oxford scientists were able to rearrange the cellular structures in rice plant leaves, making C4 rice a remarkable 20 percent more efficient at photosynthesis, the process by which plants convert sunlight into food. The result is a crop that not only produces higher yields but also needs less water. That's good for food security, farmers' livelihoods, and the environment, and it will also help smallholder farmers adapt to climate change.

Such alterations of the genomes of plants and even animals are not new. Humans have been doing this for thousands of years through selective breeding. Scientists began recombining DNA molecules in the early 1970s, and today, genetic engineering is widely used in agriculture and in medicine, the latter to mass-produce human insulin, hormones, vaccines, and many drugs. Gene editing is different in that it does not produce transgenic plants or animals—meaning it does not involve combining DNA from different organisms. With CRISPR, enzymes are used to target and delete a section of DNA or alter it in other ways that result in favorable or useful traits. Most important, it makes the discovery and development of innovations much faster and more precise.

ENDING MALARIA

In global health, one of the most promising near-term uses of gene editing involves research on malaria. Although insecticide-treated bed nets and more effective drugs have cut malaria deaths dramatically in recent decades, the parasitic disease still takes a terrible toll. Every year, about 200 million cases of malaria are recorded, and some 450,000 people die from it, about 70 percent of them children under five. Children who

survive often suffer lasting mental and physical impairments. In adults, the high fever, chills, and anemia caused by malaria can keep people from working and trap families in a cycle of illness and poverty. Beyond the human suffering, the economic costs are staggering. In sub-Saharan Africa, which is home to 90 percent of all malaria cases, the direct and indirect costs associated with the disease add up to an estimated 1.3 percent of GDP—a significant drag on countries working to lift themselves out of poverty.

With sufficient funding and smart interventions using existing approaches, malaria is largely preventable and treatable—but not completely. Current tools for prevention, such as spraying for insects and their larvae, have only a temporary effect. The standard treatment for malaria today—medicine derived from artemisinin, a compound isolated from an herb used in traditional Chinese medicine—may relieve symptoms, but it may also leave behind in the human body a form of the malaria parasite that can still be spread by mosquitoes. To make matters worse, the malaria parasite has begun to develop resistance to drugs, and mosquitoes are developing resistance to insecticides.

Efforts against malaria must continue to make use of existing tools, but moving toward eradication will require scientific and technological advances in multiple areas. For instance, sophisticated geospatial surveillance systems, combined with computational modeling and simulation, will make it possible to tailor antimalarial efforts to unique local conditions. Gene editing can play a big role, too. There are more than 3,500 known mosquito species worldwide, but just a handful of them are any good at transmitting malaria parasites between people. Only female mosquitoes can spread malaria, and so researchers have used CRISPR to successfully create gene drives—making inheritable edits to their genes—that cause females to become sterile or skew them toward producing mostly male offspring. Scientists are also exploring other ways to use CRISPR to inhibit mosquitoes' ability to transmit malaria—for example, by introducing genes that could eliminate the parasites as they pass through a mosquito's gut on their way to its salivary glands, the main path through which infections are transmitted to humans. In comparable ways, the tool also holds promise for fighting other diseases carried by mosquitoes, such as dengue fever and the Zika virus.

It will be several years, however, before any genetically edited mosquitoes are released into the wild for field trials. Although many questions about safety and efficacy will have to be answered first, there is reason to be optimistic that creating gene drives in malaria-spreading mosquitoes will not do much, if any, harm to the environment. That's because the edits would target only the few species that tend to transmit the disease. And although natural selection will eventually produce mosquitoes that are resistant to any gene drives released into the wild, part of the value of CRISPR is that it expedites the development of new approaches—meaning that scientists can stay one step ahead.

THE PATH FORWARD

Like other new and potentially powerful technologies, gene editing raises legitimate questions and understandable

concerns about possible risks and misuse. How, then, should the technology be regulated? Rules developed decades ago for other forms of genetic engineering do not necessarily fit. Noting that gene-edited organisms are not transgenic, the U.S. Department of Agriculture has reasonably concluded that genetically edited plants are like plants with naturally occurring mutations and thus are not subject to special regulations and raise no special safety concerns.

Gene editing in animals or even humans raises more complicated questions of safety and ethics. In 2014, the World Health Organization issued guidelines for testing genetically modified mosquitoes, including standards for efficacy, biosafety, bioethics, and public participation. In 2016, the National Academy of Sciences built on the WHO's guidelines with recommendations for responsible conduct in gene-drive research on animals. (The Gates Foundation co-funded this work with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or DARPA, the U.S. Defense Department organization that supports high-tech research related to national security.) These recommendations emphasized the need for thorough research in the lab, including interim evaluations at set points, before scientists move to field trials. They also urged scientists to assess any ecological risks and to actively involve the public, especially in the communities and countries directly affected by the research. Wherever gene-editing research takes place, it should involve all the key stakeholders—scientists, civil society, government leaders, and local communities—from wherever it is likely to be deployed.

Part of the challenge in regulating gene editing is that the rules and practices in different countries may differ widely. A more harmonized policy environment would prove more efficient, and it would probably also raise overall standards. International organizations, especially of scientists, could help establish global norms. Meanwhile, funders of gene-editing research must ensure that it is conducted in compliance with standards such as those advanced by the WHO and the National Academy of Sciences, no matter where the research takes place.

When it comes to gene-editing research on malaria, the Gates Foundation has joined with others to help universities and other institutions in the regions affected by the disease to conduct risk assessments and advise regional bodies on experiments and future field tests. The goal is to empower affected countries and communities to take the lead in the research, evaluate its costs and benefits, and make informed decisions about whether and when to apply the resulting technology.

Finally, it's important to recognize the costs and risks of failing to explore the use of new tools such as CRISPR for global health and development. The benefits of emerging technologies should not be reserved only for people in developed countries. Nor should decisions about whether to take advantage of them. Used responsibly, gene editing holds the potential to save millions of lives and empower millions of people to lift themselves out of poverty. It would be a tragedy to pass up the opportunity.

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Keep CRISPR Safe

Regulating a Genetic Revolution

Amy Gutmann and Jonathan D. Moreno

The possibility of rewriting the genome of an organism, or even of an entire species, has long been the stuff of science fiction. But with the development of CRISPR (which stands for "clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats"), a method for editing DNA far more precisely and efficiently than was possible with older technologies, fiction has edged closer to reality. CRISPR exploits an ancient system that allows bacteria to acquire immunity from viruses. It uses an enzyme called Cas9 to cut strands of DNA at precisely targeted locations, allowing researchers to insert new genetic material into the gap.

CRISPR promises to revolutionize gene editing, which comprises two distinct but related fields. The first involves a technique to modify inherited genes in nonhuman organisms in order to spread a trait throughout a population, using a process known as a gene drive. The other involves editing the human genome, either in normal body cells (known as somatic cells) or in the germline, the cells that pass genes down to offspring.

The advances made possible by CRISPR could bring vast benefits to society, but the technology also poses risks. An out-of-control gene drive could drastically alter or even threaten a species. And editing the human genome raises risks both for individuals and for society as a whole. To head off those dangers, governments and scientific institutions will have to respond by establishing standards that both enable promising research to go forward and reassure the public that the work is being conducted responsibly. Yet especially when the science is at such an early stage, there is a risk that governments will do too much rather than too little. To avoid that problem, the global scientific and biological ethics communities must take the lead, designing standards and procedures that reduce the dangers of these powerful new technologies without forgoing the benefits.

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PLAYING GOD

The goal of a gene drive is to spread or suppress certain genes in a wild population of organisms. It works by exploiting a quirk of nature. In sexually reproducing species, most genes have a 50 percent chance of being passed from parent to child, as offspring receive half their genes from each parent. As a result, genetic mutations normally spread only if they make an organism more likely to survive or breed. But some genes have evolved mechanisms that give them better than 50 percent odds of being passed on. That allows changes in those genes to proliferate quickly even if they have no effect on evolutionary fitness. Scientists can exploit this tendency by using CRISPR to insert genetic material into

the "selfish" part of an organism's genome, ensuring that the new trait will be passed on to most offspring, eventually spreading through large populations.

This process could be exploited both to improve public health and to promote economic development. Scientists could use gene drives to break disease transmission chains, eliminating the need to use costly and harmful insecticides. For example, researchers are looking at using the technology to inhibit the transmission of Lyme bacteria from mice to ticks, a move that could wipe out Lyme disease among humans, since humans can catch the disease only from tick bites. In agriculture, gene drives could immunize plants against many kinds of pathogens and curb or eliminate populations of invasive animals, such as mice, that destroy crops. Researchers are working to develop a house mouse that can give birth only to male offspring. If the altered mice were released into the wild, female mice would gradually disappear and the species would die off within the area in which the altered mice were introduced.

Gene drives could also reverse some worrying environmental trends. Many amphibian species, such as frogs, toads, and newts, have suffered catastrophic declines over the last few decades. If scientists introduced engineered genes that rendered amphibians immune to common pathogens, many species could recover.

But alongside these benefits come serious risks. A gene drive gone wrong could leave a species extinct or introduce dramatic and unintended effects. Most gene drives would likely be limited to a single place, such as an island or an isolated and containable area of land, at least at first. If a genetically modified animal or plant escaped, however, then the gene drive could spread uncontrollably. And if a modified organism mated with a member of another species, it could transmit the changes to new populations. Entire species could be wiped out and ecosystems upended.

These risks are dramatic, but they are also far off. In part because the research is at such an early stage, scientists disagree about how much and what kind of regulation and guidance will be required. So governments should follow the principle of regulatory parsimony, which dictates that they should impose only those restrictions necessary to maintain ethical standards and public safety. Doing so will maximize the scope of free scientific discovery in a way that is consistent with serving the public good. In the countries where much of the research is taking place, before imposing new restrictions, governments should rationalize the current system of regulation. In the United States, for example, the Department of Agriculture, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Environmental Protection Agency all share responsibility for different aspects of field trials and commercial products. They should harmonize their biological safety guidelines for gene-drive studies. On the international stage, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, an agreement among most of the world's countries that came into force in 2003, regulates genetically modified organisms, but the United States has not signed it.

In lieu of formal regulations on gene drives, scientists could agree to build safety measures into gene-drive systems, such as alterations that would cancel out previous drives or gene modifications designed to grow less frequent

over time, so that successive generations would express the gene less and less once the original problem has been sufficiently ameliorated. Researchers will also need to be transparent about their work and consult local communities to gain consent before introducing gene drives into the wild.

HUMANS 2.0

Just as challenging for the global scientific community will be the issues raised by human genome editing. A wide range of diseases have been identified as potential targets for treatments that modify genes in a patient's somatic cells, including certain cancers, cystic fibrosis, hemophilia, HIV/AIDS, Huntington's disease, muscular dystrophy, some neurodegenerative diseases, and sickle cell anemia. Developing therapies for these conditions will not be straightforward. Preliminary laboratory research suggests that the human immune system may resist the version of the enzyme Cas9 currently used in CRISPR. If that result holds up, either Cas9 will have to be modified or replacement enzymes will have to be developed. Yet this does not appear to be a major setback, as scientists are already using other enzymes for techniques associated with CRISPR.

