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DOES AMERICA HAVE A DEEP STATE?

SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2017

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Trump and the Allies

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TRUMP AND THE ALLIES

COVER: ZACH MEYER

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Archibald Cary Coolidge, Founding Editor
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In early 2015, the reporter **GRAEME WOOD** upended debates about how to understand the Islamic State with an *Atlantic* article titled "What ISIS Really Wants." His bold attack on conventional interpretations of ISIS that de-emphasized the group's religious beliefs became the most widely read article in the magazine's history. Wood is now a national correspondent for *The Atlantic* and a lecturer in political science at Yale University. In "True Believers" (page 136), he discusses the internal connections of the jihadist movement in a review of Ali Soufan's new book on al Qaeda and ISIS.

Born in New York City and raised in Turkey, **TIMUR KURAN** earned a Ph.D. in economics from Stanford University, but his work also draws on political science, history, psychology, and religious studies, and he has written about everything from medieval Islamic trade to Tunisian craft guilds to Ottoman courts to the 1989 revolutions in eastern Europe. In "What Kills Inequality" (page 151), Kuran, currently a professor at Duke University, reviews Walter Scheidel's new history of income and wealth redistribution through the ages.

TRUMP AND THE ALLIES

In the 1940s, after two world wars and a depression, Western policymakers decided enough was enough. Unless international politics changed in some fundamental way, humanity itself might not survive much longer.

A strain of liberal idealism had been integral to U.S. identity from the American founding onward, but now power could be put behind principle. Woodrow Wilson had fought "to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles." Keeping his goals while noting his failures, the next generation tried again with a revised strategy, and this time they succeeded. The result became known as the postwar liberal international order.

The founders of the order embraced cooperation with like-minded powers, rejecting isolationism and casting themselves as player-managers of an ever-expanding team. They bailed out the United Kingdom, liberated France, rehabilitated Germany and Japan, bound themselves to Canada and Mexico, and more. And for seven decades, the allies were fruitful, and multiplied, and waxed exceeding mighty.

Then arose up a new king who knew not Joseph.

Perhaps no group has been more flummoxed by the Trump era than U.S. allies, who awoke last November to find Washington no longer interested in playing the game, let alone managing the team. Having spent more than half a century believing American promises of open-ended support and basing their identity and essential national policies on it, the major U.S. allies couldn't return easily to a self-help system, even if they wanted to—which none of them do.

We asked leading experts on France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, Canada, and Mexico to report on how these countries are grappling with the challenges of the Trump era. These countries spent the first few months of the Trump administration in shock, then gradually realized they had to accommodate to the new reality somehow—at least for a while. So for now they watch, and wait, and hope the fever passes soon. This is their story.

The United States has dominated the world for generations now. Like a Carnegie or a Rockefeller or a Gates, it has legitimized its extraordinary position by making clear to all that it sees life as a positive-sum game—one in which American power is used to benefit not just Americans but also all those around the world willing to play by the rules, living and trading peacefully with one another. U.S. allies know that better than anybody, which is why they signed on to the order in the first place. Unfortunately, Washington itself seems to have forgotten.

—Gideon Rose, Editor

Trump's election has raised the specter of a dangerous breakdown in transatlantic relations.

—Stefan Theil

ZACH MEYER

France's Gamble

As America Retreats, Macron Steps Up

Natalie Nougayrède

Despite the upbeat characterization of France as the United States' oldest ally—from the Marquis de Lafayette's help in the American Revolution to France's gift of the Statue of Liberty and up through the shared fight in two world wars—the U.S.-French relationship has always been complicated. During the Cold War, French President Charles de Gaulle sided with the United States when it mattered, as during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. But he also clashed with U.S. leaders as he sought to assert French autonomy within NATO and position his country outside the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. In the 1980s, U.S. President Ronald Reagan's free-market policies made many French cringe (they tended to overlook his successful efforts to win the Cold War). But his French counterpart, François Mitterrand, also stood up to the Soviet Union, memorably declaring in 1983, "The pacifists are in the West, but the missiles are in the East." After U.S. President George W. Bush ordered the invasion of Iraq, the United States' popularity in France hit rock bottom. Things got so bad that a 2003 poll found that 33 percent of French hoped that the United States would lose to Saddam Hussein. It didn't help that Americans had started calling the French "cheese-eating surrender monkeys" and sporting "First Iraq, then France" bumper stickers on their cars. Yet U.S.-French relations survived the disagreement over Iraq, with French President Jacques Chirac successfully seeking Bush's support for a joint effort to get Syrian troops to withdraw from Lebanon in 2005.

The election of Barack Obama certainly swayed French public opinion. By the summer of 2009, according to a survey by the Pew Research Center, the United States' favorability rating in France had soared to 75 percent (the highest score in Europe), up from 42 percent in 2003. But relations between Obama and French President Nicolas Sarkozy were awkward. Sarkozy found his American counterpart cold, and Obama joked about Sarkozy's looks and his fast speech. Tensions over Iran went deeper: the French were wary of Obama's outstretched hand and pushed for harsher sanctions. The NATO intervention in Libya was another stumbling block, with Sarkozy frustrated by Obama's decision to withdraw U.S. bombers ten days into the operation.

Then came Donald Trump, a U.S. president like no other. During last fall's U.S. campaign, France's then president, the Socialist François Hollande, spoke for many of his compatriots when he said that Trump's "excesses" made him want to "throw up." On the right, Bruno Le Maire (who has since become France's finance minister) called Trump "a dangerous man." Days after Trump's election, a survey found that 75 percent of French held a negative opinion of the incoming U.S. president. Most were convinced that he would damage U.S.-European relations and threaten world peace. Even half of the supporters of the far-right

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French presidential candidate, Marine Le Pen, opposed Trump, despite sharing many of his views on Islam, immigration, and trade.

Yet behind this widespread revulsion lies a diplomatic opportunity. With the United States looking inward and Trump having torn up the traditional foreign policy rule book, France's new president, Emmanuel Macron, is seeking to reinvigorate the European project as a way of restoring French leadership. French power is no substitute for American power, of course. But with the United States' image, global role, and reliability newly uncertain, Europeans feel a void that someone must fill—and France thinks it should at least try to do just that.

ENTRE NOUS

France and the United States have historically offered up similar but competing messages to the world: "American exceptionalism" is matched by France's claim of being "the birthplace of human rights." As Sarkozy once quipped, the two countries "are separated by common values." France and the United States may not always see eye to eye on policy, but they both stand for humanistic values harking back to the Enlightenment. Against that backdrop, Trump's blunt abandonment of even the pretense of defending the liberal international order and its accompanying body of human rights conventions has marked a watershed.

Trump's style is also anathema to the French. The view from Paris is that Trump is a vulgar plutocrat who came to office by pandering to the unsophisticated masses and who might leave office early in scandal. His foreign policy positions, in their view, alternate between 1930s-style isolationism and trigger-happy unilateralism. As tempting as it may be for the French to look down their noses at the United States, however, they know that their country is not immune to right-wing populism: in France's presidential runoff in May, Le Pen received more than ten million votes, a third of the total.

But in the wake of Macron's decisive victory over Le Pen, the French have rightly felt a sense of pride for having slowed down, or perhaps even halted, the march of populism across Europe, especially when across the Atlantic, Trump's America looks like something out of *Ubu Roi*, the nineteenth-century French satirical play about an obscene king. But anxieties persist, and with the destiny of the West seemingly at stake, France feels as much discomfort as it does smugness.

Still, to a certain degree, the country is adopting a wait-and-see approach to Trump. His election has not brought the French out on the streets. There have been no demonstrations with such slogans as *Vive la France! À bas l'Amérique de Trump!* (Long live France! Down with Trump's America!). Nor have the French seized on Trump's disregard for NATO as a pretext to revive past grudges against the alliance, which some French saw as a vehicle for American imperial domination. De Gaulle has long ago turned in his grave: no official in Paris wants to undo France's 2009 return to NATO's integrated military structure, which he had pulled out of in 1966. Nor has Trump's presidency sparked a groundswell of hostility toward the United States as a whole. It's his personality, not his country, that draws so much contempt. This is good news for any future U.S.

president who decides to revive the transatlantic link.

To be sure, anti-Americanism hasn't vanished from France. It's still present on both extremes of the political spectrum. Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the former Trotskyist who won nearly 20 percent of the vote in the first round of this year's presidential election, loves to rant against U.S. policies while evincing little discomfort with those of various dictators. Le Pen, for her part, was seen sipping coffee in Trump Tower during her campaign (without meeting the man), and she did applaud his election ("Congratulations to the American people, free!" she tweeted). But her party's nationalist ideology, as well as French opinion polls showing a deep dislike for Trump, made it hard for her to speak of the prospect of a Franco-American love fest. Instead, she chose to accentuate her fondness for Russian President Vladimir Putin. Setting aside these populists, most French distinguish between Trump, whom they see as an aberration, and the United States' institutions, on which their hopes still rest.

But even though many French look back at Obama with nostalgia—so much so that Macron sought out and received his endorsement—he was not universally loved inside the Élysée Palace, the official home of France's president. In fact, it is hard to overstate how livid the French foreign policy establishment was with Obama's hesitant decision-making style, particularly when it came to Syria. The paroxysm came in August 2013, when Obama, having warned Syria's Bashar al-Assad that the use of chemical weapons would represent the crossing of a "redline," prepared to enforce it with an air strike when Assad did just that. Rafale fighter jets were ready to take off for a joint U.S.-French operation that French officials thought would set the stage for a major shift in the Syrian civil war and possibly lead Assad to accept a negotiated settlement. But within hours, Obama made a massive U-turn, declining to intervene and thus failing to carry out his own threat.

As the ensuing years have made clear, the prolongation of the Syrian conflict has not only produced untold human suffering; it has also inflicted severe damage on Europe, with the resulting terrorism and migration fueling the rise of populism. It was that moment in 2013, and not Trump's election, that made Paris realize that it could no longer count on its ally across the Atlantic. Obama, with his advertised "pivot" to Asia, was already seen as aloof from Europe, but now France's decision-makers learned that the White House could demonstrate total disregard for the objections of a close ally, and that it could go back on its word in ways that harmed European interests and international norms.

Macron was a senior aide to Hollande in the Élysée when these events unfolded, and they left deep traces on his own thinking about Europe and the United States. In an interview in June, he drew an explicit link between Obama's turnaround in Syria and Putin's aggression in Ukraine, which shattered Europe's security architecture. "When you draw redlines, if you don't know how to get them respected, you decide to be weak," he said. He went on: "What emboldened Putin to act in other theaters of operation? The fact that he saw he had in front of him people who had redlines but didn't enforce them."

Pas de deux: Trump and Macron at the Élysée Palace, Paris, July 2017

POOL / REUTERS

HOW TO TREAT TRUMP

Immediately after Macron took office, fresh from an electoral battle against political forces that Trump seemed ready to promote, he made it clear he would not submit to the U.S. president. At a NATO meeting on May 25, Macron managed to fend off Trump's apparent attempt to dominate him during a handshake. He wasted no time in capitalizing on the episode. "That's how you ensure you are respected," he told reporters. "You have to show you won't make small concessions—not even symbolic ones." Macron went on to deliver a remarkable video address to the American people in response to Trump's withdrawal from the Paris climate agreement, calling on U.S. scientists, engineers, and "responsible citizens" to "find a second homeland" in France. And he launched a campaign to "make the planet great again" that gained traction on social media. For a moment, it seemed as if Macron would single-handedly take on Trump and cast himself as the leader of Western liberalism.

In Paris, foreign policy grandees took to the television studios, barely hiding their excitement: now was the time to demonstrate a Gaullist independence, they claimed. Dominique de Villepin, a former foreign minister and former prime minister, argued that France needed to be put back on its traditional track of "mediating" and "balancing" between powers. A debate

had been raging in Parisian circles about whether Hollande—and, before him, Sarkozy—had been too "Atlanticist" in orientation, too dangerously aligned with the United States. This hardly matched the facts, considering the bilateral tensions that existed under both Sarkozy and Hollande. But Macron, it was thought, would offer a welcome course correction.

But those who hoped for a full-on clash with the United States would be disappointed. Macron, it turns out, has recognized that anti-Trumpism can hardly serve as the animating idea behind French foreign policy. He has chosen his words carefully, eager to preserve relations with the White House. Unlike German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who has publicly confronted Trump over his lack of commitment to Western values, Macron has aimed narrowly—for instance, criticizing the Trump administration's stance on climate change rather than declaring, as Merkel did, that the United States can no longer be relied on. In the run-up to the federal election in Germany in September, Merkel has no doubt been aware of the risks of appearing to agree with Trump on anything. Macron is much less constrained. In May, after meeting with Trump at the G-7 summit, he said that despite their differences, he found Trump "pragmatic" and "someone who listens and who is willing to work." Macron even went so far as to invite Trump to this year's Bastille Day festivities in Paris. Macron's team framed the gesture as aimed at honoring the United States' long-standing role in Europe, but it was hard not to see it as an attempt to generate good chemistry with Trump.

For Macron, antagonizing the new U.S. leader simply carries too many downsides—above all, the prospect of jeopardizing cooperation on counterterrorism. French officials see national security as paramount. For years, France has been positioning itself as the United States' most active European ally when it comes to counterterrorism, and since the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris and the 2016 one in Nice, that has proved truer than ever. It's no mystery why: with its constrained defense resources, France can ill afford to dispense with U.S. help in the fight against the Islamic State (or ISIS) and other terrorist groups, whether in the Middle East or the Sahel. Trump's election will not change the centrality of counterterrorism in the relationship. Indeed, Macron has declared counterterrorism his "number one priority," and his first meeting with Trump centered on the fight against ISIS. But what Trump's election will likely change is the way France manages the relationship. Like other U.S. allies, France is struggling to navigate an increasingly indecipherable Washington power structure.

EUROVISION

Instead of seeing Trump's election as a reason to completely distance France from its ally across the Atlantic, Macron is looking for ways to boost France's standing in its immediate neighborhood. French influence in Europe has waned in recent years, in turn weakening France's position on the broader international stage. During the Obama era, it was Germany that served as the United States' preferred interlocutor. From a French standpoint, that was a highly unbalanced arrangement. Ever

since its creation 60 years ago, the European project has been seen in Paris as an amplifier of French influence, not an instrument of its marginalization. Remember that it was only after France lost its empire in 1962, when it withdrew from Algeria, that de Gaulle fully committed to a common European endeavour. (He signed a friendship treaty with West Germany the very next year.)

In an important campaign speech in March, Macron described his vision of France's place in the shifting global landscape:

> To those who have become accustomed to waiting for solutions to their problems from the other side of the Atlantic, I believe that developments in U.S. foreign policy clearly show that we have changed eras. Of course, the alliance with the United States is and remains fundamental, at the strategic, intelligence, and operational levels. . . . But for now, the Americans seem to want to focus on themselves. The current unpredictability of U.S. foreign policy is calling into question some of our points of reference, while a wide space has been left open for the politics of power and fait accompli, in Europe, in the Middle East, and also in Asia. So it is up to us to act where our interests are at stake and to find partners with whom we will work to substitute stability and peace for chaos and violence.

That Macron hasn't publicly repeated those thoughts in so many words since his election does not mean they have changed: rather, he recognizes the diplomatic constraints of being in office. But while somewhat toning down his rhetoric, he has already started putting some of these ideas into practice.

The centerpiece of Macron's plan for Europe is to usher in a new era of continental defense cooperation. The French president has supported the creation of a "European defense fund" to pay for continent-wide projects, and he envisages ad hoc European coalitions for military interventions in and outside Europe. On this front, the French think it's only natural that their country take the lead. The United Kingdom has become obsessively inward-looking—almost a disappearing act, to France's deep regret. In continental Europe, France remains the top military power, and the only one with a nuclear deterrent and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. For historical reasons, Germany is still reluctant to expand its military and put soldiers in harm's way. France has no such qualms, and its political culture allows the president to act militarily without much parliamentary oversight.

But Macron recognizes that France cannot go it alone, and that Germany is key to what he likes to describe as a "European renaissance." His team is considering taking steps toward deeper integration of the eurozone, although much will depend on the outcome of the German election, as well as on Macron's capacity to implement economic reforms at home. In the future, expect Macron to showcase his closeness to Merkel, as when he went to great lengths to support the chancellor's refugee policies—ones Trump has repeatedly castigated. Reviving the so-called Franco-German engine is crucial to the continent's newfound sense of self-confidence,

momentum that Macron wants to capitalize on.

Macron has also called for reform of the European Union, which he sees as ineffective and out of touch. In his view, it must build better defenses against terrorism, Russian aggression, and abusive trade practices (including China's). Macron had drawn up this wish list well before the U.S. election, but Trump's maverick streak has made those steps even more urgent, because Europe now questions the United States' traditional security guarantees and lacks a reliable partner on free trade.

NOW WHAT?

Trump is arguably as much an opportunity for Europe as he is a problem. But those hoping that Europe will weather the United States' turn inward easily should manage their expectations. For starters, Europe can hardly fill the shoes of the United States. There is no such thing as a European nuclear umbrella on offer, and talk of a "European army" remains lofty. Rather, Europeans will take more modest steps, such as pooling their resources for the joint procurement of military equipment. Besides, there are powerful historical hang-ups that haven't entirely disappeared. Macron knows well that it was France, not Germany, that rejected plans for a European army in 1954.

Given all the threats to Europe today—Brexit, Putin's aggression, Turkey's authoritarian turn, and the specter of terrorism—Europe can only try to mitigate some of the consequences of the Trump phenomenon. On this, Macron would surely agree with how one former Obama administration official framed things for me: "Europe needs to hold the fort for as long as Trump remains in office."

Frans Timmermans, the deputy leader of the European Commission, once said that there are two kinds of countries in Europe: "small ones, and those who don't know yet they are small." The French would like to renew their country's sense of grandeur, but France is no superpower. The contrast with Trump may make them feel good about themselves. But as Macron reflects on what he has called "the strategic void" left by the United States' retreat, he knows that he has no other option but to address Europe's weaknesses if he wants France's voice to matter. In other words, he must hedge against "America first" by focusing on Europe first.

Berlin's Balancing Act

Merkel Needs Trump—but Also Needs to Keep Her Distance

Stefan Theil

In January, a disturbing report made the rounds in Berlin's corridors of power. Written by Hans-Peter Bartels, the German parliament's commissioner for defense oversight, the 95-page document laid out the abysmal state of the German military. Soldiers, the report said, lacked guns, ammunition, and night-vision goggles. Some new recruits were being forced to wait 45 weeks to get their uniforms. Only one-third of Germany's 123 Typhoon fighter jets were fully deployable, as were just five of its 60 Sikorsky CH-53 transport helicopters. Military training sometimes featured "laughable improvisations," the document said; earlier reports had described battle exercises during which soldiers used broomsticks to stand in for gun barrels and passenger vans instead of armored personnel carriers. The report was damning but not surprising: for years, the German government has starved the Bundeswehr of funds, leaving it with only 170,000 soldiers, few of them with combat experience, down from over 500,000 in 1990.

STEFAN THEIL is Executive Editor of *Handelsblatt Global Magazine*.

The decline of Germany's military comes at a particularly bad time for the country. U.S. President Donald Trump has repeatedly singled Germany out for free-riding on U.S. security guarantees and for the country's huge trade surplus with the United States. No other U.S. ally has received more of Trump's ire. "We have a MASSIVE trade deficit with Germany, plus they pay FAR LESS than they should on NATO & military. Very bad for U.S. This will change," Trump tweeted at the end of May.

Trump's bluster and oversimplification aside, the core of his accusation—that Germany has benefited more from the global order than the country has contributed to it—is largely correct. And the claim isn't new: other U.S. presidents, including Barack Obama, have made similar points. For decades, Germany has sheltered under the U.S. security umbrella and built its economy on the back of the global economic system created and upheld by the United States. Despite recent steps toward taking a more active role in Europe—engineering a eurozone bailout deal, for example, and brokering an agreement with Turkey to stem migrant flows—Germany has long shied away from global leadership. Now, however, it has no choice but to act if it wants to preserve the liberal order on which its prosperity is built. It must do more to promote free trade, take greater responsibility for its own security, and push Europe to make deep economic reforms. Above all, Germany needs a serious national debate on its vision for Europe and the wider region, and on the role the country wants to play in the world.

MADE IN AMERICA

More so than any other major European country, today's democratic and prosperous

Germany is the product of U.S. engagement in Europe. Nearly 70 years ago, the Marshall Plan jump-started Europe's postwar reconstruction and created the institutions that brought together former enemies and later grew into the European Union. Those institutions, as well as the U.S. guarantee of Western Europe's security during the Cold War, allowed West Germany to get back on its feet without alarming its neighbors.

Today, the German economy dominates Europe. German companies have built factories and distribution hubs all over the world. German container ships ply the oceans, bringing cars, precision machinery, and other industrial goods to every corner of the globe. All told, Germany earns a massive 46 percent of its GDP by selling goods abroad, more than any other major country. Even China and Japan, two other great beneficiaries of free trade, generate only 20 percent and 18 percent of their respective GDPs through exports.

But until now, Germans have been reluctant to engage in any robust debate over their country's responsibilities for maintaining the global order. During the Cold War, the horrors of the recent past gave rise to a reflexive pacifism in West Germany. The country strove for moral clarity and was happy to leave the messy business of power politics to others. At the time, such reticence was also smart policy. It made sense for West Germany, on the frontlines of the confrontation and with wary neighbors, to speak softly and carry no stick.

Even after the Cold War ended and Germany reunified, little changed. When the West went to war, as it did to liberate Kuwait from Saddam Hussein in 1990–91, Germany sent a check instead of soldiers. Less than a decade ago, after Russia's invasion of Georgia in 2008, Berlin held up NATO from planning for a conflict with Russia for fear that such plans would antagonize Moscow. Among German elites, anything other than perpetual peace on the continent seemed unthinkable.

Since then, events in Europe have forced Germany to assume more responsibility. The eurozone debt crisis of 2010 didn't abate until German Chancellor Angela Merkel threw Germany's financial power behind hastily constructed bailouts. And since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, Merkel has led Europe's response to Moscow's aggression. But each time, Germany has taken the lead only reluctantly, at the last minute, and without a broader vision of its aims and role in the world.

Now, Trump is accelerating change. Sigmar Gabriel, the German foreign minister, recently said that Germany must "resist" Trump or be "complicit" in U.S. policies that "put peace in Europe at risk." Merkel, although more circumspect, has said that her view on globalization "differs very sharply" from Trump's and has called on Germany to assert its interests on trade. Speaking to supporters at a campaign rally in Bavaria in May, she said that the days when Germany could depend completely on the United Kingdom and the United States "are to some extent over" and that "we Europeans must really take our destiny into our own hands."

AMERICA, STILL INDISPENSABLE

Despite such talk, Germany has little alternative but to maintain the transatlantic relationship. The United States buys nine percent of Germany's exports,

POOL / REUTERS

The odd couple: Trump and Merkel at the G-20 meeting in Hamburg, Germany, July 2017

more than any other country. Beyond that, without continued U.S. support, the liberal world order that has generated German prosperity would crumble. And on security, Merkel recognizes that Europe is nowhere near ready to go it alone. "We need the military power of the United States," she said at the Munich Security Conference in February. As difficult and unpredictable as Trump can be, Germany has no choice but to engage with him.

Berlin is already doing so. German officials, including Christoph Heusgen, Merkel's foreign and security policy adviser, say that relations with the Trump administration at the working level, including cooperation on defense and counterterrorism, are better than expected. Merkel has tried to build a back channel to Trump by giving his daughter Ivanka the kind of reception in Berlin normally accorded only to foreign leaders. On trade, German officials tirelessly remind their U.S. counterparts that German companies employ 700,000 people in the United States and that U.S. exporters depend just as heavily on the EU's 500 million consumers as European companies do on the United States' 300 million. Merkel has also confirmed that Germany aims to meet one of Trump's main demands by spending two percent of its GDP on defense by NATO's agreed date of 2024, up from the current figure of 1.2 percent. (Many observers, however, believe that Germany and several other NATO members will not reach the target

without relying on bookkeeping tricks, such as moving foreign aid into their security budgets.)

As well as preserving its relationship with the United States, Germany must, to secure its own self-interest, play a more active role in maintaining the broader global order, especially when it comes to trade. Here, Germany can do much better than it has in the past. In 2016, for instance, protests in cities across Germany helped scuttle a prospective EU-U.S. free-trade deal, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). A majority of the German political and business elite backed the agreement but offered only lukewarm public support, allowing a few well-financed professional activist organizations and their supporters in civil society and the media to control the conversation. They painted trade as a threat and played on widespread resentment toward the United States. The episode revealed a profound naiveté in large parts of German society about the sources of the country's prosperity.

After the United Kingdom's vote in June 2016 to leave the EU and Trump's election on an "America first" agenda in November, Germany's elite seemed to finally wake up to the country's economic vulnerability. Berlin helped push through an EU-Canada trade deal in late 2016 and agreed to the initial framework of a similar EU deal with Japan in July. Merkel has also said that she hopes to restart TTIP negotiations with Washington. Also in July, at the G-20 summit in Hamburg, Merkel began recruiting rising powers, such as Brazil and India, to play a greater role in maintaining free trade and global economic governance.

REFORMING EUROPE

Germany will not succeed in defending the current global system if it does not also commit to helping Europe get its house in order. The eurozone's debt and banking crisis is festering. Two of the continent's largest economies, France and Italy, have sunk into a decades-long malaise. Unemployment in the eurozone is falling but remains dangerously high. The EU cannot agree on how to handle the continued influx of refugees and has disguised its inability to police its outer borders with a deal that pays Turkey to prevent migrants from crossing into Europe. Meanwhile, illiberal regimes and populist movements threaten the continent's political unity.

Although Germany is Europe's most powerful country, it cannot fix these problems alone. It must work with the rest of the EU. Hopes are high in Berlin that the new French president, Emmanuel Macron, a German speaker who ran on a pro-EU agenda, can succeed in reforming the statist and stagnant French economy, something that his predecessors have failed to do. There's talk in Berlin of a grand bargain between the two countries. In return for German support for a common eurozone budget and a new eurozone finance ministry, France would implement serious economic reforms to reduce the likelihood that the European Central Bank will have to bail out its economy and major banks. Full fiscal union would be off the table, and the devil would be in the details, but Berlin should push hard for an agreement. Europe cannot remain stable and secure without revived Franco-German cooperation.

Germany also needs to get the EU to take some of the burden of military leadership off the United States. It has

made an important start: in 2016, Berlin hiked the Bundeswehr's budget for the first time since the end of the Cold War. This year, Germany's military spending will rise by another eight percent, or $3.1 billion, part of a $12 billion boost in defense spending by non-U.S. NATO members planned before the U.S. presidential election. The military is also creating a new cyber and information warfare command, to be staffed by 13,500 people. And it has bought new equipment, including $500 million worth of armored vehicles currently deployed by German peacekeepers in Afghanistan and new frigates to protect global trade routes from pirates.

To better coordinate European defense, the Bundeswehr now operates combined units with forces from France, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, and other countries, which could potentially serve as the basis for a pan-European fighting force. In the Baltics, the Bundeswehr has taken a leading role in NATO's forward defense by supplying the main contingent of a multinational force in Lithuania, a monumental step given Germany's long-standing reluctance to confront Russia. In July, Macron and Merkel announced the joint Franco-German development of a next-generation fighter jet. Germany is also helping fund a new, $1.5-billion-a-year EU-wide program for joint defense research.

Long before Trump's election, Merkel and much of her government recognized that Europe would have to do more when it came to security. To do so, however, Berlin must confront a deeply ingrained culture of pacifism and disengagement in Germany. Although German soldiers are currently deployed in 16 foreign hot spots, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali,

and the waters off Somalia, their mandates almost always exclude combat. The German navy's new frigates can take on small craft but lack the weaponry to confront an advanced adversary. In June, the Defense Ministry abandoned a plan to lease military drones from Israel, likely because the mere possession of such lethal aircraft would have proved too controversial during an election year. As long as Germany does not have a clear strategy for how and why it deploys its forces, its military upgrades will remain halfhearted. And as long as the Bundeswehr's mandates nearly always exclude combat, the country's allies will continue to worry that Germany will shirk its responsibilities in a security crisis.

As part of its leadership role in Europe's foreign policy, Germany must face up to the challenge to the continent's postwar order posed by Russia. In recent years, Russia has worked to destabilize Western countries by interfering in their elections, spreading disinformation, supporting populist and far-right parties, and undermining Western institutions such as the EU. Russia is deeply involved in German politics. It operates a network of German-language propaganda channels and hires prominent Germans as Kremlin lobbyists. If Russian President Vladimir Putin wanted to keep the 2016 U.S. Democratic nominee, Hillary Clinton, out of the White House, he likely has an even greater antipathy to Merkel, who has worked to ensure that EU sanctions on Russia in response to its annexation of Crimea will remain in place. In early July, Thomas de Maizière, Germany's interior minister, said that the government expected Russia to attempt to influence this year's German general election, perhaps by releasing data stolen from the Bundestag, Germany's parliament, in 2015.

Despite all of this, many Germans still oppose policies they perceive as anti-Russian. According to a Pew survey released in June, 25 percent of Germans trust Putin, compared with just 11 percent who trust Trump. Sanctions against Russia are unpopular with German businesses, which have closed some 500 Russian subsidiaries since 2014. Merkel also faces opposition from her own coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party, which takes a more sympathetic stance toward Russia. Merkel's foreign minister at the time of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Social Democrat Frank-Walter Steinmeier, accused NATO of "saber rattling" by deploying units to the Baltic states—ignoring Russia's threats and its far larger military buildup along its western border. Merkel's Social Democratic predecessor, Gerhard Schröder, has worked as an executive for an energy company with close ties to the Kremlin since leaving office and still wields influence in his party. Even Merkel herself has not been uniformly tough against Russia. In June, after the U.S. Senate voted to strengthen sanctions on Russia in the energy sector, she confirmed plans to go ahead with the controversial Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, to be built by a German-Russian consortium in which Schröder is a key executive. The pipeline will run from Russia to Germany and give Russia an even greater share of Europe's energy market, in direct opposition to EU policy.

To successfully deter Russia, Europe will depend on continued

U.S. engagement. So far, the Germans' worst fears have been allayed. "One of the issues we were most worried about from early news of where the Trump administration would go was that they would make a deal [with Russia]," Heusgen told Stephen Hadley, a former U.S. national security adviser, at the American Academy in Berlin in June. "This has proven wrong. . . . Trump was very tough on Russia, very tough, and very clear also on Crimea." U.S. actions have also reassured Germany. Washington has kept Russian sanctions in place, deployed more troops and equipment to Europe, and boosted funding by $1.4 billion, or 41 percent, for an Obama-era program to fortify NATO's eastern defenses. U.S. allies such as Germany see such actions as more significant than Trump's often incoherent public statements on Russia.

PHYSICIAN, HEAL THYSELF

In order for any effort to reform Europe to succeed, Germany will have to reform itself as well. Germany's economy is doing well now, but its extreme dependence on exports exposes it to great risks from the growing global anti-trade backlash. Within the EU, Germany's vast surpluses in trade and capital have not won the country any friends. Large investments of surplus export earnings in everything from Greek debt to Spanish real estate have helped destabilize the eurozone. Because German taxpayers end up holding the bag for the resulting losses, moving to a more stable economic model is in their own interest.

To rebalance its economy so that it relies less on exports, Germany needs a fresh round of reforms to unleash domestic growth. That means more spending power for citizens (Germans pay some of the highest taxes in the world), higher government investment (for example, in education, infrastructure, and defense), and deregulation to spur more domestic investment by German companies. These reforms, because they would boost German demand for foreign goods, could be Berlin's most important contribution to any Franco-German plan to rebalance the eurozone.

Most difficult of all, German politicians will have to convince a skeptical public that Germany needs to carry its fair share of Europe's security burden. Even in a time of rising tensions, most Germans oppose any increase in military spending. In a survey conducted in December 2016 by Forsa, only 32 percent of Germans polled approved of increased outlays. A similarly small minority endorsed the Bundeswehr's participation in combat missions. In the political parties, academia, and the media, skepticism toward the use of hard power is just as widespread. Too many years of collecting a rich peace dividend and standing by while others provided security have produced muddled thinking. Many in the German elite still seem to take perpetual peace in Europe for granted, are reluctant to contemplate that using hard power is ever necessary, and do not acknowledge that Germany has a bigger role to play in upholding the European order.

Dealing with these political realities would be difficult enough, but Trump's toxicity in Germany has made Merkel's task even harder. According to a June survey by Infratest dimap, 92 percent of Germans disapprove of Trump; only five percent approve. And only 21 percent of Germans asked said they considered

the United States "a trustworthy partner," down from 59 percent last November. (At 94 percent, France was the most trusted partner. Even China scored 36 percent.) In a poll conducted that same month by the Pew Research Center, among 11 European countries surveyed, Germany had the least trust in the United States.

Merkel's challenger for the chancellorship in the September elections, the Social Democrat Martin Schulz, has tried to tar her as insufficiently hostile to Trump, accusing her of letting Trump "humiliate" Germany. Schulz is also trying to paint Merkel as a warmonger for raising military spending; in his stump speeches, he opposes higher defense outlays and calls for hikes in social spending instead. He is clearly hoping to copy Schröder's come-from-behind election victory in 2002, when Schröder capitalized on fierce public opposition to U.S. President George W. Bush and the impending war in Iraq.

Merkel, therefore, has to tread carefully between preserving a working relationship with Washington and keeping her distance from Trump in the eyes of her electorate. Her statement in May that Germany and Europe could no longer fully rely on their traditional allies and would have to chart their own course didn't attack Trump directly. And although she and other leading German politicians have said similar things before, most of the German and international media interpreted her statement as a major stab at Trump, something that probably won her points with German voters. She has also closed ranks with Macron, a popular move among Germans.

Trump's election and his continued snipes at Germany have raised the specter of a dangerous breakdown in transatlantic relations. But they have had one beneficial effect: accelerating Germany's process of rethinking its global role. "Things are getting serious," Heusgen said at the American Academy event in June. "We have problems getting closer to Europe," such as Russian aggression and chaos in the Middle East. "Now we see that we cannot sit back anymore and have the Americans solve all the problems for us. . . . This is our hope: that this is a lesson for the Europeans that we have to get our act together and assume more responsibility." There are no guarantees, he said. "We've always been able to shoot ourselves in the foot, but there is a certain chance in Europe that we move forward." With a U.S. president like Trump, Berlin may no longer have a choice.

The United Kingdom's Trump Trap

How Special a Relationship?

David Goodhart

One sunny afternoon in Covent Garden this past summer, a street performer realized that an audience volunteer sounded American. "Please tell me you're not a Trump supporter!" the busker pleaded. "Er, no, I'm not," stammered the embarrassed young man—at which point, the London crowd cheered.

Most Europeans find Donald Trump alien and contemptible and a man unsuited for the U.S. presidency. Some will admit that he has at least introduced them to a large part of the American public they seldom encounter: the ordinary citizens who feel disrespected and exploited by globalist elites they see as rigging the system against them. Trump gives his supporters a rare sense that someone at the top understands their feelings of defeat and humiliation—and Europeans who simply dismiss him will continue to underestimate the power of the passions that fueled his rise.

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THE REGION'S REACTION

In office, Trump appears to have abandoned much of his domestic populist agenda and pursued traditional Republican policy priorities: cutting taxes rather than building infrastructure, restricting rather than expanding health care, rolling back environmental and consumer protections. But on foreign policy, he continues to push a strongly nationalist line, even while consigning many of his radical campaign promises to the memory hole.

European views of Trump fall into three main camps. The first and largest sees him as a living fossil, the sort of "ugly American" common enough in earlier eras, focused less on responsible global leadership than on nativism, mercantilism, and gunboat diplomacy. This camp takes it for granted that Trump is destabilizing and an embarrassment and wonders only whether he will be checked and balanced enough by the U.S. Constitution.

A second, smaller camp is more pragmatic. Its members point out that the Trump administration's actions have been more conventional than its rhetoric and that the president's tweets have not represented U.S. policy. The third, smallest camp includes Trump's European supporters, populists and nationalists across the continent who are delighted by such an emphatic vindication of their worldview from such an unexpected source.

Germany is the epicenter of the continent's anti-Trump feelings, which is hardly surprising given how the brash New Yorker is a living negation of modern Germany's liberal cosmopolitanism, not to mention its attachment to pooled sovereignty and a cooperative, rules-based

international order. "We, along with Japan, are the successful children of postwar America, so it is especially painful and confusing for us to see the institutions that have created our rehabilitation, such as NATO and the EU, trashed by our own parent," said Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger, foreign editor of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. And the tensions have been compounded by bilateral differences on issues such as trade and Iran.

Still, some things about the new administration have gone over well in Europe. For example, Trump's decision to launch an air strike against Syria in support of nonproliferation norms and his skepticism about economic globalism have pleased many on the European left (although not enough to offset their disgust with what are widely considered to be his racist immigration policies). His coolness toward NATO and the EU, ironically, has given a welcome boost to those favoring a strong Europe united under Franco-German leadership. And of course, Trump has real friends among the continent's populists and right-wing nationalists, who together account for about one-fifth of the European electorate. He has embraced some of the populists in return, most notably Nigel Farage, former leader of the UK Independence Party. And Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, an explicit proponent of "illiberal democracy," actually endorsed Trump's candidacy during the campaign.

In recent months, Orban's enthusiasm has waned, thanks in part to Trump's withdrawal from the Paris agreement on climate change. And some European populist parties closer to the mainstream, such as Alternative for Germany and the Danish People's Party, are also more circumspect.

