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

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


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AMERICA'S FORGOTTEN WARS

COVER: JON BERKELEY

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Despite having opposed the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, **EMMA SKY**, once the invasion happened, headed to Iraq to work for the Coalition Provisional Authority. Over the next decade, she became a key player in Western efforts at reconstruction, serving as the governorate coordinator of the province of Kirkuk and later as a political adviser to General Raymond Odierno, the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq. Now a senior fellow at Yale University's Jackson Institute for Global Affairs, in "Mission Still Not Accomplished in Iraq" (page 9), she makes the case against U.S. disengagement.

Over the past decade, **LISA MONACO** has worked on many aspects of the United States' fight against terrorism, serving as chief of staff to the director of the FBI, head of the Justice Department's National Security Division, and President Barack Obama's homeland security adviser. After leaving government in January, she joined New York University as a distinguished senior fellow in law and security. In "Preventing the Next Attack" (page 23), Monaco sets out how the United States can protect itself from the terrorist threat.

Growing up, **STEPHEN KOTKIN** wanted to be a doctor. But after fainting at the sight of blood during a biology class, he switched to the humanities. After completing a Ph.D. in history at the University of California, Berkeley, he joined Princeton University, where he is now a professor and a leading scholar of the Soviet Union. In "When Stalin Faced Hitler" (page 48), Kotkin tells the story of the fateful night leading up to the morning in 1941 when, after years of mutual nonaggression, Germany finally attacked the Soviet Union.

As a young scholar in the early 1980s, **OLIVIER ROY** roamed Afghanistan with the mujahideen, studying the relations between the Afghan resistance and fundamentalist Islamic movements. He went on to become a political scientist and has spent the past three and a half decades producing groundbreaking analyses of Islamism. Now a professor at the European University Institute, in Florence, in "Political Islam After the Arab Spring" (page 127), Roy argues that in many Muslim countries, mainstream Islamist parties are taking an increasingly secular approach to politics.

AMERICA'S FORGOTTEN WARS

You don't hear much about it in the media, but American forces are waging several conflicts around the world these days. As Washington obsesses over soap operas and scandals, the actual work of maintaining global order continues under the radar. The result is a national security discourse that looks like a mullet: business at the front, party in the back.

Our lead package this issue is an attempt to redress the balance, giving U.S. interventions the serious scrutiny they deserve. Think of it as a journey back to the front. We asked top experts on six key conflicts to sketch where things are, where they are going, and what the United States should do next—and we're delighted to bring you their answers.

Kosh Sadat and Stan McChrystal explain why pursuing some form of the current U.S. strategy in Afghanistan continues to be the least bad option there, even though nobody is particularly happy with the results to date.

Emma Sky and Robert Ford bring their wealth of experience to bear on the post-ISIS landscape in Iraq and Syria, respectively, with Sky advising Washington to focus on local politics and institution building while Ford suggests curtailing most engagement beyond refugee assistance.

Ivo Daalder tackles the new eastern front, arguing that given Russia's actions in Ukraine, the Middle East, and elsewhere, the United States and its NATO allies should focus on preventing miscalculations and unintended escalation.

And Lisa Monaco and Susan Hennessey explore the more amorphous realms of terrorism and cyberwarfare, respectively, arguing that international cooperation, restored deterrence, and calibrated pushback can help contain these complex and enduring threats.

U.S. foreign policy is apparently taking a gap year. Inexperienced, understaffed, and lacking a coherent grand strategy, the Trump administration has generally reacted to global events rather than driven them, engaging the world episodically and idiosyncratically. Some issues, however—like the ones covered here—are simply too important to be pushed to a back burner or delegated to staff wearing uniforms. Eventually, attention must be paid.

—Gideon Rose, Editor

As satisfying as it might be to declare "game over" and move on, a post-American Afghanistan is not a pretty picture.

—Kosh Sadat and Stan McChrystal



JON BERKELEY

Staying the Course in Afghanistan

How to Fight the Longest War

Kosh Sadat and Stan McChrystal

The cigarette glowed red as he took a drag, and the smoke rose rapidly as he exhaled. It had been a long afternoon. It had been a long war.

It was February 2010, and after months establishing a relationship, Pakistan's chief of army staff, Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, and one of us, Stan McChrystal, were having the kind of conversation senior military commanders are supposed to have, discussing the role of the NATO-led coalition's efforts in Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan. We'd spent hours alone, each laying out in detail a strategy for the conflict. While not quite my second home, the Pakistani army's headquarters in Rawalpindi was now familiar ground, and Kayani, a colleague with whom I spoke easily. Nothing, however, could soften the blow of his message to me.

KOSH SADAT is a former Lieutenant Colonel in the Afghan Special Operations Forces. From 2009 to 2011, he served as Aide-de-Camp to the Commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

STAN McCHRYSTAL is a retired U.S. Army General. He first served in Afghanistan in 2002 as Chief of Staff of Combined Joint Task Force 180, and from 2009 to 2010, he served as Commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

"For the mission you've been given, you have the right strategy," he told me. "But it won't work, because you don't have enough time."

There was nothing revelatory in the general's assessment, because like many others, I had already reluctantly concluded that it was likely correct. It may seem laughable that back in 2010, nine years after the war had begun and eight since I had first started serving there, we felt pressed for time. But for most of those years, the coalition's efforts had been underresourced and poorly coordinated. And in December 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama had announced a commitment to begin reducing the United States' role in 18 months. The clock was ticking. Still, the president had also decided to reinforce the U.S. effort so that it would comprise 150,000 U.S. and coalition forces and include an ongoing effort to train, equip, and advise 350,000 Afghan forces. If ever the United States had a realistic shot of success in its post-9/11 involvement in Afghanistan, it was then.

That was seven years of hope, effort, blood, and frustration ago. Today, anything that feels like success looks more distant than ever. The U.S.-backed government in Kabul remains plagued by political infighting and corruption, and the Afghan security forces cannot control significant parts of the country. The Taliban, while no longer the idealistic young fighters that swept north in 1994 and not particularly popular with the Afghan people, have leveraged Kabul's weaknesses to make gains in recent years.

Against this backdrop, U.S. President Donald Trump has outlined a new strategy. As he detailed in a speech in August, the United States will continue its commitment in Afghanistan, modestly

The fight goes on: near Jalalabad, Afghanistan, December 2014

LUCAS JACKSON / REUTERS

increase the number of troops to boost the capacity of the Afghan security forces, and redouble counterterrorist operations against the Islamic State, or ISIS, and other groups. It is largely more of the same.

The announcement represented a major reversal: as a candidate, Trump unequivocally declared his intention to end the U.S. military's involvement in Afghanistan, but as president, he has pledged to extend it. In truth, however, there wasn't much room for a different decision: withdrawing would risk turning the country back into the terrorist safe haven it was before 9/11, and drastically ramping up the U.S. presence would be a political nonstarter. That leaves something resembling the current approach as the only real option. Stuck with doing more of the same, Washington must try to do it better.

WHERE ARE WE NOW?

The United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001 to destroy al Qaeda and overthrow the Taliban regime that was hosting it. The overarching goal was always to protect the United States by denying terrorists a safe haven in which to plan and train, but over time, the mission grew. Eventually, it came to include the establishment of an Afghan nation that defended its own sovereignty, embraced democracy, educated women, and cracked down on opium production.

Although the initial operations appeared to work, complexities on the ground, plus the distraction of the war in Iraq, sidetracked the effort, and the Taliban's presence expanded. When Obama came into office, in 2009, he took a hard look at the Afghan campaign and announced a surge of U.S. troops and a reinvigorated counterinsurgency

strategy. But by the middle of 2015, the troop surge was complete, and a subsequent drawdown left only 9,800 coalition troops in the country, most of whom were focused on training and advising the Afghans. Progress had been made, but it was limited.

Today, Afghanistan is struggling to survive. Although the Taliban have de facto control over only limited areas of the country, their presence and influence are likely at their highest levels since the group lost power in 2001. Remnants of the al Qaeda network and one of its branches, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, are also active, having been pushed out of Pakistan's tribal areas in late 2014 by the Pakistani military. The Islamic State in Khorasan, as the branch of ISIS in Afghanistan and Pakistan is known, enjoys free rein on both sides of the two countries' border. Although each of these groups has its own transnational agenda, all have made common cause with the Taliban to overthrow the Afghan government.

The fragility of Afghanistan's security sector is making their job easier. The 180,000 soldiers of the Afghan National Army, trained and equipped largely by the United States, are employed primarily at static checkpoints around the country that are vulnerable to Taliban attacks. The Afghan National Police, which is riddled with corruption and poor leadership, is used more for the protection of members of parliament and other officials than for its intended purpose of enforcing law and order. Afghanistan's premier intelligence agency, the National Directorate of Security, is increasingly involved in military operations against terrorist groups instead of providing essential intelligence.

Compounding the challenges, the Afghan legal system struggles to deal with corruption and criminality. Knowing little about the law and the rights of citizenship, Afghan security forces often make critical mistakes, for instance, detaining innocent civilians. By contrast, Taliban fighters—especially those in the lethal Haqqani network, an offshoot of the Taliban based in Pakistan—often have a thorough understanding of the law. When captured, they have proved adept at minimizing their sentences or avoiding conviction altogether.

In Kabul, meanwhile, politics have reached a standstill. Despite its name, the National Unity Government—a power-sharing deal brokered by the United States in 2014 that made Ashraf Ghani president and Abdullah Abdullah chief executive—is deeply divided.

Whatever progress the United States has made after 16 years, it is inarguably incomplete. To some Americans, the effort has succeeded in building a shaky foundation on which more can and should be constructed. To others, it represents a fruitless waste of blood and treasure. For the ordinary Afghan, however, the U.S. campaign has led to frightening uncertainty about the future.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

In 1902, Vladimir Lenin published a now famous pamphlet titled *What Is to Be Done?*, in which he prescribed a strategy for what later became the Bolsheviks' successful takeover of Russia's 1917 revolution. Lenin argued that Russia's working classes required the leadership of dedicated cadres before they would become sufficiently politicized to demand change in tsarist Russia. It was a clear-eyed assessment of reality. The same is needed for Afghanistan now.

The United States has three basic options in Afghanistan: do less, continue on the current path, or do more. There is material for endless debates about the merits of each, but it helps to begin by remembering what the United States' objectives in Afghanistan were and still are. As Obama said in his 2009 West Point speech about Afghanistan, "We must deny al Qaeda a safe haven. We must reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government. And we must strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's security forces and government, so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan's future."

If those objectives, or anything close to them, remain valid, it is hard to view doing less as an acceptable course of action. Although the government of Afghan President Mohammad Najibullah survived for three years after the Soviets withdrew, before falling to opposition forces, it took muscular logistical support and infighting among the opposition warlords to keep it in the fight for so long. Many observers believe that absent at least the current level of support, Ghani's government could last only a small fraction of that time.

As for the doing-more option, why couldn't the United States consider a version of the 2009 troop surge again? That strategy, while flawed due to ambitious timelines and the failure to execute a truly whole-of-government approach, could have succeeded had Washington demonstrated the necessary patience and commitment. But executing a counterinsurgency campaign over an extended period, always difficult for the American psyche, was a particularly tall order after the recent experience in Iraq. Today, gathering the popular and political support for a major increase in U.S. troop levels and a renewed commitment of many years is even more unlikely. Unless conditions on the ground changed drastically, it would be unrealistic to propose such a strategy. Besides, Afghans across the nation appreciate that a stepped-up U.S. presence would not be politically sustainable for long, thus increasing their concerns about what would happen after the Americans left.

That leaves the current approach as the only viable option. Under this strategy, Washington would have to lower its ambitions in Afghanistan, with the goal being merely a long-term relationship with and a limited military presence in a troubled but functioning country. As they shed some of the loftier goals of the past, policymakers will have to make it clear that the United States is unequivocally committed to its core goals. It would still promote regional stability, encourage modest but steady economic development, and maintain a platform from which to collect intelligence and carry out counterterrorism operations. Although this strategy would indeed come at a cost, its advantages—namely, ensuring the survival of a non-Taliban government—would be worth the price.

Critics may charge that following this course would meet the definition of insanity—which, as that old adage has it, is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result. But as with everything in Afghanistan, the truth is more complicated. The United States has no better choice at hand, and in fact, this one is not all that bad. What's more, within the confines of this strategy, there is room for improvement—in terms of fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan, dealing with them and their allies in

Pakistan, and building a more responsible government in Kabul.

TARGETING THE TALIBAN

Continuing to dismantle the Taliban in Afghanistan is easier said than done, of course, but it is probably essential to the survival of Afghanistan as a nation. No other opposition group in the country has been as successful in building a movement as the Taliban have. Portraying themselves as the more legitimate alternative to the current regime, the Taliban threaten the state and continue to offer sanctuary to ISIS and other transnational threats.

The United States should continue to squeeze the Taliban with a steady campaign of targeted strikes against their leadership, training camps, and other facilities. But Washington also needs to look outside Afghanistan and seek to increase international pressure on the group. Getting a UN resolution designating the Taliban as a global terrorist group would be a powerful move—it would severely undercut their legitimacy and reduce their access to external support—but an admittedly heavy lift. More likely to bear fruit would be the application of diplomatic pressure on countries offering support and sanctuary to the Taliban, especially the Arab Gulf states, where to this day, the Taliban freely collect donations and run businesses.

That would also mean putting pressure on Pakistan, of course, a tactic that has proved difficult and largely ineffective. Although the Pakistanis have taken action against some threats, the leaders of the Taliban, the Haqqani network, and other terrorist groups continue to operate relatively freely in major Pakistani cities, such as Peshawar, Quetta, and even the capital, Islamabad. It would be nice if it were possible to secure Afghanistan without reorienting the U.S. relationship with Pakistan, but experience proves that it is not.

Disappointingly, pressuring Pakistan to take more effective actions to deny the Taliban sanctuary is not the silver bullet some hope for. Pressure could come in the form of reduced military assistance, but Washington's leverage is relatively limited and could threaten U.S. supply lines that run through Pakistan, as well as add further friction to an already strained relationship. Still, wherever possible, pressure is appropriate.

A political solution to the problem of the Taliban would be preferable, and it's possible that renewed military pressure could drive the group to the negotiating table. But it would be a mistake to overestimate the Taliban's sensitivity to such efforts. As long as the group believes there is any probability of success, even over a long time horizon, it is likely to stay in the fight, so a peace deal remains a distant prospect. It's worth remembering that the efforts of Afghanistan's High Peace Council, a body designed to negotiate a deal with the Taliban, came to a halt in 2011, when its leader, Burhanuddin Rabbani, was assassinated. (Rabbani was killed when someone claiming to be a member of the Taliban who wanted to discuss peace detonated a bomb hidden in his turban.) And the Taliban's steady drumbeat of high-profile attacks in Afghanistan, resulting in scores of civilian deaths, makes negotiations nearly impossible in the current environment. The best the United States can do is to put unrelenting pressure on the Taliban while helping build the capacity of the Afghan state—so that the Afghans can eventually

assume full responsibility for maintaining their sovereignty and preventing the reemergence of terrorist sanctuaries.

FOLLOW THE ENEMY

There is a common Afghan saying that roughly translates as "If water is muddied downstream, don't waste your time filtering it; better to go upstream." Likewise, no U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan can succeed if the enemy enjoys a safe haven in Pakistan. The United States must therefore refine and focus its operations there.

Filtering the water upstream, so to speak, has proved politically difficult across national borders. The U.S. military's 1916–17 incursion into Mexico to hunt the guerilla leader Pancho Villa was famously controversial, as were its campaigns against North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos during the Vietnam War. British forces acting on behalf of Malaysia conducted cross-border operations in Indonesia in the 1960s; the Soviets threatened to attack mujahideen safe havens in Pakistan in the 1980s; and during the Iraq war, U.S. Special Forces reached into Syria in pursuit of al Qaeda in Iraq operatives. In each case, the complexities were huge.

Still, it would be a mistake to rule out U.S. operations in Pakistan. Like the mujahideen in the 1980s, the Taliban today are organized around three main hubs in the country—the province of Baluchistan, the Waziristan region of the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas, and the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. From all three places, the Taliban launch attacks across the border into Afghanistan with impunity. Teams of Haqqani network operatives sent to conduct high-profile attacks have even managed to pass through the Torkham border crossing, in the famous Khyber Pass, using legitimate documents. Specially selected and trained inside Pakistan, they conduct meticulously planned and rehearsed lethal attacks against foreign embassies, Afghan government offices, and U.S. and NATO military installations.

A purely defensive strategy against these threats will never be sufficient; highly focused offensive operations, primarily in Afghanistan but, when necessary, also inside Pakistan, are required. To be sure, the United States has conducted such operations since the war in Afghanistan began, but it can do more. To maximize their effectiveness, the United States should assemble an integrated task force with Afghanistan that allows the two countries' intelligence communities, law enforcement agencies, and militaries to collaborate. (Washington should also break down its own organizational silos that inhibit coordination and intelligence sharing when it comes to threats in Afghanistan.) In the best-case scenario, Pakistan would willingly participate in these joint efforts, but in the event that it does not show such unprecedented cooperation, they should go on regardless.

A MORE CAPABLE KABUL

The final element of the United States' strategy in Afghanistan should involve convincing the Afghan government to press forward with reforms. Absent a concerted and effective campaign to reduce corruption and increase the effectiveness of key institutions, legitimacy with the Afghan people will remain elusive. Over the past 16 years, Washington has spent billions of dollars on training and equipping Afghan forces and building Afghanistan's infrastructure, yet the

country still has few properly functioning institutions. The handful of ones that do work owe their success to investments in developing leadership.

Driving reform in the Afghan government will require continuous coordination with the Afghans themselves, and many more than three cups of tea. Improving Afghanistan's institutions will take the long-term work of building human capital and changing officials' behavior, rather than short-term infrastructure or other projects. Accordingly, the United States needs to work closely with Afghanistan to select, train, mentor, and support the right caliber of leaders. Putting in place a "civilian surge" of large numbers of nonmilitary experts, as some have called for, is impractical. Creating and fielding such a group has proved difficult in the past, and the American public has little appetite for such an effort. But the United States could find purchase in supporting a smaller network of U.S. and international civilian advisers who would stay in Afghanistan for longer tours of duty. Driving change in any society is difficult, but Afghanistan's complex environment is no place for well-intentioned neophytes or dilettantes. For the greatest probability of long-term success, the United States will need to create across multiple organizations a cadre of dedicated professionals who are steeped in the language, culture, and political realities of Afghanistan and who are connected by a coordinated strategy.

PRESSING ON

It's tempting to view any further effort in Afghanistan as the ultimate example of stupidity or stubbornness. In the so-called graveyard of empires, failure may seem inevitable. But such pessimism ignores that a majority of Afghans oppose a Taliban regime and few would benefit from the Taliban's return to power. Furthermore, the United States and its allies in post-9/11 Afghanistan have largely avoided being cast as colonialists. To be sure, Afghans have expressed their frustrations—from outrage over civilian casualties to disappointment about the lack of economic progress—but more of them wish for a better-executed effort than wish for abandonment.

Other skeptics may argue that even a limited effort could fail, and if it does, Washington could be forced into the hellish position of reluctantly increasing its commitment to an unworthy client state. The prospect brings to mind memories of the gradual, and ultimately unsuccessful, escalation in Vietnam. This is indeed a risk, but it is manageable, if Washington carefully identifies its objectives, and worth accepting in light of the alternatives.

As satisfying as it might be to declare "game over" and move on, a post-American Afghanistan is not a pretty picture. Even though too great a Western presence in the Muslim world generates resentment, it is also true that a total absence reinforces the narrative that the United States doesn't care about the non-Christian parts of the world. Without resurrecting the domino theory from the Cold War, one can still say that an American retreat from Afghanistan is unlikely to return the country to the tranquil place that served as the exotic setting for James Michener's 1963 novel *Caravans*. More probable is a repressive and ideological regime that supports transnational terrorist groups. Among a range of unpalatable choices, the best option is to pursue some version of the current policy. The United States might as well do that as well as it can.

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Director of the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies and Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies

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Mission Still Not Accomplished in Iraq

Why the United States Should Not Leave

Emma Sky

In July 2017, Iraqi soldiers, backed by U.S. air strikes, liberated Mosul, the city where Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State (also known as ISIS), had declared a caliphate just three years before. It was a hard-won victory. For nine grueling months, Iraq's Counter Terrorism Service, an elite group of U.S.-trained forces, suffered heavy losses as they fought street by street to uproot ISIS fighters, who used the local population as human shields. Thousands of civilians were killed, and a million or so were displaced from their homes. Mosul's historic monuments have been destroyed. And the city's infrastructure lies in tatters.

But there is also much to celebrate. The liberation of Mosul ended a reign of terror that saw children brainwashed in schools, smokers publicly flogged, Yazidi women reduced to sex slaves, and gay men thrown from rooftops. The victory also struck a devastating blow to ISIS, killing thousands of its fighters, shrinking its resources, crushing its organizational capacity, and diminishing its global appeal.

With a military victory in hand, U.S. President Donald Trump might want to declare "mission accomplished" and seek a hasty exit from Iraq. Fourteen years after the U.S. invasion, that choice is no doubt tempting. But making it would be a dangerous mistake.

As much as Trump and other Americans may wish to end any involvement, what happens in Iraq does not stay in Iraq. ISIS has lost most of the territory it controlled in the country and is severely weakened as an organization, but the group retains the capacity to conduct attacks internationally. And U.S. support is still needed to strengthen the Iraqi state and to discourage other countries in the region from filling the power vacuum. The collapse of Iraq was instrumental in the unraveling of regional order; its stability is key to restoring a balance of power.

WHAT WENT WRONG?

In March 2003, the United States invaded Iraq on the assumption (which later proved incorrect) that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was developing weapons of mass destruction. Military success was quick—the U.S.-led coalition toppled Saddam's government within a few weeks—but political success proved more elusive. In 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority dismissed Iraqi civil servants and dissolved the security forces. These decisions led to the collapse of the state and civil war, which allowed al Qaeda in Iraq to gain a foothold and Iran to expand its influence. During U.S. President George W. Bush's second term, however, the United States managed to reverse a seemingly bleak

EMMA SKY is a Senior Fellow at Yale University's Jackson Institute for Global Affairs and the author of *The Unraveling: High Hopes and Missed Opportunities in Iraq.* She was Governorate Coordinator of Kirkuk from 2003 to 2004 and Political Adviser to U.S. Army General Raymond Odierno from 2007 to 2010.

prognosis. The surge of additional U.S. troops into the country in 2007, combined with the cooperation of Sunni tribes (the so-called Sunni Awakening), dramatically reduced sectarian violence and brought about the defeat of al Qaeda in Iraq.

When U.S. President Barack Obama took office, in 2009, both the Americans and the Iraqis believed that the sectarian civil war was over and that the country was finally on the right track. But rather than capitalizing on these successes to cajole Iraqi politicians toward compromise, the Obama administration disengaged. The 2010 Iraqi election marked an inflection point. When Iraqiya, the nationalist, nonsectarian political party led by Ayad Allawi, narrowly defeated the Dawa Party, led by Nouri al-Maliki, the incumbent prime minister, the Obama administration failed to uphold the right of the winning bloc to have the first go at forming a government. Instead, it signaled its desire to keep Maliki in power, despite the stipulations of the Iraqi constitution and the objections of Iraqi politicians.

The Obama administration insisted that Maliki was an Iraqi nationalist and a friend of the United States. But in reality, the decision to keep him in place played into the hands of Iran. Tehran pressured the anti-American Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, one of Maliki's most outspoken foes, to align his powerful political bloc with Maliki's coalition, a move that was instrumental in securing another term for the prime minister. In exchange for Iran's help in forging the alliance with Sadr, Maliki agreed to ensure the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq by 2011, when the status-of-forces agreement between the two countries was set to expire.

Instead of marking the peaceful transition of power in a new democratic system, the 2010 election undermined confidence that change could come about through politics. Secure in his seat for a second term, Maliki reneged on his promises to the Sunni Awakening. He labeled Sunni politicians as "terrorists," driving them out of the political process, and he ordered the security forces to violently crush Sunni dissent. In so doing, Maliki created conditions that allowed a new group to rise up out of the ashes of al Qaeda in Iraq. ISIS, as it came to be known, proclaimed itself the defender of Sunnis against Maliki's regime. Feeling betrayed and discriminated against by the government, many Sunnis determined that ISIS was the lesser of two evils.

Maliki further undermined Iraq's fledgling democratic institutions by politicizing them. These moves were particularly damaging to the military, where Maliki replaced many effective Iraqi security forces commanders—whom he regarded as too close to the Americans—with loyalists.

The Obama administration's decision to disengage from Iraq ultimately brought about conditions that required it to reengage. By 2014, ISIS had taken control of a third of the country, and the Iraqi army—trained and equipped by the United States at a cost of billions of dollars—had disintegrated, leaving behind its U.S.-supplied equipment for ISIS to capture. Confronted with a well-armed terrorist group and a weak state whose army had collapsed, the Obama administration withdrew its support from Maliki and demanded that he be replaced before once again dispatching U.S. forces to Iraq.

Back in town: Iraqi forces after liberating the village of Khalidiya from ISIS, October 2016

THAIER AL-SUDANI / REUTERS

MAPPING THE POLITICAL FIELD

Now, with ISIS unseated from Mosul and the 2018 elections on the horizon, Iraq has reached another inflection point. The current fragmentation of Iraq's political landscape provides a chance for meaningful cross-sectarian coalition building. But there is also a risk that other countries in the region might seize the opportunity to increase their influence as Iraqi politicians compete with one another for power.

Maliki's replacement as prime minister, Haider al-Abadi has sought to balance American and Iranian support and has tried to remain neutral in regional power struggles. He has also adopted a much more inclusive approach to domestic politics. To stay in power, he might form political alliances with a range of factions. One potential ally is Sadr, who has already announced his intention to form a political alliance with Allawi, the politician whose coalition defeated Maliki in 2010. Abadi may also find allies among Shiite Islamist political parties, such as the newly formed al-Hikma group, led by Ammar al-Hakim. The recent victory against ISIS has strengthened Abadi's position, but he still needs to build up his own power base.

Abadi also faces strong competition. Still smarting from being deposed, Maliki is constantly working to undermine Abadi and advance his anti-American and pro-Iranian agenda. Another key player is Hadi al-Ameri, the leader of the Badr Organization, a Shiite militia–cum–political party intent on deepening Iraq's ties to Iran and attacking secular activists.

Sunni leaders, meanwhile, remain divided and disgraced, and the old guard has been unwilling to step aside to allow a younger generation of politicians to emerge. Shiite leaders accuse the Sunnis of being beholden to neighboring countries

such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey—a fear stoked by the Sunnis' habit of holding political conferences abroad. Further complicating reconciliation is the desire for revenge against those who collaborated with ISIS and a widespread suspicion that many Sunnis initially welcomed ISIS into their cities.

THE KURDISH QUESTION

The Kurds, in contrast, find themselves in a stronger position, which they hope to leverage in their bid for independence. Kurdish ambitions for statehood date back to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, when the imperial powers drew new borders in the Middle East. Despite promises to the contrary, the Kurds did not receive a country; instead, their lands were incorporated into Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey.

But over the last few years, their situation has changed. During the campaign against ISIS, the Iraqi Kurds received weapons directly from the international community (rather than through Baghdad), and they were able to extend the territory under their control to include the multiethnic and oil-rich city of Kirkuk. These developments generated momentum, which led Masoud Barzani, the president of the Kurdistan Regional Government, to schedule a referendum on independence for September 25, 2017.

To achieve independence, however, the Kurds must surmount numerous obstacles, both internal and external. Iran and Turkey both strongly objected to the referendum out of the fear that it might strengthen the Kurdish secessionist movements in their respective countries. The United States also continues to support a unified Iraq, and U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson pushed the Kurds to postpone their referendum. Meanwhile, Barzani faces challenges at home, as well. He has overstayed his legally mandated term as president, and young Kurds in particular have grown increasingly critical of his government's corruption and mismanagement. To make matters worse, low oil prices and ongoing disputes with Baghdad have left the salaries of many Iraqi Kurds unpaid and lowered the standard of living.

THE VIEW FROM TEHRAN

In Iraq, domestic political dynamics are inextricably linked to circumstances beyond the country's borders. Concern about the level of Iranian influence is particularly widespread. During the campaign to defeat ISIS, Iran not only provided military advisers; it also supported certain Shiite militias, which it wants to maintain in order to extend its political influence in Baghdad and secure the land route from Iran to Lebanon.

These Iranian-backed militias are part of the so-called Popular Mobilization Units, which were formed in response to the 2014 fatwa of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani that called on Iraqis to rise up to defend their country against ISIS. Because of their role in preventing ISIS from marching on Baghdad, the Popular Mobilization Units enjoy wide support on the Shiite street, and some of their leaders are now looking to convert their military successes into political power. But these militias undermine the legitimacy of the state; their continued presence keeps Iraq from becoming strong enough to push back against Iranian influence. And widely disseminated reports of the

torture and murder of ISIS suspects at their hands have instilled fear among the Sunni population.

Despite having welcomed Tehran's support in the past, the Iraqi leadership is now taking steps to balance Iranian influence by making significant overtures to Saudi Arabia. In February 2017, Adel al-Jubeir became the first Saudi foreign minister to visit Baghdad since Iraq and Saudi Arabia cut ties in 1990, when Saddam invaded Kuwait. Later in 2017, Abadi and Qassim al-Araji, Iraq's interior minister, each paid separate visits to Riyadh. Even Sadr, a Shiite cleric, visited Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in August 2017, where he presented himself as an Arab and Iraqi nationalist, thus poking Iran in the eye.

For now, however, Tehran still has the upper hand. Iran has taken advantage of Iraq's volatility to cultivate clients in Baghdad and establish land corridors to the Mediterranean Sea. These moves are not simply about resupplying Shiite militias such as Hezbollah or evading sanctions by establishing a presence beyond Iran's official borders. They are also a reflection of Tehran's ambition to extend its sphere of influence and create strategic depth. Iran is now the external power with the most influence in both Iraq and Syria. Left unchecked, this could lead not just to an Iranian-Saudi confrontation but to an Iranian-Israeli one as well. Increased Iranian power in the region exacerbates Israel's fear that destructive weapons in Syria might fall into the hands of its enemies, many of whom are supported by Tehran. Already, Israel has launched strikes against several Syrian military bases

that are known to produce chemical weapons and other sophisticated tools of war.

DÉJÀ VU

So what should Washington do? Both Bush and Obama made disastrous decisions on Iraq during their first terms. It was only in their second terms that they came up with sensible policies to address their mistakes. These initial missteps cost the United States influence and credibility. But given the importance of U.S. military support in the fight against ISIS, Washington has new leverage, and it should take care not to squander it. The defeat of ISIS in Mosul should not lull the Trump administration into a false sense of security. As the past decade and a half have made clear, nothing in Iraq is irreversible.

That includes Iranian gains. To reverse those, Iraqi politicians will have to reach an agreement on politically sensitive questions such as the nature of governance and resource distribution in order make the central government less vulnerable to external meddling. This, in turn, will require a commitment to strengthening institutions, imposing the rule of law, and cracking down on corruption. (Iraq ranks 166th out of 176 countries on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index.)

The United States can help. But doing so would require it to view its national interests in Iraq through a wider lens than simply counterterrorism. This would entail sustained support for Iraqi institutions and a greater commitment to pushing back against Iranian expansionism, which is in itself one of the factors that rallies Sunni extremists.

In terms of Iraqi institutions, the United States should prioritize providing security assistance to the security forces and intelligence services that have proved themselves in the rollback of ISIS. Support for the Counter Terrorism Service has arguably been the most successful U.S. initiative in Iraq since 2003. Composed of Iraqis of all different backgrounds, the Counter Terrorism Service maintained morale and cohesion despite enduring heavy losses in the brutal battle to liberate Mosul. U.S. support for these forces should be continued and reinforced.

To secure the recent military gains, the United States should also help build the capacity of Iraqi battalions to control the western desert between Iraq and Syria and help bolster Iraq's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. To increase the legitimacy of the state, Washington should advise security-sector reform, including bringing militias supportive of the state into the fold of the Iraqi security forces—while disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating into Iraqi society those loyal to Iran.

All this assistance need not entail thorny negotiations; nor would such support require U.S. bases or combat forces. The United States can work toward these goals with advisers and trainers under the terms of the existing Strategic Framework Agreement with Iraq.

The United States must also develop a clear Kurdish policy. If separation is to occur—whether in the form of confederation or independence—the process should be negotiated between Baghdad and Erbil, endorsed by neighboring countries, and recognized by the international community. Either way, the

United States should support the revitalization of the UN's efforts to determine, district by district, the border between Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq. This process should also consider granting Kirkuk special status in recognition of its diverse population, contested history, and oil wealth. No Iraqi prime minister can afford to lose Kirkuk. International mediation could help broker a compromise.

While the negotiations are ongoing, Washington should help reduce the risk of conflict between Arabs and Kurds. In 2009, during another period of heightened tensions, the U.S. military facilitated cooperation between the Iraqi security forces and the Kurdish *peshmerga* in the disputed territories. Going forward, the United States should again help the Iraqis coordinate among the different security forces active in the area, which now also include the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK (the Turkish Kurdish guerrilla group), and the Popular Mobilization Units. And when approaching the Kurdish question, Washington must remain mindful of Turkey's concerns in order to alleviate the risk that Turkish forces will intervene in northeastern Syria or that Turkey will gravitate toward Iran and Russia.

No plan for Iraq is complete without taking into account the regional context. Building on Iraq's improving relations with Sunni countries, the United States needs to encourage Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states to support Abadi's government by investing in the reconstruction of Mosul and other areas devastated by ISIS. Mosul was once renowned across the region as a cosmopolitan city, with an excellent university, a successful merchant class, and a diverse population of Arabs, Christians, Kurds, Shabaks, Turkmen, and Yazidis. Its reconstruction would restore pride and provide young Iraqis with opportunities to live for rather than dystopian causes to die for. Such assistance, provided through the Iraqi government, would help balance Iranian influence and give Iraqi Sunnis hope for a better future.

Many of Trump's aides have considerable experience with Iraq, including James Mattis, his secretary of defense; H. R. McMaster, his national security adviser; and John Kelly, his chief of staff. One can hope that Trump's advisers might push him to select the least bad options from the choices available. But implementing the resulting policies would require a skillful secretary of state supported by a strong State Department. And at the moment, the State Department lacks the resources to play that crucial role.

The Trump administration should learn from the mistakes of the past. At the end of the day, ISIS is not the cause of Iraq's problems but a symptom of failed governance. And if the United States disengages now, Trump's successor may have to put American boots on the ground yet again, to fight the son of ISIS.

Keeping Out of Syria

The Least Bad Option

Robert S. Ford

The Syrian civil war has entered a new phase. President Bashar al-Assad's government has consolidated its grip on the western half of the country, and in the east, U.S.-backed forces are advancing on the remnants of the Islamic State (also known as ISIS). So far, these two campaigns have remained largely separate. But that is changing: Assad, with Iranian and Russian help, is starting to project more power into eastern Syria. As ISIS' remaining territory shrinks, Syrian and U.S.-backed forces are converging on the same cities. Before long, Washington will have to decide whether, when, and how to withdraw.

The United States has no good options in Syria, but some are worse than others. By now, hopes of getting rid of Assad or securing a reformed government are far-fetched fantasies, and so support for antigovernment factions should be off the table. The Syrian government is determined to take back the entire country and will probably succeed in doing so. That means the United States will have to abandon any hopes of supporting a separate Kurdish region or securing respect for human rights and democracy. And because Assad's government is deeply corrupt, the United States should also rule out providing the regime with aid for reconstruction. There is, however, one way in which the United States can still do good: easing the suffering of the millions of Syrian refugees outside the country. By focusing on their plight, Washington would help some of the most vulnerable Syrians, reduce the burden on the countries that host them, and curb opportunities for jihadist recruitment in refugee communities.

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VICTORY IN THE WEST

Over the last year and a half, Assad's government has achieved an unprecedented string of military successes in western Syria. In December 2016, it forced the last rebel fighters and their families to quit Aleppo, Syria's second-largest city, and then in May, it seized the final rebel holdout in the country's third-largest city, Homs. Meanwhile, government forces have advanced steadily against longtime rebel strongholds near Damascus, capturing Daraya in August 2016 and Barzeh and Qaboun this past spring.

A series of blunders by the opposition have aided Assad's success. Murderous leadership rivalries among the opposition have prevented unified military operations. The opposition's political leaders have failed to reach out to elements of the government's support base, such as religious minority communities and middle-class business interests, that might have been sympathetic to their aims. The opposition was slow to reject extremist organizations operating in its midst, most notably the al Qaeda–affiliated al-Nusra Front. And rebel

Behind enemy lines: Kurdish fighters in Raqqa, Syria, July 2017

GORAN TOMASEVIC / REUTERS

groups have never openly punished fighters who have committed atrocities. These failures have allowed Assad to retain enough support among Syria's disparate professional, business, and minority communities, who fear they would suffer under Islamist rule, to mobilize the necessary resources and manpower to hang on.

Assad has also benefited from foreign help. The Iranian government has assembled tens of thousands of Shiite fighters from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and even Pakistan to fight for the Syrian government. Together with Russian air support, these troops helped Assad's ground forces recapture Syria's main population centers.

At the same time as Assad has received help from abroad, the opposition's foreign support has withered away. In 2016, Turkey and the United States fell out over U.S. backing for Syrian Kurds fighting ISIS in eastern Syria. Turkey, fearing the development of an independent Kurdish region along its southern border, dropped its campaign against Assad and redirected its aid to Syrian rebels who would fight the Kurds. Then, in July, U.S. President Donald Trump ended a largely moribund CIA program that had been intended to help secular rebels fighting Assad, as the groups it had supported had turned into mere auxiliaries of al-Nusra Front.

CEASE-FIRES AREN'T THE ANSWER

As the military outcome has grown more certain, Russia has sought to capitalize on its intervention to secure a favorable political settlement that would halt the fighting and leave Syria under the control of the existing government. After the fall of Aleppo, Moscow brought delegations from the Syrian government and several opposition groups together in

Astana, Kazakhstan, along with officials from Iran and Turkey in the hope that each country would compel its Syrian allies to end hostilities on the ground. In May, Iran, Russia, and Turkey announced four "de-escalation zones" covering some of the remaining rebel strongholds in western Syria: Idlib in the northwest; an area including towns north of Homs; the eastern suburbs of Damascus; and the southwest corner of Syria near the Jordanian border, including the city of Daraa, where the uprising started in 2011. Under the agreement, all combatants would halt attacks against the nonextremist forces in those zones, and the Syrian government would allow access for humanitarian aid and returning civilians.

So far, these diplomatic efforts have met with incomplete success, largely because the Syrian government, with Iranian backing, has failed to observe the cease-fires whenever doing so would be to its advantage. Of the four de-escalation zones declared in May, only Idlib experienced a substantial decline in fighting at first. Government air strikes and ground assaults continued north of Homs, in eastern Damascus, and in the southwest. Then, in July, Russia—working with Jordan and the United States, which had backed the southern rebels—introduced a new cease-fire deal in the southwest, which has held up better.

The ability to selectively respect de-escalation zones has proved a military gift to the Syrian government. In the southwest, the Syrian army was making only slow headway in Daraa. And without sustained Russian air support to complement Syrian ground and air assaults, retaking Idlib would have been difficult, if not impossible. As a result, by August, the Syrian government was largely respecting the cease-fires around Daraa and Idlib while shifting its troops away from the southwestern border to attack the eastern suburbs of Damascus and towns north of Homs. This strategy of obeying some of the cease-fires and ignoring others has allowed the government to achieve military victories it otherwise would not have.

Of course, Damascus will not respect the remaining cease-fires forever. In southern Syria, civilians are establishing local governments to provide services and promote economic revival. And in several towns in Idlib Province, residents have organized elections for town managers. Because the Syrian government has consistently rejected all other political entities within Syria as illegitimate, it will make great efforts to quash these organizations. In Damascus in 2015 and 2016, for instance, it shut down independent administrations in neighborhoods that had made peace with the government.

The Syrian government's refusal to accept the legitimacy of other political groups within Syria has stalled progress at the UN peace talks in Geneva. Assad's envoys refuse to discuss any political reforms, much less a transition away from Assad himself. Meanwhile, the opposition's delegation, backed by Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the West, has insisted that Assad must give up power as part of any deal. This deadlock shows no signs of breaking before the next round of talks, scheduled for October or November.

Over the coming weeks and months, Syrian government forces will keep advancing, mile by mile, by turns obeying and flouting cease-fires as military advantage dictates. At some point, Assad might agree to token political changes at the behest of Russia or even Iran. He might

allow a new prime minister or a new economy or culture minister, but he will never accept transparency or hold free and fair elections. The core of the vicious security state—one that has used chemical weapons, dropped barrel bombs, co-opted terrorist groups, and tortured and killed thousands—will remain.

ISIS' FALL

In eastern Syria, detached from Assad's struggle against the opposition in the west, U.S.-backed forces have made great progress against ISIS. By August, three years after U.S. President Barack Obama launched the anti-ISIS campaign in Syria, the U.S.-led coalition had driven the group out of nearly 60 percent of the territory it once held. That progress has come at a human and diplomatic cost: U.S. air strikes have killed hundreds of civilians, and U.S. support for Kurdish forces has damaged the United States' relationship with Turkey. In June, over Ankara's strenuous objections, the Trump administration began openly supplying weapons to the People's Protection Units, known as the YPG, a Kurdish militia fighting ISIS in Syria, despite the group's direct ties to the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, a terrorist organization based in northern Iraq. In an attempt to assuage Turkey's concerns, the United States recruited a group of Arab fighters to create an alliance with the Kurds, known as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), but the YPG forms the backbone of the group.

In the summer of 2017, for the first time in the Syrian civil war, ISIS began confronting sustained attacks from both U.S.-backed and Iranian- and Russian-backed armies. As of this writing, the SDF, with U.S. air support, has nearly retaken ISIS' capital, Raqqa, and has moved into the group's last bastion, the southeastern province of Deir ez-Zor, whose oil fields have supplied ISIS with funds. Meanwhile, in early September, Syrian government forces charged into the province's capital, also called Deir ez-Zor, which lies on the banks of the Euphrates River. Russia and the United States have agreed that the river should separate the two forces, with Syrian government troops remaining on the west bank and the SDF staying on the east. At the same time as government forces are advancing on the city, they are in the process of recapturing the rest of the province of Deir ez-Zor west of the Euphrates, while the SDF takes the portion of the province east of the river.

Once the SDF captures Raqqa and Syrian government troops reach Abu Kamal, the last Syrian city west of the Euphrates before one reaches the Iraqi border, there will be no ISIS bastions left to retake. Then, Damascus will look for a way to seize Deir ez-Zor's oil fields, which will be vital for financing reconstruction, but which lie well east of the river. The Syrian government will also take an extremely dim view of the provisional civic council that the SDF is setting up to govern the portions of the province it controls. The internal tribal feuds that will likely split the SDF in the wake of ISIS' collapse will give the Syrian government a chance to move its forces east of the Euphrates, as well as providing Sunni militants with recruitment opportunities.

The Syrian government has already rejected the legitimacy of the Syrian Kurdish autonomous region, known as Rojava, being established in northeastern Syria. In August, Faisal Mekdad, Syria's

deputy foreign minister, stated that the government would not allow any region to threaten "national unity" and called the local elections that the Kurds are organizing in Rojava "a joke." For his part, Assad has repeatedly stressed that his government will defeat "separatists." Nor does Iran, which is confronting restiveness among its own Kurdish population, harbor any affection for an autonomous Syrian Kurdish zone. Assad and the Iranians will be patient, however. Their forces may delay before moving against the SDF in Deir ez-Zor or the Kurds in northeastern Syria, but they won't accept local governments that can ignore and insult Damascus. After all, the civil war began back in 2011 over Assad's refusal to reform his autocratic government.

WASHINGTON'S BAD OPTIONS

Now that the end of the campaign against ISIS is in sight, the Trump administration will have to decide how long to keep a U.S. military presence in eastern Syria. Between 1,000 and 2,000 U.S. soldiers and a handful of American civilians are currently deployed in the country. The U.S. mission inside Syria started as military support for the Kurdish forces fighting ISIS but has grown to include keeping the peace between government forces, Arab rebels, and even Turkish soldiers in the northern Syrian city of Manbij and helping carry out initial reconstruction work. The United States' first priority should be avoiding further mission creep and, above all, taking care not to get ensnared in any costly new military campaigns.

There will be no shortage of seemingly plausible reasons to intervene. When the Syrian government and Kurdish forces inevitably fight over Kurdish self-governance in Rojava, or if the Syrian government attacks SDF forces in eastern Deir ez-Zor, the United States may be tempted to step in on behalf of old allies. That would be a mistake. No significant actor in the eastern Syrian war—not Jordan, nor the Iraqi Kurds, nor the Iraqi government in Baghdad—would help defend the Syrian Kurds or even the SDF fighters in Deir ez-Zor. The Turkish government would cheer Assad's repression of the Syrian Kurds and would likely impede any U.S. aid that passed through Turkey. Russia is sensitive to Western intervention against authoritarian governments and has, in any case, limited leverage. Iran, facing its own restive Kurdish population, would back Assad. Moreover, there is no political will in the United States for a war on behalf of Syrian Kurdish interests or Syrian Arab tribal fighters in Deir ez-Zor, and eastern Syria has never been important to U.S. national security.