Whatever form it takes, research involving human gene editing will have to meet the already rigorous regulatory standards governing medical research. In the United States, all applications for clinical experiments must be approved by the Food and Drug Administration and reviewed by the National Institutes of Health. The FDA advises researchers to follow up with participants in gene therapy trials for as long as 15 years after the end of the trial to discover and deal

with any delayed ill effects. And once the FDA approves a gene therapy product for public sale, it requires companies to monitor its use, report any adverse events, and give public warnings as appropriate. This regulatory regime will be sufficient when it comes to using CRISPR to edit somatic cell genes given that the process, although different from other techniques for modifying cells, does not raise new safety or ethical issues.

The same cannot be said for interventions that modify an individual's germline, which carries genes that are inherited. Such interventions raise both the prospect of vast benefits and thorny questions of safety and ethics. Gene editing could, in theory, prevent the transmission of genes that increase the risks of life-threatening diseases, such as breast cancer or cystic fibrosis. Families with histories of breast cancer associated with certain mutations in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes (which help prevent tumors), for example, may wish to protect their descendants by editing their genes.

More speculative are germline modifications intended to make future children stronger, better looking, or smarter. The prospect of such genetic engineering raises the specter of disastrous twentieth-century experiments in eugenics, although today most of the demand would likely come from individuals rather than states. To the extent that state projects did attempt to enhance national populations, they would be ill advised and socially disruptive. What is more, because of the enormous complexity of traits such as intelligence, the results of those projects would certainly disappoint their proponents.

Reengineering the human genome raises risks not only for individual patients but also for humanity as a whole. Unlike the generations of rapidly propagating species, such as mosquitoes, human generations span many years, so any harmful change in a human germline could take decades or even centuries to become pronounced. But that does not mean that the risks should be ignored. Adjusting one part of complex human societies could well have serious consequences for public health, economic growth, and social cohesion.

In 2017, the U.S. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine recommended that researchers exercise caution when it comes to efforts to prevent disease transmission through gene editing but said that such work should be allowed to go forward, albeit under "stringent oversight." The NAS did not extend this recommendation to experiments designed to enhance future generations, which it said should not be allowed "at this time." As the report noted, the risks of enhancement experiments are similar to those of therapeutic ones, but as long as their overall benefits are smaller, they are not worth scarce research dollars.

These sorts of guidelines will shape the work of reputable scientists, but they are not designed to stop rogue actors. At some point, governments may have to pass laws to prevent unscrupulous researchers from abusing gene editing. For now, however, the science is nowhere near advanced enough for policymakers to know what kinds of measures would work.

THE LIGHT AND THE DARK

Experiments in both human genome editing and gene drives are generally



Frankenfish: genetically engineered fish in Taipei, July 2013

PICHI CHUANG / REUTERS

classified as "dual use"—research whose results may be used for good or evil. Since the mid-1970s, when scientists developed recombinant DNA technology, which allows DNA from different organisms to be combined to create new genetic sequences that can give organisms new traits, researchers have been concerned about the possibility of bioengineered pathogens, created either deliberately or accidentally. In 2000, researchers in Australia discovered a technique for modifying mousepox that made it more dangerous; this technique could also be applied to smallpox. In 2002, a lab in New York replicated the polio virus using publicly available DNA ordered from a biotechnology company. And in 2012, just as CRISPR was emerging, researchers in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom showed that the wild form of avian flu, which spreads from birds to mammals only through physical contact, could be genetically modified to allow it to move from birds to ferrets—and, by extension, to humans—through the air.

Although gene drives cannot be used to create new viruses or bacteria—neither type of pathogen reproduces sexually—they could be used to create other kinds of weapons. For example, mosquitoes could be modified to produce toxins or such that they can expand their natural habitat and so spread malaria, dengue fever, or other diseases outside tropical areas.

Indeed, virtually all biological research could plausibly be described as dual use. It is hard to think of a major biological breakthrough that could not be exploited for harmful ends. This is one reason why all of those who value the lifesaving breakthroughs that biological research has made possible should reject the idea of regulating biological research primarily because it is dual use.

Certainly, if a technology has no conceivable malign application, then regulation should be off the table. But what is equally certain, the mere fact that something can be used to do harm must not suffice to trigger regulation.

At the moment, different countries take widely varying approaches to regulating dual-use research. The United States tends to focus only on select biological agents that threaten public health. The European Union, by contrast, takes a more precautionary approach that requires a risk assessment for any organism that could pose a threat. Regulatory parsimony and a bias toward scientific freedom favor the more focused policy, whereas greater risk aversion favors the precautionary approach.

SELF-GOVERNMENT

For all its unprecedented power, CRISPR is of a piece with other research breakthroughs in synthetic biology. It has both enormous potential to transform societies for the better and possible malign uses. Dealing with the latter will require crafting highly specific rules so that regulators don't end up sweeping all CRISPR research into a costly new regulatory net with little or no benefit to society. And even the best-designed regulation cannot eliminate the possibility that researchers will accidentally discover a dangerous new application of a new technology. Before regulators consider additional rules, CRISPR researchers will have to comply with existing scientific norms and regulations, perhaps the field's biggest short-term challenge.

The modern scientific community is both cooperative and competitive. Even so, scientific establishments have shown themselves capable of self-governance when public safety and confidence are at stake. The standards developed by recognized authorities are encouraging: for example, in the first decade of this century, in response to new laboratory practices involving the use of human stem cells in nonhuman animals, national science academies came up with a set of guidelines. The guidelines are voluntary, but they delineate in a well-informed way what is and what is not ethically acceptable, and they have been widely embraced by scientists, the editors of prominent scientific journals, and regulators.

The most effective standards for gene-editing research will come from the scientific community itself, through international summits of science academies and a continual process of intellectual exchange. Those are the forums that can respond best to often unpredictable developments in the science and react sensitively to public opinion. Prudent self-governance among scientists may not produce headlines, but it is the process most likely to enable CRISPR and the next generation of research breakthroughs to reach their full potential.

BRAINY BEACH READS

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The New Killer Pathogens

Countering the Coming Bioweapons Threat

Kate Charlet

Military and political leaders have worried about large-scale biological warfare for more than a century. "Blight to destroy crops, Anthrax to slay horses and cattle, Plague to poison not armies only but whole districts—such are the lines along which military science is remorselessly advancing," Winston Churchill lamented in 1925. But despite the deadly potential of biological weapons, their actual use remains rare and (mostly) small scale. Over the last several decades, most states have given up their programs. Today, no country is openly pursuing biological weapons.

Recent breakthroughs in gene editing have generated massive excitement, but they have also reenergized fears about weaponized pathogens. Using gene-editing tools, including a system known as CRISPR, scientists are now able to modify an organism's DNA more efficiently, flexibly, and accurately than ever before. The full range of potential applications is hard to predict, but CRISPR makes it much easier for scientists to produce changes in how organisms operate.

These technologies offer vast potential for global good. Researchers are studying the use of new gene-editing techniques to fix deadly genetic mutations, create disease-resistant crops, and treat cancer. Top scientists at Harvard are pursuing medical applications once thought to be out of reach, such as age reversal and transplanting pig organs into humans. But it's not hard to imagine how gene-editing technologies could be misused. Some fear that terrorists with even moderate capabilities could develop deadlier pathogens. And laboratories, appealing to parents' instincts to offer advantages to their children, could modify embryos in ways that cross ethical boundaries.

One of the most worrisome questions today is whether advances in biotechnology could tempt states to revive their old biological weapons programs or start new ones. Such an outcome would drastically undermine the progress of the last several decades. A revitalization of state biological weapons programs could trigger new conflicts or rekindle old arms races, destabilizing the international order.

Faced with extremes of promise and peril, policymakers must proceed with a sense of perspective. Fear-mongering or overregulation could undercut the almost unimaginable benefits of the biotechnology revolution. But failing to anticipate and manage the significant risks, including the resurgence of state biological weapons programs, would be equally problematic.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN HISTORY

Understanding the risks that biological weapons pose today requires a closer look at how states have historically weighed their benefits and drawbacks. Since 1945, only six countries have publicly admitted developing biological weapons,

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Be prepared: first responders during an emergency exercise, Saint-Étienne, France, April 2016

ROBERT PRATTA / REUTERS

although sufficient evidence exists to suspect a dozen or more. As the biological warfare expert W. Seth Carus has pointed out, states have pursued these weapons for a number of different reasons.

Between 1942 and 1969, the United States developed a highly advanced biological weapons program, which was capable of large-scale lethality. Initially, this program was designed as a deterrent, but American researchers also came to value the flexibility of biological weapons, which could temporarily sicken or disable people rather than kill them. During the Cold War, the Soviets also conceived of a range of strategic and operational uses for biological weapons. In addition to lethal uses, for example, they explored targeting agriculture to damage an enemy's food stocks, economy, and morale. Stalin even considered using the organism that causes plague to assassinate Marshal Tito, then the president of Yugoslavia.

The materials needed to develop biological weapons are easy to access and relatively cheap. Many pathogens, such as the one that causes anthrax, don't need to be developed in a lab; they can be found in nature. And states pursuing biological weapons can readily obtain the necessary equipment, which is the same as what is needed for medical or defense research. Biological weapons also offer deniability: attacks can look like natural outbreaks, and they are difficult to attribute.

But in practice, biological weapons also pose tactical and technical challenges, which led many decision-makers to question their overall value. From a tactical perspective, the time lag between exposure and symptoms has limited the utility of biological weapons on a battlefield. And target populations can protect themselves with vaccines and other countermeasures. Launching a successful large-scale attack is also difficult. Unpredictable winds, changing terrain, or incorrect dosage could all lead to failure. According to Carus, the United States and the Soviet Union are the

only two countries believed to have overcome such challenges enough to be capable of using aerosol releases to reliably disseminate biological weapons over a large area.

Indeed, a significant problem with biological weapons has been the prospect that the agent could blow back on the users, infecting the attacking country's own soldiers and citizens as well as the enemy's. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, Japan undertook the largest-scale use of biological weapons in modern times, conducting both small attacks and larger campaigns in China. During one campaign, the Japanese dropped plague-infected fleas from aircraft onto Chinese targets and spread organisms responsible for other diseases in water and rice fields. Estimates of the Chinese death toll from the Japanese biological weapons attacks are debated and unverifiable, but they range from tens of thousands to several hundred thousand. In the process, however, it is thought that these attacks also killed well over a thousand Japanese.

These tactical and technical hurdles are not insurmountable, of course. But they have contributed to the lack of any known state use of biological weapons for the last several decades and to a broader trend of states voluntarily ending their programs. For example, disappointing test results and disenchantment with the deterrent power of biological weapons contributed to the decision by the British to deprioritize their program and stop developing offensive capabilities in the late 1950s. Although the U.S. program was more sophisticated than the British one, U.S. President Richard Nixon still terminated it in 1969, in part because he was unsure if it contributed to national security. The question today is whether new biotechnological applications might loosen those constraints.

A NEW CALCULUS?

Gene-editing techniques such as CRISPR could make biological weapons more deadly. Nations could develop novel or modified pathogens that would spread more quickly, infect more people, cause more severe sickness, or resist treatment more fully. Equipment needed for wide-area dispersal may become less necessary, for example, if a pathogen can be engineered to spread faster on its own. Whether that potential is tantalizing enough to convince countries to revitalize or initiate biological weapons programs is uncertain. These kinds of modifications have long been possible, just harder, using traditional genetic engineering techniques. But there are worrying signs that some leaders sense a new opportunity. In 2012, for example, Russian President Vladimir Putin intimated to his defense minister that he should plan to develop weapons based on new principles, including genetics.