There remains a striking difference between how Trump is perceived in western Europe and how he is seen in the former Soviet bloc. "Attitudes to Trump's America are different in eastern Europe, where the Russian threat is the main concern, leaving little room for moral grandstanding towards a vital ally; instead, the attention focuses, with cold-eyed realism, on who can provide the hard defense capabilities needed to deal with the security situation at hand," notes Gabriel Elefteriu, a foreign policy specialist at the London think tank Policy Exchange. And in the east, despite Trump's rhetoric, recent U.S. actions have been conventional and welcome.

The Poland-based Enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group, part of a NATO operation and built around an American unit, has deployed in the field as planned. Multinational military exercises have continued at a high tempo. And the administration has sought increased funding for the European Reassurance Initiative, an effort to strengthen deterrence in the region that was launched after Russia's annexation of Crimea.

In fact, in most areas, U.S. policy has changed far less under Trump than the breathless media coverage would suggest. As Jens Stoltenberg, the secretary-general of NATO, said at a security conference in June, "Judge him by his actions, not his words." Even his most egregious act to date, in European eyes—pulling the United States out of the Paris climate accord—was more symbolic than significant. The treaty is voluntary, the planned emission reductions are small, and the bulk of U.S. contributions to tackling climate change will continue to be

Stiff upper lip: May and Trump at the G-20 summit in Hamburg, Germany, July 2017

POOL / REUTERS

driven by technological innovation and actions by state and local governments and the private sector.

MAY'S DILEMMA

Trump's dealings with the United Kingdom have blown hot and cold. Cheered by the former real estate developer's support for Brexit, British Prime Minister Theresa May's Conservative government initially offered Trump the pomp and ceremony of a full state visit, including an audience with the queen. But as the months went on, Trump managed to alienate people across the British political spectrum—capping it off by responding to a terrorist attack in London in June with an absurd criticism of Sadiq Khan, the city's mayor, who happens to be Muslim. With nearly two million British citizens having signed a petition calling for the visit to be canceled and the prospect of massive demonstrations causing a public relations nightmare, the trip was quietly dropped (although it may be revived down the road).

In responding to Trump, May has had to balance competing concerns. The United Kingdom's planned withdrawal from the EU makes its "special relationship" with the United States more significant than ever, and Trump has backed a comprehensive post-Brexit trade deal. Staying too close to Trump, however, could complicate the United Kingdom's other major diplomatic relationships.

The value of American support for the United Kingdom's controversial new approach to Europe is crucial, even if it has scarcely been registered by most commentators. Had the Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton won the presidential election, as expected, for example, the British government would

now be even more isolated, and its path toward Brexit, even more complicated. A Clinton administration would likely have continued its predecessor's opposition to the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the EU and turned a cold shoulder to any new bilateral trade deal.

The British government has navigated these shoals relatively skillfully so far. Trying to duplicate the relationship between British Prime Minister Tony Blair and U.S. President George W. Bush, May has triangulated, casting herself as a bridge between the headstrong Americans and a worried Europe. The strategy was developed and implemented effectively right after the surprise Trump victory, with May being the first foreign leader to visit Trump at the White House. At a time when her counterparts were frantic over Trump's anti-NATO comments, she was able to extract some qualified support for the alliance from the president, reminding him of the value of the transatlantic partnership.

It is also interesting to consider how things might have played out had Trump won but Brexit lost, with David Cameron remaining British prime minister. London would probably have tacked closer to the pan-European chorus of Trump critics, or at least gone to ground—and one could easily imagine the new president being so annoyed that he would have begun unraveling the alliance in earnest. May's maneuvering has helped prevent tensions from boiling over and kept her country's options open.

The consensus in and around Whitehall is that the Trump presidency represents a painful but useful wake-up call for liberal internationalism, which had begun to slip into a less robust universalistic globalism (and one free-riding on U.S. power to boot). The problem, however, is that Trump seems to represent not a more prudent internationalism but rather crass chauvinism.

European policymakers may have occasionally been frustrated with the Obama administration's foreign policy, but they could at least be confident that there was one and that it displayed some internal logic and coherence. No such confidence exists today, with technocrats no better than anybody else at predicting or explaining Trump's idiosyncratic behavior.

Despite all the tension, there is nonetheless an element of theater in the current transatlantic rupture, with all sides using the crisis to advance their own agendas and narratives. The idea that Trump's emergence has proved that Europe cannot rely on the United States forever is welcome to those who want the continent to pursue a more independent course. And the president surely finds European opposition convenient for mobilizing his domestic political base. So Trump pretends to be a populist nationalist, and European elites pretend to be distraught. But neither side actually wants to seriously disrupt the alliance, at least not yet.

The Trump era has jangled nerves on both sides of the Atlantic. But for all the shouting, it is not at all clear yet what major lasting impact, if any, it will have on U.S.-European relations.

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

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

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

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Trump's Gift to Japan

Time for Tokyo to Invest in the Liberal Order

Takako Hikotani

Japan has more reason to worry than any other country in the world about who becomes the president of the United States. In contrast to U.S. allies and partners in Europe, which are surrounded mostly by friendly states, Japan faces many neighbors that are undemocratic and increasingly hostile. Since January, North Korea has launched missiles in Japan's vicinity 11 times, culminating in a test of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on July 4. China has continued its buildup of islands in the South China Sea. And in the face of such developments, Japan remains heavily dependent on the United States for its own security.

The unexpected victory of Donald Trump in the U.S. presidential election last year should have set off shock waves in Japan. Before and during the campaign, he repeatedly criticized Tokyo, accusing it of manipulating Japan's currency and unfairly shutting out U.S. cars from the Japanese market. He questioned the U.S.-Japanese alliance, arguing that Japan and South Korea should cough up more money to retain U.S. military bases, speculated that Japan "may very well be better off" with its own atomic weapons, and suggested that he would consider ending the U.S. defense commitment to Japan. For the Japanese, accordingly, there was more than enough reason to doubt the new U.S. president's competency and willingness to maintain the alliance—and thus more than enough reason to begin seeking alternative ways to ensure Japanese security.

The outcome of the U.S. presidential election was a surprise not just for the Japanese government but also for the Japanese public. Although some questioned whether President Barack Obama's "pivot" to Asia had delivered as much as promised, the Obama presidency had been seen as successful from the Japanese point of view. The U.S. military's quick and effective response to Japan's 2011 earthquake and tsunami was widely appreciated. Caroline Kennedy, Obama's ambassador to Japan from 2013 until earlier this year, was very popular. And in his final months in office, Obama became the first U.S. president to ever visit Hiroshima, where he delivered a widely praised speech. According to a poll conducted by the Japanese government just before the U.S. election, 84 percent of the Japanese public felt affinity toward the United States, 87 percent believed that current relations between the two countries were "on the whole good," and 95 percent considered the future development of U.S.-Japanese relations to be important for the two countries and for Asia and the Pacific region.

After Trump's election, conservative Japanese pundits, most notably the populist former mayor of Osaka, Toru Hashimoto, argued that the Trump presidency was a welcome opportunity

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for Japan to become more independent and "stand on its feet." Most Japanese, however, were concerned. In a December 2016 poll, 61 percent of respondents said they were "worried" about U.S.-Japanese relations under Trump. In another poll, conducted shortly after Trump's inauguration, 84 percent of respondents said they feared that the world would become less stable under Trump, and more than half said that U.S.-Japanese relations would worsen. And according to the Pew Research Center, Japanese confidence in the U.S. leadership fell from 78 percent to 24 percent from the end of Obama's presidency to the beginning of Trump's, 80 percent of the public said they considered Trump arrogant, and 56 percent said they considered him dangerous.

And yet so far, there has been no "Trump shock" in Japan. Rather than panicking, the Japanese government has engaged in effective "Trump management," with the pragmatic support of the Japanese public. But that approach has started to show its limits. Going forward, Tokyo will have to step up and do more to preserve the liberal democratic order, which now lacks leadership from Washington. This will mean a role reversal for Japan: rather than being the beneficiary of a liberal order led by the United States, it now must do everything it can to save that order—and keep the United States from withdrawing from it altogether.

DISARM AND DISENGAGE

Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe seem to have a natural affinity: both have pledged to restore their countries to greatness, both favor other strong leaders, and both enjoy golf. Yet their so-called honeymoon, which extended from a November 2016 get-together at Trump Tower to a February 2017 weekend at Mar-a-Lago, was not a simple expression of Abe's affection for Trump. Rather, it was a well-calculated attempt by Japanese officials to manage Trump, drawing on two basic strategies.

The first was to "disarm" Trump. Immediately after the election, there were fears that Trump would stick to his anti-Japanese accusations from the campaign, especially given Abe's meeting with the Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton during the UN General Assembly in September 2016. After Trump's victory, Japanese officials immediately went to work to set up a meeting, and Abe and Trump's November encounter consisted of gift giving (Trump got a golden golf club) and cordial conversation, with sensitive topics off the table. It was considered successful precisely because it was so insubstantial. It lasted twice as long as its scheduled time, and Japanese officials reportedly took the presence of Trump's daughter Ivanka as a sign that the Trump family had embraced Japan.

Expectations for the first official meeting after Trump's inauguration were higher. According to reports, multiple psychologists offered Abe advice for handling Trump: "no matter what Trump says, one should always express approval before any signs of disagreement," and "never refer to a topic that is unknown to Trump." Some officials worried about the length of the meeting: Abe and Trump were expected to spend 11 hours together, including over 27 holes of golf and four meals. But the preparations seemed to pay off: the personal rapport continued,

JIM BOURG / REUTERS

Grin and bear it: Abe and Trump in the Oval Office, February 2017

and Trump apparently made no further complaints about the trade deficit, currency manipulation, or the cost of maintaining U.S. forces in Japan.

The second strategy was to "disengage" Trump from key policy matters. Japanese officials feared that Trump's transactional dealmaking approach, and especially his coupling of economic and security matters, would force them to make concessions on trade in exchange for maintaining the alliance. So they worked to put economic and security policy in separate negotiating channels, both away from the White House.

The security discussion progressed more quickly and successfully than expected. According to a report in the Japanese newspaper *Yomiuri Shimbun*, Japanese officials were gleefully taken by surprise by statements that U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis made when he visited Japan in early February. He called the maintenance of U.S. forces in Japan a "model of cost-sharing" and hailed Japan's efforts to increase its defense spending. More important, he emphasized the enduring value of the U.S.-Japanese alliance and confirmed that the United States would continue to back Japanese administration of the contested Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, explicitly affirming that Washington considers the islands to be covered by Article 5 of the U.S.-Japanese security treaty, which commits the United States to defend Japanese territories against attack. Having gotten everything they wanted from Mattis, the Japanese had only to hope that Trump would not

undercut his secretary of defense; so far, he has not.

The economic discussion proved more challenging. Trump's withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), although expected, was disheartening for Japanese officials, who had worked hard for the agreement. They also realized that the trade numbers that mattered most to Trump did not look good. In 2016, for example, a mere 15,000 American cars and light trucks were sold in Japan, while Toyota alone sold 2.1 million automobiles in the United States. The Trump administration's frequent use of the term "reciprocity" in reference to trade reminded them of the fierce disputes of the 1980s.

In order to disengage Trump from such matters, Tokyo proposed an economic dialogue headed by Taro Aso, Japan's deputy prime minister and finance minister, and U.S. Vice President Mike Pence. Aso and Pence would cover macroeconomic policy, infrastructure and energy cooperation, and bilateral free-trade agreements.

The combination of disarming Trump and disengaging him from core issues seemed to work even better than expected. And the Mar-a-Lago summit came with an unexpected twist: as Trump and Abe were dining on February 11, North Korea launched a missile test, providing an opportunity for the two leaders to bond. Later that night, Trump declared that "the United States of America stands behind Japan, its great ally, one hundred percent."

BULLY FOR YOU

In the wake of that visit, the Japanese public was reassured. Most polls showed that a sizable majority of the public approved of the outcome of the meeting; in one poll, only 28 percent of respondents said that being too close to Trump could be a liability for Japan.

A number of factors contributed to this turnaround in opinion. First, most of the Japanese public understands that the U.S.-Japanese alliance is the only viable means of guaranteeing Japan's security, leading to a strong preference for the status quo. If U.S. forces were to leave Japan, the cost in terms of the military spending to replace them and the broader economic harm would be in the hundreds of billions of dollars.

Meanwhile, certain moves by the Trump administration that have led to condemnation in other countries have provoked a more muted response in Japan. (In part, this is because Japanese media coverage of the Trump administration has focused more on the bilateral relationship than on U.S. policy elsewhere or at home.) That is not to deny that there is considerable interest in how and why Trump was elected (a Japanese translation of J. D. Vance's *Hillbilly Elegy* has already been published) or that Trump's tweets are not reported on every day. But much of what has consumed U.S. domestic politics is simply difficult to comprehend in a Japanese context. For example, Abe declined to comment on Trump's proposed ban on travel from six Muslim-majority countries, and only about 350 people gathered to protest it in Japan. Owing in part to Japan's miniscule populations of foreign-born people and Muslims, the issue did not resonate. Moreover, Tokyo itself has not been friendly to refugees either. In 2016, of the 10,901 people who applied for refugee status in Japan, only 28 were accepted.

Accordingly, as long as the bilateral relationship is successfully managed, most of the Japanese public seems willing to overlook other controversial aspects of Trump's presidency. Trump is often portrayed as a bully in Japanese media, but many people in Japan seem to have decided that it is better to have the bully on your side. Opposition parties and some pundits may criticize Abe for "sucking up" to Trump. Overall, however, the strong preference for the status quo and the relative lack of sensitivity to many of Trump's moves have moderated such criticism.

STEPPING UP

For all the success of disarmament and disengagement thus far, the limits of Tokyo's Trump management are starting to become clear. For one thing, Trump himself has proved even less predictable than expected; disarming him in one meeting offers only so much comfort, since he could reverse course soon afterward. Disengagement, meanwhile, has been challenged by Trump's recent tweets on North Korea and by complaints that Trump made just prior to the G-20 meeting in July regarding market access for American products.

More fundamentally, the broader shift in U.S. foreign policy—the retreat from international institutions, the uncertainties about U.S.-Chinese relations, the growing threat of conflict on the Korean Peninsula—has forced Japan to think beyond Trump management. This means reconsidering both how Japan can strengthen its own defense capabilities and how it can expand its policy portfolio and thereby help bolster international institutions.

The most acute security concern today is North Korea. Security experts have long argued that the successful North Korean development of an ICBM that could reach the continental United States would be a game changer for the U.S.-Japanese alliance, undermining the value of Washington's security guarantee. Pyongyang's apparent achievement of this goal will thus likely spur greater Japanese public support for moves to enhance Japan's defense capabilities. In June, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's Research Committee on Security released recommendations for defense planning for fiscal years 2019 to 2023. It advocated increased spending, with NATO's target of two percent of GDP as a reference point, and introducing new land-based missile defense systems.

The committee also endorsed an earlier proposal to consider acquiring counterattack capabilities, including cruise missiles. This is not a new idea: since 1956, the Japanese government has considered striking an enemy base to be permissible within its definition of self-defense under the constitution if there is an imminent threat to Japan that cannot be dealt with by other means. But the growing North Korean threat has made it easier for proponents to make their case, and the added uncertainty coming from Washington has muted critical reactions. In an April poll conducted by the conservative-leaning newspaper *Sankei Shimbun*, 91 percent of respondents reported feeling threatened by Pyongyang's nuclear weapons development. Forty-five percent said they would support a Japanese counterattack after a North Korean missile had been launched toward Japan, and 31 percent said they would favor a preemptive strike once North Korea had started to prepare for a launch.

A counterattack capability would add an additional layer of deterrence against North Korea, but it might also affect the strategic calculation of other actors in the region. Japan needs to be careful about the message it might send to other countries, as well as such a capability's implications for the relationship with the United States, since Japan would need to rely on U.S. detection and intelligence support in order to carry out a strike. Still, despite the challenges associated with new Japanese capabilities, Tokyo has no choice but to consider its options more broadly than before, especially as Washington recalibrates its own approach to North Korea.

On the economic front, meanwhile, Japan is contending not just with Washington's withdrawal from the TPP but also with larger questions of regional economic order. In April, a day after meeting with Pence, Aso stated that Japan would proceed with the TPP. Since then, discussion among the remaining 11 countries has continued, in an effort to come up with an amended agreement that leaves out the United States. But it will not be easy. Countries such as Malaysia and Vietnam will not see the same advantages to the TPP without U.S. participation, and thus the negotiations must arrive at a means of keeping the door open for later U.S. membership.

The most important regional economic question is whether to compete, coexist, or cooperate with Chinese expansion in the region, especially Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative. As the Trump administration has weakened U.S.

economic leadership in Asia, Tokyo has been forced to rethink its approach. Earlier, it had worked with Washington to oppose Chinese projects, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and had viewed the Belt and Road Initiative with suspicion. With the United States leaving the TPP, Japan has decided to reconsider its relationship with China. In June, Abe declared that Japan was ready to cooperate on the Belt and Road Initiative, a reversal that shows a new effort at engagement with China rather than opposition. He also expressed his desire to "see a world in which high-quality rules cover an area from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean," with free trade a force that can bring both peace and prosperity. Although he insisted that he has not given up on the TPP, he emphasized Japan's Economic Partnership Agreement with the EU as a means of expanding trade beyond Asia.

None of this means that Japan is turning away from the United States and toward China. After all, Tokyo and Beijing still have significant disagreements and territorial disputes, and the U.S. military commitment to the region remains strong. And what China does, or does not do, in the face of North Korea's nuclear and missile tests could easily derail any progress in the Chinese-Japanese relationship.

The most fundamental challenge that Trump poses for Japan relates to the liberal democratic order, which has always been critical to Japan's success. Going forward, Tokyo cannot be preoccupied simply with managing Trump. It must also seek ways to play a greater role in its region and around the world. Even for immediate challenges such as North Korea, thinking beyond the bilateral relationship will be crucial.

In Asia, Japan should work with other countries to keep the TPP alive and to make sure it will be possible for the United States to join it in the future. Along the same lines, Tokyo should support Washington's reentry into the Paris climate accord, if and when the time comes. Japan can also play a leading role in coordinating with other Asian countries to prevent the North Korean crisis from turning into a tragedy. Keeping the door open for the United States—even Trump's United States—is a role Japan should seek, not just in Asia but also worldwide.

Down and Out Down Under

Australia's Uneasy American Alliance

Michael Fullilove

In late January, just days after taking office, U.S. President Donald Trump sat down in the Oval Office for his first official call with Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull. Seated around the Resolute Desk with Trump were Michael Flynn, then Trump's national security adviser; Steve Bannon, Trump's chief strategist; and Sean Spicer, the White House press secretary. It should not have been a difficult or fractious exchange: it was an introductory conversation with the leader of the United States' most reliable ally, the only country to fight beside the United States in every major conflict of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

But instead of a friendly discussion, the exchange was "hostile and charged," according to senior U.S. officials speaking to *The Washington Post*. Trump "boasted about the magnitude of his electoral college win" and "blasted" Turnbull over a refugee-transfer agreement that Australia had reached with the Obama administration. He told Turnbull, "This was the worst call by far," and then abruptly ended it after just 25 minutes, less than halfway through the allotted hour. Trump later tweeted about the refugee agreement, promising to "study this dumb deal."

Reports of the call struck like a lightning bolt on the Australian political scene. No one was surprised to learn that Trump had a poor telephone manner. But what were Australians to make of the fact that on the same day that Trump had a warm, hour-long call with Russian President Vladimir Putin—an opponent of the liberal order and an adversary of the United States—he treated their prime minister with disrespect? Some thought that Turnbull had been unwise to broach the refugee issue at all, given Trump's statements on immigration. Nevertheless, Australians of all persuasions concluded that Trump's behavior had been both appalling and revealing.

Australians are not delicate flowers. They have been known to use rough language. The problem was not the phone call itself but what it represented. It crystallized broader concerns about Trump's worldview, which may have significant consequences for Australian interests and for Australian foreign policy in the coming years. It is conceivable that Trump's presidency may push Australia away from the United States. But hopefully, the lasting result will instead be a more ambitious Australia that seeks to shape its external environment and contribute to a stable balance of power in Asia and the rest of the world. With Trump in the White House, it is time for Australians to think big.

MICHAEL FULLILOVE is Executive Director of the Lowy Institute, in Sydney, Australia, and the author of ***Rendezvous With Destiny: How Franklin D. Roosevelt and Five Extraordinary Men Took America Into the War and Into the World***. **Follow him on Twitter at @mfullilove.**

UP HIMSELF

Australians had made up their minds about Trump long before that call. Polling conducted in early 2016 by the Lowy

Institute (which I direct) had found that they favored Hillary Clinton over Trump in the presidential race by a ratio of seven to one. Almost half of Australian adults polled agreed that Australia should distance itself from the United States if it elected a president like Trump. In the final year of the Obama administration, a Pew Research Center poll found, 84 percent of Australians were confident that the U.S. president would "do the right thing" in world affairs; under Trump, that figure has fallen to 29 percent.

There are three reasons for Trump's Antipodean unpopularity. First, his personal style runs contrary to Australian sensibilities. Trump is high energy; Australians are low-key. Trump cannot stop talking, especially about himself; Australians are laconic and taciturn. They have no tolerance for bluster and prefer self-deprecation to self-aggrandizement. The greatest sin in Australia is to be "up yourself."

Second, Australians have themselves been down a populist path and found that it leads nowhere. More than 20 years ago, they first elected to the Federal Parliament their own right-wing nativist with a famous hairstyle, Pauline Hanson. They soon realized that Hanson had questions to ask but no answers to give.

Hanson has now run for election at the state and federal levels 11 times, and succeeded only twice. She is almost as well known for starring on reality television shows—including *Celebrity Apprentice Australia*—as she is for serving in Parliament. Like Trump, Hanson feeds on the alienation of people who feel they have been left behind. But when she is elected to a position of responsibility, support drains away, as Australians recognize both her personal shortcomings and the limitations of the people around her.

Last year, Hanson was elected to Parliament for the second time. Later, she toasted Trump's electoral victory with champagne outside Parliament House. She followed his lead in describing Putin as a strong leader, even though Putin's proxies took the lives of 38 Australians when they shot down a civilian airliner over eastern Ukraine in 2014. She recently called for a Trump-style travel ban on Muslims. One year after her election, however, Hanson is in trouble again, with indifferent public support, party infighting, and investigations into her campaign finances.

The third, and most important, reason Australians do not like Trump is that his foreign policy instincts—expressed repeatedly over the past three decades—run directly counter to their own. Trump wants the United States to play a shrunken role in the world; Australia wants the United States to play a significant one. Trump is sympathetic to isolationism; Australians are inclined toward internationalism. Trump is an alliance skeptic; Australians are alliance believers. Trump is hostile to free trade; Australia is a trading nation. Trump swoons over autocrats and strongmen; Australia is an old democracy and a free society. Trump decries globalists; nearly four in five Australians polled by the Lowy Institute agreed that globalization is mostly good for Australia.

Australia's primary strategic instinct has long been to make common cause with a like-minded global ally. But Trump's plan to "make America great again" renounces several of the pillars of American greatness—and compromises core Australian interests.

BEST MATES?

In the week after the phone call between Trump and Turnbull, Washington rallied around Australia. Canberra's ambassador was invited to the White House to meet with Bannon and Reince Priebus, Trump's chief of staff. A bipartisan group of senators sponsored a resolution expressing support for the alliance. Both governments worked to repair the relationship, culminating in a May dinner aboard the *Intrepid* in New York Harbor, where Trump made nice with Turnbull.

Turnbull also made nice with Trump, even agreeing when the president told reporters that their earlier phone call had been "a very, very good call" and that media accounts of it had been "fake news." Just as Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and British Prime Minister Theresa May had done, Turnbull had calculated that Australia's interests required him to maintain something resembling a working relationship with the president of the United States.

Yet Australians remain troubled by Trump's approach to foreign policy. On his first full day in office, Trump withdrew the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a 12-nation trade agreement that also includes Australia, undercutting the United States' position in Asia and putting the entire agreement at risk. In June, he announced his intention to withdraw from the Paris climate accord, leading Australians to conclude that Washington is not serious about a global challenge that concerns them greatly. He has been wholly unconvincing in demonstrating his commitment to the principle of collective defense codified in Article 5 of NATO's founding treaty, which underpins all U.S. alliances. He has been careless in his handling of intelligence provided to Washington by allies. This kind of conduct undermines perceptions of U.S. reliability. Golf clubs are about membership dues; alliances are about solidarity.

When U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis and U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson visited Sydney in June for the annual Australia–United States Ministerial Consultations, or AUSMIN, they said the right things. But the Australian participants could not help but look past the two secretaries to the man looming behind them. Will Mattis and Tillerson really get to shape U.S. policy? Will Trump allow the tension between his views and theirs to continue, or will he move to resolve it? History has shown that the long-held attitudes of U.S. presidents ultimately determine their administrations' foreign policies. George W. Bush's instinctive decision-making style and distaste for detail led to the invasion and chaotic occupation of Iraq. Barack Obama's excessive caution and aversion to the use of force led to a more reserved global posture. To date, Trump has left most policymaking to his aides and senior administration officials, even delegating some strategic decisions to the Pentagon. He appears less interested in being the commander in chief than in looking like the commander in chief. But he has not yet encountered a single externally generated crisis. What will he do when chronic international problems become acute?

Despite their distrust of Trump, Australians do not want to walk away from the alliance. According to the latest Lowy Institute polling, 77 percent of Australians still consider the alliance either "very" or "fairly" important for Australia's security. Only three out of ten now think that "Australia should distance itself from the

G'day: Trump and Turnbull in New York, May 2017

JONATHAN ERNST / REUTERS

United States under President Donald Trump." These results reflect the basic pragmatism of Australians: they take the world as they find it, not as they would like it to be. Yet it is an open question how long the relationship can prosper under the weight of Trump's behavior.

THE CHINA DEBATE

Even before Trump's election, Australians were debating the future of the U.S. alliance—largely because of the rise of China. A number of prominent individuals, including former prime ministers and foreign ministers, as well as commentators, have argued for greater independence from the United States and a stronger relationship with China.

The foreign policy debate in Australia has become bipolar. The security establishment is uneasy about China's new assertiveness and unsettled by evidence that elements close to the Chinese Communist Party are using their financial largess to try to drive Australian public debate, and policy, in a direction that would benefit Beijing. But parts of the business community, especially those with economic connections to the giant Chinese market, are frustrated at the pro-American cast of Australian foreign policy.

The China boosters argue that Australia should do more to accommodate China's rise. Australians, the thinking goes, should keep their noses out of China's business, both inside its borders and around its coastlines, and accept that the future Asian order will be centered on Beijing. Some even say that Australia should use its influence in Washington to encourage the United States to share power in Asia.

That argument neglects the full benefits of the U.S. alliance for Australia. The alliance provides a security guarantee,

intelligence that helps Canberra understand the world and counter threats to Australia, and military cooperation that keeps the Australian Defence Force sharp. Why should Australia turn away from an old ally, especially one that remains the most powerful country in the world and with whom it shares both a worldview and an interest in the status quo? Why should Australia tilt toward a power with an uncertain domestic future and an uneven foreign policy? Unsolicited gifts to rising powers are usually pocketed rather than reciprocated. And given the doubts about China's future trajectory, there is little reason to move preemptively toward Beijing. Instead, Australia should hedge against the risk of future Chinese rashness by keeping the United States deeply engaged in the region.

For seven decades, a formidable U.S. forward presence—in the form of service members stationed in Japan and South Korea, along with the U.S. Navy's Seventh Fleet—has underpinned regional stability. It has kept a lid on interstate friction and maintained an open regional order that has allowed the rise of successive Asian countries. Not surprisingly, few Asians relish the prospect of a region dominated by China. Instead, most want a balance of forces in Asia, with a general acceptance of international norms and the rule of law, along with the long-term presence of the United States.

ADRIFT IN ASIA

The Trump administration lacks an overarching approach to Asia, despite having sent a string of senior officials, including Mattis, Tillerson, and Vice President Mike Pence, to visit the region. It has rejected the Obama administration's "pivot," or "rebalance," to Asia, while putting nothing new in its place.

In many ways, the administration seems to have shrunk "Asia" to the dimensions of North Korea. Yet for all the focus on how to counter Pyongyang's nuclear weapons and missile programs, there is almost as much confusion about Trump's North Korea policy as there was a few months ago about the location of the USS *Carl Vinson*, the aircraft carrier said by the U.S. military and the White House to be heading toward North Korea when it was in fact going in the opposite direction. The administration has proclaimed that "the era of strategic patience is over," in Pence's formulation, but said much less about what new era has begun. Until recently, Trump appeared to believe that China would pressure Pyongyang to freeze its programs. Predictably, this has not happened: Beijing's interests on the Korean Peninsula are far from identical to Washington's.

This belief warped the administration's broader posture toward the region. Far from confronting China, as he threatened to do during the campaign, Trump coddled it, acting overly deferential in an effort to obtain Chinese assistance. He initially created leverage with Chinese President Xi Jinping by questioning Washington's "one China" policy, but then gave that leverage away in exchange for nothing more than an introductory phone call. Before long, Trump had declined to declare Beijing a currency manipulator, dropped his tough campaign-trail rhetoric, and hosted Xi at Mar-a-Lago, with his grandchildren greeting the visiting delegation with songs and poetry in Mandarin.

Trump's China policy is probably more transactional and ad hoc than deliberately acquiescent. In July, amid signs that the

president was becoming disillusioned with Xi, the administration sanctioned Chinese businesses engaged in illicit dealings with the North Koreans, approved an arms deal with Taiwan, and moved forward with freedom-of-navigation operations by U.S. naval vessels near disputed territories in the South China Sea. In the long term, however, an accommodation between Trump and Xi seems as likely as an argument. It is hard to believe that Trump cares about a few half-submerged water features in the South China Sea. And it is possible to imagine Trump, an unbeliever in alliances, cutting some kind of grand bargain with China, perhaps trading away security interests in return for trade concessions.

Most Australians would prefer that Trump adopt a different approach—one that takes a firmer stance than the Obama administration did when it comes to deterring Chinese efforts to coerce other Asian countries, while still cooperating with Beijing when appropriate. Such a strategy, however, would involve a greater commitment of U.S. resources and an acceptance of greater risk. Few Australians think that the Trump administration, which includes no Asia hands of note, has the deftness to pull it off.

PRESENT AT THE DESTRUCTION

Australian expectations of Washington go beyond Asia. Canberra also looks to the United States to play the role of global leader. That's because Australia has always seen itself as a country with global interests, if not global capabilities. The many distant theaters in which Australians have served are inscribed in the cloisters of the Australian War Memorial, in Canberra. They include the Sudan, South Africa during the Boer War, and China during the Boxer Rebellion; the Dardanelles, northern France, Flanders, Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Palestine in World War I; Greece, Crete, North Africa, Burma, Malaya, Papua, and New Guinea in World War II; and Korea, Vietnam, East Timor, the Solomon Islands, Afghanistan, and Iraq more recently. Australia also has a history of vigorous involvement in international institutions: Australians are joiners by instinct and practice. A country of Australia's size benefits greatly from an international order in which the rules of the road are well established and widely observed. Australian governments have always been eager to join (and, if necessary, help erect) institutions of global governance. At the San Francisco conference in 1945, Australia fought for and won a greater role for smaller powers in the new United Nations. Ever since, it is has been an active stakeholder in the liberal international order. Now, however, it faces a U.S. president who is not liberal in his outlook, nor international in his posture, nor orderly in his behavior.

The United States' unique position in the world is based on more than its strategic clout. Washington remains the only capital capable of running a truly global foreign policy and projecting military power anywhere on earth, but it is not just the United States' GDP or blue-water navy that secures its position. The idea of the United States continues to fascinate and attract: a superpower that is open, democratic, and meritocratic; a country of awesome power but also dignity and restraint. The United States is strongest when it works with others.

Franklin Roosevelt understood the power of his country's appeal to the world. With his ready laugh and cigarette holder

held at a jaunty angle, he was the quintessential American optimist. By signing on to the Atlantic Charter (with its provisions against territorial aggrandizement and for freedom of trade and the seas) and pressing his British ally on decolonization, Roosevelt signaled that other nations mattered in the American worldview. For the post–World War II settlement, he designed institutions of global order that gave others a voice even while ensuring American predominance.

Trump presents a different face to the international community. He is not persuaded that the United States does well when others do well: in fact, he seems to prefer that others do poorly. He is contemptuous of international institutions that, for the most part, serve a useful function for the United States. He is oblivious to the advantages of being at the center of the global order. He is dubious about the value of alliances, even though China or Russia would dearly love to have an alliance network as powerful and cost effective as that of the United States. Trump's policies alienate other countries, and they also damage U.S. interests.

Seventy years ago, the administration led by Roosevelt's successor, Harry Truman, helped create the postwar world in which Australia has prospered. Dean Acheson, Truman's secretary of state, called his memoir *Present at the Creation*. Australians today worry that they are present at the destruction.

AUSTRALIA'S CHOICE

Australians have a choice, but it is not between sticking with the United States and shifting their loyalty to a rising China. Australia cannot merely cast off an old ally and throw in its lot with a new prospect; nor, given the new international circumstances, can it afford to fall back on familiar approaches.

The real question is whether Australians will choose to be spectators at the global game or participants in it. As the United States does less under Trump, Australia should do more. Australia needs to prosecute a larger foreign policy. It should work as closely as possible with its long-standing ally, mainly by working with other partners in Washington rather than relying on the president himself. But Canberra cannot look at the world solely through an alliance prism. It needs to bolster international institutions, many of which it helped establish, but toward which Trump is ill disposed. And it must strengthen its connections in Asia, a region in which Trump seems uninterested. That means working with China when their interests overlap but also thickening its ties with Asian democracies such as India, Indonesia, Japan, and South Korea. Greater cooperation with like-minded regional powers can be an important hedge against the dual hazards of a reckless China and a feckless United States.

Australia must try to shape its environment, and contribute to Asia's security and prosperity, at a time when it is less able to rely on its great and powerful friend. Australia is a beneficiary of the international order. From time to time, therefore, the country must serve in its bodyguard. Earlier this year, Australia's prime minister placed a call to the leader of the free world and all he got was static. The question is, What will the Australians do while difficulties on the line persist?

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

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Trudeau's Trump Bump

How a Smaller America Gives Canada Room to Grow

Jonathan Kay

After his election, it became clear that U.S. President Donald Trump preferred to greet other political figures with an odd and aggressive gesture: in an apparent show of dominance, he would initiate a handshake, tighten his grip, and then abruptly yank the other party toward him. He did this to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, then Supreme Court nominee Neil Gorsuch, and even Vice President Mike Pence. So when Justin Trudeau visited the White House on February 13, the Canadian prime minister came prepared. Trudeau, an amateur boxer who once worked as a nightclub bouncer, braced himself, preemptively clenched Trump's shoulder, and remained immovable as the president shook his hand. Canadians pored over slow-motion video clips of the maneuver as if it were the winning goal in the Stanley Cup final.

In Canada, the scene helped dispel the concern that Trudeau—whose campaign had summoned up a venerable slogan of his Liberal Party, with Trudeau declaring, "Sunny ways, my friends, sunny ways"—would succumb to Trump's alpha-male aggression. Further strengthening the impression, the prime minister and his entourage were treated with respect and bonhomie during their visit to Washington. In one survey of Canadians conducted after Trudeau returned home, 92 percent of respondents said they thought he had done a "very good," "good," or "acceptable" job during his Washington trip. (Full disclosure: I helped produce and edit Trudeau's 2014 memoir, for which I was compensated with a one-time lump sum.)

Canadians have always paid close attention to the state of their country's relationship with Washington. And with good reason: 76 percent of Canadian exports go to the United States, whereas only 18 percent of U.S. exports travel in the other direction. This means that while a shutdown of continental free trade might hobble the United States, it would devastate Canada. As former Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney has put it (riffing on a comparison made by one of his predecessors, Pierre Trudeau, the father of Justin), "Free trade with the United States is like sleeping with an elephant. It's terrific until the elephant twitches, and if the elephant rolls over, you are a dead man."

The United States under Trump is a singularly unpredictable elephant, prone to strange nocturnal rumblings on Twitter. And so one might expect to find Canadians in a state of national agitation, bitterly torn between their suspicions of the new president and the pragmatic need to appease him for the sake of the bilateral relationship. And yet something closer to the opposite is true: at the same time that the United States has descended into partisan rancor, Canada's political class has embraced a bipartisan consensus in favor of free trade and has decisively rejected the type of

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nativist politics so popular in much of the United States and Europe these days. Overall, the rise of Trump has made Canadians more conscious of the pluralistic values that inform their society and more full-throated in their defense of those values. In an unintended way, Trump has done much to give Canada the elevated international stature it has long craved.

WORTHLESS AMERICAN INITIATIVE

Canada is a liberal country in both the modern and the classical senses of the word: it is socially progressive in outlook and protective of individual rights. Although populism is not foreign to Canada, it tends to express itself primarily through the politics of geography—not, as it does in the United States, through the politics of ideology, race, or class. A conservative reform movement in the 1980s and 1990s, for instance, was rooted in displeasure in western Canada at policies seen as favoring Ontario and Quebec. Even the late Toronto mayor Rob Ford, whose crassness seemed to presage Trump's, drew most of his support from disaffected suburbanites who opposed policies favored by well-heeled downtowners.

Trump's apocalyptic vision—in which native-born citizens are besieged by Islamist terrorism, illegal immigrants, and foreign trade—is alien to mainstream Canadian politics. The two major federal parties, Trudeau's Liberals and the opposition Conservatives, share a broad consensus on the value of free trade and immigration. As Adam Daifallah, a conservative Canadian writer, told me, to find a significant Canadian figure who practiced Trump's brand of demagogic populism, one must go back to the 1930s-era priest and broadcaster Charles Coughlin. "And even he ended up being more influential in the United States than in his native Canada," Daifallah said.