Policymakers in Washington and Jerusalem are also anxious about Iran's military position in Syria near the Golan Heights, from which it could threaten Israel. This is a legitimate concern: Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, one of the largest Iranian-mobilized Iraqi fighter groups in Syria, has already vowed that its next fight will be to liberate the Golan Heights. Syria is not the place to resist Iranian expansionism, however. Air strikes won't compel Iranian forces to quit Syria, and ground incursions would simply force the United States to defend territories against sustained Iranian and Syrian unconventional warfare tactics. History indicates that the Iranian and Syrian governments might even recruit jihadists to fight U.S. forces. And the

United States could expect little help from Turkey in any conflict with Iran. U.S. aid to Kurdish groups in Syria has created the potential for cooperation between Ankara and Tehran; in August, the chief of staff of the Iranian army visited Ankara for the first time since 1979. No one can know how long a war to limit Iranian influence in Syria would take or what achievable victory would look like.

As a result, many policymakers in Washington and Jerusalem hope that Russia will limit Iran's influence, forestalling the need for a direct military confrontation. These hopes are misguided. Russia will not jeopardize its political and business relationships with Iran, which include shared interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Washington and Jerusalem should recognize that they both made their choice years ago. Having accepted that Assad will stay in power, the United States must also accept a newly influential Iran.

Fortunately, the United States can live with greater Iranian influence in Syria. Iran's presence will complicate Israeli security but will not threaten the country's existence. Worse would be jihadists regaining Syrian territory and using it as a base to export terrorism. This is a real danger, as new jihadist groups have repeatedly appeared from the remnants of old ones. In 2011, for example, al-Nusra Front emerged from al Qaeda in Iraq. Al-Nusra learned from its predecessor: it was less brutal and concluded many alliances with non-jihadist groups until it could turn the tables on its erstwhile allies and destroy them one by one. If a new version of al Qaeda emerges in Syria, it will have learned from al-Nusra Front and ISIS and will likely be far harder to identify and contain than its forerunners.

The best way to forestall extremist recruitment in the few areas still controlled by the opposition would be to restart the local economy. Economic frustrations among the residents of poor suburbs around Aleppo, Damascus, and Homs helped stir the original 2011 uprising. And according to a poll conducted by Burson-Marsteller, a public relations firm, in 2017, 25 percent of young people in the Middle East considered providing better education and jobs the best means of resisting ISIS; only 13 percent thought the solution was military action. Right now, however, economic growth is a distant prospect. Only when the fighting stops will businesses be able to reopen and administrations be able to restore essential services such as clean water, electricity, hospitals, and schools. The Russian diplomatic strategy of creating de-escalation zones might allow for better local governance and economic recovery in those zones if the Syrian government would respect them. The United States, therefore, ought to back the Russian approach on the condition that economic aid will flow only if the cease-fires are respected.

Russia hopes that the West will eventually offer aid to rebuild Assad's portions of Syria. But recent UN humanitarian programs have proved that attempting this would be a fool's errand. Because outside resources have to flow through the Syrian government, substantial portions of UN aid have ended up in the pockets of government cronies or flowed solely to favored groups that support the government. In any case, U.S. sanctions against the Syrian govern-

ment will make such an aid program legally impossible for the foreseeable future. Some analysts, including the Syria specialist Joshua Landis, have argued that the sanctions should be dismantled because they primarily punish the Syrian people rather than the government. These arguments miss the key point: the Syrian people will suffer official corruption, brutality, and economic mismanagement no matter what Washington and its allies do. The only question is whether to waste U.S. resources on the Syrian government.

Likewise, securing even minimal respect for human rights, democratic norms, or good governance in Syria is now impossible. Assad and his spokespeople have consistently said that the government will reassert full control over all Syrian territory. They mean it. The Baathist ideology that infuses the Syrian state rejects decentralization, and Syria lacks skilled provincial and town administrators. Iraq's experience of corruption, mismanagement, and political infighting shows how hard it can be to decentralize a Baathist state, even with a degree of willpower and oil wealth that Syria does not have. Assad would rather live with a weakened but brutal centralized state than try to introduce real reform, a choice he made years ago.

There is one area where U.S. aid could do good: helping Syrian refugees in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. The governments of those countries, already overstretched, would likely allow the U.S. government and partner organizations to operate with greater autonomy than they could in Syrian-government-controlled areas. A renewed U.S. drive to raise funds would be extremely useful at a time of growing donor fatigue and dwindling UN resources, which have led to cuts in food rations in some refugee camps. Given the economic hardships in Syria and the government's ethnic-cleansing program—the regime has seized whole neighborhoods in cities such as Damascus and Homs from restive communities in which the opposition found roots—many refugees are unlikely to return home in the near future. Helping those refugees maintain a semblance of dignity would diminish the appeal of extremists and partially relieve a vast humanitarian crisis. Such a meager policy would represent a sad response to an uprising that demanded at its start only basic accountability from the government and a recognition of Syrians' dignity as human beings. But for the time being, it is the best the United States can do.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Preventing the Next Attack

A Strategy for the War on Terrorism

Lisa Monaco

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the United States' resolve was clear: never again. Never again would it let shadowy networks of jihadists, acting in the name of a perverted version of Islam, carry out a catastrophic attack on American soil. And so, in fits and starts, the George W. Bush administration and then the Obama administration developed a strategy for fighting what became known as "the global war on terror." Washington sought to disrupt plots wherever they emerged and deny terrorists safe havens wherever they existed. When possible, it would rely on local partners to prosecute the fight. But when necessary, it would act alone to disrupt plots and kill or capture terrorist operatives and leaders, including with drone strikes and daring special operations raids such as the one that killed Osama bin Laden.

Today, the terrorist threat looks much different than it did right before 9/11. The U.S. counterterrorism community has dramatically ramped up its intelligence capabilities. Determined to "connect the dots" in the future, the U.S. government created new agencies and instituted a new paradigm for intelligence—share by rule, withhold by exception—and set up a slew of "fusion centers" and joint task forces to foster interagency cooperation. Borders were hardened, cockpit doors reinforced, and watch lists created. In Afghanistan, the United States overthrew the Taliban regime, which was hosting al Qaeda. Today, despite recent Taliban gains, al Qaeda still does not enjoy free rein in the country. In Iraq and Syria, al Qaeda's offshoot, the Islamic State (or ISIS), is on the run, thanks to the work of a global coalition assembled in 2014 and U.S.-led air strikes and special operations raids. The group's Iraqi capital of Mosul fell in July, and its Syrian stronghold in Raqqa is almost certain to follow. Owing to the relentless pressure that the United States and its allies have placed on terrorists' safe havens, the threat of a complex and catastrophic attack emanating from abroad—although not gone—has diminished.

At the same time, however, the threat from homegrown and so called lone-wolf terrorism has increased. This kind of terrorism is not new, nor is it confined to Islamic terrorism (in fact, according to one study by the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security, from 2000 to 2016, white supremacists killed more people in the United States than any other group of domestic extremists). But these threats have taken on new urgency as ISIS in particular has harnessed the power of social media to inspire mostly young men to commit violence. In 2014, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, ISIS' now deceased media spokesperson, urged followers to be

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resourceful when confronted with the opportunity to murder an unbeliever: "Kill him in any manner or way however it may be: smash his head with a rock, or slaughter him with a knife, or run him over with your car."

People were listening: one study, by Lorenzo Vidino, Francesco Marone, and Eva Entenmann, identified 51 attacks between June 2014 and June 2017 by terrorists who had heeded the call to act locally in Europe and North America, with 16 of those carried out in the United States. The 2016 mass shooting in Orlando and bombings in New York City and New Jersey likely resulted from a mix of jihadist inspirations, but in both cases, the killers had no known external direction or training. The common theme: consuming a variety of extremist content online. A threat that began with an attack planned by a small group of veteran terrorists in Afghanistan has transformed into a diffuse movement of recently radicalized individuals planning pop-up attacks across the globe.

What is the right strategy for this new phase of the war on terrorism? The answer is one that confronts three main challenges: physical safe havens from which terrorists continue to plot attacks, virtual safe havens through which ISIS and other groups mobilize individuals to commit violence, and a global and domestic environment increasingly hospitable to terrorists.

NO PLACE TO HIDE

Although the likelihood of another 9/11 has diminished, it is far from zero. Indeed, it appears that al Qaeda is passing the mantle to a new generation, with bin Laden's son Hamza releasing several audio recordings since 2015 calling on followers to commit violence. Moreover, the group's various offshoots are busy plotting attacks. The most dangerous elements of its largest affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra—more accurately described as al Qaeda in Syria—are still intent on attacking the United States. So is al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, al Qaeda's Yemeni affiliate, which has proved persistently focused on attacking airliners.

ISIS, for its part, faces almost certain defeat in Iraq and Syria, but it seeks to sustain its brand with no fewer than eight global branches, from Afghanistan to Libya. And it has not been satisfied with merely amassing territory. Its affiliate in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula brought down a Russian passenger plane in 2015. And in August 2017, Australian police announced that they had foiled a sophisticated plot by ISIS to blow up a passenger jet. In separate shipments, an ISIS commander in Syria had sent followers in Sydney the parts for an explosive device that could be assembled in country—an approach that the analyst Paul Cruickshank has called "an IKEA model of terror." Although authorities have said that airport screening would have detected the device, ISIS is testing ways to defeat such defenses, and it's easy to imagine it succeeding. The lesson here is that the United States cannot take its eye off the threat of a massive, sophisticated attack.

One of the most reliable strategies for preventing such attacks has been depriving terrorist groups of the ungoverned spaces they use to train and plan, from Afghanistan to North Africa. Although territory is no longer the sine qua non it once was—the rise of virtual safe havens and encrypted communications has given terrorists

The new normal: at John F. Kennedy Airport, New York, February 2012

ANDREW BURTON / REUTERS

new ways to covertly plan attacks—there is still no substitute for it. Physical territory not only provides terrorists with room to plot but also offers reliable revenue from taxation and, often, oil sales, as well as human resources through forced conscription. And so the United States must continue to put relentless pressure on safe havens.

In practice, especially as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have wound down, this has meant adopting a "light footprint" counterterrorism strategy, premised on training and enabling local partners to take the fight to terrorists and, failing that, doing so directly through air strikes (both manned and unmanned) and special operations raids. This strategy has been successful at eliminating dangerous operatives, but it has had its downsides. At times, U.S. air and ground operations have generated backlash among locals, and unfortunate instances of civilian casualties from these operations have further fueled terrorists' propaganda and recruitment efforts.

U.S. drone operations, widely seen as the hallmark of this light-footprint strategy, have proved particularly controversial. Pointing to the problems with using force against targets outside of traditional battlefields, critics have called for more transparency regarding targeting decisions and civilian casualties. In an effort to enhance the legitimacy of these operations, answer questions about who is targeted, and check others' use of drones as the technology proliferates, the Obama administration developed a set of standards to guide the United States' employment of drones. These policies included a requirement for near certainty—the highest achievable standard—that no civilian would be injured or killed in the strikes. President Barack Obama also issued an executive order requiring the director of national intelligence to provide an annual report on civilian

casualties from U.S. strikes undertaken outside traditional battlefields.

But a light-footprint approach alone is not always sufficient. In some places, such as Libya and Yemen, the lack of stable governance and capable partners on the ground has made it impossible to sustain military gains. And of course, no amount of drone strikes or raids can counter distantly inspired violence. Ultimately, the administration's light-footprint strategy to combat ISIS and al Qaeda in Iraq and Syria gave way to what the political scientists Peter Feaver and Hal Brands have described in this magazine as the "counter-ISIS plus" approach. The Obama administration stepped up operations in Iraq and Syria, increasing the number of troops and advisers there and launching a more aggressive air campaign and a series of special operations raids. In Libya in late 2016, the U.S. military conducted air strikes in support of Libya's interim government to rout ISIS from its nascent safe haven in Sirte. These operations were guided by certain criteria: the United States would work in support of local forces except to counter an imminent threat that its partner could not or would not respond to, and it would seek to lend these operations legitimacy by sending thought-out public and diplomatic messages about their nature and purpose.

To deal lasting blows to ISIS and al Qaeda, and to keep others from seizing new safe havens, the United States will need to continue some variant of this stepped-up strategy. So far, President Donald Trump's plan to defeat ISIS closely resembles that of his predecessor—albeit with the additional element of delegating greater authority to commanders in the field. But military operations will always be half measures if they are not paired with a strategy to make U.S. partners more viable—security assistance and diplomatic engagement aimed at getting countries to govern inclusively, bolster their security sectors, and reform their economies. That's why the Trump administration's proposed budget cuts to the State Department—at a time when military leaders regularly call for increases in foreign aid—are so worrisome.

HIGH-TECH TERRORISTS

Pressure on safe havens will merely keep a lid on a threat from terrorists who are growing more creative by the day. As technology advances, so do terrorists' capabilities to exploit it. Consider the next generation of aviation threats. From AQAP's 2010 plan to stow printer cartridges filled with explosives in airplane cargo holds to ISIS' recent plot in Australia, terrorists have shown a determination to overcome the post-9/11 security obstacles to bringing down airliners. The Trump administration has wisely put an emphasis on aviation security. In March, for example, it issued a temporary ban on the use of laptops in the passenger cabin on flights originating from certain airports. The administration threatened to extend the ban to all U.S.-bound flights, prompting some international carriers to improve their security measures. The government should continue to focus on aviation security, but it should go further and partner with the private sector to generate innovative methods of detecting new explosive materials.

Terrorists, of course, are doing their own innovation, and some of them have even experimented with drones. In 2013, for instance, Iraqi officials announced

that they had thwarted a plot in which al Qaeda operatives intended to use toy planes to deliver sarin and mustard gas. Adding to the danger, more and more devices are going online as part of "the Internet of things," creating new vulnerabilities that ISIS and others could exploit. That's why the Trump administration should heed the call from the 2016 report of the Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity to work with the private sector to build security features into new technology at the design stage, rather than play catch up with terrorists' attempts to commandeer such devices. The United States' future safety demands that it, and not its adversaries, dominate the technological domain.

The innovation that has benefited terrorists the most, however, is social media. Lone wolves are never truly alone; they deliberately search for and find communities online. To draw in vulnerable youth, ISIS has created a sophisticated media machine that pumps out professionally produced videos, multilingual tweets, a glossy magazine, and Instagram posts, all serving up an intoxicating narrative that followers can belong to a cause greater than themselves. Other groups, including al Qaeda, are now mimicking ISIS' tactics. Gone are the amateur videos of al Qaeda's leader Ayman al-Zawahiri sitting cross-legged before a drab backdrop; those rare releases are now dwarfed by al Qaeda's Syrian branch's steady stream of slick videos and magazines.

The U.S. government has struggled to beat terrorists at the social media game, but Silicon Valley is taking promising steps. In June, a group of technology companies created the Global Internet Forum to Counter

Terrorism, a consortium devoted to making their platforms less hospitable to extremists. Facebook, which boasts more than two billion active monthly users, is employing artificial intelligence and image-matching technology to stop known terrorist content from proliferating. Twitter, for its part, has suspended more than 375,000 accounts promoting terrorism. Deleting by hand after the fact will not suffice, however, and so social media platforms will need to train their algorithms to detect extremist content—international and domestic—and banish it immediately.

At the same time, companies will need to ramp up their support for legitimate voices that rebut terrorists' narratives. Jigsaw, a think tank created by Google, has developed the Redirect Method, a project that targets online users who have been identified as susceptible to ISIS' messaging and serves them alternative content that subtly debunks terrorist propaganda. The government can play a role, too—not as the messenger but as a partner to the private sector. In 2016, the State Department launched the Global Engagement Center, an office dedicated to supporting voices that rebut terrorists' messaging. But so far, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has refused to spend the $80 million already earmarked for the center, which currently lacks a director and is losing some of the private-sector talent recruited last year. The Trump administration should support, not sideline, its work.

OUT OF ORDER

What may most influence the future terrorist threat, however, is not the flourishing of physical and virtual safe havens per se but the breakdown in order that is sure to spawn more of both. Today, old and new powers are seeking to redraw the map. Across the Gulf and the Levant, and even in Afghanistan, Iran and its proxies are promoting and taking advantage of instability. Russia is doing the same in eastern Europe, and it has worked hard to protect its client in Syria and create a new one in Libya. The future threat will be defined by these areas of chaos—the safe havens presented by them, the foreign fighters drawn to them, and the violence inspired by them.

So there is a dangerous irony in Trump's invocation of "America first," a message that has caused U.S. allies to wonder whether they can still count on Washington to continue as a partner in—if not the guarantor of—their security. If the United States pulls up the drawbridge in the name of protection, it may deny itself counterterrorism tools that are essential to the country's safety. By banning the travel of all citizens from certain countries, rather than tailoring screening to specific threats, the United States risks alienating the very partners it needs to fight today's terrorists and fueling the "clash of civilizations" narrative that ISIS uses to recruit future ones.

As the campaign against ISIS has laid bare, partnerships with local allies are the key to successfully taking back territory from terrorists. The same is true when it comes to interdicting foreign fighters. In the past, the United States has taken the lead on working with foreign governments to share watch lists, improve border security, and impose new criminal penalties on foreign fighters. Experts have warned that as ISIS' territory in Iraq and Syria shrinks, some 40,000 fighters who came from more than 120 countries to fight for ISIS could

start to return home. But given that some of these fighters have spent years perfecting their violent craft on the battlefield, the greater concern may now be "not so much one of quantity as one of quality," as Nicholas Rasmussen, the director of the National Counterterrorism Center, put it earlier this year.

Europe will continue to face an immediate threat from skilled returnees of the type that participated in the 2015 Paris attacks and the 2016 Brussels bombings. Unfortunately, however, the continent has yet to experience the kind of sea change that occurred in the United States, which radically rethought its practices for sharing information among law enforcement and intelligence agencies. In many European capitals, the wall impeding such sharing is far too high. And since the Atlantic Ocean is not a perfect buffer, what happens in Europe matters for the security of the United States. So rather than confusing U.S. allies with travel bans and mixed messages about the value of NATO, the United States should expand its counterterrorism cooperation with its European partners. For example, it should press its partners to more rapidly share airline passenger data and intelligence gleaned from investigations. And it should resume the dialogue begun by James Clapper, the former director of national intelligence, on promoting intelligence sharing with and among European countries.

It would be a mistake, however, to look only outward, ignoring the growing terrorist threat at home. The hit-and-run murder of a peaceful protester in Charlottesville, Virginia, by an avowed white supremacist is only the most recent reminder that the United States has a terrorism problem unrelated to violent jihadism. The challenge that bedeviled both the Bush and the Obama administrations—building trust between communities and their government to address extremism in all its forms—seems harder than ever. And lately, this important work has suffered from neglect. The Trump administration has proposed a budget that zeroes out funding for a Department of Homeland Security program aimed at countering violent extremism and has already withdrawn a grant for a group dedicated to combating domestic hate groups such as the Ku Klux Klan.

Sixteen years after 9/11, many Americans are weary of the war on terrorism. Having built up its defenses, the United States should no longer go abroad in search of monsters to destroy, some contend. Instead, they say, it should stick to keeping the bad guys out and adjust to a new normal in which some attacks are inevitable. But it would be a grave mistake to confuse a mitigated threat with a weak one. Rather than resignation, Americans will have to demonstrate resilience—just as New York, Fort Hood, Boston, Charleston, San Bernardino, Orlando, Portland, and Charlottesville have done in the face of hate and violence. To date, the United States' strategy has succeeded in preventing another 9/11-type attack, largely because it built a net designed to do just that. But for the next phase in the war on terrorism, the country will need a new net. It cannot afford to operate without one.

Responding to Russia's Resurgence

Not Quiet on the Eastern Front

Ivo H. Daalder

Many observers believe that the greatest damage Russia has done to U.S. interests in recent years stems from the Kremlin's interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential race. Although there is no question that Moscow's meddling in American elections is deeply worrying, it is just one aspect of the threat Russia poses. Under Vladimir Putin, Russia has embarked on a systematic challenge to the West. The goal is to weaken the bonds between Europe and the United States and among EU members, undermine NATO's solidarity, and strengthen Russia's strategic position in its immediate neighborhood and beyond. Putin wants nothing less than to return Russia to the center of global politics by challenging the primacy that the United States has enjoyed since the end of the Cold War. He has undertaken a major military modernization designed to intimidate neighbors and weaken NATO, and he has resorted to the overt use of military force to establish new facts on the ground—not just in what Moscow calls its "sphere of privileged interests," which encompasses all of the former Soviet republics, but also further afield, including in the Middle East, an area where the U.S. military has long operated with a free hand.

For some time now, "the Kremlin has been de facto operating in a war mode," the Russia scholar Dmitri Trenin has observed, and Putin has been behaving like a wartime leader. Washington's response to this challenge must be equally strong. First, it is critical to maintain transatlantic unity; divisions across the Atlantic and within Europe weaken NATO's ability to respond to Russian provocations and provide openings for Moscow to extend its reach and influence. The alliance has responded to the new Russia challenge by enhancing its presence in eastern Europe and the Baltic states, and Russia has so far not threatened the territorial integrity of any NATO member state. But NATO must do more to bolster its deterrence by sending a clear message to the Kremlin that it will not tolerate further Russian aggression or expansionism. At the same time, policymakers must remember that the United States is not at war with Russia; there is no need for Washington to put itself on a war footing, even if Moscow has. Dialogue and open channels of communication remain essential to avoiding misunderstandings and miscalculations that could escalate into a war no one wants.

OLD HABITS DIE HARD

After the Cold War ended, American, European, and Russian strategic objectives appeared to converge on the goal of fostering the economic and political transformation of eastern Europe and Russia and creating an integrated Europe that would be whole, free, and

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Nothing to see here: a suspected Russian soldier in Crimea, March 2014

THOMAS PETER / REUTERS

at peace. The military confrontation that had marked relations for more than 40 years rapidly and peacefully disappeared with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from eastern Europe, and the negotiation of far-reaching arms control agreements. Freed from the strategic logic of the Cold War, governments focused their energies on transforming eastern Europe's command economies into functioning market democracies and on the task of unifying the continent.

In Russia in the early 1990s, economic "shock therapy" rapidly dismantled the state-controlled economy of the Soviet era but failed to produce immediate or widely shared prosperity. The Russian financial crisis of 1998 imposed significant costs on the population—including a sharp rise in prices for basic goods as a result of the rapid depreciation of the ruble—and helped set the stage for the emergence of a new generation of leaders committed to stability and order even at the cost of economic and political liberalization. By the end of the decade, a demoralized Russian public welcomed the arrival of a strong new leader; Putin, the former head of Russia's security services, took office in late 1999, promising an end to chaos and a return to stability. By tightening his control over the state bureaucracy, Putin fulfilled his promise. And as rising oil and gas prices filled government coffers, he also managed to raise the standard of living of ordinary Russians. The focus during this time was on domestic renewal rather than foreign engagement, although Putin did indicate a desire for increased cooperation with the United States, especially when it came to confronting common threats, such as terrorism.

As Russia's confidence and wealth grew, however, the Kremlin became

increasingly concerned about what it perceived as Western encroachment in its sphere of influence, as successive countries in central and eastern Europe, including the three Baltic states, opted to join NATO and the EU. Putin chafed at what he saw as Washington's growing power and arrogance, especially in the wake of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and he gradually abandoned any thought of seeking common ground with the West.

The first signs of this shift came, unexpectedly, in a speech Putin delivered at the Munich Security Conference in 2007. He railed against NATO expansion and accused the United States of running roughshod over the sovereignty of other countries in its pursuit of a unipolar world. In Putin's eyes, Washington aimed at nothing less than world domination: "One single center of power. One single center of force. One single center of decision-making. It is [a] world in which there is one master, one sovereign."

And it wasn't just Putin's rhetoric that changed. That same year, Russia exploited internal disagreements between ethnic Russians and Estonians to launch a cyber-attack against Estonia's government, media outlets, and banking system. The following year saw the first overt military expression of Moscow's new foreign policy direction: Russia's war with Georgia, ostensibly designed to secure the independence of two breakaway regions but in fact meant to send a clear message that Russia was prepared to stymie Georgia's ambitions to join the West.

THE PUTIN PLAYBOOK

Although Moscow achieved its objectives in the war against Georgia, the conflict laid bare real weaknesses in Russia's armed forces, including failing command and control, a woeful lack of military training, and significant shortcomings in its military hardware. Some 60 to 70 percent of Russian tanks and armored vehicles broke down during the five days of fighting, and although Russia's per capita military spending was 56 percent greater than Georgia's that year, the heavy armor deployed by Tbilisi was far more modern and advanced than Moscow's.

None of these deficiencies went unnoticed in Moscow, and the Kremlin immediately embarked on a massive military reform and modernization program. Between 2007 and 2016, Russia's annual military spending nearly doubled, reaching $70 billion, the third-highest level of defense spending in the world (following the United States and China). Military spending in 2016 amounted to 5.3 percent of Russia's GDP, the highest proportion since Russia's independence in 1990 and the highest percentage spent on defense by any major economy that year. In 2011, Moscow announced a ten-year modernization program that included $360 billion in new military procurement. At the same time, the Russian armed forces began a wholesale restructuring and an overhaul of their training programs.

The effect of these improvements became clear in Ukraine six years after the war in Georgia. As Kiev was rocked by political upheaval over its ties to the EU, Putin—who had once told U.S. President George W. Bush that Ukraine was "not even a state" and claimed that the Soviet Union had given the territory of Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 as "a gift"—responded by invading and annexing Crimea in early 2014. Not satisfied with controlling this strategically vital

peninsula, Moscow then fomented a separatist rebellion in the eastern Ukrainian provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk, home to a predominantly Russian-speaking population and to many of Ukraine's heavy industries. Russia sent military equipment, advisers, and ultimately thousands of troops to the area in order to prevent Ukraine from securing control over its own territory.

The thrusts into eastern Ukraine were straight out of the Putin playbook, but the Crimea operation represented a qualitatively new effort by Moscow to get its way. Crimea was not just invaded; it was annexed and incorporated into the Russian Federation after an illegitimate, rigged referendum. Putin wanted Russia's "gift" back, even though Moscow had agreed to respect the territorial integrity of every former Soviet republic when the Soviet Union broke up, in 1991, and had explicitly reiterated that commitment in a legally binding memorandum negotiated with Ukraine, the United States, and the United Kingdom in 1994. For the first time in postwar European history, one country had annexed territory from another by force.

The operation in Crimea also demonstrated a whole new form of Russian military prowess. Stealthily deployed special forces took over key facilities and organs of the Ukrainian state. Sophisticated cyber-operations and relentless disinformation diverted attention from what was happening. And the speed of the operation meant it was completed before anyone could mount an effective response. Russian special forces, dressed in green uniforms without identifying patches, suddenly appeared at strategic points throughout Crimea and effectively took control of the peninsula. Simultaneously, a large-scale propaganda operation sought to hide Moscow's fingerprints by suggesting that these "little green men" were local opposition forces that reflected the popular will to reject the political change in Kiev and reunite with Russia instead. This, in short, was no traditional military invasion; it was hybrid warfare in which goals were accomplished even before the adversary understood what was going on. It represented an entirely new threat for which neither Ukraine nor NATO was prepared.

Moscow justified the invasion and annexation of Crimea with arguments based on a new form of Russian nationalism. From the outset of the conflict, Putin had maintained that Crimea was rightly Russia's and that Moscow was fully within its right in retaking it. Moreover, Russia claimed that it had to act because Russian-speaking people in Ukraine were being attacked by a violent mob of "nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes, and anti-Semites" who had carried out a coup in Kiev. Later, Putin went further, pronouncing a new doctrine aimed at defending Russians anywhere. "I would like to make it clear to all: our country will continue to actively defend the rights of Russians, our compatriots abroad, using the entire range of available means." And Putin was adamant that he was not talking about just Russian citizens, or even ethnic Russians, when pronouncing this absolute right to defend them anywhere. "I am referring to those people who consider themselves part of the broad Russian community; they may not necessarily be ethnic Russians, but they consider themselves Russian people." To many, these words echoed claims made during the 1930s that Germany had

a right—and an obligation—to protect Germans in other countries, such as Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

GAMES WITHOUT FRONTIERS

Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the continued fighting there have exacted a huge toll on the country. According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, more than 10,000 people have died since mid-2014, nearly 25,000 have been injured, and some 1.6 million Ukrainians have been internally displaced. Every day brings exchanges of fire and more casualties. Yet the incursion into Ukraine represents only one part of the expansion of Russia's military footprint, which stretches from the Arctic in the north to the Mediterranean in the south.

Russia's military buildup is both vast in scope and strategically significant. In the country's far north, Russia has reopened former military bases near the Arctic Ocean, establishing a position of military dominance in a region where peaceful cooperation among the Arctic powers had become the norm. From there, Russia has bolstered and modernized its military presence in its western territories, which stretch from the Norwegian border in the north to the Ukrainian border in the south. Moscow has also beefed up its presence in what is already the most heavily militarized piece of land in Europe, the Kaliningrad exclave—just under 6,000 square miles of Russian-controlled territory sandwiched between Lithuania and Poland. More than 300,000 well-trained troops are deployed in Kaliningrad, equipped with modern tanks, armored vehicles, and missile batteries, including a nuclear-capable short-range missile system—posing a significant military threat to Poland and the three Baltic states.

A similar buildup has occurred farther south. Since the war in Ukraine began, Russia has sent additional brigades to the Ukrainian border and announced the creation of three new divisions that will face in a "southwest strategic direction"—in other words, toward Ukraine. In addition to deploying 30,000 troops to Crimea, Moscow has positioned 30 combat ships, five submarines, more than 100 combat aircraft, and more than 50 combat helicopters, as well as long-range antiship and antiaircraft missile and radar systems, on the strategically vital peninsula, giving Russia the ability to dominate the Black Sea region. It also has deployed thousands of troops to occupied areas in eastern Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova—as well as some 5,500 troops to Armenia, which are there with the consent of the Armenian government in support of its claim to the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. Finally, Russia has enlarged its air and naval presence in Syria in order to better assist the endangered regime of Bashar al-Assad, effectively ending NATO's uncontested control of the eastern Mediterranean, a strategically pivotal area that includes the Suez Canal. Although many analysts worry about the Russian threat to the Baltic states, the more dramatic shift has been in the Mediterranean, where Russia's navy now boasts missiles that can threaten most of Europe.

Russia's enhanced military presence has been matched by increased military assertiveness. This trend started with the invasion of Ukraine but did not end there. In Syria, Russia has increased the tempo of its military operations in support of the flailing Assad regime and employed

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long-range missiles fired from naval vessels in the Caspian and Mediterranean Seas. It has flown fighter and bomber missions close to or even within the airspace of NATO member states and other European countries. It has deployed nuclear submarines armed with ballistic missiles from its northern ports to the Atlantic. And it has engaged in often dangerous air and naval activities, including buzzing NATO naval vessels and aircraft, flying military aircraft with their transponders turned off, and intentionally failing to monitor emergency communications channels. Meanwhile, the Russian military has significantly enhanced the scale and scope of its training exercises, launching many without any notice. In 2014, days before the invasion of Ukraine, a snap exercise mobilized 150,000 troops near the Russian-Ukrainian border; in September 2017, Moscow conducted its quadrennial Zapad exercise, mobilizing up to 100,000 troops in western Russia, Kaliningrad, and Belarus and requisitioning enough rail cars to transport 4,000 tanks and armored vehicles. At the same time, Russia is modernizing all three legs of its nuclear triad, building new long-range missiles, submarines, and bombers to maintain a nuclear force that is at least the equal of the U.S. arsenal.

ALARM BELLS

Russia's military buildup and posturing have provided Moscow with renewed confidence—a sense that Russia once again matters and that the world can no longer ignore it. In the Kremlin's eyes, Russia is again a great global power and therefore can act as global powers do. Not surprisingly, the buildup has caused concern in the Pentagon. Calling Russia's behavior "nothing short of alarming," the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford, concluded in 2015 that "Russia presents the greatest threat to our national security."

How should the United States and its European allies respond to this threat? To date, the combined NATO response has been impressive. But Washington and other NATO allies must work harder to thwart the challenge Russia poses to security and stability in Europe and beyond.

For years, the NATO allies had been divided in their views of Russia, with some (such as France, Germany, and Italy) insisting that the alliance should seek a strategic partnership with Moscow, and others (such as Poland and the Baltic states) warning that Russia still posed a threat. The Russian invasion of Ukraine ended much of this internal debate, and NATO responded with actions designed to leave no doubt about its commitment to defend all its members against a possible Russian attack. The alliance created a new 5,000-member joint task force that can deploy within 48 to 72 hours, sent four multinational combat battalions to Poland and the Baltic states, and established command-and-control headquarters in all its eastern European member states, including new multinational headquarters in Poland and Romania. NATO has also increased the number of exercises it carries out in central and eastern Europe, made infrastructure investments to enable reinforcements to arrive at their destinations more quickly, and ramped up its naval and air presence in the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea.

As the alliance's strongest and most important ally, the United States has taken the lead in many of these activities. It heads the new combat battalion in Poland and has added an additional combat brigade, which deploys to Europe from the United States on a rotating basis. Beginning this year, it will also begin forward-deploying tanks and other heavy equipment for a combat division in order to allow for the rapid reinforcement of NATO's eastern territories. Annual spending on this European reassurance initiative has risen from less than $1 billion two years ago to a budget request of nearly $5 billion for the coming fiscal year. Together, these steps amount to the largest reinforcement of NATO's collective-defense efforts since the end of the Cold War. But they are not enough.

The steps taken by NATO countries since 2014 to strengthen deterrence have halted the alliance's decline in overall capabilities, but the response has been too slow and too limited. These steps must be backed by real improvements in the overall capability of NATO's military forces, as well as significant investments in land, air, and naval infrastructure to enable the rapid reinforcement of the alliance's eastern European member states. Unfortunately, for over a decade, most European countries have cut their defense spending and failed to invest sufficiently in maintaining, let alone increasing, their armed forces. Meanwhile, distracted by conflicts in Afghanistan and the Middle East, the United States has steadily reduced its overall military footprint in Europe.

After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, NATO leaders finally agreed to stop cutting defense spending, and all members committed to spending at least two percent of GDP on defense by 2024. That target is hardly onerous—in fact, it is too modest. In 2000, just a decade after the Cold War ended, European NATO countries were spending two percent of their combined GDP on defense; by 2014, that number had fallen to 1.45 percent. Given the magnitude of the threat and the pressing need to demonstrate every ally's commitment to the collective defense of NATO's territory, NATO should move more quickly and push all members to reach the two percent target by 2020 at the latest.

NO LONGER OBSOLETE

Speaking almost a decade after Putin lambasted NATO and the United States at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev returned to the same podium last year to lament that "we have slid back into a new Cold War." But the current confrontation is very different from the actual Cold War, an ideological clash that extended to every part of the world. Huge armies were deployed on either side of the Iron Curtain, many thousands of nuclear weapons were ready to launch at a moment's notice, and proxy wars were fought as far away as Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Today's confrontation lacks the intensity, scale, and ideological divisiveness of that earlier, deadlier conflict.

Moreover, the biggest threat today is not a deliberate war, as it was then, but the possibility of miscalculation. One worry is that Russia might not believe that NATO would actually come to the defense of its most exposed allies—which is why strong statements of reassurance and commitment by all

NATO countries, and not least the United States, are so vital. Improving the military capabilities and extending the forward presence of NATO forces are important signals of resolve, but they need to be backed by words that leave no doubt of the intention to use these forces to defend allies if they are attacked. That is why it was so important for U.S. President Donald Trump to publicly recognize the centrality of NATO's Article 5 commitment to collective defense, which he did by noting, in April, that NATO is "no longer obsolete"—reversing his earlier claim that it was—and by explicitly stating, at a press conference in June, that he was "committing the United States to Article 5."

Another possible miscalculation could come from the failure of NATO or Russia to understand the other party's true motives and intentions. Doubts are fed by snap military exercises involving large numbers of troops near borders, a lack of transparency in deployments, and dangerous military activities that simulate attacks and threaten the safety of opposing forces. At a time of rising tensions, actions like these contribute to an uncertain climate and increase the possibility of accidents and escalation.

Whatever the growing differences between Russia, the United States, and NATO, they all share one crucial common interest: avoiding a major war that no one wants. The most pressing priority is to encourage direct dialogue, at both the political and, especially, the military level. The NATO-Russia Council, forged in more optimistic times but still a body that brings Russia and all 29 NATO members together under one roof, is well suited to this task and can help devise rules and procedures that will reduce the likelihood of confrontation. Rising political tensions have sidelined the council and turned it into a venue for debating differences rather than finding common ground. Yet it provides a forum for discussing ways to increase transparency, build confidence, and ensure communication during crises, which are all necessary to avoid miscalculation and escalation.

Today, Russia poses a threat unlike any the United States and its allies have faced since the end of the Cold War. It is a challenge the United States and its European allies can meet only through unity and strength. If they fail to unite and bolster NATO's defense capabilities, Europe's future stability and security may well be imperiled.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Deterring Cyberattacks

How to Reduce Vulnerability

Susan Hennessey

The Cybersecurity Dilemma: Hacking, Trust, and Fear Between Nations
BY BEN BUCHANAN. Oxford University Press, 2017, 304 pp.

Cyberspace in Peace and War
BY MARTIN C. LIBICKI. Naval Institute Press, 2016, 496 pp.

In the two years before the 2016 U.S. presidential election, hackers targeted a number of prominent political organizations of both parties, including the Democratic National Committee (DNC), and managed to steal a trove of documents pertaining to the presidential campaign of Hillary Clinton. The hackers got ahold of private e-mails, including those belonging to Debbie Wasserman Schultz, the DNC chair, and John Podesta, Clinton's campaign chair. Some of these exchanges discussed hot-button issues such as the Clinton Foundation's fundraising or suggested that senior DNC figures had sought to aid Clinton in her primary campaign against Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont.

As the presidential election drew near, a number of websites, including WikiLeaks, began publishing the stolen e-mails, fueling right-wing conspiracy theories about Clinton and generating anger among Sanders supporters. Donald Trump, the Republican presidential nominee, seized on the leaks to criticize his opponent; "I love WikiLeaks!" he declared at a rally in October. Meanwhile, Democrats seethed as reports emerged that the hackers were linked to Russian military and intelligence agencies.

Those rumors were officially confirmed in early October when the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Homeland Security issued a joint statement asserting that the Russian government had been behind the hacking, which aimed to interfere with the election. In January, the ODNI released a declassified report stating even more definitively that the hacking had been part of a Russian attempt to "undermine the U.S.-led liberal democratic order" by sowing chaos and eroding faith in the democratic process. "There should be no fuzz on this whatsoever: the Russians interfered in our election," James Comey, the former director of the FBI, said in testimony before Congress in June. Comey had previously issued a warning about the Russians: "They'll be back in 2020. They may be back in 2018, and one of the lessons they may draw from this is that they were successful because they introduced chaos and division and discord."

One reason Moscow succeeded is that Washington has failed to devise a strategy to deter cyberattacks or to respond strongly enough when such attacks have occurred. In the face of crafty and concerted assaults on U.S. interests, Washington's retaliatory

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measures have amounted to little more than largely symbolic sanctions and diplomatic slaps on the wrist. This has remained true even in the wake of Russia's unprecedented meddling in the 2016 presidential election. Put simply, the United States failed to deter Russia; instead, Russia has deterred the United States from meaningful retaliation.

Two recent books illuminate the immensely complex issues at play. In *The Cybersecurity Dilemma*, Ben Buchanan, a cybersecurity specialist at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center, outlines the structural challenges unique to interactions among states in cyberspace. In *Cyberspace in Peace and War*, the economist and security expert Martin Libicki authoritatively details states' operational and strategic considerations in the cyber-realm. These two books add nuance to debates about digital conflicts while resisting the temptation to treat them as analogous to nuclear or conventional ones. And together, they help explain why the United States has failed to adequately protect itself from cyberthreats.

Although these authors do not address the hacking that targeted the 2016 campaign, they offer clear-eyed reviews of U.S. responses to earlier state-sponsored hacks and provide analytic frameworks that could help policymakers think through the challenge of preventing future digital assaults. Moving forward, the United States must clearly delineate what constitutes unacceptable behavior in cyberspace and embrace a broader range of retaliatory measures so that it can deter attacks that are certain to come harder and faster than ever before.

TERMS OF ENGAGEMENT

Buchanan and Libicki agree that deterrence is primarily about messaging, or the ability to clearly communicate boundaries and consequences. Libicki renders the core message of deterrence as "if you do this then that will be done." The ability to send that message requires four things: attribution (the state must be able to define the target of retaliation), thresholds (the state must be able to consistently distinguish between acts that merit retaliation and those that do not), credibility (the state's will to retaliate must be believed), and capability (the state must be able to pull off a successful response).

Each of these components is exponentially more complex in cyberspace than in a conventional setting. First and foremost, cyberattacks are hard to detect. As Buchanan notes, hackers can easily intrude into a network without attracting attention. Even when an attack is discovered, it can be notoriously difficult to confidently attribute it to any one particular actor. A hacker might be a state agent or employee, or a member of a criminal organization, or even—as Trump once crudely put it—"somebody sitting on their bed that weighs 400 pounds." And if authorities do identify the perpetrator, they still must determine whether the cyberattack crossed the retaliation threshold and merits a response. In conventional settings, physical troop movements, progress along a path to nuclearization, or military buildups have long guided these decisions. But states have yet to agree on the digital equivalents of such moves.

The state must also signal that it has the will and ability to respond without giving away too much information about

Semper WiFi: a U.S. marine at cyberwarfare training in Virginia Beach, February 2012

SAMANTHA SAIS / REUTERS

just how it would do so, since that would allow would-be attackers to prepare. Cyber-capabilities depend on preserving information asymmetry. Secrecy and surprise are essential because cyber-defenses can block particular methods of intrusion completely, unlike conventional military defenses, which cannot necessarily prevent the actions of a more powerful state.

WHEN DETERRENCE FAILS

Washington has gained ample experience with these strategic dilemmas in the past decade, as it has faced escalating cyber-threats from a range of adversaries. The United States may well have deterred the worst; after all, it has yet to experience a cyberattack that directly threatened lives. As is often true in deterrence, success is invisible but failure is public. But two high-profile failures—the 2014 hacking of Sony Pictures, attributed to North Korea, and the 2015 cyberattack on the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), attributed to China—revealed important weaknesses in U.S. deterrence policy.

In 2009, President Barack Obama announced a new U.S. strategy to address the threat posed by increasingly aggressive actors in cyberspace. "It's now clear this cyberthreat is one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face as a nation," he declared. "It's also clear that we're not as prepared as we should be." The Obama administration took a number of steps to bolster cybersecurity, such as streamlining response channels and intelligence sharing, increasing the security of government networks, and outlining more explicit thresholds for retaliation. But repeated digital assaults tested the comprehensiveness of these new policies and revealed strategically significant shortcomings.

In November 2014, a group sponsored by North Korea and calling itself the Guardians of Peace infiltrated computer networks at Sony Pictures, extracting sensitive personnel information and stealing copies of unreleased films. The hackers attempted to blackmail Sony, demanding that the studio abandon its plans to release a comedy critical of North Korea's supreme leader, Kim Jong Un. The disclosure of studio executives' hacked e-mails proved embarrassing and expensive; one Sony executive estimated that it cost the company $35 million. The U.S. government, however, did not publicly attribute the attack to North Korea until the Guardians of Peace threatened physical attacks on U.S. movie theaters if the film were released. Sony initially capitulated, but following widespread public criticism, including from Obama, it reversed course and released the film on a limited basis. The Department of Homeland Security insisted there was no genuine threat to theaters, and the screenings proceeded without incident. In January 2015, the U.S. government announced new sanctions against North Korean government agencies and officials in response to the hacking, but this haphazard response demonstrated the difficulty Washington has had in defining thresholds for retaliation.

The Sony episode revealed three notable shortcomings in U.S. cyberdeterrence policy. First, there was persistent ambiguity about the government's role in responding to attacks on privately owned information infrastructure. Second, the government and private industry were unable to coordinate a unified response to the threats. Finally, the press was eager and willing to report on the substance of the hacked e-mails, even if they were brought to light by an aggressive foreign actor, and focused far more on the often frivolous or salacious content of the e-mails than on the motives behind the hacking.

Because a movie studio fell outside the definition of critical infrastructure, Washington was slow to recognize the broader implications of the attack and the need for a government-led response. Drawing the line at intrusion of government networks failed to deter consequential attacks on private networks. In this case, it seemed that U.S. officials had not anticipated an attack on the country's core values—here, freedom of speech and expression—as a potential trigger for retaliation. And the fact that government action came only after physical threats may have communicated to North Korea and other adversaries that Washington did not consider the cyberattack itself sufficient grounds for retaliation.

Attacks on government networks themselves have also failed to elicit a strong response, a further blow to U.S. credibility. In June 2015, the Obama administration revealed that hackers had stolen a trove of data from servers at the OPM, which houses massive amounts of sensitive personal information about government employees. James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, said that China was the "leading suspect" in the attack. But regardless of that attribution and despite the fact that the theft clearly crossed one of the lines established by the Obama administration, there was no visible U.S. response (although China did arrest several people it claimed were responsible). Clapper even expressed

grudging admiration for the hackers: "You have to kind of salute the Chinese for what they did," he said, acknowledging that unless U.S. adversaries were denied the opportunity through better security or a more substantive deterrence strategy, such attacks would only continue.

But the Obama administration's updated cyber-deterrence policy, which was signed into law in December 2015, did little to address the weaknesses revealed by the Sony and OPM hacks. Even after such visible deterrence failures, the Obama administration continued to narrowly define thresholds for retaliation in cyberspace, focusing on threats to human life, critical infrastructure, economic security, and military command and control. And Russia was clearly paying attention.