Another concern is that gene editing may make it easier to carry out targeted assassinations. Conceivably, a government might edit the genes of a deadly virus so that it would affect only a single target based on his or her genetic code. This capability does not yet exist, but it might become possible with time and effort. Nonetheless, as the biosecurity expert Gigi Gronvall has noted, given the prevalence of far easier methods of assassination, states may decide that developing and testing such a weapon is not worth the time, effort, and cost.

A related fear is that advances in gene editing could allow scientists to develop biological weapons capable of discriminating among target populations based on ethnic, racial, or other genetically defined characteristics. According to Gronvall, these so-called ethnic weapons would be tricky to design and test, and any target population would likely have considerable overlap with nontarget populations. Still, the world is only in the early stages of the biotechnology revolution, and biological weapons have been used in ethnic and racial conflicts before. In the 1970s, for example, Rhodesia's intelligence agency introduced cholera into wells in areas held by black nationalist guerillas. And in 1981, the apartheid government of South Africa launched Project Coast, which is believed to have looked into biological means to assassinate opponents. According to some accounts, researchers with Project Coast also discussed plans to selectively administer an antifertility vaccine to black women. These examples give reason to monitor the threat of targeted biological weapons.

Some observers argue that gene editing could make it easier to develop or use biological weapons clandestinely, thus reducing the risk of international disapprobation. But maintaining a secret biological weapons program has never been particularly difficult. The equipment and agents required also have legitimate uses, and the challenges of international oversight mean that the odds of getting caught are low. It is unlikely that new technologies would change this in any fundamental way.

Concerns that gene editing will make biological weapons so cheap that countries reassess their strategic value are also overstated. CRISPR does make

gene editing less expensive; in 2014, a scientist at Vanderbilt University noted that an activity that used to take 18 months and cost about $20,000 took only three weeks and cost about $3,000. The expense can only have fallen in the years since this estimate was made. But biological weapons are already cheaper than alternatives such as nuclear weapons. And although gene editing lowers the cost of developing a deadly pathogen, it does little to reduce the price tag on the many other steps involved, such as weaponization, manufacturing, and delivery.

Considering all of this, one particular concern emerges. The combined factors of lower cost, easier access, and greater effectiveness might not be enough to sway major powers, but they may incentivize rogue and small states to reconsider the marginal utility of investing in biological weapons. As a result, any strategy to address the risk of genetically edited biological weapons must take into account a broad range of state types, not just the major powers. Still, it's important to put the threat in perspective: gene-editing advancements need not change the basic calculus to the extent that some fear.

THE NORMS MATTER

Major disincentives to the use of biological weapons already exist, and they can be strengthened to prevent countries from revitalizing or starting biological weapons programs. This is not an excuse for complacency; countries will need to reinforce and update the existing protections in light of new capabilities. Still, the norms and incentives against the use of traditional biological weapons should buy time and space for the international community to put new measures in place.

The vast majority of states—180 of them—are parties to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, which bans the development, stockpiling, acquisition, retention, and production of biological agents for nonpeaceful purposes. Although the treaty is often criticized for its lack of a meaningful enforcement mechanism, it has helped establish a global norm that using biological weapons is immoral and unacceptable. Although such norms may not constrain the worst actors' behavior, they do provide the rationale and motivation for the rest of the world to punish violators.

Today, any state that used biological weapons, genetically edited or otherwise, would meet severe reprisal from other states seeking to defend the norm of nonuse. Breaking the status quo, even on a small scale, would turn any country into a pariah. Few would be willing to take that risk, and those most likely to do so, such as North Korea or Syria, already face sanctions and military containment. Were either of these states to use biological weapons, the United States and its allies would almost certainly respond with force.

Becoming a "first misuser" of a genetically edited biological weapon could also prevent a state from enjoying the positive applications of the new technologies. Researchers, businesses, and governments worldwide hope to take advantage of advanced biotechnologies in medicine, agriculture, and manufacturing. Countries discovered to be misusing such technologies could end up undermining their own businesses and research institutions and cutting their citizens off from the benefits discovered by others. Of course, if a country were to find that it profits little from the new technologies, then

this disincentive would be lessened—one reason why the purveyors of new biotechnological applications should strive to make them affordable and widely available.

Ultimately, the power of these disincentives hinges on the ability to determine that an attack has occurred and to identify its source. For now, investigators looking at a pathogen in the aftermath of an attack would not necessarily be able to tell if gene-editing techniques had been used. Although plausible deniability could lower a state's inhibitions, it probably would not eliminate them altogether. The perpetrator of an attack might still be uncovered through other means, such as espionage.

Of course, individual terrorists and groups such as the Islamic State, or ISIS, do not feel bound by international norms. Indeed, gene-editing advancements do increase the risk that such actors could use biological weapons. But strong international norms are still useful, because they motivate the rest of the world to prevent and punish violations. The possible revitalization of state programs requires explicit attention because it is a more multidimensional threat. Not only could state programs produce deadly weapons, but the existence or use of the resulting weapons could trigger conflict, escalation, arms races, and other destabilizing events.

KEEP THE DISINCENTIVES STRONG

The current system does not eliminate the risk that a state could see new value in biological weapons, but it is enough to give any country pause. That means that the international community still has time to reinforce the current norms against all types of biological weapons and decrease the perceived benefits of genetically edited ones.

First, countries must strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. Since 1986, state parties to the convention have affirmed that the treaty's prohibitions apply to new scientific and technological developments. The prohibitions likewise apply regardless of the origin or method of production of a biological agent. In December 2017, state parties agreed to initiate a series of discussions on the risks of new technologies. These are important foundations, but more steps are required.

The five permanent members of the UN Security Council should invite other states to join them in making a strong statement that emphasizes the enormous positive potential of synthetic biology techniques, including gene editing, and reiterates their firm commitment to use such techniques for nonhostile purposes only. Reinforcing the positive potential of these new technologies could strengthen current norms by broadening awareness of what might be lost if a violation occurs.

Above all, countries must strengthen their ability to detect and respond to biological attacks. If gene editing can help create pathogens that spread more widely and quickly, then nations must detect outbreaks sooner, wherever they originate. If gene editing enables novel pathogens, then nations need the capability to rapidly create novel countermeasures. If gene editing allows for more clandestine uses of biological weapons, then nations require better techniques for determining their origin. Such improved capabilities would act as a deterrent by denying perpetrators the devastation they might hope to achieve. Fortunately, they are exactly what is needed to safeguard global health more generally.

Yet governments are not moving in the right direction. A February report by the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense warned that U.S. spending remains out of sync with actual threats. Outbreak response—such as the $5.4 billion spent on Ebola in 2014—is essential, but resources should also be spent on programs that might prevent outbreaks in the first place. The latest White House budget cuts funding for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's preparedness and response programs by $20 million and its programs for emerging infectious diseases by $60 million. Instead, Washington and other governments should be protecting and coordinating their biological defense, prevention, and preparedness budgets for maximum effectiveness. Strategically applied resources and strong leadership would save lives by enabling quick responses to outbreaks, thus limiting the impact of disease—even if no one ever conducted a purposeful attack.

To make the most of limited resources, governments and biosecurity experts should improve their coordination by developing an international biological security strategy. Such a strategy would mobilize national and international bodies to detect harmful new diseases or health anomalies in human populations, agriculture, and the environment and to share information about them. It would also marshal financial and institutional resources to quickly utilize gene editing and other new techniques to produce countermeasures against harmful, and potentially novel, pathogens. The elements of such a strategy are not new. As in so many other fields, what is needed is sustained, high-level leadership to promote and implement them.

The United States can be a leader in these efforts, given its broad influence and technical know-how. None of these proposals would require new regulations that would stifle American business or innovation. Nor would they prevent militaries from conducting lawful operations. Some steps would cost money, but the price tag would pale in comparison to the damage caused by a well-executed biological attack or even a large, naturally occurring outbreak. If the United States is not willing to lead, China has increased its investment in global health over the last decade and might step into the void.

In seeking to prevent the use of biological weapons, governments, businesses, and scientists must arm themselves with equal parts fear and confidence, urgency and pragmatism. Given recent technological advancements, the consequences of a return to an era of states with biological weapons programs would be devastating. But a sound strategy to keep the disincentives strong can keep that possibility in the realm of fiction.

REVIEWS & RESPONSES



It is easy to succumb to a sense of despair about the laws and institutions designed to protect human rights.

—Caroline Bettinger-López

JONATHAN ERNST / REUTERS

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The Long Arc of Human Rights

A Case for Optimism

Caroline Bettinger-López

Evidence for Hope: Making Human Rights Work in the 21st Century
BY KATHRYN SIKKINK. Princeton University Press, 2017, 336 pp.

Does fighting for human rights actually make a difference? Scholars, policymakers, lawyers, and activists have asked that question ever since the contemporary human rights movement emerged after World War II. At any given moment, headlines supply plenty of reasons for skepticism. Today, the news is full of reports of Rohingya refugees fleeing a campaign of murder, rape, and dispossession in Myanmar; drug users dealing with brutal, state-sponsored vigilantism in the Philippines; and immigrants and minorities facing the wrath of extreme right-wing and populist movements in European countries and the United States. It is easy to succumb to a sense of despair about the laws and institutions designed to protect human rights.

In 1968, the legal scholar Louis Henkin wrote that "almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time." Subsequent empirical studies, primarily in the fields of international trade and international environmental law, have confirmed Henkin's qualified optimism. But in the field of international human rights, empirical studies have sometimes led to more pessimistic conclusions. In a 2002 article in *The Yale Law Journal*, for instance, the legal scholar Oona Hathaway concluded that "although the practices of countries that have ratified human rights treaties are generally better than those of countries that have not, noncompliance with treaty obligations appears common."

Hathaway and others who have analyzed international human rights regimes have generally focused on the efficacy of specific laws, institutions, or methodologies: for example, the number of human rights treaties that a given country has ratified, the existence of domestic legislation that reflects international norms, or the presence of national human rights institutions. But few have stepped back and considered the overall impact of the broader international human rights movement. In her new book, *Evidence for Hope*, the political scientist Kathryn Sikkink fills that gap—and the news, she reports, is better than one might fear. Drawing on decades of research into transnational civil society networks and international institutions, Sikkink counters skeptics from the left and the right who have argued that the persistence of grave human rights violations throughout the world is evidence that the international movement has failed and should be abandoned altogether. On the contrary, she concludes, the struggle for human rights has indeed made a difference: "Overall there is less violence and fewer human rights

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violations in the world than there were in the past."

Sikkink contends that skeptics have relied on the wrong metrics to measure progress and have failed to see shifts in the human rights movement that have made it more durable. She is even relatively bullish about the prospects for continued progress in the Trump era. In this way, she distinguishes herself from the many activists and scholars who fear that the populist nationalism that helped put Donald Trump in the White House could reverse hard-fought human rights gains of the past few decades, both in the United States and abroad.