It's no surprise, then, that Trump and his agenda are extremely unpopular in Canada. One survey released in June found that more than 80 percent of Canadians consider the U.S. president bad for the environment, bad for the United States' image, and bad for global peace. Asked to choose between pairs of adjectives that best describe Trump in the same poll, 92 percent of respondents chose "rude" over "gracious," 78 percent chose "dishonest" over "honest," and 65 percent chose "dumb" over "smart."

Given such sentiments, Trudeau might have been tempted to score some quick political points by denouncing the U.S. president—a time-tested gambit for Canadian politicians. But aside from a few veiled references to his counterpart's Islamophobia and some calm statements of disapproval of Trump's climate policy, Trudeau has held his fire. "We don't believe that public condemnation is the right way to go," one insider in the prime minister's office explained to me. "Lots of people have tried to condemn this guy. It doesn't work."

Above all, Trudeau seems motivated by a desire to avoid giving Trump any additional pretext to act on his protectionist impulses. So far, the president has issued an executive order making "buy American, hire American" official policy, pulled the United States out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and suggested that the United States ignore unfavorable World Trade Organization rulings. During the presidential campaign, Trump called the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA, "one of the worst

Keep your friends close: Trump and Trudeau at the White House, February 2017

CARLOS BARRIA / REUTERS

deals ever made by any country," and in May, the U.S. trade representative notified Congress of the administration's intention to renegotiate the treaty.

But as of this writing, formal negotiations over NAFTA have not yet begun. That doesn't mean Canada is out of the woods, however. The Trump administration has suggested that it may push for more favorable treatment on auto parts, pharmaceuticals, intellectual property, alcohol, steel, and aluminum. It may also reiterate long-standing complaints over Ottawa's support for the softwood lumber and aerospace industries, as well as press for changes to NAFTA's dispute-settlement provisions that could compromise Canada's ability to hold the United States to account. Trump has also taken Canada to task for its protectionist quota system for dairy products, warning on Twitter, "We will not stand for this. Watch!"

PROTECTING AGAINST PROTECTIONISM

In public, the Canadian government has responded calmly to such protectionist threats, but behind the scenes, it has been anything but passive. Immediately after Trump's surprise victory, Trudeau and his advisers began a full-court press aimed at convincing U.S. officials that sticking with free trade remained in the United States' economic interests. Trudeau reorganized the prime minister's office to create a new standalone unit, led by Brian Clow, a Liberal Party operative, charged with managing relations with Washington. Trudeau fired Stéphane Dion, his foreign minister, whose bookish character and awkward English made him a bad fit for Trump and his team, and replaced him with Chrystia Freeland, a media-savvy former journalist who once lived in New York.

During the Obama administration, the prime minister's office usually approached the U.S. government through formal channels. On energy and the environment, for example, it worked with Brian Deese, the lone senior White House official charged with Canadian relations on those issues. In the Trump era, it has launched the diplomatic equivalent of a carpet-bombing campaign: Canadian emissaries have relentlessly knocked on doors throughout the United States, spreading their message as widely as possible. Even the leaders of Canada's thinly populated northern territories and Atlantic provinces have gotten into the game. "We are going broad and deep to governors, legislators, even mayors," the insider in the prime minister's office told me. "And we aren't ignoring Democrats, many of whom share Trump's instincts." According to a tally offered by Freeland on May 23, since Trump's inauguration, Canadian representatives had met 115 members of Congress and 35 state governors or lieutenant governors, in addition to holding 235 meetings with other U.S. officials.

As part of this effort, Trudeau has also enlisted Conservatives known to wield influence in Washington. These include Mulroney (who knows Trump from Palm Beach, Florida, where both have homes), Derek Burney (Canada's ambassador to the United States from 1989 to 1993), and Rona Ambrose (the Conservatives' interim leader from 2015 to 2017). Although they have no formal roles, they have proved helpful in supplying the Trudeau team with contacts and gently making the case for maintaining good relations with Canada among American elites.

Some of Trudeau's advisers have even managed to strike up unlikely relationships with members of Trump's team. Katie Telford, Trudeau's chief of staff, has formed a good working rapport with Jared Kushner, Trump's son-in-law and one of his senior advisers, after meeting him in New York after the election. One of Trudeau's top advisers, the progressive-minded Gerald Butts, has bonded with one of Trump's, the right-wing nationalist Steve Bannon. Despite the enormous ideological gulf that separates them, both men come from humble backgrounds—Butts is the son of a coal miner, and Bannon the son of a telephone lineman—and both, in their own way, care about improving the lot of the middle class.

In managing their outreach, the Canadians have closely studied Trump's decision-making style. Xi Jinping's successful meetings with Trump in April, in which the Chinese president managed to change his U.S. counterpart's mind on trade and North Korea, proved instructive. Trudeau's advisers concluded that Trump needs to come out of a meeting with some sort of win for him or his family, whether it be a business deal, an upbeat headline, or even just an attention-grabbing photograph. Trudeau's high-profile photo ops with Trump's daughter Ivanka in Washington and New York have been no accident; one of the best ways to please Trump, Trudeau's team has realized, is to show respect to his family members.

One of the best ways to incur Trump's wrath, of course, is to insult him. So Trudeau has ruthlessly enforced message discipline within his party. In the past, Canadian leaders would sometimes play up their conflicts with the United States to arouse nationalist support, or they would permit the formation of vocal anti-American constituencies within their backbenches as a way of releasing

pressure. In 2004, one Liberal member of Parliament created a furor when she stepped on a doll of U.S. President George W. Bush for a comedy-show sketch; these days, it is impossible to imagine a member of Parliament performing such a brazen gesture. If there has been any intra-Liberal dissent against Trudeau's approach to Trump, it has been very well hidden. As for the New Democratic Party, Canada's social democratic party, its members of Parliament have called on Trudeau to denounce Trump. But the NDP is in the midst of a leadership transition, and Canadians have showed relatively little interest in its line of attack.

In April, Trudeau burnished his bilateral bona fides when Trump declared that Trudeau and Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto had convinced him to step back from his plans to scrap NAFTA. In the most dramatic telling of the backstory, reported by Canada's *National Post*, Trump's reversal followed back-channel pleas to Ottawa made by White House advisers, who urged the prime minister to get on the phone and bend the president's ear. The reality, according to another Trudeau aide, was slightly less dramatic. Trudeau's team had read on *Politico* that Trump was considering ripping up NAFTA, so they contacted officials at the White House, who told them that the president had a window for a phone call. "What it was not," explained the adviser, "was Jared Kushner calling up and saying, 'Hey, call now!'"

That said, Trudeau's opinion clearly does carry weight with Trump, which is one reason the prime minister's handling of the United States has proved so popular at home. Until recently, Canada tended to see itself as an ignored child tugging on Uncle Sam's pant leg. Now Trudeau (and Peña Nieto) has become the adult in the room, doing his best to prevent Trump from destroying the North American economy with a stroke of his pen.

TAKING UP THE SLACK

Canadians' attitudes on foreign policy have long turned on Canada's relationship with the United States, and especially the Canadian public's perception of the U.S. president. Canada joined NATO's 1999 mission in Kosovo in large part because Canadians trusted President Bill Clinton as a reliable partner who promoted international comity. They were less enamored of President George W. Bush, and so Prime Minister Jean Chrétien decided that Canada would sit out the Iraq war. (His successor, Paul Martin, did send Canadian troops to Afghanistan in 2006, however.) For decades, Canada saw itself as a nation of principled multilateralists, duty-bound to resist the American impulse for unilateralism and bellicosity.

This pattern was scrambled somewhat during the era of President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Stephen Harper, a Conservative given to hawkish slogans. For the first time in recent memory, the Canadian leader took more militant positions than his U.S. counterpart on the protection of Israel, the threat of radical Islam, and the war against terrorism more generally. Trudeau's government has restored Canada's traditional dovishness, but that can sometimes read as wimpishness. In 2014, a year before becoming prime minister, Trudeau dismissed Canada's contribution to U.S. operations against the Islamic State, or ISIS, in vulgar terms—he accused Harper of "trying to whip out our CF-18s and show them how big they are"—which

suggested that he had done little serious thinking about the issue. And his early decision to halt Canada's involvement in that campaign, although consistent with a campaign pledge, suggested a pacifistic approach to the war on terrorism. If Canada would not join its allies in attacking such a universally reviled foe, then where would it make a stand?

After his election, Trump added to the sense of flux by breaking the well-established pattern of internationalism that Canada (and other U.S. allies, from Australia to Japan to Saudi Arabia) had come to rely on. Unlike all his predecessors going back to Franklin Roosevelt, Trump appears to be an inveterate isolationist who occasionally lapses into martial fantasies about exterminating terrorists. Would Canada try to take up the slack in the liberal order while the United States was out of commission? Would it instead lie low? It was anyone's guess how Canada would reimagine its foreign policy in the age of Trump.

Something of an answer came in June 2017, when Freeland announced that Canada, which has traditionally ranked near the bottom of NATO countries in the share of GDP devoted to defense, would make "a substantial investment" in new military spending. Coming just two weeks after Trump castigated fellow alliance members for not paying their "fair share," the gesture might have been interpreted as one of appeasement. But Freeland couched the announcement in language that suggested the opposite. "The fact that our friend and ally has come to question the very worth of its mantle of global leadership puts into sharper focus the need for the rest of us to set our own clear and sovereign course," Freeland said. She added, "For their unique, seven-decades-long contribution to our shared peace and prosperity, and on behalf of all Canadians, I would like to profoundly thank our American friends." It seemed a clever bit of triangulation: Give Trump exactly what he wants to avoid his wrath, while presenting the move to Canadians as a means to help stabilize an international order that Trump is endangering.

Freeland also reiterated Canada's disappointment with Trump's decision to withdraw the United States from the Paris agreement, putting climate change at the top of her list of "clear challenges" that Canada's upgraded military may face. Others included "civil war, poverty, drought, and natural disasters." It is still early days, and this catalog of focus-group-tested foreign policy issues seems too broad to form the basis for a coherent new foreign policy. But seeing as how this Freeland Doctrine—free-trade internationalism, infused with environmentalism and pluralism—artfully folds in so many of the elements that are already popular with Canadians, it has the promise of eventually being reduced, like a sauce in a pan, to something substantial.

MAKING CANADA GREAT AGAIN

Trump has destabilized politics outside the United States for a number of reasons. He has legitimized viewpoints once considered toxic in the mainstream party politics of developed nations. He has renounced long-standing treaties and questioned traditional alliances, stoking fears of abandonment in foreign capitals. And he has demonstrated a chaotic style of governance and personal fickleness that have left governments unsure of his next move.

Yet in Canada, Trump has had a paradoxically stabilizing effect on national politics. Whereas the presidencies of George W. Bush and Obama tapped into long-standing fissures between the Canadian left and the Canadian right, Trump is regarded almost universally among Canadians as an object of derision. Canadians are not beset by the sort of intractable culture war that rages in the United States, where two mutually antagonistic tribes are getting their news—much of it fake—from two different sets of sources. During the Conservative Party's leadership campaign earlier this year, the only candidate who attempted to use dog-whistle rhetoric to speak to anti-Muslim skeptics of immigration, Kellie Leitch, attracted just seven percent of the vote on the first ballot. The eventual winner, Andrew Scheer, is an optimistic 38-year-old who, until 2015, served as Speaker of the House of Commons—a role that, within Canada's parliamentary system, requires impartial and collegial behavior.

Scheer has a tough path ahead, because Trump's presidency has made Trudeau a more formidable opponent. Ever since Trudeau became leader of the Liberal Party, in 2013, pundits have been writing countless columns predicting that his honeymoon would soon end. And it is true that some of his hard domestic choices (he approved the expansion of a controversial pipeline) and cynical reversals (he broke his campaign promise to reform the electoral system) have dimmed his star. But on one key issue—Canada's ability to ship crude oil and bitumen from its western oil sands into the United States—Trump has made Trudeau's life much easier. The Obama administration blocked construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline through several U.S. states, a project that would allow significantly greater throughput. The Trump administration has reversed this decision, providing a massive boon to Canada's oil industry without Trudeau having to lift a finger and saving him from sullying his reputation among environmentalists (whose primary focus has been preventing the construction of a new pipeline off the coast of British Columbia).

More important, as was the case with Obama, Trudeau's popularity overseas is burnishing his brand back home. Trudeau's awkward predecessors, Harper, Martin, and Chrétien, were not exactly front-page eye candy, and Canadians are still getting used to having a leader who is feted internationally. Even more unusual, however, is that Trudeau is being talked of not just as a charming politician but also as a defender of the free world. Two weeks after the 2016 U.S. election, the British historian Timothy Garton Ash spoke in Toronto about Brexit and the rise of Trump. Until recently, attendees at such a talk would have seen themselves as mere provincials gathering to hear a report from the great halls of power in London and Washington. But that was not the sense that night. After reciting the tale of how the two most powerful English-speaking nations on earth had succumbed to populism, and surveying the "global counterrevolution against liberalism" unfolding elsewhere, Garton Ash identified Canada and Germany as "two points of light in a fairly dark picture." It was a statement of fact, but a stunning one nonetheless.

As its hard power declined in relative terms in the decades after World War II, Canada was never more than a marginal player in the global order. Canadian internationalists tried to argue otherwise,

highlighting Canada's championing of multilateralism, soft power, and the "responsibility to protect" doctrine. But in practice, the world was uninterested in being hectored about such abstract principles, and Canada's relatively small economic and military might meant that the country could never escape its true role as the United States' sidekick. This stubborn truth helps explain why so much of Canadian intellectual life has traditionally been organized in support of or in opposition to the United States.

Anti-Americanism in Canada began to ebb after 2008, with the election of Obama, who was more popular among Canadian liberals than Harper, and after the housing crisis, which laid the United States' economy low but spared Canada's. Although one might have expected Trump's election to have revived this anti-Americanism, it has in fact helped seal its fate, since Canadians now look at the United States not as a power to be joined or resisted but as a neighbor down on its luck. Canadians used to discuss such issues as health care, taxation, and foreign policy as corollaries to the deeper moral question of whether Canada should style itself in the United States' image. But in the age of Trump, that question seems utterly ridiculous, especially considering that Americans themselves feel so confused by the state of their politics. Trump's presidency is thus encouraging Canadians to view their country's place in the world in light of their own circumstances and values, and not by comparison with the United States.

The plight of the liberal order seems slightly less dire that it did in late 2016, when Trudeau and German Chancellor Angela Merkel were fighting their lonely struggle to defend it. Trump's more radical instincts have been kept in check by the U.S. court system and by divisions within his own party. Across the Atlantic, meanwhile, the election of French President Emmanuel Macron, a decided Europhile, has signaled a counterrevolution against nativist populism. Free trade, too, seems less endangered now than it once did. Although Trump could still use his diminished political capital to push for changes to NAFTA, the renegotiation process would likely stretch out past the end of his first term. (The negotiation of Canada's free-trade agreement with the EU, finalized in 2014, took five years.) And with Trudeau's team already deeply engaged in the effort to enlist allies south of the border, it seems unlikely that U.S. negotiators would be able to bulldoze the Canadians.

Since his inauguration, Trump has often seemed to be a foreign policy crisis on two legs. But out of crisis comes opportunity. And in Canada's case, this includes the opportunity to redefine its role in the world and take on new missions. Freeland's announced increase in military spending will likely help Canada do just that. So will a new policy through which the majority of Canada's overseas development aid will go to programs that promote gender equality and the health of women and girls. Canada could also ramp up its naval patrols in its warming Arctic waters, which will see freight traffic surge in the coming decades. In this and other areas, Canada can now find its own way, without regard to how its interests might intersect with those of the United States. That marks an important moment in the development of a modern, independent identity for Canada. And in a strange way, Trump has helped the country get there.

The Mexican Standoff

Trump and the Art of the Workaround

Shannon K. O'Neil

For most of the twentieth century, Mexico and the United States were distant neighbors. Obliviousness and neglect from the north was met with resentment and, at times, outright hostility from the south, leaving the two countries diplomatically detached. Yet as the twenty-first century approached, this wariness began to fade, replaced by cooperation and even something resembling friendship. The détente began in the early 1990s, when Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari and U.S. President George H. W. Bush developed a shared economic vision, culminating in the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement, the largest free-trade agreement in the world and the first to include countries with mature economies (the United States and Canada) and a country with a still emerging economy (Mexico). Bush's successor, Bill Clinton, embraced the rapprochement, shepherding NAFTA through Congress and later rescuing Mexico from a financial crisis. And although Clinton's successor, George W. Bush, failed in his attempt at comprehensive immigration reform, he succeeded in working with his Mexican counterparts, Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderón, to transform the U.S.-Mexican security relationship for the better. President Barack Obama reaffirmed and expanded bilateral cooperation by deepening the two countries' economic integration and supporting Mexico's efforts to establish the rule of law and improve the security of its citizens.

During the past 25 years, connections between the two countries have proliferated at the state and local levels as well. Governors have set up trade offices and sponsored repeated commercial visits. Law enforcement officers have trained together and conducted joint operations. Universities have initiated cross-border research projects and exchanges. Mayors have embraced sister cities and held joint events and conferences; San Diego and Tijuana even explored a shared bid for the 2024 Summer Olympics.

But that quarter century of partnership is now faltering, thanks to U.S. President Donald Trump's overt hostility to Mexico and Mexicans. The invective began during Trump's campaign, during which he called NAFTA "the worst trade deal in history" and claimed that Mexico was "killing us economically." He attacked Mexican immigrants to the United States, painting them as "criminals" and "rapists" that steal jobs and threaten American lives. He pledged to establish a "deportation force" to rid the nation of millions of "criminal aliens." And his bellowed promise to build a wall along the U.S.-Mexican border—and force Mexico to pay for

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it, no less—served as a frequent climax at his rallies, often eliciting the loudest cheers from his supporters.

Since Trump took office, his approach to Mexico has alternated between insincere flattery and in-your-face aggression. Even when talking up his "tremendous relations with" and "love" for Mexico, he has prioritized the border wall, bidding out the project and asking Congress for $1.6 billion to jump-start construction, while still maintaining that Mexico will somehow pay for it, ultimately. (So far, Congress has demurred.) On immigration, Trump has spared the so-called Dreamers—young people, mostly from Mexico, who were brought to the United States illegally when they were children—from his earlier threats to deport them. But he has also ordered the Department of Homeland Security to step up raids in immigrant communities and has lashed out at so-called sanctuary cities, which block their local law enforcement agencies from sharing information about residents' immigration status with DHS. The Trump administration has also threatened to send anyone caught crossing the southern border illegally back to Mexico—regardless of their actual nationality. And Trump's hatred of NAFTA has endured, although his threats to pull out of the deal altogether have been replaced by a plan to renegotiate its terms.

Faced with this unprecedented belligerence, Mexico has few options—and even fewer good ones. The best approach would be to avoid confronting Trump—not by capitulating to him but by going around him. To salvage the hard-won gains of the last two and a half decades, Mexico needs to venture outside the Beltway and deepen its already rich connections to U.S. states, municipalities, businesses, civic institutions, and communities. This approach is being pursued (with some early success) by the United States' neighbor to the north, Canada. And it might work even better for Mexico, which has more grass-roots connections to American society than does Canada.

THINGS GO SOUTH

The about-face in Washington's approach to Mexico is taking place at a time when Mexico has never been more important to the U.S. economy and to Americans themselves. Mexico provides a huge proportion of the vegetables on their tables, the parts in their cars, and the caregivers for their youngest and oldest citizens. NAFTA helped usher in this interdependence, influencing the way that thousands of companies buy, sell, and make things on both sides of the border. Trade in goods between the two countries skyrocketed, from around $135 billion in 1993 to over $520 billion in 2016, adjusting for inflation. Meanwhile, Mexican exporters came to prefer U.S. suppliers over all others, buying, on average, 40 percent of their inputs from the United States, compared with 25 percent from Canada and less than five percent each from Brazil, China, and the EU. Prior to NAFTA, that figure for the United States stood at just five percent. In that sense, U.S. trade with Mexico hasn't "killed jobs," as NAFTA's critics argue; it has instead ramped up sales of U.S. goods south of the border that support some five million U.S.-based jobs.

Meanwhile, immigration has deepened interpersonal bonds

So far from God, so close to Trump: Peña Nieto and Trump in Mexico City, August 2016

HENRY ROMERO / REUTERS

between the citizens of the two countries. Some seven million Mexicans settled in the north between 1990 and 2007. That immigration wave has receded in recent years; since 2009, over 140,000 more Mexicans have left the United States than have come to it. But around 11 million still reside in the United States, in addition to nearly 25 million Americans of Mexican heritage. And the movement has gone both ways: over one million U.S. citizens currently make their homes in Mexico, the largest diaspora community of Americans anywhere in the world.

These ever more encompassing ties mean that Trump's outbursts, threats, and vilification of Mexico have reverberated throughout the country's economy, society, and politics. Mexican markets have taken the most immediate blow. The peso plummeted following Trump's victory, falling further than any other emerging-market currency during the first quarter of 2017. Foreign investment also sank as Trump criticized companies, including Carrier and Ford, for moving jobs south of the border (or planning to) and the companies responded by postponing, scaling back, or canceling those plans. Overall foreign direct investment in the country fell by 20 percent in 2016 as Trump marched toward the GOP nomination, with the largest declines concentrated in trade-oriented sectors. After Trump's victory in the general election, forecasts for Mexico's 2017 economic performance turned pessimistic.

Recently, those losses have eased: once the perceived threat to NAFTA

passed in April, the peso recovered and foreign direct investment began to flow again. Still, NAFTA's future remains uncertain. And U.S. congressional proposals to create a new border adjustment tax (to be levied on imports from Mexico and elsewhere) and to dramatically lower U.S. corporate tax rates would threaten Mexico's competitiveness and export-based economic model.

MAKE MEXICO GREAT AGAIN

Meanwhile, Mexicans' attitudes toward their powerful neighbor have swiftly changed as well; the United States has gone from paragon to pariah. The public's ire has been reflected in the proliferation of Trump-inspired piñatas and *luchadores* (costumed professional wrestlers). Polls show that the number of Mexicans with negative views of the United States has tripled since the election; overall, Mexicans now feel more warmly toward Russia and Venezuela than toward the United States. In a recent Pew survey, Mexico ranked last among 37 nations in terms of public confidence in Trump.

Not only are fewer Mexicans immigrating to the United States these days, but even tourist numbers are down. According to the global research firm Tourism Economics, almost two million fewer Mexicans are currently planning to take an American vacation than were planning to at the same time last year, and the number of Mexicans who applied to enroll at schools in the University of California system this fall dropped by more than a third compared with last year.

Of course, nearly one in ten Mexican citizens already lives in the United States, and Trump's rise has taken a terrible toll on many of them. Families of mixed immigration status, newly fearful of federal enforcement agents, have pulled their kids out of school, canceled medical appointments, and stopped going to local restaurants, grocery stores, and neighborhood events. This self-isolation is hollowing out once vibrant communities and has hurt the economies of many struggling U.S. towns.

Indignation and anger over Trump's rise have begun to reshape domestic politics in Mexico, stirring up long-dormant nationalist and isolationist currents. Mexicans across the political spectrum were astonished and outraged when Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto invited Trump to meet with him in Mexico City in August 2016, sparking a catastrophic slide in Peña Nieto's approval ratings, from which he has yet to recover; in July, only 17 percent of Mexicans approved of his performance. As Mexico looks toward national and presidential elections in 2018, Trump has made it once again politically profitable for Mexican politicians to stand up to the United States. Today, Mexican senators display anti-Trump banners in their chamber and churn out numerous retaliatory and anti-American bills. Trump's ascent has also emboldened Mexican protectionists, who are eager to turn back the clock to the pre-NAFTA era and recapture the profits they enjoyed when economic competition was more limited. Producers of aluminum, steel, cement, glass, and numerous other materials and goods could argue that if Washington can favor U.S. companies

over foreign ones in some industries, then the Mexican government should do the same for Mexican firms.

The biggest political beneficiary of these trends has been the left-wing populist Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who is planning to run for president a third time next year. The day after Trump's victory, López Obrador was filmed in front of a mural by the celebrated Mexican painter Diego Rivera assuring Mexicans that Mexico would remain a "free, independent nation"—"not a colony" and "not dependent on any foreign government." (Peña Nieto limited his own response to a tweet congratulating Trump.) López Obrador's approval ratings shot up, from 11 percent in September 2016 to 24 percent in November. In recent months, he has melded this appeal to Mexican sovereignty into his broader antiestablishment platform. He is now considered the front-runner in next year's presidential race.

As other hopefuls announce their intentions, they, too, will undoubtedly promise a firmer hand with the bully to the north. Mexicans will elect not only the president but also more than 3,000 other officials next July, raising the possibility that nationalists could take power at all levels of Mexico's government.

MAKING NEW FRIENDS

Meanwhile, the Peña Nieto administration has struggled to respond effectively to Trump and his provocations. It initially relied on the personal relationship that Trump's son-in-law and adviser, Jared Kushner, and Luis Videgaray, now Mexico's foreign minister, had built as they negotiated candidate Trump's visit to Mexico in August 2016. But Mexican officials were blindsided when, five days before a scheduled one-on-one meeting between the two presidents in January, Trump took to Twitter to declare that Peña Nieto should not come to Washington unless he would agree to pay for the border wall. Peña Nieto, humiliated, canceled the trip.

Since that debacle, the Mexican government has recalibrated its approach. Without giving up entirely on the possibility of winning over White House advisers and members of Trump's cabinet, it has focused on reaching out to other potential allies. These include governors and other elected officials in the 23 U.S. states for whom Mexico is their largest or second-largest export market, the hundreds of thousands of American farmers who sell over $18 billion worth of goods to Mexico every year, those small and medium-sized U.S. exporters that are more likely to send their wares to Mexico than anywhere else in the world, and large multinationals catering to Mexican consumers. With the help of 50 consular offices in the United States and the assistance of Mexican business elites, Peña Nieto's government has begun to work the U.S. system, courting all levels of government and seeking out potential grass-roots allies.

This ground game is in its very early stages and is more limited and ad hoc than the one undertaken by the United States' other neighbor, Canada. Yet it is already showing some signs of promise. A bipartisan group of U.S. senators, including the Republican

heavyweights John Cornyn of Texas, John McCain of Arizona, and Marco Rubio of Florida and Democrats Ben Cardin of Maryland, Dick Durbin of Illinois, and Bob Menendez of New Jersey, have introduced a resolution reaffirming the importance of bilateral cooperation in an effort to protect the progress made in U.S.-Mexican relations over the past 25 years. Members of the U.S. House of Representatives and governors and mayors across the United States are also awakening to the importance of Mexico to their constituents and speaking out in support of the relationship. Within the U.S. business community, chief executives such as GE's Jeff Immelt and Facebook's Mark Zuckerberg have condemned Trump's bashing of Mexico and immigrants. Meanwhile, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other associations have thrown their support and lobbying dollars behind the defense of NAFTA.

But Mexico is also hedging its bets by working on a Plan B. It remains committed to the Trans-Pacific Partnership and, in both May and July, sent trade envoys to meet with representatives from the other ten remaining signatory countries to push forward with the trade agreement despite Trump's rejection of it. Mexico is also holding talks with the EU to update and modernize a free-trade agreement that the two parties made in 2000. And it is working to expand its commercial ties with Argentina, Brazil, China, and countries in the Middle East. Although the United States will remain Mexico's largest market, such moves can strengthen the Mexicans' negotiating hand with Washington and provide some insurance in case the relationship deteriorates even further.

GOING AROUND TRUMP

So far, Mexico's main aim has been simply to protect the pre-Trump status quo as much as possible. Yet with the entire U.S.-Mexican relationship in flux, there is now an opportunity to think big and fundamentally reshape North America's future.

Making real progress would oblige Americans to abandon their fantasies of walling themselves off from Mexico and would require Mexicans to move past their outrage over Trump and ignore the siren song of nationalism. Only then would a new economic deal between Mexico and the United States be able to go beyond merely tinkering with NAFTA and instead create a more innovative, better-functioning border that speeds the flow of goods, services, ideas, and people. Only then could the two countries together confront the common threats of drug trafficking, organized crime, terrorism, natural disasters, health epidemics, and cyberattacks. Only then could they invest in the work forces that span the border. And only then could they expand their educational exchanges, vocational training, and certification for North American workers and set immigration rules that recognize that freer movement strengthens families, communities, and economies that increasingly depend on cross-border assembly lines and supply chains.

Of course, that vision is anathema to many of Trump's core supporters and sits uneasily with Trump's "America first" protectionism. But Mexico will continue to find a more receptive

audience outside Washington. Roads, bridges, railways, aquifers, and other vital elements of the border area can be studied, planned, and promoted by U.S. regional leaders and funded by local public-private partnerships. Local utilities can invest in and prepare for cross-border grids. Universities and community colleges can partner with one another and with companies to train future workers. Licenses and certifications, which are always controlled by states and professional associations, can be expanded to incorporate skilled practitioners on both sides of the border. And police departments, prosecutors, and public defenders can work together across the border to improve safety and security in both countries. Mexico would do well to emulate U.S.-Canadian regional agreements, such as the one that created the Pacific NorthWest Economic Region, which allows five U.S. states and five Canadian provinces to coordinate on issues including infrastructure, energy, the environment, disaster resilience, border management, and education.

The country has already started to adopt this kind of approach, but it must ramp up its efforts by reaching out to city councils and state legislators, community colleges and universities, family-owned farms and businesses, and the administrators of public-private partnerships at the local and state levels. And it must improve its relationship with the millions of Mexicans and Mexican Americans who live north of the border—a diaspora that has been neglected by its homeland for decades. If executed well, such a strategy would deepen day-to-day integration and also create a massive lobby to push Washington—even Trump's Washington—toward partnership and away from isolation.

Thanks to the populist wave that swept Trump into office, Mexico has been forced to become the mature partner in the U.S.-Mexican relationship. The country's leaders must ignore Trump's petty insults, resist the temptation to act in kind, and put forward a positive agenda to more receptive audiences north of the border. If Mexico can rise to the occasion, then the carefully cultivated friendship of the past quarter century can be not only salvaged but even deepened.

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ESSAYS

The Trump administration's bureaucratic problems come not from an insidious, undemocratic "deep state" but simply from the state.
—Jon Michaels



YURI GRIPAS / REUTERS

Trump and the "Deep State"

The Government Strikes Back

Jon D. Michaels

One of the strangest aspects of the current era is that the president of the United States seems to have little interest in running the country's government. A political novice with no fixed ideology or policy agenda, Donald Trump took office as if orchestrating a hostile corporate takeover. In his first six-plus months as president, he has followed his own counsel, displaying open contempt for much of the federal work force he now leads, slashing budgets, rescinding regulatory rules, and refusing to follow standard operating procedures. This has cost him allies in the executive branch, helped spur creative (and increasingly effective) bureaucratic opposition, and, thanks to that opposition, triggered multiple investigations that threaten to sap party and congressional support.

Furious at what they consider treachery by internal saboteurs, the president and his surrogates have responded by borrowing a bit of political science jargon, claiming to be victims of the "deep state," a conspiracy of powerful, unelected bureaucrats secretly pursuing their own agenda. The concept of a deep state is valuable in its original context, the study of developing countries such as Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey, where shadowy elites in the military and government ministries have been known to countermand or simply defy democratic directives. Yet it has little relevance to the United States, where governmental power structures are almost entirely transparent, egalitarian, and rule-bound.

The White House is correct to perceive widespread resistance inside the government to many of its endeavors. But the same way the administration's media problems come not from "fake news" but simply from news, so its bureaucratic problems come not from an

JON D. MICHAELS is Professor of Law at the University of California, Los Angeles, School of Law.

insidious, undemocratic "deep state" but simply from the state—the large, complex hive of people and procedures that constitute the U.S. federal government.

L'ÉTAT, C'EST TOI

Broadly speaking, the American state comprises the vast expanse of federal administrative agencies—the organizations and people responsible for making and enforcing regulations, designing and running social programs, combating crime and corruption, providing for the national defense, and more. These agencies function somewhat autonomously from their political masters, drawing on their own sources of legal authority, expertise, and professionalism. They oversee the disbursement of vast amounts of money to vast numbers of people for various things, and most of their day-to-day operations are largely unaffected by broad-stroke policy statements issued from the White House or even their department's leaders.

Officials inside these agencies can defend environmental and workplace safety standards, international alliances, and the rule of law. They can investigate, document, and publicize instances of high-level government malfeasance. And they can do so, in no small part, because a good number of them are insulated by law from political pressure, enjoy de facto tenure, and have strong guild codes of professional behavior. In some ways, the Trump administration—in truth, any administration—is right to see them, collectively, as a potentially dangerous adversary.

But unlike the deep states in authoritarian countries, the American state should be embraced rather than feared. It is not secretive, exclusive, and monolithic, but open, diverse, and fragmented. Its purpose is not to pursue a private agenda contrary to the public will but to execute that will—to deliver to the people the goods and services that their elected representatives have decreed, and to do so fairly and effectively.

In Europe, the upper reaches of the state are often dominated by a tight-knit group of graduates from the country's most exclusive schools, such as Cambridge, Oxford, and the École Nationale d'Administration. Across Asia and the Middle East, ministries and state-owned enterprises are often controlled by clans and cliques and run for their private benefit. In the United States, however, the state is an amalgam of middle-class technocrats without any strong collective identity or

financial incentives to profit personally from their jobs. In fact, one could make a good case that the bureaucrats (more numerous outside the Beltway than they are in Washington proper) are closer to and more in tune with median voters than the mostly rich, elite politicians who control them.

Throughout the developing world, and even in some developed countries, power is not only concentrated in the hands of a cohesive elite but also exercised largely in secret. In the United States, by contrast, government agencies are overwhelmingly transparent and accessible. (Within the United States, it is generally easier to get accurate and comprehensive information about the inner workings of federal agencies than about the White House or Congress.) And when officials take the extraordinary step of opposing the choices of their political bosses, they often do so in a reasoned, public manner—as with the State Department's exemplary Dissent Channel. Even their crimes are transparent: What is the offense Trump supporters are most outraged by? The unauthorized disclosure of accurate information.

The American state should be embraced rather than feared.

What's more, unlike in many nations where democracy presented itself as a late-arriving imposition on an already entrenched bureaucracy, in the United States, it is the administrative state that is seen as the intrusion. The American state therefore operates from a position of weakness and deference. It is disaggregated and siloed. True deep states involve powerful, elite factions that control multiple interlocking ministries and funding sources. By contrast, in the United States, the only actor with even a plausible ability to control many separate parts of the American state is the president, whose own powers and resources are limited by law and custom.

U.S. administrative fragmentation makes it hard for things to get done—but it also makes the notion of a coordinated, secret conspiracy by multiple state actors laughable. Tree huggers in the Environmental Protection Agency live to enforce the Clean Air Act, and latter-day Eliot Nesses in the Treasury Department obsess about combating corruption and fraud. Neither group is professionally interested in or involved with the other's agenda, or, for that matter, interested in or involved with health care, immigration, or foreign policy.

DIVIDE AND AVOID BEING CONQUERED

The American constitutional order is based on many different separations of powers, not just the division of the legislative, executive, and judiciary branches. There are splits between the two halves of the legislature; the federal, state, and local levels of government; the public and private sectors; and more.

Over the first half of the twentieth century, as Americans realized that they wanted government to play a larger role in economic and social affairs, Congress delegated large swaths of its own lawmaking power to federal agencies operating under the president's control. This transfer of authority greatly destabilized the original, Madisonian separation of powers. But to prevent true presidential imperialism, the architects of the modern welfare and national security states generated new checks and balances, including the legal and cultural empowerment of an autonomous bureaucracy. And today, the enabling of that autonomy has positioned agency officials to challenge and resist efforts by the Trump administration that lack legal or scientific foundations.

Of course, the value (and advisability) of such a potent check depends on the quality of the state actors involved, and in the United States, agency officials are highly trained, relatively diverse, and demonstrably devoted to the public weal. They understand that they would forfeit their authority and legitimacy if they were captured by special interests working for private rather than public goods or if they conspired to undermine the will of the people's representatives. Here again, however, whatever problems the bureaucracy poses are dwarfed by the much greater danger of special interests capturing those representatives. After all, the civil service constitutes a relatively meritocratic technocracy operating under strict transparency rules and within careful guardrails that prevent tampering—compared with presidents and legislators who spend half their time setting policy and the other half desperately soliciting money from anybody willing to contribute.

RESTORING THE STATE

Why is the American state so susceptible to vilification? The current efforts to delegitimize the state are not without precedent. For decades, certain groups in society have chipped away at the American state's status, resources, and independence. Outsourcing, privatization,

the conversion of civil servants into at-will employees—these and other attempts to sideline or defang the independent bureaucracy have taken their toll. Now more than ever, the state and its officials need to be supported and nurtured rather than demonized and starved. Two obvious efforts worth pursuing would be insourcing some previously outsourced responsibilities and safeguarding the civil service.

Recent administrations, Democratic and Republican alike, have increasingly turned to private-sector contractors for the provision of core government services relating to defense and intelligence, policing and incarceration, social welfare provision, and so on. Proponents of such shifts argue that contractors are cheaper and more efficient than federal employees. In practice, however, outsourcing and privatizing key government services have rarely produced the promised economic windfall.