FROM RUSSIA WITH LOVE

The Russians have long engaged in cyber-enabled information warfare campaigns—including targeting the elections of its strategically important neighbors. In 2014, for example, a Russian-backed group known as CyberBerkut interfered in Ukraine's presidential election. The group temporarily rendered Ukrainian vote-counting systems inoperable, deployed malware designed to portray the ultranationalist candidate as winning on government websites, and launched a cyberattack that delayed the final vote count by hours. Ultimately, those efforts were detected in time and did not alter the election's outcome.

Given that track record, Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. election should have come as no surprise. And yet Washington's response was erratic and unclear. The Russians targeted nongovernment networks, just as the

North Koreans had done earlier. The Kremlin seems to have noted that the leaked e-mails of Sony executives were deemed an embarrassment rather than a form of information warfare. And indeed, because the DNC and Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee networks that the Russians infiltrated were not government systems or election infrastructure, their penetration by a foreign power did not set off sufficient alarms within the U.S. government. Clapper indicated in May 2016 that the intelligence community was aware that hackers were targeting the presidential campaigns but implied that the activity was within the ordinary course of passive intelligence collection.

By the summer of 2016, there was strong evidence of Russia's involvement in the hacking and release of the DNC's e-mails, but the U.S. government did not publicly attribute the attacks to Russia until October. In the intervening period, the press treated the Russian link as speculative and as something of a footnote: as with the leaked Sony e-mails, media outlets focused primarily on the content of the messages, failing to highlight the fact that they had probably been stolen and released by a foreign adversary, in this case, in an effort to influence a U.S. election. If anything, the fact that the e-mails had been surreptitiously obtained created the impression that the Clinton campaign had something to hide; information that was otherwise unremarkable became headline news. Strong and specific U.S. government attribution from the outset could have substantially shifted the focus to Russia's motives.

When the Obama administration finally did respond to the Russian hacking, the trigger was not the theft itself or the release of stolen e-mails. Instead, it was the targeting of election infrastructure—the threat of actual vote counts being compromised—which had been uncovered by state election administrators. And even after publicly attributing the attack to Russia, Washington stuck to its usual noncommittal lines, employing the same language it had used after the Sony and OPM hacks: the United States' response would be proportional, perhaps not visible, and "at a time and place of [its] choosing."

THE CYBERSECURITY DILEMMA

Although his book predates the 2016 election, Buchanan offers a compelling and prescient explanation of why the United States was so hesitant to respond more forcefully: a cyberspace version of what the political scientist John Herz first identified in the 1950s as "the security dilemma." Herz posited that actions undertaken by states for defensive reasons—such as increased defense spending or amassing troops on a border—are frequently perceived as threats by other states. Those states respond by affirming their own security, which others in turn perceive as threatening. Activities meant to be defensive unintentionally create and fuel an escalatory cycle.

In conventional armed conflicts, Buchanan explains, states have partly dealt with this dilemma by trying to make sure that others don't mistake their defense for offense. As a result, states have gotten better at making such judgments and have developed a set of standards about what constitutes "normal" defensive behavior. But those improvements have yet to reach the

cyber-realm, where civilian and government networks are commingled and defensive and offensive tools are often indistinguishable. A lack of shared norms complicates matters, as does the nature of cyberdefense. As Buchanan highlights, states sometimes intrude into the networks of other states for genuinely defensive purposes, but evaluating intent in cyberspace is often more difficult than judging a conventional military move. And when a state cannot determine intent, it will generally assume aggression. Furthermore, Buchanan argues that even defensive intrusions in cyberspace can compromise the security of the targeted state by establishing footholds that might be later exploited for offensive purposes. Any such move is therefore inherently threatening.

An acute awareness of the risks of escalation has inhibited Washington's response to cyberattacks. So has the fact that the United States is more reliant on information systems than its adversaries are, contributing to a cautiousness that borders on paralysis. But by failing to come up with an effective cyber-deterrence policy, the United States has increased its vulnerability to adversaries that are more willing to embrace risk.

FAILURE AND CONSEQUENCES

The Obama administration's concerns about the risks of retaliation ultimately resulted in a feckless response to Russia's election interference. According to a deeply reported postmortem in *The Washington Post*, the White House considered responses including cyberattacks on Russian infrastructure, damaging economic sanctions, and the release of information embarrassing to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Some officials even floated the idea of sending aircraft carriers to the Baltics. But the administration ultimately chose a modest response: imposing economic sanctions against a few individuals linked to Russian military intelligence, expelling 35 Russian diplomats from the United States, and seizing two Russian compounds in the United States that Washington believed Moscow used for espionage activity. According to the *Post*, the administration also approved a covert action to infiltrate Russian cyber-infrastructure in order to plant "cyber weapons" that could be used in the future. Trump, who, as president, has repeatedly cast doubt on the idea that the Russians interfered in the election, appears disinclined to use those tools.

Moreover, the U.S. government report on Russian interference overpromised and underdelivered, outlining the intelligence community's top-line conclusions without offering much evidence to back them up. Although the protection of sources and methods is important, the document failed to persuade skeptics, and the report's release backfired. A subsequent series of highly specific leaks of classified information have revealed far more detail, but they lack the persuasive strength of official confirmation.

Domestic political factors also contributed to this reticent response. The Obama administration was loath to be viewed as improperly influencing the election. According to *The Washington Post*, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, Republican from Kentucky, told the Obama administration that he would view any effort to publicly challenge the Russians over their interference in

the election as politically motivated, thereby blocking any chance for a unified, bipartisan response. The delicacies of electoral politics, however, provide yet another compelling reason for establishing clearer rules of the road when it comes to cyberattacks. By setting neutral standards, future administrations can guard against claims of partisanship should they choose to respond forcefully to foreign attempts to interfere in U.S. politics or policymaking.

Unquestionably, stronger responses carry significant risks. As Libicki writes, "The do-nothing option is not entirely crazy." Sometimes, an adversary desires a response, and so refusing to acknowledge an attack is one way to fight back. But Libicki also notes that whichever path a state chooses in responding to a cyberattack, it must "assure itself that it is defeating the attacker's strategy as well as altering the attacker's calculus." By that measure, the U.S. cyber-deterrence strategy, both past and present, has failed.

That failure has already affected U.S. allies. In May, the French presidential candidate Emmanuel Macron was targeted with a similar hack and e-mail dump on the eve of a national election. (He won anyway.) Although the evidence is less definitive than in the U.S. case, Russia—which favored Macron's opponent, the right-wing populist Marine Le Pen—is widely believed to be responsible.

NEXT STEPS

To avoid a repeat of the 2016 fiasco, the United States must chart a new course shaped by a higher tolerance for strategic risk. For starters, Washington must articulate clearer lines. The Obama administration's cyberstrategy presented ambiguity as a deterrent tactic, claiming that a lack of specificity would discourage states from simply tailoring their malicious activities to avoid crossing lines. But experience has demonstrated that aggressive adversaries considered that zone of ambiguity to be a zone of impunity. Although setting clearer lines does risk encouraging some additional below-the-threshold activity, containing behavior in that space is a better outcome than allowing more serious violations to go unchecked.

Likewise, the United States should be more consistent and proactive in publicly attributing attacks. When officials fail to point fingers for fear of revealing sources and methods, they offer U.S. adversaries plausible deniability. Strong attribution and statements that unambiguously link retaliation to corresponding offenses are important steps toward shaping and enforcing the norms necessary to govern state conduct in cyberspace.

Finally, the United States must cease to be inhibited by the fear of sparking escalatory cycles. Stronger responses to hacking, such as counterattacks and aggressive sanctions, do carry significant risks, but Washington can no longer rely on a do-nothing or do-little approach. Cyber-deterrence policy must reflect the reality that failing to respond in the face of an attack is itself a choice with consequences.

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

GETTY IMAGES

When Stalin Faced Hitler

Who Fooled Whom?

Stephen Kotkin

Through the first four decades of his life, Joseph Stalin achieved little. He was born in 1878 to a poor family in Gori, Georgia, then part of the Russian empire. His father was a cobbler; his mother, a cleaning lady and seamstress. Stalin's childhood, illnesses and mishaps included, was largely normal for the time. He received good marks in school and, as a teenager, got his poems published in well-regarded Georgian periodicals. ("To this day his beautiful, sonorous lyrics echo in my ears," one reader would later recall.) But he did not sit for his final-year exams at the Tiflis Seminary and failed to graduate. Instead of becoming a priest, he became an underground revolutionary fighting tsarist oppression, spending the next 20 years hiding, organizing, and serving time in prison and internal exile in Siberia.

Stalin's life was altered forever by the outbreak of total war in 1914, which helped precipitate the Russian tsar's abdication in February 1917 and, later that year, a putsch by radical leftists led by Vladimir Lenin. Suddenly, the 39-year-old Stalin was a leading member of the new Bolshevik regime.

He played a central role in the Russian Civil War and the creation of the Soviet Union. In 1922, Lenin appointed him head of the Communist Party. A month later, Lenin was incapacitated by a stroke, and Stalin seized his chance to create his own personal dictatorship inside the larger Bolshevik one. Beginning in the late 1920s, he forced through the building of a socialist state, herding 120 million peasants onto collective farms or into the gulag and arresting and murdering immense numbers of loyal people in the officer corps, the secret police,

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embassies, spy networks, scientific and artistic circles, and party organizations.

The vast shadow of Stalin the despot often hides Stalin the human being. He collected watches. He played skittles and billiards. He loved gardening and Russian steam baths. He liked colored pencils—blue, red, and green. He drank mineral water and wines from his native Georgia. He smoked a pipe, using tobacco from cigarettes, which he would unroll and slide into the pipe—usually two cigarettes' worth—and then light with matches. He kept his desk in order.

Stalin had a passion for books, which he marked up and filled with placeholders to find particular passages. His personal library would ultimately grow to more than 20,000 volumes. He annotated works by Karl Marx and Lenin, of course, but also Russian translations of Plato and Clausewitz, as well as the writings of Alexander Svechin, a former tsarist officer whom Stalin never trusted but who demonstrated that the only constant in war was an absence of constants. Among Russian authors, Stalin's favorite was probably Anton Chekhov, who portrayed villains, and not just heroes, with complexity. Still, judging by the references scattered among his writings and speeches, he spent more time reading Soviet-era literature. His jottings in whatever he read were often irreverent: "Rubbish," "fool," "scumbag," "piss off," "ha-ha!"



Stalin's manners were coarse, and his sense of humor perverse. But he cultivated a statesmanlike appearance, editing out his jokes and foul language from the transcripts of official gatherings. He appears to have had few mistresses, and definitely no harem. His family life was neither particularly happy nor unhappy. Personal life was subsumed in politics.

Stalin spoke softly, sometimes inaudibly, because of a defect in his vocal cords. He relished being called Koba, after the Georgian folk-hero avenger (and a real-life benefactor who had underwritten Stalin's education). But one childhood chum had called him Geza, a Gori-dialect term for the unusual gait Stalin had developed after an accident. He had to swing his hip all the way around to walk. A childhood bout with smallpox had left lifelong scars on his nose, lower lip, chin, and cheeks.

It is tempting to find in such deformities the wellsprings of bloody tyranny: torment, self-loathing, inner rage, bluster, a mania for adulation. His pockmarks were airbrushed out of public photographs, and his awkward stride was hidden from public view. (Film of him walking was prohibited.) But people who met him saw the facial disfigurement and odd movement; they also discovered that he had a limp handshake and was not as tall as he appeared in photographs. He stood five feet seven inches, roughly the same as Napoleon and one inch shorter than Adolf Hitler. And yet, despite their initial shock on seeing him for the first time—could this be Stalin?—most people found that they could not take their gaze off him, especially his expressive eyes.

THE DREAM PALACE

Stalin saw himself and his country as menaced from every direction. After seizing power in 1917, Lenin and his followers had obsessed over the "capitalist encirclement" their coup had brought about: now, this structural paranoia fed, and was fed by, Stalin's personal paranoia. Such were the paradoxes of power: the closer the country got to achieving socialism, Stalin argued, the sharper the class struggle became; the more power Stalin personally wielded, the more he still needed. Triumph shadowed by treachery became the dynamic of both the revolution and his life. Beginning in 1929, as the might of the Soviet state and Stalin's personal dictatorship grew and grew, so, too, did the stakes. His drive to build socialism would prove both successful and shattering, and deeply reinforcing of his hypersuspicious, vindictive disposition.

Communism was an idea, a dream palace whose attraction derived from its seeming fusion of science and utopia, and Stalin was an ideologue. In the Marxist conception, capitalism had created great wealth by replacing feudalism, but then promoted only the interests of the exploiter class, at the expense of the rest of humanity. Once capitalism was overcome, the thinking went, the forces of production would be unleashed as never before. Exploitation, colonization, and imperialist

war would give way to solidarity, emancipation, and peace. To be sure, socialism in practice had been difficult to imagine. But whatever it was, it could not be capitalism. Logically, socialism would be built by eradicating private property, the market, and "bourgeois" parliaments and putting in their place collective property, socialist planning, and people's power. Of course, as Stalin and many other Marxists avowed, the capitalists would never allow themselves to be buried. Rather, they would fight to the death against socialism, using every means—lies, espionage, murder—because this was a war in which only one class could emerge victorious. Socialism, therefore, would also have to use mass violence and deceit. The most terrible crimes became morally imperative acts in the name of creating paradise on earth.

Under Stalin, the most terrible crimes became morally imperative acts in the name of creating paradise on earth.

The purported science of Marxism-Leninism ostensibly explained why the world had so many problems (class) and how it could be made better (class warfare), with a role for all. People's otherwise insignificant lives became linked to building an entirely new world. To collect grain or operate a lathe was to strike a hammer blow at world imperialism. It did not hurt that those who took part stood to gain personally: idealism and opportunism are always reinforcing. Accumulated resentments, too, fueled the aspiration to become significant. People under the age of 29 made up nearly half of the Soviet population, giving the country one of the youngest demographic profiles in the world, and the youth proved especially attracted to a vision that put them at the center of a struggle to build tomorrow today.

Stalin personified communism's lofty vision. A cult would be built around him, singling him out as *vozhd*, an ancient Slavic word that came to mean something like "supreme leader"—the Russian equivalent of "duce" or "führer." Stalin resisted the cult, calling himself "shit compared with Lenin." According to his close associate Anastas Mikoyan, Stalin once rebuked another Soviet official, saying, "Why do you praise me alone, as if one man decides everything?" Whether Stalin's objections reflected false modesty or genuine embarrassment remains hard to say, but he indulged the prolonged ovations he received in public. "At first," recalled Vyacheslav Molotov, who served as Stalin's principal lieutenant for decades, "he resisted the cult of personality, but then he came to like it a bit."

Stalin was a ruler of seemingly irreconcilable contradictions. He could flash burning anger; he could glow with a soft, capacious smile. He could be solicitous and charming; he latched on to perceived slights and compulsively sought revenge. He prided himself on his voracious reading and his ability to quote the wisdom of Marx or Lenin; he resented fancy-pants intellectuals who he thought put on airs. He possessed a phenomenal memory and a mind of scope; his intellectual horizons were severely circumscribed by primitive theories of class struggle and imperialism. He developed a feel for the aspirations of the masses and incipient elites; he almost never visited factories or farms, or even state agencies, instead reading about the country he ruled in secret reports and newspapers. He was a cynic about everyone's supposed base motives; he lived and breathed his own ideals.

Stalin did what winning leaders do: he articulated and drove toward a consistent goal, in his case a powerful state backed by a unified society that had eradicated capitalism and built industrial socialism. "Murderous" and "mendacious" do not begin to describe him. At the same time, Stalin galvanized millions. His colossal authority was rooted in a dedicated party, a formidable governing apparatus, and Marxist-Leninist ideology. But his power was magnified many times over by ordinary people, who projected onto him their ambitions for social justice, peace, abundance, and national greatness. Dictators who amass great power often retreat into pet pursuits, expounding interminably on their obsessions and paralyzing the state. But Stalin's obsession was a socialist great power, and he labored day and night to build one. Stalin was a myth, but he proved equal to the myth.

"A TREMENDOUS CHAP"

Hitler was 11 years Stalin's junior, born in 1889 in a frontier region of Austria-Hungary. He lost his father at age 13 and his mother at 18. (The Jewish physician who tended to his mother would recall that in 40 years of practicing medicine, he had never seen anyone as broken with grief over a mother's death as Hitler.) At age 20, Hitler found himself on a bread line in Vienna, his inheritance and savings nearly spent. He had twice been rejected from Vienna's Academy of Fine Arts ("sample drawing unsatisfactory") and was staying in a homeless shelter behind a railway station. A vagrant on the next bed recalled that Hitler's "clothes were being cleaned of lice, since for days he had been wandering about without a roof and in a terribly neglected condition." Soon, with a small loan from an aunt, Hitler got himself into a group home for men. He

managed to find odd jobs, such as painting picture postcards and drafting advertisements. He also frequented the city's public libraries, where he read political tracts, newspapers, the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer, and the fiction of Karl May, set in the cowboys-and-Indians days of the American West or in the exotic Near East.

Hitler dodged the Austrian draft. When the authorities finally caught up with him, they judged the undernourished and gloomy youth unfit for service. He fled across the border to Munich, and in August 1914, he joined the German army as a private. He ended World War I still a private, but the war's aftermath transformed his life. He would be among the many who migrated from the political left to the right in the chaotic wake of imperial Germany's defeat.

Film footage from 1918 shows Hitler marching in the funeral procession of provincial Bavaria's murdered leader, a Jewish Social Democrat; he is wearing two armbands, one black (for mourning) and the other red. In April 1919, after Social Democrats and anarchists formed the Bavarian Soviet Republic, the Communists quickly seized power; Hitler, who contemplated joining the Social Democrats, served as a delegate from his battalion's *soviet* (council). He had no profession to speak of but appears to have taken part in leftist indoctrination of the troops. Ten days before Hitler's 30th birthday, the Bavarian Soviet Republic was quickly crushed by the so-called Freikorps, made up largely of war veterans. Hitler remained in the military because a superior, the chief of the German army's "information" department, had the idea of sending him to an antileftist instructional course and then using him to infiltrate leftist groups. The officer recalled that Hitler "was like a tired stray dog looking for a master" and "ready to throw in his lot with anyone who would show him kindness." The assignment as an informant led to Hitler's involvement in a minuscule right-wing group, the German Workers' Party, which had been established to draw workers away from communism and which Hitler, with the assistance of rabidly anti-Semitic émigrés from the former imperial Russia, would remake into the National Socialist German Workers' Party, or Nazi Party.

Although he had begun to earn a reputation as a transfixing far-right agitator, Hitler remained a marginal figure. When Stalin was the new general secretary of the Communist Party of the largest state in the world, Hitler was in prison for a failed 1923 attempt to seize power in Munich, which would be derided as "the Beer Hall Putsch." He was convicted and sentenced to five years. Still, he managed to turn his trial

into a triumph. One of the judges remarked, "What a tremendous chap, this Hitler!" Indeed, even though Hitler was an Austrian citizen, the presiding judge allowed him to stay in Germany, reasoning that the law requiring deportation "cannot apply to a man who thinks and feels as German as Hitler, who voluntarily served for four and a half years in the German army at war, who attained high military honors through outstanding bravery in the face of the enemy, was wounded."

During his first two weeks in prison, Hitler refused to eat, believing he deserved to die, but letters arrived congratulating him as a national hero. Richard Wagner's daughter-in-law, Winifred, sent paper and pencil, encouraging him to write a book. Hitler had an attendant in confinement, Rudolf Hess, who typed his dictation, creating an autobiography dedicated to the 16 Nazis killed in the failed putsch. In *Mein Kampf*, Hitler portrayed himself as a man of destiny and pledged to revive Germany as a great power and rid it of Jews, anointing himself "the destroyer of Marxism." In December 1924, after serving only 13 months, he was released. But his book sales disappointed, a second book failed to find a publisher, and his Nazi Party struggled at the ballot box. Lord D'Abernon, the British ambassador to Berlin at the time, summarized Hitler's political life after his early release from prison as "fading into oblivion."

Hitler was a master improviser who grasped opportunities that came his way.

History is full of surprises. That this Austrian member of a fringe political movement would become the dictator of Germany, and Stalin's principal nemesis, was scarcely imaginable in 1924. But Hitler turned out to be a master improviser: often uncertain, but a man possessed of radical ideas who sensed where he was ultimately going and grasped opportunities that came his way. Stalin, too, was a strategist in that sense: a man of radical ideas able to perceive and seize opportunities that he did not always create but turned to his advantage. The richest opportunities perceived by Stalin and Hitler were often supposedly urgent "threats" that they inflated or invented. History is driven by the interaction of geopolitics, institutions, and ideas—but it takes historical agents to set it all in motion.

Stalin's direct experience of Germany consisted of just a few months in 1907 in Berlin, where he stopped on the way back to Russia from a Bolshevik meeting in London. He studied but never mastered the German language. But like several tsarist predecessors, Stalin was a Germanophile,

STRONGER ON THE GLOBAL STAGE

Having shed its image as a strife-ridden country, the Kingdom of Cambodia has made great strides in building a bright, sustainable future for its people. Made up of a population of 15 million, half of which are under 25 years old, Cambodia's demographics present the perfect condition to speed up economic growth.

Growing at an average of seven percent during the last two decades, Cambodia already boasts one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Analysts remain optimistic about the country's ability to sustain its growth, particularly in tourism, garment manufacturing, construction and property development.

Prime Minister Hun Sen, whose ruling party secured a fresh mandate in elections earlier this year, has continued to enact measures aimed at boosting Cambodia's economic competitiveness within ASEAN and the rest of the world.

In May, Cambodia hosted the 26th World Economic Forum on ASEAN. With the theme "Youth, Technology and Growth: Securing ASEAN's Digital and Demographic Dividends", the WEF event, held in the bustling capital Phnom Pehn, was attended by more than 700 leaders from business, government, academe and civil society from around the world.

The event, according to the Cambodian government, was "an opportunity to raise Cambodia's international profile and enhance its national prestige" and "contribute to the promotion of investment opportunities and tourists to the Kingdom".

Justin Wood, the head of the World Economic Forum Pacific Region, praised Cambodia for boosting economic growth and reducing poverty in the country.

"There is a different story to be told about Cambodia. We want the world to understand a bit more about what is happening in Cambodia," Wood said.

Setting the Foundations

As Cambodia pursues its growth strategy, the government recognizes that it needs to attract more investment in various vital sectors, particularly in infrastructure and education. At the heart of this plan is Minister of Public Works and Transport. Sun Chantol, who was also Minister of Commerce.

"The government recognizes the critical importance of a healthy, efficient and cost-effective national infrastructure to expedite trade and lower transportation costs overall. Trade moves through different modes of transport, by sea, rivers, by airfreight, rail and road, and the respective networks continue to be rehabilitated, built and expanded," Chantol explained.

In line with the WEF forum's theme, Cambodia has stepped up efforts to make its graduates more competitive in the global market.

The University of Cambodia, one of the kingdom's largest private universities, is a key contributor to this renaissance in education.

Founded in 2003 by Dr. Kao Kim Hourn, UC can accommodate 10,000 students and stands as a leader in business and entrepreneurship education. In 2017, the university named its business school after AirAsia Group CEO Tony Fernandes, arguably the best-known Southeast Asian entrepreneur.

In a ranking of business schools last year, the University of Cambodia was cited for possessing a "strong regional influence."

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

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

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

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

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

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

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admiring that country's industry and science—in a word, its modernity. But for the longest time, Stalin had no idea of Hitler's existence.

Then, in 1933, Hitler was handed the wheel of the great state Stalin admired. The lives of the two dictators had run in parallel, as the historian Alan Bullock wrote. But it was the intersection that would matter: two very different men from the peripheries of their societies who were bloodily reviving and remaking their countries, all while unknowingly (and then knowingly) drawing ever closer. It was not only the German people who turned out to be waiting for Hitler.

FACE-OFF

On Saturday, June 21, 1941, Stalin paced and paced in his Kremlin office, with his usual short steps, gripping a pipe. Inside the triangular Kremlin, the Imperial Senate formed its own triangular stronghold, and Stalin's wing was a fortress within the fortress. Even the regime personnel with regular Kremlin passes needed a special pass to enter Stalin's wing. It came to be known to regime insiders as the Little Corner. The walls in the offices were lined with shoulder-height wood paneling, under the theory that wood vapors enhanced air quality, and the elevators were paneled with mahogany. Behind Stalin's working desk hung a portrait of Lenin. In a corner, on a small table, stood a display case with Lenin's death mask. Another small table held several telephones. ("Stalin," he would answer.) Next to the desk was a stand with a vase holding fresh fruit. In the rear was a door that led to a room for relaxation (although rarely used for that purpose), with oversize hanging maps and a giant globe. In the main office, between two of the three large windows that let in afternoon sun, sat a black leather couch where, in his better moods, Stalin sipped tea with lemon.

Over the years, people who were granted an audience with him surmised that he paced to control his explosive emotions or, alternatively, to unnerve those in his company. Invariably, he would be the only one in the room standing, trundling back and forth, sidling up to people while they were speaking. Only a few intimates knew that Stalin suffered nearly constant pain in the joints of his legs, which may have been a genetic condition and which movement partly alleviated. He also strolled the Kremlin grounds, usually alone, touching the leaves on the trees and shooing away black ravens. (Afterward, guards would come and massacre the birds.)

Stalin had eliminated private property and made himself responsible for the Soviet equivalents of Washington, Wall Street, and Hollywood

all rolled into one, and all rolled into one person. He complained of fatigue, especially toward the end of his long workdays, and suffered from insomnia, a condition never acknowledged publicly. A tiny group of insiders knew of his infections and multiday fevers. Rumors of various health problems had circulated abroad, and the use of foreign doctors had long ago been discontinued. But a narrow circle of Russian physicians had acquired detailed knowledge of his illnesses and of his bodily deformities, including his barely usable left arm, the thick, discolored toenails on his right foot, and the two webbed toes on his left foot (an omen, in traditional Russian folklore, of Satanic influence). For long periods, Stalin resisted being seen by any doctor, and he had ceased using medicines from the Kremlin pharmacy that were issued in his name. The household staff had stopped bringing his meals from the Kremlin canteen, cooking them in his apartment instead and, in his presence, tasting from the plates. All the same, Stalin's stomach was a wreck. He suffered from regular bouts of diarrhea.

The Imperial Senate had been built by the Teutonic empress of Russia, Catherine the Great, for "the glorification of Russian statehood." A few decades after its opening, in the early fall of 1812, Napoleon had arrived with his invading forces. Members of the French Grande Armée—which included many Protestants and Catholics from Germany, Italy, and Poland—had defecated in the Kremlin's Orthodox churches and taken potshots at the holy icons. After cunning Russian resistance starved the occupiers, a retreating Napoleon had ordered the Kremlin blown to pieces. Heavy rains limited the damage, but the explosives destroyed parts of the walls and several towers. The Imperial Senate suffered a fire.

The long, red-carpeted corridors around the Little Corner were attended by an army of sentries. "See how many of them there are?" Stalin once remarked to a military commander. "Each time I take this corridor, I think, which one? If this one, he will shoot me in the back, and if it is the one around the corner, he will shoot me in the front." The commander was dumbfounded by such paranoia: after all, there had never been a single genuine assassination attempt against Stalin. But the "Man of Steel"—"deeper than the ocean, higher than the Himalayas, brighter than the sun, teacher of the universe," in the words of the Kazakh national poet—was being stalked from afar.

In the summer of 1941, it seemed clear that Hitler had won World War II. He had annexed his native Austria, the Czech lands, much of Poland, and a strip of Lithuania, creating the Greater Germany that in

1871 Otto von Bismarck had deliberately avoided forging during the wars of German unification (deeming Austria-Hungary's existence vital for the balance of power). Hitler's troops had occupied the Balkans, Denmark, the Low Countries, Norway, and northern France. Leaders loyal to the führer ruled Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Romania, and Spain. Hitler essentially controlled all of Europe from the English Channel to the Soviet border; only Sweden and Switzerland remained neutral, and both were cooperating with Nazi Germany economically. True, the defiant British still refused to come to terms, but London could never overturn Berlin's continental dominance.

Stalin was strictly observing the nonaggression pact that Germany and the Soviet Union had signed in August 1939. At that time, Hitler, who had decided to swallow Poland by force, needed to keep the Soviet Union out of a possible anti-German coalition with France and the United Kingdom. Stalin extracted a highly favorable bargain. As Hitler rampaged across the rest of Europe, Stalin avoided having to face Germany's military might and, taking advantage of the situation, occupied and soon annexed the Baltic states, eastern Poland, and the eastern European regions of Bukovina and Bessarabia. Moreover, in exchange for Soviet grain and oil, Stalin received advanced machine tools and state-of-the-art weaponry from Germany.

Stalin's apprenticeship in high-stakes diplomacy had shown him to be cunning but also opportunistic, avaricious, obdurate. His approach had remained the same: prepare for war with a massive armaments buildup, yet do everything to avoid fighting while allowing the British and the Germans to go at each other. This had worked, until Germany—aided by the cornucopia of Soviet raw materials—conquered France in the summer of 1940, and Germany was freed up to turn its troops toward the Soviet Union. The two geopolitical and ideological rivals, as a result of their shared aggrandizement, had acquired a common border.

Now, after half a year of contradictory secret reports about a possible German invasion of the Soviet Union, intelligence warnings of an imminent titanic war were coming from everywhere. In Moscow, German embassy personnel were evacuating, taking with them oil paintings, antique rugs, and silver. The Soviet secret police reported that the Italian embassy, too, had received instructions to evacuate. Earlier in the day, a Soviet agent in Bulgaria had reported that a German emissary had said that "a military confrontation is expected on June 21 or 22." The Chinese Communist leader Zhou Enlai reported to officials at the Comintern, the

international communist organization, that his nationalist rival, Chiang Kai-shek, "is declaring insistently that Germany will attack the USSR, and is even giving a date: June 21, 1941!" This prompted the head of the Comintern to call Molotov. "The situation is unclear," Molotov told him. "There is a major game under way. Not everything depends on us."

FAKE NEWS

It was a hot, stifling day, and Stalin's top aide, Alexander Poskryobyshev, was sweating profusely, his window open but the leaves on the trees outside utterly still. The son of a cobbler, like the despot he served, Poskryobyshev occupied the immediate outer office through which all visitors had to pass, and invariably they would spray him with questions—"Why did the Master have me summoned?" "What's his mood?"—to which he would laconically answer, "You'll find out." He was indispensable, handling all the phone calls and document piles in just the way the despot preferred. But Stalin had allowed Lavrenti Beria, the feared head of the secret police, to imprison Poskryobyshev's beloved wife as a "Trotskyite" in 1939. (Beria had sent a large basket of fruit to their two girls; he then executed their mother.)

Poskryobyshev sat at his desk trying to cool down with a bottle of mineral water. On Stalin's instructions, at around 2:00 PM, he phoned General Ivan Tyulenev, head of the Moscow Military District. Soon the general heard Stalin's muffled voice asking, "Comrade Tyulenev, what is the situation concerning Moscow's antiaircraft defenses?" After a brief report, Stalin said, "Listen, the situation is unsettled and therefore you should bring the antiaircraft defenses of Moscow up to 75 percent of their readiness state."

Poskryobyshev placed the latest intelligence, delivered by a field courier, on Stalin's desk. Almost all of it was hearsay, rather than purloined documents. The reports were contradictory, contaminated with obviously false information, and often delivered with skepticism. In London, the Soviet ambassador to the United Kingdom wrote in his report that he considered a German attack "unlikely" despite having received information to the contrary from British intercepts of secret German military communications. In Berlin, however, the Soviet ambassador to Germany, after months of equivocation, finally averred that Germany's actions signaled an imminent invasion. But Stalin evidently concluded that his envoy in Berlin had been fed disinformation and remarked that he was "not such a smart fellow."

For Stalin, the question was not whether war with the Nazi regime was inescapable but whether it was inescapable this year. Scores and scores of invasion warnings had accumulated on his desk, but 14 specific dates that intelligence reports had identified as the day when Germany would attack had come and gone. The only remaining possibilities were "June 22–25" and "June 21 or 22." The invasion window would soon shut, because of the short time remaining until the onset of winter. Stalin was virtually home free for another year.

Of course, warnings of impending war were even splashed across the front pages of newspapers all over the world. But knowing how he himself made use of the press, Stalin took the screaming headlines to be planted provocations. He reasoned that the Americans and the British wanted nothing more than for the Germans and the Soviets to become embroiled in war. He was right, of course. But as a result, he dismissed all warnings of a German attack. He knew that Germany was experiencing severe shortages and reasoned that it needed even more supplies from him, thus a German invasion would be self-defeating because it would put those supplies at risk. He knew further that Germany had lost World War I because it had fought on two fronts, and so he reasoned that the Germans understood that it would be suicidal for them to attack the Soviet Union in the east before defeating the United Kingdom in the west.

Stalin labeled as "disinformation" whatever he chose not to believe.

This kind of reasoning had become a trap for Stalin, allowing him to conclude that the colossal buildup of German forces on his doorstep was not a sign of imminent attack but rather Hitler attempting to blackmail him into giving up territory and making other concessions without a fight. Indeed, a brilliant Nazi disinformation campaign fed the Soviet global spy network with incessant reports about German demands that would follow the vast eastern military buildup. Thus, even Stalin's best intelligence said both that war was coming and that there would be blackmail. And if the latter were true, the former need not be.

When Stalin damned his intelligence as contaminated by disinformation, therefore, he was right. But the despot had no idea which parts were disinformation and which might be accurate intelligence. He labeled as "disinformation" whatever he chose not to believe.

READY OR NOT, HERE I COME

Colonel Georgy Zakharov, a decorated fighter pilot, had been ordered to conduct a full daylight reconnaissance of the border region on the German side, and he reported that the Wehrmacht was poised to invade. The NKGB, the Soviet secret police agency, had discovered that German saboteurs brazenly crossing the border had been instructed that "in the event German troops cross the frontier before they return to Germany, they must report to any German troop unit located on Soviet territory." Soviet counterintelligence noted vigorous German recruitment of disaffected people in the Baltic region, Belarus, and Ukraine, who were forming underground groups and engaging in terrorism long after Stalin's supposed annihilation of the perceived fifth column during the Great Terror. Overburdened Soviet rail lines that were needed to transport troops westward were swamped with tens of thousands of "anti-Soviet elements" being deported. German tanks, warplanes, and pontoons had been advanced into an inner zone protected by barbed wire; now the wire was being removed. The click and whir of German motors resounded across to the Soviet side of the frontier.

At the centerpiece of the Little Corner, a felt-covered conference table, Stalin had held countless sessions devoted to war preparations. He had forced into being upward of 9,000 new industrial enterprises during three Five-Year Plans, and Soviet military production grew even faster than GDP for a decade. He had overseen the formation of 125 new divisions just since 1939, and the Red Army now stood at 5.37 million troops, the largest military force in the world. It had 25,000 tanks and 18,000 fighter planes, three to four times the size of Germany's stocks. Stalin knew that Germany was underestimating this massive force out of prejudice as well as ignorance, so he had arranged German visits to Soviet aviation and tank factories, and even allowed German planes nearly unimpeded reconnaissance of Soviet troop concentrations, airfields, naval bases, and fuel and ammunition depots. Stalin also had his spies spread rumors that, if attacked, Soviet aircraft would assault Berlin with chemical and biological agents. In Hitler's shoes, Stalin would have been deterred.

Of course, if his own country really was so well armed, why not let an enemy foolishly underestimate it? Because the so-called Winter War between the Soviet Union and Finland, waged in 1939–40, had exposed Soviet military weaknesses not just to Hitler but also to Stalin. (The Soviets had won a crushing victory in the end, but only after

being stymied for months by stout Finnish resistance.) The Red Army was still in the middle of a protracted post-Finland technological upgrade and reorganization. The Soviets possessed only around 1,800 advanced heavy tanks; the rest of their tanks were too light relative to their German counterparts. Similarly, the most advanced Soviet warplanes made up just one-quarter of the air force. Stalin's war preparations also bore the mark of his executions of thousands of loyal officers, especially top commanders such as Vasily Blyukher, whose eye had been deposited in his hand before he died under torture in 1938, and the gifted Mikhail Tukhachevsky, whose blood had been splattered all over his "confession" to being a German agent—not long before Stalin concluded the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact.

Now, 85 percent of the officer corps was 35 or younger; those older than 45 constituted around one percent. Fully 1,013 Soviet generals were under age 55, and only 63 were older than that. Many had been majors just a short time earlier. Out of 659,000 Soviet officers, only around half had completed military school, while one in four had the bare minimum (a few courses), and one in eight had no military education whatsoever.

TONIGHT'S THE NIGHT

Stalin was keenly aware of these realities, and lately, the despot's morose side had gotten the upper hand. "Stalin was unnerved and irritated by persistent reports (oral and written) about the deterioration of relations with Germany," recalled Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov, the commissar of the Soviet navy, of this period. "He felt that danger was imminent," recalled Nikita Khrushchev, who was at the time the party boss of Ukraine and had spent much of June in Moscow. "Would our country be able to deal with it? Would our army deal with it?"

June 21 happened to be the summer solstice, the longest day of the year—and it must have seemed interminable. At 5:00 PM, Stalin ordered that party secretaries of all Moscow wards were to stay at their posts. At 6:27 PM, Molotov entered the Little Corner—the first visitor, as usual. At 7:05, in walked Beria, Kuznetsov, Georgy Malenkov (a senior Communist Party secretary responsible for cadres), Grigory Safonov (a young deputy procurator general responsible for military courts), Semyon Timoshenko (a senior military commander), Kliment Voroshilov (a deputy head of the government), and Nikolai Voznesensky (the head of state planning). The discussion apparently revolved

around recent developments pointing toward war and Stalin's dread of provocations that might incite it.

Stalin's military intelligence estimated that only 120 to 122 of Germany's 285 total divisions were arrayed against the Soviet Union, versus somewhere between 122 and 126 against the United Kingdom (the other 37 to 43 were said to be in reserve). In fact, there were around 200 divisions arrayed against the Soviets—a total of at least three million Wehrmacht soldiers and half a million troops from Germany's Axis partners, as well as 3,600 tanks, 2,700 aircraft, 700,000 field guns and other artillery, 600,000 motor vehicles, and 650,000 horses. The Soviets had massed around 170 divisions (perhaps 2.7 million men) in the west, along with 10,400 tanks and 9,500 aircraft. The two largest armies in world history stood cheek by jowl on a border some 2,000 miles long.

Most conspicuously, German forces had occupied their firing positions; the Soviets had not. To be sure, Stalin had allowed covert strategic redeployments to the western border from the interior. But he would not permit the assumption of combat positions, which he feared would only play into the hands of hawks in the German military who craved war and were scheming to force Hitler's hand. Soviet planes were forbidden from flying within six miles of the border. Timoshenko and Georgy Zhukov, another senior military commander, made sure that frontline commanders did not cause or yield to provocation. Beria also tasked a master assassin with organizing "an experienced strike force to counter any frontier incident that might be used as an excuse to start a war." Soviet commanders could be liquidated by their own side if their forces returned any German fire.

Soviet intelligence was now reporting that not just Germany but also its eastern allies—Finland, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia—were at full war readiness. But Stalin, having long ago ceded the initiative, was effectively paralyzed. Just about anything he did could be used by Hitler to justify an invasion.

At 7:00 PM, Gerhard Kegel, a Soviet spy in the German embassy in Moscow, had risked his life, slipping out to tell his Soviet handler that German personnel living outside the facility had been ordered to come inside immediately and that "all think that this very night there will be war." At 8:00 PM, a courier arrived to give Stalin, Molotov, and Timoshenko this new piece of intelligence in sealed envelopes. In the Little Corner, Kuznetsov, Safonov, Timoshenko, Voroshilov, and Voznesensky were dismissed at 8:15. Malenkov was dismissed five minutes later. Nothing significant was decided.

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Zhukov phoned in to report that yet another German soldier had defected across the frontier and was warning of an invasion within a few hours. This was precisely the kind of "provocation" Stalin feared. He ordered Zhukov to the Kremlin, along with the just-departed Timoshenko. They entered Stalin's office at 8:50. Whereas Molotov and Beria parroted Stalin's denials that Hitler was going to attack, the two peasant-born commanders could see that Germany was coiled to invade. Still, when Stalin insisted otherwise, they presumed that he possessed superior information and insight. In any case, they knew the costs of losing his trust. "Everyone had in their memory the events of recent years," Zhukov would later recall. "And to say out loud that Stalin was wrong, that he is mistaken, to say it plainly, could have meant that without leaving the building, you would be taken to have coffee with Beria."

Stalin clung to his belief that Germany could not attack Russia before defeating the United Kingdom.

Nonetheless, the pair evidently used the defector's warnings to urge a general mobilization—tantamount, in Stalin's mind, to war. "Didn't German generals send that defector across the border in order to provoke a conflict?" Stalin asked. "No," answered Timoshenko. "We think the defector is telling the truth." Stalin: "What do we do now?" Timoshenko allowed the silence to persist. Finally, he suggested, "Put the troops on the western border on high alert." He and Zhukov had come prepared with a draft directive.

Stalin had himself tried to engage Hitler even as he waited for the blackmail demands he expected Hitler to issue. "Molotov has asked for permission to visit Berlin, but has been fobbed off," Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi propaganda chief, had written in his diary on June 18. "A naive request."

Stalin, instead of continuing to wait for an ultimatum from Hitler, could have preempted it. This was the last option he had left, and a potentially powerful one. Hitler feared that the wily Soviet despot would somehow seize the initiative and unilaterally, publicly declare dramatic, far-reaching concessions to Germany. Stalin appears to have discussed possible concessions with Molotov, but if he did, no record survives. Evidently, Stalin expected Germany to demand Ukraine, the Caucasian oil fields, and unimpeded transit for the Wehrmacht through Soviet territory to engage the British in the Near East and India. A cunning



despot could have publicly declared his willingness to join the hostilities against the United Kingdom, exacting revenge against the great power he most reviled and, crucially, robbing Hitler of his argument that the British were holding out against Germany in anticipation of eventual Soviet assistance. Instead, or in parallel to that, Stalin could have demonstrably begun the withdrawal of Soviet forces back from the entire frontier, which would have struck at the heart of the Nazi leader's public war rationale: a supposed "preventive attack" against the "Soviet buildup."

Instead of acting cunningly, Stalin clung to his belief that Germany could not attack Russia before defeating the United Kingdom, even though the British did not have an army on the continent and were neither defending territory there nor in a position to invade from there. He assumed that when Hitler finally issued his ultimatum, he would be able to buy time by negotiating: possibly giving in, if the demands were tolerable, and thereby averting war, or, more likely, dragging out any talks beyond the date when Hitler could have launched an invasion, gaining one more critical year, during which the Red Army's technological revamp would advance. Failing that, Stalin further assumed that even if hostilities broke out, the Germans would need at least two more weeks to fully mobilize their main invasion force, allowing him time to mobilize, too. When his spies out of Berlin and elsewhere reported that the Wehrmacht had "completed all war preparations," he did not grasp that this meant that day one would bring full, main-force engagement.

BARBAROSSA BEGINS

In the Little Corner, while the relatively heated discussion with Timoshenko and Zhukov continued, Molotov stepped out. Stalin had

him summon the German ambassador, Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg, to the Imperial Senate for a meeting at 9:30 PM. Schulenburg arrived promptly, direct from overseeing the burning of secret documents at the embassy. The envoy had been deeply disappointed that the Hitler-Stalin Pact, in which he had played an important role, had turned out to be an instrument not for a territorial deal over Poland to avoid war but for the onset of another world war. Now he feared the much-rumored German-Soviet clash, and recently he had gone to Berlin to see Hitler himself and persuade him of Stalin's peaceful intentions but had come back empty-handed. In desperation, Schulenburg had sent his embassy counselor to Berlin to try one last time, but this had failed as well.

Molotov demanded to know why Germany was evacuating personnel, thereby fanning rumors of war. He handed Schulenburg a letter of protest detailing systematic German violations of Soviet airspace and plaintively told him that "the Soviet government is unable to understand the cause of Germany's dissatisfaction in relation to the [Soviet Union], if such dissatisfaction exists." He complained that "there was no reason for the German government to be dissatisfied with Russia." Schulenburg responded that "posing those issues [is] justified," but he shrugged, saying that he was "not able to answer them, because Berlin utterly refrains from informing [me]."

During a state visit to Germany in November 1940, Molotov had gone toe to toe with Hitler in the gargantuan new Reich Chancellery, arguing over clashing spheres of influence in eastern Europe. "No foreign visitor had ever spoken to [Hitler] in this way in my presence," the führer's translator later wrote. But now Molotov could merely express, several times, his regret that Schulenburg was "unable to answer the questions raised."

Molotov shuffled back to Stalin's Little Corner. Suddenly, around 10:00 PM, amid the still suffocating heat, the winds gushed, billowing

the curtains at open windows. Then came the thunderclaps. Moscow was struck by a torrential downpour.

Finally, Stalin yielded to his insistent soldiers and accepted their draft directive. Timoshenko and Zhukov rushed out of the Little Corner at 10:20, armed, at long last, with an order for full-scale war mobilization, Directive Number 1. "A surprise attack by the Germans is possible during 22–23 June 1941," it stated. "The task of our forces is to refrain from any kind of provocative action that might result in serious complications." It ordered that "during the night of June 22, 1941, the firing positions of the fortified regions on the state border are to be secretly occupied," that "before dawn on June 22, 1941, all aircraft stationed in the field airdromes are to be dispersed and carefully camouflaged," that "all units are to be put in a state of military preparedness," and that "no further measures are to be carried out without specific instructions." It carried the signatures of Timoshenko and Zhukov. The military men had managed to delete an insertion by the despot that if the Germans attacked, Soviet commanders were to attempt to meet them, to settle any conflict. Still, the document made clear that the military was to prepare for war while doing everything possible to avoid it.