HIDDEN PROGRESS

Among Sikkink's aims is to defend the institutions and movements that have supported the concept of human rights, which together are often described as "the human rights regime." Sikkink takes issue with scholars and activists who fault the human rights regime for failing to produce a "maximum ideal of justice" but who do not offer alternative approaches that are "within the realm of the possible." The human rights movement should be praised, she contends, for "widening the limits of the possible," thereby changing what is probable. In an earlier book, *The Justice Cascade*, Sikkink showed how that process can work by tracking how the idea of individual accountability for human rights violations gained a foothold and led to an increase in criminal prosecutions for such wrongdoing. In her new work, she traces the diverse origins of the modern human rights movement and the pivotal contributions of people and organizations from the developing world, especially Latin America. For instance, she describes the successful efforts of Latin American jurists and diplomats to include seven references to human rights in the 1945 UN Charter, including one that describes the promotion of human rights as one of the basic purposes of the organization, in spite of resistance from the great powers. This history, she contends, contradicts common critiques of human rights law as a tool of Western imperialism.

Sikkink's main goal, however, is to identify and quantify the improvements that she argues have come about as a result of the human rights regime: a decline in genocide and "politicide" (which Sikkink defines as politically motivated murder by a government), fewer international and civil wars, a reduction in battle deaths and civilians killed in war, less frequent use of the death penalty, and dramatic gains in women's rights. Some of her arguments are more convincing than others. In one of the book's most compelling passages, she charts the undeniable correlation between the campaign that Amnesty International launched against the death penalty in the late 1970s and the global trend toward the abolition of capital punishment. In 1977, only 16 countries had abolished the death penalty; today, that number has increased to 140—nearly two-thirds of the countries in the world. However, she does not explicitly connect the dots between Amnesty International's campaign and the abolitionist trend, leaving the reader wondering whether the move away from capital punishment may have stemmed from other sources—for instance, the effect of DNA science in exposing wrongful convictions.

Sikkink's attribution of worldwide declines in genocide, politicide, and other acts of violence to the human rights

regime at times feels even more forced. Although she acknowledges that "explanations for improvements in core human rights issues like genocide are complex," she suggests that human rights ideologies and criminal prosecutions—rather than, say, improvements in medicine or more targeted weaponry—best explain the worldwide decline in war crimes. More plausibly, she cites research that suggests "that the rise in improved military medicine is in itself an aspect of the humanitarian ideals that some authors argue have contributed to the decline in war." Indeed, states have arguably developed more targeted weapons in order to avoid civilian casualties—a concern that derives, in part, from the rise of the human rights movement.

Part of what distinguishes *Evidence for Hope* is Sikkink's thoughtful examination of the role that data and quantitative research play in debates about progress on human rights. In the information age, people know and care more than ever before about human rights—but, she contends, that does not necessarily lead to a better understanding of the state of freedom in the world. Activists, by disseminating information about human rights abuses, often inadvertently create the impression that things are getting worse. Owing to the greater availability of information, it is easier than ever to conclude that the world faces graver human rights problems today than in the past. But the fact that people can now see more easily when, where, and how human rights have been violated does not mean there is more suffering today, Sikkink contends. Drawing from political psychology, she also argues that certain cognitive biases make humans prone to pay more attention to negative than positive information. Activists capitalize on that tendency—understandably, Sikkink concedes—by "naming and shaming" bad actors far more frequently than they praise governments or highlight progress.

"Perhaps," she suggests, "human rights activists should rely less on information politics, less on so-called 'naming and shaming,' and more on what we might call 'effectiveness politics'—identifying techniques and campaigns that have been effective at improving human rights." In other words, organizations might have a greater impact by putting together a letter-writing campaign, staging a concert, or piggybacking on existing legislative initiatives, rather than releasing yet another report or press release.

THE BOOMERANG EFFECT

Another mark of progress on human rights is the way in which the movement has expanded beyond its traditional boundaries to address a growing number of abusive and criminal behaviors that infringe on basic liberties and freedoms. Take domestic violence, a seemingly intractable problem that, until relatively recently, few recognized as a human rights issue. That has changed in the past decade as activists and lawyers, including me, have used human rights advocacy to improve how law enforcement authorities respond to domestic violence. My principal avenue for doing this work has been through representing a Colorado woman named Jessica Lenahan (formerly Gonzales), whose tragic story has become a landmark human rights case. In 1999, Lenahan's three young daughters were abducted by her abusive estranged

husband (and the girls' father), Simon Gonzales, in violation of the terms of a judicial restraining order that severely limited his access to them. Although Lenahan repeatedly called the police, telling them she feared for her daughters' safety and at one point identifying their location, the police ignored her. The dispatcher who took her call even chided her for being "a little ridiculous," a sentiment subsequently echoed by the town's police chief in an interview with *60 Minutes*. Nearly ten hours after the abduction, Gonzales, armed with a semiautomatic handgun, drove his truck to the police department and opened fire. The police shot him dead and subsequently discovered the deceased bodies of the three girls inside his truck. But local authorities did not conduct a proper investigation into the children's deaths, resulting in uncertainty about when, where, and how they died.

Lenahan filed a lawsuit against the town of Castle Rock, Colorado, in federal court, claiming that the police violated her constitutional due process rights when they failed to meaningfully respond to her calls for help. The case eventually landed at the Supreme Court, which ruled in 2005 that she had no constitutional right to have her restraining order enforced by the police. Having exhausted her domestic remedies, Lenahan filed a petition later that year with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), an organ of the Organization of American States. She alleged that the United States, whose criminal justice system had failed to protect her and her daughters from acts of domestic violence, had violated her human rights under the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, which is a source of international obligations for the 35 members of the OAS (including the United States). Lenahan's was the first international human rights case brought by a victim of domestic violence against the United States.

In many respects, the Lenahan story fits what Sikkink, in *Activists Beyond Borders* (an earlier book she co-wrote with Margaret Keck), dubbed "the boomerang effect" of human rights advocacy, which holds that when civil society groups and activists fail to persuade their government to take action or change its policy, they often find international allies who can exert external pressure and contribute to at least a partial victory. In *Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States of America*, the IACHR found that the local authorities were "not duly organized, coordinated, and ready to protect these victims from domestic violence by adequately and effectively implementing the restraining order," which the commission declared was a violation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. The commission went on to recommend that the United States investigate the systemic failures that took place, adopt legislation at the federal and state level to protect women and children from imminent acts of violence, and continue to adopt public policies aimed at shattering stereotypes of domestic violence victims.

In the years since, the Lenahan case has been cited in international and domestic case law and legislation throughout the world. And although the U.S. government, which has not ratified most major international human rights treaties, officially rejected the IACHR's decision on technical and jurisdictional grounds, the decision has had an undeniable effect on

U.S. federal policy and law enforcement. Beginning in 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice began stepping up its investigations into discriminatory law enforcement responses to domestic violence and sexual assault in several cities—the exact type of government action that the IACHR had called for—without ever explicitly connecting this work with the Lenahan case. Then, in 2015, U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch released official guidance to law enforcement agencies on how to prevent gender bias in their response to such crimes—a step originally proposed by advocates who supported Lenahan's lawsuit. A year later, the Department of Justice established a nearly $10 million grant program to implement the guidance nationwide. The boomerang that Lenahan had tossed had returned to the United States, even if the government did not explicitly acknowledge it.

HOPE SPRINGS ETERNAL

For the most part, Sikkink does not sugarcoat the challenges facing the human rights movement. Trump's nativist agenda, hateful rhetoric, and professed enthusiasm for torture techniques "a hell of a lot worse than waterboarding" have rightly alarmed U.S. human rights advocates, provoking fears of backsliding at home and emboldening bad actors around the world. Last December, the UN's top human rights official, Zeid Ra'ad al-Hussein, who had expressed concerns about the Trump administration and other potential sources of harm to the human rights regime, announced his unusual decision to not seek a second term, saying it "might involve bending a knee in supplication."

But Sikkink remains optimistic. She argues that the fight for human rights has taken on a new dimension as developing countries have joined the fray in ways that do not depend on Washington. "Human rights work in the coming years of the twenty-first century may look very much like the Cold War period," she writes, when "the major powers were mainly in opposition to the international protection of human rights and where momentum and progress depended on the actions of smaller countries, with support from emerging NGOs and civil society." But she also notes an important distinction between the two time periods: today, "these small countries and activists have far more institutional resources at their disposal—the human rights law, institutions, and movements that earlier activists created in the mid- to late twentieth century."

Everyone should hope that Sikkink is right. Human rights organizations based in the developing world have evolved significantly over the past few decades, and Sikkink cites a study showing that they are increasingly trusted by citizens and are not perceived as the "handmaidens" of powerful donor countries. Such groups could become highly effective in mobilizing support for human rights in an era of populist nationalism and rising authoritarianism. But they and their counterparts in the developed world will need to craft customized solutions that do not rely solely on established practices. The kind of "boomerang" that has worked in the past may not always be the right tool—especially if powerful figures in Washington are not interested in listening to world opinion.

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Political and Legal

G. John Ikenberry

Why Liberalism Failed
BY PATRICK J. DENEEN. Yale University Press, 2018, 248 pp.

Western democracies are in trouble, grappling with rising inequality, lost confidence in government, fraying social fabrics, and intense political divides. What has brought on this crisis? In this provocative book, Deneen argues that modernity itself has failed. Today's predicament is the inevitable result of flawed ideas laid down by thinkers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, René Descartes, and John Locke, who together inspired the Enlightenment and modern liberal democracy. These theorists, Deneen argues, rejected classical and Christian efforts to foster virtue and instead premised their secular visions of politics on a less lofty view of the individual as motivated by pride, selfishness, greed, and the quest for glory. On this basis, Western liberal democracies have grown powerful and wealthy but have also experienced the corrosive effects of untrammeled self-interest. Social bonds and traditional values have disappeared, and citizens feel threatened by the growing power of a distant state. Deneen argues for a retreat into smaller units: family, church, and local communities. Yet it is precisely this world of private life and civil society that liberalism has sought to protect.

Anti-Pluralism: The Populist Threat to Liberal Democracy
BY WILLIAM A. GALSTON. Yale University Press, 2018, 176 pp.

In this thoughtful collection of essays, Galston surveys the problems facing the liberal democratic world. The triumphalism that flourished after the Cold War was misplaced, but so, too, in Galston's view, is today's pessimism. The populism and polarized politics unsettling Western democracies reflect deep shifts in modern industrial society, including growing divisions between urban and rural populations, failed policies on immigration, and stagnant middle-class incomes. But Galston argues that these problems can be addressed through an enlightened reform agenda oriented toward shared prosperity: worker education, progressive tax reform, the expansion of social insurance, and investment in infrastructure. Liberal democracy, he points out, requires balancing competing principles—the market and democracy, freedom and equality, action and constraint—and so it is doomed to disappoint many citizens. And because modernity constantly generates new challenges, liberal democracy will always struggle to keep up. But Galston provides a reminder that the system's great virtue, compared with its authoritarian, theocratic, and socialist rivals, is its ability for self-reflection and correction. Galston is betting that the democratic spirit is still alive.

The Peacemakers: Leadership Lessons From Twentieth-Century Statesmanship
BY BRUCE W. JENTLESON. Norton, 2018, 400 pp.