But even if there are efficiency gains, they have come at the expense of democratic and legal accountability, as contractors operate more opaquely and without much oversight. And whereas tenured civil servants are legally and culturally positioned to subject administration proposals and policies to independent expert scrutiny, contractors rarely challenge the presidentially appointed agency leaders who write their checks. Outsourcing thus undercuts that new, and critical, internal check on modern administrative power.

In addition to circumventing a contentious civil service through outsourcing, recent administrations have tried to strip government personnel of their legal protections. This campaign, principally pitched in neutral, technocratic terms as bringing private-sector methods into public-sector workplaces, has already succeeded in reclassifying thousands of agency personnel as at-will employees. They are now subject to summary termination for any reason, including political disagreement or perceived disloyalty, clearly introducing a chilling effect and checking the autonomy that employees allow themselves to display.

Confident and capable presidents tend to recognize that a healthy, high-quality bureaucracy is a national treasure, a force multiplier that can use its skills, judgment, and hard-earned credibility to help an administration achieve responsible goals as effectively as possible. It is the insecure presidents, unable to hear honest technocratic feedback, who go to war with the state they nominally lead.

Graduate School Forum Showcase:

Keeping Ahead in Uncertain Times

In uncertain times, we wonder: Do our assumptions about the world still apply? Can we separate facts from opinions? How can the institutions we created adapt to new situations? How do we incorporate different voices into a coherent conversation? How can we contribute positively?

Training in international affairs and policy builds a critical foundation of expertise—regional, cultural, economic, political—to recognize the underlying forces at work in the world. Programs challenge students to develop the critical thinking, communications, leadership, and teamwork skills to navigate a changing landscape. Graduates are distinguished by their flexibility and adaptability. These traits are fostered by an interdisciplinary curriculum and the rich community of people with whom they study.

As you begin your search for a master's program, consider how you can establish a grounding in the past, prepare for the present, and get ready to adjust to the future. Look at how programs support innovation in their field. Ask by what means they incorporate diverse perspectives. Discover in what ways students challenge established ideas and formulate new ones.

Greek philosophy tells us that the only constant in life is change; yet, moving forward requires making plans, getting the proper training, and building a profession. International affairs graduates master underlying principles of an ever-changing world to help prepare for the future.

By **Carmen Iezzi Mezzera**
Executive Director,
Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs (@apsiainfo)

ForeignAffairs.com/GraduateSchoolForum

Contents

Hugh White AO

Professor of Strategic Studies
Strategic & Defence Studies Centre,
Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs
College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University

Study in a Region That Matters at an Institution That Matters

Why is the Asia-Pacific important to the United States, and the world?

The Asia-Pacific is home to two-thirds of the world's population, two-thirds of the global economy, and provides two-thirds of all global economic growth. It is the arena that poses the most serious challenge to the United States' international role since it emerged as a global power over a century ago. It is also the region that hosts six of the world's nine nuclear states, and four of those have the fastest growing stockpiles and the most unpredictable nuclear doctrines.

The Asia-Pacific is one of the most significant regions in the world, and the region in which the greatest challenges to the U.S.-led global order will play out. This region has global implications for changing economic relations, potential conflict, and security challenges.

Why do students need to study at the Australian National University (ANU)?

ANU is the sixth highest ranked institution for politics and international studies worldwide. We are the leading Australian university in this area, and across all disciplines, ANU is twentieth in the QS World University Rankings in 2017.

Thanks to our location within the Asia-Pacific, the Bell School is home to the world's leading international experts in Asian and Pacific politics, international relations, strategic studies, and diplomacy. The class lecturers speak with authority on issues of regional and international significance, thanks to their deep engagement with the region.

Our approach to research and education is distinct and unique: we bring leading disciplinary expertise and deep knowledge of the region from a global perspective into the classroom. Many of the centers in the Bell School are over fifty years old, representing a rich tradition of rigorous graduate education and world-class academic research and training.

Why is Canberra, Australia a great place to study?

Canberra is the nation's capital, and our proximity to government ensures our teaching staff has strong and influential relationships with decision makers. Our students are provided with access to these networks through guest lectures, seminar series, internship opportunities, and other events throughout the year.

Canberra has been ranked the number one most liveable city in the world for 2016 and 2017, according to a recent quality of life index. Known as the "bush capital," it is common to see kangaroos and wombats on the vast green campus of the ANU. There are natural parks and reserves just a few minutes' drive from ANU, as well as a thriving bar and restaurant scene in the city center. With many students living on-campus, the university precinct offers all the amenities students need to complete their studies, as well as places to relax with friends.

Australian National University

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Vali Nasr
Dean
The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)

Preparing for the Complexities of a Changing World

Graduate study offers talented students the chance to advance their careers and make a difference in the world. Why is the study of international relations important?

The perspective of history shows that we live in a time of unprecedented peace, cooperation, and widespread prosperity. However, the world is also more complex, interconnected, and vulnerable than ever before. Every day, news headlines remind us of the work that remains to be done to assist the millions of people who are affected by economic instability, security challenges, poverty, inequality, and vulnerability. People who can understand and translate the complexities of a changing world—and can lead effectively with that knowledge in hand—are needed now, more than ever before. Whether serving as investment bankers, international media correspondents, energy consultants, or countless other career possibilities, students of international relations will be instrumental in achieving a safer, more equitable, and just global order.

How does Johns Hopkins SAIS stand out from other schools of international relations?

Finding solutions to multifaceted issues like water scarcity, population growth, terrorism, and economic development requires innovative thinkers connected to history and committed to shaping the future.

Through a rigorous graduate curriculum rooted in the study of practical application of international economics, international relations, regional studies, and language, Johns Hopkins SAIS attracts exceptional students eager to solve real-world problems and lead institutions driving positive global change. The school maintains three distinct competitive advantages: location, reach, and platform. Our campus locations in Washington, DC, Bologna, Italy, and Nanjing, China offer unique educational and professional opportunities and experiences in today's competitive higher education environment. Our reach—through a diverse student body, faculty, and alumni—ensures access to an influential and global network of scholars, policymakers, and industry leaders. Finally, the university's strong tradition of scholarship and exceptional faculty provide the foundation for a transformational educational experience.

How should aspiring foreign affairs professionals think about their futures?

There have been surprising geopolitical developments in the past year, causing many pundits to question the prospects for globalism and cooperation. Young people may think that perhaps this is not the best time to serve the public good. In times like these, some may dispute the merits of working in international affairs, but I beg to differ. The most pressing global challenges today are beyond the reach of talented diplomats, economists, entrepreneurs, business executives, and nonprofit visionaries—if they are working alone. The world needs change agents who can understand and translate the complexities of a changing world. Johns Hopkins SAIS is dedicated to educating and preparing the next generation of global leaders in government, the private sector, multilateral institutions, and the nonprofit sector to serve the billions of people around the world who wake up every day working for a better life. I encourage you to learn more about our unique community of globe-trotting polyglots and passionate activists that will challenge and inspire you to study with purpose.

SAIS
JOHNS HOPKINS
SCHOOL of ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Judith Kelley

Senior Associate Dean
ITT/Terry Sanford Professor of Public Policy Studies
Professor of Political Science
Duke Sanford School of Public Policy

'Outrageous Ambitions' for the Greater Good

At a time when political discourse is antagonistic and polarized, what is the Sanford School doing to promote constructive dialogue?

An international affairs career—whether in the field or conducting research on global concerns—requires an exchange of ideas from a rich diversity of perspectives, backgrounds, and experiences. To achieve this exchange, all partners must feel secure, welcomed, and respected, and all voices must be heard. These values and skills are critical to navigating these contentious times. At the Duke Sanford School, we work both to model them and to teach them.

In the classroom, our faculty address issues such as power imbalances and structural inequality. Outside of class, our committee on diversity and inclusion holds brown-bag discussions and training modules. Student groups—such as Sanford Pride, the Latin American and Caribbean Group, and Sanford Women in Policy—strive to make our campus welcoming to everyone.

Our student body is diverse. Some of our Master of Public Policy students arrive from stints in the Peace Corps, the U.S. military, and international nongovernmental organizations. Each year, our Master of International Development Policy program attracts mid-career professionals from more than twenty countries. With our small program size and collaborative spirit, students are able to establish career connections that reach across continents.

Globalization, mobile technologies, and social media are transforming global affairs. How does the Sanford School prepare students for rapid change and uncertainty?

Thinking imaginatively and being future-oriented are essential. The policy issues we face are cross-national, and we need big ideas. At Duke and Sanford, thinking big is in our DNA—our founder, Terry Sanford, challenged students to pursue "outrageous ambitions" for the greater good. Our students embrace that entrepreneurial spirit. They recently established a social innovation working group, a nonprofit board leadership program, and even a coding club. With their input, our curriculum focuses more on analyzing big data and incorporates ideas from behavioral economics and human-centered design.

Sanford students pursue these new approaches while also building core competencies in politics, microeconomics, statistics, and management. Through group projects for global and local clients, they also practice critical teamwork skills. Some choose to develop subject area expertise—security studies, environment and energy, or international development, for example—or pursue dual degrees in business, law, and environmental management.

How can students find mentors and role models?

Our accomplished alumni hold influential positions around the world. They include the founder of the Global Fund for Children, a humanitarian affairs officer working in Syria with the UN Refugee Agency, U.S. Foreign Service officers fighting human trafficking, and the founder of a global health-care access nonprofit. Our faculty, too, have broad experience. They include a former diplomat, military leaders, economic advisors to foreign governments, and a State Department policy planner. Because of our relatively small program sizes, our students have access to these faculty mentors.

In addition, our dedicated career services staff provides individualized career counseling—assisting with not only a first job but also with planning for the third, or fifth, position. They help students hone networking skills and make connections to our far-flung alumni network. Graduates leave the Duke Sanford School with a forever-widened worldview.

Duke | SANFORD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY

Nikita Lomagin
Professor of History and International Economics
ENERPO Academic Director
European University at St. Petersburg

A Spotlight on Eurasian Energy Politics

European University at St. Petersburg is a private graduate school and the top research university in Russia. It is a well-known destination for students from the United States, Europe, and Asia who are interested in all aspects of Russian and Eurasian studies. Why have you decided to launch a specific Master of Arts (MA) program with a focus on energy affairs in Eurasia?

In the twenty-first century, competition and cooperation over energy resources have become key factors in international affairs. The intensive one-year ENERPO (Energy Politics in Eurasia) and two-year ENERPO Plus programs are the only MA programs in Russia where students can learn and discuss, in English, a variety of topics, including Russian-European and Russian-Asian energy relations and challenges, influence of energy sector on politics, and economics and social development in the post-Soviet space. Interestingly, Albert Hirschman's observation of 1945, an expansion upon Machiavelli, seems to be correct: "a textbook for the modern prince should contain extensive new sections on the most efficient use of quotas, exchange controls, capital investment, and other instruments of economic warfare," including energy.

For people, "life is movement." For countries, "life is energy," as it affects entire industries and the economy. Energy security is a very intricate subject depending on economic, political, and social factors. What helps your students become experts in this field?

The ENERPO program offers students an exceptional interdisciplinary program combining energy-related courses from various disciplines—political and social sciences, economics, law, and history—in order to gain answers to basic questions. These questions vary from whether a combination of national energy security models could entail a system that could be accepted as a global common good, to if it is possible to merge different energy security approaches by exporters, importers, and transit states, as well as by climate change advocates and their opponents. Also what is the take on this from businesses and other industries.

In order to provide a practical approach on these issues, we arrange ENERPO workshops—roundtable meetings with prominent experts and energy business representatives from Russia and abroad. The seminar on world oil and gas affairs helps students analyze energy market news on a daily basis and prepare materials for a weekly ENERPO e-newsletter and a quarterly ENERPO journal. The summer school in Tyumen, known as the capital of Russian oil, and regular internships give our students the opportunity to immerse themselves in the industry and to attend both research and industrial facilities related with energy production.

This year, the fifth class of students graduated from the ENERPO program. What are their career prospects?

Solid education and strong skills in energy markets and political analyses, along with the opportunities for summer internships and career counseling, help students start their career in business, government, journalism, nongovernmental organizations, and academia. Some of our alumni work as energy analysts or traders in international energy companies; others use their skills in civil service or seek degrees in law and business or PhDs. Being a truly international program with students from more than a dozen countries—the United States, Australia, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Norway, Russia, the Caucasus, South Korea, Turkey, and the Gulf States—ENERPO guarantees a rich and vivid multicultural experience.

EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY AT ST. PETERSBURG

Alnoor Ebrahim

Professor of Management
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Tufts University

Management Matters: Applying Business Strategy to an International Affairs Education

Alnoor Ebrahim joined The Fletcher School in 2016 as a professor of Management, and teaches courses on Leadership, International Business Strategy, and Managing NGOs and Social Enterprises. Ebrahim has shared his expertise with the NGO Leaders Forum, the G8 and other major groups, and penned the award-winning book, "NGOs and Organizational Change: Discourse, Reporting, and Learning." He received a Ph.D. in Environmental Planning and Management from Stanford University's School of Engineering and has worked on projects with The World Bank, ActionAid International, and many leading organizations throughout his career.

You have a formidable background in academia and have also worked with the NGO Leaders Forum and a working group established by the G8. How has this experience informed your work as a professor at a school of international affairs?

So that my research can help tackle critical international issues, I am constantly engaging with global leaders on the challenges they face. The NGO Leaders Forum was a gathering of chief executive officers of the largest humanitarian development organizations based in the United States. I worked with a team to provide leaders with insights from research and policy that could help inform their discussions on core management challenges—such as how to design governance, impact measurement, and accountability.

I also served on an impact measurement working group established by the G8 to provide guidance to impact investors on how to measure the social impacts of their investments. I draw on these experiences in the classroom, as they pose real-world challenges, help inform new research, and provide networks for student projects and career connections.

Fletcher's curriculum offers a strong multi-disciplinary approach to international affairs. How does this broad view of today's global landscape prepare students for long-lasting careers in a variety of sectors?

Today's complex international problems—such as climate change, poverty, human rights, security, and sustainable development—require an ability to work across disciplines. At The Fletcher School, we prepare students to work across the boundaries of economics, law, business, and diplomacy in order to craft integrative solutions. Whether public policy, diplomacy, or another field, careers today require an ability to see the big picture and to galvanize diverse stakeholder groups toward a shared purpose.

The business world is accustomed to periods of uncertainty. How do you train students to be nimble and adaptive regardless of their chosen career path?

Uncertainty in the global economy has many roots—political instability, security and cyber threats, and risks to our food supply from climate change. This means we must train students to analyze these broader underlying forces, develop public policies that can address them, and lead organizations that can anticipate and manage them. This is true not only of careers in business but also in government and in civil society.

My courses teach students that the central task of leadership is to frame the challenges in a way that motivates collective problem-solving. The solutions to complex problems will rarely come from the top but are almost always jointly discovered.

Shujiro Urata
Dean and Professor
Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies
Waseda University

The Center of Gravity for Asia-Pacific Studies: GSAPS

What innovative ways has your program found to prepare students for an age of uncertainty?

The election of Donald Trump as the President of the United States and Brexit are two recent examples of the age of uncertainty, as these events were totally unexpected for many people. Although unexpected—or because they were unexpected—these events have had significant effect on the global economy and on politics. Increased uncertainty makes it difficult for graduate students interested in international studies to identify an area of specialization. In order to prepare students for an age of uncertainty, the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies (GSAPS) emphasizes not only the development of expertise in a core discipline from areas such as international politics, economics, cooperation, society and culture, history, and others but also an understanding of the foundations of multiple disciplines. Through effective education and training, GSAPS nurtures students with a core competence as well as broad issue coverage, so that they can be competitive and flexible in dealing with problems in an uncertain world.

The merit of learning from and understanding diverse perspectives now takes a more important role than ever. How is your school responding?

Recognizing the importance of understanding diverse perspectives, GSAPS offers a broad range of courses, from politics and economics to society and culture to history. Besides wide issue coverage, GSAPS's curriculum spans regions, from the Asia-Pacific to Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Our faculty members offer multiple, rich perspectives: not only do they have excellent academic achievements across different disciplines, but they also come from various countries and diverse backgrounds, including former officials in international organizations, journalists in mass media, and researchers in think-tanks. To broaden perspectives, students are encouraged to participate in exchange programs at graduate schools in foreign countries. One unique international program is the East Asian University Institute, a joint education program with four universities in Asia. As a way to encourage students to pursue high-level research, GSAPS offers selected students funds for conducting research in foreign countries.

What are the unique strengths of your program?

Situated in the center of Tokyo—a gateway to a rapidly growing Asia—GSAPS is an ideal location for students interested in conducting research in regional and global issues and in gaining experiences in international activities. Our MA program takes in approximately one hundred and twenty students annually, of whom 80 percent are from over fifty countries outside Japan. One unique feature of our MA program is project research: carried out in seminar style, the objective is for the students to prepare their MA thesis under the guidance of academic advisors. As well, GSAPS offers scholarships to qualified students, resulting in the successful recruitment of top students. Furthermore, the graduate school enjoys the advantage of being a part of Waseda University, one of the oldest and best private universities in Japan and Asia and the alma mater of a number of Japan's former prime ministers. Students and alumni of GSAPS have the opportunity to be a part of the broader global Waseda University network.

Waseda University
Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies
早稲田大学 大学院アジア太平洋研究科

Laura Bloomberg
Dean
Humphrey School of Public Affairs
University of Minnesota

Bringing the World into the Humphrey School and the Humphrey School into the World

The Humphrey School of Public Affairs is uniquely positioned to impact complex global challenges that demand innovative and effective approaches. Guided by a dynamic curriculum, and with the support of a globally engaged faculty, Humphrey School students are trained for careers in foreign policy, global affairs, international development, and human rights and humanitarianism.

What innovative ways has your program found to prepare students for an age of uncertainty?

The world needs visionaries to address daunting and ever-changing global challenges involving diplomacy, conflict prevention and management, humanitarian response, global migration, human rights, food security, climate change, poverty, and inequality. Our curriculum combines core courses in policy analysis and implementation with an array of academic opportunities to learn from practitioners through internships and field studies. Our partnership with the Stimson Center in Washington, DC, provides students research and internship opportunities with experts, and crisis negotiation exercises presented by the U.S. Army College—most recently with retired Ambassador Thomas Pickering—train students to negotiate international crises. We also leverage technology in ways that bring the world into the school and the school into the world by connecting students with professionals around the globe, and hosting an online collection of public policy teaching cases produced at institutions in Africa, Asia, East Asia, Central and South America, and across the United States.

How does the Humphrey School create learning environments where a diversity of views is present and allowed to flourish?

Faculty, staff, students, and alumni share a deep commitment to social justice and the celebration of diversity that are the legacy of our namesake, Hubert Humphrey, a statesman recognized internationally for his contributions to improving the well-being of humanity. We continuously review curriculum against our schoolwide goals of equity, inclusion, and diversity, and our classroom discussions are guided by ground rules for respectful and inclusive discourse. We have prioritized hiring practices that help to ensure a diversity of tenure and tenure-track faculty members—not only with regard to race, but also country of origin, orientation, and political view. Our faculty bring a global mindset and guide students to apply newly learned skills in a global context.

How are you preparing students to remain flexible in their career paths?

We prioritize two essential skills that are transferrable in uncertain times: public policy analysis and public policy implementation through community engagement. Students learn evidence-based best practices that shape effective policy and gain skills to engage respectfully with multiple stakeholders throughout the communities impacted by such policies and practices. Our Master of Public Policy (MPP) degree program, which includes a global policy concentration, trains students to lead and manage across sectors, institutions, and diverse populations and learn to solve complex problems in dynamic, uncertain environments. In courses on U.S. foreign policy and bilateral relations taught by our diplomat-in-residence, students explore ways that international diplomatic norms are continuously challenged by changes in the international political structure, the rise of non-state actors and organizations, and the explosion of digital technology and social media.

HUMPHREY SCHOOL
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Tamojit Chatterjee
Master of Advanced International Studies Program, 2017
UN's Sustainable Energy for All

Laura Beitz
Master of Science in Environmental Technology and International Affairs Program, 2015
Junior Professional Officer, UN's Sustainable Energy for All

Embracing Diversity—Understanding Complex Perspectives of International Affairs

Studying at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna (DA) is an opportunity to acquire a comprehensive knowledge of international affairs in order to prepare for the varied challenges of an international career. Vienna, as a seat of a high number of international organizations, is a comparative advantage, as well as the alumni network of more than 2,100 alumni from more than 120 countries.

The Diplomatic Academy of Vienna's graduates enjoy a high reputation in international organizations. Was that an advantage for you?

Laura: The reputation of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna (DA) was definitely an advantage. However, for me, the DA network was even more valuable. Being able to ask other DA alumni about their career and work experiences allowed me to gain a better understanding of the expectations and different work fields; consequently, it helped me to prepare for my interviews. The DA also provided me with valuable career advice.

Tamojit: While applying for jobs, I did feel that the DA piqued a certain admiration and was a good starting point for a conversation. Moreover, the alumni base of the DA is spread across international organizations in Vienna, and that definitely helps in getting to know the job market better. The alumni network has had a major role in supporting my efforts in navigating through the system while looking for a job. In general, the informal nature of the alumni club allows one to keep abreast of recent trends and news from other organizations.

The challenges for future leaders are manifold. How did your studies at the DA help you navigate through these uncertain times?

Laura: The challenges that today's leaders face are not all new. They are, however, more interconnected and demand holistic approaches to tackle them. Understanding the political, legal, economic, technical, and environmental dimensions behind new approaches are now more essential than ever. This was at the core of the Environmental Technology and International Affairs program, which has allowed me to start an international career in the energy sector. It helped me to develop a global mindset and to fully acknowledge the imperative necessity of worldwide cooperation to successfully address current and future challenges.

Tamojit: I believe that we are going through a period of seismic shifts in the international order. These are interesting times for us to enter the professional field because there is more need than ever for fresher and more rigorous efforts to piece the puzzles of the international system together. The DA's contribution in this regard, for me, definitely lies in its commitment to diversity, whether it is cultural or academic. The DA's multicultural and tightly knit student community allows one to interact and appreciate people from different cultures and walks of life. Second, the multidisciplinary approach of the Master of Advanced International Studies program placed me on solid ground with a better understanding of interconnected issues and allowed me a 360-degree perception to think of issues from multiple viewpoints.

Both of these factors, I believe, contribute to overcoming the challenges that one may face while navigating through life as well as through professional journeys.

diplomatische akademie wien
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Angela Evans
Dean
Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs
The University of Texas at Austin

Leading and Succeeding in a World of Uncertainty

How are you preparing students to succeed in an uncertain global environment?

Unpredictability has always been a defining characteristic of global affairs. We teach students to not only expect uncertainty but also to capitalize on it and use it as an opportunity for transformational change. That is only possible if one understands the roots of changes taking place, so we instill in our students a truly global outlook—one that does not take the U.S. perspective as universal. Our students study the opposing vantage point, question assumptions, and plan for the unexpected, which builds resiliency in times of flux.

How relevant and contemporary is the curriculum and learning environment?

At the LBJ School, we prepare students by constantly adapting our curriculum to incorporate new tools, methodologies, and ways of thinking. Specifically, students pursuing our Master of Global Policy Studies (MGPS) degree are well-versed in the traditional areas of study—development, diplomacy, security, humanitarian aid—and they understand how modern forces change how we confront issues such as the emergence of non-state actors, sustainable development, climate patterns, and cyber warfare. We put a strong emphasis on experiential learning, in which students study policy through real-world exposure and practice, including participation in a year-long policy research project funded by an external client.

Students have the unique advantage of accessing the vast resources of The University of Texas (UT) at Austin, a Tier 1 research institution. MGPS students are afforded ten dual degree options, choose from existing specializations, or design one based on their personal career trajectory. They especially benefit from the LBJ School's affiliations with the Clements Center for National Security and the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, both of which integrate expertise from across UT as well as from the private and public sectors to tackle pressing global security challenges. Notably, LBJ is host to UT's new China Policy Center, a laboratory for the study of contemporary U.S.-China relations. Our Latin America working group investigates the most serious issues facing the region over the next decade, with Texas a gateway to this region of the world. We continue to see high-level officials from Washington, DC, and around the globe make us a destination for important exchange and dialogue. In the last two years, we hosted a secretary of state, secretary of defense, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director, Federal Bureaus of Investigations director, director of national intelligence, and several U.S. senators.

How do you connect students to jobs in their desired fields?

Our faculty include world-renowned scholars and former senior officials in the departments of state and defense, the National Security Council, U.S. Agency for International Development, the World Bank, and more. In recent years, students have taken jobs at the U.S. State Department and the Defense Department, the CIA, the U.S. Senate and House Armed Services Committees, the World Bank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Brookings Institution, the Atlantic Council, prominent nongovernmental organizations, and nonprofits.

Whether through our faculty, LBJ's Washington Center in DC, Austin's burgeoning global community, or through our engaged alumni network numbering over 4,100 on the world stage, our students are exposed to the full range of professional possibilities.

LBJ SCHOOL
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Michael A. McFaul
Director
Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University

Stanford Offers Far More Than a Traditional Policy Degree

Michael A. McFaul is the former U.S. ambassador to Russia, 2012–2014; former senior director for Russia and Eurasia, U.S. National Security Council, 2009–2012; senior fellow, Hoover Institution; and professor of political science, Stanford University

What differentiates the Ford Dorsey Program in International Policy Studies (IPS) from other policy studies programs?

Stanford has a strong tradition of collaborating across disciplines, which creates a truly interdisciplinary learning environment. IPS students can fulfill program requirements at other Stanford professional schools, such as the Graduate School of Business, the Law School, the Graduate School of Education, the design school, and even the medical school. Over the next few years, we will be rolling out more joint-degree programs to take greater advantage of these opportunities. This interdisciplinary spirit is heavily influenced by Silicon Valley's entrepreneurial and innovative ethos. Unique courses such as hacking for defense and hacking for diplomacy afford our students opportunities to approach national security issues from a technological perspective. Courses that combine technology and international policy are unique to Stanford and differentiate us from traditional policy schools.

IPS recently underwent a reorganization, moving into the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI). What changes are on the way as IPS settles into its new home?

With its diverse faculty, FSI creates greater opportunities for IPS students to work across disciplines and to receive an applied education. Over the past few years, we have worked to give students more experience with real clients in our practicum and in other classes. In the autumn quarter of 2018, there will be a new, stronger curriculum that will provide future public service professionals with even greater tools for their careers. Additionally, we will continue to grow the robust career development opportunities available to students.

What skills do students obtain in your program?

The IPS curriculum prepares students to address problems in diplomacy, governance, security, international economic policy, energy and environmental policies, and development. Our students tell us that they chose our program in order to get a firm grounding in analytical and quantitative skills. IPS graduates leave the program with expertise in quantitative analysis, policy writing, decision-making, and negotiation, among a host of other skills that contemporary policymakers need. Since students can take classes in different departments and schools at Stanford, many also obtain skills in finance, computer science, management, and other fields.

Our students must also study one of the five areas of programmatic concentration: democracy and development, energy and environment, global health, international political economy, and international security. In 2018, we are adding an additional concentration in cyber policy.

What networking and career opportunities can IPS offer to students?

At Stanford—and FSI in particular—we have a group of people with incredible policy experience. At FSI alone, there are four former ambassadors, while Stanford is home to former U.S. cabinet officials, policymakers from federal and state governments, and, of course, the Silicon Valley community. We also routinely host non-U.S. policymakers in our visiting diplomats programs. There is an increasing demand for tech companies to have effective government and international relations departments, and many of our recent graduates have accepted jobs at some of the Valley's most exciting enterprises. IPS is not a traditional policy degree in many respects—we offer far more than that!

Stanford | *Ford Dorsey* Program in International Policy Studies

Mihailo Jovanovic

MA, 2016
School of Diplomacy and International Relations
Seton Hall University

Ready for the Real World: Putting Diplomacy into Practice

As a student from Serbia, what aspects of diplomacy do you value most?

Sometimes it feels as if I have only lived in times of uncertainty, which is why international relations and diplomacy have always been a big part of my life. Growing up in Serbia and the war-torn Balkans region in the 1990s, I knew about United Nations (UN) missions and the diplomats who were active in the region. I was fascinated with diplomacy and its application as an instrument that states could use to negotiate and realize their national interests.

After graduating from college in 2009 with a degree in finance, I started working for a global banking firm and then moved to a major professional services company. These experiences offered me a deeper understanding of globalization and cross-border cooperation and helped me to appreciate collaboration within teams—all hallmarks of diplomacy.

After working for a few years, I decided to pursue a master's degree in international affairs. At Seton Hall University's School of Diplomacy and International Relations, I gained a strong foundation in international relations theory, improved my analytical and research skills, and expanded my knowledge of global institutions. I also studied with international affairs scholars and career diplomats and participated in a study seminar in Cyprus, where I met the country's current president and other top leaders. I also spent a week at the UN with students from around the world, where we attended briefings and heard from senior UN officials about the organization's dynamics and the daily challenges diplomats face.

All of these experiences gave me a realistic understanding of the complexity and hard work involved in diplomacy. Managing the demands of today's multilateral world requires a new generation of diverse, well-informed, and flexible international front-runners.

How did your experience at the School of Diplomacy enhance your ability to work in diverse settings?

Among the things I valued most about the School of Diplomacy were its small class size, communal environment, and global student body. For example, our art and science of negotiation class simulations gave us a chance to practice negotiating in real-time with students of different backgrounds. I have used the skills I gained in that class in my new global role at work. I also had an opportunity to hear different perspectives on the U.S.-Iran nuclear deal from Iranian and U.S. colleagues who thoughtfully represented opposing points of view. I heard firsthand about issues in Afghanistan from a student who worked in his country's ministry of foreign affairs. This level of engagement is unique. It helped me grow personally and professionally and showed me the value of diversity—not just in terms of ethnicity, religion, and race—but in opinion and perspective, as well.

What advice would you have for new students of international relations?

There is a need for students who, as international civil servants, will focus on *accomplishing* something rather than *becoming* somebody. My modest advice to these future global leaders is to never stop learning, be flexible about their careers, especially in times of uncertainty, and to remain open to hearing different points of view.

SCHOOL OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
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Elizabeth Blass

Master of Science in Management,
Strategy and Leadership, 2015
The Eli Broad College of Business
Michigan State University

Today's Professionals Can Never Learn Enough

Tell us a little bit about your background.

I began at MCI Telecommunications—which later became Verizon. I started in an entry-level position and worked my way up to be a regional service vice president in the enterprise customer division. I was able to grow and learn because I worked with and for some of the best leaders and most supportive mentors of my career.

Three months into Michigan State University's program, my husband and I moved from Chicago to San Francisco, where I am now responsible for the global privacy solutions organization at TRUSTe.

Why did you choose the Master of Science in Management, Strategy and Leadership degree, specifically?

I believe that a person can never learn enough about management and leadership. It is an ever-evolving field of study. I use strategy in nearly every part of my role and knew that sharpening my skills in this area would also be of benefit.

Why did you choose to pursue an online master's degree from Michigan State University (MSU)?

I had wanted to pursue a master's degree for a while but did not want to put my life on hold. I travel often for work and for personal reasons; I would not have been able to pursue a program that did not offer the flexibility of online learning. I have written papers from various places and was able to manage school while moving cross-country.

Prior to this program, I had not found a reputable program that I could be proud to attend. Once I did a little research, I knew this was the answer. MSU's Broad College of Business has produced some fantastic leaders and has an excellent reputation.

With your new learnings, where do you hope to go?

This knowledge enhances my abilities, replenishes my toolkit, and increases my confidence. Eventually, I may also pursue a higher level of education. In the near future, I would also like to pursue undergraduate online teaching.

What is your most valuable learning so far, and how have you been able to apply it?

I have been able to apply many things. During the first class, I was able to create a business scorecard, and during the second class, the instructor helped me to implement an employee survey related to our mission.

The cohort that I have been with since the beginning has been so impressive, knowledgeable, and fun. These are connections that I will keep for a long time.

What advice would you give to others considering enrolling in the program?

You must be organized, be able to plan school around your busy life, be committed to learning and contributing to the class, and be incredibly disciplined throughout the program.

What or who is driving you to succeed during this process? How?

I will be the first one in my family to earn an advanced degree. I am proud of this, and it drives me.

What's your number one takeaway from this experience?

If you listen, you can learn so much from those around you. It is important to be a lifelong learner.

Broad College of Business
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

Rachel Korberg, MA '13

Yale Jackson Institute for Global Affairs
Associate Director at The Rockefeller Foundation

Preparing Leaders for Pressing Global Challenges

How did Jackson prepare you not just for your first job after graduate school but for the rest of your career?

What drew me to Jackson was the ability to learn from a diverse group of fields and people. I took classes not just at Jackson but also at the Schools of Management, Law, Public Health, and Forestry & Environmental Studies. This helped me learn how to be a translator between fields and perspectives. For example, in my current job, I may speak with Silicon Valley in the morning and then to an organizer or a scientist in the afternoon—taking courses and learning with leaders in all of those spaces have really helped.

Prior to Yale, you were involved in several non-profit organizations and government agencies. After graduate school, you transitioned into private sector work. How did your Jackson degree help you to make this change?

My career was initially in the global development and humanitarian world. At a certain point, though, I was frustrated not to see more results. Instead, I saw work happening without enough impact and collaboration with the communities that were actually living these challenges. I needed a moment to reflect and reorganize. I was grateful that Jackson gave me an opportunity to do that.

While at Jackson, I ended up building my skills in business strategy and finance. I took this training to my job as vice president at a frontier markets investment firm. One of my favorite projects was a market study on energy-efficient appliance manufacturing in Ghana, and we later advised the government on how to spur more manufacturing. Jackson helped me to make that shift into the private sector.

How would you advise students interested in global development to take advantage of their time at Jackson, given the program's flexibility?

Don't be afraid of digging into policy and business approaches—getting outside of the typical tools used by the global development sector will serve your career. Take courses that explore, and really grapple with, criticisms about development aid. I would also suggest taking at least one class on something that you've never done before. One of the best classes I took while at Jackson was a six-person, PhD-level history seminar with historian Tim Snyder.

How did you benefit from the Jackson community?

What I loved most about Jackson was the students' commitment to service. A few of my classmates were former military, for example; despite my being an aid worker at the time, I quickly realized that what we had in common was that we were all committed to serving in some way. Jackson students come from all around the world and from different sectors. Because it's a small program, we were able to spend time together and expanded each other's perspectives. It's a great community.

Ms. Korberg leads the Foundation's efforts to identify new, large-scale opportunities for impact.

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Lauren Carruth
Assistant Professor
School of International Service
American University

School of International Service: Leadership Through Service

You are a medical anthropologist specializing in humanitarian assistance and global health who teaches international affairs. Tell us about your research and approach to teaching.

My research draws on insights from ethnographic field work and ongoing conversations with many different people in the Horn of Africa to help improve the global health policies and humanitarian interventions that affect them. My goal as an instructor at the School of International Service (SIS) is to share these experiences with my students and, therein, help them more effectively recognize, analyze, and redress health inequities, both in faraway places like the Horn of Africa and right here in Washington, DC.

How has your work with humanitarian organizations such as UNICEF and the United Nations (UN) World Food Program informed how you teach international affairs?

As an anthropologist, I consider UN agencies and nongovernmental organizations as cultural systems with discernable histories, symbols, rituals, and values. In class, we study how power operates within these organizations. We ask how power relations affect how we define a humanitarian crisis, a famine, or an epidemic, and how and by whom particular health and humanitarian interventions are designed and evaluated. To supplement scholarly and policy texts, I introduce students to aid workers, policymakers, and beneficiaries who can offer grounded insights into the importance, challenges, and inadequacies of particular foreign interventions.

How does the SIS curriculum, built around the combination of knowledge and practice, benefit students?

In my classes, I make sure that every student ends the semester with three things: scientific and programmatic proficiency, depth of historical knowledge, and the ability to critically analyze global inequities. First, I make sure students are knowledgeable about the science and policy underpinning health and humanitarian interventions. Second, I teach the history and roles of international organizations and governments in the development of laws and intervention strategies. Students exit the class understanding, for example, the history, structure, and critiques of the UN World Health Organization and how it positions itself for future global health challenges. Third, students gain critical thinking skills to evaluate how diseases or problems are prioritized and how groups of people and problems can sometimes be left behind or obscured.

SIS was founded on the promise of educating international affairs students to wage peace. How do you apply this to your work?

"Waging peace" means building relations of trust and fighting for social justice. Anthropologists have long studied the role of health in people's social identities and the cultural sensitivity required to optimize medical care—especially in the aftermath of war or violence. Health care has important societal effects; conversely, social relations shape the outcomes and evaluations of the medical care people receive. Therefore, health and humanitarian responses can never be limited to building clinics and donating material goods but must also include explicit efforts to foster trust and reconciliation. Histories of violence make relief operations and clinical encounters between oppositional groups formidable. However, in my work, I have found that healthcare providers and aid workers, by explicitly working to undo political tensions, can build meaningful rapport across antagonistic divides. In other words, peace can begin in the clinic.

PHOTO: NYUSPS/MARK MCQUEEN

Michael Oppenheimer

Clinical Professor
NYU School of Professional Studies
Center for Global Affairs

Using Uncertainty to Gain Future Strategic Advantage

You've been asked to comment on how to "stay ahead in uncertain times". Why is this such a critical question?

The goal of any graduate program in global affairs must be to educate students on how to be effective in shaping the future in whatever occupation they choose, when that future is surrounded by uncertainty. Political realism teaches us to expect surprise: relations among states are anarchic, power competition is never ending, periods of stability are transitory. Globalization and rapid technology innovation accelerate change and further widen the range of uncertainty. The current power transition, from U.S centric to non-centric, and the absence of effective management of this transition, make the present period in IR uniquely unstable and dangerous.