"The beginning of every war is like opening the door into a dark room," Hitler once said.

Soviet commanders up and down the frontier were hosting performances, as they generally did on Saturday nights. In Minsk, 150 miles east of the border, the officers' club put on *The Wedding at Malinovka,* a Soviet comic operetta about a village in the Ukrainian steppes during the civil war. The venue was packed. Attendees included the commander of the critical Western Military District, Dmitry Pavlov; his chief of staff; and his deputies. Six German aircraft had crossed the frontier in Pavlov's region on a recent night. "Never mind. More self-control. I know, it has already been reported! More self-control!" Pavlov was overheard saying on the phone about reports of German actions. As soon as Pavlov put the receiver down and prepared to greet a visitor, the phone rang again. "I know; it has been reported," Pavlov was heard to say. "I know. Those at the top know better than us. That's all." He slammed down the phone. During the operetta, Pavlov was interrupted in his box by a new report of unusual activity: the Germans had removed the barbed wire from their side of the border, and the sound of motors had grown louder,

even at a distance. An uninterrupted flow of German mechanized columns was moving forward. Pavlov remained at the show.

Around midnight, the commander of the Kiev Military District called the defense commissariat to report that another German had crossed the border, claiming that Wehrmacht soldiers had taken up their firing positions, with tanks at their start lines. Some 12 hours earlier, at 1:00 PM, Germany's high command had transmitted the password for war, "Dortmund." That afternoon, Hitler had composed letters explaining his decision to attack the Soviet Union to the leaders of Nazi-allied states. Hitler's adjutant Nicolaus von Below noticed that the führer was "increasingly nervous and restless. Hitler talked a lot, walked up and down; he seemed impatient, waiting for something." In his residence in the old Reich Chancellery, Hitler did not sleep for a second straight night. He took a meal in the dining room. He listened to *Les Préludes*, the symphonic poem by Franz Liszt. He summoned Goebbels, who had just finished watching *Gone With the Wind*. The two walked up and down Hitler's drawing room for quite a while, finalizing the timing and content of Hitler's war proclamation for the next day, which would focus on "the salvation of Europe" and the intolerable danger of waiting any longer. Goebbels left at 2:30 AM, returning to the Propaganda Ministry, where staff had been told to await him. "Everyone was absolutely astonished," he wrote in his diary, "even though most had guessed half of what was going on, and some all of it." The Germans had given the invasion the code name Operation Barbarossa. Now, it had begun.

Most of the intended recipients in Soviet frontline positions failed to receive Directive Number 1. Wehrmacht advance units, many disguised in Red Army uniforms, had already crossed the border and sabotaged Soviet communications. "The beginning of every war is like opening the door into a dark room," Hitler had told one of his private secretaries. "One never knows what is hidden in the darkness."

BLINDED BY THE MIGHT

Stalin's regime had reproduced a deep-set pattern in Russian history: Russian rulers launching forced modernizations to overcome or at least manage the asymmetry of a country that considered itself a providential power with a special mission in the world but that substantially lagged behind the other great powers. The urgent quest for a strong state had culminated, once more, in personal rule. Stalin's regime

defined the terms of public thought and individual identity, and Stalin himself personified the passions and dreams of a socialist modernity and Soviet might. With single-sentence telegrams or brief phone calls, he could spur the clunky Soviet party-state machinery into action, invoking discipline and intimidation, to be sure, but also galvanizing young functionaries who felt close emotional ties to him and millions more who would never come close to meeting him in person.

Stalin's regime promised not merely statist modernization but also the transcendence of private property and markets, of class antagonisms and existential alienation—a renewal of the social whole rent by the bourgeoisie, a quest for social justice on a global scale. In worldview and practice, it was a conspiracy that perceived conspiracy everywhere and in everything, constantly gaslighting itself. In administration, it constituted a crusade for planning and control that ended up generating a proliferation of improvised illegalities, a perverse drive for order, and a system in which propaganda and myths about "the system" were the most systematized part. Amid the cultivated opacity and patent falsehoods, even most high officials were reduced to Kremlinology. The fanatical hypercentralization was often self-defeating, but the cult of the party's and especially Stalin's infallibility proved to be the most dangerous flaw of Stalin's fallible rule.

Hitler turned out to be someone neither Marx nor Lenin had prepared Stalin for.

By inclination, Stalin was a Russian nationalist in the imperial sense, and anti-Westernism was the core impulse of this long-standing Russian-Eurasian political culture. Initially, the ambitious Soviet quest to match the West had actually increased the country's dependency on Western technology and know-how. But after importing technology from every advanced Western economy, Stalin's regime went on to develop its own sophisticated military and related industries to a degree unprecedented for even a military-first country. Geopolitically, however, whereas tsarist Russia had concluded foreign alliances for its security, the Soviet Union mostly sought, or could manage, only nonaggression pacts. Its sole formal alliance, formed with France, lacked any military dimension. The country's self-isolation became ever more extreme.

Stalin insisted on calling fascism "reactionary," a supposed way for the bourgeoisie to preserve the old world. But Hitler turned out to be

someone neither Marx nor Lenin had prepared Stalin for. A lifelong Germanophile, Stalin appears to have been mesmerized by the might and daring of Germany's parallel totalitarian regime. For a time, he recovered his personal and political equilibrium in his miraculous pact with Hitler, which deflected the German war machine, delivered a bounty of German industrial tools, enabled the conquest and Sovietization of tsarist borderlands, and reinserted the Soviet Union into the role of arbitrating world affairs. Hitler had whetted and, reluctantly, abetted Stalin's own appetite. But far earlier than the despot imagined, his ability to extract profit from the immense danger Hitler posed to Europe and the world had run its course. This generated unbearable tension in Stalin's life and rule, yet he stubbornly refused to come to grips with the new realities, and not solely out of greed for German technology. Despite his insight into the human psyche, demonic shrewdness, and sharp mind, Stalin was blinkered by ideology and fixed ideas. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill controlled not a single division on the Soviet frontier, yet Stalin remained absolutely obsessed with British imperialism, railing against the Treaty of Versailles long after Hitler had shredded it and continuing to imagine that Hitler was negotiating with the British behind his back.

HITLER'S CHOICE

For Hitler, the 1939 pact had been a distasteful necessity that, with luck, would not endure very long. His racial, social Darwinist, zero-sum understanding of geopolitics meant that both the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom would have to be annihilated in order for Germany to realize its master-race destiny. To be sure, in the immediate term, he thought in terms of domination of the European continent (*Grossmacht*), which required *Lebensraum*—living space—in the east. But in the longer term, he foresaw domination of the world (*Weltmacht*), which would require a blue-water fleet, bases rimming the Atlantic, and a colonial empire in the tropics for raw materials. That was incompatible with the continued existence of the British Empire, at least in the form it took at that time. Hitler thus put himself in front of a stark choice of either agreeing to deepen the pact with Stalin and taking on the entire British Empire, which would mean conceding at least a partial Soviet sphere in the Balkans and on the Black Sea—on top of the Soviet sphere in the Baltics—or, alternatively, freeing himself from the infuriating dependency on Moscow and taking on

the British later. In the end, military circumstances helped determine the sequencing: Hitler did not possess the air or naval capabilities or the depth of resources to prevail militarily over the United Kingdom; he did have the land forces to attempt to smash the Soviet Union.

A commitment to a prolonged contest for supremacy with the British, whom Hitler expected to be aided more and more by the vast resources of the United States, made quick annihilation of the Soviet Union an absolutely necessary prelude. Moreover, even though Hitler and the German high command knew that the Soviet Union was not poised to attack, the invasion amounted to a preventive war all the same in his logic, for the Soviet Union was only getting stronger and might itself attack at a time it deemed more advantageous. And so in 1940, while pushing Japan to attack British positions in East Asia, Hitler had offered the British government a version of the pact he had concluded with Stalin and seemed dumbfounded when the British government did not accept it. The Nazi leader had grasped the British imperial mindset, and he was sincere when promising that, in exchange for a free hand on the continent, he would keep the British Empire intact for now. He continued to hold out hope that the United Kingdom, patently weak militarily on land and therefore unable to defeat him, would come to terms with him. But Hitler had failed to understand the long-standing British preference for a balance of power on the continent (on which the security of the empire, too, partly depended). And he perceived far more common interests between London and Moscow than either of them saw themselves.

During the preparations for the blitzkrieg against the Soviets, Hitler continued to devote resources to preparing for a long naval and air war against the British and the United States. May and June of 1941 was the blackest period yet for the United Kingdom: Germany was sinking its ships and bombing its cities, and it had lost its position in the Balkans. After German paratroopers had captured Crete, in late May 1941, the British position seemed grievously imperiled. Eleven days before the scheduled launch of his Soviet invasion, Hitler had dictated a draft of Directive Number 32, "Preparations for the Time after Barbarossa." It envisioned the subdivision and exploitation of Soviet territories, as well as a pincer movement against the Suez Canal and British positions in the Middle East; the conquest of Gibraltar, northwestern Africa, and the Spanish and Portuguese Atlantic islands, to eliminate the British in the Mediterranean; and the building of

coastal bases in West and possibly East Africa. Eventually, there would need to be a German base in Afghanistan for seizing British India.

Had Hitler thrown all his might into this "peripheral strategy" rather than invading the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom might not have survived. The war with the Soviets would have gone ahead at some point, but with the British knocked out of the picture. There would have been no British beachhead to assist an eventual U.S.-led Allied landing in western Europe.

THE WISDOM OF BISMARCK

Hitler cannot be explained in terms of his social origins or his early life and influences, a point that is no less applicable to Stalin. The greatest shaper of Stalin's identity was the building and running of a dictatorship, whereby he assumed responsibility for the Soviet Union's power in the world. In the name of socialism, Stalin, pacing in his Kremlin office, had grown accustomed to moving millions of peasants, workers—whole nations—across a sixth of the earth, on his own initiative, often consulting no one. But his world had become intensely constricted. Hitler had trapped the Soviet despot in his Little Corner.

Stalin's dealings with Hitler differed from British appeasement in that Stalin tried deterrence as well as accommodation. But Stalin's policy resembled British appeasement in that he was driven by a blinding desire to avoid war at all costs. He displayed strength of capabilities but not of will. Neither his fearsome resolve nor his supreme cunning—which had enabled him to vanquish his rivals and spiritually crush his inner circle—was in evidence in 1941. He shrank from trying to preempt Hitler militarily and failed to preempt him diplomatically.

In the end, however, the question of who most miscalculated is not a simple one. "Of all the men who can lay claim to having paved the way" for the Third Reich, Hitler liked to say, "one figure stands in awe-inspiring solitude: Bismarck." But Bismarck had built his chancellorship on avoiding conflict with Russia. When a bust of Bismarck was transferred from the old Reich Chancellery to Hitler's new Reich Chancellery, it had broken off at the neck. A replica was hastily made and artificially aged by soaking it in cold tea. No one shared this omen with Hitler.

The Korean Missile Crisis

Why Deterrence Is Still the Best Option

Scott D. Sagan

It is time for the U.S. government to admit that it has failed to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles that can reach the United States. North Korea no longer poses a nonproliferation problem; it poses a nuclear deterrence problem. The gravest danger now is that North Korea, South Korea, and the United States will stumble into a catastrophic war that none of them wants.

The world has traveled down this perilous path before. In 1950, the Truman administration contemplated a preventive strike to keep the Soviet Union from acquiring nuclear weapons but decided that the resulting conflict would resemble World War II in scope and that containment and deterrence were better options. In the 1960s, the Kennedy administration feared that Chinese leader Mao Zedong was mentally unstable and proposed a joint strike against the nascent Chinese nuclear program to the Soviets. (Moscow rejected the idea.) Ultimately, the United States learned to live with a nuclear Russia and a nuclear China. It can now learn to live with a nuclear North Korea.

Doing so will not be risk free, however. Accidents, misperceptions, and volatile leaders could all too easily cause disaster. The Cold War offers important lessons in how to reduce these risks by practicing containment and deterrence wisely. But officials in the Pentagon and the White House face a new and unprecedented challenge: they must deter North Korean leader Kim Jong Un while also preventing U.S. President Donald Trump from bumbling into war. U.S. military leaders should make plain to their political superiors and the American public that any U.S. first strike on North Korea would result in a devastating loss of American and South Korean lives. And civilian leaders must

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convince Kim that the United States will not attempt to overthrow his regime unless he begins a war. If the U.S. civilian and military leaderships perform these tasks well, the same approach that prevented nuclear catastrophe during the Cold War can deter Pyongyang until the day that communist North Korea, like the Soviet Union before it, collapses under its own weight.

DANGER OF DEATH

The international relations scholar Robert Litwak has described the current standoff with North Korea as "the Cuban missile crisis in slow motion," and several pundits, politicians, and academics have repeated that analogy. But the current Korean missile crisis is even more dangerous than the Cuban one. For one thing, the Cuban missile crisis did not involve a new country becoming a nuclear power. In 1962, the Soviet Union was covertly stationing missiles and nuclear warheads in Cuba when U.S. intelligence discovered the operation. During the resulting crisis, Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro feared an imminent U.S. air strike and invasion and wrote to Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev advocating a nuclear strike on the United States "to eliminate such danger forever through an act of clear legitimate defense, however harsh and terrible the solution would be." When Khrushchev received the message, he told a meeting of his senior leadership, "This is insane; Fidel wants to drag us into the grave with him!" Luckily, the Soviet Union maintained control of its nuclear weapons, and Castro did not possess any of his own; his itchy fingers were not on the nuclear trigger.

Kim, in contrast, already presides over an arsenal that U.S. intelligence agencies believe contains as many as 60 nuclear warheads. Some uncertainty still exists about whether North Korea can successfully mount those weapons on a missile capable of hitting the continental United States, but history cautions against wishful thinking. The window of opportunity for a successful U.S. attack to stop the North Korean nuclear program has closed.

At the time of the Cuban missile crisis, both the American and the Soviet nuclear war plans were heavily geared toward preemption. Each country's system featured a built-in option to launch nuclear weapons if officials believed that an enemy attack was imminent and unavoidable. This produced a danger that the strategist Thomas Schelling called "the reciprocal fear of surprise attack." That fear was why Khrushchev

was so alarmed when a U.S. U-2 spy plane accidentally flew into Soviet airspace during the crisis. As he wrote to U.S. President John F. Kennedy on the final day of the crisis: "Is it not a fact that an intruding American plane could be easily taken for a nuclear bomber, which might push us to a fateful step?" Today, the world faces an even more complex and dangerous problem: a three-way fear of surprise attack. North Korea, South Korea, and the United States are all poised to launch preemptive strikes. In such an unstable situation, the risk that an accident, a false warning, or a misperceived military exercise could lead to a war is alarmingly high.

Another factor that makes today's situation more dangerous than the Cuban missile crisis is the leaders involved. In 1962, the standoff included one volatile leader, Castro, who held radical misperceptions of the consequences of a nuclear war and surrounded himself with yes men. Today, there are two such unpredictable and ill-informed leaders: Kim and Trump. Both men are rational and ruthless. Yet both are also prone to lash out impulsively at perceived enemies, a tendency that can lead to reckless rhetoric and behavior.

This danger is compounded because their senior advisers are in a poor position to speak truth to power. Kim clearly tolerates no dissent; he has reportedly executed family members and rivals for offering insufficiently enthusiastic praise. For his part, Trump often ignores, ridicules, or fires those who disagree with him. In May, *The New York Times* reported that Trump had described his national security adviser, Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster, as "a pain" for subtly correcting him when he made inaccurate points in meetings. And in June, the spectacle of U.S. department secretaries falling over themselves to declare their deep devotion to Trump and flatter him on live television during the administration's first full cabinet meeting brought to mind the dysfunctional decision-making in dictatorships. Any leader who disdains expertise and demands submission and total loyalty from his advisers, whether in a democracy or in a dictatorship, will not receive candid assessments of alternative courses of action during a crisis.

TONE-DEFCON

Trump's poor decision-making process highlights another disturbing contrast with the Cuban missile crisis. In 1962, strong civilian leaders countered the U.S. military's dangerously hawkish instincts. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended an immediate air strike and an

Rocket man: Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang, October 2015

KCNA / REUTERS

invasion of Cuba, Kennedy insisted on the more prudent option of a naval blockade. Together with his subsequent refusal to retaliate with an air strike after an American U-2 spy plane was shot down over Cuba, Kennedy's approach reflected the best kind of cautious crisis management.

Now, however, it is the senior political leadership in the United States that has made reckless threats, and it has fallen to Secretary of Defense James Mattis (a former general) and senior military officers to serve as the voices of prudence. In early August, Trump warned: "North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States. They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen." By appearing to commit to using nuclear force in response to North Korean threats, he broke sharply with U.S. deterrence policy, which had previously warned of military responses only to acts of aggression. Vice President Mike Pence, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, and UN Ambassador Nikki Haley have not echoed Trump's "fire and fury" rhetoric, but they have repeated the worrying mantra that "all options are on the table."

That phrase may sound less threatening than Trump's comments, but it still leaves itself open to misinterpretation. To some listeners, it just suggests that Washington is considering limited military options. But from a North Korean perspective, the statement implies that the United States is contemplating launching a nuclear first strike. This would not be an altogether unreasonable conclusion for Pyongyang to draw. In 2008, U.S. President George W. Bush stated that all

options were on the table when it came to U.S. tensions with Iran, and when a reporter explicitly asked Bush whether that included "nuclear options," Bush simply repeated himself: "All options are on the table." The Obama administration made a commitment, in its 2009 Nuclear Posture Review, not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapons state that was in compliance with its nonproliferation commitments. But then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates quickly added that "because North Korea and Iran are not in compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, for them, all bets are off. All options are on the table."

The United States should take some military options off the table, starting with a preventive nuclear war.

Such rhetoric is dangerous. The U.S. government must convince Kim that an attack on the United States or its allies would spell the end of his regime. But it is equally important that U.S. leaders acknowledge loudly and often that it would be a disaster for the United States to start a war. If those in the White House do not do so, the civilian and military leadership in the Pentagon should more forcefully and publicly make this point.

To back this rhetoric up, the United States should take some military options off the table, starting with a preventive nuclear war. A preemptive strike, the use of force when a country considers an adversary's first strike imminent and unavoidable, can sometimes be justified strategically and legally as "anticipatory self-defense." But preventive war—starting a war to prevent another country from taking future action or acquiring a dangerous capability—is rarely justified and arguably contrary to the UN Charter.

U.S. military officers are trained to follow orders from political authorities, unless they are clearly unconstitutional. The Constitution, however, says nothing about what to do if a president's orders are legal but also crazy. This leads to bizarre situations, such as the response that Admiral Scott Swift, the commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, gave when he was asked at a seminar at the Australian National University in July if he would launch a nuclear strike against China "next week" if Trump ordered him to do so. The admiral should have said that the hypothetical scenario was ridiculous and left it at that. Instead, he answered, "Yes."

Trump's volatility has produced a hidden crisis in U.S. civil-military relations. In 1974, during the final days of Richard Nixon's presidency,

when Nixon had become morose and possibly unstable, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger told the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George Brown, that if Nixon gave military orders, Brown should contact Schlesinger before carrying them out. Schlesinger's action was extraconstitutional but nonetheless wise, given the extraordinary circumstances. The U.S. government faces similar dangers every day under Trump. Mattis and senior military leaders should be prepared to ignore belligerent tweets, push back against imprudent policies, and resist any orders that they believe reflect impetuous or irrational decision-making by the president. Their oath, after all, is not to an individual president; it is to "support and defend the Constitution of the United States." The Constitution's 25th Amendment lays out procedures on how to relieve an impaired president of his responsibilities. If senior military leaders believe at any time that Trump is impaired, they have a duty to contact Mattis, who should then call for an emergency cabinet meeting to determine whether Trump is "unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office" and thus whether to invoke the 25th Amendment.

WHAT YOU DON'T KNOW CAN HURT YOU

One similarity with the Cuban missile crisis is that those Americans who think the United States should attack North Korea exaggerate the prospects that U.S. military action would succeed and underestimate the costs of a war. In 1962, the CIA and the military assumed that there were no nuclear weapons in Cuba and, on that basis, recommended air strikes and an invasion. But the intelligence assessment was wrong. Well over 60 nuclear warheads, gravity bombs, and tactical nuclear weapons had already arrived in Cuba, and one missile regiment was already operational by the time the Joint Chiefs were advising military action. Any attack on Cuba would almost certainly have led to nuclear strikes on the United States and against invading U.S. forces.

Today, U.S. intelligence finds itself once again in the dark. It does not know the status of North Korea's warheads or the locations of its missiles. For example, when the North Koreans successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile in late July, it came as a complete surprise to the United States and demonstrated that North Korea can now build such missiles, store them, take them out of storage, and launch them, all before the United States could react. Yet U.S. military leaders have failed to pour cold water on the idea of a U.S. first strike. Instead, they have added fuel to the fire.

Consider the complaint expressed by General Joseph Dunford, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the Aspen Security Forum in July that "many people have talked about the military options with words such as 'unimaginable.'" Dunford insisted that, to the contrary, "it is not unimaginable to have military options to respond to North Korean nuclear capability. What's unimaginable to me is allowing a capability that would allow a nuclear weapon to land in Denver, Colorado. . . . And so my job will be to develop military options to make sure that doesn't happen." Dunford should have reinforced deterrence. Instead, he created a redline that Kim may have already crossed.

The military's job is to come up with options. That involves thinking the unthinkable. But it is also military leaders' responsibility to offer brutal honesty to political leaders and the public. When it comes to the current conflict with North Korea, that means admitting that there are no military options that do not risk starting the most destructive war since 1945.

WHY THERE'S NO MILITARY SOLUTION

Some Trump supporters, including former UN Ambassador John Bolton and Trump's evangelical adviser Robert Jeffress, have argued that a U.S. strike to assassinate Kim is the best solution. Any attempt to "decapitate" the regime, however, would be a gamble of epic proportions. The history of unsuccessful U.S. decapitation attempts, including those launched against the Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi in 1986 and the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in 1991 and again in 2003, warns against such thinking. Moreover, Kim may well have ordered his generals to launch all available weapons of mass destruction at the enemy if he is killed in a first strike—as did Saddam before the 1990–91 Gulf War. There is no reason to think that the North Korean military would fail to carry out such an order.

U.S. leaders should also resist the temptation to hope that limited, or "surgical," conventional attacks on North Korean missile test sites or storage facilities would end the nuclear threat. Proponents of this course believe that the threat of further escalation by the United States would deter North Korea from responding militarily to a limited first strike. But as the political scientist Barry Posen has explained, this argument is logically inconsistent: Kim cannot be both so irrational that he cannot be deterred in general and so rational that he could be deterred after having been attacked by the United States. Moreover, even a limited

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

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

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

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attack by the United States would appear to North Korea as the beginning of an invasion. And because no first strike could destroy every North Korean missile and nuclear weapon, the United States and its allies would always face the prospect of nuclear retaliation.

Nor can missile defense systems solve the problem. The United States should continue to develop and deploy missile defenses because they complicate North Korean military planning, and any missiles that Pyongyang aims at U.S. or allied military targets are missiles not aimed at American, Japanese, or South Korean cities. But military leaders should be candid about the limits of U.S. ballistic missile defenses. Most such systems have failed numerous tests, and even the most effective ones, such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, system, could be overwhelmed if North Korea fired multiple missiles—even dummy missiles—in a salvo at one target. That is why North Korea has been practicing launching several missiles simultaneously. Any prudent U.S. planner should therefore assume that in the event of an attack, some North Korean nuclear-armed missiles would reach their targets. Even in the best-case scenario, in which only a few North Korean nuclear weapons penetrated U.S. defenses, the consequences would prove catastrophic.

Estimating the potential fatalities in a limited nuclear strike is difficult, but the nuclear weapons scholar Alex Wellerstein has designed a useful modeling tool called NUKEMAP, which uses data from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings to provide rough estimates of how many people would die in a nuclear strike. After North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test, in early September, Japanese, South Korean, and U.S. intelligence agencies reportedly provided a range of estimates of the weapon's explosive yield, with an average estimate of around 100 kilotons. According to NUKEMAP, a single 100-kiloton nuclear weapon detonated above the port city of Busan, in South Korea (which was shown as a target in a recent North Korean press release), would kill 440,000 people in seconds. A weapon of that size detonated over Seoul would kill 362,000; over San Francisco, the number would be 323,000. These estimates, moreover, include only immediate blast fatalities, not the deaths from fires after a nuclear detonation or the longer-term deaths that would result from radioactive fallout. Those secondary effects could easily cause the number of dead to double.

Even if a war were limited to the Korean Peninsula, the costs would still be unacceptable. According to a detailed study published in 2012

by the Nautilus Institute, a think tank based in California, North Korea has thousands of conventional artillery pieces along the demilitarized zone that by themselves could inflict some 64,000 fatalities in Seoul on the first day of a war. A major attack on South Korea could also kill many of the roughly 154,000 American civilians and 28,000 U.S. service members living there. If the North Korean regime used its large arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, the fatalities would be even higher. Finally, there are a number of nuclear power plants near Busan that could be damaged, spreading radioactive materials, in an attack. All told, one million people could die on the first day of a second Korean war.

ACCIDENTAL WAR

Even if the United States forswore preventive conventional or nuclear strikes, the danger of an accidental war caused by the mutual fear of a surprise attack would remain. South Korea increasingly (and quite openly) relies on a strategy of preemption and decapitation. In 2013, General Jeong Seung-jo, the chairman of the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced that "if there is a clear intent that North Korea is about to use a nuclear weapon, we will eliminate it first even at the risk of a war," adding that "a preemptive attack against the North trying to use nuclear weapons does not require consultation with the United States and it is the right of self-defense." A white paper published by the South Korean Ministry of National Defense in 2016 featured an illustration of several missiles being fired at and a group of South Korean commandos attacking the "war command" building in Pyongyang. (Unsurprisingly, the North Koreans have similar ideas about preemption: in April 2016, in response to U.S. and South Korean military exercises, North Korean state media reported that "the revolutionary armed forces of [North Korea] decided to take preemptive attack as the mode of its military counteraction. . . . The right to nuclear preemptive attack is by no means the U.S. monopoly.")

In such a tense environment, one government's preemptive-war plan can look a lot like a first-strike plan to its enemies. Would Seoul see the movement of Pyongyang's nuclear missiles out of the caves in which they are stored as a drill, a defensive precaution, or the start of an attack? Would Pyongyang mistake a joint U.S.–South Korean exercise simulating a decapitation attack for the real thing? Could an ill-timed inflammatory tweet by Trump provoke a military response

from Kim? What if a radar technician accidentally put a training tape of a missile launch into a radar warning system—which actually happened, creating a brief moment of panic, during the Cuban missile crisis? Add in the possibility of an American or a South Korean military aircraft accidentally entering North Korean airspace, or a North Korean nuclear weapon accidentally detonating during transport, and the situation resembles less a Cuban missile crisis in slow motion than an August 1914 crisis at the speed of Twitter.

The fear of a U.S. attack explains why Kim believes he needs a nuclear arsenal. Pyongyang's nuclear weapons development undoubtedly appeals to Kim's domestic audience's desire for self-sufficiency. But that is not its primary purpose. Kim's spokespeople have stressed that he will not suffer the fate of Saddam or Qaddafi, both of whom gave up their nuclear programs only to be attacked later by the United States. The North Korean nuclear arsenal is not a bargaining chip. It is a potent deterrent designed to prevent a U.S. attack or disrupt one that does occur by destroying U.S. air bases and ports through preemption, if possible, but in retaliation if necessary. And if all else fails, it is a means for exacting revenge by destroying Kim's enemies' cities. That may sound implausible, but keep in mind that Castro recommended just such an attack in 1962.

KEEP CALM AND DETER ON

Living with a nuclear North Korea does not, in *Dr. Strangelove*'s terms, mean learning "to stop worrying and love the bomb." On the contrary, it means constantly worrying and addressing every risk. U.S. policy should aim to convince Kim that starting a war would lead to an unmitigated disaster for North Korea, especially as his own ministers and military advisers may be too frightened of his wrath to make that argument themselves. The United States should state clearly and calmly that any attack by North Korea would lead to the swift and violent end of the Kim regime.

Kim may be under the illusion that if North Korea were to destroy U.S. air bases and kill hundreds of thousands of Americans, Japanese, and South Koreans, the American public would seek peace. In fact, it would likely demand vengeance and an end to Kim's regime, regardless of the costs. Such a war would be bloody, but there is no doubt which side would prevail. There are few, if any, military targets in North Korea that the United States could not destroy with advanced conventional

weapons in a long war. And the Kim regime cannot ignore the possibility of U.S. nuclear retaliation.

The more difficult challenge will be convincing Kim that the United States will not attack him first. Reducing the risk of war will therefore require an end to U.S. threats of first-strike regime change. In August, Tillerson told reporters that the United States did not seek to overthrow Kim unless he were to begin a war. Other American leaders should consistently echo Tillerson's comments. Unfortunately, the Trump administration's rhetoric has been anything but consistent.

Should the United States succeed in bringing North Korea back to the negotiating table, it should be prepared to offer changes to U.S. and South Korean military exercises in exchange for limits on—and notifications of—North Korean missile tests and the restoration of the hotline between North and South Korea. The United States should also continue to extend its nuclear umbrella to South Korea to reduce the incentive for Seoul to acquire its own nuclear arsenal. Some have argued for a return of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to air bases in South Korea, but such weapons would be vulnerable to a North Korean first strike. A better option would be to keep nuclear-capable bombers at Guam on ground alert. Or the United States could borrow a tactic it used in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis. To assuage Moscow, Washington promised to remove its Jupiter ballistic missiles from Turkey after the crisis. But to reassure Ankara, it also assigned some submarine-based missiles to cover the same retaliatory targets in the Soviet Union that the Jupiter missiles had and arranged for a U.S. submarine to visit a Turkish port. Today, occasional U.S. submarine calls at South Korean harbors could enhance deterrence without provoking North Korea.

In 1947, the American diplomat George Kennan outlined a strategy for the "patient but firm and vigilant containment" of the Soviet Union. Writing in this magazine, he predicted that such a policy would eventually lead to "either the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power." He was right. In the same way, the United States has deterred North Korea from invading South Korea or attacking Japan for over 60 years. Despite all the bluster and tension today, there is no reason why Kennan's strategy of containment and deterrence cannot continue to work on North Korea, as it did on the Soviet Union. The United States must wait with patience and vigilance until the Kim regime collapses under the weight of its own economic and political weakness.

SINGAPORE



SMALL IS NO LIMIT

Ever since it gained independence in 1965, Singapore has transformed itself many times to adapt to the changing global economic landscape. In just two generations, the tiny city-state has developed into one of the world's richest and most technologically advanced economies.

In March of 2015, the country mourned the death of its founder, Lee Kuan Yew. While marking the 50th anniversary of independence later that year in August, the so-called Asian Tiger, still confident of its future, asked itself: How does The Little Red Dot stay relevant for the next 50 years?

"Our strategies in the past have worked for us. While they continue to be relevant, global changes and current circumstances also offer us new opportunities," said Chan Chun Sing, Minister in the Prime Minister's Office, who is also Secretary-General of the National Trades Union Congress and a member of the Future Economy Council, which maintains labor competitiveness and steers its industries to adjust to global shifts.

Having limited resources and bound by larger countries, Singapore realized early it had to surmount those geographical challenges. Today, its basic strategies remain the same: invest heavily in human capital, remain open and connected to the world, and provide a stable and transparent business environment.

"Given that we are facing technological disruptions and have attained a certain level of economic development, there are new areas that Singapore can leverage, such as the digital revolution," Chan said.

Seeing data as a resource, Singapore has joined a global trend in developing urban solutions in line with its Smart Nation movement.

"Connectivity, such as financial and data connectivity, is another area that can thrive. This goes beyond the air, land, and sea links that we have invested and will continue to invest in," the minister said.

To achieve this, Singapore uses education to transform its workforce and industries.

"We have to reimagine a new way of learning and delivering knowledge to our people. Speed of delivery and relevance to industry are some things to bear in mind. Other countries may be talking about the same things, so how do we distinguish ourselves?" Chan said.

Execution has always been Singapore's strength.

"We have always had a true tripartite system. Government, labor and businesses execute strategies as a closely knit unit. That is what will put us in good standing," the minister said.

"This new wave of technological changes actually favors city-states like ours. If we get those basics, policies, focus, and training right, then there's absolutely no reason we can't have another 50 or 100 years of good progress for this nation," he added.

Opportunities In and Out of Singapore

With just over five million people, Singaporean companies are in a constant search for overseas markets. But thanks to state-run International Enterprise (IE) Singapore, companies get support in terms of due diligence, market intelligence, and lead generation.

"IE Singapore helped identify what was noise and what were real opportunities. If not for them, we would have kept banging on doors that would not open," recalled Melvin Tan, Managing Director of Cyclect Group, an integrated construction, engineering, construction and project management company present in eight countries.

Like Cyclect, specialist medical services provider Singapore O&G (SOG) is looking into regional expansion following its IPO in 2015. CEO Victor Ng said: "We are

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

the first company focusing on women's health that was publicly listed on the Singapore Exchange. We did that to grow strategically."

SOG subsequently acquired a well-known aesthetic medical group to add to its mainstream obstetrics and gynecology pillar. With women's cancer and paediatrics as its newest specialities, SOG plans to expand overseas through partnerships with doctors and clinics abroad.

As Asia eclipses other parts of the world in terms of growth, investor interest in the region has increased, with Singapore seeing a steady stream of capital coming in from global companies, many of them from the United States.

"We represent roughly 700 companies - both U.S. and non-U.S. - at AmCham Singapore. And the presence of U.S. companies continues to grow," said Ashley McInerney, Head of Business Development and Operations of the American Chamber of Commerce in Singapore.

"The government's transparency and agility are phenomenal. It is what is most attractive about doing business here. Our members regularly have opportunities to engage with top government officials and discuss areas either the government or the private sector needs assistance with. The dialogue allows us to bridge the gap and facilitate swift solutions to challenges as they arise," McInerney added.

"AmCham Singapore is on the cusp of its 45th anniversary. Throughout, we've cultivated close working relationships with buisness and government leaders. It's built around a mutual commitment to growing the economy and enhancing business relationships in Singapore and the region. As we look ahead, we are going to continue doing exactly that," she also said. ■

Well connected to the world

Located at the heart of Southeast Asia, Singapore is an ideal global connectivity hub. Despite its small size, the island-state is closely wired to its neighbors and the rest of the world because of the level of its technological development.

To make up for its limited natural resources, the city-state capitalizes on a new kind of asset – data. Singapore's early adoption of digitalization and its proven speed to adapt have made it a more attractive location to do business. Already praised for its top-rate logistics infrastructure, the country is now building further on its digital connectivity.

"Singapore's strategic location, strong infrastructure, business-friendly policies and expertise, and reputation for integrity and efficiency have enabled the country to develop itself as a regional business and trade hub and to position itself well to seize the opportunities that come with the rise of Asia," said United Overseas Bank CEO Wee Ee Cheong.

"ASEAN's favorable fundamentals are attractive to those seeking new opportunities. Of course, the journey of connectivity and integration is not always smooth. But through continued engagement and a practical and paced approach, the collective potential of the region can be realized," he added.

In partnership with the Economic Development Board and International Enterprise Singapore, UOB helps foreign companies seeking to set up their operations in Singapore and in expanding across the region.

"We extended our Foreign Direct Investment Advisory Team to nine markets and thus provided important links across the region. The teams have helped customers understand market entry strategies, industry dynamics and how to navigate the complexities of doing business in ASEAN," Wee explained.

Immigration solutions and visa consultancy company, One Visa, is one key player in helping connect foreign companies and talented individuals to Singapore. Established in 2010, One Visa has grown significantly to become a leading immigration service provider in Singapore.

"One Visa is one of only a few visa consultancy companies that have the capability to advise and offer the full spectrum of immigration services in Singapore. We have been very focused on knowing where we can move people, while consistently adding new value and excellence to our clients' experience," said Founder and Managing Director Cheng King Heng.

"After years of experience managing Western clients, it's our very boutique style of service that sets us apart from our competitors. We can make their next move effortless," Cheng added.

One Visa plans to establish further globally and is looking at new partnerships with migration agents in the US and Canada.

For commodities trading

Wendell Trading keeps its business fertile

A year short of its 40th anniversary, family-owned Wendell Trading Co. continues to grow because of its ability to adapt to the ever-changing business environment in Singapore. As competitors failed to keep up with changing conditions in the 1970s, it ventured into horticulture, landscape services and garden supplies while the city-state moved away from agriculture.

Now managed by the second generation, Wendell adjusts its business model to sustain its business. It has partnered with golf courses here and abroad to maintain their grounds and went into public health via mosquito control products.

"In marketing, we have to maintain a strong home market. I found my niche. Most are penny competitive and go for volume, but mine is high margin and smaller volume, which better fits my company size. We understand flexibility and the need to adapt," Marketing Executive Doris Wee said. ■

http://www.fertilizers.com.sg

company Rhodium Resources Pte. Ltd., being located in Singapore may have been more important that just understanding Asia and navigating the market.

"Few financial centers in the world have an understanding of commodity trade and finance. Finance is our specialty. But in Singapore, where we do not have alternatives or the luxury of a base resource, we tend to be a trading hub," said Director Cheam Hing Lee.

"We are a unique commodities trading company that leverages lots of financial institutions. We are big enough to borrow and buy assets or have joint venture partners who recognize our credibility," Cheam added.

Global port operator PSA International provides value by staying competitive, preparing their people's capabilities and transforming well in tandem with the shipping and logistics industries' ever-growing interconnectivity.

"Our business is facility-driven and capacity-driven. So when we have new facilities, we enable new connectivity. And if there is good industrialization, if the country also builds the right infrastructure, we will have a successful outcome. Over time, that has given us a very steady rate of growth," said Group CEO Tan Chong Meng

While Singapore's Changi Airport is consistently named one of the best airports in the world, it has also remained an important air cargo hub in the region. With connections to more than 380 cities around the world, Changi plays an important role in global trade and tourism.

"We are constantly on the lookout for new and exciting ways to create an unparalleled Changi Experience for our passengers. We invest and innovate to differentiate Changi Airport," Senior Vice President Ivan Tan said.

At the end of this year, Changi Airport is expected to open its new Terminal 4, which will add another 16mppa to Changi's capacity. Changi's current capacity is 66 mppa, and with T4, Changi's total handling capacity will be 82 mppa. ■

Keeping commodity trading relevant

When Cheam Hing Lee retired from the banking world after more than 12 years, he took with him valuable experience in finance and commodities, as well as the confidence to start his own company. In just five years, Rhodium Resources Pte. Ltd. has grown from a small enterprise into a billion dollar multinational.

Rhodium Resources CEO and Managing Director Cheam Hing Lee

Cheam attributes Rhodium's success to preemptive insight that allows them to anticipate and avoid devastating setbacks and to their aptitude to innovate that prioritizes the needs of customers and capitalizes on Singapore's financial trade structure.

"We understand Asia. We are able to manage local issues professionally in a transnational and legitimate manner, so that we become a valuable supplier to other multinationals that want that same standard when they buy from us," the CEO and Managing Director explained.

Cheam pointed out that few financial centres in the world fully understand commodity trade and considered trade finance a specialty. In effect, Rhodium acts like a financial institution that finds unused links within the traditional supply chain.

"We make many things irrelevant; but only do relevant business," he said.

In the future, Cheam is thinking of taking Rhodium public. The company Chief also expressed his wish to explore more opportunities in the United States in infrastructure and double Rhodium's business.

Rhodium has offices in Hong Kong, Australia, Dubai and London and has a partnership with American global asset management firm Oaktree. ■

www.rhodiumresources.com

UOB connects businesses to opportunities in Asia

With the rise of intra- and inter-regional trade in Asia, United Overseas Bank (UOB) is well positioned to connect businesses to opportunities in Asia.

Created in 1935 to serve the needs of the overseas Chinese merchant community in Singapore, UOB has expanded its presence across Asia in line with the regional growth ambitions of its clients. Today, UOB is one of the world's strongest banks and has an integrated network across 19 countries and territories, from which it helps clients to identify and to seize opportunities.

Over the last eight decades, the bank's experience and local presence have given it a first-hand understanding of what it takes to build a sustainable business in the region.

In 2011, UOB set up a dedicated unit to help businesses plan and execute their regional expansion strategies. Its Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Advisory team was initially based in Singapore. It has since been building an ecosystem of partners able to support its clients, including government agencies, trade and investment associations and professional services providers such as legal, audit and accounting firms across the region.

The unit has now expanded to include FDI Centres in Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, China, Hong Kong, Myanmar, Vietnam and India. In 2015, the bank also received approval to offer its regional FDI advisory services to Japanese companies venturing out of their home country.

As part of helping companies navigate the complexities of the diverse operating environments in Asia, UOB has signed strategic partnerships with key government agencies, including the Singapore Economic Development Board, International Enterprise Singapore, the Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board and China's leading trade organization, the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade.

These partnerships have been integral to providing companies with practical guidance on how to set up and to run their local operations successfully.

Since 2011, UOB has engaged and supported more than 2,000 companies from around the world in their expansion into and across Asia.

While 82 percent of these companies are homegrown in Asia, UOB has observed an increasing number of companies from the United States and Europe seeking its FDI Advisory services.

Last year alone, the UOB's FDI Centres facilitated more than S$27 billion of business flows into Southeast Asia as companies invested in the region's fast-moving consumer goods, natural resources and building and construction industries.

UOB Plaza: the headquarters of Singapore banking giant United Overseas Bank

More than 40 percent of these business flows were directed through Singapore, reinforcing the nation's strategic importance as an international business center and launchpad to the region. ■

www.uobgroup.com

Getting smarter and greener

As Singapore strives to become a smart nation, the country's business sector proceeds full steam towards full digitalization.

"Digitalization pushes us to reimagine banking and the customer journey. DBS aims to run like a 22,000-person startup that embraces technological transformation," said Piyush Gupta, CEO of DBS, named World's Best Digital Bank by Euromoney in 2016.

Digitalization helped another banking giant – OCBC – expand its geographical reach and better understand customer preferences and trends. By providing new banking channels, technology also helped OCBC improve customer interaction.

Group CEO Samuel Tsien foresees that those new banking channels will grow increasingly "natural" and will dispense of the need for an intervening medium.

"So instead of having to carry a token, you use your fingerprint or your voice, which you carry naturally. This is the direction that it's going," he said.

With new opportunities arising from digitalization, V3 Smart Technologies, a mobility and robotics solutions provider, has invested heavily in R&D. Already with 600 SMEs as clients, V3 is looking for new partners that can benefit from their new technologies.

"We always welcome companies from the West and hope they collaborate with us, especially if they have good tech ideas, products and solutions and want to commercialize and enter Asia," said Executive Director Jon Wong Shih.

Because of challenges like limited land and high population density, Singapore sees urban solutions as a new export sector.

Sun Electric is venturing beyond the country to bring solar power to local communities from building rooftops. The company won a government grant three years ago after taking part in a proof-of-concept exercise backed by state-owned real estate company JTC Corporation.

"Now, Sun Electric is exporting its patented technologies and software tools to a wide range of smart city and grid initiatives globally, scaling significantly from our Singapore base. It's an exciting time," said CEO Matthew Peloso.

Surbana Jurong, one of Asia's largest infrastructure and urban development consultancies, is also eager to share its expertise.

"We want to impart what we have learned, build sustainable cities, and shape communities," said Group CEO Wong Heang Fine.

Meanwhile, Wendell Trading Company has helped Singapore maintain its reputation as one of Asia's greenest places. Originally started as a distributor of fertilizers and agriculture chemicals, the company has diversified its activities to include development and maintenance of gardens and golf courses.

"We want to contribute to the sustainability of landscapes globally. We have found our niche in specialty fertilizers for turf and landscaping," Managing Director Doris Wee said.

"Outside of Singapore, we have reached international markets such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, the US and the EU. Moving forward, we would like to establish more partnerships around the world, especially in Vietnam and Indonesia, where we see the market growing," Wee added. ■

Solar technology: Singapore's global competitor

Solar energy firm Sun Electric sees many opportunities for fellow "smart" companies around the world. With its pioneering initiatives and patented technologies, Sun Electric built a platform that allows open access to solar energy by connecting consumers and rooftop owners.

"There's significant promise in what we do. Simultaneously, we've been innovative and consumer-focused. Despite challenges to implementing our innovation, Sun Electric helps cities adopt clean energy," said Sun Electric CEO Matthew Peloso.

"How cool is it if your city – whether Dallas, Manila, Melbourne or Jeddah - makes its own energy just because the sun shines every day? It's an amazing opportunity to harvest sunlight, which doesn't cost anything as a fuel source. This makes for a really positive future for the energy sector and healthier cities," Peloso added. ■

Education for the future

Singapore invests heavily in its schools, aware that human capital is the country's most valuable resource and that education is the best way to keep its workforce relevant in a fast changing world.

To prepare its students for the ever-evolving global marketplace, the government emphasizes skills building and versatility. Singapore's polytechnic institutes play an important role in this mission by offering industry-specific programs which give students an alternative pathway towards productive and meaningful employment.