"Great man" accounts of history have long been out of favor with scholars of

international relations. But Jentleson reminds readers that leaders do matter. He looks across the twentieth century to identify 15 "transformational" people who bent the flow of politics in the direction of peace and reconciliation. They include the U.S. diplomat Henry Kissinger and the Chinese leader Zhou Enlai (for their roles in the United States' opening to China), U.S. Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt (for their work building international institutions), and Mahatma Gandhi, Lech Walesa, and Aung San Suu Kyi (for their efforts to advance freedom and protect human rights). Jentleson observes that there is no single recipe for good political leadership, but many of the figures had some common traits, including "personal capital" (derived from strong bonds with a community and a reputation for personal courage or moral conviction), an abundance of political skill, and the ability to use the right combination of carrots and sticks to enlarge the space for compromise. None of the leaders he profiles was without flaws, but each found a moment when his or her charisma, wit, or rugged determination helped move history forward.

The Populist Temptation: Economic Grievance and Political Reaction in the Modern Era
BY BARRY EICHENGREEN. Oxford University Press, 2018, 260 pp.

In this survey of two centuries of populist movements and political revolts in Western democracies, Eichengreen argues that from the Luddites in early-nineteenth-century England to the upheavals of the interwar period, economic insecurity, labor dislocations, and rising inequality fueled backlash politics. Yet not all periods of economic hardship generate populist revolts, and not all populist revolts succeed. Eichengreen shows that populism tends to thrive most when economic insecurity exposes the divergent interests of the people and the elites. Societies become particularly ripe for populist backlashes in the wake of financial crises that lead to bailouts for plutocrats. But governments can push back against the populist tide. In the 1880s, German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck undercut populist worker revolts by establishing social welfare programs, and U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal promoted economic security and shared prosperity after the Great Depression. Yet in the United States, the government's ability to respond to populist grievances by strengthening the social safety net and reducing income inequality has been undermined by the antipathy to government enshrined in the country's political DNA—a phenomenon clearly visible in the nascent Trump era.

The BRICS and Collective Financial Statecraft
BY CYNTHIA ROBERTS, LESLIE ARMIJO, AND SAORI KATADA. Oxford University Press, 2017, 288 pp.

Over a decade ago, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa began working together to strengthen their roles in global governance. This well-researched and insightful book represents the best effort yet to assess the impact of the BRICS, as the group of countries is known. For those who saw the BRICS as a new bloc that would take on the Western liberal order, the results have been disappointing.

Several of the countries have fallen on hard economic times, and their interests have often failed to align. But the authors argue that, despite these problems, the grouping is not just an exercise in symbolism. Through trial and error, the BRICS have found a way to cooperate in what the book calls "financial statecraft" to achieve larger foreign policy goals. They have built new institutions, such as the New Development Bank and the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and they have successfully pushed for reforms to the old Bretton Woods system and amplified their own voices within it. What unites these countries, the authors conclude, is less a common vision of a new world order than a "common aversion" to Western hegemony.

Economic, Social, and Environmental

Richard N. Cooper

Clashing Over Commerce: A History of US Trade Policy
BY DOUGLAS A. IRWIN. University of Chicago Press, 2017, 832 pp.

At a time when Washington's approach to trade seems poised to undergo a significant shift, this magisterial book surveys the entire history of U.S. trade policy since the Colonial era, using congressional debates and actions to show how conflicting domestic economic interests have led Americans to clash repeatedly over trade. By the 1930s, the basic debate seemed to have been settled: ever since then, every U.S. president has publicly supported trade liberalization and negotiated trade agreements. According to Irwin, this policy has served the U.S. economy and the average American household extremely well. His book will serve as an authoritative reference on U.S. trade policy and its effects on trade patterns for years to come, and it usefully corrects several common misconceptions, such as the idea that Alexander Hamilton was a protectionist and that the Smoot-Hawley tariffs imposed in 1930 caused the Great Depression. The Trump administration's controversial new tariffs on steel and aluminum, which rely on a little-used national security justification, even though they will hit U.S. allies the hardest, were announced after the book was published.

Taming the Sun: Innovations to Harness Solar Energy and Power the Planet
BY VARUN SIVARAM. MIT Press, 2018, 392 pp.

Ultimately, human civilization will have to be powered mainly by solar energy. Luckily, the sun provides more energy to the earth in an hour than humanity currently consumes in a year. But how long will it take to develop the technology and systems needed to truly harness solar power, and how much will doing so cost? Sivaram's enlightening and candid book describes both the enormous progress that has already been made in exploiting solar energy in its two major forms—photovoltaic and concentrated solar power—and the major obstacles to further progress. The author worries that existing silicone-based photovoltaic solar panels will "lock out" those made with newer,

cheaper, and more effective materials, such as perovskite. Sivaram, a scientist with practical experience advising city governments on energy policy, argues that solar power cannot realize its full potential without significant innovations in power generation, power storage, grid management, financing, and regulation. All of these are achievable with sufficient imagination and money, so he pleads for more R & D funding and fewer subsidies for existing solar installations.

The Growth Delusion: Wealth, Poverty, and the Well-Being of Nations
BY DAVID PILLING. Tim Duggan Books, 2018, 277 pp.

Pilling charts an unpleasant voyage of discovery. After spending years writing about trends in countries' GDP growth as a journalist, the author has discovered what GDP actually means and how it is measured. His research has left him appalled that he and others—journalists, commentators, and politicians—have been extolling GDP growth for so long. It is not that growth itself is a delusion: after all, it has been associated with increases in living standards and reductions in poverty in many countries over the past half century. But growth often becomes a fetish for politicians and policymakers, who have given it priority over many other aspects of national well-being. This informative and sometimes humorous book serves as a useful antidote to that myopia. When it comes to the economy, Pilling argues, officials and leaders should pay a little more attention to quality and a little less to quantity.

Winning Together: The Natural Resource Negotiation Playbook
BY BRUNO VERDINI TREJO. MIT Press, 2017, 336 pp.

For decades, a history of mutual suspicion and recrimination between Mexico and the United States stymied cooperation on three resources that cross national land and sea boundaries: the water of the Colorado River and the oil and gas buried beneath the Gulf of Mexico. In 2012, after several years of negotiations, the two countries finally reached breakthrough agreements on both issues, which Verdini treats as case studies in successful international deal-making on environmental issues and national resources. His book generalizes from the agreements to draw broader lessons about how to switch international bargaining from a zero-sum framework to one of cooperation for mutual gain. In both these cases, that shift was made possible partly by crises (a Mexican earthquake, a drought in the western United States and Mexico, and the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf), but even more by poor national management of common resources, which showed both countries that they could benefit from working together. Verdini fills the book with applied wisdom about international negotiation, but it is unclear to what extent the lessons of bilateral negotiations can be extrapolated to multilateral ones.

Bioinformation
BY BRONWYN PARRY AND BETH GREENOUGH. Polity, 2017, 208 pp.

Who owns an individual's personal medical information? In the past, the privilege of accessing that sensitive data belonged solely to patients, their doctors,

and, perhaps, laboratories. Today, such information is often made much more widely available for scientific research and even for commercial use by pharmaceutical firms, particularly in the form of "big data" for studies that seek to find previously unknown patterns—a trend that is only likely to increase. This slim but informative book describes the sources of what the authors call "bio-information" and the current and possible future beneficial uses of such data, such as identifying patients whose genes make them particularly susceptible to certain adverse medical conditions. Parry and Greenough also explore the ethical implications of using and sharing the data, including the possibility of privacy violations and other abuses, such as using health information to stigmatize groups of people. They close with a discussion of possible legal and institutional frameworks that would maximize the benefits and minimize the harms of large-scale medical data collection.

Military, Scientific, and Technological

Lawrence D. Freedman

The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in Vietnam
BY MAX BOOT. Liveright, 2018, 768 pp.

During the mid-1950s, the U.S. Air Force officer Edward Lansdale served as the CIA's liaison to South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem. Lansdale ran a range of covert operations to weaken communist influence in the country and encouraged Diem to do more to earn the respect of his people. Lansdale was wary of the use of brute force, and his early career in advertising had given him an interest in the psychology of warfare. His efforts in South Vietnam gained him a reputation as a man who did his best to understand the countries in which he operated and who looked for innovative ways to undermine insurgencies. He urged the United States to support Diem, and when Diem was assassinated, in 1963, he considered it a disaster. After Diem's death, Lansdale despaired over the persistent corruption of the new South Vietnamese leaders whom he was attempting to build up. In this sympathetic and revealing biography, Boot draws on his past work on guerrilla warfare to argue that adopting Lansdale's "hearts and minds" approach might have caused less pain. But Boot is properly cautious, declining to firmly conclude that such a strategy would have resulted in a different overall outcome.

The Saboteur: The Aristocrat Who Became France's Most Daring Anti-Nazi Commando
BY PAUL KIX. Harper, 2017, 304 pp.

This gripping account of the French resistance to the Nazi occupation is told through the remarkable experiences of Robert de La Rochefoucauld, a Frenchman from an aristocratic family who was a teenager at the time of the German invasion. After escaping to London via Spain, he was recruited by the Special Operations Executive, the British espionage and irregular warfare service, and returned to France to sabotage the German war effort and gather intelligence. His expertise in plastic explosives

led to a number of early successes. But as his network of agents expanded, some betrayed him; others cracked under torture. Eventually, La Rochefoucauld himself was captured and brutally interrogated. Having failed to extract any information from him, the Germans sentenced him to death. The book's most dramatic sequences describe his escape from the truck that was taking him to his execution and his subsequent journey back to London. He returned to France again just before D-Day, was caught again, and escaped yet again to carry out even more sabotage behind German lines.

Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War
BY PAUL SCHARRE. Norton, 2018, 448 pp.

Scharre, a former U.S. Army Ranger, has thought more than most about the implications of autonomous weapons. He has spent time not only among their designers and operators but also with those so alarmed by the prospect of machines making life-and-death decisions that they wish to ban them—or, at the very least, impose strict limits on their use. In this comprehensive analysis, Scharre moves beyond the clichés of "killer robots" to explore the complexity of human-machine interactions, distinguishing systems that still partly rely on humans from those that are completely autonomous and highlighting the importance not only of machines' capabilities but also of human fallibilities. Scharre recognizes the advantages of remote-control systems and doubts whether it would be possible to craft and enforce a ban. But he also warns against being "seduced by the allure of machines—their speed, their seeming perfection, their cold precision." New technologies are most likely to reduce the harm caused by war if they incorporate the principles of proportionality and discrimination, which are already central to the established laws of armed conflict.

The Last Battle: Victory, Defeat, and the End of World War I
BY PETER HART. Oxford University Press, 2018, 464 pp.

Hart's history of the final year of World War I opens just after the major German offensive of 1918 had ground to a halt and as the Allies geared up for their own campaign. After years of grueling trench warfare had caused many to doubt that the conflict would ever end, the rapid success of the Allied offensive came as a surprise to those who led and fought in it. Hart enlivens his lucid account of this final battle with quotes from memoirs, letters, and diaries. He shows how increased professionalism and better tactics allowed British and French troops, fortified by the arrival of the U.S. Army, to push back the German forces. He also opens a window into the minds of individual soldiers, relating how they accepted the possibility of death and their relief at the eventual armistice. As one wrote: "Do you realise that we shall probably live to be old men!"

The West Point History of the American Revolution
EDITED BY CLIFFORD J. ROGERS, TY SEIDULE, AND SAMUEL J. WATSON. Simon & Schuster, 2017, 320 pp.