Making smart strategic decisions in conditions of uncertainty is a critical source of future competitive advantage, and is a focus of the MS in Global Affairs offered by the NYU School of Professional Studies Center for Global Affairs (CGA). Managing uncertainty is hard. Some organizations wait for 'clarity' before making big decisions, but clarity never arrives while opportunities to shape the future are forfeited. Some double down on existing strategic assumptions, but rapid change degrades these assumptions and existing strategy loses its robustness. Some conclude that all is uncertain, failing to leverage what we do know about the world, and thus make poor choices that invite unintended consequences.

So what are the attributes of organizations that succeed in an uncertain world?

They take the future seriously. They try to understand and track forces for change in their environment. They make sure the assumptions upon which strategy are based leverage the best knowledge available, and are subjected to reality checks as the world evolves in unexpected ways. Their strategies are tested against alternate, plausible futures, which minimizes surprise and helps prepare for change, both positive and negative. They are conscious of risk, but not immobilized by it, understanding that any strategy comes with downsides, and that these can be mitigated by making risk explicit and planning actions if risks materialize. Successful organizations find the right balance between knowledge and imagination. They know how to think about uncertainty, how to organize themselves to reduce surprise and manage risk. Because they see the world more clearly than others they turn uncertainty to strategic advantage.

So how exactly does CGA prepare students to excel in this world of surprise and uncertainty?

Thinking about the future permeates the MS in Global Affairs. I oversee a concentration (one of eight) called International Relations/Global Futures, which is devoted to teaching the substance and process of future international developments. My book *Pivotal Countries, Alternate Futures,* recently published by Oxford, synthesizes many years of teaching and consulting on the future. I also supervise an ongoing research project for the UN, involving five students per semester, on countering emerging terrorist threats. Many other professors who teach in the program also are focused on the future. Regina Joseph teaches strategic foresight and the uses of big data, conducts forecasting tournaments and policy hackathons; Mary Beth Altier leads our Transnational Security concentration, which focuses on emerging global threats; and Jennifer Trahan who heads our International Law and Human Rights concentration, ran a global conference at CGA this past semester on the future of global justice. These are just a few examples of how coping with uncertainty and surprise is woven into CGA's curriculum and public events.

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Manuel Muñiz
Dean
IE School of International Relations

Educating for the World of Tomorrow: Where Technology and Change meet Global Affairs

Why does your School aim to educate for "the world of tomorrow"?

The world is changing at an exponential pace. In the last three decades life expectancy increased by an average of three months per year lived, century-old companies ceased to exist and many of the jobs performed by humans for generations were taken over by robots and algorithms. In the last two years alone humanity produced more data than in the previous twenty millennia. Advances in artificial intelligence, robotics, the biological and medical sciences and many others will mean that the world where our graduates will live will be very different to the one we know today. Many more of our jobs will be automated, we will have redefined the concept of privacy and of security, and the boundaries between local and global will have become completely blurred. This complex and interdependent world will be in dire need of leaders capable of navigating it and of guiding its companies, institutions and governments. We aim to be at the forefront of the process of educating those leaders both at the undergraduate and graduate levels.

How does the IE educate its students to address current and future challenges?

At IE School of International Relations we are committed to innovation in education. This is not only reflected in the use of technology in the classroom and beyond but also in how our teaching is always focused on trends of change. We do not educate for the past but for the future. This requires linking our teaching to the latest advances in the fields of technology and innovation and leveraging the power of the humanities to make sense of such a rapidly changing landscape. It also requires providing our students with a solid foundation on how the private sector works. We are strong believers in the need for the public and private sectors to work together to solve some of the greatest problems of our time. By bringing together knowledge about technology, public policy, business and global affairs we seek to educate individuals capable of succeeding in an ever-changing world.

What is the IE experience and what sort of careers do IE graduates have?

The IE School of International Relations is a cosmopolitan institution. The vast majority of our students are international. Our language of instruction is English. And our students get to spend time in both Madrid, the over-4-million-strong capital of Spain, and in Segovia, a UNESCO World Heritage site where the IE owns a beautiful 13th century monastery.

Our Bachelor and Master in International Relations graduates have gone on to work for some of the world's largest corporations in strategy, business development and institutional affairs departments. Some are working for multilateral institutions such as the United Nations or the World Bank. Others have gone into politics and the public sector more broadly. Others, in turn, are helping some of those in need in our world through their work in NGOs and other philanthropic institutions. Overall, our graduates have made the most of their education and are working at the frontier of global affairs. We are very proud of them. I encourage readers to join us here in Spain, to accept future challenges affronting humanity and to take part in our vast alumni community currently continuing to make the world a better-governed place for all.

ie SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Rey Koslowski

Director of the Master of International Affairs Program
Rockefeller College of Public Affairs & Policy
University at Albany

Building Skills and Expertise in an Innovative Program

What does Rockefeller College offer students pursuing professional international affairs careers?

With origins in a graduate public administration program established in 1947, Rockefeller College of Public Affairs & Policy recently launched an innovative Master of International Affairs (MIA) program that emphasizes flexibility and individualized attention. International affairs students build core competencies in international relations and policy analysis, economics, management, and quantitative methods. They develop expertise in areas such as global and homeland security, diplomacy and global governance, information technology policy and management, global public management, and international development administration.

How do Rockefeller's international affairs students acquire skills and expertise required for a changing world?

Our highly accomplished international affairs faculty members offer skills-based courses to meet changing demands in a range of concentration areas.

More wars are now fought within states than between them, and civil wars spill across borders as terrorist attacks. Students concentrate electives in global and homeland security to learn about insurgencies and the causes of political violence that spans international borders as well as develop the necessary skills to work in organizations that must deal with terrorism. International affairs students desiring even more specialized expertise may enroll concurrently in certificate programs in homeland security or cybersecurity or focus their elective coursework on intelligence analysis.

To meet millennium development goals or support counterinsurgency strategies, states and international organizations increasingly turn to nongovernmental organizations for project implementation. To become skilled development professionals, students focus their studies on international development administration and take courses offered by faculty from Rockefeller College's Center for International Development (CID), which has implemented over $200 million in development projects for national governments—such as the U.S. Agency for International Development—and international organizations—such as the United Nations Development Program.

As half of the world's population gains internet access, governments are going online to serve their citizens and are becoming vulnerable to cyber attacks in the process. Students develop solid e-governance skills by focusing their studies on information technology policy and management and taking courses with faculty affiliated with the University at Albany's Center for Technology in Government (CTG), which has partnered with over one hundred and fifty government agencies.

Students hone their skills through internships in these and other areas of specialization. With assistance from our career development staff, Rockefeller College students routinely intern at federal and state homeland security, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies. Our students also intern with CID on international development projects and with CTG on government technology projects, as well as with their partners around the world.

What flexibility does the MIA program offer to students with varying needs and career paths?

Whether full-time or part-time, students take courses in-person or through synchronous distance learning using web conferencing. This means students may continue their coursework even when interning in other cities or when traveling for work. While offering internship and experiential learning opportunities to students who need to build their résumés, we also enable students with extensive professional experience to focus solely on their academic training. Regardless of the path taken, students acquire the skills and knowledge they need to succeed.

Kent Boydston
Master of Pacific International Affairs, 2015
School of Global Policy and Strategy
UC San Diego

West Coast-Trained for a Washington, D.C., Think Tank

Immediately after the School of Global Policy and Strategy (GPS), you headed to Washington, D.C., as a research analyst at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. What are you working on now, and how did your graduate studies help?

Currently, I track various metrics for measuring the North Korean economy to ascertain how and at what levels their economy is growing. I also have an ongoing project assessing the extent of South Korean humanitarian and economic aid in North Korea.

I have always wanted to be in the mix of discussions on U.S. foreign policy in East Asia, and Washington, D.C., is the hub. GPS combines quantitative analysis skills and top-notch research and was the best place for my studies.

What lessons prepared you to work at a leading think tank?

I use my quantitative skills every day. The economics training at GPS is great, and so is the broad training in public policy. In a town like Washington, D.C., you are never too far removed from politics, and I gained a superb foundation for understanding this. It is not about learning facts; it is about acquiring that foundation to analyze problems in many contexts.

North Korea represents uncertainty for many in the world. What are your thoughts on the current tensions?

We are in a very difficult time. We need bold new ideas to signal the intent of the U.S. toward long-term peace and engagement with North Korea while simultaneously improving sanctions enforcement and continuing to punish aberrant behavior. This is not an easy balance to find.

Just as important as analyzing these complex policy issues, it is necessary to connect them with stakeholders. That is why I maintain relationships with government officials, diplomats, and members of the media. This makes my work better but also allows for opportunities to share it with others.

As a graduate student, how pivotal were your multiple fellowships?

Immensely pivotal. The Robertson Foundation for Government Fellowship provided unparalleled financial assistance to support my training in public policy with an eye on public service. The Boren Fellowship provided funding to study Korean in South Korea, and the Rosenthal Fellowship supported my U.S. Department of State internship. The Career Services staff at GPS kept me up to speed with fellowship deadlines and made sure my applications were solid.

To what extent has your collaborative work with faculty benefitted you?

While a student, I had the chance to work with truly fantastic professors such as Stephan Haggard and Susan Shirk—experts in Korea and China, respectively. It is hard to imagine a better place to study if you want to think deeply and critically about Northeast Asia policy.

I am currently working on research with Stephan Haggard and writing posts for his and Marcus Noland's blog, North Korea: Witness to Transformation. Faculty members Susan Shirk and Emilie Hafner-Burton also have been very helpful in encouraging me in my career and carrying on policy discussions even after classes ended.

UC San Diego
SCHOOL OF GLOBAL POLICY AND STRATEGY

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Wei Liang

Professor & Co-Chair of the International Trade and Economic Diplomacy Program
Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey

Real World Issues Inspire Graduate Degree Learning

How does the Middlebury Institute prepare students for an age of uncertainty?

The Middlebury Institute of International Studies is a professional graduate school in Monterey, California. Our goal is for students to develop professional skills and gain up-to-date industry knowledge through our innovative learning approaches. We understand that new teaching methods are needed to better suit the learning needs of students with professional goals. Our master's degree in international trade and economic diplomacy is a good example of our approach to teaching.

First, we use real-world issues as learning opportunities. Through the use of case materials based on current issues, we ask students to conduct role-playing negotiation simulations. For instance, we have an in-class negotiation simulation on global climate talks, Doha round negotiations, Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, and a South China Sea dispute settlement. By providing detailed instruction and inviting professional negotiators to guide the process, we teach the subject matter in an engaging way and enable students to practice negotiation skills effectively. In addition, we have developed a number of immersive courses that give our students opportunities to conduct field research in different parts of the world, including East Asia, South America, and Africa.

What I am most proud of is that these unique practicum courses offer a rare opportunity for our students to develop, work on, and deliver a real policy-relevant research project from scratch. The knowledge they gain throughout this process endures; more importantly, the skills they acquire and practice in the field are applicable to their future endeavors anywhere in the world. These practicum courses develop professional research skills that cannot be learned simply by sitting in the classroom and library. Finally, the last semester of this graduate program allows students to gain additional professional experience at our Washington, DC, campus after they complete two semesters of coursework in Monterey.

The merits of learning from and understanding diverse perspectives now takes a more important role than ever. How is the Middlebury Institute responding?

This is important for a graduate professional school with a strong focus on international policy studies like the Middlebury Institute. It is our priority to make sure that students study complicated global issues by deeply understanding and appreciating the different and diverse perspectives presented to them. The policy studies and research initiatives we include in our degree programs are taught in over seven languages by scholars with different perspectives. Fortunately, we have a very diverse campus community: almost 30 percent of our students are international. Besides learning from open-minded professors, students truly enjoy learning from each other in the classroom.

What specific skills can the Middlebury Institute provide to its students while allowing them to remain flexible in their career paths?

We train our students in communication, public speaking, negotiation, qualitative and quantitative research methods, and much more. We know that we cannot teach students every skill they will need in their jobs, now or later; therefore, we put great emphasis in the classroom on knowing how to collaborate with others, learn continuously, and think critically. The goal is always to provide students with the skills and tools to be flexible and passionate throughout their professional life.

Middlebury Institute *of* International Studies at Monterey

Khong Yuen Foong

Li Ka Shing Professor of Political Science
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy
National University of Singapore

Grooming Future Leaders from Asia

Why study in Asia now? And why Singapore?

Because Asian economies are developing at a tremendous pace and power is shifting from the West to the East, there is a growing demand throughout the world to better understand Asian perspectives. Located in the heart of the region where East meets West, Singapore offers an unmatched vantage point to view and interpret these changes. Recent developments—China's emerging role as the region's champion of trade through the Belt and Road Initiative, in the context of a retreating Western order—signal the emergence of a new world order in which the actions of Asian powers matter more in global affairs than before. Therefore, studying in Asia enhances the global competitiveness of those who want to make a difference: our students achieve a strong grasp of the economic, strategic, and cultural dynamics of the region as they form new networks with Asia's young policy and thought leaders. Singapore's education reputation also continues to attract global attention, with the National University of Singapore ranking fifteenth in the world in the latest QS World University Rankings.

How does the Lee Kuan Yew (LKY) School of Public Policy groom leaders of tomorrow?

The LKY School is uniquely positioned to prepare future leaders for the new era. For over a decade, it has trained students from Asia and other parts of the world through its world-class public policy education. Our careful selection of students from the world over allows students to learn from one another through their diverse perspectives and varied experiences. This global network of fellow graduates and future leaders remain invaluable contacts throughout their careers. The LKY School allows its students opportunities to learn by engaging in dialogue with global luminaries and Asian leaders, such as Aung San Suu Kyi, former Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Kofi Annan, and David Cameron. The LKY School also facilitates internship opportunities and job connections for students, enabling graduates to move quickly to jobs in national governments, multilateral agencies, nongovernmental organizatons, and research institutes.

What is special about the newly launched Master in International Affairs (MIA) program?

The LKY School launched its inaugural MIA program in August 2017. Our distinguished international faculty, with deep expertise on China, India, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the United States, and other Asian-Pacific powers, is committed to delivering an outstanding education in international affairs. Students in the MIA program will have the opportunity to work closely with faculty members, and they are expected to participate in the latest debates in international affairs from both a theoretical and practical point of view. Students who share our excitement about Asia and who aspire to an international career in policy, business, consulting, research, or academia will thrive in the challenging LKY School environment. Last but not least, our students are also encouraged to undertake practical fieldwork and internships, in addition to taking advantage of exchange programs with other top universities in Asia and beyond.

Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy
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Stephen J. Collier
Chair
Julien J. Studley Graduate Program in International Affairs
The New School

A New Kind of International Affairs

What was the original motivation for launching the Julien J. Studley Graduate Program in International Affairs (GPIA) in 2001?

Our founding director, Mike Cohen—who led the World Bank's urban department for many years—wanted to design an alternative international affairs program. He wanted it to have a truly global focus—looking at issues in poor and middle-income countries, not only at the latest issues in U.S. foreign policy. The program would be committed to practice and getting students out in the field, and be critical, engaged, and iconoclastic, in The New School tradition. He put together a faculty with this in mind, and these orientations are still central to our program.

What are the program's main academic and professional areas of focus?

We offer five concentrations: Conflict and Security, Media and Culture, Cities and Social Justice, Governance and Rights, and Development. Each provides a different set of real-world experiences and skills. In Conflict and Security students learn to conduct conflict assessments; in Media and Culture students learn transmedia design, and its links to advocacy; and so on. We also offer an extensive practice curriculum that provides a range of skills—geographic information systems, participatory design, monitoring and evaluation, media production, survey research, and many others—that are essential to the ever-changing field of international affairs.

What makes The New School's program different from other international affairs programs?

Traditionally, the field has been centered on economics and political science. Although other programs bring in new perspectives, their core curriculum is still organized around classic areas. One can certainly study those topics at The New School, but our program is distinguished by our critical perspective, our commitment to practice and engaged learning, the unique possibilities in New York for students of international affairs, and the connections across The New School in media, design, and social research. There is no other international affairs program that combines this set of things.

Another attractive distinction of GPIA is that our program is flexible. We do not march students through a bunch of required courses—we believe that students should put together a course of study guided by their own interest. Our program has always been accommodating for nontraditional students: people who are changing careers or working full- or part-time. We are committed to making our program work for people in different situations.

Third, our International Field Program is an entirely unique opportunity for our graduate students. Students spend two summer months at our field sites abroad getting on-the ground experience. They work and conduct research with community-based organizations, NGOs, and government agencies around the world.

What has been students' favorite part of GPIA?

Students love the program and report that they find it to be a transformative experience. Dealing with international affairs is not like fixing a car—just a matter of knowing which part to replace or which screw to adjust. It is about critically engaging with the field: Why are we asking certain questions and not others? What political agendas are behind particular answers to global problems? Students who come to our program are interested in these questions, and I think they are satisfied with what they find.

THE NEW SCHOOL

Shane Woodson
Student
Thunderbird School of Global Management
Arizona State University

Thriving in Uncertain Times

What is unique about Thunderbird, and how does it prepare you for a career in this age of uncertainty?

I am pursuing my Master of Arts in Global Affairs and Management; I just finished my first year. Essentially, the MAGAM is a specialized MBA. This summer, I took part in a Global Consulting Lab (GCL) in Ecuador with 3M Corporation; and now, I am doing an internship in Philadelphia with GE.

The applied learning projects give students a unique perspective on what it is like to work on an international platform, and the GCL was my first time working abroad. Currently, at my ten-week internship at GE, I meet people from Thunderbird all the time, and I work with people from all over the world. In fact, when I interviewed for the position, we had studied the GE-Electrolux acquisition—I was able to bring that knowledge to the conversation, and I think that was part of the reason why I got the job. The study was another Thunderbird experience that gave me an advantage.

Thunderbird has exceeded all my expectations. I tell people that it is the best decision I could have made—the doors it has opened have been incredible. At the school, we have the best professors and the best subject matters that really take students to the next level, both personally and professionally.

With all the changes going on in the world, how does your program give you a foundation for success in a dynamic job market?

The professors have in-depth background in what they are teaching—they have worked on a global stage with different people and different companies from around the world, and they bring that passion to the classroom and to the students. Everything about Thunderbird prepares students to be comfortable in uncertain situations. What I am learning at Thunderbird helps me to be more certain of the future and to make sure I have an impact going forward.

The merits of learning from and understanding diverse perspectives is more important than ever; how does Thunderbird prepare you for this?

The diversity at Thunderbird prepares students every day—classmates from around the world with different backgrounds, cultures, and experiences. I am in Washington, DC, right now with four other students, and we're all from different countries—Bolivia, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, and the United States. That's Thunderbird. At GE, I go into this experience knowing how to work with people from all over the world because it is what we do in school every day, and that makes for an easy transition.

What specific skills are you receiving from Thunderbird that enables you to be flexible and to adapt to change on your career path?

We learn the hard skills, but the soft skills have been most important—relationship building and adapting to different working environments with different people. At Thunderbird, students are always in different situations with different people, and that's where I feel I have grown the most. With this background, a Thunderbird graduate can always handle whatever is thrown at him or her.

THUNDERBIRD
SCHOOL OF GLOBAL MANAGEMENT
A unit of the Arizona State University Knowledge Enterprise

Dr. Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels
Academic Director
Brussels School of International Studies
University of Kent

Advanced International Studies in the Capital of Europe with Leading Academics and Experienced Practitioners

What is it about the Brussels School that encourages diverse opinions?

Our diverse international student body, representing fifty-five nationalities and backgrounds, ensures students are exposed to diverse perspectives—it is what our school is built on. The different backgrounds, academically but also professionally, create a stimulating environment in our seminars. We encourage this participation and consider all other viewpoints, which results in some lively discussion! These perspectives are built into the classes that students take as electives; for example, our module on migration, conflict, and human rights challenges students' perceptions by inviting guest speakers into the class each week to cover a range of issues across the spectrum of human migration. These speakers, with personal firsthand experiences of conflicts and human rights, inspire students to think beyond the theories.

How does the Brussels School equip students to face the challenges of an uncertain world?

Our students choose us for many different reasons, but the ability to combine a world-class education with outstanding networking opportunities in Brussels among the international community is the reason we hear most. The ever-increasing competitiveness of the job market post-graduation puts a heavy emphasis on the combination of study and internships. To help our students, we come at the challenge from two angles.

First, through our academic programs, we ensure that students have a firm grasp of both the theoretical approaches and practical applications of the subject they are studying. We teach them to read critically, to analyze problems, and to learn how to develop a coherent and balanced argument. Our lecturers are a mix of academics and practitioners who are not only at the cutting edge of their fields of research but also have extensive work experience, and they bring that experience and advice into the learning environment. Second, our careers coach helps students consider the international job market. Through a series of workshops, seminars, and networking events, students make contacts across a range of organizations and practice their networking skills with potential employers.

What specific skills do you provide students to allow them to remain flexible in their career paths?

Achieving a balance between the theoretical and the practical is something that is vital toward building a flexible career. For instance, our module on European Union (EU) migration law provides students with a sound grounding in the law governing regular migration within the EU as well as an opportunity to undertake an internship at the EU Rights Clinic and put their theoretical knowledge to use by advising them on their rights under EU migration law. In several modules, students play simulation games—for example, acting as mediators in an international conflict or negotiating among EU member states. By learning how to use these tools effectively, our students are able to achieve success in many avenues of life, even if these sometimes fall outside of the formal scope of their education.

University of Kent | Brussels School of International Studies

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Daniel Bessner
Anne H.H. and Kenneth B. Pyle Assistant Professor of U.S. Foreign Policy
Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies
University of Washington

How to Maximize Your Education for an International Career in a Changing World

What makes your school unique in preparing students for international careers?

Area studies, which simply refers to deep academic engagement with particular world regions, is critical to developing global citizens able to create new knowledge and contribute to pressing policy debates. Only by studying a region, by immersing oneself in a culture, language, and society, can one learn to think more sophisticatedly about a particular geographical space and to engage with it in a constructive, empathetic, and useful way. This is why the Jackson School, and in particular its MA programs in area studies and Applied International Studies, is so important to both the scholarly and policy communities.

What aspects of the Jackson community do you value?

The Jackson School has expert faculty in most of the world's regions, from South Asia to Europe to North America, and also enjoys the privilege of having the most Title VI centers—eight—of any institution in the United States. These Title VI centers provide graduate students with unique resources that enable them to devote themselves to their studies and to research and write papers and theses that they can use as a knowledge base for the remainder of their careers, whether they be in public service, the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, or academia. These centers, as well as the Jackson School as a whole, provide students with connections to diverse Seattle communities, including the business community—the Pacific Northwest is home to Starbucks, Amazon, Microsoft, and other major multinational corporations—and government community—for example, I was recently appointed to the City of Seattle's International Affairs Advisory Board.

How is your institution keeping competitive in the face of new challenges?

We are leading new frontiers—in cybersecurity, technology, arctic research, outer space, and religion—and using innovative teaching of international studies that are important to society now. Simply put, the Jackson School takes its engagement with the world seriously; we value both our ability to train excellent scholars and global citizens dedicated to using their knowledge for public purposes. We are committed to providing students with hands-on training about how to use their knowledge in nonacademic settings. For example, in our MA in Applied International Studies program, students work on applied research projects that are designed to allow them to bring their academic knowledge to bear on decisions made by influencers of global policy. Indeed, many of our students take special efforts to communicate their knowledge to the public, writing op-eds, articles, and essays read by people throughout the world.

As a whole, the Jackson School combines the best in academic and pragmatic training. Students leave our programs with a deep knowledge of both theory and practice and use their knowledge to build lasting careers in the industries and sectors that presently define our world.

THE HENRY M. JACKSON SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
UNIVERSITY of WASHINGTON

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Joel S. Hellman
Dean
Walsh School of Foreign Service
Georgetown University

Continuing to Think Globally

Both within the United States and abroad, groups espousing nationalism and isolationism are on the rise, casting doubt on global trade and international institutions. How has this affected the Walsh School of Foreign Service (SFS)?

Our mission—preparing the global leaders of tomorrow—has never been more important than today, with the global order being questioned in so many ways. This is a critical and exciting time to be engaging students in interdisciplinary discussion at the highest levels, and we find that SFS students are intellectually engaged and politically committed. Concerns that applications to a school of international affairs might dip in this environment have, to date, proven unfounded: SFS applications are at an all-time high.

How is SFS adapting as the world and the job market change so quickly?

The strengths of our graduate programs in international affairs have always been on the cutting edge. We are top-ranked for many reasons, but surely one is that our Washington, DC, location provides faculty who are top practitioners as well as important thinkers. Our location also offers unparalleled access to internships and practical experiences—exactly the kind of interdisciplinary problem-solving that marks the best education today. Students may spend the morning studying global trade with a government economist who worked on the Trans-Pacific Partnership and then head to the Federal Reserve in the afternoon to research capital flows. Classes from Monday to Wednesday might give way to an internship at Freedom House on Thursday and Friday.

What are the advantages of SFS having nine different master's degrees in international affairs?

The SFS graduate programs offer an ideal balance of focus and context. Our three largest programs cover broad and vital themes: international affairs and diplomacy, security studies, and international development. Then, we have five additional programs that offer multidisciplinary focus on regional studies: Asian studies; Arab studies; Eurasian, Russian, and East European studies; German and European studies; and Latin American studies. We have also just introduced a new master's in business diplomacy aimed at executives. This range of choices gives students a small cohort experience within a larger graduate community.

How does the atmosphere at Georgetown bring students the diverse perspectives that are increasingly important?

At their core, the SFS graduate programs are highly global. We have students from many countries and cultures, each of whom contributes in critical ways to inquiry and discussion. Our faculty of more than one hundred and twenty professors comes from and understands a huge variety of cultures, languages, and philosophies. And, because Georgetown is located in our most international and global city, our campus continuously hosts important international leaders. Just last year, we heard from foreign ministers from France, Argentina, Sweden, Panama, Canada, and the United Arab Emirates and the former president of Kiribati—not to mention former Secretary of State John Kerry and the former chief executive officer of GE, Jeff Immelt. In most cases, these visitors not only spoke to the university but also took the time to engage with SFS students in small groups. There simply is not a more powerful university forum in the world for the leaders and thinkers who matter most in international affairs.

SFS | GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
Walsh School of Foreign Service

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Hiroaki Ataka
Associate Professor
Graduate School of International Relations
Ritsumeikan University

Acquiring Diverse Perspectives in an Age of Uncertainty

What innovative ways has your program found to prepare students for an age of uncertainty?

We are living in a period of transformation. The world has witnessed dynamic changes, and continuity of the postwar liberal order has been called into question. Such times of profound change create opportunities as well as uncertainties.

Our Graduate School of International Relations (GSIR) offers innovative programs and courses that prepare students for an age of uncertainty by introducing them to different perspectives and experiences. The dual master's degree program, which offers qualified students the opportunity to study at two institutions, enhances our students' flexibility in approaching an uncertain world and in addressing the issues they may face.

For instance, in the global cooperation program, which is taught in English, students learn the theoretical foundations and the practical applications of international cooperation from seasoned academics and experienced professionals. They study side-by-side with domestic students, international students from over thirty-two countries, and foreign government officials who come to GSIR via prestigious scholarship programs offered by the Japanese government. Courses like "professional training" provide hands-on experience concerning the rapidly changing world of international development in Asia and beyond by specialists who have worked for national and international organizations. The dual master's degree improves the students' ability to respond to developing situations and prepare them to work anywhere in the world upon graduation.

The merit of learning from and understanding diverse perspectives now takes a more important role than ever. How is your school responding?

Understanding diverse views and perspectives is a strength in uncertain times, and that is a skill we foster and champion at GSIR. Located in Kyoto, the ancient capital of Japan and home to multiple World Heritage sites, our school attracts many international students as well as faculty members, who make up over two-thirds and one-fourth of our intellectual community, respectively.

In order to enrich our students' educational experience, we recently launched the global and Japanese perspectives program (GJP), which is taught in both English and Japanese. The program specifically prepares students to examine global issues from the Japanese and Asian perspectives, along with other established approaches to these issues. Students focus on the experience and history of Japan and of Asian countries to develop alternative and critical insights to world affairs. They will also have the opportunity to acquire Japanese language skills through courses such as the "GJP platform", where students learn about Japan and international relations either in Japanese or in English, depending on the language that they wish to improve.

For students who want to build a career in Japan after their studies, the program offers courses in business management and the economy in Japan as well as Japan's role in East Asia, Japan in world history, and Japanese politics and foreign relations, which give them the understanding necessary to develop a successful career in Japan. GSIR also connects students to internship opportunities that complement their education and increase their skills in the global market place.

+R 未来を生みだす人になる。
立命館大学
RITSUMEIKAN

Alejandro Pérez

Alumnus, Master of Arts in International Relations, 2002
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs
Syracuse University
Director of Federal Affairs, California Department of Justice
Former Deputy Assistant to President Barack Obama

Making a Difference, in a World of Differences

The power of Alejandro Pérez's international relations degree is its breadth. Maxwell's Master of Arts (MA) program uniquely combines international scholarship with transferable leadership and management skills drawn from the number-one ranked public affairs program in the country. Backed by a required internship in Washington, DC, or abroad, the degree provides excellent preparation and access for public service professionals to find and succeed at their vocation.

As a political science undergraduate who grew up on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border, Perez first prepared for a career in the U.S. Foreign Service; however, he later discovered a passion for policymaking. In all cases, Maxwell served him.

You have spent eighteen years on Capitol Hill and in the White House. How did your time at Maxwell impact your career path?

Maxwell's MA program, with its built-in flexibility and diverse intellectual community, gave me the tools to develop my own path and exposed me to people who were also trying to find their own paths. Through its Washington program, it gave me the opportunity to participate in internships at the Department of State and on Capitol Hill. During those internships, I discovered that I enjoyed international work, but I also decided that rather than *serving* in diplomacy, I would prefer to help *shape* foreign policy.

As Deputy Assistant and Special Assistant to President Obama for eight years, you offered strategic guidance on a wide range of major issues, some of them international in focus and some of them not. How did Maxwell prepare you?

On Capitol Hill, you have an opportunity to make major contributions in the policy arena, but you need to absorb, understand, and distill a wide range of complex subjects quickly, and you need to put your thoughts on paper concisely. From international trade, the environment, and national security to taxes, health care, and education, Maxwell's interdisciplinary approach to public policy issues offers a unique space for developing and enhancing this type of analytical thinking. In addition, the range of disciplines and viewpoints at Maxwell challenged my thinking and prepared me for the diversity of backgrounds and partisan viewpoints on Capitol Hill and for building coalitions across various groups.

How does your current work for the Attorney General of California build on your prior experiences?

My job now is to monitor federal legislation in Washington through the California lens to keep the California Congressional delegation up to speed on the Attorney General's actions and to partner with them to defend and advance California's interests. Some of these have an international dimension—immigration and clean energy and the environment are key issues in California, for example. Much of my work pertains to domestic policy, like health care. Both are served by my Maxwell degree.

Wherever I end up serving, I believe there is a positive role for government to play, and my main goal is to be part of a government that helps people. Maxwell shares that belief and prepared me well.

Maxwell | Syracuse University

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Ambassador Robert Loftis

Professor of the Practice of International Relations
Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies
Boston University

Analyzing Uncertain Times in International Affairs

How is the Pardee School curriculum adapting to the changes in the world and preparing for the future?

The key to understanding, thriving in, and improving a world that is changing in rather unpredictable ways is the ability to see how seemingly disparate events and trends influence each other. Our curriculum is designed to give our students a solid foundation in international diplomacy and negotiations, international economics, quantitative analysis, global governance, and research design. Graduates will be able to discern the interplay of different factors, such as shifting centers of economic development, the role of religion, and the rise of non-traditional actors, and how they influence the direction of world events. With this strong foundation, students will be able to delve more deeply into their particular areas of interest. When they graduate, our students will have the specialized knowledge they need, with the broad vision to put it into perspective. To do well, both depth and breadth are required.

The merit of learning from and understanding diverse perspectives now takes a more important role than ever. How is the Pardee School responding?

One of the changes we are most excited about is introducing a strong component on ethics throughout our curriculum. Decisions and policies have consequences, and even well-intentioned actions can have unanticipated negative effects. We want our students to consider the challenges confronting policy makers, to recognize that sometimes there are no "right" answers, and to know that life cannot be reduced to bumper sticker slogans. Improving the human condition is only possible with a strong, ethical base. A second change requires all students to have a grounding in international negotiations: there is no challenge facing us today that can be solved by one country or institution alone. We are also putting a renewed emphasis on quantitative analysis. Good decisions are made on the basis of good information, and our students will be well-equipped to understand what is relevant and what is not.

What specific skills does the Pardee School provide students, which will prepare students for their desired career paths?

Pardee has two unique features. The first is a strong interdisciplinary faculty, including world-class experts on international relations, history, political science, sociology, international security, and regional studies. The second is the hearty collaboration between traditional academics and professors of the practice. Our students work with professors who have spent their careers in studying and writing on the key issues of our times and with professors who come from careers in diplomacy, intelligence, and the military, benefitting from their experiences in policy formulation and implementation. We also offer experiential learning, where students, both individually and in groups, take on projects and research opportunities for real-world clients. Indeed, two of our recent graduates were hired to implement recommendations from their graduate research papers. We expect our students to approach their studies with these practical applications in mind.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY

Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies

Larry Napper

Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy
Ambassador (ret) in the U.S. Foreign Service
The Bush School of Government and Public Service
Texas A&M University

Celebrating 20 years of Service: Preparing the Next Generation of Leaders

In its 20th anniversary year, the Bush School of Government and Public Service is fulfilling its mandate from President George H. W. Bush to prepare the next generation of principled public servants to cope with the unprecedented challenges of the 21st century international landscape. Bush School faculty and students hold and express a wide variety of views on the challenges facing our nation, and they do it with integrity, civility, and mutual respect. The blended faculty of scholars and practitioners, many of whom served in government and NGOs, offer guidance on both the theory and practice of effective and ethical service in public institutions charged with ensuring national security. Texas A&M offers Bush School students access to the myriad of resources of a 60,000-student, Tier One research university and membership in the Aggie network of thousands of graduates already serving in government, the armed forces, diplomacy, and the private sector.

How does the Bush School help students acquire the critical thinking and communication skills essential to effective public service?

Bush School students learn by doing: researching, analyzing, and framing complex issues for policymakers. Students write both original research papers and two-page action memos designed to extract a decision from a harried policymaker. They are challenged to think on their feet, deliver cogent and poised oral arguments, and defend their conclusions in spirited and respectful debate. The principles of effective leadership in public policy institutions are integral to our curriculum and to the many opportunities for practical public service available to students. Foreign language study, international internships or language immersion, and study abroad trips to countries like China and Germany deepen the international experience. A capstone research project for a real-world client, such as the CIA, the State Department, or the United Nations Development Program, provides hands-on research experience and the opportunity to personally brief senior policymakers.

How does a Bush School education set students apart?

Bush School students have wide latitude to shape their study program to meet current interests and prepare for a great career in public service. We encourage unconventional thinking about pressing issues that range from gender in American foreign policy to grand strategy to the politics of trade and development. A typical second year at the Bush School might include an internship with the Defense Ministry of Latvia or the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi, a simulated NSC meeting with the President on an international crisis, a VTC with students at the Russian Diplomatic Academy in Moscow, and a briefing of the Commanding General of the U.S. Special Operations Command on the results of a student-led capstone research project on emerging terrorist threats.

The Bush School offers this quality education at an affordable cost so students can pursue their fields of interest without acquiring burdensome debt. As a public institution, Texas A&M offers some of the lowest tuition/fees among the APSIA schools. As a premiere graduate school, the Bush School tops that with scholarships to all admitted MIA students, backing our commitment to educating future public servants.

The Bush School
OF GOVERNMENT & PUBLIC SERVICE
TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY

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Dr. Deborah Avant

Sié Chéou-Kang Chair and Director, Sié Chéou-Kang Center
for International Security and Diplomacy
Josef Korbel School of International Studies
University of Denver

Ideas with Impact: Policy-Relevant Research in Action

What is unique about the research conducted at the Sié Center?

The Sié Center at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies fosters research to advance global peace and security that is innovative in many ways. Our efforts focus on emerging security challenges. As the twenty-first century unfolds, international armed conflict is on the decline, while other forms of organized and interpersonal violence have spread. Our research provides rigorous analysis of this violence and the various ways and groups that affect it, all with an aim to enable better governance and foster peace.

Our research is connected with the wider world. We engage cooperatively and respectfully with the range of ideas, approaches, and actors in the broader global politics arena. We actively involve policymakers, practitioners, and the public—from identifying research questions to translating findings into meaningful contributions to the public discourse.

A significant part of our research is collaborative; we have projects that include all eight of our full-time faculty. Three staff members, three postdoctoral scholars, and more than 35 MA and PhD research assistants also work on various initiatives at the Center. We are proud to be a team that is driven to improve lives through path-breaking, rigorous, and practice-oriented research on mitigating and promoting alternatives to violence.

What are some of the new research initiatives at the Sie Center?

The Sié Center was one of five research institutes to receive a $1 million, two-year grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York in 2014 as part of its efforts to inform critical global issues with accessible expert analysis. Our project seeks to understand how different nonviolent strategies that are used by non-state actors affect violence in armed conflict. Our collaboration with diverse groups opens channels of communication, allows for real-time responses to policy inquires, and facilitates dynamic programmatic changes that respond to rapid shifts in global politics.

In another important research project, the Center partners with research institutes in Norway, South Africa, and Nepal for a global effort to study how international norms and local dynamics combine to create innovations in peacebuilding. We also have ongoing data collection projects on nonviolent and violent campaigns and outcomes (NAVCO), social conflict (SCAD), corporations and human rights (CHRD), private security (PSM), and women's participation in protests (MicroMob).