"Singapore is changing. Our immediate concern is how to remain relevant to Singapore. The old mindset towards internship was one-directional: How could enterprises benefit the polytechnic? Now, the mindset is bi-directional. We are also now concerned with how student interns can help with innovations that can transform enterprises," said Soh Wai Wah, CEO and Principal of Singapore Polytechnic (SP), the first polytechnic institution in the country.

Founded 63 years ago, SP remains very global-minded and is looking to explore partnerships in the United States for research and collaboration.

Meanwhile, as a university of applied learning, Singapore Institute of Technology (SIT) provides practical education wherein students are taught to apply their knowledge in real-life contexts.

Its students undergo a skills-based apprenticeship that "allows students to get a true sense of what the industry is about," President Tan Thiam Soon explained.

"Universities need to adapt and create curricula that are flexible, build expertise more easily and better prepare our society for a fast-changing future," Tan added.

With that approach, the university hopes to collaborate more with companies and expand its joint degree programs offerings with its current overseas university partners, as well as its own SIT-conferred degree programs.

Students at the Lee Kong Chian School of Medicine form part of Singapore's increasingly globalized population.

As Singapore's schools focus on globalization and seek foreign partnerships, Lee Kong Chian School of Medicine (LKCMedicine) has become a leader in this global trend.

"I have been incredibly impressed by Singapore's willingness to partner with universities internationally. That willingness to open up to the rest of the world, I think, has been a significant part in Singapore's progress," Dean James Best said.

A partnership between Nanyang Technological University, Singapore (NTU) and the Imperial College London, LKCMedicine seeks more collaborations in the field of research in the next few years. ■


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Will India Start Acting Like a Global Power?

New Delhi's New Role

Alyssa Ayres

The country with the world's third-largest military by personnel strength, fifth-largest defense budget, and seventh-largest economy isn't a member of the UN Security Council. It isn't even a member of the G-7, the exclusive club of major industrialized economies. It is India, a country long regarded as an emerging power rather than a major global player.

In fairness, for years, this assessment was not off the mark, and India's reality did not match up to its vaunted potential. And indeed, India still faces daunting developmental challenges. It is home to around 270 million people living in extreme poverty. Its infrastructure is in need of major investment—to the tune of $1.5 trillion over a decade, according to India's finance minister. Discrimination among India's famously diverse population persists, whether on the basis of gender, caste, religion, or region.

Because of these challenges, and because the country has been kept on the margins of the global institutions central to U.S. diplomacy, India's impressive economic power and defense capabilities have often gone unnoticed. But that is changing. A more confident India has already begun to shape the global agenda on climate change, clean energy, and worker mobility. And spurred by China's increasingly assertive regional posture, India has ramped up its own military capacity.

India has long chafed at the fact that despite its size and its democracy, the world does not see it as a major power. Unlike China, it does not

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have a coveted permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Considering India's growing economy and enhanced military capabilities, Indian leaders are pushing for their country's "due place in global councils," as former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh put it. Under the current prime minister, Narendra Modi, India has begun to see itself as a "leading power," laying overt claim to a new, more central place in the world.

As India leaves behind some of its old defensiveness on the world stage, a vestige of its nonaligned worldview, it is time for U.S. policy to evolve, as well. Relations between the United States and India have come a long way from the days in which the diplomat and historian Dennis Kux could write of the two as "estranged democracies," and both countries now talk of being "strategic partners"—a relationship of cooperation, but not a formal alliance. U.S. President Donald Trump has not yet fully articulated his plans for relations with India, although he did remark in June that they have "never looked brighter," and in a departure from the Washington playbook, he has explicitly asked India to do more on economic development in Afghanistan.

As the president and his team grapple with India's rise, they should reconceptualize the U.S.-Indian relationship to better manage differences with a power that prizes policy independence above all. And they must address the inequity of India's exclusion from major institutions of global governance by championing Indian membership and giving New Delhi a long-overdue place at the table.

Working with a rising India will not always be easy. The country remains fiercely protective of its policy independence, shuns formal alliances, and remains ever willing to break global consensus, as it has done most famously on trade negotiations. It can be a close defense partner, but not in the familiar template of most U.S. alliances. India wants an improved trade and economic relationship, but it will not be easily persuaded by U.S. entreaties for increased market access. Still, Democratic and Republican administrations alike have prioritized forging closer ties with New Delhi, rightly regarding a tighter relationship as a vote for the importance of democracy and a bet on shared prosperity and stability in Asia.

PROSPERITY AND POWER

As with China, the economy has been at the center of India's global transformation. While many outside India are aware of the country's great potential, few realize that the Indian economy, with a GDP of

over $2 trillion at current exchange rates, has now surpassed the economies of Canada and Italy (both members of the G-7). U.S. government projections anticipate that India will be the world's third-largest economy by 2029, lagging behind only China and the United States. A slowdown in China and contractions in Brazil and Russia have increased India's share of global GDP as measured by purchasing power parity, which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects will exceed eight percent by 2020—above that of Japan in 1995 and that of China in 2000. If the world at large doesn't yet see India as akin to those economic powerhouses, CEOs around the world do: a 2016 survey conducted by the firm KPMG found that India had moved up four notches to become their top pick for growth opportunities in the next three years.

India has begun to see itself as a "leading power," laying overt claim to a new, more central place in the world.

India's sheer size and its youthful demographics offer the prospect of enormous economic growth. According to UN estimates, India will overtake China as the world's most populous country sometime around 2024, and it will do so with a significantly younger population. India's large working-age population will continue to grow until 2050, while Japan, China, and western Europe age. By then, Japan's median age is expected to stand at 53 years, China's at nearly 50, and western Europe's at 47. The median-age Indian will be just 37 years old.

Although India remains home to the world's largest number of poor, its middle class is growing and now consists of anywhere from 30 million (as the Pew Research Center estimates) to 270 million people (as the National Council of Applied Economic Research estimates), depending on how "middle class" is measured. A 2007 McKinsey report estimated that the Indian middle class, if defined as those with an annual disposable household income of $4,000 to $22,000, could balloon to nearly 600 million people by 2025. A growing middle class wields market power, which explains why giant multinational companies, from Apple and Xiaomi to Bosch and Whirlpool, have India in their sights: all those four are now manufacturing goods in India for the growing Indian market. India surpassed China as the world's largest market for motorcycles and scooters in 2016, but it has also become a global hub for automobile manufacturing, producing

nearly one in three small cars sold worldwide. India does not yet come to mind as an automotive powerhouse, but Ford, Hyundai, Maruti Suzuki, and Tata are all making cars there. Collectively, the Indian automotive industry built only slightly fewer automobiles in 2016 than South Korea and more than Mexico, both major car-producing nations. Although India needs to do much more to develop its manufacturing base, its advances in the auto industry represent an about-face from just 15 years ago.

Increasingly, India is translating its economic might into military power. It already counts itself as part of a select club of countries with advanced defense technology, including a nuclear weapons program. India is also a space power: it sent a probe to the moon in 2008 and has another in the works, and in 2014, it placed a vehicle in orbit around Mars (at a fraction of the cost of NASA's latest Mars orbiter).

With its sights set on primacy in the Indian Ocean, New Delhi is strengthening its defense ties with countries across the region and building a blue-water navy. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, India now has a force strength of nearly 1.4 million troops on active duty and nearly 1.2 million reservists. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates that India became the world's fifth-largest military spender in 2016, ahead of France and the United Kingdom. Now the world's top importer of military equipment for the last five years, India has accelerated its procurements from U.S. companies from essentially zero to more than $15 billion worth over the past decade. But even as defense ties with the United States grow, India is not going to end its long-standing relationship with Russia, and recognizing that is part of working with New Delhi. Indeed, Russia remains a major defense supplier for India, as are France and Israel; India is simply diversifying its strategic bets by doing business with multiple partners.

India is also increasingly producing its own advanced defense technologies, instead of importing them. Although it recently replaced its aging aircraft carrier in a much-delayed deal with Russia in 2013, it now has a second carrier under construction, developed and built at home, although it may not be ready for as long as a decade. India has a third carrier scheduled for construction, also to be made domestically, and it has plans to add at least three nuclear-powered submarines to its fleet. In fact, in a major departure from the past, the country has begun to export military equipment to other countries in the region.

India began transferring a series of naval patrol vessels to Mauritius in 2015, and it has been in discussions with Vietnam to sell it cruise missiles.

A NEW SWAGGER

A more confident India, eager to shape, rather than simply react to, global events, has already made its presence felt diplomatically. Take climate change. In the long-running multilateral climate negotiations, India moved, in less than a decade, from playing defense to taking the lead in setting the global climate agenda. For years, India had refused to acquiesce to proposals to cap carbon emissions. Indians considered it deeply unfair that the developed West was looking for cuts from developing India, a country with a historically small contribution to climate change, low per capita emissions, and large future development needs. But at the 2015 Paris climate conference, a new Indian stance emerged. Along with François Hollande, then France's president, Modi announced a new international solar power alliance to be headquartered in India, with a focus on promoting the rapid deployment of solar energy and cutting the costs of financing and development. Given India's ambitious and expensive goal of ramping up domestic solar energy production to 100 gigawatts by 2022, the alliance has allowed India to take on an international leadership role that complements its preexisting domestic energy plans. The Paris agreement showcased a different style of Indian diplomacy—this was not the India that helped scuttle the World Trade Organization's Doha negotiations in 2008 but a new, problem-solving India.

On defense and security, India has strengthened its capacity over the past decade to such an extent that U.S. secretaries of defense now routinely refer to India as a net provider of regional security. India's maritime ambitions, especially its goal of primacy in the Indian Ocean, are a response to China's more assertive presence across South Asia. Beijing's intensified infrastructure development assistance to Bangladesh, the Maldives, Sri Lanka, and, especially, Pakistan—as well as a new military base in Djibouti—have expanded China's Indian Ocean reach. A 2012 decision upped India's naval ship requirement to 198 from its earlier level of 138. In 2015, New Delhi quietly reached an agreement with the Seychelles to host its first overseas military base. That same year, India took the lead in rescuing nearly 1,000 foreign citizens from 41 countries stranded in Yemen, including Americans. And when Japan joined India and the United States that year as a



permanent participant in the annual Malabar naval exercises, India was able to showcase its warships, planes, and submarines beside the two most powerful democracies in the Asia-Pacific region.

While deepening its ties with the West, New Delhi has also shown a determination to invest in alternative international organizations over the course of the past decade. India does not seek to overturn the global order; rather, it merely wants such institutions as the UN Security Council, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the World Bank, the IMF, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and others to expand to accommodate it. But as reform of these organizations drags on, New Delhi has put some of its eggs in other baskets.

Take the BRICS, comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. In less than a decade, the group has become an important diplomatic forum and has accomplished more than most observers expected. At their 2012 summit, the BRICS began discussions on the New Development Bank—which announced its first loans in 2016—an institution in which these five countries could have an equal voice, unlike their disproportionately low representation in the World Bank and the IMF. And in 2014, they agreed to form the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement, an alternative to IMF support in times of economic crisis. India also supported the Chinese-led creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and it is now the bank's second-biggest contributor of capital.

In 2017, India also joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and it maintains an active presence in other institutions far outside the United States' orbit, such as the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia. Although New Delhi's top priority remains a seat commensurate with its size and heft within the

traditional global organizations still dominated by the West, India has shown that it is also willing to help build other arenas in order to have a greater voice. India will likely continue to maintain this diverse array of relationships even as it strengthens its ties with the United States; regardless, granting New Delhi the place it deserves in major Western international forums would help, rather than hinder, U.S. interests. At a time when international coordination has become far more complex, the increase in new organizations creates "forum-shopping" opportunities, as the political scientist Daniel Drezner and others have argued. More forums and more options make it harder to get things done internationally—and also decrease Washington's influence.

A SEAT AT THE TABLE

Successive U.S. administrations have viewed the relationship with India as one of the United States' great strategic opportunities, offering a chance to overcome historical differences and strengthen ties with a fast-growing market, a stable pillar in a region of turmoil, and a large country that can provide a balance of power across Asia and a bulwark against Chinese dominance. The George W. Bush administration sought to reframe the U.S.-Indian relationship by striking a 2005 deal concerning civilian nuclear cooperation, bridging what had been a 30-year divide on nonproliferation. The Obama administration continued the momentum, with various efforts to expand defense, economic, and diplomatic cooperation.

But shared goals do not always translate into shared approaches. Such was the case with Russia's annexation of Crimea: Indian officials walked a tightrope, saying little publicly about it beyond an anodyne tweet from a Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson ("We are closely watching fast evolving situation and hope for a peaceful resolution") rather than clearly condemning Russia's violation of Ukrainian sovereignty.

On questions of grand strategy, India's desire to be recognized as a major global power includes an indelible commitment to its own ideas of autonomy. Although New Delhi has shifted over the years from reflexive nonalignment to a recent philosophy of "strategic autonomy" to the present Indian government's vision of "the world is one family" (from the Sanskrit phrase *vasudhaiva kutumbakam*), the connecting thread remains policy independence. But that sense of independence can sometimes clash with the United States' tendency to believe that its partners and allies should support it across the board.

Part of the problem is that Washington has no template for a close defense relationship outside of the obligations inherent in a formal alliance. The U.S. government's designation of India last year as a "major defense partner"—a status created and accorded only to India, as a means to facilitate advanced defense cooperation—illustrates the unique situation and marks the beginning of a new way to think through this relationship. Even though New Delhi seeks deeper ties, including obtaining U.S. technology, Indians do not want to sign themselves up for every U.S.-led initiative around the world. There is a difference between being "natural allies," in the words of former Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, and the extensive commitments of a formal alliance. New Delhi seeks the rhetorical flourish of the former without the restrictive expectations of the latter.

Given the size of India's economy, it is past time for the country to be brought into agenda-setting institutions.

Given that U.S. and Indian interests are converging across Asia, military ties between the two countries will no doubt deepen. But as they do, U.S. policymakers will have to manage their expectations and not be disappointed when India, say, improves ties with Iran. In order to ward off frustrations with India's inevitable departures from U.S. preferences, the United States should frame its relationship with India differently, conceiving of it more as a joint venture in business than a traditional alliance. That would mean insulating shared initiatives from areas of disagreement, such as policy toward Iran or ties with Russia.

On economics, too, Washington at times differs sharply with New Delhi, despite a commitment on both sides to expanding bilateral trade. Indeed, India has never hesitated to break global consensus to protect its perceived economic interests. A decade ago, New Delhi and Beijing made common cause to protect their agricultural sectors, leading to the July 2008 stalemate that ended the Doha round of international trade negotiations. Then, in 2014, India backed out of the Trade Facilitation Agreement, which sought to cut red tape, despite having previously agreed to it. It took extensive talks to revive the deal. More recently, India's powerful information technology sector has raised trade in services to the very top of India's economic negotiating agenda, since one way to provide information technology

services is to perform work on location—including in another country. New Delhi is pushing other countries to accept greater numbers of Indian temporary workers while remaining resistant to opening its own market further to goods and services. In 2016, India filed a formal dispute against the United States in the World Trade Organization over increases in visa fees that India claimed would hit its information technology workers especially hard; the outcome will set a precedent for managing worker mobility across the globe.

Despite these disagreements, there is ample room for progress on the economic relationship. India's global ambitions rest on sustained economic growth, and for that, India needs to maintain ongoing reforms. While only India's own political process will determine the trajectory of those efforts, the United States can and should do a better job of including India in the international networks conducive to economic growth and job creation. Historically, decades of self-sufficiency and a relatively small economy locked India out of productive economic institutions such as APEC, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the International Energy Agency (IEA)—all bodies that set standards and provide a meaningful place for cooperation on trade, development, and economic policy.

Given the size of India's economy, it is past time for the country to be brought into such agenda-setting institutions. An APEC missing Asia's third-largest economy lacks legitimacy and makes little economic sense. Washington should support Indian membership, something it has so far refrained from doing. The same argument holds for the OECD, especially because India has emerged as a major donor of development aid across South Asia and Africa. In recent years, the OECD has created a category of states called "key partners"—a group that includes India, along with Brazil, China, and Indonesia—which it consults but does not count as members. Locking India out of the OECD also keeps it out of the IEA, for arcane historical reasons, thus excluding one of the world's largest energy consumers. If the G-7 is to remain a central economic-agenda-setting institution for the world's leading democracies, at some point, it, too, will have a hard time rationalizing its exclusion of India given the rapidly growing size of the Indian economy. Concerns that bringing India into the fold will disrupt consensus in these economic institutions are overblown, since these are not binding negotiating forums. If anything, giving India a place at the table will help pull it into a cohort of countries already committed to economic openness and transparency.

Finally, on the security front, India is right to see its continued exclusion from permanent UN Security Council membership as unfair, given its population and contributions to UN peacekeeping (India is among the top troop contributors annually). Washington should seek to make good on its promise of working toward permanent membership for India "in a reformed and expanded" Security Council, as President Barack Obama pledged before the Indian Parliament in 2010. Promoting India's membership could present challenges to many U.S. positions, but the perspective Indian diplomats bring on some of the world's most intractable problems deserves to be heard in the same room as the perspectives from China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom. Unfortunately, the UN Security Council has not budged on the issue of expansion since Obama first voiced support for Indian inclusion. Reform has been held hostage to competing demands from other deserving countries—such as Brazil, Germany, and Japan—not to mention a lack of consensus on the size of expansion and whether new permanent members should have veto powers.

Even if the UN remains plagued by inertia, there are many other forums where India could make a contribution, with a little help from Washington. The United States must do a better job of normalizing the reality of India's rise and overtly emphasizing the country's importance to U.S. national interests and to the world, just as Washington assumes the importance of so many of its close European partners. Despite their political differences, both Modi and his predecessor, Singh, shared a conviction: that for India on the world stage, "our time has come." Washington should embrace—rather than merely await—its arrival.

Yemen's Humanitarian Nightmare

The Real Roots of the Conflict

Asher Orkaby

On February 20, 2015, as the residents of Sanaa prepared for evening prayers, Yemeni President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi put on a woman's *niqab* and slipped out the back door of his official residence, where a car was waiting for him. For a month, Houthi rebels, who had taken Sanaa in late 2014, had been holding him under house arrest. By the time the guards noticed that he was gone, Hadi had reached the relative safety of the southern port of Aden. A month later, as Houthi forces advanced south, he fled again, this time to Riyadh, where he called on Saudi Arabia to intervene in Yemen's civil war.

Within days, a Saudi-led coalition of Arab states began a campaign of air strikes against Houthi targets that rapidly became a siege of the entire country. Cut off from imports, and under a ceaseless Saudi bombardment, Yemen has turned into one of the worst humanitarian crises of modern times. Seven million Yemenis live in areas that are close to famine, nearly two million children are suffering from acute malnutrition, and an outbreak of cholera has infected over 600,000 people.

The conflict in Yemen is often described as an outgrowth of the Shiite-Sunni rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, as Iran has supplied weapons and military advisers to the Houthis. But this misunderstands both the origins of the war and the reason why Saudi Arabia intervened. The war is not about regional interests; it is a continuation of a long-standing conflict between the Yemeni government and marginalized northern tribes, which escalated thanks to a gradual decline in the legitimacy and competence of the central government

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in Sanaa. And Saudi Arabia intervened not to counter Iranian expansionism but to secure its southern border against the Houthi threat. As a result, only an internal Yemeni political settlement can end the war, although Saudi Arabia, the United States, and international humanitarian organizations can do much to improve the situation in the meantime.

THE SHADOW OF THE PAST

The modern state of Yemen was born in 1962, when revolutionaries, many of whom had absorbed contemporary ideas of nationalism at foreign universities, deposed Imam Muhammad al-Badr and created the Yemen Arab Republic, or North Yemen. For the next 40 years, the foreign-educated elite who had sparked the revolution occupied some of the most important positions in the new republic, serving as presidents, prime ministers, cabinet ministers, and chief executives. They based their legitimacy on the roles they had played during the revolution and its aftermath, achieving an almost mythic status in the national imagination. The revolution also transformed the rest of Yemeni society. It empowered Yemen's growing urban population and ended the dominance of those families—known as "sayyids"—who could trace their lineage back to the Prophet Muhammad. And it sent Yemen's northern tribes, which had supported the deposed Badr, into the political wilderness. Shut off from government funding, their region stagnated and their problems festered.

After North and South Yemen unified, in 1990, discrimination against the northern tribes gave rise to a protest movement in the north, led in part by the Houthi family, one of the most prominent sayyid dynasties in northern Yemen. Then, in 2004, during early clashes between northern tribes and the government, the Yemeni military killed Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, one of the leaders of the movement. His death marked the beginning of the northern tribes' armed insurgency and gave the rebels their name. For the next seven years, sporadic fighting continued, with neither side gaining a meaningful advantage.

At the same time as the government was fighting the Houthis in the north, its authority in the rest of the country was fading. The greatest challenge for a revolutionary state is maintaining its legitimacy after the founders have died, and half a century after the revolution, few of Yemen's original leaders remained. In June 2011, Abdul Aziz Abdul Ghani, one

ABDULJABBAR ZEYAD / REUTERS

Critical condition: at a hospital in Al Hudaydah, Yemen, June 2017

of the last of the revolutionary generation, was mortally wounded in an assassination attempt on the country's president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, during popular protests that had paralyzed Sanaa. Both sides of the political divide paused the hostilities to mourn. But from that point on, the Yemeni state created by the revolution effectively disappeared.

The passing of Yemen's revolutionary generation created not only a crisis of national identity but also one of governance. Once, Yemeni students who had obtained degrees abroad took pride in returning home as future leaders. But over the last ten years, much of the educated elite has left the country, citing worsening government corruption and ineptitude and a lack of domestic employment opportunities. Political appointments are now granted on the basis of tribal membership rather than training or experience, and technocrats have gradually given way to the beneficiaries of nepotism.

As the central government's legitimacy declined over the last decade, a political void opened. Beginning in 2009, extremist groups, including al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, emerged to fill the gap. But it was the northern Houthi movement, already organized and opposed to the central government, that was positioned to take the fullest advantage of the derelict republic.

REVOLUTIONS

The Houthis' chance came in early 2011, when revolts in places such as Egypt and Tunisia inspired months of mass protests against the corrupt, autocratic government in Sanaa. That February, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, a northern rebel leader, declared his support for the anti-government demonstrations and sent thousands of his followers to join the rallies in the capital. Some of the most powerful images of the uprising were those of tribesmen in traditional robes demonstrating alongside members of the urban youth movement. Fifty years earlier, these two groups had fought each other for control of Yemen; in 2011, they marched together against a common enemy, Saleh.

By the end of the year, the uprising had achieved its main goal: Saleh agreed to step down and be replaced by his vice president, Hadi. In early 2013, the government and opposition groups began a national dialogue conference that culminated in 2014 with a plan, backed by Hadi, to write a new constitution and divide Yemen into six provinces. At the time, Jamal Benomar, then the UN's special envoy for Yemen, predicted that the agreement would lead to "democratic governance founded on the rule of law, human rights and equal citizenship."

Yet the Houthi opposition rejected the deal, as it would have further weakened the power of the northern tribes. Throughout 2014, antigovernment protests, many of them led by Houthis, continued to rage. In September, Houthi forces captured Sanaa, and then in early 2015, they dissolved parliament, forced Hadi to resign, and installed a revolutionary committee to replace the Yemeni government.

The Houthi advance unnerved Riyadh. Ever since Saudi Arabia was founded, in 1932, its leaders have worried about the security of the country's southern border with Yemen. In 1934, Saudi Arabia fought its first war against the Kingdom of Yemen to secure that border. Under the treaty that ended the war, Saudi Arabia annexed three Yemeni border provinces that it had occupied during the fighting. Since then, Saudi foreign policy toward Yemen has been driven by the need to maintain a weak central government in Sanaa that does not threaten Saudi security. Each time a popular movement or a strong central authority has looked as though it were appearing in Yemen, the Saudi government has responded with military action and financial support for pro-Saudi groups.

The Houthis' rise was the realization of Saudi leaders' worst fears. In 2009 and 2010, cross-border skirmishes between Houthi fighters and

Saudi forces caused the first Saudi casualties along the Saudi-Yemeni border since the 1960s. After taking Sanaa in 2014, the Houthi leadership openly called for war with Saudi Arabia, using demands for the return of the three border provinces as a rallying cry for the movement.

SAUDI ARABIA STEPS IN

As a result, when Hadi requested Saudi help, Riyadh was only too happy to oblige. In March 2015, Saudi Arabia and a coalition of Arab nations from the Gulf Cooperation Council launched a military campaign to push back the Houthis and restore the government. Saudi Arabia presented the intervention as a response to the threat of Iranian expansionism, arguing that the Houthis were effectively an Iranian proxy. This won it the support of other Arab countries and the United States. Yet Saudi rhetoric has grossly misrepresented Iran's role in the conflict. Although some small arms and money have flowed from Iran to the Houthis, the amounts are not large, and there is no real Houthi-Iranian alliance. The northern tribes do not share Iran's desire to challenge Israel and the United States, and they began positioning themselves as an alternative to Yemen's central government long before receiving any Iranian help. The true target of the Saudi campaign was not Iran but the Houthis themselves.

The intervention, which began as a series of air strikes against Houthi military targets, has morphed into an attempt to destroy Yemen's economic infrastructure in order to turn public opinion away from the Houthi movement and its anti-Saudi stance. Hospitals, factories, water mains, sewage facilities, bridges, and roads have all been demolished in bombing raids. The Saudi coalition, with help from the United States, has blockaded Yemen's ports and rendered it dangerous for civilian aircraft to fly over the country, making it difficult for aid agencies or businesses to bring goods into Sanaa's airport and for wounded Yemenis to go abroad for treatment.

Yemen's economy, already weak, has collapsed under the pressure. For many Yemenis, buying food or medicine is now difficult or impossible. According to the UN, two-thirds of Yemen's 28 million people face food shortages and do not have access to clean water. Seven million of them live in areas on the brink of famine, and nearly two million Yemeni children are acutely malnourished. Without working public services, rubbish and sewage have piled up on the streets and leached into drinking wells. Since April, cholera,

which spreads in contaminated water, has infected over 600,000 people, killing more than 2,000.

The UN Human Rights Council, Amnesty International, and other humanitarian organizations have condemned Saudi Arabia's human rights violations in Yemen. Adama Dieng, the UN's special adviser on the prevention of genocide, has called on the Security Council to investigate possible Saudi crimes against humanity. Yet by portraying its intervention as a conflict with Iran, Saudi Arabia seems to have convinced much of the world, especially the United States, to ignore the deliberate targeting of Yemeni civilians.

The Houthis' rise was the realization of Saudi leaders' worst fears.

The practical response to the crisis from international aid organizations has been ineffective. In July, the World Health Organization announced that it was suspending its cholera vaccine program in Yemen indefinitely. It cited difficulties delivering the drugs and the fact that the vaccination campaign would have had limited effect as the disease had already infected over 300,000 people. The WHO may well have been right, but it and other international organizations have missed opportunities to help resolve the wider conflict.

Because the international community has officially recognized only the Yemeni government in exile and given the Houthi government scant diplomatic attention, neutral humanitarian organizations are among the few groups that can mediate the conflict without political restraints. This is a role they have played in Yemen before. In the 1960s, the government of the new Yemen Arab Republic fought a six-year civil war with northern tribes loyal to the deposed leader Badr. Back then, as today, the northern tribes were not officially recognized by foreign governments, so the International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN were the only groups that had access to them. The UN opened a direct line of communication with their leaders, legitimizing their position in the conflict and encouraging them to participate in a national peace conference. And the Red Cross facilitated several prisoner exchanges, introducing aspects of the Geneva Convention to an area of the world where belligerents had traditionally beheaded captives rather than swapped them.

During the current war, the Red Cross and the UN can repeat that strategy. They should both address the humanitarian crisis and provide

the Houthi tribes with an international platform from which to negotiate with the government in exile.

The UN could also send peacekeepers to secure Saudi Arabia's southern border, alleviating one of the main drivers of the conflict. That tactic worked from 1963 to 1964, when UN personnel patrolled a demilitarized zone between Saudi Arabia and Yemen and mediated cross-border disputes. A similar peacekeeping presence today would give Riyadh enough confidence in the security of the border to cease its aerial campaign and lift its naval blockade, ending the immediate humanitarian crisis.

WASHINGTON'S ROLE

Although the United States is not involved in the fighting in Yemen, it has supported the Saudi-led coalition in several ways. The U.S. military trains Saudi forces and offers its bases to Saudi warplanes for refueling. And the United States has sold Saudi Arabia billions of dollars' worth of weapons, many of which have been used in Yemen.

That means that the United States is well positioned to improve the situation on the ground. Washington should threaten to withdraw its military support in order to pressure Saudi Arabia to end hostilities and accept an international peacekeeping force along the Saudi-Yemeni border. With a buffer against immediate territorial incursions, Saudi Arabia might be more willing to allow Yemenis to adopt their own political solution, even if the Houthi leadership played a significant role in the ensuing government.

Any negotiations between the U.S. government and the Houthis would meet serious opposition in the United States. At every Houthi rally, the protesters chant, "God is great! Death to America! Death to Israel! Curse on the Jews! Victory to Islam!" U.S. officials have pointed to this slogan as proof of the movement's anti-American stance and, since the expression is based on an Iranian revolutionary catch phrase, as evidence of Houthi-Iranian cooperation. Hadi has even formally petitioned the UN to brand the Houthis a terrorist organization.

Yet the slogan is misleading. The Houthis are one of the few groups in the Middle East that has little intention or ability to confront the United States or Israel. And far from being aligned with extremists, the Houthi movement has repeatedly clashed with the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. It is Saudi Arabia that has long supported Sunni Islamist groups in Yemen. More-

over, Yemen's northern tribes are willing to accept foreign assistance no matter who gives it. During the 1960s, they even received secret military aid from Israel in their civil war against the new republic.

Abdul-Malik al-Houthi and the rest of the movement's leadership, however, need a crash course in modern diplomacy. Members of the Houthi family have dismissed the group's anti-American slogan as mere words, arguing that it does not reflect actual policy. Yet words can be dangerous. The Houthi leadership needs to distance the Yemeni conflict from the divisions that characterize the rest of the region. It should start by adopting a new slogan.

A PATH TO PEACE

The United States and international organizations should realize that focusing on tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia only distracts from finding a local political settlement to end the fighting. Both of the main causes of the civil war are internal to Yemen: an illegitimate republican government and a Houthi movement that has no intention of retreating to the political obscurity of its northern stronghold. So far, peace talks led by Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, the UN's special envoy for Yemen, have missed both of these points and attempted to solve the crisis by demanding Houthi withdrawal and the reinstatement of the deposed republican government.

That must change. Before 1990, Yemen had never existed as a single country. A peaceful solution needs to acknowledge Yemen's internal divisions. The country is made up of three regions. The north, the home of the Houthi movement, contains the great majority of the Shiite population and is dominated by powerful tribal alliances. The south of the country, a British colony from 1839 to 1967 and thereafter an Arab communist state until Yemeni unification, is primarily Sunni, with a weak tribal structure that has been eroded by over a century of imperial dominion and then decades of secular communist ideology. Finally, Yemen's eastern region, known as Hadramawt, is inhabited by a sparse Hadrami population that has traditionally enjoyed significant independence.

None of these regions can or should exercise complete control over the other two. Yet nor would breaking Yemen up into three separate nations solve the problem. A better solution would involve a federal system that maintained a degree of autonomy for each region and established a weak central government to mediate disputes over

territory or resources and to guide foreign policy. As well as keeping the peace within Yemen, the absence of a strong central state would allay Saudi concerns over regional stability.

The greatest threat to Yemen's future, however, is not Saudi Arabia, Iran, or even a renewed civil war, but rather a growing water shortage that threatens the country's major cities. According to projections from the UN, Yemen's major urban areas could run out of water as soon as 2018, a consequence of inefficient irrigation and a growing population. Saudi Arabia has long promised funds to repair Yemen's damaged infrastructure after the war. That money should be used to move major urban populations to areas with more water and invest in massive desalination projects. This need not be a one-sided deal: a stable Yemen could let Saudi Arabia pipe oil from its wells to the refineries and shipping facilities in Aden, giving the Saudi government a new export route that would bypass the Strait of Hormuz, avoiding the perennial danger of an Iranian blockade. If foreign governments and the UN act soon to reduce Yemen's suffering and accept that the civil war needs a local solution, then Yemen can still recover and even add a measure of stability to a volatile region.

Even Smarter Sanctions

How to Fight in the Era of Economic Warfare

Edward Fishman

Economic sanctions have been a fixture of U.S. foreign policy for decades, but never have they enjoyed so much popularity as they do today. On virtually every major foreign problem—North Korea's belligerence, Iran's nuclear aspirations, Russia's aggression, the Islamic State's (or ISIS') brutality—the U.S. government has turned to some form of sanctions as an answer. Their value is one of the few things that former President Barack Obama and President Donald Trump agree on: Obama used them more than any other president in recent history, and Trump, in his first eight months in office, oversaw significant expansions of U.S. sanctions against North Korea, Venezuela, and, despite his misgivings, Russia.

Some U.S. sanctions aim to stigmatize foreign leaders and human rights abusers, such as those against North Korea's Kim Jong Un, Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe, and the Russian officials responsible for killing the lawyer Sergei Magnitsky. Others are designed to deny terrorists, drug traffickers, nuclear proliferators, and other bad actors the money and tools they need to wreak havoc. It is a third category, however, that U.S. officials have come to rely on so heavily in recent years: coercive economic sanctions. Their purpose is to apply economic pressure to force a foreign government to do something it doesn't want to do (or to refrain from doing something it does want to do). The prime example is the sanctions that pressured Iran to sign the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, under which it agreed to stringent limitations on its nuclear program.

For all the popularity of sanctions, however, the system for applying them remains underdeveloped. U.S. officials almost never design

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sanctions, much less negotiate them with allies, until crises are already under way, and so the measures tend to be either rushed and ill conceived or too slow to deter adversaries. These shortcomings make sanctions less effective in the present, and they will do even more harm in the future. As governments around the world race to hone their own economic warfare capabilities while finding clever ways to insulate themselves from the effects of U.S. sanctions, Washington risks falling behind in an area in which it has long enjoyed primacy. So it's well past time for the U.S. government to modernize its favorite foreign policy tool.

SMARTER AND SMARTER

Sanctions have been Washington's foreign policy tool of choice throughout the post–Cold War period. As the specter of great-power war receded, policymakers came to see sanctions as an efficient means of advancing U.S. interests without resorting to military force. But the explosion of sanctions programs during the Clinton administration led to a backlash among experts. In the late 1990s and early years of this century, their reputation hit rock bottom.

In particular, the UN Security Council's strict embargo against commerce with Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq was seen as depriving ordinary civilians while doing little to pressure those in power. Waning international support for these sanctions inspired U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell to propose a new approach. Dubbed "smart sanctions," it aimed to move beyond embargoes by targeting leaders and influencers directly.

But beginning around 2006, as Washington shifted its focus to sanctions against Iran, it became clear that this approach was not up to the task of curbing the country's nuclear program. It would take pressure on the Iranian economy, chiefly the financial and energy sectors, to do that. So sanctions experts in the State Department and the Treasury Department aimed higher, crafting measures that would damage Iran's economy without placing undue burdens on its civilians or destabilizing global markets. The resulting sanctions severed Iran's largest banks from the global financial system, denied its maritime shipping fleet access to insurance and repairs, and gradually reduced the regime's oil revenues. The strategy worked: from 2012 to 2013, Iran's GDP shrank by roughly nine percent and its oil sales fell from 2.5 million barrels per day to 1.1 million barrels per day. Meanwhile, broad exceptions to sanctions granted ordinary Iranians access to food, medicine, and cell phones from abroad.

Even though sanctions have gotten smarter, their precise impact remains extraordinarily difficult to forecast. That's because it is banks and companies that perform the first line of sanctions implementation, and it is impossible to know exactly how they will manage this task. In some cases, they simply decide to cease doing business with entire countries for fear of violating sanctions, making the effect of the measures more draconian than intended. That is what has happened with Somalia, where remittances have been impeded after U.S. banks decided to end their relationships with companies transmitting money to the country. In other cases, sanctions end up being weaker than intended, as the private sector grows accustomed to complying right up to the boundary of legality and illicit actors find workarounds.

U.S. officials almost never design sanctions until crises are already under way.

The United States possesses two principal assets to handle this inevitable uncertainty. The first is the sheer size and reach of its economy (and the global dominance of the U.S. dollar), which gives it a fairly wide margin for error. The second is the flexibility of U.S. legal authorities, which permit the Treasury Department to issue licenses, update sanctions lists, and pursue other course corrections with relative ease.

Both factors help explain the success of U.S. sanctions against Russia, the largest economic power the United States has ever sanctioned. But perhaps the most unique element of this particular sanctions program is that, from the start, it has been a collaborative project between the United States and Europe. (The sanctions program against Iran became a genuine multilateral endeavor only after years of pressure from Washington.) Given the many links between the Russian and European economies, getting the EU's buy-in was essential. After all, if Russia could replace all its lost business with the United States by turning to Europe, the sanctions would be toothless, leaving U.S. companies as the only losers.

The sanctions on Russia are also distinct in their precision. Unlike ordinary sanctions, which shut their targets out of the U.S. economy altogether, these focus primarily on blocking Russia's state-owned enterprises from raising capital in Western financial markets and on hindering its energy companies' efforts to develop Arctic, deep-water, and shale oil projects. The United States and the EU designed the sanctions this way to put pressure on Russia while limiting the risk to markets posed by going after a major player in the global economy.

All in favor: at a UN Security Council meeting on North Korea, September 2017

STEPHANIE KEITH / REUTERS

On paper, the sanctions against Russia are a fraction as harsh as those placed on Iran before the 2015 nuclear deal. But owing to the outsize roles played by Western banks and oil companies in global finance and energy, the sanctions have managed to squeeze Russia's economy while causing little financial blowback in the United States or Europe. In the six months after the first round of sanctions on key sectors of Russia's economy were enacted, in July 2014, the ruble lost more than half its value. The International Monetary Fund estimates that sanctions initially reduced Russian GDP by 1.0 to 1.5 percent and will cost the country up to nine percent of GDP over approximately five years. The drop in world oil prices that began in 2014 no doubt remains a crucial factor behind Russia's economic fall, but sanctions have held back the country's recovery, curbing investment, hampering access to credit, and stalling the development of energy projects.

Sanctions have not forced Russia to pull out of Ukraine. But they have helped deter it from taking more drastic measures, such as conquering a wider swath of eastern Ukraine, using its military forces to secure a land bridge to Crimea, or overthrowing the democratically elected government in Kiev. It is impossible to prove a counterfactual, but it strains credulity that Moscow would have abstained from all these actions had it believed it could get away with them scot-free. The timeline of events also provides evidence of deterrence. Russia put the brakes on

its two large-scale military offensives, in September 2014 and February 2015, as Washington and Brussels were preparing harsher sanctions. And in the spring of 2015, after several rounds of sanctions and clear signals from the West that tougher ones were in the offing, Moscow abandoned the so-called Novorossiya (New Russia) project, which envisioned Russia swallowing up nearly half of Ukraine's territory. The Russia experience thus suggests an important lesson: the best use of sanctions may be not to counterpunch but to deter.

WHEN TO SANCTION

Despite these recent successes, sanctions are no panacea. In some cases, they are best suited to a supporting role—a means of constraining an adversary's capacity for mischief, for instance, as opposed to a solution to an intractable problem. In others, they are the wrong tool altogether. The United States should be wary of using them capriciously, as doing so would allow adversaries to adapt to its tactics, decrease allies' appetite for cooperation, and encourage foreign corporations to reduce their exposure to the U.S. economy. Before turning to sanctions to address a problem, policymakers should ask themselves four questions.

First, is there money at stake? Sanctions will sway a country's political leaders only if their economy relies substantially on foreign trade or access to international financial markets. This is why sanctions programs that remain stagnant for years tend to be the least effective: their targets have long since limited their exposure to the U.S. economy. Such is the case with sanctions against Cuba, which have been in place since 1960 to little effect. The same dynamic was also at work with the embargo against Iran initially imposed by the Reagan administration in 1987. With minimal commerce between the United States and Iran, sanctions were largely ineffective until 2010, when the Obama administration began a policy of threatening sanctions against firms in Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere that conducted business with Iran—putting more stress on the Iranian economy than decades of an embargo ever did.

The second question concerns the need for a persuasive theory of success: Will economic pressure actually change the target country's policies? All governments, even autocracies, care to some degree about their people's livelihoods, as plunging living standards can spark political unrest. But in general, the more politically active a target's population is, the more likely sanctions are to work.

Take Iran. Although hardly a democracy, the country does elect its president (from a slate of approved candidates, to be sure). After the government's election rigging in 2009 led to mass protests—and after escalating Western sanctions caused a sharp economic decline—Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader, assented to the election of Hassan Rouhani in 2013. Rouhani had campaigned on the promise of freeing Iran from sanctions, and without his election, the nuclear deal almost certainly would not have happened.

Sanctions can work in a similar way with Russia, another autocracy that holds stage-managed elections. For over a decade and a half, President Vladimir Putin has promised the Russian people political stability and rising living standards in exchange for acquiescence to his personal rule. But Western sanctions, mixed with the Kremlin's own economic mismanagement, have made this social contract untenable, forcing Putin to seek a new one based on his supposed role as Russia's protector from a predatory West. Putin's popularity spiked after the 2014 annexation of Crimea, but as a full economic recovery remains far from sight, discontent is brewing and seems likely to grow.

Sanctions should be the United States' most potent deterrent in the gray zone between war and peace.

The third question officials should ask themselves involves the disposition of the coalition imposing sanctions: Do the United States and its allies have the determination to maintain these measures over the long haul? If not, then a target country will likely try to wait them out, hoping that interest groups and opposition parties in the West will seize on the domestic costs of sanctions and force Washington or Brussels to throw in the towel.

The experience with Russia shows how sanctions can turn into a race against time. For the last several years, Russia has sought to free itself from sanctions not by giving the West what it wants—the restoration of Ukraine's international borders—but by trying to break the West's resolve. By setting up a process in which member states must unanimously agree to extend sanctions against Russia every six months, the EU has made itself a frequent target, with Moscow currying favor with incumbent leaders, such as Hungary's Viktor Orban, and boosting aspiring ones, such as France's Marine Le Pen. The spectacular failure of Russia's intervention in the recent French presidential election and the

U.S. Congress' overwhelming approval of a law that restricts Trump's ability to lift sanctions against Russia have done much to clarify that the West is not prepared to fold. But still, EU sanctions would be far more effective if they didn't require a semiannual vote of confidence.

The fourth question zeroes in on the political objective of sanctions: Does the target have a feasible off-ramp? Even the harshest sanctions are unlikely to result in total capitulation, and it is foolhardy to expect any leader to commit political suicide in order to get sanctions lifted. Hence the failure of sanctions against North Korea: Kim has made his nuclear program a centerpiece of his domestic legitimacy, and so the political costs of agreeing to denuclearize have outweighed the economic benefits of doing so. For sanctions to change a country's behavior, they must allow leaders on the receiving end to save face while acceding to U.S. demands.

IF YOU WANT PEACE, PREPARE FOR ECONOMIC WAR

In March 2016, the U.S. secretary of the treasury, Jacob Lew, struck a memorable note of caution in a speech on sanctions. "We must be conscious of the risk that overuse of sanctions could undermine our leadership position within the global economy and the effectiveness of our sanctions themselves," he said. The more the United States relies on sanctions, Lew argued, the more other countries will wean themselves off dependency on the U.S. financial system—and reduce their vulnerability to U.S. sanctions.

However compelling its logic, Lew's argument overlooked a key point: we are already living in an era of intensifying economic warfare. In just the last two years, China has threatened sanctions against U.S. companies involved in arms sales to Taiwan, Russia has responded to Turkey's shooting down of a Russian attack aircraft with restrictions on tourism and food imports, and Saudi Arabia and other Arab states have imposed a slew of economic penalties on Qatar. At a time when states are trying to challenge the liberal world order without triggering great-power war, rising economic combat has become inevitable. And that's to say nothing of the political impetus for more and more sanctions in Washington: supporting them is one of the easiest ways for politicians to burnish their national security credentials. Curtailing the use of sanctions would be akin to the error of those who protested the Industrial Revolution by smashing textile machines: the individual may opt out, but the tool will continue to spread.

Instead, the United States must prepare itself for the coming economic battles by overhauling its sanctions apparatus. Although sanctions have some record of success in persuading adversaries to reverse troublesome steps they've already taken—such as in the Iran nuclear negotiations—it remains far easier to prevent future actions. So the goal should be to establish sanctions as the United States' most potent deterrent in the gray zone between war and peace, where so much of today's international jostling takes place.

The first step is to build a permanent sanctions contingency-planning process within the U.S. government. Just as the U.S. military draws up detailed plans for wars it might someday have to fight, U.S. officials in the State Department, the Treasury, and other agencies should create and constantly update off-the-shelf plans to impose sanctions rapidly if needed. To practice these plans and signal the government's readiness to use them, they should routinely perform military-style exercises that simulate crises in which sanctions play a central role in the response.

The U.S. government should also bolster its defenses against other countries' sanctions. That means prioritizing the collection of intelligence on adversaries' blueprints for economic warfare in addition to their military plans. It also means identifying vulnerabilities in the U.S. economy and quietly working with private companies to rectify them. Some vital American-made products, including aircraft and pharmaceuticals, depend on components from countries that may one day sanction the United States, and so the federal government should team up with their manufacturers to identify potential alternative suppliers in advance.