The essays in this authoritative collection illuminate the origins and conduct

of the American War of Independence, with a particular focus on the transformation of the Continental army under George Washington into a professional and disciplined fighting force—a crucial achievement, even though Washington lost many of the battles he fought. After weighing all the factors that contributed to the revolutionaries' eventual victory, including Great Britain's long supply lines, Stephen Conway concludes that the foreign interventions by France, the Netherlands, and Spain mattered most. In one of his contributions, Watson examines the wider social and political contexts of the Revolution, as well as the role played by developments in weaponry and the art of war. The special value of this book lies in its splendid presentation: it features excellent illustrations, maps, timelines, and charts, as well as reproductions of key documents and letters.

The United States

Walter Russell Mead

Trumpocracy: The Corruption of the American Republic
BY DAVID FRUM. HarperCollins, 2018, 320 pp.

Frum thinks that Donald Trump is a bad man and a worse president and that his presidency endangers the American republic. Those opinions aren't particularly original or particularly rare, but this book distinguishes itself by its literary quality and its intellectual breadth. Most anti-Trump literature acknowledges the economic concerns of Trump's supporters and suggests that establishment politicians need to address them. Frum goes significantly further. He shows awareness of, and even sympathy for, their cultural grievances and their sense of dislocation. The book would be even better, and perhaps less alarmist, if Frum had looked more closely at the history of populism in the United States. Although quack economics and racism frequently accompany populist uprisings, populism has sometimes served as a useful corrective to out-of-touch elites. The Trump phenomenon should drive political observers on both sides of the aisle to deepen their understanding of populism, not to pander or surrender to it but to think intelligently about how to channel populist energy toward constructive reform.

Zbigniew Brzezinski: America's Grand Strategist
BY JUSTIN VAÏSSE. TRANSLATED BY CATHERINE PORTER. Harvard University Press, 2018, 544 pp.

Vaïsse's biography of U.S. President Jimmy Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, reminds readers just what an extraordinary phenomenon this Polish outsider was. By the late 1970s, when Brzezinski rose to prominence, the old well-heeled and well-bred WASP foreign policy establishment had imploded under the strain of the Vietnam War and yielded to a new elite from more diverse backgrounds. Both Brzezinski, whose father was a Polish diplomat stranded in Canada by the Nazi conquest of Poland and then

the Soviet-backed communist takeover of 1945, and his friend and rival Henry Kissinger, whose family fled Nazi persecution in Germany, possessed a gift for strategic vision that few of their American-born contemporaries could match. Into a foreign policy community increasingly composed of technocrats, political scientists, and area specialists, Brzezinski and Kissinger brought a more generalist and historical perspective. Of the two, Kissinger has always been the better known and the more controversial. Vaïsse's evenhanded appraisal of Brzezinski's contributions to U.S. foreign policy will help redress the balance and will introduce a new generation of readers to a great American strategist.

Arthur Vandenberg: The Man in the Middle of the American Century
BY HENDRIK MEIJER. University of Chicago Press, 2017, 448 pp.

Until now, Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan has been best known to students of U.S. foreign policy through former Secretary of State Dean Acheson's elegant, if acerbic, portrait of him as an isolationist blowhard seduced into supporting international engagement after World War II by Acheson's flattery. Meijer's biography punctures this caricature. Vandenberg, who had his full share of both the vices and the virtues of Midwestern Republicanism in the middle of the twentieth century, will not be remembered as a great figure in U.S. history. But his evolution from a prewar isolationist to a committed Cold Warrior reflected the dramatic changes in American thought that enabled the United States to make the post–World War II era such a peaceful and progressive one. His powerful articulation of a bipartisan approach to foreign affairs, summed up in his 1947 injunction to his fellow senators to "stop partisan politics at the water's edge," sounds quaint today, but few doubt that a return to even a limited bipartisan foreign policy consensus would strengthen the United States' voice in world affairs.

New World, Inc.: The Making of America by England's Merchant Adventurers
BY JOHN BUTMAN AND SIMON TARGETT. Little, Brown, 2018, 432 pp.

Americans, claim Butman and Targett in this brisk and fascinating book, spend too much time thinking about the Pilgrims and not enough time thinking about the hardheaded businessmen who did much more to found the main English-speaking settlements in what is now the United States. They have a point. "I am not so simple to think," wrote Jamestown's Captain John Smith about England's North American possessions, that "any other motive than wealth will ever erect there a commonweal." The settlers who founded Plymouth Colony were much less important than their legend suggests. The more commercially oriented settlements of Boston and Massachusetts Bay soon eclipsed the struggling Pilgrim community. By overemphasizing the idealists and ignoring the pragmatists and opportunists in American history, patriotic historians often mislead their audiences. But that isn't the whole story; in the seventeenth century, as now, people's motives were often mixed.

The Pilgrims were less otherworldly, and adventurous merchants were less cynical, than superficial observers might conclude.

God's Country: Christian Zionism in America
BY SAMUEL GOLDMAN. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018, 248 pp.

As the American Jewish community grows increasingly divided over U.S. policy toward Israel, much of the academic and policy focus has shifted to the far larger number of American Christians who want the United States to pursue pro-Israel policies in the Middle East. This study of the history of pro- and anti-Israel ideas among American Christians from the Colonial period to the present day challenges the stereotypes that often distort discussions of Christian Zionism and offers useful observations about one of the most important political forces in American life. It is not, Goldman points out, only fundamentalist and dispensationalist Christians who support Israel. Nor is Christian support for Israel solely the product of a set of beliefs about Israel's role in the approach of Armageddon. Pro-Zionist positions are widely shared across different strains of American Christianity. Mormons, who most fundamentalists and dispensationalists dismiss as misguided heretics, are among Israel's staunchest backers. And many of Israel's most prominent Christian supporters, including Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, were neither fundamentalist nor conservative.

Western Hemisphere

Richard Feinberg

Stranger: The Challenge of a Latino Immigrant in the Trump Era
BY JORGE RAMOS. Vintage Books, 2018, 224 pp.

Latinos in the United States: What Everyone Needs to Know
BY ILAN STAVANS. Oxford University Press, 2018, 226 pp.

Ramos, a Mexican immigrant and news anchor at Univision, writes that the role of a journalist is to challenge the powerful and speak for those without a voice. Thus, it was very much in character when, during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, he confronted the Republican candidate Donald Trump over his anti-immigrant posture, before Trump had one of his security guards expel Ramos from the room. Ramos' book pulls no punches, denouncing Trump for stirring up racism to gain political power and for causing undocumented immigrants and their families to live in constant fear. (Ramos also criticizes President Barack Obama for failing to advance immigration reform.) Despite the rise of Trump, Ramos remains an optimist, proud to live in a country of freedom and opportunity and confident that the coming demographic transformation—by 2044, Latinos will make up a quarter of the U.S. population—will push aside xenophobia in favor of tolerance. Ramos fills out the book with his ruminations on the

immigrant experience: the challenges of reconciling multiple identities and recalling fading memories.

In contrast to Ramos and his journalistic activism, Stavans, a Jewish Mexican immigrant, strives for an evenhanded, but still sympathetic, presentation of the Latino experience. This breezy introduction to the topic, which takes the form of a series of questions and answers, is stronger on cultural and linguistic matters than on socioeconomic ones, and too often its language is imprecise and its facts incorrect. (The Mexican businessman Carlos Slim is rich, but not the richest person in the world, at least not anymore. The Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista did not lose an election in 1952; he canceled it.) Nevertheless, Stavans provides a timely corrective to the degrading myths about Latinos peddled by many U.S. politicians, Trump chief among them. Departing from the neutral Q&A format in a passionate afterword, Stavans argues against the threatened deportation of so-called Dreamers (young people illegally brought to the United States as children). But he seems to disagree with those advocates who would shield students from dissonant ideas for fear of making them uncomfortable; rather, he argues, teachers should broaden students' perspectives on cultures other than their own and help them build their own defenses.

Making Peace in Drug Wars: Crackdowns and Cartels in Latin America
BY BENJAMIN LESSING. Cambridge University Press, 2017, 354 pp.

In this ambitious study, Lessing argues that governments cannot successfully pursue the three interconnected goals of combating narcotics trafficking, eliminating official corruption, and reducing drug-related violence all at the same time. The conclusion he draws from his three detailed case studies, of Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, is that governments that launch all-out military campaigns provoke drug cartels to respond with their own brutal, escalatory attacks against the state, catching innocent bystanders in the crossfire. Such indiscriminate official crackdowns are misconceived because, as Lessing points out, the cartels do not aim to usurp state power—they are not political insurgents. They instead seek to dissuade the state from using overwhelming force to destroy them. A more rational approach for governments, he argues, is to adopt policies, such as offering lower prison sentences and imposing more calculated levels of repression, that give cartels incentives to behave more peacefully, even if that means tolerating drug trafficking and official corruption.

Resisting War: How Communities Protect Themselves
BY OLIVER KAPLAN. Cambridge University Press, 2017, 376 pp.

Caught in the crossfire between militant insurgents and government forces, unarmed civilians are often portrayed as helpless. Kaplan rejects this idea and finds that under certain circumstances, local communities can protect their members from civil strife. He bases his hopeful conclusion primarily on his extensive field research in rural Colombia; using secondary sources, he also finds local islands of peaceful civilian autonomy within conflict zones in

Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Syria—suggesting that even in extreme circumstances, civilians can organize to keep themselves safe. Successful strategies include building early warning systems to allow people to escape the fighting, opening dialogues with armed groups, and threatening to publicize acts of extreme violence. To discourage retaliation, communities must avoid openly sympathizing with one side or the other. So Kaplan warns U.S. policymakers against counterinsurgency or democracy-promotion strategies that could put the intended beneficiaries at risk by undermining their claims to neutrality.

Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Republics

Robert Legvold

Putinomics: Power and Money in Resurgent Russia
BY CHRIS MILLER. University of North Carolina Press, 2018, 240 pp.

Miller challenges the popular notion that Russian President Vladimir Putin's entire talent lies in using corruption to sustain a kleptocratic authoritarian regime. Putin and his loyalists certainly are corrupt, but he and the liberal technocratic economic team on which he relies have also skillfully managed Russia's economic fortunes. As Miller recounts in this short and admirably clear book, Putin took over a debt-ridden, revenue-starved economy in 1999 and then forced the oligarchs to pay taxes, saved the windfall from soaring oil profits (and later used it to weather successive financial crises), paid off Russia's debts, tamed inflation, and presided over rapid growth (fueled not only by oil profits but also by increased productivity). Russia, Miller argues, has a dual economy: one portion dominated by corrupt and inefficient state-owned enterprises, the other driven by a widening range of efficient and innovative private companies. He sketches a "hierarchy of Putinomics": "first, political control; second, social stability; third, efficiency and profit." The first two objectives are within reach, but the system's inability to properly fund the country's health-care and educational systems, fight corruption, or establish the rule of law threatens to sacrifice the third.

Peacemakers: American Leadership and the End of Genocide in the Balkans
BY JAMES W. PARDEW. University Press of Kentucky, 2017, 424 pp.