How are students involved in the Sié Center's activities?

Students are an integral part of our team. The Sié Fellowship program was established when the Center was founded. Each year, the program selects 10 leadership-bound MA students as Sié Fellows. They receive a free-tuition scholarship to the Josef Korbel School, have the chance to conduct research with faculty, and take advantage of a host of other mentoring, ethics training, cohort building and networking opportunities. Sié Fellows emerge from the program as budding global leaders.

Faculty regularly co-author with their students and co-present with them at major academic conferences. PhD students serve, with the managing editor, as the production team for the newest ISA journal: the *Journal of Global Security Studies* (JoGSS), which is edited at the Center.

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Saving "America First"

What Responsible Nationalism Looks Like

Andrew J. Bacevich

One of the privileges of power that Americans routinely abuse is to remember selectively. It was not surprising, then, that this year's centennial of the United States' entry into World War I attracted barely any official attention. A House resolution commending "the brave members of the United States Armed Forces for their efforts in 'making the world safe for democracy'" never made it out of committee. And although the Senate did endorse a fatuous decree "expressing gratitude and appreciation" for the declaration of war passed back in April 1917, the White House ignored the anniversary altogether. As far as Washington is concerned, that conflict retains little or no political salience.

It was not always so, of course. For those who lived through it, the "war to end all wars" was a searing experience. In its wake came acute disillusionment, compounded by a sense of having been deceived about its origins and purposes. The horrific conflict seemed only to create new problems; President Woodrow Wilson's insistence in a 1919 speech that the 116,000 American soldiers lost in that war had "saved the liberty of the world" rang hollow.

So 20 years later, when another European conflict presented Americans with a fresh opportunity to rescue liberty, many balked. A second war against Germany on behalf of France and the United Kingdom, they believed, was unlikely to produce more satisfactory results than the first. Those intent on keeping the United States out of that war organized a nationwide, grass-roots campaign led by the America First Committee. During its brief existence, the movement enlisted more supporters than the Tea Party, was better organized than Occupy Wall Street or Black Lives Matter, and wielded more political clout than the "resistance" to President Donald Trump.

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Yet despite drawing support from across the political spectrum, the movement failed. Well before the Pearl Harbor attack in December 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt had embarked on a program of incremental intervention aimed at bringing the United States into the war as a full-fledged belligerent. When it came to Nazi Germany, Roosevelt believed that the putative lessons of World War I—above all, that France and the United Kingdom had played the United States for a sucker—did not apply. He castigated those who disagreed as "enemies of democracy" aligned with fascists, communists, and "every group devoted to bigotry and racial and religious intolerance." In effect, Roosevelt painted anti-interventionism as anti-American, and the smear stuck. The phrase "America first" became a term of derision. To the extent that anti-interventionist sentiment survived, it did so as a fringe phenomenon, associated with the extreme right and the far left.

For decades, World War II remained at the forefront of the American historical consciousness, easily overshadowing World War I. Politicians and pundits regularly paid homage to World War II's canonical lessons, warning against the dangers of appeasement and emphasizing the need to confront evil. As for "America first," the slogan that had resonated with those reeling from World War I, it appeared irredeemable, retaining about as much political salience as the Free Silver and Prohibition movements. Then came Trump, and the irredeemable enjoyed sudden redemption.

THE MYOPIA OF UTOPIANISM

As long as the Cold War persisted and, with it, the perceived imperative of confronting international communism, America First remained an emblem of American irresponsibility, a reminder of a narrowly averted catastrophe. When the fall of the Soviet Union triggered a brief flurry of speculation that the United States might claim a "peace dividend" and tend to its own garden, elite opinion wasted no time in denouncing that prospect. With history's future trajectory now readily apparent—the collapse of communism having cleared up any remaining confusion in that regard—it was incumbent on the United States to implement that future. U.S. leadership was therefore more important than ever, a line of thought giving rise to what the writer R. R. Reno has aptly termed "utopian globalism."

Three large expectations informed this post–Cold war paradigm. According to the first, corporate capitalism of the type pioneered in the

Isolated: Lindbergh arriving at the White House to meet Roosevelt, 1939

United States, exploiting advanced technology and implemented globally, held the potential of creating wealth on a once unimaginable scale. According to the second, the possession of vast military might—displayed for all to see in the 1990–91 Gulf War—endowed the United States with an unprecedented ability to establish (and enforce) the terms of world order. And according to the third, the White House, no longer merely the official residence of the country's chief executive, was now to serve as a de facto global command post, the commander in chief's mandate extending to the far corners of the earth.

In policy circles, it was taken as a given that American power—wielded by the president and informed by the collective wisdom of the political, military, and corporate elite—was sufficient for the task ahead. Although a few outsiders questioned that assumption, such concerns never gained traction. The careful weighing of means and ends suggested timidity. It also risked indulging popular inclinations toward isolationism, kept under tight rein ever since the America First campaign met its demise at the hands of the imperial Japanese navy and Adolf Hitler.

Again and again during the 1990s, U.S. officials warned against the dangers of backsliding. The United States was "the indispensable nation," they declared, a quasi-theological claim pressed into service as a basis for statecraft. After 9/11, policymakers saw the attacks not as a warning about the consequences of overreach but as a rationale for

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redoubling U.S. efforts to fulfill the imperatives of utopian globalism. Thus, in 2005, in the midst of stalemated wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, President George W. Bush summoned the spirit of Wilson and assured his fellow citizens that "the expansion of freedom in all the world" had become "the calling of our time."

A decade later, with both of those wars still simmering and other emergencies erupting regularly, despite vast expenditures of blood and treasure, Trump denounced the entire post–Cold War project as a fraud. During his presidential campaign, he vowed to "make America great again" and recover the jobs lost to globalization. He pledged to avoid needless armed conflicts and to win promptly any that could not be avoided.

The challenge is to save "America first" from Trump.

Yet although he rejected the first two components of utopian globalism, he affirmed the third. As president, he and he alone would set things right. Once in office, he pledged to use his authority to the fullest, protecting ordinary Americans from further assault by the forces of globalization and ending the misuse of military power. Instead of embracing globalism, Trump promised to put "America first."

Trump's appropriation of that loaded phrase, which formed a central theme of his campaign and his inaugural address, was an affront to political correctness. Yet it was much more. At least implicitly, Trump was suggesting that the anti-interventionists who opposed Roosevelt had been right after all. By extension, he was declaring obsolete the lessons of World War II and the tradition of American statecraft derived from them.

The policy implications seemed clear. In a single stroke, the columnist Charles Krauthammer wrote, Trump's inaugural "radically redefined the American national interest as understood since World War II." Instead of exercising global leadership, the United States was now opting for "insularity and smallness." Another columnist, William Kristol, lamented that hearing "an American president proclaim 'America First'" was "profoundly depressing and vulgar."

That Trump himself is not only vulgar but also narcissistic and dishonest is no doubt the case. Yet fears that his embrace of "America first" will lead the United States to turn its back on the world have already proved groundless. Ordering punitive air strikes against a regime that murders its own citizens while posing no threat to the

United States, as Trump did in Syria, is not isolationism. Nor is sending more U.S. troops to fight the campaign in Afghanistan, the very epitome of the endless wars that Trump once disparaged. And whatever one makes of Trump's backing of the Sunnis in their regional struggle with the Shiites, his vow to broker an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal, his threats against North Korea, and his evolving views on trade and the viability of NATO, they do not suggest disengagement.

What they do suggest is something much worse: an ill-informed, impulsive, and capricious approach to foreign policy. In fact, if "policy" implies a predictable pattern of behavior, U.S. foreign policy ceased to exist when Trump took office. The United States now acts or refrains from action according to presidential whim. Trump's critics have misread their man. Those who worry about the ghost of Charles Lindbergh, the aviator and America First backer, taking up residence in the Oval Office can rest easy. The real problem is that Trump is making his own decisions, and he thinks he has things under control.

Yet more important, unlike Trump himself, Trump's critics have misread the moment. However oblivious he was to the finer points of diplomacy, candidate Trump correctly intuited that establishment views about the United States' proper role in the world had not worked. In the eyes of ordinary citizens, policies conceived under the direction of George H. W. Bush or George W. Bush, Bill Clinton or Hillary Clinton, Condoleezza Rice or Susan Rice no longer command automatic assent. America *über alles* has proved to be a bust—hence, the appeal of "America first" as an alternative. That the phrase itself causes conniptions among elites in both political parties only adds to its allure in the eyes of the Trump supporters whom the Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton dismissed during the campaign as "deplorable."

Whatever the consequences of Trump's own fumbling, that allure is likely to persist. So, too, will the opportunity awaiting any would-be political leader with the gumption to articulate a foreign policy that promises to achieve the aim of the original America First movement: to ensure the safety and well-being of the United States without engaging in needless wars. The challenge is to do what Trump himself is almost certainly incapable of doing, converting "America first" from a slogan burdened with an ugly history—including the taint of anti-Semitism—into a concrete program of enlightened action. To put it another way, the challenge is to save "America first" from Trump.

THINKING ABOUT TOMORROW

The problem with utopian globalism, according to Reno, is that it "disenfranchises the vast majority and empowers a technocratic elite." This is good news for the elite, but not for the disenfranchised. True, since the end of the Cold War, globalization has created enormous wealth. But it has also exacerbated inequality. Much the same can be said of U.S. military policy: those presiding over and equipping American wars have made out quite handsomely; those actually sent to fight have fared less well. The 2016 presidential election made plain to all the depth of the resulting divisions.

Reno's proposed solution to those divisions is to promote "patriotic solidarity, or a renewed national covenant." He's right. Yet the term "covenant," given its religious connotation, won't fly in secular quarters. What's needed is a statement of purpose capable of binding Americans together as Americans (as opposed to citizens of the world), while also providing a basis for engaging with the world as it is, not as it might once have been.

To fill this tall order, Americans should go back to their beginnings and consult the Constitution. Its concise, 52-word preamble, summarizing the purpose of the union, concludes with a pledge to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." Put the emphasis on "ourselves," and this passage suggests a narrow, even selfish orientation. Put the emphasis on "our Posterity," however, and it invites a more generous response. Here is the basis for a capacious and forward-looking alternative to utopian globalism.

Taking seriously an obligation to convey the blessings of liberty to Americans' posterity brings to the fore a different set of foreign policy questions. First, what do Americans owe future generations if they are to enjoy the freedoms to which they are entitled? At a minimum, posterity deserves a livable planet, reasonable assurances of security, and a national household in decent working order, the three together permitting the individual and the collective pursuit of happiness.

Second, what are the threats to these prerequisites of liberty? Several loom large: the possibility of large-scale environmental collapse, the danger of global conflict brought about by the rapidly changing roster of great powers, and the prospect of a citizenry so divided and demoralized that it can neither identify nor effectively pursue the common good. Taken separately, each of these threats poses a serious danger to the American way of life. Should more than one materialize, that way

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









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

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of life will likely become unsustainable. The simultaneous realization of all three would jeopardize the very existence of the United States as an independent republic. Therefore, the overarching purpose of U.S. policy should be to forestall these eventualities.

How best to respond to these threats? Proponents of utopian globalism will argue for the United States to keep doing what it has been doing, even though since the end of the Cold War, their approach has exacerbated, rather than alleviated, problems. A broad conception of "America first" offers an alternative more likely to produce positive results and command popular support.

An "America first" response to environmental deterioration should seek to retard global warming while emphasizing the preservation of the United States' own resources—its air, water, and soil; its flora and fauna; and its coastlines and inland waterways. The pursuit of mere economic growth should take a back seat to repairing the damage caused by reckless exploitation and industrial abuse. To effect those repairs, Congress should provide the requisite resources with the kind of openhandedness currently reserved for the Pentagon. On all matters related to safeguarding the planet, the United States would serve as an exemplar, benefiting future generations everywhere.

An "America first" response to ongoing changes in the international order should begin with a recognition that the unipolar moment has passed. Ours is a multipolar era. Some countries, such as China and India, are just now moving into the first rank. Others long accustomed to playing a leading role, such as France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, are in decline while still retaining residual importance. Occupying a third category are countries whose place in the emerging order remains to be determined, a group that includes Germany, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, and Turkey.

As for the United States, although it is likely to remain preeminent for the foreseeable future, preeminence does not imply hegemony. Washington's calling should be not to impose a Pax Americana but to promote mutual coexistence. Compared with perpetual peace and universal brotherhood, stability and the avoidance of cataclysmic war may seem like modest goals, but achieve that much, and future generations will be grateful.

Similar reasoning applies to the question of nuclear weapons. Whatever advantage a ready-to-launch strike force once conferred on the United States will almost surely disappear in the coming years. As

the Pentagon continues to develop ever more discriminate and exotic ways of killing people and disabling adversaries, strategic deterrence will no longer depend on maintaining a capability to retaliate with nuclear weapons. Even as the actual use of U.S. nuclear weapons becomes increasingly unimaginable, however, the United States' own vulnerability to these weapons will persist. As a first step toward eliminating the scourge of nuclear weapons altogether, Washington should pay more than lip service to its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which requires signatories "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures" leading to the abolition of nuclear arms. Taking that obligation seriously would exemplify enlightened self-interest: the very essence of what it means to put America first.

Let marines be marines, and help do-gooders do good.

As for the societal fissures that gave rise to Trump, Americans are likely to find that restoring a common understanding of the common good will be a long time coming. The era of utopian globalism coincided with a period of upheaval in which traditional norms related to gender, sexuality, family, and identity fell from favor among many. The resulting rifts run deep. In one camp are those waging a fierce rear-guard action in favor of a social order now in tatters; in the other are those intent on mandating compliance with precepts such as diversity and multiculturalism. Both sides manifest intolerance. Neither gives much evidence of empathy or willingness to compromise.

A reimagined "America first" approach to statecraft would seek to insulate U.S. foreign policy from this ongoing domestic Kulturkampf as much as possible. It would remain agnostic as to which blessings of liberty the United States views as ready for export until Americans themselves reach a consensus on what liberty should actually entail.

This need not imply turning a blind eye to human rights abuses. Yet an "America first" foreign policy would acknowledge that on an array of hot-button issues, as varied as gun ownership and the status of transgender people, the definition of rights is in a state of flux. In that regard, the warning against "passionate attachments" that President George Washington issued in his Farewell Address should apply not only to countries but also to causes. In either case, those responsible for the formulation of foreign policy should avoid taking positions that threaten to undermine the nation's fragile domestic

cohesion. It may be naive to expect politics to stop at the water's edge. That said, diplomacy is not an appropriate venue for scoring points on matters on which Americans themselves remain deeply at odds. That's what elections are for. What the present generation of Americans owes to posterity is the opportunity to sort these things out for themselves.

Something similar applies to U.S. military policy. Future generations deserve their own chance to choose. Unfortunately, military actions undertaken under the auspices of utopian globalism have narrowed the range of available choices and squandered vast resources. The duration of the post-9/11 wars tells the tale: Afghanistan is the longest in U.S. history, and Iraq is the second longest. The countless sums of money wasted—few in Washington evince interest in tallying up how much—have contributed to the exploding size of the U.S. national debt. It stood at approximately $4 trillion when the Cold War ended, has risen to $20 trillion today, and is projected to exceed $25 trillion by the end of this decade. The United States has become a country that does not finish what it starts and then borrows exorbitantly to conceal its failures.

From an "America first" perspective, the antidote is twofold: first, curb Washington's appetite for armed intervention except when genuinely vital U.S. interests are immediately at risk, and second, pay for wars as they occur, rather than saddling future generations with their cost. Posterity deserves books that balance.

Critics will contend that a nation that fights only when vital interests are at stake will become oblivious to the suffering of those unfortunate people living in such hellholes as Syria. Yet fighting is neither the sole nor necessarily the best way to respond to suffering. Indeed, Washington's scorecard when it comes to sending U.S. troops to liberate or protect is mixed at best. Consider the present-day conditions in Somalia, Iraq, and Libya, each the subject of U.S. military action justified entirely or in large part by humanitarian concerns. In all three countries, armed intervention only made life worse for ordinary people.

Does this mean that Americans should simply avert their eyes from horrors abroad? Not at all. But when it comes to aiding the distressed, they should not look to U.S. bombs or troops to fix things. The armed forces of the United States may occasionally engage in charitable works, but that should not be their purpose. Far better to incentivize concerned

citizens to open their own wallets, thereby expanding the capacity of relief organizations to help. In comparison to bureaucratically engineered programs, voluntary efforts are likely to be more effective, both in making a difference on the ground and in winning hearts and minds. In short, let marines be marines, and help do-gooders do good.

POTUS ON NOTICE

All these suggestions amount to little more than common sense. Yet given the state of U.S. politics, defined above all by the outsize role of the president, none of it is likely to happen. In that regard, the most immediate goal of an "America first" policy must be to restore some semblance of constitutional balance. That means curtailing presidential power, an aim that is all the more urgent with Trump in the White House.

In utopian globalist circles, however, the thought of constraining executive authority is anathema. The entire national security apparatus is invested in the proposition that the president should function as a sort of quasi deity, wielding life-and-death authority. Disagree, and you've rendered yourself ineligible for employment on the seventh floor of the State Department, in the E Ring of the Pentagon, at CIA headquarters, or anywhere within a half mile of the Oval Office.

This line of thinking dates back to the debate over whether to enter World War II. Roosevelt won that fight and, as a result, endowed his successors with extraordinary latitude on issues of national security. Ever since, in moments of uncertainty or perceived peril, Americans have deferred to presidents making the case, as Roosevelt did, that military action is necessary to keep them safe.

Yet Trump, to put it mildly, is no Roosevelt. More to the point, both the world and the United States have changed in innumerable ways. Although the lessons of World War II may still retain some legitimacy, in today's radically different circumstances, they do not suffice. So although the risks of ill-considered appeasement persist, other dangers are at least as worrisome—among them, recklessness, hubris, and self-deception. In 1940, the original America First movement warned against such tendencies, which had in recent memory produced the catastrophe of World War I and which would lay the basis for even worse things to come. Today, those warnings deserve attention, especially given the recklessness, hubris, and self-deception that Trump displays daily.

The point is not to relitigate the arguments over whether the United States should have entered World War II: in that instance, Roosevelt got it right and those who thought Nazi Germany posed no threat to the United States got it wrong. Yet the latter were not wrong to insist that the previous war against Germany and all that it had wreaked remained relevant. Nor were they wrong to decry the chicanery and demagoguery that Roosevelt was employing to maneuver the United States toward war.

Americans today need to do a better job of remembering. To remember with an open mind is to consider the possibility that those on the losing end of old arguments might be worth listening to. The imperative now, amid the wreckage created by utopian globalism and the follies of Trump, is to think creatively about the predicaments that the United States faces. Stripped of their unfortunate historical associations and understood properly, many of the concerns and convictions that animated the original America First movement provide a sound point of departure for doing just that.

The False Prophecy of Hyperconnection

How to Survive the Networked Age

Niall Ferguson

It is a truth universally acknowledged that the world is connected as never before. Once upon a time, it was believed that there were six degrees of separation between each individual and any other person on the planet (including Kevin Bacon). For Facebook users today, the average degree of separation is 3.57. But perhaps that is not entirely a good thing. As Evan Williams, one of the founders of Twitter, told *The New York Times* in May 2017, "I thought once everybody could speak freely and exchange information and ideas, the world is automatically going to be a better place. I was wrong about that."

Speaking at Harvard's commencement that same month, Facebook's chair and CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, looked back on his undergraduate ambition to "connect the whole world." "This idea was so clear to us," he recalled, "that all people want to connect. . . . My hope was never to build a company, but to make an impact." Zuckerberg has certainly done that, but it is doubtful that it was the impact he dreamed of in his dorm room. In his address, Zuckerberg identified a series of challenges facing his generation, among them: "tens of millions of jobs [being] replaced by automation," inequality ("there is something wrong with our system when I can leave here and make billions of dollars in ten years while millions of students can't afford to pay off their loans"), and "the forces of authoritarianism, isolationism, and nationalism," which oppose "the flow of knowledge, trade, and immigration." What he omitted to mention was the substantial contributions that

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STEPHEN LAM / REUTERS

Add friend: Mark Zuckerberg at a conference in San Francisco, April 2016

his company and its peers in Silicon Valley have made to all three of these problems.

No businesses in the world are working harder to eliminate jobs such as driving a truck than the technology giants of California. No individuals exemplify the spectacular growth of the wealth of the top 0.01 percent of earners better than the masters of Silicon Valley. And no company did more—albeit unintentionally—to help the populists win their political victories in the United Kingdom and the United States in 2016 than Facebook. For without Facebook's treasure house of data about its users, it would surely have been impossible for the relatively low-budget Brexit and Trump campaigns to have succeeded. The company unwittingly played a key role in last year's epidemic of fake news stories.

Zuckerberg is by no means the only believer in one networked world: a "global community," in his phrase. Ever since 1996, when the Grateful Dead lyricist turned cyber-activist John Perry Barlow released his "Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace," in which he asked the "Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel," to "leave us alone," there has been a veritable parade of cheerleaders for universal connectivity. "Current network technology . . . truly favors the citizens," wrote Google's Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen in 2013. "Never before have so many people been connected

through an instantly responsive network." This, they argued, would have truly "game-changing" implications for politics everywhere. The early phase of the Arab Spring seemed to vindicate their optimistic analysis; the subsequent descent of Syria and Libya into civil war, not so much.

Like John Lennon's "Imagine," utopian visions of a networked world are intuitively appealing. In his Harvard speech, for example, Zuckerberg contended that "the great arc of human history bends towards people coming together in ever-greater numbers—from tribes to cities to nations—to achieve things we couldn't on our own." Yet this vision, of a single global community as the pot of gold at the end of the arc of history, is at odds with everything we know about how social networks work. Far from being new, networks have always been ubiquitous in the natural world and in the social life of humans. The only thing new about today's social networks is that they are the biggest and fastest ever, connecting billions of people in seconds. Long before the founding of Facebook, however, scholars had already conducted a great deal of research into how smaller and slower social networks operate. What they found gives little ground for optimism about how a fully networked world would function.

NOT MANY MEN ARE ISLANDS

Six fundamental insights can help those without expertise in network theory to think more clearly about the likely political and geopolitical impacts of giant, high-speed social networks. The first concerns the pattern of connections within networks. Since the work of the eighteenth-century Swiss scholar Leonhard Euler, mathematicians have conceived of networks as graphs of nodes connected together by links or, in the parlance of network theory, "edges." Individuals in a social network are simply nodes connected by the edges we call "relationships." Not all nodes or edges in a social network are equal, however, because few social networks resemble a simple lattice, in which each node has the same number of edges as all the rest. Typically, certain nodes and edges are more important than others. For example, some nodes have a higher "degree," meaning that they have more edges, and some have higher "betweenness centrality," meaning that they act as the busy junctions through which a lot of network traffic has to pass. Put differently, a few crucial edges can act as bridges, connecting together different clusters of nodes that would otherwise not be able to

communicate. Even so, there will nearly always be "network isolates"—individual nodes that are not connected to the main components of the network.

At the same time, birds of a feather flock together. Because of the phenomenon known as "homophily," or attraction to similarity, social networks tend to form clusters of nodes with similar properties or attitudes. The result, as researchers found when they studied American high schools, can be self-segregation along racial lines or other forms of polarization. The recent division of the American public sphere into two echo chambers, each deaf to the other's arguments, is a perfect illustration.

Utopian visions of a networked world are at odds with everything we know about how social networks work.

A common error of much popular writing about social networks is to draw a distinction between networks and hierarchies. This is a false dichotomy. A hierarchy is simply a special kind of network with restricted numbers of horizontal edges, enabling a single ruling node to maintain an exceptionally high degree and exceptionally high betweenness centrality. The essence of any autocracy is that nodes further down the organizational chart cannot communicate with one another, much less organize, without going through the central node. The correct distinction is between hierarchical networks and distributed ones.

For most of history, hierarchical networks dominated distributed networks. In relatively small communities with relatively frequent conflicts, centralized leadership enjoyed a big advantage, because warfare is generally easier with centralized command and control. Moreover, in most agricultural societies, literacy was the prerogative of a small elite, so that only a few nodes were connected by the written word. But then, more than 500 years ago, came the printing press. It empowered Martin Luther's heresy and gave birth to a new network.

Luther thought the result of his movement to reform the Roman Catholic Church would be what came to be called "the priesthood of all believers," the sixteenth-century equivalent of Zuckerberg's "global community." In practice, the Protestant Reformation produced more than a century of bloody religious conflict. This was because new doctrines such as Luther's, and later John Calvin's, did not spread evenly through European populations. Although Protestantism swiftly

acquired the structure of a network, homophily led to polarization, with those parts of Europe that most closely resembled urban Germany in terms of population density and literacy embracing the new religion and the more rural regions reacting against it, embracing the papal Counter-Reformation. Yet it proved impossible for Catholic rulers to destroy Protestant networks, even with mass executions, just as it proved impossible to wholly stamp out Catholicism in states that adopted the Reformation.

THE STRENGTH OF WEAK TIES

The second insight is that weak ties are strong. As the Stanford sociologist Mark Granovetter demonstrated in a seminal 1973 article, acquaintances are the bridges between clusters of friends, and it is those weak ties that make the world seem small. In the famous experiment with chain letters that the psychologist Stanley Milgram published in 1967, there turned out to be just seven degrees of separation between a widowed clerk in Omaha, Nebraska, and a Boston stockbroker she did not know.

Like the Reformation, the scientific revolution and the Enlightenment were network-driven phenomena, yet they spread faster and farther. This reflected the importance of acquaintances in correspondence networks such as Voltaire's and Benjamin Franklin's, communities that might otherwise have remained subdivided into national clusters. It also reflected the way that new social organizations—notably, Freemasonry—increased the connectedness of like-minded men, despite established divisions of social status. It is no accident that so many key figures in the American Revolution, from George Washington to Paul Revere, were also Freemasons.

GOING VIRAL

Third, the structure of a network determines its virality. As recent work by the social scientists Nicholas Christakis and James Fowler has shown, the contagiousness of a disease or an idea depends as much on a social network's structure as on the inherent properties of the virus or meme. The history of the late eighteenth century illustrates that point well. The ideas that inspired both the American Revolution and the French Revolution were essentially the same, and both were transmitted through the networks of correspondence, publication, and sociability. But the network structures of Colonial America and ancien

régime France were profoundly different (for example, the former lacked a large, illiterate peasantry). Whereas one revolution produced a relatively peaceful, decentralized democracy, albeit one committed to a transitional period of slavery, the other established a violent and at times anarchic republic that soon followed the ancient Roman path to tyranny and empire.

Hierarchical order was not easily restored after the fall of Napoleonic France in 1814. It took the great powers that dominated the Congress of Vienna, which concluded the next year, to reestablish monarchical governance in Europe and then export it to most of the world in the form of colonial empires. What made the spread of imperialism possible was the fact that the technologies of the industrial age—railways, steamships, and telegraphs—favored the emergence of "superhubs," with London as the most important node. In other words, the structure of networks had changed, because the new technologies lent themselves to central control in ways that had not been true of the printing press or the postal service. The first age of globalization, between 1815 and 1914, was a time of train controllers and timetables.

NETWORKS NEVER SLEEP

Fourth, many networks are complex adaptive systems that are constantly shifting shape. Such was the case even for the most hierarchical states of all time, the totalitarian empires presided over by Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, and Mao Zedong. With his iron grip on the party bureaucracy and his ability to tap the Soviet telephone system, Stalin was perhaps the supreme autocrat, a man so powerful that he could effectively outlaw all unofficial social networks, even persecuting the poet Anna Akhmatova for one illicit night of conversation with the philosopher Isaiah Berlin. In the 1950s, Christian democratic Europe and corporate America were hierarchical, too—just look at the midcentury organizational charts for General Motors—but not to anything like the same extent. A network-based reform campaign such as the civil rights movement was unthinkable in the Soviet Union. Those who campaigned against racial segregation in the American South were harassed, but efforts to suppress them ultimately failed.

The middle of the twentieth century was a time that lent itself to hierarchical governance. Beginning in the 1970s, however, that began to change. It is tempting to assume that credit goes to technology. On closer inspection, however, Silicon Valley was a consequence, rather

than a cause, of weakening central control. The Internet was invented in the United States and not in the Soviet Union precisely because the U.S. Defense Department, preoccupied with a disastrous war in Vietnam, essentially let the computer scientists in California build whatever system for computer-to-computer communication they liked. That did not happen in the Soviet case, where an analogous project, directed by the Institute of Cybernetics, in Kiev, was simply shut down by the Ministry of Finance.

The 1970s and 1980s saw two great phase transitions within the superpowers that waged the Cold War, marking the dawn of the second networked age. In the United States, the resignation of President Richard Nixon seemed to represent a major victory for the free press and representative government over the would-be imperial presidency. Yet the Watergate scandal, the defeat in Vietnam, and the social and economic crises of the mid-1970s did not escalate into a full breakdown of the system. Indeed, the presidency of Ronald Reagan restored the prestige of the executive branch with remarkable ease. By contrast, the collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe was brought about by networks of anticommunist dissent that had almost no technologically advanced means of communication. Indeed, even printing was denied to them, hence the underground literature known as "samizdat." The Polish case illustrates the role of networks well: the trade union Solidarity succeeded only because it was itself embedded in a heterogeneous web of opposition groups.

NETWORKS NETWORK

The fifth insight is that networks interact with one another, and it takes a network to defeat a network. When networks link up with other networks, innovation often results. But networks can also attack one another. A good example is the way the Cambridge University intellectual society known as the Apostles came under attack by the KGB in the 1930s. In one of the most successful intelligence operations of the twentieth century, the Soviets managed to recruit several spies from the Apostles' ranks, yielding immense numbers of high-level British and Allied documents during and after World War II.

The case illustrates one of the core weakness of distributed networks. It was not only the Cambridge intelligentsia that the Soviets penetrated; they also hacked into the entire old-boy network that ran the British government in the twentieth century. They were able to do

so precisely because the unspoken assumptions and unwritten rules of the British establishment caused telltale evidence of treachery to be overlooked or explained away. Unlike hierarchies, which tend to be paranoid about security, distributed networks are generally bad at self-defense.

Likewise, the 9/11 attacks were carried out by one network on another network: al Qaeda against the U.S. financial and political system. Yet it was not the immediate damage of the terrorist attacks that inflicted the real cost on the United States so much as the unintended consequences of the national security state's response. Writing in the *Los Angeles Times* in August 2002, before it was even clear that Iraq was to be invaded, the political scientist John Arquilla presciently pointed out the flaws in such an approach. "In a netwar, like the one we find ourselves in now, strategic bombing means little, and most networks don't rely on one—or even several—great leaders to sustain and guide them," he wrote. Faulting the George W. Bush administration for creating the Department of Homeland Security, he argued, "A hierarchy is a clumsy tool to use against a nimble network: It takes networks to fight networks, much as in previous wars it has taken tanks to fight tanks."

It took four painful years after the invasion of Iraq to learn this lesson. Looking back at the decisive phase of the U.S. troop surge in 2007, U.S. General Stanley McChrystal summed up what had been learned. In order to take down the terrorist network of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, McChrystal wrote, his task force "had to replicate its dispersion, flexibility, and speed." He continued: "Over time, 'It takes a network to defeat a network' became a mantra across the command and an eight-word summary of our core operational concept."

THE INEQUALITY OF NETWORKS

The sixth insight is that networks are profoundly inegalitarian. One enduring puzzle is why the 2008 financial crisis inflicted larger economic losses on the United States and its allies than did the terrorist attacks of 2001, even though no one plotted the financial crisis with malice aforethought. (Plausible estimates for the losses that the financial crisis inflicted on the United States alone range from $5.7 trillion to $13 trillion, whereas the largest estimate for the cost of the war on terrorism stands at $4 trillion.) The explanation lies in the dramatic alterations in the world's financial structure that followed the introduction of

information technology to banking. The financial system had grown so complex that it tended to amplify cyclical fluctuations. It was not just that financial centers had become more interconnected, and with higher-speed connections; it was that many institutions were poorly diversified and inadequately insured. What the U.S. Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and other regulatory authorities failed to grasp when they declined to bail out Lehman Brothers in 2008 was that although its chief executive, Richard Fuld, was something of a network isolate on Wall Street—unloved by his peers (including the U.S. treasury secretary, Henry Paulson, formerly the head of Goldman Sachs)—the bank itself was a crucial node in a dangerously fragile international financial network. Economists untrained in network theory woefully underestimated the impact of letting Lehman Brothers fail.

The unregulated oligopoly that runs Silicon Valley has done very well from networking the world.

In the period after the financial crisis, everyone else caught up with the financial world: the rest of society got networked in the ways that, ten years ago, only bankers had been. This change was supposed to usher in a brave new world of global community, with every citizen also a netizen, equipped by technology to speak truth to power and hold it to account. Yet once again, the lessons of network theory had been overlooked, for giant social networks are not in the least bit egalitarian. To be precise, they have many more nodes with a very large number of edges and many more with very few edges than would be the case in a randomly generated network. This is because, as social networks expand, the nodes gain new edges in proportion to the number that they already have.

The phenomenon is a version of what the sociologist Robert Merton called "the Matthew effect," after the Gospel of Matthew 25:29: "For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath." In science, for example, success breeds success: to the scientist who already has citations and prizes, more shall be given. But the trend is perhaps most visible in Silicon Valley. In 2001, the software developer Eric Raymond confidently predicted that the open-source movement would win out within three to five years. He was to be disappointed. The open-source dream died with the rise of monopolies and duopolies that successfully fended off government regulation that

might have inhibited their growth. Apple and Microsoft established something close to a software duopoly. Beginning as a bookseller, Amazon came to dominate online retail. Google even more swiftly established a near monopoly on search. And of course, Facebook won the race to dominate social media.

At the time of this writing, Facebook has 1.17 billion active daily users. Yet the company's ownership is highly concentrated. Zuckerberg himself owns just over 28 percent of the company, making him one of the ten richest people in the world. That group also includes Bill Gates, Jeff Bezos, Carlos Slim, Larry Ellison, and Michael Bloomberg, whose fortunes all derive in some way or another from information technology. Thanks to the rich-get-richer effect, the returns to their businesses do not diminish. Vast cash reserves allow them to acquire any potential competitor.

At Harvard, Zuckerberg envisioned "a world where everyone has a sense of purpose: by taking on big meaningful projects together, by redefining equality so everyone has the freedom to pursue purpose, and by building community across the world." Yet Zuckerberg personifies what economists call "the economics of superstars," whereby the top talents in a field earn much, much more than the runners-up. And paradoxically, most of the remedies for inequality that Zuckerberg mentioned in his address—a universal basic income, affordable childcare, better health care, and continuous education—are viable only as national policies delivered by the twentieth-century welfare state.

THAT WAS THEN, THIS IS NOW

The global impact of the Internet has few analogues in history better than the impact of printing on sixteenth-century Europe. The personal computer and the smartphone have empowered the individual as much as the pamphlet and the book did in Luther's time. Indeed, the trajectories for the production and price of personal computers in the United States between 1977 and 2004 look remarkably similar to the trajectories for the production and price of printed books in England from 1490 to 1630.

But there are some major differences between the current networked age and the era that followed the advent of European printing. First, and most obvious, today's networking revolution is much faster and more geographically extensive than the wave of revolutions unleashed by the German printing press.

Second, the distributional consequences of the current revolution are quite different. Early modern Europe was not an ideal place to enforce intellectual property rights, which in those days existed only when technologies could be secretively monopolized by a guild. The printing press created no billionaires: Johannes Gutenberg was no Gates (by 1456, in fact, he was effectively bankrupt). Moreover, only a subset of the media made possible by the printing press—newspapers and magazines—sought to make money from advertising, whereas all the most important network platforms made possible by the Internet do. That is where the billions of dollars come from. More than in the past, there are now two distinct kinds of people in the world: those who own and run the networks and those who merely use them.

Third, the printing press had the effect of disrupting religious life in Western Christendom before it disrupted anything else. By contrast, the Internet began by disrupting commerce; only very recently did it begin to disrupt politics, and it has truly disrupted just one religion, Islam, by empowering the most extreme version of Sunni fundamentalism.

Nevertheless, there are some clear similarities between our time and the revolutionary period that followed the advent of printing. For one thing, just as the printing press did, modern information technology is transforming not only the market—for example, facilitating short-term rentals of apartments—but also the public sphere. Never before have so many people been connected together in an instantly responsive network through which memes can spread faster than natural viruses. But the notion that taking the whole world online would create a utopia of netizens, all equal in cyberspace, was always a fantasy—as much a delusion as Luther's vision of a "priesthood of all believers." The reality is that the global network has become a transmission mechanism for all kinds of manias and panics, just as the combination of printing and literacy temporarily increased the prevalence of millenarian sects and witch crazes. The cruelties of the Islamic State, or ISIS, seem less idiosyncratic when compared with those of some governments and sects in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The contamination of the public sphere with fake news today is less surprising when one remembers that the printing press disseminated books about magic as well as books about science.

Moreover, as in the period during and after the Reformation, the current era is witnessing the erosion of territorial sovereignty. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Europe was plunged into a series

of religious wars because the principle formulated at the 1555 Peace of Augsburg—*cuius regio, eius religio* (to each realm, its ruler's religion)—was being honored mainly in the breach. In the twenty-first century, there is a similar phenomenon of escalating intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. Consider the Russian attempt to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Moscow's hackers and trolls pose a threat to American democracy not unlike the one that Jesuit priests once posed to the English Reformation.