Indeed, effective offensive and defensive planning will require more regular consultation between sanctions policymakers and private-sector leaders. The United States has traditionally shunned the types of close ties between business and government that are so prevalent elsewhere, but it is worth making an exception for national security. In a similar vein, when building the teams that fashion sanctions, the State Department and the Treasury Department should draw on not just the usual diplomats and lawyers but also experienced professionals from the financial, energy, and technology sectors. Industry expertise is critical for the U.S. government to construct sanctions programs that are forceful yet don't backfire on the United States or its allies. And it is especially important when deploying sanctions against larger economies, because the risk of financial contagion is higher in such cases.

The final ingredient to sanctions-based deterrence is making economic warfare a regular subject of consultations between the United States and its allies. Despite the tantalizing prospect of widespread international support, the UN Security Council is not the right forum for these discussions, since the differences among its five permanent members tend to result in watered-down sanctions. In fact, a cardinal weakness of the U.S. campaign to pressure North Korea has been its reliance on the UN Security Council, a legacy of a program that has historically been geared more toward frustrating the country's efforts to obtain nuclear missile components than economic coercion. By giving China and Russia a veto over sanctions decisions, and by entrusting them to police violations within their borders, the United States has left itself with fewer options on North Korea than it has had in the case of Iran or Russia. It has also exposed itself to the vexing possibility that Beijing and Moscow will claim the moral high ground for agreeing to Security Council resolutions while surreptitiously continuing to aid Pyongyang.

In most cases, U.S. interests are best served by negotiating coercive economic sanctions with like-minded allies in the EU and the G-7, while focusing efforts in the UN on less divisive sanctions, such as those that stigmatize bad actors and stem weapons proliferation and illicit finance. The U.S. government should also invite allies to participate in sanctions contingency planning and exercises, and it should work with them to use sanctions for collective defense. A reasonable strategy for deterring future Russian interference in foreign elections, for example, would entail a joint EU-NATO declaration affirming that such meddling will be treated as an attack against all and result in strong multilateral sanctions.

Economic warfare is a reality of the international environment, and perfecting the art of it will be essential for the United States to deter the incremental interventions favored by its adversaries. That doesn't mean crises will go away; the United States will always find it difficult to check aggression and defend its interests in such hot spots as the South China Sea, the Persian Gulf, and Russia's periphery. But if Washington strengthens its sanctions policy so that its capabilities are unquestioned and its intentions unmistakable, it will provide a critical service to the sustenance of great-power peace: averting crises before they spiral out of control.

Why Military Assistance Programs Disappoint

Minor Tools Can't Solve Major Problems

Mara Karlin

Since the end of World War II, U.S. administrations of both parties have relied on a time-honored foreign policy tool: training and equipping foreign militaries. Seeking to stabilize fragile states, the United States has adopted this approach in nearly every region of the world over the last 70 years. Today, Washington is working with the militaries of more than 100 countries and running large programs to train and equip armed forces in such hot spots as Afghanistan, Iraq, Jordan, and Pakistan.

The logic behind this approach is simple. Fragile states jeopardize U.S. interests, but large-scale interventions are costly and unpopular. By outsourcing regional security in places where U.S. interests are not immediately threatened, Washington can promote stability without shouldering most of the burden itself. And heading off threats before they metastasize means that the United States can keep its eye on more sophisticated rivals such as China and Russia.

Among U.S. policymakers, this approach enjoys widespread popularity. Writing in this magazine in 2010, for example, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called weak states "the main security challenge of our time" and made the case for dealing with them by "helping other countries defend themselves or, if necessary, fight alongside U.S. forces by providing them with equipment, training, or other forms of security assistance." And at a moment when public support for military intervention is falling and once coherent countries are dissolving, the prospect of stabiliz-

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ing weak states cheaply and quickly is more alluring than ever. Indeed, these days, the commonly accepted narrative in Washington for security assistance in fragile states can be summed up in one word: "more"—more training, more equipment, more money, more quickly.

But history shows that building militaries in weak states is not the panacea the U.S. national security community imagines it to be. As examples that span the globe have demonstrated, in practice, American efforts to build up local security forces are an oversold halfway measure that is rarely cheap and often falls short of the desired outcome.

For decades, the United States has poured countless billions into foreign security forces—to the tune of nearly $20 billion per year these days. But the returns have been paltry. Sometimes, the problem is one of execution, and the United States can improve the way it conceives of and carries out military assistance. Often, however, the problems run deeper, and the United States must recognize that the game is simply not worth the candle.

NOT ENOUGH STRINGS ATTACHED

The biggest problem with Washington's efforts to build foreign militaries is its reluctance to weigh in on higher-order questions of mission, organizational structure, and personnel—issues that profoundly affect a military's capacity but are often considered too sensitive to touch. Instead, both parties tend to focus exclusively on training and equipment, thus undercutting the effectiveness of U.S. assistance.

Such narrow-mindedness hampered U.S. support for South Vietnam, which began in earnest after the French withdrawal from Vietnam in 1954. Ngo Dinh Diem, South Vietnam's president from 1955 to 1963, sought to orient his military toward external threats, even though internal defense against communists should have been the primary concern, as many U.S. officials knew. Yet even after receiving nearly half a billion dollars in U.S. military aid between 1956 and 1960, Diem reorganized the South Vietnamese military according to his preferences, preparing it for a conventional external conflict with North Vietnam and leaving it ill equipped for the growing communist insurgency at home. To make matters worse, the military's leadership remained weak, its chain of command confusing, and its method of promotion based on loyalty rather than merit. When the security situation deteriorated throughout 1960 and Vietnam's military was incapable of dealing with the growing insurgency, it became evident

that the country had a poorly led military that was oriented toward the wrong kind of threat.

Something similar happened in El Salvador, where the Carter and Reagan administrations supported the country's military in its fight against left-wing guerrillas. Despite U.S. officials' preference for a more humane approach to the rebels, the El Salvadorian military spearheaded an extremely violent counterinsurgency campaign characterized by death squads and civilian massacres. Things got slightly better once the United States decided to intervene in the military's internal affairs: after it temporarily conditioned arms transfers on respect for human rights in 1983, the military purged some right-wing officers, which resulted in a reduction in violence. But it was too little, too late. Although the military did prevent the guerrillas from taking over the state, more than 75,000 civilians died in the protracted conflict, mostly at the hands of government forces. And El Salvador today remains a fragile state with one of the world's highest homicide rates.

Building militaries in weak states is no panacea.

In Yemen, from 2007 to 2011, the U.S. government disbursed more than $500 million to assist the country's military in its fight against a mix of domestic insurgents and al Qaeda affiliates. In its narrow focus on counterterrorism, however, the United States failed to fully appreciate that Yemen's security challenges were only one of many problems facing the country. Its president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, had filled the military with friends and family members who grew rich while nearly everyone else in the country suffered from poverty, hunger, and unemployment. Moreover, Saleh used the U.S. funds and equipment intended for counterterrorism to enrich his family and bolster his personal security detail. In 2015, when Yemen descended into outright civil war, Pentagon officials admitted that they had lost track of millions of dollars' worth of military equipment and could not guarantee that U.S. weapons would not fall into the wrong hands.

U.S. efforts to build Mali's military have fizzled out for similar reasons. As General Carter Ham, the commander of U.S. Africa Command from 2011 to 2013 explained, military assistance to Mali "focus[ed] almost exclusively on tactical or technical matters." The U.S. approach consisted of ad hoc assistance programs, which failed to comprehensively strengthen Mali's military or address issues such as organization,

discipline, and mission. As a result, most of the force collapsed in 2012, after a U.S.-trained officer staged a military coup and leaders of elite units defected, taking valuable U.S. materiel with them.

Although the situation is different in Afghanistan and Iraq—namely, the United States has put American boots on the ground—similar problems have emerged. In both countries, the United States has spent billions of dollars to build militaries composed of hundreds of thousands of troops. But it has largely sidestepped bigger-picture questions about these forces' mission, structure, and leadership in favor of a focus on training and equipment. Small wonder, then, that both militaries remain plagued by problems with recruitment, discipline, leadership, motivation, and corruption.

Despite receiving some $60 billion in aid since 2001, Afghanistan's military has suffered from chronic problems with morale and desertion, especially in regions of intense conflict, such as Helmand Province. And in Iraq, during the battle for Mosul against the Islamic State (or ISIS) that began in 2014, whole swaths of the Iraqi military deserted en masse, leaving behind U.S.-supplied equipment for ISIS to capture. The current fight against ISIS has been more successful, with the U.S.-trained Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service playing a key role in the liberation of Mosul in July 2017. But credit for success in the broader fight against the terrorist group also goes to the numerous Iranian-backed Shiite militias that have fought alongside—and often in place of—the Iraqi military.

TRYING TO KEEP THE CUSTOMER SATISFIED

One might expect that Washington's tendency to avoid raising hot-button issues with its partners would placate them, but that is rarely the case. Almost always, partner states are disappointed by the quantity, quality, and timing of the assistance they receive. Because these countries are living with the threat every day, they usually want help as quickly as possible. But the U.S. system is not designed to work so fast, even in high-priority cases.

That was true of the $1 billion-plus U.S. program to build Lebanon's military after 2005, when Syrian forces withdrew from the country. Despite a consensus in Washington that Lebanon needed urgent help to exert control over its territory after almost 30 years of occupation, it took over a year for any military assistance to materialize. It took yet another year to set up a comprehensive military training program

This is how we do it: U.S. Special Forces training Iraqi fighters, December 2016

MOHAMMED SALEM / REUTERS

and upward of 18 months for vital equipment—including vehicles, light arms, sniper rifles, and night-vision devices—to arrive. Frustrated by these delays, the Lebanese did not shy away from criticizing U.S. assistance and even sought additional help from Russia.

But even under the best of circumstances, U.S. partners are rarely satisfied. In 2007, when the Lebanese military faced down Fatah al-Islam, an al Qaeda–affiliated group that had taken over a Palestinian refugee camp, the United States dispatched planeloads of materiel to the frontlines in just a few weeks. Lebanese officials nonetheless griped. "We didn't get anything but promises and best wishes and some ammunition," Michel Suleiman, the commander of the Lebanese armed forces, said. "It's as though [the Americans] are telling us, 'Die first and assistance will follow.'" This disappointment resulted in uncertainty about U.S. seriousness and staying power and made the Lebanese less amenable to U.S. guidance.

A HOUSE DIVIDED

Another problem with U.S. military assistance concerns divisions on the American side. Washington does not always come to a consensus on the parameters and purpose of its help. This confusion undermines a program's efficacy and can result in unmitigated disaster.

Again, consider Vietnam. The man the Pentagon put in charge of assisting the South Vietnamese military from 1955 to 1960 was Lieutenant General Samuel Williams, a commander who had received a battlefield demotion during World War II due to incompetence. Williams repeatedly clashed with U.S. embassy officials in Saigon, kowtowed to Diem, and remained committed to building a conventional South Vietnamese military, contrary to the wishes of the White House and the CIA. At a time when there were more than enough problems among its Vietnamese allies, Washington was needlessly undermining its own efforts.

It repeated that mistake in Lebanon in the 1980s. In the wake of Israel's 1982 invasion of the country, the Reagan administration dispatched U.S. troops to serve in a multinational peacekeeping force and to professionalize Lebanon's military. But Washington failed to establish a consensus on the purpose of its involvement. What began as a 30-day mission to oversee the withdrawal of the Palestine Liberation Organization from Beirut turned into a vague and open-ended commitment to support Lebanese stability and security. Senior U.S. policymakers disagreed sharply over the scope of the U.S. role in Lebanon—in particular, the extent to which the United States should directly support Lebanon's military in combat operations. Not surprisingly, then, officials sent mixed messages. Although officially speaking, the U.S. government was invested in the stability and security of the Lebanese state, one senior U.S. policymaker broke ranks and encouraged the commander of the armed forces to lead a military coup.

This disunity laid the groundwork not only for a convoluted program but also for the deaths of hundreds of U.S. military and diplomatic personnel. Two spectacular attacks in 1983 on the U.S. embassy and marine barracks in Beirut illustrated that at least some actors saw the United States as a combatant in the conflict, despite efforts to characterize itself as playing a supporting role. By early 1984, portions of the Lebanese military had melted away amid increased violence, and the United States withdrew from Lebanon, having failed to make the state more stable or secure.

THREE'S COMPANY

A final problem with assistance programs concerns the impact of antagonistic external actors. When Washington partners with foreign militaries, it too often fails to grapple with the third parties intent on exploiting a country's weakness. These actors have a vested interest in opposing

policies designed to strengthen the state, but U.S. policymakers, often viewing the situation through a bilateral lens, tend to pay too little attention to their meddling.

In Lebanon, for example, U.S. efforts to build up the military in the 1980s were thwarted by all manner of foreign proxies and governments. Iran flooded the country with hundreds of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps personnel to establish Hezbollah, a group whose original purpose was to fight the Israeli occupation. Israel intimidated senior Lebanese political figures by parking tanks outside their homes. Syria had perhaps the greatest influence of all. As Donald Rumsfeld, Reagan's envoy to the Middle East at the time, quipped, "If [Amine] Gemayel [the president of Lebanon] fears Israel could eat him 'like a mouthful of bread,' the Syrians could do so like a potato chip." By refusing to work with Lebanon's fledgling government and empowering its opponents, Israel, Syria, and Iran undercut U.S. efforts to help Lebanon's military strengthen the state.

External meddling also poses a threat to U.S. objectives in Iraq, where Iranian-backed militias and politicians feed sectarian tensions. Countering Tehran in Baghdad is admittedly complicated, given Iran's help in the fight against ISIS, but if left unchecked, continued Iranian interference will undermine Iraqi sovereignty, posing further problems as Iraq's government struggles to achieve political reconciliation among the country's Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. With ISIS routed from Mosul, the United States should help Iraq meaningfully incorporate the Iranian-backed militias into the Iraqi military. In Afghanistan, likewise, Pakistan's support for the Afghan Taliban has weakened the government in Kabul and inhibited national reconciliation. U.S. efforts to pressure Pakistan—including through drone strikes within the country's borders—should be redoubled to stop the country from serving as a safe haven.

BETTER BUILDING

History is not replete only with tales of failure, however. Under certain circumstances, the United States has succeeded in reforming foreign militaries. Perhaps the best example is the first: the U.S. program to build Greece's military after World War II. In 1946, communist insurgents began waging war against the Greek government. In the words of Dean Acheson, then the U.S. secretary of state, "Greece was in the position of a semiconscious patient on the critical list whose relatives and physicians had been discussing whether his life could be

saved." Concerned about growing Soviet influence around the world, the administration of President Harry Truman quickly undertook a $300 million effort to strengthen the Greek economy and military.

Crucially, the United States deeply involved itself in all aspects of Greek military affairs. State Department officials even drafted the Greek government's initial request for aid. U.S. officials worked closely with Greece to reorganize the Hellenic Army's structure to align with the mission of defending the government against communist guerillas rather than foreign armies. And they made sure that capable military leaders were appointed to the right positions. The architect of the U.S. effort, General James Van Fleet, was himself a capable and charismatic leader committed to keeping Athens and Washington on the same page.

As the provider of military assistance, Washington has more influence than it may realize.

Under Van Fleet's leadership, U.S. advisers trained and equipped the Greek forces, provided tactical and strategic advice, planned operations to rout guerilla fighters, and made organizational and personnel changes. Van Fleet and his team oversaw a complete overhaul of military personnel, appointing a new chief of staff and compelling all of the Hellenic Army's lieutenant generals except one to resign. They then facilitated the promotion and placement of eight major generals and encouraged the removal of division and corps commanders who were reluctant or incapable of supporting the broader strategy.

In Washington, senior national security officials regularly assessed the program to ensure its purpose was clear, making necessary adjustments as the situation evolved. They held serious debates about the appropriate role for the U.S. military, including when and if the United States should consider becoming a co-combatant in Greece's civil war. And Truman responded promptly and decisively to signs of division among those administering the program. When a clash between Lincoln MacVeagh, the U.S. ambassador to Greece, and Dwight Griswold, who was in charge of the U.S. aid program in the country, proved insurmountable, the president removed MacVeagh.

There were challenges, to be sure. The most intense disagreements with the Greeks centered on the size of the Hellenic Army, which Athens wanted to increase beyond what the United States thought necessary for internal defense. After more than a year of debate, during

which the Greeks kept expanding the military despite American displeasure, U.S. officials finally threatened to withdraw U.S. support. The threat had its intended effect: the Greeks dropped the issue, and the military stayed within its authorized limits.

All told, the program was a success. When Yugoslavia diminished its support for the communist insurgents as part of an effort to reposition itself away from the Soviet Union, the Greek military, thanks to the reforms instituted at the behest of Washington, was able to extend its control over the country. By 1949, thanks to U.S. support and training, government forces had defeated the guerillas, and the Greek state prevailed in one of the first proxy conflicts of the Cold War.

TO BUILD OR NOT TO BUILD

Past experience offers two key lessons for U.S. officials as they seek to strengthen the security sectors of weak states. First, like all state-building endeavors, these are political, not technical, exercises. Instead of focusing narrowly on training and equipment, U.S. policymakers responsible for implementing such programs must address the purpose and scope of the U.S. role and the mission, leadership, and organizational structure of the partner's military. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the U.S. military is running a handful of programs to train and equip the country's armed forces, but it stays far away from sensitive issues, in line with Saudi preferences. The United States should align these disjointed programs, assess the broader purpose of U.S. support, and use the findings to meaningfully engage on crucial but sensitive matters.

To be sure, increasing U.S. involvement in the details of a foreign country's military is rife with colonial undertones and therefore might be difficult to digest. To minimize pushback, U.S. officials should watch how they communicate and avoid creating the perception that they are bullying those they seek to assist. That said, it would be foolish not to acknowledge the reality of the relationship between the United States and its partners: as the provider of often irreplaceable military assistance, Washington has more influence than it may realize. Recent efforts to condition military aid to Pakistan on the country's cracking down on the militants within its borders, for example, are a good first step.

The second lesson for policymakers is that they cannot afford to ignore the destabilizing potential of third parties that pose a serious challenge to a newly equipped military. When and where possible, the United States should marshal its tools to limit external meddling.

This might involve enhancing border security, going to the UN to leverage international pressure, or even, in extreme cases, attacking the third parties themselves.

At times, however, these recommendations may prove infeasible. A partner state may refuse to discuss those crucial, higher-order questions, motivated by some combination of distrust, a desire to pursue a different agenda, uncertainty about the American commitment, and the belief that it will receive U.S. aid no matter what. For example, officials in Egypt, one of the top recipients of U.S. military aid, appear to believe that Washington will continue to provide assistance in order to maintain the country's peace treaty with Israel regardless, which explains their reluctance to reform their corrupt military. Nigerian officials, likewise, seem to have calculated that the United States will help with their fight against Boko Haram despite the military's egregious human rights violations, and so they have refused to discuss changes to the Nigerian military's outdated defense strategy and inefficient organizational structure.

In other cases, improving an assistance program may be unworkable because the United States is unwilling to crack down on external actors, whose support it needs for higher-priority issues. In Syria, for example, where the United States supports a range of Syrian opposition forces, it may make sense for the United States to give up on trying to get Russia to lessen its meddling in the civil war and instead prioritize making progress on broader European security affairs.

In such scenarios, policymakers need to make a clear-eyed assessment about the goals and likely outcomes of U.S. military assistance. That will lead them to one of two conclusions. Sometimes, they may decide to move forward, recognizing that the effort to train and equip the foreign military will be just that: light security-sector reform. Limited train-and-equip programs can serve useful purposes, such as providing intelligence, professionalizing the military to make the force more respected, enabling some tactical and operational cooperation on mutually agreed threats, and giving U.S. personnel valuable experience working with foreign forces. But limited U.S. involvement will have a limited impact. Alternatively, policymakers may conclude that the costs outweigh the benefits. In those cases, better to submit to reality and deal with the problem some other way than throw good money after bad.

REVIEWS & RESPONSES



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Why the British Chose Brexit

Behind the Scenes of the Referendum

Anand Menon

Unleashing Demons: The Inside Story of Brexit
BY CRAIG OLIVER. Hodder & Stoughton, 2017, 432 pp.

All Out War: The Full Story of How Brexit Sank Britain's Political Class
BY TIM SHIPMAN. William Collins, 2016, 688 pp.

The United Kingdom's vote last year to leave the European Union was a seismic event. The British people ignored the advice of the leaders of all their major political parties and of virtually all experts. George Osborne, the chancellor of the exchequer, told voters that leaving would wreck the British economy. U.S. President Barack Obama warned that it would reduce the United Kingdom's influence on the world stage. Financial markets, many pollsters, and political pundits all anticipated that voters would heed the elites' advice. And yet they decided not to, setting off a process destined to transform the country's politics, economy, and society.

No wonder, then, that the referendum has generated a rash of books seeking to explain, or at least describe, what happened. The pace of academic publishing means that most of those that have already appeared are quick and dirty accounts by journalists or politicians and their advisers. Among these, two stand out: *Unleashing Demons*, by Craig Oliver, who worked as Prime Minister David Cameron's director of communications, and *All Out War*, by the journalist Tim Shipman.

These two books tell the story of Brexit in different ways. Oliver has drawn heavily on his diaries to produce an account of one part of the Remain side, whereas Shipman offers an exhaustive history of the campaign as a whole. But both are elite histories, focusing on the words and deeds of political leaders rather than the details of the ground operations or the reasons why over 33 million people voted the way they did. The doings of the elites certainly mattered. Cameron's team made huge errors when it came to immigration policy, messaging, and the decision to hold the referendum in the first place. Yet because both Oliver and Shipman focus on elites and on a fairly brief period, essentially from the start of 2016 to the vote on June 23, they largely ignore the longer-term trends that produced the vote to leave: rising distrust of politicians and experts, years of grinding economic austerity, and a political establishment that had converged on the center.

HOW TO LOSE A REFERENDUM

Years before the referendum, Cameron's team made a series of mistakes that doomed its cause, as did the official

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Remain campaign later on. The most serious involved immigration. Before the 2010 election, Cameron promised to bring annual net immigration to the United Kingdom down from more than 200,000 people to "tens of thousands." The EU's principle of free movement, however, made this promise impossible to keep. But at the Conservative Party conference in October 2014, Cameron doubled down. "Britain," he declared, "I know you want this sorted, so I will go to Brussels, I will not take no for an answer, and when it comes to free movement, I will get what Britain needs." By suggesting that control over EU migration was attainable, Cameron had created expectations he could not meet. By February 2016, his attempt to renegotiate immigration with the EU had turned into a political disaster. Although he won the ability to restrict access to some benefits for EU migrants for the first four years after they arrived in the United Kingdom, the deal fell far short of Euroskeptics' demands. He had, in effect, taken no for an answer. Shipman, who has clearly spoken at length to almost everyone who matters, explains how, early on, the Leave campaign recognized the importance of immigration. After the release of official figures at the end of May showing that net immigration had risen the previous year, the campaign targeted the issue mercilessly. The Remain camp struggled to respond.

Shipman also shows how Cameron's tendency to put the fate of the Conservative Party over that of the country led him into several blunders, beginning with the decision to hold a referendum in the first place. In 2013, incessant pressure from Conservative backbenchers, along with the fear of losing votes to the UK Independence Party, known as UKIP, a Euroskeptical, anti-immigrant party, drove Cameron to promise to include a referendum in the next Conservative manifesto. Doing so certainly helped him defy the odds and win the 2015 election, but in the end, it proved a shortsighted move.

As a Cameron loyalist, Oliver is understandably less willing to concede that party unity trumped the national interest. But he provides a wonderful insight into how the prime minster and his team approached the issue when he argues that had a referendum not been promised, "the Conservative Party, and consequently the country, would have become almost ungovernable." Oliver's belief that only the Conservative Party could run the United Kingdom meant that, for him, the interests of party and country were one and the same.

During the campaign itself, as Shipman details, Cameron's desire to maintain Conservative unity decisively shaped his tactics. Confronted with opponents who relished provoking intra-Conservative fights, Downing Street hesitated to hit back. For much of the campaign, Cameron and Osborne refused to directly attack the two leading pro-Brexit figures in the Conservative Party, Michael Gove and Boris Johnson. In one such instance, the Remain campaign had designed a poster intended to tar the Leave camp with the brush of extremism by showing Johnson inside the breast pocket of Nigel Farage, the leader of UKIP. In the end, Cameron's team pulled the Johnson-Farage poster because of fears that it would make post-referendum reconciliation within the Conservative Party more difficult. After the vote, Matthew Elliott, the boss of the Leave campaign, expressed

surprise at this decision to the *Financial Times*. Linking senior Tory defectors to UKIP as "crazy, rightwing nutters" would have proved "terminal" for Leave's hopes, he suggested.

As *All Out War* explains, the Labour Party was also tearing itself apart over the EU. The referendum came just when Labour's pro-EU establishment was on the back foot. In 2015, the party had elected a leader from the far left, Jeremy Corbyn, who had voted to leave the European Economic Community (a forerunner to the EU) in a 1975 referendum and had opposed various EU treaties as a member of Parliament. In the run-up to the referendum, Corbyn supported staying in the EU, but Shipman provides excruciating detail about just how reluctant his team was to cooperate with the official Remain campaign. "Jeremy's advisers . . . absolutely wanted to leave," Shipman quotes Alan Johnson, a Labour MP and the leader of his party's pro-Remain group, as saying. "They might be leaders of the Labour Party, but they've got the hammer and sickle tattooed somewhere."

No account of the campaign would be complete without considering the media. It is here that Oliver is at his best, especially when it comes to the BBC. Before joining government, he held several roles at the corporation, including as editor of the flagship 6 PM and 10 PM news programs. As he notes, the corporation tied itself in knots as it struggled to appear balanced. Presented with competing claims, the BBC often did not question the validity of one or the other but attempted to solve the problem by simply giving both sides equal airtime. For example, although expert opinion overwhelmingly held that leaving the EU would harm the British economy, the BBC routinely put one of the few Brexit-supporting economists alongside a pro-Remain voice without mentioning that a clear preponderance of economists backed Remain. As Oliver recounts, although the Remain camp managed to pressure the BBC to reflect expert opinion more accurately on its flagship radio and TV programs, it had less success at shaping the rest of the corporation's coverage. That hurt them badly because although much of the British establishment listens to a few major broadcasts—the *Today* program on BBC Radio 4 and *Newsnight* on BBC Two—a majority of the public does not. And the most popular outlets, such as music shows (which also feature news bulletins and debates on current affairs) and the BBC website, tend to receive far less editorial scrutiny than the BBC's main programs.

In the end, however, despite the missteps of the Labour Party and the media, the referendum result stemmed primarily from the failure of the Conservative government. Having called an unnecessary referendum, it misunderstood its own people and lost despite arguing that defeat would have dire consequences.

A LONG TIME COMING

Shipman admits in his introduction that past relations with the EU may have been "more important than what happened during the campaign in determining the result." He's right. British Euroskepticism was a long time in the making. The seeds of the Leave campaign were sown during bitter parliamentary fights in the early 1990s, when a gang of Euroskeptical Conservative MPs rebelled against their own government over ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, which created the EU.

The fight over that treaty also led to the establishment of UKIP, which was formed out of an anti-Maastricht campaign group.

The Brexit vote reflected more than boiling Euroskepticism, however. It was also the result of a growing distaste for politicians, experts, and the United Kingdom's economic system. In the years before the vote, the country witnessed a sustained decline in trust in politicians. The perception spread that politics offered no answers. Both Labour and the Conservatives had bought into the same ideas: neoliberal economic thinking and a socially liberal cultural agenda. It was, for example, a Conservative-led coalition that legalized same-sex marriage in 2014. And so the public increasingly saw politicians as all the same.

The Cameron government exacerbated this rising distrust and detachment. In the wake of the financial crisis, it pursued policies of austerity that disproportionately hit the worst-off in society. And even as GDP growth recovered, most saw little benefit. Real wages, for example, fell by over ten percent from 2007 to 2015.

Neither of the books captures much of this background. But its absence from Oliver's account—the word "austerity" appears nowhere—is particularly galling. After all, the government Oliver served in from 2011 onward played a crucial part in alienating the people who turned out to poke the political establishment in the eye.

During the referendum campaign, these trends combined to mobilize several disparate groups in support of Brexit. Almost three million people who did not vote in the 2015 election turned out in 2016. Those who held conservative social values were far more likely to vote Leave. That side did well in areas of the country where jobs are hard to find, easy to lose, and badly paid; where affordable housing is scarce; and where levels of education rank far below those in London. In these places, people no longer believed what experts or politicians said about the economy and were profoundly skeptical of those who described the status quo as the safer option. Shipman cites a Labour campaign source who told him that the problem with the Remain campaign's focus on the theoretical economic dangers of Brexit was that poorer Labour voters in the northeast and the northwest already felt that the economy wasn't working for them.

FALLOUT

Despite the centrality of economics to the Brexit campaign, its immediate effects were political. The morning after the vote, Cameron resigned. (*The Sun* quoted him expressing his desire to avoid operationalizing Brexit: "Why," he asked aides in private, "should I do all the hard shit for someone else, just to hand it over to them on a plate?") To his successor, Theresa May, he bequeathed not only possibly the most challenging set of negotiations the United Kingdom has ever undertaken in peacetime but also no contingency plans (it would have looked bad, apparently, to do such planning before the vote).

As a result, under May, the civil service has spent much of the last year analyzing how Brexit might affect the United Kingdom and how it should approach negotiations with the EU before the country leaves the union on March 29, 2019. Slowly but surely, May's position has crystallized. In her view, respecting the referendum outcome

means a so-called hard Brexit. This implies taking the country out of the EU's single market and customs union, which together embody the shared rules and regulatory standards and the absence of internal customs checks that make the market across the EU resemble that of a single country. But a hard Brexit is not the only way of interpreting the referendum outcome. Another, for instance, is "the Norway option," which would see the United Kingdom remain within the single market even after leaving the EU.

Whatever kind of Brexit the government decides to adopt, the United Kingdom seems set for a turbulent few years. Even now, economic warning signs are flashing red. Inflation is on the rise, partly driven by the devaluation of the pound that immediately followed the referendum. Business and consumer confidence have fallen. And things are likely to get worse before they get better. Economists estimate that a hard Brexit would lead to a 40 percent reduction in trade with the EU, the United Kingdom's largest trading partner. The British economy will have to adapt as some export industries decline and firms, especially in the manufacturing and service sectors, consider relocating to a country within the EU's single market and customs union. That adaptation will likely prove a slow and painful process.

The British state will also have to change to cope with Brexit. It will need to organize new customs arrangements, enact new regulations and policies in such areas as agriculture and immigration, and set up new regulators to replace EU bodies. For the next several years, it is hard to see how the government will be able to do much apart from operationalizing Brexit.

Of course, the government's approach to Brexit might change. The stable, pragmatic United Kingdom of old is no more. Politics has become febrile and unpredictable. May is heading a minority government. Ministers squabble in public. Senior civil servants leak damaging stories about their political bosses to the press.

A growing number of people seem to take this instability as a sign that the result of the referendum may be overturned. But it is hard to see how that could happen. The Conservative Party has (with the exception of a few die-hard Europhiles) committed itself to enacting Brexit. And the current leadership of the Labour Party, never particularly keen on EU membership, has decided to maintain the ambiguous position on the issue that helped it exceed expectations in the last election.

Those whose hubris and willingness to put party before country brought the United Kingdom to this juncture, however, are all thriving. Cameron has hit the international speaker circuit and, between jaunts, is writing his memoirs in a designer garden shed that cost him 25,000 pounds. Osborne, the architect of the austerity that impoverished and alienated so many, was hired as the editor of the influential *London Evening Standard*, despite his complete lack of journalistic experience. As for Oliver himself, he was knighted for his achievements and now makes a living working for a high-end consultancy firm providing advice on Brexit. He ends his book with a plea on behalf of his former boss: "I hope history will be kind to you." There is little reason it should.

Political Islam After the Arab Spring

Between Jihad and Democracy

Olivier Roy

Rethinking Political Islam
EDITED BY SHADI HAMID AND WILLIAM McCANTS. Oxford University Press, 2017, 398 pp.

The term "Islamism" and its watered-down equivalent, "political Islam," sprang into widespread use after the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and soon became permanent fixtures of contemporary political discourse. They were coined to describe an allegedly new phenomenon: political movements headed by educated Muslim laymen who advocated the "re-Islamization" of Muslim-majority countries (and Muslim communities elsewhere) that had, in their eyes, ceased to be sufficiently Islamic. These movements promoted sharia through modern forms of popular mobilization—for example, creating branches specifically for young people, women, and workers. They adopted a hybrid organizational structure, a cross between a traditional Sufi brotherhood, in which members pass through different steps of initiation, and a modern political party, where an advisory council appoints a leader who oversees technical committees devoted to particular policy areas. Islamists worked on two tracks: fostering a social movement that would partner with community organizations and charities and establishing a political movement that would compete in elections while pushing its members into the state bureaucracy.

By the 1970s, such organizations were hardly novel. The first and most famous Islamist group was the Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded in Egypt in 1928 and later established branches throughout the Arab world. Over time, similar organizations cropped up elsewhere in the Sunni Muslim world. But the Shiite Iranian clergy and militants who took part in the overthrow of the shah of Iran in 1979 helped define political Islam in the public imagination—possibly because they were the first Islamists to control a modern state. Their rise helped popularize the term "Islamist" in the media, academia, and government.

Today, unfortunately, journalists, scholars, and politicians apply the phrase liberally, attaching it to a broad range of figures and groups—from Rached Ghannouchi, the leader of the Ennahda Party of "Muslim democrats" in Tunisia, to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-appointed caliph of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (or ISIS). This is akin to using the term "socialist" to describe both U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

One of the many qualities of *Rethinking Political Islam*, a thoughtful and useful

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collection of essays assembled by Shadi Hamid and William McCants, two prominent American experts on the subject, is how it sharpens the debate over political Islam by identifying what they call "mainstream Islamists." Hamid and McCants use that term to refer to Islamist parties "that operate within the confines of institutional politics and are willing to work within existing state structures, even ostensibly secular ones." Groups fitting this description include the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan, the Islah Party in Yemen, the Prosperous Justice Party in Indonesia, and many others.

Hamid and McCants' definition leaves out movements, such as the South Asia–based Tablighi Jamaat, that seek to re-Islamize society through proselytizing rather than politics. It also excludes extremist groups, such as al Qaeda, that advocate and practice violent jihad. But the book's focus on mainstream Islamists is warranted, because although terrorist groups generate headlines, more moderate groups enjoy far deeper and broader support in the Muslim world—and thus pose a more profound long-term challenge to secular states of all kinds. They are genuine social movements with concrete, near-term goals: if they support the idea of a global caliphate, they consider it a distant dream. In the here and now, they seek accommodation with existing institutions and build support by setting up charities that fill the gap left by poor governance in much of the Muslim world. With the goodwill this generates, they try to persuade people to "return" to Islam through piety: attending mosque, praying openly in public spaces, and, for women, wearing the veil. They do not overtly contest the legitimacy of secular governments but instead try to influence them; they enter into the electoral arena when allowed to do so and are open to joining political coalitions. They reject the practice of *takfir* (accusing other Muslims of apostasy) and do not promote armed insurrections—except against Israel. They take up arms rarely, only when under attack. And although they accuse Western powers of neocolonialism and "cultural aggression," they always keep the door open to contacts and negotiation. (It should be noted that critics and opponents of such groups have long accused them, usually without much evidence, of having hidden agendas and of practicing doublespeak to disguise far more radical intentions and beliefs.)

This is a somewhat familiar portrait. But in recent years, it has been placed in an unfamiliar frame, owing to what Hamid and McCants call "the twin shocks": the 2013 military coup in Egypt, which brought down a freely elected Islamist-led government after it had spent barely a year in power, and the 2014 emergence of an ISIS statelet in the wake of the group's brutal rampage through Iraq and Syria. There was, of course, an earlier shock, as well: the so-called Arab Spring of 2010–11, which brought mainstream Islamists more influence and power than they had ever enjoyed before.

But far from clarifying the nature and trajectory of Islamism, these shocks have seemed to only further muddy the water. As Hamid and McCants write, "After decades speculating on what Islamists would do when they came to power, analysts, academics—and Islamists themselves—finally have an answer. And it is confusing."

ZOUBEIR SOUISSI / REUTERS

For God and country: Rached Ghannouchi voting in Tunis, October 2014

CONTEXT VS. ESSENCE

To illuminate the subject, the contributors to *Rethinking Political Islam* wisely set aside theoretical debates about Islamist ideology and examine the practices and policies of Islamist parties in recent years. The book devotes chapters to developments in nine countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia. Their experiences run the gamut. After the 2010–11 revolutions, Islamists won elections in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, whereas in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, they were immediately embroiled in messy civil wars. No uprisings took place in Jordan or Kuwait, but Islamist parties in both places—which have a long tradition of participating in elections and working within existing institutions—were nonetheless energized by the upheavals elsewhere. The same was true of Islamist parties in Pakistan and Southeast Asia.

Despite this variety, analyses of political Islam in these places tend to fall into two categories. The first might be called "the contextualist view," which holds that the policies and practices of Islamist movements are driven less by ideology than by events and sees such groups as reactive and adaptive. So, for example, the harsh repression faced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1960s produced a more cautious approach from the movement's leadership, coupled with radicalization on its fringes. In turn, the political opportunities supplied by the 2010–11 revolts led the group to enter into the electoral game, as the political scientist Steven Brooke notes in his contribution to *Rethinking Political Islam*. Contextualists believe that Islamist groups seek to adapt to circumstances and country-specific norms (for example, by recognizing the monarchies in Jordan and Morocco). The groups' main goal is

to survive as coherent organizations and political actors. And their use of religious rhetoric is often little more than "Muslim-speak" (in the words of the French political scientist François Burgat)—a way to express a unique identity and articulate grievances, especially against the West.

The second school of thought might be called "the essentialist view." It holds that Islamists are fundamentally ideological and that any concessions they make to secularist principles or institutions are purely tactical: their participation in electoral politics hardly precludes them from calling for violent jihad, as well. According to this view, the true Islamist conception of democracy is "one man, one vote, one time." In other words, Islamists see the ballot box as little more than a path to power; once there, they would replace democracy with theocracy. A corollary to this argument is the idea—extolled by critics of Islamism but also some of its adherents—that Islamic theology recognizes no separation between religion and politics, and therefore an authentic Islamist cannot renounce his ideological agenda in favor of a more pragmatic or democratic approach.

In recent years, however, mainstream Islamists have frequently done just that. They did so in the wake of victory, as in Tunisia, and defeat, as in Egypt. In both cases, political constraints overrode ideological commitments. Egyptian and Tunisian Islamists realized that their constituents cared far less about, say, the role of Islam in the constitution than jobs, food, and housing. In Egypt, they learned this lesson the hard way. At first, the government headed by Mohamed Morsi, who had previously served as a senior leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, appeared willing to work within the confines of existing institutions—indeed, that willingness is part of what got the Islamists elected. But when Morsi increased his own authority and failed to deliver economic growth and security, public support for his government plummeted, and most Egyptians welcomed the return of military rule after Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the defense minister, took power in a coup in 2013. In Tunisia, the mainstream Islamists of the Ennahda Party adapted more deftly, as the scholar Monica Marks discusses in her contribution to the book, dissolving their ruling coalition in 2013 in the wake of public anger over security lapses and economic instability—a step that prevented a confrontation with secularists who might have threatened the party's long-term survival.

In many places, Islamist parties also realized that they do not enjoy a monopoly on religious politics: in Egypt in 2012, the hitherto quietist Salafists formed their own party and won a slice of the devout electorate. Meanwhile, clerical institutions, such as Cairo's Al-Azhar University, did not endorse the Islamists. And even secularist parties, such as Tunisia's Nidaa Tounes, often promoted some Islamic norms to reinforce their cultural authenticity. In Southeast Asia, as the political scientist Joseph Chinyong Liow shows in his chapter, almost all political parties and figures have incorporated re-Islamization into their platforms, undermining the Islamist brand.

The aftermath of the Arab revolts of 2010–11 have not supplied a clear verdict in the debate between the contextualist and essentialist camps. But as *Rethinking Political Islam* demonstrates, a preponderance of the evidence supports the

contextualist side. "Democracy," Hamid and McCants write, "empowers and encourages all parties, Islamist or otherwise, to seek the center, wherever that may be." Tunisia's Ennahda offers the most convincing proof for that argument. After winning a parliamentary plurality in 2011, the party spent years debating—with itself and its opponents—the text of a new constitution. The result was perhaps the most secular foundational document of any Arab state, one that even protects "freedom of conscience"—that is, the right to hold or not hold any religious beliefs and the freedom to change religions. That is a more expansive right than "freedom of religion," which would allow non-Muslims to practice their faith but not allow them to convert Muslims to it and would ignore atheists and other secular-minded people. As the international relations scholar Peter Mandaville notes in his chapter, Ennahda's voluntary abandonment of governing power showed that old fears of "one man, one vote, one time" are often unfounded. Meanwhile, in Egypt in 2013, it was not the Islamists who put an end to democratic rule but a strange alliance of military leaders, secularists, and Salafists. In any case, Morsi did not have the means to resist Sisi's coup, as demonstrated by the overwhelmingly peaceful and completely futile reaction of Morsi's supporters, nearly one thousand of whom were massacred by the army after occupying a public square in Cairo.

MOSQUE AND STATE

Ultimately, the contributors to *Rethinking Political Islam* are interested in going beyond the long-running, familiar debates about the sincerity of Islamists. These scholars seek to understand what it will mean for religious parties to transform from fringe actors confined to the opposition into genuine political players. The question is no longer, What does Islam say about politics? but, How will Islamists practice politics?"

Ennahda's answer to that question was a dramatic change in its structure and identity: in 2016, the group officially ceased to define itself as an Islamist party. Ennahda "no longer accepts the label of 'Islamism'—a concept that has been disfigured in recent years by radical extremists—as a description of its approach," Ghannouchi wrote in this magazine. He continued: "Tunisia is finally a democracy rather than a dictatorship; that means that Ennahda can finally be a political party focusing on its practical agenda and economic vision rather than a social movement fighting against repression and dictatorship."

But if a party such as Ennahda stops trying to shape civil law along sharia lines, in what sense is it Islamic at all? The answer—still controversial for many members—is that although the movement (*harakat*) and the party (*hizb*) are now formally separate, the goal of the party's participation in politics is to protect the movement from politics. By becoming a normal political actor in a normal political system, the Ennahda Party will help the Ennahda movement carry out its mission of fostering a society in which religion, although not enshrined in state institutions, nonetheless lies at the core of daily life. The approach is akin to the Western liberal concept of the separation of church and state—although closer to the American conception of shielding religion from state interference than to the French idea of protecting the state from religion. And in the Islamic

context, the separation must be enforced not only by state institutions and the constitution but also at the grass-roots level, by Islamist parties themselves.

That represents a profound change, no less than the redefining of religion to refer more narrowly to a set of beliefs and practices that exist in the framework of a secular society. Ennahda has recognized that although Tunisian society may be culturally Muslim, it is not destined to become ideologically Islamic. Ghannouchi glossed this move by declaring that Ennahda had become "a party of Muslim democrats," intentionally inviting comparisons to the Christian democratic parties of Europe.

But the comparison only goes so far. From the mid-1940s until the mid-1970s, Christian democratic parties found ways to secularize what had been primarily religious values in order to better reach out to an ever more secular electorate. In predominantly Protestant and Catholic countries alike, such parties promoted values drawn from the social doctrine of the church on issues related to the family, cooperation between workers and businesses, and social security. But even though these parties still survive (and even thrive in Germany), there is no Christian democratic social movement equivalent to the ones that Ennahda and other Islamist groups see as crucial to their missions. In countries such as Germany, Christian democrats have a *hizb* but no *harakat*. And although Catholic social movements operate in European countries such as Italy, they do not identify with political parties. In Europe, secularism triumphed not only in the political realm but also in the social one: after World War II, Western countries drifted further and further away from traditional Christian views, especially on matters relating to sexuality, gender, and the family. In this sense, it's striking that Ghannouchi and other mainstream Islamists would encourage comparisons to Christian democrats, who hardly seem to present a model of success by Islamist standards.

It seems unlikely that the secularization of Islamic politics will be accompanied by a drift away from traditional values in Muslim countries, at least in the foreseeable future. (Tunisia is not likely to legalize gay marriage anytime soon.) But separating mosque and state poses a more acute short-term risk for Islamist parties such as Ennahda: it could provide an opening for jihadist extremists, who often refer to themselves as "foreigners in this world." That phrase comes from a well-known chant, or *nashid*, popularized during the trials of members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1960s. It is an expression of the idea that, in their ideological purity and refusal to accommodate secular norms and institutions, jihadists represent the only true Islamists—and, perhaps, the only true Muslims. The danger is that if mainstream Islamists purchase inclusion in the secular state at the price of separating their political goals from their religious and social ones (as in Tunisia), or suffer exclusion from the state owing to their own overreach and a repressive backlash against it (as in Egypt), young Muslims seeking "authentic" religious and political identities might look elsewhere. And the jihadists will be waiting for them.

How Should Governments Address Inequality?

Putting Piketty Into Practice

Melissa S. Kearney

After Piketty: The Agenda for Economics and Inequality
EDITED BY HEATHER BOUSHEY, J. BRADFORD DELONG, AND MARSHALL STEINBAUM. Harvard University Press, 2017, 688 pp.