Pardew was at the center of the U.S. diplomatic intervention in the former Yugoslavia from the time of the 1995 Dayton peace accords, which ended the Bosnian war and the accompanying genocide, to Kosovo's independence, in 2008. As a diplomat, he played a key role in rebuilding the Bosnian military after the war; in negotiating the Ohrid Agreement in 2001, which averted a civil war in Macedonia; and in the failed effort to avoid the 1998–99 Kosovo war. He provides a compelling, detailed account of the diplomatic give-and-take with wily Balkan leaders (none more so than Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic),

debates among Western negotiators, and the crosscutting pressures from Brussels and Washington. His portrait of Richard Holbrooke, the controversial but skilled American diplomat, at work during the Dayton negotiations is particularly powerful. Pardew puts the reader in the room during his encounters with several major actors, including Milosevic, both in Holbrooke's company and, later, alone. He acknowledges some of the shortcomings of Washington's policies in the Balkans, but he makes a strong case that U.S. diplomacy ended the Bosnian genocide and prevented further bloodshed.

Anatomy of a Genocide: The Life and Death of a Town Called Buczacz
BY OMER BARTOV. Simon & Schuster, 2018, 416 pp.

In this wrenching but beautiful history, Bartov follows the Jews of Buczacz, an eastern Galician town in what is now Ukraine, from the sixteenth century to World War II. The Jews were welcomed when they arrived in the area and prospered for many years. But they suffered their first mass slaughter during a Cossack and peasant uprising in 1648. The next massacre took place three decades later, at the hands of Ottoman forces. Despite these atrocities, the Jews remained a dominant group within the town's elite. Partly for that reason, they were almost never free from the resentment and enmity of their Polish and Ukrainian neighbors. At the heart of the book are the tragic events of the twentieth century. Bartov recounts the fate of the Jews as German and Russian troops marauded through their town in World War I and during the successive German and Soviet invasions of World War II, ending with the final Soviet offensive of 1944–45. His account of this last nightmare is specific and personal. There are moments of humanity in the story, but they appear only as bright specks in a very dark stone.

My Life as a Spy: Investigations in a Secret Police File
BY KATHERINE VERDERY. Duke University Press, 2018, 344 pp.

From 1973 to 1988, Verdery, an anthropologist, spent a total of nearly four years conducting field research in Nicolae Ceausescu's Romania. Over that time, Romania's security service amassed an impressive file on her, totaling 2,781 pages in eight volumes. She got ahold of it in 2008 and has spent much of the time since then dealing with its impact on her. The resulting book is an extraordinary exploration of her research, reexperienced through the eyes of those who surveilled her. Believing her to be a spy, the security services built up a wildly distorted picture of her, which she terms her "doppelgänger." Rather than reflexively dismiss this double, she agonizes over its reality, its challenge to her identity, and its implications for her profession. The most dramatic portion of the book centers on her struggle to understand those who informed on her, particularly those she counted as close friends, a few of whom she has confronted face to face. Coming from such a distinguished academic, Verdery's brutally honest description of herself, including as a naive and careless young scholar, is stunning. Few books reflect so frankly and so powerfully on the nature and complications of an academic career.

Stalinist Perpetrators on Trial: Scenes From the Great Terror in Soviet Ukraine
BY LYNNE VIOLA. Oxford University Press, 2017, 304 pp.

The story of Stalin's terror is well known, except for one dimension: the fate of those among the tormentors who were themselves swept into the meat grinder. This "purge of the purgers," as Viola terms it, came after Stalin called off the Great Terror in 1938. Those who had carried out the two mass operations in 1937–38 against former "kulaks" (supposedly well-off peasants), foreigners, and "anti-Soviet" and "socially dangerous" elements—sending almost 1.5 million people to either the gulag or execution—were themselves put on trial. In 1939, nearly a thousand of them were arrested; many were subjected to torture—the very crime for which a lot of them were being tried. After elaborate trials, they were either sentenced to death or the gulag or sent to the front during World War II. Viola draws from Ukraine's secret police archives—which, unlike Russia's, are open—to detail how the accused defended themselves, the testimony against them, and the outcomes. As well as lifting the cover from this less well-known part of the story, Viola explains in great detail the interaction between what was commanded from above and what flowed from forces at the ground level.

Rival Power: Russia in Southeast Europe
BY DIMITAR BECHEV. Yale University Press, 2017, 320 pp.

Bechev introduces a sophisticated and cool-headed corrective to the crude image of Russian foreign policy favored by much of the Western press. He focuses on Russia's relations with four areas of southeastern Europe: the post-Yugoslav republics, Bulgaria and Romania, Greece and Cyprus, and Turkey. Russia's engagement with those countries has little to do with Slavic identity or a desire to fulfill imperialist dreams. Instead, its approach is highly pragmatic and focused on dealmaking, particularly on energy. The other countries are playing the same game. Moscow is eager to increase its influence and, especially at the moment, to damage that of the West, but in the end, the Kremlin is mindful that these countries are in Europe's backyard, not its own. The concluding portion of the book focuses on three critical dimensions of Russia's approach to the region: security relations, particularly with NATO members; the ups and downs of energy projects; and the nature and use of its soft power.

Middle East

John Waterbury

We Crossed a Bridge and It Trembled: Voices From Syria
BY WENDY PEARLMAN. Custom House, 2017, 352 pp.

This collection of hundreds of excerpts from interviews of refugees who have fled the violence that has gripped Syria since 2011 makes for sickening, although unsurprising, reading. The brutality, greed, and cynicism of the leading actors led one refugee to say, "I've reached a point in my life where I hate everything.

I am disgusted by humanity." Another, contemplating the rise of al Qaeda and the Islamic State (also known as ISIS), explained, "You are in dire need for a narrative that can justify the futility." The excerpts follow the major stages of the violence as experienced by the refugees: the peaceful revolution, the government's violent response, the meat grinder of aerial assault and prison torture, the flight abroad, and the process of starting anew. The observations of Assad supporters, religious extremists, and members of foreign proxies, such as Hezbollah, are missing. But that is unsurprising: refugees are not likely to be loyalists.

Fifty Million Rising: The New Generation of Working Women Transforming the Muslim World
BY SAADIA ZAHIDI. Nation Books, 2018, 288 pp.

Between 2000 and 2015, 50 million Muslim women joined the global work force, raising the total to 150 million, with a combined income of $1 trillion. Zahidi, a member of the Executive Committee of the World Economic Forum, is one of them. In this lucid presentation, she draws on 200 interviews to depict an inexorable march forward for Muslim women, who are set to make up over 30 percent of the global Muslim work force by 2030. Zahidi feels no need to mount an Islamic defense of women's right to work and argues that for now, Muslim women should avoid directly confronting the patriarchy. For a time, they will have to do it all: absorb most of the domestic work and master the job market. The Internet, the gig economy, and the traditional extended family can all make the transition easier. So can governments, by improving Internet access for women, promoting education, providing more public transport, reforming workplace rules, and more.

Iraq and the Politics of Oil: An Insider's Perspective
BY GARY VOGLER. University Press of Kansas, 2017, 318 pp.

Vogler, a former ExxonMobil executive, recounts the seven years he spent on and off in Iraq between 2003 and 2015 working to rebuild the oil sector. Most of the book deals with his on-the-ground experiences, offering considerable detail about the main Iraqi and foreign actors, but it ends on a more provocative note. By 2014, Vogler had become convinced that the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq was driven in large part by a plan worked up by Ahmed Chalabi, the head of the Iraqi National Congress, and a cluster of neoconservative policymakers in the Bush administration. The aim of the plan was to reopen a pipeline from Kirkuk, in Iraq, to Haifa, in Israel, that had been closed since Israel's founding in 1948 and which would provide Israel with a major source of oil and substantial transit fees. Ultimately, this quixotic scheme never saw the light of day. The most likely explanation is that the White House viewed it as a possible dividend of the invasion, but not as a major impetus for going to war.

The Muslim Brotherhood and the West: A History of Enmity and Engagement
BY MARTYN FRAMPTON. Belknap Press, 2018, 672 pp.

Frampton exhaustively chronicles the history of the Muslim Brotherhood

from its founding in 1928 to the Arab Spring of 2011. Before the 1970s, the West viewed Islam as a spent force, but then in the middle of that decade, militant jihadists became active in Egypt, and in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran was born. Subsequently, Western governments saw Islam as an integral part of politics, but they never solved the riddle of how to embrace it, and the United States never broke with any of its more secular authoritarian allies. As Frampton demonstrates, the United Kingdom and the United States never treated the Brotherhood as more than a possible tactical ally in the struggle against communism or as a bulwark against more extreme forms of Islam. There were exceptions, such as the British historian H. A. R. Gibb, who preferred the Brotherhood to military dictators in Egypt, but they were few and far between. Despite what many Egyptians believe, there is little evidence that the United States has actively sought to bring the Brotherhood to power.

Saudi, Inc.: The Arabian Kingdom's Pursuit of Profit and Power
BY ELLEN R. WALD. Pegasus Books, 2018, 448 pp.

Wald has written a competent history of the Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Saudi Aramco) and of how the House of Saud came to dominate the Arabian Peninsula in the 1920s. The book is built on interviews, U.S. government records, and the work of other historians, but not Saudi Aramco's archives. Its most original parts deal with the Saudi government's "long game" to gain full control of Aramco while avoiding outright nationalization. That project was completed in 1980, when, after decades of gradually increasing its influence over the company, the government acquired the entire firm. In the resulting arrangement, Aramco owned the expertise, but the kingdom owned the oil it produced. Throughout Aramco's history, Saudi Arabia has always found a way to make money selling oil, shape world petroleum prices, and avoid lasting confrontation with the United States. Even the 1973 embargo of oil exports to the United States, imposed by the Arab members of OPEC in retaliation for U.S. support of Israel during the Yom Kippur War, did not do long-term damage to the U.S.-Saudi alliance.

Asia and Pacific

Andrew J. Nathan

Authoritarian Advance: Responding to China's Growing Political Influence in Europe
BY THORSTEN BENNER, JAN GASPERS, MAREIKE OHLBERG, LUCREZIA POGGETTI, AND KRISTIN SHI-KUPFER. Global Public Policy Institute and Mercator Institute for China Studies, 2018, 53 pp.

This pathbreaking report investigates the ways in which China seeks to shape politics and public opinion in Europe. The Chinese Communist Party uses governmental and ostensibly private wealth in overt and covert ways to influence political and economic elites, the media and public opinion, and civil society and

academia. Some European states have begun to adopt a stance of "preemptive obedience" to Chinese interests on issues such as human rights. The authors name some of China's "willing enablers," including former British Prime Minister David Cameron, who took a post with a Chinese-sponsored infrastructure investment fund after leaving office, and former French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin, who accepted a role in a Chinese cultural-exchange foundation. To protect the integrity of Western systems without violating their character as liberal democracies, the report recommends screening Chinese investments, banning foreign support for political parties, providing help to poorer EU members that are vulnerable to Chinese financial pressure, and promoting transparency for universities, media organizations, and politicians that accept Chinese support. The report also covers similar patterns in Australia and New Zealand, where Chinese influence efforts are even more advanced, and in the United States, where they are expanding rapidly.

The Return of Bipolarity in World Politics: China, the United States, and Geostructural Realism
BY OYSTEIN TUNSJO. Columbia University Press, 2018, 288 pp.