For the scholar Anne-Marie Slaughter, the "hyper-networked world" is, on balance, a benign place. The United States "will gradually find the golden mean of network power," she wrote in these pages last year, if its leaders figure out how to operate not just on the traditional "chessboard" of interstate diplomacy but also in the new "web" of networks, exploiting the advantages of the latter (such as transparency, adaptability, and scalability). Others are less confident. In *The Seventh Sense*, Joshua Cooper Ramo argues for the erection of real and virtual "gates" to shut out the Russians, the online criminals, the teenage Internet vandals, and other malefactors. Yet Ramo himself quotes the three rules of computer security devised by the National Security Agency cryptographer Robert Morris: "RULE ONE: Do not own a computer. RULE TWO: Do not power it on. RULE THREE: Do not use it." If everyone continues to ignore those imperatives—and especially political leaders, most of whom have not even enabled two-factor authentication for their e-mail accounts—even the most sophisticated gates will be useless.

Those who wish to understand the political and geopolitical implications of today's interconnectedness need to pay more heed to the major insights of network theory than they have hitherto. If they did, they would understand that networks are not as benign as advertised. The techno-utopians who conjure up dreams of a global community have every reason to dispense their Kool-Aid to the users whose data they so expertly mine. The unregulated oligopoly that runs Silicon Valley has done very well indeed from networking the world. The rest of us—the mere users of the networks they own—should treat their messianic visions with the skepticism they deserve.

China vs. America

Managing the Next Clash of Civilizations

Graham Allison

As Americans awaken to a rising China that now rivals the United States in every arena, many seek comfort in the conviction that as China grows richer and stronger, it will follow in the footsteps of Germany, Japan, and other countries that have undergone profound transformations and emerged as advanced liberal democracies. In this view, the magic cocktail of globalization, market-based consumerism, and integration into the rule-based international order will eventually lead China to become democratic at home and to develop into what former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick once described as "a responsible stakeholder" abroad.

Samuel Huntington disagreed. In his essay "The Clash of Civilizations?," published in this magazine in 1993, the political scientist argued that, far from dissolving in a global liberal world order, cultural fault lines would become a defining feature of the post–Cold War world. Huntington's argument is remembered today primarily for its prescience in spotlighting the divide between "Western and Islamic civilizations"—a rift that was revealed most vividly by the 9/11 attacks and their aftermath. But Huntington saw the gulf between the U.S.-led West and Chinese civilization as just as deep, enduring, and consequential. As he put it, "The very notion that there could be a 'universal civilization' is a Western idea, directly at odds with the particularism of most Asian societies and their emphasis on what distinguishes one people from another."

The years since have bolstered Huntington's case. The coming decades will only strengthen it further. The United States embodies what Huntington considered Western civilization. And tensions between American

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and Chinese values, traditions, and philosophies will aggravate the fundamental structural stresses that occur whenever a rising power, such as China, threatens to displace an established power, such as the United States.

The reason such shifts so often lead to conflict is Thucydides' trap, named after the ancient Greek historian who observed a dangerous dynamic between a rising Athens and ruling Sparta. According to Thucydides, "It was the rise of Athens, and the fear that this instilled in Sparta, that made war inevitable." Rising powers understandably feel a growing sense of entitlement and demand greater influence and respect. Established powers, faced with challengers, tend to become fearful, insecure, and defensive. In such an environment, misunderstandings are magnified, empathy remains elusive, and events and third-party actions that would otherwise be inconsequential or manageable can trigger wars that the primary players never wanted to fight.

In the case of the United States and China, Thucydidean risks are compounded by civilizational incompatibility between the two countries, which exacerbates their competition and makes it more difficult to achieve rapprochement. This mismatch is most easily observed in the profound differences between American and Chinese conceptions of the state, economics, the role of individuals, relations among nations, and the nature of time.

Americans see government as a necessary evil and believe that the state's tendency toward tyranny and abuse of power must be feared and constrained. For Chinese, government is a necessary good, the fundamental pillar ensuring order and preventing chaos. In American-style free-market capitalism, government establishes and enforces the rules; state ownership and government intervention in the economy sometimes occur but are undesirable exceptions. In China's state-led market economy, the government establishes targets for growth, picks and subsidizes industries to develop, promotes national champions, and undertakes significant, long-term economic projects to advance the interests of the nation.

Chinese culture does not celebrate American-style individualism, which measures society by how well it protects the rights and fosters the freedom of individuals. Indeed, the Chinese term for "individualism"—*gerenzhuyi*—suggests a selfish preoccupation with oneself over one's community. China's equivalent of "give me liberty or give me death" would be "give me a harmonious community or give me death." For

China, order is the highest value, and harmony results from a hierarchy in which participants obey Confucius' first imperative: Know thy place.

This view applies not only to domestic society but also to global affairs, where the Chinese view holds that China's rightful place is atop the pyramid; other states should be arranged as subordinate tributaries. The American view is somewhat different. Since at least the end of World War II, Washington has sought to prevent the emergence of a "peer competitor" that could challenge U.S. military dominance. But postwar American conceptions of international order have also emphasized the need for a rule-based global system that restrains even the United States.

Finally, the Americans and the Chinese think about time and experience its passage differently. Americans tend to focus on the present and often count in hours or days. Chinese, on the other hand, are more historical-minded and often think in terms of decades and even centuries.

Of course, these are sweeping generalizations that are by necessity reductive and not fully reflective of the complexities of American and Chinese society. But they also provide important reminders that policymakers in the United States and China should keep in mind in seeking to manage this competition without war.

WE'RE NUMBER ONE

The cultural differences between the United States and China are aggravated by a remarkable trait shared by both countries: an extreme superiority complex. Each sees itself as exceptional—indeed, without peer. But there can be only one number one. Lee Kuan Yew, the former prime minister of Singapore, had doubts about the United States' ability to adapt to a rising China. "For America to be displaced, not in the world, but only in the western Pacific, by an Asian people long despised and dismissed with contempt as decadent, feeble, corrupt, and inept is emotionally very difficult to accept," he said in a 1999 interview. "The sense of cultural supremacy of the Americans will make this adjustment most difficult."

In some ways, Chinese exceptionalism is more sweeping than its American counterpart. "The [Chinese] empire saw itself as the center of the civilized universe," the historian Harry Gelber wrote in his 2001 book, *Nations Out of Empires*. During the imperial era, "the Chinese scholar-bureaucrat did not think of a 'China' or a 'Chinese civilization' in the modern sense at all. For him, there were the Han people and, beyond that, only barbarism. Whatever was not civilized was, by definition, barbaric."

To this day, the Chinese take great pride in their civilizational achievements. "Our nation is a great nation," Chinese President Xi Jinping declared in a 2012 speech. "During the civilization and development process of more than 5,000 years, the Chinese nation has made an indelible contribution to the civilization and advancement of mankind." Indeed, Xi claimed in his 2014 book, *The Governance of China,* that "China's continuous civilization is not equal to anything on earth, but a unique achievement in world history."

Americans, too, see themselves as the vanguard of civilization, especially when it comes to political development. A passion for freedom is enshrined in the core document of the American political creed, the Declaration of Independence, which proclaims that "all men are created equal" and that they are "endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights." The declaration specifies that these rights include "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness" and asserts that these are not matters for debate but rather "self-evident" truths. As the American historian Richard Hofstadter wrote, "It has been our fate as a nation not to have ideologies, but to be one." In contrast, order is the central political value for Chinese—and order results from hierarchy. Individual liberty, as Americans understand it, disrupts hierarchy; in the Chinese view, it invites chaos.

DO AS I SAY . . . AND AS I DO?

These philosophical differences find expression in each country's concept of government. Although animated by a deep distrust of authority, the founders of the United States recognized that society required government. Otherwise, who would protect citizens from foreign threats or violations of their rights by criminals at home? They wrestled, however, with a dilemma: a government powerful enough to perform its essential functions would tend toward tyranny. To manage this challenge, they designed a government of "separated institutions sharing power," as the historian Richard Neustadt described it. This deliberately produced constant struggle among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, which led to delay, gridlock, and even dysfunction. But it also provided checks and balances against abuse.

The Chinese conception of government and its role in society could hardly be more different. As Lee observed, "The country's history and cultural records show that when there is a strong center (Beijing or Nanjing), the country is peaceful and prosperous. When the center

is weak, then the provinces and their counties are run by little warlords." Accordingly, the sort of strong central government that Americans resist represents to the Chinese the principal agent advancing order and the public good at home and abroad.

For Americans, democracy is the only just form of government: authorities derive their legitimacy from the consent of the governed. That is not the prevailing view in China, where it is common to believe that the government earns or losses political legitimacy based on its performance. In a provocative TED Talk delivered in 2013, the Shanghai-based venture capitalist Eric Li challenged democracy's presumed superiority. "I was asked once, 'The party wasn't voted in by election. Where is the source of legitimacy?'" he recounted. "I said, 'How about competency?'" He went on to remind his audience that in 1949, when the Chinese Community Party took power, "China was mired in civil war, dismembered by foreign aggression, [and] average life expectancy at that time [was] 41 years. Today [China] is the second-largest economy in the world, an industrial powerhouse, and its people live in increasing prosperity."

In some ways, Chinese exceptionalism is more sweeping than its American counterpart.

Washington and Beijing also have distinctively different approaches when it comes to promoting their fundamental political values internationally. Americans believe that human rights and democracy are universal aspirations, requiring only the example of the United States (and sometimes a neoimperialist nudge) to be realized everywhere. The United States is, as Huntington wrote in his follow-on book, *The Clash of Civilizations*, "a missionary nation," driven by the belief "that the non-Western peoples should commit themselves to the Western values . . . and should embody these values in their institutions." Most Americans believe that democratic rights will benefit anyone, anywhere in the world.

Over the decades, Washington has pursued a foreign policy that seeks to advance the cause of democracy—even, on occasion, attempting to impose it on those who have failed to embrace it themselves. In contrast, although the Chinese believe that others can look up to them, admire their virtues, and even attempt to mimic their behavior, China's leaders have not proselytized on behalf of their approach. As the American diplomat Henry Kissinger has noted, imperial China "did not export its ideas but let others come to seek them." And unsurprisingly, Chinese leaders have

been deeply suspicious of U.S. efforts to convert them to the American creed. In the late 1980s, Deng Xiaoping, who led China from 1978 until 1989 and began the country's process of economic liberalization, complained to a visiting dignitary that Western talk of "human rights, freedom, and democracy is designed only to safeguard the interests of the strong, rich countries, which take advantage of their strength to bully weak countries, and which pursue hegemony and practice power politics."

THINKING FAST AND SLOW

The American and Chinese senses of the past, present, and future are fundamentally distinct. Americans proudly celebrated their country turning 241 in July; the Chinese are fond of noting that their history spans five millennia. U.S. leaders often refer to "the American experiment," and their sometimes haphazard policies reflect that attitude. China, by contrast, sees itself as a fixture of the universe: it always was; it always will be.

Because of their expansive sense of time, Chinese leaders are careful to distinguish the acute from the chronic and the urgent from the merely important. It is difficult to imagine a U.S. political leader suggesting that a major foreign policy problem should be put on the proverbial shelf for a generation. That, however, is precisely what Deng did in 1979, when he led the Chinese side in negotiations with Japan over the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and accepted an eventual, rather than an immediate, solution to the dispute.

Ever more sensitive to the demands of the news cycle and popular opinion, U.S. politicians take to Twitter or announce alliterative, bullet-point policy plans that promise quick solutions. In contrast, Chinese leaders are strategically patient: as long as trends are moving in their favor, they are comfortable waiting out a problem. Americans think of themselves as problem solvers. Reflecting their short-termism, they see problems as discrete issues to be addressed now so that they can move on to the next ones. The American novelist and historian Gore Vidal once called his country "the United States of Amnesia"—a place where every idea is an innovation and every crisis is unprecedented. This contrasts sharply with the deep historical and institutional memory of the Chinese, who assume that there is nothing new under the sun.

Indeed, Chinese leaders tend to believe that many problems cannot be solved and must instead be managed. They see challenges as long term and iterative; issues they face today resulted from processes that have evolved over the past year, decade, or century. Policy actions

they take today will simply contribute to that evolution. For instance, since 1949, Taiwan has been ruled by what Beijing considers rogue Chinese nationalists. Although Chinese leaders insist that Taiwan remains an integral part of China, they have pursued a long-term strategy involving tightening economic and social entanglements to slowly suck the island back into the fold.

WHO'S THE BOSS?

The civilizational clash that will make it hardest for Washington and Beijing to escape Thucydides' trap emerges from their competing conceptions of world order. China's treatment of its own citizens provides the script for its relations with weaker neighbors abroad. The Chinese Communist Party maintains order by enforcing an authoritarian hierarchy that demands the deference and compliance of citizens. China's international behavior reflects similar expectations of order: in an unscripted moment during a 2010 meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, then Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi responded to complaints about Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea by telling his regional counterparts and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that "China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that's just a fact."

By contrast, American leaders aspire to an international rule of law that is essentially U.S. domestic rule of law writ large. At the same time, they also recognize the realities of power in the Hobbesian global jungle, where it is better to be the lion than the lamb. Washington often tries to reconcile this tension by depicting a world in which the United States is a benevolent hegemon, acting as the world's lawmaker, policeman, judge, and jury.

Washington urges other powers to accept the rule-based international order over which it presides. But through Chinese eyes, it looks like the Americans make the rules and others obey Washington's commands. General Martin Dempsey, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, became familiar with the predictable resentment this elicited from China. "One of the things that fascinated me about the Chinese is whenever I would have a conversation with them about international standards or international rules of behavior, they would inevitably point out that those rules were made when they were absent from the world stage," Dempsey remarked in an interview with this magazine last year.

YOU CAN GO YOUR OWN WAY

The United States has spent nearly three decades as the world's most powerful country. During that time, Washington's massive influence on world affairs has made it crucial for elites and leaders in other nations to understand American culture and the U.S. approach to strategy. Americans, on the other hand, have often felt that they have the luxury of not needing to think too hard about the worldviews of people elsewhere—a lack of interest encouraged by the belief, held by many American elites, that the rest of the world has been slowly but surely becoming more like the United States anyway.

In recent years, however, the rise of China has challenged that indifference. Policymakers in the United States are beginning to recognize that they must improve their understanding of China—especially Chinese strategic thinking. In particular, U.S. policymakers have begun to see distinctive traits in the way their Chinese counterparts think about the use of military force. In deciding whether, when, and how to attack adversaries, Chinese leaders have for the most part been rational and pragmatic. Beyond that, however, American policymakers and analysts have identified five presumptions and predilections that offer further clues to China's likely strategic behavior in confrontations.

First, in both war and peace, Chinese strategy is unabashedly driven by realpolitik and unencumbered by any serious need to justify Chinese behavior in terms of international law or ethical norms. This allows the Chinese government to be ruthlessly flexible, since it feels few constraints from prior rationales and is largely immune to criticisms of inconsistency. So, for example, when Kissinger arrived in China in 1971 to begin secret talks about a U.S.-Chinese rapprochement, he found his interlocutors unblinkered by ideology and brutally candid about China's national interests. Whereas Kissinger and U.S. President Richard Nixon felt it necessary to justify the compromise they ultimately reached to end the Vietnam War as "peace with honor," the Chinese leader Mao Zedong felt no need to pretend that in establishing relations with the capitalist United States to strengthen communist China's position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, he was somehow bolstering a larger socialist international movement.

Just as China's practical approach to international politics arguably gives China an edge over the United States, so, too, does China's obsessively holistic strategic worldview. Chinese planners see everything as connected to everything else. The evolving context in which a strategic situation occurs determines what the Chinese call *shi*. This term has no

direct English translation but can be rendered as the "potential energy" or "momentum" inherent in any circumstance at a given moment. It comprises geography and terrain, weather, the balance of forces, surprise, morale, and many other elements. "Each factor influences the others," as Kissinger wrote in his 2011 book, *On China*, "giving rise to subtle shifts in momentum and relative advantage." Thus, a skilled Chinese strategist spends most of his time patiently "observing and cultivating changes in the strategic landscape" and moves only when everything is in optimal alignment. Then he strikes swiftly. To an observer, the result appears inevitable.

War for Chinese strategists is primarily psychological and political. In Chinese thinking, an opponent's perception of facts on the ground may be just as important as the facts themselves. For imperial China, creating and sustaining the image of a civilization so superior that it represented "the center of the universe" served to deter enemies from challenging Chinese dominance. Today, a narrative of China's inevitable rise and the United States' irreversible decline plays a similar role.

Traditionally, the Chinese have sought victory not in a decisive battle but through incremental moves designed to gradually improve their position. David Lai, an expert on Asian military affairs, has illustrated this approach by comparing the Western game of chess with its Chinese equivalent, *weiqi* (often referred to as go). In chess, players seek to dominate the center of the board and conquer the opponent. In *weiqi*, players seek to surround the opponent. If the chess master sees five or six moves ahead, the *weiqi* master sees 20 or 30. Attending to every dimension in the broader relationship with an adversary, the Chinese strategist resists rushing prematurely toward victory, instead aiming to build incremental advantage. "In the Western tradition, there is a heavy emphasis on the use of force; the art of war is largely limited to the battlefields; and the way to fight is force on force," Lai wrote in a 2004 analysis for the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute. By contrast, "the philosophy behind *go* . . . is to compete for relative gain rather than seeking complete annihilation of the opponent forces." In a wise reminder, Lai warns that "it is dangerous to play *go* with the chess mindset."

LET'S MAKE A DEAL

Washington would do well to heed that warning. In the coming years, any number of flash points could produce a crisis in U.S.-Chinese relations, including further territorial disputes over the South China Sea

and tensions over North Korea's burgeoning nuclear weapons program. Since it will take at least another decade or more for China's military capabilities to fully match those of the United States, the Chinese will be cautious and prudent about any lethal use of force against the Americans. Beijing will treat military force as a subordinate instrument in its foreign policy, which seeks not victory in battle but the achievement of national objectives. It will bolster its diplomatic and economic connections with its neighbors, deepening their dependency on China, and use economic leverage to encourage (or coerce) cooperation on other issues. Although China has traditionally viewed war as a last resort, should it conclude that long-term trend lines are no longer moving in its favor and that it is losing bargaining power, it could initiate a limited military conflict to attempt to reverse the trends.

The last time the United States faced extremely high Thucydidean risks was during the Cold War—especially during the Cuban missile crisis. Reflecting on the crisis a few months after its resolution, U.S. President John F. Kennedy identified one enduring lesson: "Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or nuclear war." In spite of Moscow's hard-line rhetoric, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev ultimately concluded that he could compromise on nuclear arms in Cuba. Likewise, Kissinger and Nixon later discovered that the Chinese ideologue Mao was quite adept at giving ground when it served China's interests.

Xi and U.S. President Donald Trump have both made maximalist claims, especially when it comes to the South China Sea. But both are also dealmakers. The better the Trump administration understands how Beijing sees China's role in the world and the country's core interests, the better prepared it will be to negotiate. The problem remains psychological projection: even seasoned State Department officials too often mistakenly assume that China's vital interests mirror those of the United States. The officials now crafting the Trump administration's approach to China would be wise to read the ancient Chinese philosopher Sun-tzu: "If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle."

Making Government Smarter

How to Set National Priorities

Bjorn Lomborg

These days, people for the most part believe that governments should try to promote the general welfare of the populations they serve. The disagreements come over how to do that—what goals to focus on, what policies to adopt, and so on. These questions are usually approached through broad intellectual frameworks, such as political ideology or religion, and much time is spent debating the finer points of various doctrines. Often overlooked, however, is a simple and easy way to make lives better: use routine cost-benefit analysis to compare the expected returns from alternative policies and then choose the more effective ones.

Effectiveness sounds dull. But what if an extra dollar or rupee in a budget could feed ten people instead of one? Or if $100,000 of international aid spending could be tweaked so it would save ten times as many lives? When the stakes are this high, efficiency in spending becomes a moral imperative. Moreover, unlike debates over ideology or religion, debates over efficiency can actually get somewhere, because there is a straightforward mechanism for resolving them: compare the predictable costs and benefits of different courses of action and see which yields more bang for the buck.

Surely, this is just common sense, one might say, and governments must do it all time. Maybe they should, but in the real world, they rarely do—partly because this analysis involves a lot of work, but mostly because the results can be inconvenient, showing that a preferred policy is inefficient or even that elements of existing government bureaucracy may be unnecessary. Unsurprisingly, nobody wants to be the superfluous

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official—whether in a government, an international organization, a nongovernmental organization, or even a private philanthropy.

This means that decisions are affected by other factors. One town in rural Virginia, for example, holds an annual fair to support local charities. Each year, an animal-rescue organization brings a bald eagle to its booth as a prop, and each year, it receives more donations than other groups—which have a harder time using stagecraft to promote the virtues of, say, being a foster parent or working with at-risk youth. This sort of thing happens everywhere, and everybody knows it. Marketing and politics shape policy selection at least as much as technical merit, and the public suffers as a result.

The difference can be considerable: the philosopher Toby Ord analyzed 108 health interventions from the Disease Control Priorities Project, identifying the number of additional years of healthy life gained from spending the same amount on each. The most effective interventions were at least hundreds of times as powerful as the least. Moving $50 million from the bottom to the top of the list could save 1,000 lives instead of one. Likewise, extensive research on the United Nation's Sustainable Development Goals reveals a similar pattern: the most efficient interventions aren't just good; they're remarkably better than the middle-of-the-road ones—and it's likely that such a pattern holds true for spending by governments and development agencies in any country.

But just because inefficiency is common doesn't mean it's inevitable. Governments and other service providers can do better, even within their existing budgets, simply by disciplining themselves to embrace best practices across all their operations and by shifting time, effort, and resources from inefficient programs to efficient ones. Recently, my think tank, the Copenhagen Consensus Center, worked with the government of Bangladesh, as well as an extensive list of public- and private-sector organizations and Bangladeshi media, to find out how to improve the efficiency of development efforts in the country, and the lessons we learned in the process are applicable to other nations trying to improve their performance.

THE BANGLADESHI EXPERIMENT

The Bangladesh Priorities project has been funded by the C&A Foundation, an affiliate of the Dutch fashion company C&A, with help from the Swedish International Development Cooperaton Agency and

the Danish embassy in Dhaka. We worked with all the major players in Bangladesh to assess what kinds of spending (both for the government's $30 billion annual budget and for the $3 billion in development aid given by outside organizations) would do the most good for the country. The results were startling: they showed that major gains in national well-being could be achieved simply by rearranging budgets to favor policies with high returns on investment.

We began with the country's latest five-year plan, which shapes most conversations about national development. Partnering with BRAC, the world's largest nongovernmental development organization, we took each of the plan's 20 topic areas, from gender equality to urbanization, and noted all the associated policies. Then we invited several hundred thought leaders from government, the academy, nongovernmental organizations, donors, and the private sector to add their own recommendations. This ultimately yielded 1,000 proposals, about half overlapping with those in the plan, on topics as varied as infrastructure, tax reform, public health, and more.

In 20 roundtables, we asked Bangladeshi experts to look at all the proposals and rank them—specifically identifying which ideas had the most potential or were likely to be politically popular, and also which had enough empirical data available to make a thorough examination possible. That whittled the list down to 76 proposals. Then, 30 teams of local and foreign economists estimated the costs and benefits of all 76 proposals. Most of the costs were monetary, but the benefits included several noneconomic ones as well.

Take a proposal to promote wetland conservation in the Sundarbans, a vast mangrove forest on the coast of the Bay of Bengal. It would help address climate change, enhance biodiversity, and create opportunities for fishing and tourism. The projected benefits added up to almost $4 billion, for a cost of $1.4 billion, generating a predicted nearly $3 of benefits for every $1 spent.

Or take an early childhood education program that would help kids overcome setbacks from stunting. Stunting is caused by poor nutrition or repeated early infections, and its effects can last for many decades, with afflicted children earning less than their peers ever after. The program would bring specialists to work with stunted children and their parents to improve the children's development skills, and the evidence shows that such efforts can boost the children's lifetime earnings by 25 percent, completely eliminating the stunting effect.

In Bangladesh, such a program would cost about $160 per child and increase each child's future earnings by $2,884. So every $1 invested would bring an $18 return.

The Bangladesh Priorities project has generated more than 1,150 pages of peer-reviewed studies, available for free online and to be published in a two-volume book. Changes in spending require public support, so we published more than 40 articles on the research results in the largest Bengali and English newspapers, with a combined readership of more than ten million people. To help spread the message even more, we combined all the results in one chart, showing the bang for the buck of all 76 policies evaluated: the longer the line, the greater the multiplier effect.

TB OR NOT TB

To compare the policies fairly against one another, we had to translate all their impacts into a single ultimate scale of value, using common assumptions and calculations. For example, across all the studies, we used a standard figure for the economic value of a year of life and standard discount rates to calculate the value of future costs and benefits. Even so, the figures can obviously be only rough estimates, because of the inherent uncertainties involved in many of the projections.

Moreover, efficiency is not the only important value; governments need to consider other factors as well, such as justice, equality, and political sustainability. So we built in additional rounds of discussion in which the calculations and rankings could be challenged, including having a special panel of top economists scrutinize all the findings, make sure all variables were considered, and adjust the rankings as appropriate.

For example, microfinance programs have a relatively low economic return, but they promote equality and often benefit the poorest of the poor and so have more going for them than one might assume at first glance. A similar effect is true for family subsidies designed to prevent child marriage. The educational benefits of a delay in marriage are well established, but the broader social and health benefits are challenging to study. A simple economic cost-benefit analysis underestimates these and overlooks the moral benefits of deterring child marriage.

In the end, the project's most important finding related to the treatment of tuberculosis. It turns out that one in every 11 deaths in Bang-

ladesh is caused by tuberculosis and that virtually all of those deaths are preventable. Today, proven treatments can cure TB patients for about $100 each. And yet nine Bangladeshis die from the disease every hour nevertheless. Why? Because only half of those who need treatment get it, thanks to the limited reach of Bangladesh's health-care system, popular ignorance about how the disease is transmitted, and the shame and stigma associated with diagnosis.

Treating all TB patients in Bangladesh appropriately would not be easy or free. Identifying and treating people with the disease would require extensive outreach initiatives, costing $402 per death avoided. The value of the average life gained from those efforts, however, would be $8,503. So every $1 spent on treating TB—one of the country's crucial problems—would produce an impressive $21 of benefits.

But wait, there's more! Most of the benefits would go to the poorest of the poor, and curtailing TB would prevent all the disruption and tragedies stemming from the death of adults in their prime. Putting everything together, therefore, the expert panel decided that increasing expenditures on TB treatment was the single most effective way to improve life in Bangladesh. "For many years, [it has] been difficult to get enough attention and funding for TB," according to BRAC's Md. Akramul Islam. He has found that the results of our study are increasing the visibility of and funding for this neglected disease.

Perhaps more surprising, the second-biggest finding concerned expanding e-procurement. Reforming government purchasing procedures is about as unsexy a topic as one could imagine, but it turns out that it is extremely important in practice, particularly for a developing country such as Bangladesh. The government there spends more than $9 billion on procurement annually, on everything from roads to office buildings to pencils. There are opportunities for corruption at every step along the way: contractors have to hand in their proposals in person, and companies with political connections have been known to hire goons to physically block competitors from submitting bids. This leads to higher prices and sometimes subpar output.

Our research showed that switching to a digital procurement system would increase competition, reduce corruption (by an estimated 12 percent), and save money (up to $700 million annually). The practical requirements would involve little more than buying computers and educating staff—and for each $1 spent on such efforts, the return would be a whopping $663.

Benefit-to-Cost Ratios in Bangladesh



SOURCE: Copenhagen Consensus Center.

DIESEL WIN

Doing this sort of exercise properly enables policymakers to see whether familiar nostrums live up to their billing. Bangladesh, and especially its garment industry, has benefited from trade liberalization, for example. But by how much? Now we can say that each $1 spent on further trade liberalization would bring the country $10 in benefits. Bangladesh has battled naturally occurring arsenic in its groundwater for decades, to cite another example. Now we can say that every extra $1 invested in fixing the problem for the worst-affected households would return $17 worth of benefits.

Even more important, this sort of process enables previously obscure ideas to get the audition and acceptance they deserve. Take a policy to counter malnutrition by providing small children with micronutrient supplements, including iodized salt, vitamin A, and zinc. Delivering the supplements would cost roughly $125 per child in need—in return for which the child would be healthier, do better in school, and have higher lifetime earnings. The result? For every $1 spent, the supplements program would generate $19 in benefits.

Or take retrofitting kilns. More than a thousand kilns across Dhaka manufacture four billion bricks each year, emitting so much pollution along the way that the city's air quality is often 16 times as bad as international standards. This air pollution kills 2,000 people each year. Upgrading the kilns with improved technology would make them burn more cleanly and efficiently and decrease fuel consumption by a fifth. And every $1 spent would yield $8 in value.

This kind of exercise also enables policymakers to tell which celebrated programs aren't particularly effective, especially on a comparative basis. Household solar projects, for example, are darlings of the development community, but analysis by the economist A.K. Enamul Haque—who also co-wrote the recent World Bank report on solar energy in Bangladesh—showed that the panels produce only $1.80 in benefits for every $1 spent on them. Why such a poor showing? Because solar panels are relatively expensive and deliver fairly little energy, available for only a few hours at night.

Haque noted that most rich Bangladeshis use diesel generators rather than solar panels to provide alternative electricity sources during power cuts. So he decided to test whether it made sense for poorer Bangladeshis to emulate their richer neighbors. And sure enough, if five households chipped in to split the cost of a diesel generator, each $1 spent would yield $25 of benefits—even after accounting for the

harm of higher carbon dioxide emissions. People who care about eliminating energy poverty should follow the numbers.

Similarly, Bangladesh is famous for its experiments in microfinance. But extensive research in many countries over long periods has shown that microfinance is not a particularly powerful intervention, as these things go. It carries a significant initial cost and produces modest benefits that taper off after a few years; all told, it yields $2 in benefits for every $1 spent. That's better than nothing, but much less efficient than many other ways of using the same aid dollars.

Surprisingly, one program very popular in some development circles—unconditional cash transfers—turned out to be one of the least effective, according to the economists. These programs give a one-time cash amount to ultra-poor recipients, often microentrepreneurs, without conditions on how the money can be used. Multiple randomized controlled trials—the gold standard in estimates of effect—showed little direct impact: just 80 cents for each $1 invested, while the long-term impacts are not well studied.

Nor was cash what the ultra-poor themselves wanted most. In addition to asking experts for their recommendations, we also engaged many poor Bangladeshis in remote areas directly. Many of their priorities were similar to those identified by the experts, but there were some crucial differences, depending on their circumstances. What the ultra-poor wanted most was increased agricultural productivity. Research has shown that efforts in this area can be extremely valuable, and our calculations predicted that investing $9,000 per agricultural worker would increase Bangladeshi farming productivity by ten percent over two decades—yielding a $4 return on each $1 spent.

MOVING FROM INTERPRETATION TO CHANGE

As one might imagine, the results of our study were not always popular, particularly among advocates of programs that ranked poorly. Sketching what could be done was easy; translating the findings into practice will be hard. But already, the discourse in Dhaka has changed for the better. As an editorial in *Prothom Alo*, one of the country's leading newspapers, recently observed, "It is clear that the research is having a real impact on guiding decisions on Bangladeshi priorities and promises to help even more into the future."

The prime minister's office is now incorporating cost-benefit analysis across all government ministries. The finance minister has promised to

complete e-procurement in two years, and his new budget sets aside $12 million for the effort. And the recommendations on nutrition have already been incorporated into the National Plan of Action for Nutrition, helping the country spend $1.5 billion over ten years even better. "Policymakers prioritize between competing options many times every single day," Tofail Ahmed, Bangladesh's minister of commerce, observed. "This project will help us to take a step back and ask, where are the areas where we should focus more attention and resources?"

At this point, the Copenhagen Consensus Center is continuing to work with BRAC in Bangladesh, helping move the reforms from concept to implementation. And what of our own project's cost-benefit ratio? One immediate result has been the government's decision to rapidly scale up its e-procurement. This will cost some $60 million in total, but the benefits will run to about $700 million every year. The move would likely have happened eventually anyway, but even if we can claim responsibility for only half the benefits for just the first year, that still means that the $2.5 million project has generated $350 million in benefits for Bangladesh, or $140 back on the dollar. If we were to include the impact of the other 75 proposals, the benefits would be even higher.

There is nothing special about Bangladesh when it comes to the potential gains to be realized. Any country could do a project like this, and we're currently working on similar efforts for Haiti and India. This type of project is not a panacea for all of the world's problems, and it would be naive to expect most of the gains to be realized. Nevertheless, the scale of the possible upside is so vast as to be sobering. For example, we estimate that shifting a mere one percent of Bangladeshi government spending from mediocre programs to great ones could end up producing more than $35 billion worth of social benefits every five years—a whole additional government budget's worth.

Too often, politicians, voters, and donors fall for the bald eagle at the charity fair, letting catchy marketing and heart-rending anecdotes capture their imaginations and their wallets. But cost-benefit analysis provides a powerful tool to see the true track records and potential benefits of the policy alternatives before us, helping more people live longer, healthier, better lives. The moral is simple: If you really want to make the world dance, don't forget about the price tag. Check it very carefully.

A Continuous Transformation

By David Tawei Lee, Ph.D., Minister of Foreign Affairs

Taiwan remains committed to strengthening economic and trade ties with countries around the world, including the United States, while fostering development in partner nations across the globe.

In the 1950s and 1960s, Taiwan embarked on a program of industrialization so transformative that it would become known, by the 1970s, as the Taiwan Economic Miracle. With the help of international partners such as the United States and through the concerted efforts of Taiwan's government and people, our economy rapidly transitioned over the latter half of the 20th century from labor-intensive sectors to high-tech manufacturing, which set the stage for Taiwan's emergence as a world-leading technology hub.

Today, the country plays an indispensable role in the global supply chains for numerous critical technology products.

Taiwan's competitive edge derives from its vibrant small and medium enterprises. Comprising some 97 percent of the nation's companies, SMEs are the drivers of innovation and powerful vehicles for equitable growth. As such, the development of Taiwan's thriving SME culture is a regular topic of discussion at Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings and other international forums.

Sharing Development Experience

As Taiwan carved out a vital position in the world economy, we moved from a recipient to a donor of international aid, while also eagerly sharing our development expertise. Capitalizing on our strengths in such areas as agriculture, healthcare and vocational training, Taiwan has launched scores of international cooperation projects in allied and partner nations.

Under these programs, our overseas specialists provide assistance to those most in need, as well as convey our experiences in establishing

David Tawei Lee, Ph.D., Minister of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan

one of the world's leading national healthcare systems.

Taiwan's assistance programs emphasize capacity building in line with the old adage that we do not simply give people fish, but teach them how to fish. Through our diverse vocational training programs, specialists equip young people from recipient countries with practical skills in areas such as carpentry and plumbing.

Over the past year, I have visited many nations to inspect projects implemented by our overseas medical, technical and trade missions. And I am constantly impressed by the passion and professionalism of our personnel. They deliver real and effective aid in communities across the globe and accelerate economic and social development in partner countries.

Mutually Beneficial Trade with the United States

Taiwan is committed to strengthening economic and investment ties with its trading partners including the United States. Our two countries have long enjoyed robust trade links characterized by high levels of supply chain integration, especially in high-tech manufacturing.

In 2016, the United States was Taiwan's second-largest trading partner, while Taiwan was the 10th-biggest trading partner of the United States. Notably, Taiwan was also the seventh-largest agricultural export market of the United States.

U.S. President Donald Trump has expressed concern about his nation's trade deficits and has signed an executive order to investigate bilateral ties wherein it runs significant imbalances. Taiwan is listed 14th among the 16 countries subject to such scrutiny, with the United States having recorded a trade-in-goods deficit of around $13.3 billion with Taiwan last year.

But that figure does not reflect the mutually beneficial nature of our trade links. Each year, Taiwanese tech companies pay U.S. firms significant royalties for patented technologies. In addition, some of our military purchases are not included in U.S. trade statistics. To gain a more accurate picture of our trade relationship, we need to factor in these sales, as well as services related to intellectual property.

In response to President Trump's "Buy American, Hire American" policy, Taiwan has sent its largest ever delegation to the SelectUSA Investment Summit in June. An agricultural mission will also visit major U.S. agricultural states to purchase large quantities of crops like corn, soybeans and wheat.

Many Taiwan companies that have made substantial investments in the United States, including those in Apple Inc.'s supply chain, are seeking to expand their American operations. As a result, Taiwan investments in the country, which reached an accumulated total of $26 billion by 2016, could increase to $35 billion in the short to medium term.

Ultimately, our goal is to bolster economic ties with the United States while expanding lines of communication to deepen discussions on issues of mutual concern. Given the complementary nature of our economies, we also believe that a trade agreement is in the best interest of both sides. Such an accord would further boost trade and investment, thus elevating our longstanding and healthy economic partnership to a new level. ■

TAIWAN

Taiwan's success takes teamwork

Like many of its prosperous neighbors, Taiwan has invested a lot into its schools, knowing very well that the foundation of a successful and sustainable society lies in its people and the quality of the education they receive.

While currently several of Taiwan's top universities are public, the private sector has become more active in shaping Taiwan's next generation.

Only a few years old, CBTC Financial Management College in the southern city of Tainan is focused on preparing the country's next generation for life after graduation.

Believing that life skills plays an important part in education, the school, funded by banking giant China Trust Banking Corporation, uses its extensive network in the business world to instruct its students.

"Our professors are bank presidents, vice presidents in charge of insurance, security vice presidents and CFOs. The group's many companies send executives down to speak to the students so that after they graduate, they know exactly what they need to do," University Chairman Chi-Tai Feng said.