In 2014, an unusual book topped bestseller lists around the world: *Capital in the Twenty-first Century*, an 816-page scholarly tome by the French economist Thomas Piketty that examined the massive increase in the proportion of income and wealth accruing to the world's richest people. Drawing on an unprecedented amount of historical economic data from 20 countries, Piketty showed that wealth concentration had returned to a peak not seen since the early twentieth century. Today in the United States, the top one percent of households earn around 20 percent of the nation's income, a dramatic change from the middle of the twentieth century, when income was spread more evenly and the top one percent's share hovered at around ten percent. Piketty predicted that without corrective action, the trend toward ever more concentrated income and wealth would continue, and so he called for a global tax on wealth.

Like much of the popular commentary about inequality, Piketty's book rested on an implicit moral claim—that wealth concentration beyond a certain degree violates the inherent sense of fairness on which a just society depends. But antipathy toward inequality alone cannot drive a policy agenda that will create a more egalitarian society. Critics of inequality need a compelling, evidence-based explanation for how and why the concentration of income and wealth at the top is problematic. Is this inequality the result of a purposely rigged game, or is it caused by unintentional distortions in a basically fair system? Whatever its causes, does inequality impede overall economic growth? Does it undermine widespread opportunity and upward mobility? Does it pose a threat to global capitalism and liberal democracy?

In *After Piketty*, three left-of-center economists—Heather Boushey, J. Bradford DeLong, and Marshall Steinbaum—have curated an impressive set of essays responding to Piketty's work and taking a few steps toward answering those questions. Among them are deep dives into the assumptions underlying Piketty's predictions, historical accounts of the role of slavery and gender in capitalist systems, and considerations of the relationship between concentrated wealth and political power. The essays put Piketty's arguments into a broad historical and intellectual context and highlight some noteworthy omissions that call into question his book's most dire predictions.

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At the end of the volume, Piketty himself weighs in. The result is an intellectual excursion of a kind rarely offered by modern economics.

The contributors tend to look backward to history or inward to economic models, which is a natural way to respond to a book that is fundamentally historical and theoretical. But to more fully answer the questions Piketty's book raised and to start crafting policies to tackle growing inequality, economists and policymakers need to know much more than they currently do about the causes and consequences of today's concentration of wealth at the top. To reduce extreme inequality's threat to economic security and upward mobility, the United States needs policies that enhance the skills and opportunities of the disadvantaged. Washington must pursue tax reform and changes to corporate-governance rules that will create more shared prosperity. But policymakers also need to avoid steps that would impede innovation and productivity.

THE TOP OF THE HEAP

In the past four decades, studies of rising inequality in the United States have typically focused on the bottom 90 percent of earners. Economists have produced rigorous evidence demonstrating how trends in technology, trade, unionization, and minimum wages have shaped the fortunes of those Americans. Global labor-market forces have pushed up the demand for highly skilled workers and have led to steadily increasing wages for those with a college education. The same forces have led to declining or stagnant wages for those with lower levels of education. And a decline in unionization rates and the fall in the real value of the minimum wage have exacerbated the downward pressures on middle- and low-wage workers.

Less well understood are the causes of the tremendous surge in income among extremely high earners, meaning the upper 1.0, 0.1, and 0.01 percent. From a policymaking point of view, the most important question is how much of the ultrarich's income reflects activity, such as technological innovation, that benefits the broader economy. The more of it that does, the greater the potential economic costs of raising taxes on the highest-income individuals. If, in contrast, the income of the biggest earners is produced by pursuits that are less broadly beneficial, such as high-frequency stock market trading, then higher taxes at the top would pose fewer economic costs. Either way, there are likely compelling reasons to raise the top income tax rates—as a way of funding public services and investing in infrastructure, for example. But policymakers would be able to make better decisions about "soaking the rich" if they had a clearer sense of the tradeoffs involved.

One of the most interesting facts uncovered by Piketty and others is that compared with the richest people and families in the early 1900s, when large fortunes often came from inherited assets, today's superrich are acquiring a larger share of their income in the form of earnings. About 60 percent of the income of the top one percent in the United States today is labor income. A number of essays in *After Piketty* mention the rise of "supersalaries" or "supermanagers": top executives of large corporations, primarily in the financial industry, who enjoy very generous compensation packages. Economists disagree, however, about whether the income earned by such executives reflects the efficient working

Le Penseur: Thomas Piketty in Paris, March 2017

CHRISTIAN HARTMANN / REUTERS

of a market for talent, in which case their pay reflects their value, or whether the massive compensation packages result from a bargaining process that is shaped by regulations, institutions, and social norms.

In their contribution to the book, the economists Laura Tyson and Michael Spence highlight the role of technological developments in creating substantial economic rewards for those who possess specific skills and in reducing the employment security of less skilled workers. But Tyson and Spence also note that markets are imperfect and that compensation packages are not determined solely by market value. They point to a growing body of research indicating that income generated by patents and intellectual property protections and by the market power of brand names flows primarily to upper-level management and the owners of capital.

In contrast, in Piketty's view, the primary factors driving the rise in executive pay at the top are not technology or imperfect markets but eroded social norms, questionable corporate-governance practices, and declining union power. Tyson and Spence favor more research to weigh the relative impact of market forces and institutional factors but argue that either explanation provides a strong rationale for increasing the marginal income tax rate for top earners in an effort to combat income inequality.

ONE FOR YOU, TWO FOR ME

Another essential set of questions about inequality centers on whether wealth concentration negatively affects economic

growth, shared prosperity, and democratic institutions. In his contribution to *After Piketty,* Mark Zandi, the chief economist at Moody's Analytics, outlines a number of ways in which it might. One such potential negative effect is reduced aggregate consumer spending. Since lower-income households have a higher propensity to spend out of their earnings than do higher-income ones, the more wealth held by high-income households, the less overall spending the economy might see. Another potential problem is that wealthy Americans tend to vote for (and lobby for) lower taxes; increased wealth concentration, then, could lead to harmful reductions in government spending on public goods such as education and infrastructure. Nevertheless, Zandi cautions that the link between income inequality and aggregate U.S. economic growth is relatively weak. "There is evidence that extreme inequality, as prevails in some parts of the world, weakens economies," he writes, "but inequality in the United States doesn't appear to be significant enough for it to make a substantial difference to the economy's prospects."

Even if the income of top earners reflects genuinely worthwhile contributions to society and does not impede economic growth, today's extreme inequality does threaten social cohesion. I used to contend that economists and policymakers need not worry about inequality and should instead focus on reducing poverty and expanding opportunity. But after years of researching the topic, I've come to believe that policymakers cannot achieve those goals without directly addressing inequality.

In the winner-take-all economy of the contemporary United States, the gap between the top and the bottom has grown so large that it undermines any reasonable notion of equal opportunity. As inequality has increased, the country has witnessed a fraying of communities and institutions and deepening divisions along socioeconomic lines. Children from high-income homes are pulling further and further ahead of their less advantaged peers in terms of education, which means it is far less likely that children born into middle- or low-income homes will experience upward economic mobility. Americans celebrate "rags to riches" stories, but the data indicate that the United States has less social mobility than most European countries. Social mobility in the United States is not yet on the decline, but if current trends continue, it will be soon.

Inequality also harms American society by encouraging negative perceptions of the economy and one's prospects for upward mobility. If Americans view the system as rigged against them and see economic success as out of reach, they might give up on the celebrated American ideals of hard work and meritocracy. That may already be happening. Research I have conducted with the economist Phillip Levine shows that young men are more likely to drop out of high school if they live in places with higher levels of income inequality, all else being equal. This is consistent with evidence produced by psychologists showing that beliefs about inequality negatively affect people's expectations of social mobility.

The alarmingly low rates of labor-force participation among young Americans and those of prime working age might also be driven, at least in part, by a sense of malaise shaped by today's high levels of income inequality. Labor-force

participation among American men aged 25 to 54 has fallen steadily since the mid-1960s, a trend that has been sharper in the United States than in other advanced economies. In 1964, 98 percent of such prime-age men with a college degree or more participated in the work force, as did 97 percent of those with a high school degree or less. By 2015, the rate for college-educated workers had fallen only slightly, to 94 percent, but the rate among less educated men had plummeted to just 83 percent. This drop reflects market forces and technological change, to be sure, but it also suggests shifting social norms and attitudes.

HIGH AND NOT SO MIGHTY

A growing body of evidence now indicates that inequality in the United States threatens to create intergenerational poverty traps, greatly reduce social mobility, and marginalize entire swaths of the population. Such effects are sure to have political ramifications. Piketty proposed that greater wealth inequality will increase the demand for egalitarian policy responses. But it also means that the wealthy, with their deeper-than-ever pockets, will be even better able to block such changes. Beyond that observation, Piketty doesn't have much to say about the politics of inequality in the United States or elsewhere. As the social policy expert Elisabeth Jacobs points out in her contribution to *After Piketty*, politics is both "everywhere and nowhere" in Piketty's *Capital in the Twenty-first Century:* the problems Piketty identifies are inherently political, but he pays little attention to the crucial role that politics would play in any attempt to address them.

Unfortunately, the same criticism applies to *After Piketty*. Many of the volume's contributors assume that no matter what policy remedies for extreme inequality emerge, wealthy elites will marshal their considerable influence to maintain their position and privileges. But they do not explore those potential policies at great length, nor do they consider the precise mechanisms that would shape pushback from the elites.

After Piketty would also have benefited from more discussion about whether recent political events challenge the notion that elites can overcome a wave of support for more redistribution of wealth. In 2016, the Brexit vote and the American presidential election revealed the strength of populist and nationalist sentiments among voters who gleefully rejected the elite classes in both the United Kingdom and the United States. Even in the wake of such surprising outcomes, the political economy models described in *After Piketty* tend to associate rising wealth concentration with growing political power of the elite—not the rise of populism. The watershed political events of 2016 call those models into question; in both the United Kingdom and the United States, elites saw their preferred choices lose out.

E PLURIBUS UNUM?

When it comes to the problem of income and wealth inequality in the United States, there are no silver bullets. But policymakers have many levers available to them. The best evidence suggests that the United States could have a more progressive federal income tax code without incurring substantial economic costs. Tax reform should focus on expanding the tax base by closing loopholes and eliminating regressive features such as the mortgage-interest tax deduction, which benefits only high-income homeowners, and the carried-interest loophole, which benefits only those involved in private-equity finance.

The federal government should take the additional revenue such steps would generate and invest it in programs that would increase the country's economic potential. That would include improvements to public infrastructure, expanded access to high-quality childcare and preschool programs, and more spending on programs that assist economically disadvantaged youth. Government commitments to public universities and community colleges must be strengthened. At the same time, institutions of higher education must focus on helping their students build the skills they will need to succeed in a competitive, rapidly changing labor market. These types of investments are crucial if the United States is to remain a land of opportunity.

Public and Private Eyes

Surveillance in the Digital Age

Jennifer Daskal

We Know All About You: The Story of Surveillance in Britain and America
BY RHODRI JEFFREYS-JONES.
Oxford University Press, 2017, 290 pp.

In 2013, after the National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden released thousands of top-secret documents, the U.S. government scrambled to justify its far-reaching surveillance programs. In an effort to make these data-collection programs more transparent and legitimate, the Obama administration established a special review group, revived a dormant privacy oversight board, and issued an executive order pledging to respect the privacy rights of noncitizens abroad. U.S. technology and telecommunications companies—whose complicity Snowden's documents had exposed—moved into a defensive crouch. In order to maintain their international customer base, they sought to explain away their past cooperation and distanced themselves from the government. In 2015, the U.S. Congress entered the fray, reining in the so-called telephony metadata program, the NSA's bulk collection of the phone numbers of incoming and outgoing calls, which can be used to draw a map of a person's associations.

The British, with their own set of sophisticated intelligence capabilities, have been grappling with many of the same concerns. In the fall of 2016, Parliament passed the Investigatory Powers Act—which opponents call "the snoopers charter," but which defenders portray as an overdue piece of legislation that sets the parameters on what the government can do when it comes to surveillance. As with most controversies, there is an element of truth to both sides of the debate. The statute gives the intelligence services the right to collect large quantities of information with a single warrant, and it allows courts to compel private companies to help decrypt communications (a development that raises concerns about both privacy and network security). But it also adds checks and protections where there were none before. For the first time in the United Kingdom's history, warrants to intercept communications are subject to judicial review; previously, the executive branch could execute these on its own say-so.

Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones' comprehensive new book, *We Know All About You*, puts these contemporary debates over surveillance—which he defines as "spying on a *mass* scale"—in historical and comparative context. Jeffreys-Jones ably tells the story of surveillance in the United States and the United Kingdom from its beginnings in the eighteenth century to today. But what makes the book unique is not its description of government surveillance, about which much has been

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written; instead, it is its emphasis on the role that private companies play in it.

ESPIONAGE, INC.

As Jeffreys-Jones details, surveillance is the prerogative not just of governments. It is something that was developed, relied on, and institutionalized by private actors as well. In the American South before the Civil War, plantation owners hired white men to monitor the movements of slaves and collect intelligence about possible uprisings. Further north, a merchant in New York named Lewis Tappan started what was essentially the first credit bureau in 1841. To determine customers' creditworthiness, the company built a database of their ethnicity, age, business history, drunkenness, and even sexual proclivities.

With the rise of manufacturing, private companies turned to surveillance as a union-busting tactic. Jeffreys-Jones tells chilling stories of U.S. and British companies hiring private detectives to spy on workers and keep tabs on labor organizers. Once identified as subversive, individuals lost everything: they were fired from their jobs and put on blacklists that made them unemployable elsewhere. In the 1950s, Hollywood studios facilitated McCarthyism by informing government investigators of alleged Communist subversives, ruining the careers of countless screenwriters, directors, and actors.

Even the press has gotten in on the surveillance game. Jeffreys-Jones tells the story of *News of the World*, a British tabloid that hounded a family looking for their missing daughter in 2002. The paper surreptitiously tracked the family's movements, photographed their grieving faces, and illegally hacked the missing child's voice mail. "In terms of the harm done to people on a daily basis," Jeffreys-Jones concludes, "private surveillance outperforms its public counterpart."

But although Jeffreys-Jones documents a great deal of damage inflicted by private actors, it's a stretch to claim that private surveillance causes more harm than government snooping. After all, only the state can use information gained through surveillance to incarcerate people or even lawfully kill them. At any rate, which actor is worse is beside the point. What really matters is the fact of public and private surveillance, the risk of abuse by both the government and the private sector, and the interplay between the two.

Indeed, the decisions of the private sector have an enormous impact on the scope of government surveillance. Every day, companies make choices about what to collect, where to store data, whether and what to encrypt, and how, whether, and when to accede to or resist the government's demands for information. These decisions, in turn, shape what information is available for the government to collect.

Moreover, as Jeffreys-Jones shows, the revolving door between the public and private sectors allows the two sides to trade techniques. In the late nineteenth century, for example, Ralph Van Deman, a U.S. Army officer stationed in the Philippines, developed an indexing and classification system that U.S. commanders could use to identify insurgents in the field. After leaving government, he used his skills to keep tabs on union workers on behalf of California industrialists, sometimes sending confederates into union meetings to spy on workers and report back. By the time Van Deman died, in 1952, his

list of alleged subversives numbered more than 125,000.

Then there is the story of William Reginald Hall, a British intelligence officer who ran a code-breaking unit in World War I. After being booted from government, he created a group that became known as the Economic League. A powerful and murky association of industrialists, the Economic League tracked and blacklisted union activists on behalf of the private sector. Untold numbers of workers lost or were denied jobs as a result.

Jeffreys-Jones also reminds readers of the ebb and flow of public-private partnerships. In 1919, Western Union initially refused to grant permission to the Black Chamber—the U.S. government's code-breaking agency and the predecessor to the NSA—to access sought-after telegraph messages as they crossed the Atlantic Ocean. By the end of the year, however, the government had sufficiently laid out its case, and Western Union and other telegraph services assented to the surveillance scheme. Temporarily paused between the two world wars, cooperation began again in the 1940s—leading to what was known as Project SHAMROCK. Under this program, the U.S. government was able to read, without a warrant, hundreds of thousands of telegraph messages between U.S. residents and

international recipients. Project SHAMROCK lasted for decades; the NSA shut it down only after the Church Committee exposed it in the 1970s. The episode foreshadowed the private sector's relationship to government surveillance after 9/11: companies provided expansive cooperation at first, only to backtrack after the Snowden revelations.

RISK AND REWARD

Jeffreys-Jones does a good job cataloging government and private-sector surveillance. What's missing from his account, however, is an assessment of what kind of surveillance is justified and what kind is not and how to make that determination in an increasingly digitized and interconnected world—one in which just about all of a person's movements, interactions, and interests are known to the cell phone providers, social media companies, and search engines that make modern life possible.

To be fair, these kind of normative judgments are not the goal of his book. But someone does have to make them. In that regard, Jeffreys-Jones is correct when he notes that "the adoption of the Fourth Amendment did not settle the surveillance debate." That, of course, should come as no surprise, since the Fourth Amendment was never meant to serve as a bulwark against government surveillance (and doesn't even address private-sector surveillance). Rather, it was intended to ensure that the government's searching and seizing is "reasonable"—a pragmatic and malleable concept that takes into account both the government's need for information to fight crime and provide security and the risks of overreach. Put simply, sometimes government surveillance is reasonable, and sometimes it is not. Drawing the line between what is and what is not reasonable is the hard part.

This, in fact, is the exact task that U.S. legislators now face as Congress takes up Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which is set to expire in December. Authorized by Congress in 2008, the Section 702 program allows the NSA to collect the e-mails and other communications of foreigners located outside the United States without getting a warrant. The NSA can collect data only for the purposes of gathering "foreign intelligence information," and the general targeting procedures must be approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, a special panel of federal judges. But the specific decisions of who and what to target are left to the executive branch and require little more than a finding that the target is a foreign national who possesses sought-after intelligence. Even by conservative estimates, every year, the government collects hundreds of millions of communications under the Section 702 program.

The government has argued that the program has helped protect the United States from various terrorist threats, a claim supported by two independent review groups set up by the Obama administration. But the Section 702 program has also come under heavy criticism for sweeping in millions of communications of innocent U.S. citizens and residents who happen to be talking with a targeted foreigner. Ordinarily, after all, the government can intercept the communications of U.S. citizens and residents only when authorities have a warrant based on probable cause. Under

the Section 702 program, once information is obtained, intelligence agencies can look at it for various purposes, and the FBI can examine it in support of criminal investigations.

The upcoming reauthorization debate provides a chance to reform this program, and there are a number of options on the table. Some argue that all searches of U.S citizens' and residents' information must be supported by a warrant based on probable cause. Others claim that only searches of actual content require that protection, whereas searches of metadata (such as the "to" and "from" lines on e-mails) can be accessed without judicial approval. Still others contend that the FBI's warrantless querying of databases is fine so long as the investigations concern national security or espionage rather than other crimes.

In my view, the FBI should, at a minimum, be required to get a warrant based on probable cause when searching the data of U.S. citizens and residents in the course of a criminal investigation, regardless of the type of crime being investigated. After all, that is what investigators would have to do if they were seeking that information directly from the suspect or from the private entity that manages the suspect's data. The law should put in place some emergency exceptions, but the default rule should be that investigators need a warrant when seeking the content of a U.S. person's communications. If the government wants metadata, it should have to document a reasonable suspicion. As of now, there is no such requirement in place.

Wherever one comes down on these issues, the interests on both sides need to be taken into account. Intelligence and law enforcement agencies need to access information to keep people safe. But at the same time, as the United States' founders wisely recognized, there is a real risk that security will trump all other concerns. That's why procedural and substantive safeguards are needed to ensure that government surveillance remains reasonable.

The same goes for the private sector. Although companies do not have the authority to incarcerate people, they can, as Jeffreys-Jones documents, use information to wreak havoc on individuals' lives. And as everything from televisions to thermostats stores digital data, the amount of personal information private companies have access to will only grow. Their decisions about what to retain, access, and share will increasingly influence how much both the private sector and the government know about all of us.

And so one is left with a lot of hard questions about how to respect privacy, provide security, and protect against abuse in the modern, digitally connected world. In focusing on the threat to privacy and the history of abuse, Jeffreys-Jones' book highlights one set of critical concerns to take into account. It is now up to the rest of us to reconcile those risks with the government's legitimate need to access information that keeps us safe.

Can Bankers Fight Terrorism?

What You Get When You Follow the Money

Bank On It

Matthew Levitt and Katherine Bauer

More than a decade and a half after the 9/11 attacks, Peter Neumann argues, "the war on terrorist financing has failed" ("Don't Follow the Money," July/August 2017). He contends that although the effort to cut terrorists off from the global financial system has crimped business and hampered humanitarian aid, "there is no evidence that it has ever thwarted a terrorist campaign." "Governments," he concludes, "should overhaul their approach to countering terrorist funding, shifting their focus away from the financial sector."

That is bad advice. It is true that financial tools cannot solve the threat of terrorism. But they are not meant to. Rather, they are intended to form part of a broader strategy to confront a variety of international threats. Neumann argues that such a comprehensive approach is indeed necessary, but he claims that governments have yet to adopt one, writing, "In most countries, the responsibility for choking off terrorists' funds lies with finance ministries, which are disconnected from broader counterterrorism strategies." In fact, much of the integration he calls for has already happened. Take the finances of the Islamic State (also known as ISIS). Neumann argues that they have decreased not so much as a result of financial measures but largely thanks to military action against the group's oil infrastructure and cash depots and the loss of its territory in Iraq and Syria. What he fails to appreciate is that private-sector financial data, gleaned by finance ministries and shared with the U.S. military and U.S. law enforcement agencies, have helped identify financial targets for those military strikes. Today, banks run financial intelligence units, which in several cases have provided "that missing piece of the puzzle to identify someone here or abroad who is planning or supporting plans to attack our interests," as Gerald Roberts, then the section chief of the Terrorist Financing Operations Section of the FBI's Counterterrorism Division, told a forum at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy in 2015.

Neumann also wrongly assumes that sanctions make up the bulk of measures to counter terrorist financing and that the best way to measure their impact is to tally up the number of entities designated or the amount of funds frozen. In fact, sanctions are only one weapon in a large armory. Not every terrorist funder that comes across the U.S. government's radar is sanctioned; in many cases, it is more useful to share that information with partner governments and allow them to act. Although governments aim to freeze terrorists' funds, they know that they will never bankrupt terrorism, because, as Neumann notes, terrorists have too many ways to raise, move, launder, and access funds. Instead, sanctions aim to disrupt

terrorists' financial networks and deter rich terrorist sympathizers who have business interests they would rather not put at risk from funding terrorists.

At the least, denying terrorists easy access to financial tools forces them to use more costly and less reliable means of fundraising, making their lives far more difficult. In 2006, for example, the jihadist militant group Abu Sayyaf was reportedly unable to carry out plans to bomb targets in Manila due to a lack of funds. And in 2007, following the outing of several of al Qaeda's deep-pocketed donors and the ways in which the group used charities to move its funds, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, al Qaeda's finance chief, lamented the group's money problems in a propaganda video, arguing that the primary need for jihad in Afghanistan was financial. "There are hundreds wishing to carry out martyrdom-seeking operations, but they can't find the funds to equip themselves," he said. "So funding is the mainstay of jihad."

Neumann also errs by focusing only on attempts to disrupt terrorist financing and ignoring a far more powerful tool: using financial data to gather intelligence. As the 9/11 Commission's report concluded, "Expect less from trying to dry up terrorist money and more from following the money for intelligence, as a tool to hunt terrorists, understand their networks, and disrupt their operations." Following the money allows governments to map out the links between known terrorist operatives and supporters and to identify new ones.

Indeed, financial intelligence has provided valuable information in several high-profile investigations. In 2003, transactions between a person suspected of belonging to al Qaeda and a previously unknown figure in Southeast Asia allowed the U.S. government to track down Riduan Isamuddin, believed to be the mastermind of the 2002 Bali bombing, which killed 202 people. In 2006, authorities in the United Kingdom helped thwart a plot to blow up several aircraft with liquid explosives by tracking large transfers of money disguised as earthquake relief from a British-based Islamic charity to the three suspected bombers. And in 2007, financial intelligence contributed to the arrest of three al Qaeda affiliates who were plotting attacks in Germany.

Neumann insists that financial measures are particularly ineffective at preventing the kinds of cheap, self-funded attacks that have recently become common in Europe. But such attacks often cost more than meets the eye, and because even the cheapest attack is not free, when terrorists are frozen out of their bank accounts, they have to resort to riskier tactics. Consider the case of Ismail Issa, an ISIS operative arrested while traveling from Germany to Syria in 2013. The group had sent him with cash to shop for supplies rather than wiring money to an operative already in the country, because it had become too difficult for ISIS members to transfer money without it being picked up by the authorities. In many cases, the jihadists had grown so worried that their transactions were being monitored that they were too scared to collect the funds. Even when terrorists do manage to carry out an attack, financial intelligence can play an important role in the subsequent investigation—as was the case, according to the U.S. Treasury Department, with the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, the January 2015 shooting at the offices of the French

magazine *Charlie Hebdo*, and the November 2015 attacks in Paris.

Neumann argues that in the age of ISIS, the ways terrorists finance their operations simply don't lend themselves to the traditional tools used to fight terrorist financing. He suggests that governments rely too heavily on UN Security Council resolutions, for example. But those resolutions demonstrate international resolve and can provide cover for local officials to act when it would otherwise be too politically risky. In the Persian Gulf, for example, some of al Qaeda's funders have family or tribal ties to governments and ruling families, so international backing has been necessary for officials to move against them.

There is no doubt that ISIS has created a unique challenge. But the group's ability to take territory was a function not of any particular financial prowess but of the breakdown of the rule of law in parts of Syria and northwestern Iraq. As Neumann notes, terrorist organizations are in some ways better resourced than they were before 9/11. But that is a result not of the failure of efforts to crack down on terrorist financing but of the proliferation of ungoverned places. These trends call for governments to work even harder to understand terrorists' financial structures and to design sophisticated ways of countering them.

Neumann is right to highlight the heavy burden that regulations designed to combat money laundering and terrorist financing place on financial institutions. He is also correct that governments need to do a better job of balancing competing priorities, such as delivering humanitarian aid while preventing terrorists from abusing charities to raise, launder, and move money. More progress can and should be made. But the solution is not to throw the baby out with the bath water.

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Money Talks

Danielle Camner Lindholm and Celina B. Realuyo

Peter Neumann paints an incomplete picture of the ways in which the United States and its partners have used financial tools to fight terrorism, crime, and corruption since 9/11. He underestimates the vital role of financial intelligence in detecting, analyzing, and dismantling dangerous networks. And he overlooks important progress in cooperation among countries, U.S. government agencies, and the private sector.

Although measures to counter terrorist financing will not by themselves eradicate terrorism, they play a significant role. Terrorist organizations have to recruit and train fighters, buy weapons and equipment, bribe corrupt officials, wage propaganda campaigns, and plan and carry out operations. These activities cost money, so understanding how groups raise, store, move, and spend that money has helped bring terrorists to justice and deter others from harboring them or funding or joining their organizations. In the

campaign to defeat ISIS, for example, U.S. forces have exploited financial intelligence, killing top financial officers and destroying several cash warehouses, helping debilitate the group.

The ways in which terrorists finance their operations have certainly changed since 9/11, but the strategy that the Bush administration developed in response to the 9/11 attacks remains relevant. That approach was based on three pillars: analyzing how an attack was financed in order to prevent copycats; working to bring terrorist financers and facilitators to justice in the United States and abroad; and designating, sanctioning, and freezing the assets of terrorist organizations. Neumann points out that little money has been blocked, but freezing assets represents just one part of a larger strategy. Neumann also discounts the notable deterrent effect that sanctions have had on potential terrorist financers. Al Qaeda operatives from Afghanistan to Iraq, including al Qaeda in Iraq's late leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, have complained about increased difficulty in raising funds, financing terrorist operations, paying foreign fighters, and supporting their networks.

In recent years, the boundary between terrorist groups and other organized criminal networks has blurred, as terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, the al Qaeda–aligned Haqqani network in Afghanistan, and ISIS have grown more reliant on crime to generate revenue. As a result, officials combating terrorism have turned to financial tools originally designed to fight international crime. The counter-ISIS coalition, for example, has worked with the private sector to use its anti-smuggling experience to prevent ISIS from selling the antiquities it loots

from ancient sites in Iraq and Syria, once a major source of the group's funding. Banks and other private-sector organizations have adopted crime-fighting analytic tools and techniques to better identify bad actors and trends in terrorist financing. They then report suspicious activity to government agencies, which fuse that information with law enforcement and intelligence data.

Neumann also points to the high costs that efforts to counter terrorist financing have imposed on the private sector, but a great deal of progress has already been made on that front. Governments have begun to work more closely with financial institutions to mitigate the costs of regulations on the financial sector, while gathering as much data as possible. Groups such as the Association of Certified Financial Crime Specialists, the Association of Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialists, and the Financial Intelligence and Information Sharing Working Group regularly bring together banking executives and government experts to share information on the most recent trends in terrorist financing and money laundering. And initiatives such as the annual Public-Private Analytic Exchange Program, convened by the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, encourage cooperation on such issues as virtual currencies and methods of money laundering. The public and private sectors are further working together to better understand how innovations in financial technology, such as Bitcoin, blockchain, mobile banking, and machine learning, will affect future legal and illegal financial flows. As these examples demonstrate, Neumann is wrong to suggest that efforts to counter terrorist financing have failed. It would be a grave mistake for industry, law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and the international community to give up this crucial tool.

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Cashing In

Jodi Vittori

Peter Neumann is right to point out that efforts to counter terrorist financing focus too much on the international banking sector and to call for a more comprehensive approach. But he is wrong to imply that controls on the international financial system have failed to curb terrorism. It is true that these measures do little to prevent imminent attacks, but the ability to track terrorists and their associated networks through the financial system forms an important part of investigations after the fact. And these measures act as a useful deterrent to potential funders of terrorism and throw sand in the wheels of large terrorist organizations. And the same financial requirements also help mitigate other international threats, such as corruption and organized crime.

There is room for improvement, however. Western governments should end their excessive focus on just the banking

system and begin knitting together disparate sets of rules, regulations, and international norms—covering everything from banking to natural resources to antiquities—into a comprehensive system for fighting all kinds of illicit financing.

Unfortunately, the Trump administration has gone in the wrong direction on this issue. Since January, the U.S. government has rolled back important transparency and accountability mechanisms, many of which were designed to tackle other global problems but which also affect terrorist financing. In February, President Donald Trump signed legislation that sent a Securities and Exchange Commission rule on oil, gas, and mining transparency back to the drawing board. This will limit the transparency of the flows of money from oil, gas, and mining firms to governments, making it easier for corrupt politicians and their cronies to use the cash to illicitly fund anything from extravagant lifestyles to terrorism. The SEC has also watered down an important regulation requiring U.S. companies to assess whether minerals bought through certain supply chains are funding conflict or human rights abuses. And the U.S. Department of the Interior has refused to take the steps needed for the United States to become a full member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Although none of these steps alone would end terrorist financing, enhancing transparency is crucial to hampering all manner of illicit financial activities.

If the United States is serious about preventing terrorist financing, it should work to replace the current international focus on specific areas or threats with a broader approach, combining the various transparency, accountability, and due-diligence mechanisms that cover a wide range of businesses, including banking, trade in some natural resources, and wildlife trafficking. The goal should be to minimize the ability of terrorists and criminals to easily acquire or move money or goods, regardless of the sectors in which they operate. Doing so will require governments, the private sector, law enforcement, and civil society to balance the need for risk assessment, due diligence, and transparency against the need for privacy and practicality, while minimizing the effects of rules and regulations on legitimate trade and financial flows. Neumann is right that the war on terrorist financing has not lived up to its promises, but it has done some good. If the international community stops focusing on just a few issues, such as banks and cash, and instead concentrates on stitching the various transparency and accountability mechanisms together and filling the gaps between them, then it will be far more successful.

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Neumann Replies

As my critics write, efforts to counter terrorist financing have certainly had some successes. But these respondents fail to address the more fundamental questions that my article raised. Do the examples they cite represent a wider pattern? Why is there no systematic data on the effectiveness of the current approach? Is the enormous bureaucracy that has been created in the name of countering

terrorist financing, a bureaucracy that has imposed billions of dollars of costs on governments and the private sector, justified by its results? What else could have been done with all that time, effort, and money? And to what extent does success in deterring terrorists from using the formal banking system simply push them into the informal sector, where their activities are even more difficult to uncover?

Although several of my critics worked on these issues as government officials, none of them offers any systematic data to show that the current strategy works. This epitomizes the entire approach, which has relied on the instinctive appeal of following the money, while remaining sufficiently obscure to escape the scrutiny to which other parts of the war on terrorism have, eventually, been subjected. There has been virtually no public debate over combating terrorist financing, nor is there any academic literature on the subject beyond case studies of individual groups and terrorists. Discussions, where they exist, revolve around anecdotes, making it difficult to test wider assumptions and judge the effectiveness of the overall approach.

After my article was published, several current and former intelligence officials contacted me to echo my conclusions. "I agree with more or less every word," wrote the former head of a Western intelligence agency, who recalled: "When in the service, I could never see the point of quite a lot of terrorist finance work." He insisted that financial intelligence—the use of financial information to track suspects or establish connections between known and unknown terrorists—could be "valuable" and "evidentially helpful," especially after an attack. But along with others who contacted me, he made it clear that financial intelligence, as he understood it, had little to do with the massive efforts to find needles in haystacks that constitute much of the fight against terrorist financing.

Finally, the current strategy offers no answer to the rise of cheap attacks. Banks and other financial institutions cannot monitor every $100 transaction or notice every time someone with a potentially suspicious background rents a truck. Yet because countering terrorist financing remains the job of treasuries and finance ministries, governments will keep looking in the wrong places. As the saying goes, "If all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail." As long as these ministries are in charge, that will not change.

Recent Books

Political and Legal

G. John Ikenberry

The World Reimagined: Americans and Human Rights in the Twentieth Century
BY MARK PHILIP BRADLEY.
Cambridge University Press, 2016, 320 pp.

Beginning in the second half of the twentieth century, people in the United States and around the world started talking about freedom and justice in strikingly new ways. The UN's 1948 adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was the starting point for what would become a revolution in global political culture. In this landmark book, Bradley illuminates this transformation, focusing less on the drama of great-power politics than on subtle shifts in how elites and activists outside of government visualized and verbalized the rights and obligations of people within an emerging postwar community of nations, tracking how talk of human rights went from an "exotic aspirational language" to an "everyday vernacular." In a multitude of small steps, symbolic moments, breakthroughs, and setbacks during the postwar decades, ideas about human rights wove themselves into narratives about the United States' identity and role in the world. Sensibilities in Africa, Asia, and Europe also changed dramatically. But Bradley's arresting account of the rise of a global human rights imagination makes its most profound statements on the subject of the United States' changing—and, unfortunately, declining—position within this evolving moral landscape.

Power Without Victory: Woodrow Wilson and the American Internationalist Experiment
BY TRYGVE THRONTVEIT.
University of Chicago Press, 2017, 416 pp.

In recent decades, historians and pundits have not been kind to Woodrow Wilson. He is remembered at home for his paternalistic liberalism and complicity in racial injustice and abroad for his naive idealism. But this groundbreaking book by Throntveit, a young historian, tells a different and more sympathetic story; it is an extraordinary effort to recover and illuminate the thinking behind Wilson's internationalist vision. Throntveit argues that Wilson was not actually a "Wilsonian," if that term implies imposing American-style democracy on other countries. What Wilson actually sought was the gradual and collective development of a system of global governance geared toward the promotion of justice and peaceful change. It was a vision, Throntveit maintains, that was deeply influenced by the American wing of the philosophical school of pragmatism, particularly the ideas of William James. Wilson's views were also shaped by the Anglo-American progressive tradition and its many public intellectuals, including Jane Addams, W. E. B. Du Bois, John Dewey, Herbert Croly, and Walter Lippmann. Wilson's thinking was certainly eclectic, with ideas drawn from British constitutional theorists, the American founders, and Christian ethicists. But Throntveit makes a powerful case that Wilson developed a pragmatic and sensible internationalist

vision—an accomplishment that should not be obscured by Wilson's moral and political failings.

Renegotiating the World Order: Institutional Change in International Relations
BY PHILLIP Y. LIPSCY. Cambridge University Press, 2017, 348 pp.

How will rising states such at Brazil, China, and India seek to reshape the global order? Will they be responsible stakeholders working within the existing Western-led order, or will they be revisionists seeking to overturn it? After years of debate, most scholars have concluded that the most likely answer is not either-or: sometimes rising states will seek greater authority within existing institutions (for example, greater voting rights in the International Monetary Fund), and at other times they will venture out to create new ones (such as China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank). Lipscy provides the most elegant and systematic explanation yet for these diverse and shifting choices. His key insight is that policy areas differ in their propensity to create competition between institutions. In some areas, such as the management of financial crises, all states want global surveillance of the situation, so it makes sense to concentrate capabilities in a single institution—and the costs for dissatisfied rising states of creating new institutions would be prohibitively high, anyway. But other policy areas, such as foreign aid and infrastructure lending, reward competition over cooperation, creating more opportunities for rising states to strike out on their own.

Fighting for Credibility: U.S. Reputation and International Politics
BY FRANK P. HARVEY AND JOHN MITTON. University of Toronto Press, 2017, 312 pp.

Does reputation matter in world politics? If an American president draws a "redline" but fails to enforce it with military power when an adversary crosses it, will this embolden other adversaries? The prevailing wisdom among policymakers and pundits is that credibility counts. No such consensus exists, however, among political scientists, many of whom argue that Washington's credibility in the eyes of an adversary will be overwhelmingly shaped by the adversary's reading of current U.S. interests and capabilities, and not by past actions. Harvey and Mitton join this debate with a detailed study of the Obama administration's response to Syria's use of chemical weapons in 2013. After Syria crossed U.S. President Barack Obama's publicly stated redline by using such weapons against civilians and rebels, Russia brokered an agreement in which Syria gave up its chemical stockpiles but avoided U.S. military action. Harvey and Mitton argue that Washington's "reputation for resolve"—earned by the use of U.S. military force in similar circumstances in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq—influenced Russian and Syrian calculations. The authors do not settle the debate about whether Obama harmed that reputation by declining to use military force to punish Syria. But they drive home the fact that credibility ultimately depends on the imperfect perceptions of leaders and their real-time calculations of risks and probabilities.

Economic, Social, and Environmental

Richard N. Cooper

Beating the Odds: Jump-Starting Developing Countries
BY JUSTIN YIFU LIN AND CÉLESTIN MONGA. Princeton University Press, 2017, 384 pp.

Lin, a former chief economist of the World Bank, and Monga, the chief economist of the African Development Bank, bring to bear their considerable scholarly credentials and practical know-how in this iconoclastic treatment of economic development in poor countries. The authors quarrel with the conventional wisdom about what is necessary for successful development. Instead of hawking a one-size-fits-all formula, they urge countries to find a niche in the world economy by taking a pragmatic approach tailored to their financial resources, labor markets, and types of government. That said, Lin and Monga tend to favor the creation of industrial or export zones, outfitted with infrastructure and unburdened by red tape—but also offered no protection from market forces. They have no ideological objection to an active role for government, which is often necessary, but they are wary of restrictions and regulations that allow only some players to profit.

Robert McNamara's Other War: The World Bank and International Development
BY PATRICK ALLAN SHARMA. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017, 240 pp.

Robert McNamara was best known as the "whiz kid" secretary of defense under U.S. Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson and as one of the main architects of U.S. (and, by extension, South Vietnamese) strategy in the Vietnam War. But as the death toll from the war mounted and public opposition increased, McNamara left (or was perhaps pushed out of) the Pentagon and took the helm at the World Bank, where he served until 1981. His famous drive and energy radically transformed the bank: reformulating its mission, increasing the scale of its operations, and turning it into the preeminent global institution for supporting economic development. This useful book describes McNamara's tenure during a turbulent period that saw the partial breakdown of the postwar international monetary system, two major increases in world oil prices, and China's entry into the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Sharma analyzes the positive and negative aspects of McNamara's enduring legacy at the bank, including his focus on reducing poverty and his insistence on rigorous quantitative analysis of both client countries and the bank's own performance.

Basic Income: A Radical Proposal for a Free Society and a Sane Economy
BY PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS AND YANNICK VANDERBORGHT. Harvard University Press, 2017, 400 pp.

Basic Income: A Guide for the Open-Minded
BY GUY STANDING. Yale University Press, 2017, 392 pp.

Is the world—or at least some countries—ready for a basic income? These two books argue strongly in the affirmative. Such a policy involves the government providing cash grants to every member of society at a level that could sustain life: an amount equal to one-quarter of GDP per capita would suffice, suggest Van Parijs and Vanderborght. The size of the grants could be affected by various factors, such as the recipient's age and level of need, and could be conditioned on grantees meeting certain behavioral requirements, such as preventing truancy in their school-age children. Van Parijs and Vanderborght, however, prefer a universal, unconditional cash grant—as does Standing. Van Parijs and Vanderborght's book is more scholarly than Standing's and explores the history of basic-income schemes going all the way back to sixteenth-century Antwerp. Standing, for his part, usefully examines present-day pilot projects in Finland, the Netherlands, and the Canadian province of Ontario.

Both books summarize the existing empirical research on basic incomes and the various ideological and practical objections that economists have put forth. And both books address the question of how rich and poor countries could finance basic-income schemes. In India, for example, a basic income that would lift millions out of extreme poverty could be comfortably financed by eliminating numerous subsidies, such as those for electricity and gasoline, that mainly benefit higher-income families. Finally, both books emphasize how a basic income would bring about not only economic benefits but also greater freedom of choice for individuals; evidence suggests that most recipients would make good decisions about how to spend the money. Puzzlingly, however, neither book discusses the potential impact that a basic income might have on birthrates—possibly positive for countries with declining populations but possibly negative in the many more countries where populations continue to rise.

The Language of Global Success: How a Common Tongue Transforms Multinational Organizations
BY TSEDAL NEELEY. Princeton University Press, 2017, 200 pp.

In 2010, the chief executive of a rapidly growing Japanese e-commerce firm, Rakuten, mandated that all of the company's 10,000 employees, most of whom were Japanese, start using English to communicate within the firm, both in speech and in writing. Neeley followed the implementation of this radical change over the course of five years. She weaves her observations of Rakuten into a larger story about language education in Japan, which is a crucial part of the "Abenomics" agenda of the country's prime minister, Shinzo Abe. The result is an interesting and informative book full of practical lessons for any internationally ambitious organization. Ninety percent of Rakuten's employees obtained the targeted level of English proficiency within two years, and those

who did not but nevertheless showed promise were granted another six months to reach the goal. Neeley points out that although language reflects culture and influences behavior, it does not determine them. Indeed, she reports that one consequence of the universal use of English at Rakuten was the reinforcement of traditional Japanese customs throughout the firm, especially Japanese-style hospitality, thanks to clearer shared expectations.

The End of Theory: Financial Crises, the Failure of Economics, and the Sweep of Human Interaction
BY RICHARD BOOKSTABER.
Princeton University Press, 2017, 240 pp.

Bookstaber criticizes modern economic theory, especially its reliance on the idea of a natural equilibrium in human affairs and its use of models that assume that households will always maximize their utility based on unchanging preferences. As aesthetically pleasing and occasionally useful as such theoretical constructs may be, human life does not conform to them. In particular, they fail to account for the crises that all too frequently plague modern economies. Bookstaber's cogent and accessible book explains the financial crisis of 2008 in great detail, demonstrating how people's reactions to events—sometimes emotional, sometimes rational—influenced the behavior of other people, which then reverberated back to the initial actors. This is what the philanthropist and investor George Soros has called "reflexivity." To better understand such dynamics, Bookstaber endorses a pragmatic, inductive "storytelling" approach and recommends that analysts eschew deductive, theoretical approaches.

Military, Scientific, and Technological

Lawrence D. Freedman

The Exile: The Stunning Inside Story of Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda in Flight
BY CATHY SCOTT-CLARK AND ADRIAN LEVY. Bloomsbury, 2017, 640 pp.

Scott-Clark and Levy tapped a remarkable array of sources to put together this detailed and intimate investigation into how Osama bin Laden, his family, and some of his closest collaborators spent the decade that began with the planning of the 9/11 attacks and ended with bin Laden's death in Pakistan at the hands of U.S. Special Forces. The authors reveal the complex set of relations among bin Laden's many wives and children, the disagreements within al Qaeda (most of its senior figures opposed the 9/11 plan), and the challenge posed to the organization by the brutal sectarianism of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of its affiliate in Iraq. The books sheds considerable (although not conclusive) light on the question of whether senior Pakistani officials knew that bin Laden was hiding in their country. Perhaps the book's most fascinating sections explain how a large group of senior al Qaeda figures and bin Laden family members found unlikely refuge in Iran after the 9/11 attacks. They were both guests and hostages, providing Iran with some immunity from al Qaeda attacks and representing potential bargaining chips—ultimately never cashed in—during negotiations with the United States.

Turning to Political Violence: The Emergence of Terrorism
BY MARC SAGEMAN. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017, 520 pp.

Sageman sets out to explain why people with radical political agendas turn to violence. He covers the French Revolution, the development of terrorism in tsarist Russia, the radical nationalist movements in the Balkans that helped trigger World War I, and anarchist violence in the United States during the early twentieth century. The book's greatest value lies in its detailed accounts of the individuals who plotted *attentats* (Sageman favors this French word over "attacks" because it better conveys a sense of aggression). Although the book touches on mob violence and indiscriminate killing, Sageman mostly examines efforts to assassinate significant political figures. His sharp focus on the perpetrators of such acts illuminates their motives and circumstances but does not contribute much to Sageman's main goal of developing a general theory of why some people become killers. One thing that comes through quite clearly, however, is the role of political repression in radicalizing those who might otherwise have eschewed violence.