Tunsjo challenges the prevailing view of U.S.-Chinese relations, arguing that even though China is not the military or economic equal of the United States, it is powerful enough to serve as what theorists call a second "pole" in the international system. That makes today's international system not multipolar, as most analysts believe, but bipolar. But he argues that today's bipolar system differs from that of the Cold War because of geographic differences between Europe and Asia. Chinese and U.S. forces do not face each other on land, the way that Soviet and U.S. forces did, so Tunsjo considers a direct superpower confrontation less likely than it was during the Cold War. Proxy wars are also less likely, because China's security concerns are primarily regional rather than global. But he sees a high risk of conflict in maritime East Asia, where today's superpowers both have vital interests. His views provide valuable nuance for the growing number of analysts who are worried about the strategic implications of China's rise.

Making Money: How Taiwanese Industrialists Embraced the Global Economy
BY GARY G. HAMILTON AND CHENG-SHU KAO. Stanford University Press, 2017, 320 pp.

One crucial element of Taiwan's economic success, which began in the 1960s—and equally of its economic slowdown, which started in the 1990s—was the agility of its small and medium-sized "contract manufacturers," firms that produce consumer products for U.S. brands such as Apple and Timberland but have no brand names of their own. By studying the Taiwanese entrepreneurs who built these firms, Hamilton and Kao shed light on the relationship between globalization and the Asian economic miracle. These entrepreneurs sprang out of the countryside in response to the needs of the growing U.S. consumer market. They drew on family and social networks for capital, labor, and parts suppliers and to help organize production.

Whether making cell phones or footwear, the best of these firms have adjusted to changing market conditions, repeatedly innovating their product lines and production methods. This was a boon for Taiwan. But as the island developed, the costs of labor and parts went up, and many Taiwanese entrepreneurs moved their production to China. (Some firms are now leaving China for Southeast Asia and even, in some cases, the United States.) As these companies departed, the Taiwanese economy slowed. Nevertheless, Taiwanese-owned firms remain among the top contract manufacturers in the world.

India Turns East: International Engagement and US-China Rivalry
BY FRÉDÉRIC GRARE. Oxford University Press, 2017, 280 pp.

Since the early 1990s, most Indian strategists have viewed China as their country's main security threat. One result has been New Delhi's cooperation with Washington—halting and ambivalent though it is. Less well known is India's Look East Policy, formally adopted in 1992, by which New Delhi has sought to increase its economic, diplomatic, and security ties with countries and institutions in East Asia and Southeast Asia. This useful survey finds that the policy has generated a number of joint declarations but only modest programs of defense cooperation, intelligence sharing, and arms sales with partners such as Japan, Singapore, and Vietnam. India signed a free-trade agreement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and pivoted from suspicion of to engagement with ASEAN's associated institutions. But India's attempts to strengthen ties

with Australia and Myanmar have been hampered by both countries' reluctance to antagonize China. Indeed, India itself does not want to confront China. Grare cautions that the Look East Policy does not offer the congruence with U.S. strategies that some Washington policymakers like to imagine.

China's Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative
BY NADÈGE ROLLAND. National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017, 208 pp.

Billions of dollars are flowing out of China, as part of the country's Belt and Road Initiative, to build ports, railways, roads, pipelines, and telecommunications facilities across the Eurasian land mass (the "belt") and along the coast of the Indian Ocean (the "road"). The physical infrastructure undergirds growing trade, financial, academic, and political networks. Chinese President Xi Jinping's rhetoric about a wealthy China giving back to the world and win-win cooperation is not without foundation, as hungry governments, not just in the developing world but also in Europe, gratefully soak up Chinese investments. But Rolland's helpful survey reveals the initiative's strategic motives, which include providing outlets for China's excess production capacity and generating a Eurasian center of gravity as a counterweight to U.S. influence in maritime Asia. Rolland speculates that Xi's long-term vision is to create a world order in which Western-style rule of law and democracy promotion are replaced by deference to Chinese interests and the international application of Chinese "stability maintenance" techniques.

End of an Era: How China's Authoritarian Revival Is Undermining Its Rise
BY CARL MINZNER. Oxford University Press, 2018, 296 pp.

As Xi Jinping embarks on his second five-year term as China's top leader, Minzner delivers a withering assessment of his first one, in a well-informed contribution to the flourishing declinist school of China analysis. Over the last five years, Xi has intensified his retreat from reform. A reversal of economic liberalization has led to widening income inequality, calcifying class lines, and an economic slowdown. Instead of advancing fairness in the legal system and transparency in media, Xi has tightened social control so that grievances intensify without finding outlets other than Internet rants, mob violence, and illegal protests. State control of religion drives many believers into underground sects. By concentrating an unprecedented amount of power in himself, Xi is destroying hard-won rules of the political game that contributed to regime stability. All this repression breeds resistance, and resistance breeds further repression, in a cycle that Minzner predicts will end badly.

China as a Polar Great Power
BY ANNE-MARIE BRADY. Cambridge University Press, 2017, 290 pp.

In this study of China's efforts to become the only nation other than the United States capable of operating comprehensively in both the Arctic and Antarctica, Brady opens up a new frontier of insight into an area of international relations all but ignored by Western scholarship. She draws on a wide range of Chinese

sources to offer eye-opening revelations about China's burgeoning polar activities. Beijing regards the polar regions as vital domains for fishing and shipping and hopes to exploit their rich reserves of energy and minerals. It also plans to use its activities there to grow China's global influence, something that Washington has encouraged by largely ignoring the issue. Beijing talks little about its polar activities and is deliberately ambiguous when it does, meaning that these moves have drawn little notice outside specialized professional communities. Yet as a component of an ambitious grand strategy laid out by President Xi Jinping, China's development as a polar great power will shape how the changing global order is governed. Brady's book provides the best place to start for understanding the genesis, motivations, and dynamics of China's exploits in the ice.

ANDREW ERICKSON

Africa

Nicolas van de Walle

Congo's Violent Peace: Conflict and Struggle Since the Great African War
BY KRIS BERWOUTS. University of Chicago Press, 2017, 256 pp.

Berwouts' savvy history explores how the Democratic Republic of the Congo has changed since the official end of the war that devastated the country from the late 1990s to the early years of this century. Recent analyses of Congo have tended to discuss either the political dynamics in the capital or

the persistent outbreaks of ethnic violence and human rights abuses in the country's east, with its complex and ever-changing array of armed groups. Berwouts shows how the two are linked. Local ethnic conflicts over land and resources have been exacerbated by a combination of neglect and short-term political manipulation by the Congolese state. Other countries in the region, mostly notably Rwanda, have also stirred up trouble. The predatory, although largely incompetent, regime of President Joseph Kabila has survived for 17 years but failed to build a state capable of promoting development or stabilizing the eastern provinces. Berwouts ends with a pessimistic review of recent popular protests over Kabila's attempts to grant himself a third term without holding elections. Today, Berwouts believes, Congo is once again facing a descent into violence.

Soldiers in Revolt: Army Mutinies in Africa
BY MAGGIE DWYER. Oxford University Press, 2018, 256 pp.

Most of the literature on African militaries focuses either on the officers or on the relationship between the brass and civilian politicians. Dwyer's compelling study of mutinies in West Africa, which are growing increasingly common, is welcome because it concentrates on the rank and file and noncommissioned officers, the groups that are most likely to rebel. She shows that insurrections follow a different logic from coups, as mutinies are not typically motivated by a desire for regime change. Instead, soldiers start them to make demands about their material conditions and communicate their unhappiness with specific officers or policies. Dwyer suggests that two factors have increased the frequency of mutinies in recent years. First, the democratization of several countries in the region has spurred all Africans to voice public grievances, and soldiers are no exception. Second, she finds that mutinies are more likely in armies that are involved in international peacekeeping operations, because the extra pay they entail generates greater inequality between ranks and because they present substantially more risk to individual soldiers, which makes them more likely to question the military hierarchy.

The Next Factory of the World: How Chinese Investment Is Reshaping Africa
BY IRENE YUAN SUN. Harvard Business Review Press, 2017, 224 pp.

This book is short on hard data and long on generalizations, but it is nonetheless worth reading because it expresses a popular argument: that China's growing commercial interest in Africa is fundamentally altering the continent's business climate and creating the possibility of a manufacturing revolution there. Sun is not concerned with the substantial deals that the Chinese state has brokered with the governments of oil-rich countries, such as Angola. Instead, she focuses on the many Chinese entrepreneurs who are undertaking smaller ventures in Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, and Nigeria. She argues that independent Chinese investors are spearheading the current rapid economic growth in those countries thanks to a willingness to take risks that Western businesses will not. Yet although she tells revealing anecdotes about individual firms, she never provides the kind of systematic

data that would make her case convincing. The book is also frustratingly silent on what Chinese investors have done to overcome high labor costs and poor infrastructure, the main constraints on the competitiveness of African manufacturing.

African Dominion: A New History of Empire in Early and Medieval West Africa
BY MICHAEL A. GOMEZ. Princeton University Press, 2018, 520 pp.

For a long time, Western historians downplayed the influence that West Africa's precolonial political traditions have had on the region's modern culture, economics, and politics. Even today, scholars' understanding of the great West African medieval states remains hampered by weak and sometimes contradictory evidence, essentially limited to a small number of Arab sources, some complementary Portuguese and Spanish material, and what's left of an important oral tradition. The earliest and most powerful of the kingdoms that emerged in West Africa, based on trading networks along the Niger and Senegal Rivers, were the Ghana, Mali, and Songhai empires, which dominated the region in succession from the eighth century to the sixteenth century. Gomez's ambitious new study uses the available evidence to construct a remarkably detailed understanding of the rise and fall of these empires. His book is particularly cogent on the cultural, political, and administrative lineages that linked them; the growth of Islam; and the institution of slavery. There are more readable introductions to the region's history, but none that is better informed.

Building a Capable State: Service Delivery in Post-Apartheid South Africa
BY IAN PALMER, SUSAN PARNELL, AND NISHENDRA MOODLEY. University of Chicago Press, 2017, 320 pp.

During apartheid, South Africa built local administrations that delivered social services at First World levels to the small white minority, even as they ignored the large black majority. The challenge after apartheid ended, in 1994, was to extend the same quality and quantity of services to the entire population. This lucid and detailed review of local administrations since then argues that they have made a great deal of progress in housing, public transportation, and sanitation. (Local governments are not responsible for education and health, so the authors pay little attention to those areas.) The book depicts an impressive level of pragmatism, dedication, and vision among the decision-makers who achieved this progress. But, the authors argue, officials have not done enough to address major problems of racial and geographic inequality. And the authors' overall optimism is tempered by their worries about the corruption of President Jacob Zuma's administration; completing this unfinished agenda is now up to Zuma's successor, Cyril Ramaphosa.

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Has Democracy Lost Its Appeal?

Foreign Affairs Brain Trust

We asked dozens of experts whether they agreed or disagreed that democracy has lost its global appeal. The results from those who responded are below:



DISAGREE, CONFIDENCE LEVEL 7

Steven Levitsky

Professor of Government, Harvard University

"Democracy never had quite the global appeal that many believed it to have in the 1990s, and the decline is not as steep as many now claim. The West has lost some appeal, and liberalism has lost some appeal, but competitive electoral politics still appeal to many citizens across much of the globe."

AGREE, CONFIDENCE LEVEL 9

Julianne Smith

Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security

"People in multiple democratic systems around the world are losing faith in their governments' ability to deliver both economically and politically, which is fueling populism."

→ **See the full responses at ForeignAffairs.com/DemocracyLosingAppeal**

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