The Darkening Web: The War for Cyberspace
BY ALEXANDER KLIMBURG. Penguin Press, 2017, 432 pp.

Understanding Cyber Conflict: Fourteen Analogies
EDITED BY GEORGE PERKOVICH AND ARIEL E. LEVITE. Georgetown University Press, 2017, 304 pp.

The rapid development of the Internet has created a new form of conflict, one that is often touted as transformational. Almost every online transaction, however routine and innocent, has the potential to become part of an unseen maneuver to cause mischief, steal money, bring down vital infrastructure, or subvert a government. But it is difficult to take the measure of cyberconflict, because it is now part of every other form of conflict; it affects everything while deciding very little on its own, at least thus far. One merit of Klimburg's book is his description of the many layers of the Internet, their vulnerabilities, and the governance problems they pose, although the book's profusion of acronyms can be overwhelming. The essential portrait of cyberspace that emerges is of a stateless global good being ruthlessly exploited by states, especially for the purpose of reshaping the way people think; some of the strongest sections focus on Russia, an innovator in such activity.

Perkovich and Levite's volume explores the issue of cyberconflict through analogies to conventional forms of violence—a potentially misleading approach, as the editors acknowledge, but one they nonetheless successfully adopt to explore what is genuinely distinctive about the digital domain. They have assembled a first-rate cast of contributors to investigate the cyberspace dimension of areas such as nonlethal weapons, drones, preemption, surprise attacks, and economic warfare. In overt warfare, the effects of digital tools have become much clearer in recent years. The real difficulty now lies in sorting out what is taking place in covert forms of conflict, where cyberattacks are easy to mount but hard to attribute to any particular actor. Because those attacks

have thus far been nonviolent and because the legal framework is murky, victims' responses have been hesitant. Witness, for example, Washington's tentative reaction to Moscow's alleged interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

On Tactics: A Theory of Victory in Battle
BY B. A. FRIEDMAN. Naval Institute Press, 2017, 256 pp.

Given the steady flood of books about strategy, it is remarkable how few there are about tactics. Friedman has filled that gap with a short, sharp piece of analysis that highlights the physical, mental, and moral dimensions of conflict and explores important concepts such as "the culminating point of victory," the term Clausewitz used to describe the point when the attacker had achieved the maximum possible. The successful tactician, Friedman writes, "arranges the physical means at his disposal in terms of maneuver, mass, firepower, and tempo to inflict mental effects in the mind of the opposing tactician and his units: deception, surprise, confusion, and shock." Friedman enlivens a potentially dull subject, using plenty of historical examples to illustrate his points. In so doing, he demonstrates that some core lessons are timeless—the advantage of combined arms, the importance of having the right mix of mass and firepower—even though their application must incorporate the latest technologies. Although he shows how war fighters can win tactical victories, he is well aware that in the broader strategic context, these may not be sufficient to win a war.

The United States

Walter Russell Mead

Devil's Bargain: Steve Bannon, Donald Trump, and the Storming of the Presidency
BY JOSHUA GREEN. Penguin Press, 2017, 288 pp.

In the history of U.S. politics, few meteors have burned as hot or hit as hard as Steve Bannon, the fiery provocateur behind Donald Trump's transgressive and unexpectedly successful 2016 campaign for the White House. Bannon, who prior to the campaign had been largely unknown beyond the audience of his controversial "alt-right" website, Breitbart News, helped Trump skewer the bipartisan political establishment and activate enough angry voters in the right places to eke out an Electoral College victory despite losing the popular vote. Green saw Bannon as an important figure early on and began to track his career long before other journalists. As a result, Green had the material and access to produce a deeply researched and sharply observed account of a political figure and a movement that took most of the country by surprise. Many seasoned observers thought that Trump had rendered himself unelectable by embracing and peddling "birther" conspiracy theories regarding President Barack Obama's national origins. Bannon, however, understood that Trump had forged a bond with a significant Republican constituency that could win him the GOP nomination and put him on the road to the White House. Although Bannon's tenure as Trump's chief strategist in the White House was brief and mostly unsuccessful, it is unlikely that his influence in U.S. politics will fade quietly away. Readers will find no better guide to Bannon's vision than this gripping and sometimes appalling account.

The Voice of America: Lowell Thomas and the Invention of Twentieth-Century Journalism
BY MITCHELL STEPHENS. St. Martin's Press, 2017, 336 pp.

Lowell Thomas was the journalist who brought fame to T. E. Lawrence, helping to transform the British archaeologist and military officer into "Lawrence of Arabia" in the public imagination during World War I. Thomas remained a dominant presence in the U.S. media well into the 1970s, but he might be the most famous twentieth-century media figure whom hardly anyone under 40 has heard of. Stephens has written an unusual biography; he is less interested in rescuing Thomas from oblivion than in illuminating what his rise and fall say about a changing country. Thomas was more of a showman than a reporter; he embellished Lawrence's story with so many legends and half-truths that biographers and researchers are still trying to untangle the mess. He nimbly adapted to the shifting conditions in the media industry, moving from radio to newsreels and finally to television. Stephens suggests that today's media environment is less hospitable to the kind of journalism Thomas practiced. The mass audiences of the networks have broken up, and Thomas' trademark travelogues would have less appeal in the age of jet travel. All true, but if

Thomas were a young man today, he might just find another road to fame and glory.

The Least Among Us: Waging the Battle for the Vulnerable
BY ROSA L. DeLAURO. New Press, 2017, 288 pp.

DeLauro, a Democrat who has served as the U.S. Representative for Connecticut's Third District since 1991, grew up in the rough and tumble of New Haven politics. Both of her parents were elected as Democrats to the city's Board of Aldermen and plied their trade in much the same way that past generations of ward politicians had done: doing favors, finding jobs for constituents, keeping their fingers on the pulse of the local community. Out of that experience DeLauro developed a concern for the underdog and a commitment to retail politics. In *The Least Among Us*, which combines backward-looking memoir with forward-facing prescriptions, DeLauro argues that, with inequality growing and newly arrived immigrants struggling in U.S. cities, old-school Democratic politics has much to offer. Should the Democrats recapture the House of Representatives in 2018, DeLauro's mix of sharp intelligence, skilled partisan instincts, and long-term legislative experience will make her a key player. Readers who want to know how the winds might shift in Washington could do worse than to learn how DeLauro understands politics.

Stanton: Lincoln's War Secretary
BY WALTER STAHR. Simon & Schuster, 2017, 768 pp.

With cities and college campuses around the United States engaged in bitter debates over the fate of memorials to the Confederacy and its leaders, Stahr's timely biography of Edwin Stanton, who served as President Abraham Lincoln's secretary of war, brings an important reminder of just how wrenching and transformational the Civil War was. Stanton was responsible for the recruitment, supply, and coordination of the unprecedented military machine that the Union assembled during the war, and also played a critical role in the suppression of Confederate sympathizers and antidraft activists in the North, which led to thousands of arrests and trials by military commission. A longtime Democrat, Stanton would go on to forge close links with the Radical Republican faction, and in the shocking days following Lincoln's assassination and the attempted assassination of Secretary of State William Seward, Stanton was the virtual ruler of the United States. In 1868, President Andrew Johnson demanded Stanton's resignation after Stanton sided with Republicans who wanted to take a harder line on Reconstruction in the South. That dispute led to Johnson's impeachment and trial. Few Americans have been at the center of so many consequential political storms; this long and thorough (at times a bit too thorough) account sheds new light on some of the most important events in the history of the United States.

Western Europe

Andrew Moravcsik

Tangled Governance: International Regime Complexity, the Troika, and the Euro Crisis BY C. RANDALL HENNING. Oxford University Press, 2017, 312 pp.

This book uncovers the cold, hard realities that lurk beneath the technical complexity of modern financial diplomacy. Many commentators on both the left and the right insist that powerful officials in international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the EU dominate global finance. Yet such institutions rarely act independently. Instead, just like domestic political institutions, they are arenas of political conflict. Henning analyzes the European financial crisis of the last decade, focusing on seven debt-restructuring programs that pitted creditors against debtor nations. He explores why oversight of such programs lies with the so-called troika formed by the European Central Bank, the European Commission, and the IMF—a cumbersome arrangement that increases complexity, reduces efficiency, and undermines European integration. The reason, Henning argues, is that parliaments in powerful creditor countries, notably Germany, will only approve institutional arrangements designed to do their bidding to the greatest extent possible. Ironically, given the widespread belief that the EU suffers from a "democratic deficit," creditors rejected an EU-based solution—a proposed European Monetary Fund—because it would have diluted their power and restricted the imposed austerity that benefits them.

Realizing Roma Rights EDITED BY JACQUELINE BHABHA, ANDRZEJ MIRGA, AND MARGARETA MATACHE. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017, 320 pp.

The estimated 14 million Roma people—"gypsies," in old-fashioned parlance—compose Europe's hidden minority. This book introduces readers to their plight, focusing especially on legal remedies for human rights violations. Like African Americans, the Roma suffer from a legacy of slavery, discrimination, and economic marginalization. Yet over the past century, the Roma have not benefited from the type of broad legal revolution that has improved the lot of minorities in the United States. Governments, especially in eastern Europe, continue to slight the Roma, often informally, in the provision of housing, education, and employment and frequently fail to protect them from violence and violations of family rights, including the unjustified forcible removal of children. Although a significant literature on Roma rights exists in Europe, this book seeks to bring the Roma's plight to the attention of Americans. Insofar as policies toward the Roma have improved, it is largely because western European countries use the EU to impose policy changes on eastern European governments. The authors blame the Roma's continued second-class status in Europe on a weak social and governmental commitment to the cause of equality, but they also note that the Roma have failed to organize effectively.

After Europe
BY IVAN KRASTEV. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017, 128 pp.

The multiple crises washing over Europe—Brexit, the rise of right-wing populism, mass migration, the resurgence of Russia, simmering financial crises, the uncertainty introduced by the Trump administration—have produced overblown, opportunistic warnings about "the end of Europe." But some Europessimists sincerely believe that Europe's travails reflect an epochal transformation in Western societies. So argues Krastev, an uncommonly literate, reflective, and engaging observer of European affairs who is also a trained philosopher with a penchant for grand historical visions. He argues that in the wake of Franco-German reconciliation, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the stagnation of the European economic model, the movement for further European integration lacks big ideas to push it forward. Moreover, Krastev believes that the refugee crisis poses a genuine threat to European identity by spawning populism, which in turn threatens Europe's established political compromises, cultural cosmopolitanism, commitment to human rights, and social solidarity. Still, a realistic analysis of these crises might suggest a more sanguine conclusion. Consider that in the past two years, European governments have worked together to cut third-country immigration by more than 80 percent. The United Kingdom has manifestly failed to outline a workable plan for leaving the EU. And although economic malaise may be the most serious of all the crises, the eurozone seems to be stable and recovering for the moment. Even without great ideas or popular optimism, Europe muddles through.

Out of the Shadows: Portugal From Revolution to the Present Day
BY NEILL LOCHERY. Bloomsbury, 2017, 384 pp.

Although it has ten million citizens, a strategic location, and a crisis-prone economy, Portugal receives little international academic or media attention. Lochery has written a useful introduction to an underappreciated corner of Europe, tracing the country's history from the fall of authoritarian rule in the so-called Carnation Revolution of 1974 to the present. Most of his story covers the early years. It recounts how Portugal established democracy, a tale that involves U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's curious intervention in Portuguese domestic politics to bolster moderates against Communists. Lochery also narrates Portugal's joining the EU in 1986 and the 2004 elevation of a Portuguese politician, José Manuel Barroso, to head the European Commission. Short chapters on recent years focus on the political fallout of the financial crisis, which posed as dire a threat to Portuguese democracy as communism had a quarter century earlier.

Western Hemisphere

Richard Feinberg

Social Policies and Decentralization in Cuba: Change in the Context of Twenty-First-Century Latin America
EDITED BY JORGE I. DOMÍNGUEZ, MARÍA DEL CARMEN ZABALA ARGÜELLES, MAYRA ESPINA PRIETO, AND LORENA BARBERIA. Harvard University Press, 2017, 282 pp.

Voces de cambio en el sector no estatal cubano (Voices of Change in the Cuban Private Sector)
BY CARMELO MESA-LAGO, ROBERTO VEIGA GONZÁLEZ, LENIER GONZÁLEZ MEDEROS, SOFÍA VERA ROJAS, AND ANÍBAL PÉREZ-LIÑÁN. Iberoamericana, 2016, 214 pp.

The Cuban Affair
BY NELSON DEMILLE. Simon & Schuster, 2017, 448 pp.

Undertaking professional social science in Cuba must be a labor of love, for the available resources are grossly inadequate, ideological overseers are watching, official statistics are scant, and the authorities generally permit only small-sample field studies. Yet the collection of admirable studies presented by Domínguez and his esteemed Cuban collaborators manages to convey a compelling, if depressing, portrait of Cuban society. Universal health and education have produced worthy outcomes, but their quality is visibly deteriorating, and efforts at reform have fallen short. Although good data are scarce, it is clear that socioeconomic inequalities are widening along gender, ethnic, and geographic lines. Cuba's highly centralized bureaucracy and tightly planned economy, both of which rest on ideological foundations resistant to reform, have repeatedly frustrated attempts to decentralize decision-making and increase democratic participation. Even these erudite authors struggle to recognize that renewed economic growth and higher labor productivity will require sacrificing some egalitarian social ideals.

Voces de cambio en el sector no estatal cubano supports a similar conclusion. The book was written by scholars at the University of Pittsburgh who teamed up with Cuban researchers to interview 80 Cubans participating in the island's emerging business landscape. The researchers recognize that their sample is necessarily small and nonrepresentative. Nevertheless, their findings are valuable and generally confirm what other small-sample studies have uncovered. Despite the many obstacles confronting Cuban entrepreneurs, most report a high level of satisfaction and are earning handsome returns and reinvesting for future growth. The Cuban private sector has added jobs, generated tax revenues, and improved the quality of services. Yet in recent months, Cuban authorities have criticized small businesses for earning "excessive" profits and for allegedly engaging in illicit practices that, they charge, undermine socialist ideals. Officials would do better to digest the many well-founded recommendations in *Voces de cambio* and further encourage the productive capacities of the Cuban people.

Now more accessible to U.S. visitors than at any time in the past six decades, Cuba has become a popular backdrop for fictional adventures. The thrill master DeMille visited Cuba with Yale Educational Travel in 2015, just long enough to enrich his fast-paced, entertaining novel *The Cuban Affair* with some vivid local color. His handsome protagonist is a wry, jaded U.S. Army veteran of the war in Afghanistan who owns a fishing charter boat in Key West. Die-hard anti-Castro Cuban Americans hire his ship, *The Maine* (pun intended), to sneak into Cuba to recover property records squirreled away long ago by a fastidious banker fleeing the revolution. DeMille largely adopts the exiles' political perspective: his Cuba is a poverty-stricken police state ruled by a regime "long past its expiration date." DeMille sympathetically conveys the profound sense of loss of dispossessed elites, even as his world-weary veteran concludes that the Cuban American hard-liners had "such a big hard-on for screwing the Castro brothers that they couldn't see straight," and muses that those hidden property titles are worth little more than Confederate war bonds. *The Cuban Affair* features an amusing take on the Yale tour group, unsavory spies (Cuban and American), and a climactic firefight on the high seas.

Fractured Utopias: A Personal Odyssey With History
BY ROGER BURBACH. Freedom Voices, 2017, 300 pp.

Burbach, who passed away in 2015, was a self-styled "utopian intellectual vagabond" who had fled his Midwestern origins to struggle alongside left-wing comrades striving to remake their worlds, most intensely in Chile during the Allende years, in the early 1970s, and in Sandinista Nicaragua, in the 1980s. In this posthumously published memoir, he blends tales of dramatic political upheaval and stories of libertine liaisons: "Passion and eroticism can be part of the longing for Utopia," he notes. Burbach was an erudite student of progressive political theory who enjoyed deep connections to major figures on the Latin American left, and his emotive memoir takes an unusually profound dive into the revolutionary movements of the late twentieth century, their lofty aspirations, euphoric victories, costly illusions, and tragic confrontations. Despite political and romantic setbacks, and injuries he endured in a swimming accident in 1989 that confined him to a wheelchair for the rest of his life, Burbach persisted in his uncompromising commitment to radical research and activist engagement.

Home—So Different, So Appealing
Los Angeles County Museum of Art (LACMA), 2017.

Forty-two Latino and Latin American artists present a mostly grim view of low-income urban life and reduced opportunity, whether in the shantytowns of Bogotá and Buenos Aires or the housing projects of the Bronx. The exhibition, organized by LACMA, the UCLA Chicano Studies Research Center, and the Museum of Fine Arts, Houston, includes works in many media—drawings, paintings, photographs, installations, videos—and encourages

the viewer to see mundane domestic objects as artifacts laden with historical and psychological meaning. But the overwhelming, strident political commentary is disturbingly pessimistic. Ugly slums brutalize vulnerable children, loudly flapping buzzards loom over heaps of trash, jarring inequalities separate the prosperous from the impoverished. Latino immigrants to the United States confront class divisions, bogus patriotism, and long, wrenching jail sentences. New single-family housing developments in Mexico and the United States alike appear as bleak, dehumanized wastelands of consumerism. In these artists' eyes, the American dream is an illusion, and there is no exit from the Western Hemisphere's social nightmares. Ironically, these images of despair are more akin to U.S. President Donald Trump's vision of "American carnage" than to Barack Obama's "audacity of hope."

Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Republics

Robert Legvold

The NGO Game: Postconflict Peacebuilding in the Balkans and Beyond BY PATRICE C. McMAHON. Cornell University Press, 2017, 238 pp.

McMahon has produced a detailed, tough-minded study of what happened when a swarm of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) rushed into Bosnia and Kosovo in the wake of conflicts during the 1990s. She argues that, despite their good intentions and hard work, their actual contribution to postconflict peace building was largely insignificant—or even counterproductive. Rather than generate local initiative, create community, strengthen civil society, or foster democracy, they left locals despairing of change, cynical, and disdainful of the NGO model. This, she says, is because of a perverse interaction between international and local NGOs. International groups and the governments and global institutions that supported them had the money, but their aims did not match the reality on the ground. Making matters worse, they relied on self-serving measures of success and disregarded the insights and preferences of their local counterparts. Those counterparts soon figured out that to get funding, they had to design their programs according to international priorities rather than genuine local needs. Bust followed boom as failure and exhaustion set in; international NGOs moved on, and local NGOs withered. Many within the NGO community now understand these problems, but McMahon fears that too many incentives exist to leave things as they are.

Communism's Shadow: Historical Legacies and Contemporary Political Attitudes BY GRIGORE POP-ELECHES AND JOSHUA A. TUCKER. Princeton University Press, 2017, 344 pp.

In this immensely ambitious, careful, and data-rich study, Pop-Eleches and Tucker do not merely explore the historical legacy of communism in eastern Europe; they also tackle the far more difficult problem of distinguishing its impact from that of other factors. They

compare contemporary attitudes in postcommunist countries with those in societies never ruled by communist regimes on issues such as democracy and market-based economics (less support in postcommunist states), government-funded social welfare programs (more support in postcommunist states), and gender equality (not much difference between the two groups). It is often hard to determine how much those differences are due to the communist past rather than historical features that predated communism or factors that transcend the nature of political systems, such as what the authors refer to as "geographic location." But Pop-Eleches and Tucker succeed in that task by applying a highly refined theoretical model to their large data sets. Those trying to pin down with greater precision the legacy of communism now have a model to emulate.

Fragile Conviction: Changing Ideological Landscapes in Urban Kyrgyzstan
BY MATHIJS PELKMANS. Cornell University Press, 2017, 232 pp.

Kyrgyzstan was once seen as one of the post-Soviet states best positioned to build democracy and foster a market economy. It is now mired in corruption, political dysfunction, and economic stagnation. Pelkmans paints an earthy portrait of how people in one Kyrgyz city, a former mining town of 20,000 inhabitants, have coped. Half of them have fled. Those who stayed have adopted a variety of credos to help them understand their new world. Initially, many hewed to neoliberalism, which promised a future of democracy and prospering markets. When those dreams failed to materialize, people drifted to alternatives, including nationalism and religion, with conservative Islam (ushered in by Tablighi Jamaat, a proselytizing group that encourages personal piety), Pentecostal Christianity, and shamanistic spiritual healing all enjoying a surge in popularity. Pelkmans focuses on the swift cycle in which these belief systems gained purchase over people and generated enthusiasm and energy, which then deflated when prophets failed and outcomes disappointed. He is interested in not merely the force of ideas but also what determines their influence, durability, and decline.

Property Rights in Post-Soviet Russia: Violence, Corruption, and the Demand for Law
BY JORDAN GANS-MORSE. Cambridge University Press, 2017, 250 pp.

A lack of reliably enforceable property rights discourages investment and burdens the Russian economy. This problem attracts intense scrutiny from those studying and promoting economic reform. Normally, scholars draw a sharp correlation between secure property rights and the strength and integrity of political and legal institutions. Most analysts assume that if those institutions are weak or corrupt, people and groups struggling to protect their property will resort to criminal or corrupt means. Gans-Morse, employing survey data and extensive interviews, turns that assumption upside down. In this valuable, original take on an important subject, he demonstrates that even when faced with imperfect legal remedies, Russians increasingly use the courts when the costs of criminal or corrupt

alternatives are too high or the returns insufficient. Despite lagging efforts to improve Russian courts and state bureaucracies, a great many disputes over ownership and contracts are settled by legal means. This trend, however, has advanced unevenly, and the level of engagement with the legal system often depends on the size of the firms involved, the nature of their products, and the character of the markets in which they operate.

Written in Blood: Revolutionary Terrorism and Russian Literary Culture, 1861–1881
BY LYNN ELLEN PATYK. University of Wisconsin Press, 2017, 368 pp.

The immediacy of the threat from contemporary terrorism might make it difficult to view the phenomenon through the lens of nineteenth-century Russian literature, but Patyk makes a stimulating case that the essence of today's violence originates there. The seditious emotions that would later inspire political terror, she suggests, first appeared in Aleksandr Radishchev's 1790 *Journey From St. Petersburg to Moscow*. It then gestated in the work of authors such as Turgenev and Dostoyevsky (and, even more boldly, in that of their less famous but more radical counterparts, Sergei Nechaev and Nikolai Chernyshevsky), who depicted revolutionary zeal and its terrorist strain. Although Patyk draws on the works of many authors to subtly tease out the symbiosis between words and deeds, her central focus is Dostoyevsky's three great novels *Crime and Punishment*, *Demons*, and *The Brothers Karamazov*, which gave terrorism literary form well before it became a fixture of modern politics.

The House of Government: A Saga of the Russian Revolution
BY YURI SLEZKINE. Princeton University Press, 2017, 1,128 pp.

Slezkine builds the core of this epic narrative around the lives of a stunning cast of Soviet personalities in the period from the Russian Revolution through the aftermath of World War II. The main characters are the residents of the House of Government, an immense edifice in Moscow, completed in 1931, that housed the Soviet elite. He traces their lives, often in their own words, from youthful idealism and ardent revolutionary fervor to disillusionment and prosaic surrender to pragmatism—and, for a vast portion of the protagonists, exile or death during Stalin's terror. The book is richly layered and multifaceted: it offers a philosophical reflection on religion and its relationship to the intellectual underpinnings of the Russian Revolution, a political and biographical history of the first half of the twentieth century, a study of the period's key literary texts, and an extensive assessment of Stalinist architecture. The book's depth (not to mention its length) invites the reader to luxuriate in it, chapter by chapter, rather than simply plowing through.

Middle East

John Waterbury

Democratic Transitions in the Arab World
EDITED BY IBRAHIM ELBADAWI AND SAMIR MAKDISI. Cambridge University Press, 2016, 354 pp.

This important collection follows an earlier edited volume that Elbadawi and Makdisi put together prior to the Arab uprisings of 2010–11. That book explored the "democracy deficit" in the Arab world. For decades, the region's autocracies defied predictions that growing wealth, rising levels of education, and the development of middle classes would lead to democratic transitions. In their contribution to the book, Elbadawi and Makdisi persuasively argued that the deficit derived from a combination of war and the wealth afforded autocrats by natural resources. The uprisings briefly raised the possibility that the deficit would be overcome. But in the eyes of most experts, civil war and the reassertion of autocracy have crushed those hopes (except in Tunisia, where a fragile democracy arose after the upheaval). Nevertheless, in their new volume, Elbadawi and Makdisi conclude that the process of democratic transition that began in 2011 will resume at some point and that Islamist fundamentalism will not emerge as the dominant political paradigm in the medium or long term. The other contributors, all Arab academics, generally make similar arguments in useful sketches of particular countries, including Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria. The trouble is that, outside Tunisia, there is not much empirical evidence to support such optimism.

Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy
BY TRITA PARSI. Yale University Press, 2017, 472 pp.

Parsi has written a detailed and gripping account of the 22 months of negotiations over Iran's nuclear program that resulted in the 2015 deal struck by the Islamic Republic and the permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (known as the P5+1). Iran pledged to eliminate its stockpiles of uranium, drastically limit its enrichment activities, and allow inspections of its nuclear facilities. In exchange, the P5+1 agreed to lift crippling sanctions on Iran. Parsi did not participate in the negotiations but has interviewed just about everyone who did. His book captures the ebb and flow of the process—indeed, its psychology. The United States saw sanctions as a way to force Iran to negotiate; Iran saw enrichment as a way to force the United States to negotiate. Neither wanted to put down its stick. There is no doubt in Parsi's mind that the only alternative to the deal was war, which was U.S. President Barack Obama's position, as well. Further sanctions would not have produced regime change in Tehran, Parsi contends. He also does not believe that Iran—a big, diverse, proud nation—could be isolated indefinitely. The Trump administration may think otherwise, but Parsi presents a convincing argument that normalization with Iran, although not inevitable, is possible.

Citizen Hariri: Lebanon's Neoliberal Reconstruction
BY HANNES BAUMANN. Oxford University Press, 2017, 256 pp.

Rafiq Hariri was twice Lebanon's prime minister, first from 1992 to 1998 and again from 2000 to 2004. Hariri, a Sunni Lebanese billionaire who made his fortune in the construction business in Saudi Arabia, was the primary force behind Beirut's reconstruction after the long Lebanese civil war, which ended in 1989. (He was also a trustee and benefactor of the American University of Beirut, where I served as president from 1998 until 2008.) Hariri was assassinated in a massive blast in Beirut in 2005 that killed dozens of people and that a UN special tribunal has blamed on members of the Shiite militia Hezbollah. Baumann focuses on Hariri's economic reforms, specifically his program of acquiring undervalued property in Beirut and redeveloping it and his pegging of the Lebanese pound to the U.S. dollar. He argues that such policies exploited the state's power to engineer a huge transfer of wealth from ordinary Lebanese to oligarchs such as Hariri himself, many of them based in Gulf Arab states. The story is well told, but Baumann crowds too much under the umbrella term "neoliberalism." The Gulf-based oligarchs, for example, did not need Lebanon to make their fortunes, which were more directly affected by oil prices than by the Beirut property market.

The New Sultan: Erdogan and the Crisis of Modern Turkey
BY SONER CAGAPTAY. I.B. Tauris, 2017, 224 pp.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey's leader since 2003, has had an impact on the republic arguably equal to that of its transformational founder, Kemal Ataturk. Turkey's economy has boomed under Erdogan; its middle class has tripled in size during his rule and now includes around 40 percent of the population. But Cagaptay sees Erdogan as a deeply flawed figure who threatens Turkey's democracy. After the economic troubles of the 1990s, Erdogan, whose politics are shaped by an uneasy mix of Islamism and constitutional secularism, consolidated a center-right coalition of pro-market and Islamist supporters that has never quite exceeded 50 percent of the electorate. After the 2007 election, in which his Justice and Development Party, known as the AKP, came close to receiving a majority, Erdogan began to eliminate all checks on his power: the military, the press, and the judiciary were all suborned. At first, Erdogan was aided by Fethullah Gulen, an influential cleric with many followers in the security establishment. But in 2013, Erdogan broke with the Gulenists. In 2016, a failed coup allegedly organized by Gulenists gave Erdogan a pretext to purge the government, academia, and the media of not only Gulenists but also liberals and Kurds. Only an economic downturn could now loosen his grip on power.

Political Islam in Tunisia: The History of Ennahda
BY ANNE WOLF. Oxford University Press, 2017, 304 pp.

Are Rached Ghannouchi and his Ennahda Party in Tunisia true democrats or merely tactical ones? Wolf spent four years and conducted 400 interviews trying to answer that question. She declines to give a definitive judgment but hints that the commitment to democracy may be more opportunistic than doctrinal. Ghannouchi is at the liberal end of the Ennahda spectrum, and the party's rank and file may not be with him. Wolf stresses, however, that Tunisia's political culture is rooted in a history of reform, and Ennahda likes to cast itself as the inheritor of the reformist mantle. After decades of repression, Ennahda began to operate legally only in 2011, when a broad-based revolt drove President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali from power. Since then, the party has grappled with issues such as the tension between civil and religious law and the question of whether Muslims and non-Muslims should be considered equal under the law. Aside from a lack of internal consensus on such questions, Ennahda's main weakness, Wolf contends, is its failure to put forward an explicit economic philosophy.

Asia and Pacific

Andrew J. Nathan

Rising China's Influence in Developing Asia
EDITED BY EVELYN GOH. Oxford University Press, 2016, 304 pp.

Even as China's power increases, the country does not always get what it wants from its regional neighbors. Goh and her contributors explore the complex interplay of pressure and resistance in China's relations with Myanmar, North Korea, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam, as well as China's role in regional issues such as dam building, monetary policy, and human rights. These interesting essays go beyond the standard chronology of diplomatic interactions to probe factors that amplify or impede Chinese influence. China's neighbors may cooperate for economic gain, or to manage troublesome borders, or simply because they share China's preferences. When necessary, they yield to China's superior force. But they also fear Chinese dominance and tend to side with India, Japan, and especially the United States whenever those powers are available. Domestic politics in these countries also play a role. Corruption may make it easier for China to gain access to local decision-makers, but it can also generate scandal. Pro- and anti-China factions often form in these countries, and Beijing's gains can be reversed because of shifts in public opinion or leadership.

Transforming Patriarchy: Chinese Families in the Twenty-first Century
EDITED BY GONCALO SANTOS AND STEVAN HARRELL. University of Washington Press, 2016, 312 pp.

The anthropological perspective on Chinese family life adopted by the contributors to this volume reveals a great deal of interesting variation—across the urban-rural divide; according to region, class, and sexual orientation; and even just by personality and circumstance. But a pattern emerges. The Chinese family is changing under the impact of many forces, including marketization, urbanization, reduced family size, consumerism, and loosening sexual mores. There is more personal choice in marriage, families are smaller, and elders today rely less on their children to take care of them than in the past. Daughters are more valued than they used to be, because the housing and gifts that must be purchased to marry off a son are more expensive, and because daughters are more likely than sons to help their parents in old age. Yet tradition still weighs heavily. Between what the editors of this volume call "the two axes of patriarchy," the power of elders has weakened more than the dominance of males.

Sold People: Traffickers and Family Life in North China
BY JOHANNA S. RANSMEIER. Harvard University Press, 2017, 408 pp.

Making innovative use of police and court archives dating from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Ransmeier shows that Chinese families often bought and sold family members. Some families purchased male children to adopt as heirs. Others bought young girls to serve as future brides for their sons. Still others indentured children to work as servants or purchased children, women, and disabled people to serve as beggars, laborers, or prostitutes or to be sold on the international "coolie" market. For every buyer, there was a seller, usually driven by need—except in cases where traffickers snatched people off the street. Modernizing officials outlawed some but not all of these practices; many forms of buying and selling were covered by a veneer of kinship. China today still suffers from widespread human trafficking. Ransmeier's richly detailed stories of individual cases show how societies can come to accept the trade in people as a normal kind of business.

Assignment: China
BY THE USC U.S.-CHINA INSTITUTE. The USC U.S.-China Institute, 2016.

This 12-chapter documentary series, reported by the former CNN Asia correspondent Mike Chinoy, surveys the history of the U.S. media's reporting on China. It includes contentious episodes such as the *Time* reporter Theodore White's struggle with the publisher Henry Luce over how to portray the Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek during World War II and Bloomberg News' 2013 decision to fire the reporter Michael Forsythe because, Forsythe says, his research into the wealth of Chinese elites had angered the Chinese regime, threatening the expansion of Bloomberg's business in China. (Bloomberg has denied this.)

Viewers who are new to the China story will get a vivid primer on 70 years of political, social, and economic change through the eyes of journalists who covered it. As China followed a twisting path from war to Maoist revolution to its present state of prosperity and assertiveness, American correspondents faced ever-changing challenges. Still, wave after wave of reporters understood the importance of the story and covered it with remarkable insight.

Samurai to Soldier: Remaking Military Service in Nineteenth-Century Japan
BY D. COLIN JAUNDRILL. Cornell University Press, 2016, 248 pp.

More than two centuries of peace, stretching from the early 1600s to the mid-1800s, left Japanese samurai more skilled in martial arts than in martial action. Jaundrill's impressively researched study traces the origin of the modern Japanese military to the 1840s, when one martial arts teacher introduced a more westernized style of musketry and artillery training based on the Dutch example. Samurai aristocrats resisted such regimentation. But the West's relentless encroachment, together with internal battles between modernizing reformers and conservative feudal lords, kept up the pressure to create more effective fighting units. Soon after reformists took power in the 1868 Meiji Restoration, the new regime adopted a universal conscription law, breaking the link between service in the military and social status and consolidating the idea of a mass citizenry. By 1894, Japan was poised to defeat Qing China and win control of Korea and Taiwan.

Architects of Occupation: American Experts and Planning for Postwar Japan
BY DAYNA L. BARNES. Cornell University Press, 2017, 240 pp.

The U.S.-led Allied occupation of Japan after World War II is considered a strategic success because it placed a formerly militaristic, aggressive enemy firmly on the road to democracy, prosperity, and an alliance with the United States. Barnes shows that the planning for the occupation started as early as 1939. (The Council on Foreign Relations played a prominent, although unofficial, role.) It was far from obvious in advance whether or how Japan would be defeated or what to do if it was. One faction, led by some of the U.S. State Department's leading Asia experts, held that the Japanese were culturally impervious to Western worldviews and inherently aggressive, and so Japan had to be reduced to impotence to make the world safe. The other view was that Japan's aggression had been stimulated by resource insecurity, and so integrating the country into open global markets would be the key to peace. Barnes' engaging intellectual and social history of the planners provides a fresh window into the origins of today's liberal international order.

Purifying the Land of the Pure: A History of Pakistan's Religious Minorities
BY FARAHNAZ ISPAHANI. Oxford University Press, 2017, 224 pp.

Founded in 1947 as a Muslim homeland but a secular state, Pakistan quickly descended into internal violence as the search for Islamic purity set Muslims against non-Muslims, Sunnis against

Shiites and Ahmadis, and various Sunni sects against one another. Ispahani is a journalist and former aide to the secularist leader Benazir Bhutto, who served as prime minister from 1988 to 1990 and again from 1993 to 1996 and who was assassinated in 2007. The author places much of the blame for Pakistan's ever-worsening intolerance on a series of military men turned politicians who fostered sectarian oppression in pursuit of political gain. Her prime villain is Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, who took power in a coup in 1977 and ruled until 1988 and who instituted a vague law against "blasphemy" that is still widely used to persecute innocent people. The coalition he assembled included the intelligence and military agencies (who saw jihadists as useful tools to extend Pakistani influence into Afghanistan and Kashmir), the Punjabi landholding elite (who saw fundamentalism as a tool to mobilize voters), Saudi Arabia (which saw Sunni Pakistan as a bulwark against Shiite Iran), and the United States (which tolerated human rights violations because of Pakistan's cooperation in fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan). Unfortunately, this coalition has mostly held.

China's Governance Puzzle: Enabling Transparency and Participation in a Single-Party State
BY JONATHAN R. STROMSETH, EDMUND J. MALESKY, AND DIMITAR D. GUEORGUIEV. Cambridge University Press, 2017, 343 pp.

The American authors of this valuable study benefited from their collaboration with a number of scholars at Chinese universities and think tanks. They set out to demonstrate that even within China's closed regime, it is possible to advance transparency and public participation, often through small experiments that are subsequently scaled up. Why would an authoritarian party permit such changes? That is the puzzle of the book's title. According to the authors, the central state does so to reduce corruption and improve compliance with its policies at the local level. But the authors worry that under Chinese President Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party is backpedaling on earlier reforms and instead favoring "coercive, top-down approaches." Xi's anticorruption campaign is a case in point. The authors skillfully blend the latest statistics on corruption with illuminating case studies to argue that enlisting the Chinese public to monitor the bureaucracy would yield better results than continuing the current heavy-handed crackdown that targets corrupt individuals one at a time.

YUEN YUEN ANG

Africa

Nicolas van de Walle

Julius Nyerere
BY PAUL BJERK. Ohio University Press, 2017, 116 pp.

Julius Nyerere, who in the 1960s served as prime minister and then president of the state that would become Tanzania and then served as independent Tanzania's first president, until 1985, was one of the dominant personalities of African politics during

the second half of the twentieth century. This short, accessible biography provides an excellent introduction to his life and to the country that he ruled. Born in 1922, he was identified as a promising pupil in a Catholic mission school and later became one of the first Tanzanians to earn a college degree. That distinction, along with his keen grasp of political tactics and his talent for rhetoric, thrust him into a leadership position in the burgeoning nationalist movement. Nicknamed Mwalimu ("teacher" in Swahili), Nyerere earned a reputation for being a thoughtful and visionary socialist whose high degree of personal integrity was not matched by many other African heads of state at the time. Bjerk's balanced biography lauds Nyerere's accomplishments (most notably the steps he took to reduce ethnic and racial divisions within Tanzania) but also makes clear that the Nyerere regime committed human rights violations, tolerated a good deal of corruption, and implemented disastrous economic policies that left the country bankrupt by the mid-1980s.

The Horn of Africa: State Formation and Decay
BY CHRISTOPHER CLAPHAM. Oxford University Press, 2017, 256 pp.

Clapham has produced a sharp political history of Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia. (Unfortunately, his book largely ignores Djibouti, the fourth country located in the Horn of Africa.) He walks the reader through a complex story of uneven state building and civil war that begins in the nineteenth century and extends to the present. To explain the variation in political outcomes in the region, Clapham turns to geography. He contrasts the region's highlands, where relatively high population density and fertile soil have produced agricultural surpluses that can finance a viable state such as Ethiopia, with the lowlands, in which pastoralism dominates and has undermined the establishment of state authority in Somalia. Clapham sensibly puts Ethiopia at the center of his narrative: with a large population and a relatively strong state, the country was able to fight off European attempts to colonize it and has long acted as the region's hegemon, although its neighbors have always viewed it with great suspicion. The book deftly describes how Ethiopia has emerged from recent crises with a stable government (albeit one led by military rulers) and ambitions to become Africa's first "developmental state," fostering growth with major infrastructure projects that have the potential to dramatically change the region.

Violent Nonstate Actors in Africa: Terrorists, Rebels, and Warlords
EDITED BY CAROLINE VARIN AND DAUDA ABUBAKAR. Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, 340 pp.

The best chapters in this volume on violent nonstate actors across Africa describe contemporary groups that remain understudied and poorly documented: for example, the various militias fighting in the Central African Republic, the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) in Libya, and the armed factions that briefly formed a jihadist statelet in northern Mali in 2012. One depressing message the book delivers is that a good

deal of continuity exists when it comes to the emergence of these kinds of violent groups. Decade after decade, extremists continue to exploit the continent's dire poverty and underperforming, illegitimate regimes. The names and the rhetoric change, but the essential qualities stay the same. In her succinct and useful introduction to the book, Varin suggests, however, that one significant change has occurred: newer groups, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria and al Shabab in Somalia, commit even more senseless, gratuitous violence than earlier groups, which were often brutal but were reined in to an extent by a combination of stronger chains of command, clearer ideologies, and more significant foreign support.

Infrastructure in Africa: Lessons for Future Development
EDITED BY MTHULI NCUBE AND CHARLES LEYEKA LUFUMPA. Policy Press, 2017, 720 pp.

The African continent's generally woeful infrastructure has long acted as a brake on economic growth and poverty alleviation in the region. Better roads would help African farmers get their crops to markets. Better sanitation would significantly improve public health. Cheaper and more reliable electric power would allow manufacturing sectors to expand. This collection of essays by economists associated with the African Development Bank suggests ways to achieve those outcomes. The main idea: more public spending. The authors estimate that the region's governments currently spend less than half of the $93 billion a year they need to on infrastructure investment and maintenance. The difficulty in bridging this funding gap stems not just from a lack of money but also from a paucity of proposals for well-defined, bankable projects.

Intimate Interventions in Global Health: Family Planning and HIV Prevention in Sub-Saharan Africa
BY RACHEL SULLIVAN ROBINSON. Cambridge University Press, 2017, 302 pp.

Robinson argues that African countries' responses to the HIV/AIDS crisis have been largely determined by their previous experiences in implementing family-planning programs. Based on careful case studies of Malawi, Nigeria, and Senegal, she documents how the same local nongovernmental organizations and technocrats that had gained experience and developed working relationships with international family-planning organizations, such as Family Health International (now FHI 360) and the International Planned Parenthood Federation, were typically the same actors who spearheaded efforts to combat HIV/AIDS. Preventing pregnancies and preventing the spread of HIV require the same ability to intervene in intimate relations and influence sexual practices. Robinson convincingly demonstrates that the effectiveness of a given family-planning program depended on whether the political conditions allowed for the development of relatively strong nonstate actors with links to transnational agencies. Against conventional wisdom, this fine study conveys an abiding optimism about the ability of large international aid organizations to help smaller local groups build skills in one area and then apply them to other challenges.

Letters to the Editor

A KINDER TRUMAN DOCTRINE

To the Editor:

I am delighted to see Senator Tim Kaine ("A New Truman Doctrine," July/August 2017) describe a bold new foreign policy strategy that balances greatness and goodness. He should further develop his proposal in two important ways.

First, the strategy should empower positive nonstate actors. Kaine highlights the rising influence of nonstate actors but seems to consider only their destructive power. Of course, the United States must find, defend against, and hold accountable those who seek to harm the country and its allies. But a new strategy should also seek to identify and empower those nonstate actors working to improve lives and reduce suffering. More time and money should go to the Malala Yousafzais, Nelson Mandelas, and Vaclav Havels of the world than to heads of state and CEOs.

Second, the strategy should incorporate the so-called "responsibility to protect." Kaine rightly highlights the role of the United States in addressing natural and man-made crises. He mentions the failures in Rwanda and Syria as proof that failure can come from crimes of omission, not just those of commission. Fortunately, in 2005, policymakers, activists, academics, and others came together to develop the doctrine of "the responsibility to protect," or R2P. Kaine's new strategy should adopt or adapt R2P—as many U.S. allies have done—to address genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.

MARK HANIS

Research Fellow, WSD Handa Center for Human Rights and International Justice, Stanford University

ROOM FOR EVERYONE

To the Editor:

The World Health Organization's newly elected director general, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, points out that epidemics and pandemics are a major threat to global health "because viruses don't respect borders, and they don't need visas" ("Global Health Gets a Checkup," September/October 2017). He also mentions that the core mission of the WHO is to increase health coverage so as to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals' aim to "leave no one behind." His efforts, however, could be undermined by political interference.

For years, Taiwan has been excluded from the WHO. Continuing this practice will not serve Tedros' purposes well. Taiwan has one of the world's best universal health-care systems, which offers reasonably priced, high-quality care, with a coverage rate of 99 percent of the population and short waiting times. Taiwan could do a lot to help the WHO speed up the expansion of health coverage, and many countries could benefit from Taiwan's know-how and medical expertise.

During the Ebola and MERS outbreaks in 2015, for example, Taiwan joined forces with the United States to hold training courses for medical personnel in Asia. It also donated funding and medical equipment to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to fight Ebola.

If the WHO is serious about preventing epidemics and closing the gaps in global health coverage, it should not let any member states dictate its actions. The WHO should adhere to its principles, convey its professional concerns honestly to its members, and refuse to succumb to political pressure to exclude anyone.

BRIAN SU

Deputy Director General, Taipei Economic and Cultural Office, New York

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FOR THE RECORD

"Kleptocracy in America" (September/October 2017) provided the wrong date for when Mikheil Saakashvili first took office as president of Georgia and pursued anticorruption reforms; it was 2004, not 2008.

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—Mia Higgins, Interim Publisher

A Drawdown in Afghanistan?

Foreign Affairs Brain Trust

We asked dozens of experts whether they agreed or disagreed that the United States should significantly reduce its military involvement in Afghanistan. The results from those who responded are below:



STRONGLY AGREE, CONFIDENCE LEVEL 8

Mara Karlin

Associate Professor of the Practice of Strategic Studies, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies

"The opportunity costs of a longer, wider, open-ended commitment to Afghanistan have grown too profound to ignore. The U.S. military increasingly needs to deal with real rivals—like China and Russia—and to operate across the conflict spectrum."

DISAGREE, CONFIDENCE LEVEL 8

Michael Kugelman

Senior Associate for South Asia, Wilson Center

"Significantly reducing the U.S. military's involvement could imperil an Afghan security forces training mission that has made major progress in recent years. A big escalation in troops is not the way to go, but neither is a big de-escalation."

→**See the full responses at ForeignAffairs.com/AfghanistanDrawdown**

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