"We are not trying to build a great academic institution. We are trying to produce international financial experts," added Feng, who pointed out that the school provides scholarships to less fortunate students.

In Kaohsiung, Taiwan's second-largest city, another private institution is committed to raising the quality of education for its future doctors.

"We have thoroughly integrated our affiliated hospital so that all of the efforts are more economical and efficient. This has been a major focus since our 60th anniversary three years ago. Our midterm goals involve putting more emphasis on innovation and entrepreneurship from our faculty and students," Kaohsiung Medical University President Dr. Ching-Kuan Liu said.

"Before, our university only emphasized its hospital services but were not involved in the economic development," Liu added.

With this "pre-incubator" approach to education, KMU allows new ideas to flourish as it also provides business-related classes that may encourage its students to start their own company involving medicine or a related field. It also uses its close ties to local and national government to create an environment for growth not only within its campus but across Taiwan as well.

Exporting good health around the world

Life-changing discoveries in the fields of medical and biotechnology have put Taiwan in the spotlight the past few decades. With strong IP protection, transparent legal and financial systems, strong pursuits of innovation, as well as cost effective and efficient manpower, the region continues to flourish.

These factors have created an atmosphere that allows small and medium sized enterprises on the island to thrive, among them TaiwanJ Pharmaceuticals, which has a team of only 30 people.

TaiwanJ Pharmaceutical CEO Dr. Shih Ying-Chu is very proud of their impressive results from its clinical trials of its liver disease drugs. In operation only since 2011, the company has successfully completed two phases of trials and is on their third and fourth phases of testing, all in collaboration with American counterparts.

"We are a group of very honest scientists with a good reputation. We are looking for sustainable growth both in Taiwan and in the international community. We also welcome everyone to participate in our upcoming IPO. Check out our performance. The trials speak for themselves," Shih also said.

Meanwhile, Charsire Biotechnology, based in the Southern Taiwan Science Park in Tainan, has developed organic solutions with botanical drugs. With clinical trials underway in various neurodegenerative areas, Charsire has raised funds for additional research through the sales and marketing of their skin care line.

"By selling these products, we not only financially support our research but we also gain valuable market data from our customers. This human experience helps us create better products," said President Yi-Hung Weng.

"Charsire is quite special since we started with plant-based drug R&D. Our skincare products are both botanical and topical, which makes them very safe. The experience we gained from selling these products gave us the confidence to pursue clinical trials," Weng added.

Transforming Technology

Often called the "Island of Innovation," Taiwan is home to some of the technology and

electronic giants that have transformed our daily lives, such as Foxconn, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, HTC and Acer.

This deeply-ingrained spirit of innovation has since spread across Taiwan's other industries and has made the country a vital link in the global supply chain.

A so-called old world industry, textile manufacturing in Taiwan still remains at the top of the global game because it continually adopts the latest machinery and technology. With its development of functional fibers and yarns, the country has become a hub for textile manufacturing in the region.

An early adopter of industry 4.0, Everest Textile has transformed its facility into a truly smart factory. Nearly 30-years-old, Everest has been a driving force in Taiwan's textile manufacturing with a profile that includes top apparel brands such as Nike, North Face and Columbia Sportswear.

"Our focus has been on innovation for many years. We invest a lot of money in it. We always have new ideas, new products. This is our way. We are a learning organization. We are hungry to learn and to take action," said Everest President Roger Yeh, who continues to push for more sustainable ways to run his business.

His efforts have paid off. By reducing electricity usage throughout his factory and using an all natural cooling system, Everest has saved $2 million on energy expenses alone.

With a new operations plant in North Carolina, Yeh has not only added more value to his North American customer base, but he placates the current administration's push for American-made products, while being able to fulfill the needs of the U.S. Department of Defense.

In central Taiwan, LinkWin Technology takes the textile industry in a different innovative direction. Through extensive carbon material research and development, LinkWin makes carbon fibers for various industries.

"Typicallly, artificial carbon fibers are used in aerospace applications, such as NASA, SpaceX and other special applications. Medical applications of our products are expanding and we look to collaborate with foreign countries and companies to further fund our research," said LinkWin President Arthur Cheng.

While medical applications are LinkWin's main focus at the moment, Cheng is open to working with other industries.

Aviation and Defense Keep Soaring

JYR Aviation, a member of the JY Group, is tasked with adding value to the conglomerate's product line. Taking a small but essential part, JYR Aviation extensively tested its own screws with other industries before it found success in the aerospace industry.

"We are also seeing an increase in our machine parts orders. We have a great relationship with GE Aviation and that has really helped us connect with Asia and beyond," General Manager Vincent Sun explained. JYR Aviation is GE Aviation's only certified distributor in the Asia Pacific region.

And while industry leaders strive to cut costs without compromising on quality, JYR Aviation fills a gap in the supply chain. "We are very new to aerospace, yet we have many experienced and talented engineers. Because of this we have our own way of thinking and are able to reduce costs and lead times. We are very experienced newcomers to aerospace," Sun also said.

Meanwhile, the National Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology has been responsible for developing Taiwan's defense systems and capabilities for close to 50 years and is now looking to become a major player in the global defense industry.

"We hope to be a part of the international supply chain and work with other major defense companies, even in jointly developing products. We also want to play a role in establishing a regional maintenance center here in Taiwan," said recently-promoted Army Gen. Chang Guan-chung, who is Deputy Minister of Defense and a former president of NCSIST.

Historically, NCSIST's engineers and scientists have had to be creative and resourceful in compensating for its limited access to foreign technologies and spare parts. This challenging environment has strengthened its capacity to innovate and develop custom-made systems, sub-systems, components and materials for defense and civilian applications.

Because of its strong capabilities in system integration, NCSIST makes home-grown systems that are compatible to many foreign systems, including those used in the United States, an often overlooked advantage.

"We firmly believe that we have the capabilities and necessary experience to work with other international partners," Chang said. ■

NCKU PLAYS VITAL ROLE IN BUILDING TAIWAN AND THE WORLD

As centers of research and innovation, higher education institutions play a significant role in the development of countries. In Taiwan, over just a few decades, universities have made valuable contributions to the astounding progress made by the entire country.

National Cheng Kung University President Dr. Jenny Su has made it her mission to ensure that her students contribute to the ongoing mission of nation-building.

"This institution will be a fully engaged academy. Through education, we will cultivate top level human capital for society and the country, whether that be in science and technology, biomedicine or even in culture and heritage," Su said.

NCKU President Dr. Jenny Su

"More and more, we are playing a pivotal role not only as an international higher education institution but also as a global citizen," she added.

Established nearly a century ago, NCKU has expanded its influence beyond the main campus in the southern city of Tainan. The university's work has had a tangible impact on the life of the entire country.

When a dengue fever epidemic struck Tainan in 2015, NCKU organized students and faculty to assist the city in containing the outbreak. Following this successful effort, Dr. Su and NCKU realized that the city, as well as the entire country, would benefit from the school's science-based medicine and various innovations, including many in computer applications, robotics systems and IoT systems and design.

"Our role not only lies in our academic reputation but also in our service to the people around the city and the country which is rooted to our noble calling of being a responsible global citizen," Su also said.

Outside of its social contributions, NCKU is also a leader in academia-industry collaboration. It has the highest percentage of commercialized intellectual properties and made history with its involvement in the single highest licensing fee of $40 million.

"The strength of the university is nt only that we continuously strive to raise the quality of our research. We also ensure through IP licensing, that every discovery will deliver an impact," Su said.

Focused on improving interdisciplinary collaboration between its departments, NCKU forecasts a very exciting future as a model for other academic institutions in terms of innovation and international collaboration.

"We would like to see a platform that will better connect us to global centers. One of our strengths is connecting academic experiences with real life challenges. Our goal is to realize and deliver on this connection. I see that as the value of the university," Su said. ■

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NCKU

TWSE: Cultivating Growth

www.twse.com.tw

When gauging a country's economic prospects, analysts first study the historical performance of its financial market and activity that characterize its investment environment. For more than 50 years, the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) has served as the island nation's definitive economic benchmark.

With strict attention paid to corporate governance reporting standards and strong economic upturn, Taiwan has a well-earned reputation as a preferred investment destination both at home and abroad. This is evidenced in the growth of TWSE's main index, which hit the 10,000 ceiling on May 11.

TWSE Chairman Jun-ji Shih knows what it takes not only to realize this record high but also to sustain that growth.

"One factor is economic performance, and we think that performance should be able to support the growth of the stock market. Other factors include the inflow of foreign funds and the contribution of individual domestic investors to enhance capital market surplus. The last decade has seen a steady climb in institutional investors, with this group having 40% of the overall holdings of the Taiwan market."

At the end of June 2017, the TWSE reported 837 domestic listed companies and 64 foreign primary listed companies. Taiwan's well-known strength in high tech has also contributed to the stock market progress with globally-recognized giants Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company and Hon Hai Precision (Foxconn) being listed on TWSE. Biotech is also active, and the bourse has the highest number of listed biotech companies in Asia.

"Taiwan's position as a leading global supply chain gives our market many advantages with international linkage through Asia and worldwide. Our advanced ICT ecosystem enterprises are an integral part of our success. Investors in these companies enjoy the benefits of Taiwan's transparency and shareholder protection, while easily accessing other markets in the region and beyond," noted Shih.

External recognition of Taiwan's advances in corporate governance by global reporting bodies shows yet another side of Taiwan's market strength. It is well worth mentioning that 2016 was the first year Taiwan made the Robeco SAM Country Sustainability Ranking. This is significant because when we were ranked, we were in the top third. Taiwan also placed first in APAC in Bloomberg's ESG category as well as rising to the 4th place position in ACGA's most recent survey.

"The ultimate goal of the TWSE is to provide trading value growth and consistently high dividend yields in the 4 percent range. Our listed companies also have reasonable P/E ratios; both of these are factors that continue to draw foreign investors to our market," Shih added.

Looking to the future, Shih is active in building greater collaboration with the international community to further strengthen Taiwan's investment environment. This involves working closely with other exchanges like Japan, Korea, Malaysia and NASDAQ with whom strong ties are held. Promoting the advantages of investing in Taiwan is also a key strategy which entails roadshows in all regions of the world that include New York, London, Hong Kong and Singapore. With all this momentum in place, the TWSE is poised to deliver.

TAIWAN STOCK EXCHANGE

NCSIST: Always adapting to an ever-changing world

Deputy Minister of Defense and former NCSIST President Gen. Chang Guan-chung

The island-nation of Taiwan has long prided itself on maintaining stable social order, low crime rates, and a prosperous economy. Its dynamic semiconductor industry has driven the worldwide boom of information and communication technology. Moreover, Taiwan's vibrant democratic system recently elected its first-ever female president.

In conjunction with these achievements, Taiwan has also faced urgent geopolitical and diplomatic obstacles. Surmounting these challenges will require the contribution of Taiwanese institutions dedicated to the country's long-term development. Among these is the National Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST), a research facility comprising talented, technologically innovative experts who work tirelessly behind the scenes to ensure Taiwan's long-term defense and national security.

HF III supersonic anti-ship missile

Age of growth

NCSIST was formally established in 1969, following the ambitious expansion of the ballistic missile and nuclear bomb strength by the People's Republic of China's, as well as a series of diplomatic setbacks for the Republic of China, which included withdrawal from the United Nations, the loss of key political alliances, and the overall disruption of the country's international relations.

At the time, Taiwan had a poorly developed national defense program. Moreover, limited diplomatic resources precluded the feasibility of obtaining weapons from overseas. Against an increasingly grim military threat, Taiwan initiated its own weapon system programs.

In this initial period, progress was hindered by a severe shortage of the hardware, instruments, laboratories, and test sites required to support an adequate defense program. Taiwan also did not have many experts in defense technology. With little in terms of guidance, NCSIST broke new ground with the development of short-range missiles and self-propelled rockets, fully aware that the accumulated experience – and failures notwithstanding – would slowly but surely lead to success.

Finally, in the 1980s, NCSIST found commendable success with the development of its first three missiles and one fighter jet: the Tien Kung surface-to-air missile, the Tien Chien air-to-air missile, the Hsiung Feng anti-ship missile, and the indigenous defense fighter (IDF) jet. These milestone achievements allowed Taiwan to indirectly purchase weapons and equipment from the international community, thereby strengthening its defense capabilities.

Vertical integration, horizontal expansion

In the 1990s, the international community tightened regulations on Taiwan's arms industry in response to the changing geopolitical landscape. Amid these challenges, NCSIST implemented a system of vertical integration in order to make the key modules, components and materials required by its weapon systems, which could no longer be obtained from foreign providers. NCSIST also widened the scope of its R&D program to meet military demands, which included radars, communication systems, command and control systems and missile systems. This transition made NCSIST one of the few R&D institutions worldwide to implement both deep systems integration and product diversification.

With these systems in place, NCSIST has spent recent years developing the new generation of its homegrown missile technology: the Tien Kung III anti-tactical ballistic missile area defense system, the Hsiung Feng III supersonic anti-ship missile and the air-launched Wan Chien remote attack missile, which together bolster Taiwan's combat readiness.

Superior performance

During annual military exercises, Taiwan tests the performance and effectiveness of its own weapons against those purchased from abroad. In these field tests, NCSIST's weapon systems have outperformed equipment bought from overseas, while also proving more reliable and more affordable to maintain.

Bridging defense to industry

Taiwan is home to prominent manufacturers of the world's high-tech products, as well as birthplace to several giants of the global supply chain in a wide range of industries. In the local defense industry, NCSIST plays a vital role in converging these civilian technological capabilities into the manufacturing, maintenance and upgrade of self-made weapon systems and foreign equipment, including missile parts, wireless communication devices, bulletproof armor plate, and composite armors.

TK III ATBM and air defense system

In line with the institute's mission to ultimately employ its defense technology for military and civilian benefit, the core technologies offered by NCSIST are adapted by private enterprises to develop innovative industrial and consumer products that strengthen these companies' market value. These include target materials, titanium golf club heads, advanced bearings, electronic devices for the AMS space magnetic spectrometer multinational project, community-type green power systems, and high-speed railway components.

Mapping out the future

In order to bolster the national defense industry and spur NCSIST's momentum, the Taiwanese government re-branded the organization from a research institute under the Ministry of Defense into an administrative corporation in 2014.

The change allows NCSIST greater flexibility and more freedom to cooperate with foreign entities and participate in forming government policy. Since then, NCSIST has joined large-scale national projects, such as the Homemade High-level Training Aircraft, Homemade Warship and Homemade Submarine.

In the future, NCSIST anticipates more successes, as it tackles the enormous responsibility of developing the national defense industry, expands participation in the international market, and faces geopolitical challenges on the global stage. ■

www.ncsist.org.tw

TAIWAN

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

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The Congressional Apprentice

How Trump Is Approaching Capitol Hill

Jeff Bergner

Within 100 days of his inauguration as U.S. president, Donald Trump had concluded that the U.S. legislative process is "a very tough system." He is hardly the first occupant of the Oval Office to arrive at that judgment. Every new president finds interaction with Congress more difficult than expected. But what is challenging for any president was bound to be even more so for Trump—especially given the political climate in the United States today.

Trump ascended to the highest office in the land with no previous political experience, few settled policy views, and a combative style that had created enemies in quarters not usual for political leaders. With transactional instincts honed by decades in the business world, Trump has an approach that is characterized by speed and finality—hardly the hallmarks of the U.S. Congress. Instead of one place or person for a president to work with, there are two houses and two political parties, several dozen committees, various informal voting blocs, and a range of quasi-congressional bodies such as the Congressional Budget Office. A deal struck with one group must wend its way through the rest of the legislative process. It might change significantly in the process, as in the case of current Republican health-care legislation, which took several forms in the House of Representatives, a brand new form in the Senate, and a yet-to-be-determined form if there is ever a House-Senate conference. Or it might die altogether, as in the case of the 2013 immigration-reform legislation, which passed in the Senate but died in the House.

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"I'm disappointed that it doesn't go quicker," an exasperated Trump said of his early experience working with Capitol Hill. Still, he has proved a fast learner. He has an uncanny ability to pivot quickly, as demonstrated by his business career, his personal life, and every step of the primary and general election campaigns. He has learned to trim his sails when necessary, as he has done with each successive iteration of the health-care bill. He has accepted that Congress can typically deal with only a handful of big issues at a time, making him recalibrate his expectation of what constitutes "quick" legislative action. What was once promised immediately, and then in the first 100 days of the administration, is now promised for the end of the 115th Congress' first session. And he has come to see that achieving just a handful of legislative victories will count as success.

But even if he continues to adjust to the rhythms of Congress, Trump will face greater challenges than many of his predecessors. The country's current political divisions compound the normal complexities of executive-legislative relations. Congress reflects and magnifies today's political polarization, making it harder than ever to pass significant legislation. That would be true even if the 2016 Democratic nominee, Hillary Clinton (whose campaign offered small-bore proposals and a commitment to expand the scope of the Obama administration's executive orders), or a more mainstream Republican, such as Senator Marco Rubio of Florida, had been elected.

Moreover, although Congress is deeply divided, it has also become newly assertive. After years of relative passivity, legislators—including those in Trump's own party—have taken on a more active role in shaping key policies. Should an executive-branch misstep cause the political parties in Congress to come together, the challenges for Trump could escalate quickly.

MODERATION IN ALL THINGS

In the transition from candidate to public official, some moderation is inevitable. It is always easier to promise big results than to achieve them. Trump has already tempered his positions in several areas, and Congress has played a significant, and surprising, role in this process. In Trump's case, it is not the opposition party that has forced him to the center (as, for example, a Republican Congress did to President Bill Clinton after the 1994 midterms). It is his own party.

The House always wins? Trump addressing a joint session of Congress, February 2017

JIM BOURG / REUTERS

Congressional Democrats today are wallowing in the irrelevancy of total "resistance." What Democrats once denounced as nearly criminal Republican obstruction during the Obama administration is now billed as essential for the preservation of the republic. For Trump and congressional Republican leaders alike, that makes attempting to negotiate with the Democrats a near-certain waste of time. Even though a handful of congressional Democrats have spoken about working with Republicans on health-care reform, their conditions for beginning negotiations include retaining every major provision of Obamacare. But the Democrats' irrelevance also means that, with Republicans controlling both the House and the Senate, failure to advance significant legislation cannot be blamed on the opposition.

Many congressional Republicans, including the House and Senate leaderships, are uncomfortable with a number of Trump's stated positions. They resist the sudden or radical departures from the status quo that Trump has called for: massively increasing funding for a border wall, upsetting relationships with Washington's NATO allies, making radical reductions in the State Department's budget, and scrapping the North American Free Trade Agreement (Senator John McCain of Arizona, with broad Republican backing, has slowed this initiative in the Senate). In the continuing budget resolution passed in May to fund the government for five months, Trump's own

budget plans, such as providing more funding for a border wall and defunding Planned Parenthood, were largely replaced by congressional preferences. House and Senate Republicans are committed to working with Trump, but they will continue to moderate his positions in many areas as they do. But it is interesting that it may be Trump who ends up moderating congressional Republicans on health-care reform.

The Trump administration's slowness in naming political appointees has helped congressional Republicans expand their role. Typically, senior political appointees bring a settled, institutional quality to an administration's policies and work closely with members of Congress to advance an administration's priorities. Trump has moved more slowly than his predecessors to fill political slots (for the understandable reasons of not wanting to nominate individuals who opposed his election and not wanting his presidency to settle into business as usual). The resulting vacuum has given Congress wide latitude to shape Republican policies.

Congressional Republicans, not the president, will set the bounds of what is possible.

For the administration, the process will only grow more challenging from here. What Trump gets from Congress now is as good as he will get. Six months after inauguration day, a newly elected president can usually still expect something of a honeymoon with members of his own party. Trump has not enjoyed much of one, and congressional independence will grow as the 2018 midterm elections near.

Trump has a strong stake in maintaining Republican control of the House and the Senate. If the Democrats recapture the House in the 2018 midterm elections, he will face far deeper difficulties not only on legislative policy issues but also with the investigative mechanisms of the House. Democratic control would likely mean nonstop committee investigations, subpoenas, and threats of impeachment. That would cripple Trump's ability to win any serious legislative victories.

Yet congressional Republicans have even more at stake than Trump does. Their entire political world is on the line: leadership positions, committee chairmanships, staffs, and fundraising capabilities. Accordingly, as the elections approach, they will increasingly look out for themselves. And what now looks like presidential policy deference to Congress is likely by mid-2018 to look more like "leading from behind."

FRIENDS LIKE THESE

The White House has focused much of its early policy effort on issuing deregulatory executive orders, which require little input from the Hill—but even there, congressional Republicans have helped; by using their authority under the Congressional Review Act, they have been able to roll regulations back quickly. President Barack Obama pushed the envelope on executive orders about as far as a president can. With the exception of his executive order on the so-called Dreamers (undocumented immigrants who came to the United States as children), most of these orders will be overturned by either Trump or the courts. The latest example is the Paris climate accord. Because Obama took the easy way out by not sending the agreement to the Senate as a treaty, Trump was able to justify the United States' withdrawal with a simple executive order.

But on most important domestic issues, Trump will find that he needs Congress to create meaningful, enduring reform. Accordingly, congressional Republicans, not the president, will set the bounds of what is possible. They will dictate the final outcomes and, in the process, do even more than they have done so far to moderate Trump's policies.

The efforts to repeal the Affordable Care Act give some indication of how the process will play out. Republicans in the House and the Senate, as well as Trump, are far too exposed on this issue to fail to produce any changes at all. Moreover, unless the administration massively subsidizes health insurance companies, competition in many states' insurance exchanges will wither away. But radical changes such as total repeal—which might have been possible before Obamacare became entrenched—are no longer plausible. The most likely result—and for Republicans, the best possible result—is a limited set of changes, many of which will empower the secretary of health and human services, that will be advertised by the GOP as a wholesale reform. Trump seems not to worry excessively about the details of health-care reform and would certainly sign a bill that left many of the Affordable Care Act's provisions in place. So long as Congress passes a replacement bill of some sort, both congressional Republicans and Trump will declare victory.

There will also be a concerted effort by congressional Republicans to pass a tax bill. The outline of the tax plan presented by the Trump administration will serve as a point of departure, but any

bill that can pass both houses of Congress will look very different. Trump's plan calls for comprehensive reform and deep cuts in tax rates, and it makes no effort to achieve revenue neutrality. A congressional bill is likely to push for a reduction in the number of personal income tax brackets and a limited net tax cut, along with corporate tax reform, which has been politically viable since the Obama administration. Tax reform has a natural advantage over other kinds of policy legislation: despite Democrats' rhetorical opposition to any Republican tax bill, it will be difficult for Democrats in contested states or districts to vote against tax cuts. If the scope of the president's tax-reform plan is reduced, it will not be at all surprising to see a number of Democrats in the House and the Senate join with Republicans to support the resulting bill.

There is no stronger force in American politics than a unified Congress.

Congress will also significantly diverge from Trump in crafting a fiscal year 2018 spending bill. The administration has presented a 2018 budget that proposes substantial changes, including many reductions, across the board. Some of these, such as cuts to Planned Parenthood (if not achieved in a health-care reform bill), reflect longstanding Republican objectives. But many other proposed reductions are opposed not only by Democrats but also by Republican leaders and appropriators. Mick Mulvaney, Trump's budget director, has signaled that the administration's proposal is an opening offer—the art of the deal at work—and that he expects changes as the process unfolds. Both Trump and the Republican congressional leadership would be well advised to agree in advance on a limited number of priorities for the bill—increased defense spending, funding for the border wall, cuts to the Environmental Protection Agency, or whatever they may be—and then declare victory if and when they achieve those goals.

In all these areas, the dynamic between the legislative and executive branches will look quite different than it did during much of the Obama presidency. For decades, Congress has largely relinquished key parts of its constitutional role. It has ceded authority on issues such as finance, immigration, and environmental protection to regulatory bodies. It has handed over the authority to go to war to the White House. During much of the Obama administration, Congress

was uniquely supine. Democratic leaders cheered on the White House's executive orders on immigration and the Clean Air Act, which created lawlike policies entirely within areas of Congress' constitutional authority (offering a reminder of why the framers of the Constitution were wary of political parties). The relationship between Trump and Republicans on the Hill already marks a change. Congressional Republicans will work with Trump whenever they can, especially when his proposals conform to their own long-standing policy preferences. But there will be no rubber stamp.

Consider the various committees looking into the relationship between the Trump campaign and Russia. Congressional committees frequently investigate presidents: Ronald Reagan over Iran-contra, Clinton over Monica Lewinsky, Obama over Benghazi. But it is unusual for a president to be under investigation by four separate committees, led by members of his own party, in the first year of his term. Although congressional Republicans regularly say that they can "walk and chew gum at the same time," there is no doubt that the Russia investigations have slowed legislative progress on other issues. The appointment of Robert Mueller as special counsel, which most Republicans understandably opposed at first, may give them the space to focus on policy priorities. As Republican Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina put it, "We can get back to the normal business of legislating."

THE WATER'S EDGE

Although Congress has undertaken several minor initiatives on foreign policy—an effort to stop Saudi arms sales; legislation to impose new sanctions on Russia, which the Senate passed in June; and an endorsement of NATO's Article 5—newly recovered congressional assertiveness has largely centered on domestic issues. Trump is quickly discovering what every other post–World War II president has recognized: he has much wider latitude on foreign and defense policy than on domestic policy. He has already been encouraged by the favorable reception he received in the Middle East during his first foreign trip, in May.

The president requires no proactive congressional input to conduct foreign and defense policies, which create significant, lasting changes to the world order. This is true of initiatives such as forging a new, informal alliance among Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the

United Arab Emirates to counter Iran's role in the Middle East. It is true of arming Kurdish forces to attack the Islamic State (also known as ISIS). It is true of whatever deal the president might choose to strike, or not strike, with Russia over the future of Syria. It is true of efforts to secure additional defense spending by NATO allies and to shape the tenor of the transatlantic alliance. And it will be true of however the president might choose to address North Korea's nuclear weapons program or the growing Chinese military presence in the South China Sea.

In recent years, presidents have also enjoyed an almost totally free hand in decisions to use military force abroad, despite the considerable power the Constitution invests in the legislative branch. In this regard, Congress has utterly failed to defend its constitutional prerogatives. Not since 2002, when Congress authorized the Iraq war, has it exercised its self-created responsibilities under the War Powers Act. In 2011, Congress sat idly by as the Obama administration conducted an eight-month-long bombing campaign in Libya with the ridiculous legal rationale that the attacks should not count as hostilities. And Congress has continued to sit idly by as Trump, like Obama did before him, expands the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force beyond all recognition as he wages military campaigns in six different countries.

There have been recent signs in Congress of attempts to amend or revoke that 2001 authorization. But none of these efforts is likely to make it to the president's desk (at least not without the provision of a lengthy period grandfathering the 2001 authorization), and if one did, it is highly unlikely that Trump would sign it. Unlike in domestic-policy making, there is no reason to expect deeper congressional involvement in presidential decisions to use military force in the future. As the face of war is shaped more and more by standoff weapons, drones, and cyberwarfare, it seems less and less likely that Congress will assert its role in authorizing military actions.

CONGRESS AWAKENED

In Washington today, the conventional wisdom holds that Trump is unlikely to finish 2017 with a strong record of policy accomplishments. Yet should he continue to learn how to work with a newly assertive Congress, he may defy that conventional wisdom. If he emerges from the first session of the current Congress with a health-care bill, a tax

bill, several new budgetary priorities, the elimination of numerous regulations, a new Supreme Court justice, a growing economy, and no new conflicts around the world, who could fairly judge this as anything but success?

But Trump would be wise to keep in mind that there is no stronger force in American politics than a unified Congress, by the design of the Constitution's framers. In light of recent decades of congressional passivity, that may be difficult to remember. But if the administration heads down a path that majorities in both political parties oppose, Trump could confront a unified Congress, a body that possesses far more constitutional power than the presidency.

When Congress rises to its full height and decides to act, it is fitted with the most expansive powers of any institution in the U.S. government. President Richard Nixon learned that fact the hard way. Those powers are latent, but they are always available. And they are a reminder to any president, including Trump, that although executive power can be stretched and expanded, sometimes very widely, there are limits beyond which it is not wise to proceed.

Pay Up, Europe

What Trump Gets Right About NATO

Michael Mandelbaum

Donald Trump, the 45th president of the United States, has a point about Europe and NATO. In May, in a speech at the alliance's headquarters, in Brussels, he told his fellow leaders that "NATO members must finally contribute their fair share." In July, he repeated the warning in Warsaw. "Europe must do more," he said.

European leaders may find these demands grating, especially given Trump's unpopularity among their constituents, but they should heed them. In recent years, Europe has become a dangerous place. In search of domestic support, Russian President Vladimir Putin has turned to aggression abroad, invading Ukraine and intervening in Syria. Since any one military adventure can provide only a temporary popularity boost, Putin will always need new victims. That makes him an ongoing threat. Just when NATO has once again become necessary for Europe's security, however, Trump's election has thrown the future of the U.S. role in the alliance into doubt.

For these reasons, Trump is right: to strengthen NATO and encourage the United States to continue its commitment to European security, the alliance's European members should contribute more. Just as important for European and Western security, however, is for the United States to lead other multilateral initiatives to defend the interests and values that North America and Europe have in common. Without that leadership, Europe—and the rest of the world—will be a harsher place.

OLD MISTAKES

For the two and a half decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the word that candidate Trump used to describe NATO—"obsolete"—

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Commitment issues: NATO headquarters, Brussels, May 2017

CHRISTIAN HARTMANN / REUTERS

was largely accurate. It no longer is. In 2014, Russia put an end to the post–Cold War European peace. It invaded Ukraine, backed pro-Russian politicians in eastern European countries, and has since meddled in elections in the United States and France. This renewed aggression stems from Putin's need for public support to sustain the kleptocracy over which he presides. During his first two terms as president, from 2000 to 2008, the skyrocketing price of oil, Russia's largest export, allowed Putin to buy popularity. But in 2014, two years after he returned to the presidency, the price of oil collapsed. He was forced to turn to the only other reliable source of support at his disposal: aggressive nationalism. That year, in response to a popular uprising in Ukraine, known as the Euromaidan revolution, that deposed the corrupt, pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych, Putin launched an invasion, initially disguised as a spontaneous reaction by local forces. Russian troops seized the Crimean Peninsula and began a campaign to support pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine's eastern provinces.

Putin claimed that Russia's actions were necessary because the Euromaidan revolution stemmed from a Western plot to isolate, humiliate, and ultimately destroy Russia. The Russian public largely believed him. His approval ratings rose sharply, and then got a further boost from his intervention in the Syrian civil war on the side of the brutal dictator Bashar al-Assad.

Although Putin and his regime bear the primary responsibility for the return of war to Europe, the West, particularly the United States, has unintentionally helped bring about this dangerous state of affairs. In the 1990s, NATO expanded eastward, against the wishes of Russians across the political spectrum, even those favorably disposed to the West, and in spite of earlier assurances by Western leaders to their Soviet and, later, Russian counterparts that no such expansion would occur.

The West also pursued other policies to which Russia objected in vain, including the U.S.-led wars in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq and the unilateral U.S. withdrawal in 2002 from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, an agreement that had restricted the number of missile defense systems the Soviet Union and the United States could build. Together, these initiatives created a constituency for Putin's claim, used to justify his aggressive foreign policies, that the West was pursuing an anti-Russian campaign that he was acting to thwart.

Whereas NATO expansion mobilized Russia, it tranquilized the West. To gain domestic acceptance of the policy, Western governments portrayed it as a harmless gesture of goodwill made by an organization that was transforming itself from a defensive multinational army into a benign club of democracies. Expansion, its sponsors claimed, would require no exertion or expense on the part of current NATO members. Nor would Russia object to it, they added, in spite of considerable evidence to the contrary. These false claims have left the ultimate arbiters of NATO's fate—the voters of the alliance's member countries—unprepared for the renewed threat in Europe and the need for increased efforts to meet it.

It is worth recalling the blunder of NATO expansion and the effects that the subsequent Western policies have had on Russia in case the country ever has, as it did at the end of the Cold War, a government willing to participate in a security order based on cooperation and transparency. Today, however, it is both too late and too early for such an arrangement.

BACK TO THE PAST

The basic condition that gave rise to NATO during the Cold War, a threat from the east, has returned. But not every feature of the U.S.-Soviet conflict has reappeared. Russia has three-quarters of the territory and half the population of the Soviet Union. It poses a conventional military threat only to Europe, not, as in Soviet times, to countries elsewhere. Today's Russia also lacks the kind of messianic ideology

that drove Soviet foreign policy. Still, it does challenge Europe in two familiar ways.

First, it possesses nuclear weapons, which other European countries must balance with their own or those of the United States. The United Kingdom and France have maintained nuclear arsenals since the 1950s and 1960s, respectively. During the Cold War, the other European members of NATO, particularly West Germany, concluded that these could not deter the Soviet Union by themselves. Effective deterrence required the United States' far larger arsenal. German nuclear weapons could have substituted for U.S. ones, but no one, least of all the Germans themselves, wanted Germany to acquire them.

The West has unintentionally helped bring about this dangerous state of affairs.

The same principle applies today. In May, German Chancellor Angela Merkel hinted at reducing Europe's dependence on the United States by telling a crowd at a political rally in Munich that "the times in which we could totally rely on others are to some extent over." But without the familiar U.S. role in NATO, its European members would face an unwelcome choice between Russian dominance and German nuclear weapons.

The second problem that Putin has resurrected involves the three Baltic countries, all of which belong to NATO. According to a 2016 Rand Corporation study by the defense analysts David Shlapak and Michael Johnson, because Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are so small and share borders with Russia, "as currently postured, NATO cannot successfully defend" them against a Russian invasion. In the same way, during the Cold War, the alliance could not hope to defend West Berlin successfully, a small Western island surrounded by communist East Germany. Preventing a direct Soviet attack required energetic efforts by successive U.S. administrations to convince the Soviet Union that the United States was committed to keeping the city free of communist control. To protect the Baltic countries from Moscow today, Washington will have to make a similarly credible commitment.

In September 2014, in a speech in the Estonian capital of Tallinn, U.S. President Barack Obama declared, "We will defend the territorial integrity of every single ally . . . because the defense of Tallinn and Riga and Vilnius is just as important as the defense of Berlin and Paris and London." By contrast, during his trip to Europe last May, Trump

conspicuously failed to endorse Article 5 of NATO's founding treaty, which pledges every member of the alliance to the defense of the others. Only in June, at a press conference with Romanian President Klaus Iohannis, did Trump commit the United States to that provision of the treaty.

This indifference to the established U.S. role in Europe is not simply a personal eccentricity that will vanish after Trump leaves office. American voters, after all, knew his views and elected him as commander in chief. For many of them, talk of Russian threats and U.S. deterrence in Europe seems long out of date. Even Americans sympathetic to the need for a continued U.S. military presence on the continent know that the wealthy European countries are capable of contributing more to their own security. U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis spoke for many when he told NATO members at a meeting in Brussels in February that they would have to increase their military spending since "Americans cannot care more for your children's future than you do."

In 2014, the European members of NATO did agree to devote two percent of their GDP to defense by 2024, but only five of the 29 NATO members are currently doing so. That target is an arbitrary one, and achieving it would not by itself maximize the alliance's military power. Still, reaching it would send a signal to the American public that Europe was taking its own defense seriously and thus deserved U.S. support.

ECONOMIC COMPETITION

Important as increased defense spending is, NATO cannot effectively meet the threat that Putin's Russia poses through military means alone. After all, the military confrontation between the two Cold War blocs ended in a stalemate. It was in the economic sphere that the West triumphed: its free-market economies decisively outperformed the centrally planned systems of the communist world. The prosperity of West Germany juxtaposed with the relative economic backwardness of East Germany offered the most telling contrast.

Today, the rivalry between Ukraine and Russia comes closest to replicating the competition between the two Germanys. A stable, prosperous, and democratic Ukraine would provide an example to the people of Russia that would do more than anything else to discredit and subvert the kleptocratic Russian political system.

The twin shocks of the Euromaidan revolution and the Russian invasion have produced a Ukrainian government committed, at least rhetorically, to liberal democracy and a market-based economy.

Although it has made some progress, the country remains far from achieving either. Success will depend principally on the efforts of the Ukrainians themselves. Still, other countries can provide economic support for the reformist government in Kiev, as some European countries, through the EU, have already done. In this way, European countries are making an important contribution to European security.

In addition to supporting Ukraine, the West has sought to punish Russia. In response to Russia's invasion, the United States and the EU imposed sanctions on several Russian individuals and businesses. Together with the low price of oil, these have hurt the country's economy, damaging Putin's standing with the Russian public. They have also signaled that further assaults will trigger even stiffer economic penalties.

Because they have taken an economic toll not just on Russia but also on the countries imposing them, the sanctions have become controversial in Europe. Indeed, Putin may well have reckoned that public opposition would, before long, force European leaders to lift them. If so, he was wrong. They have remained in place, largely thanks to the efforts of Merkel, who understands, as many of her compatriots do not, the threat that Putin poses. The United States and the EU should be prepared to impose additional, stiffer economic penalties if Russian policy warrants them.

GLOBAL THREATS

Europe is not the only place where an aggressive power is threatening the security of its neighbors. In the Middle East, Iran has pursued nuclear weapons and fought proxy wars in Syria and Yemen. In response to its aggression, European countries joined the international sanctions regime against Iran that preceded the 2015 nuclear agreement, which slowed Iran's nuclear weapons program. Given the weakness of the restraints in that deal and the vigor with which Iran is working to dominate the region, the United States and European countries may soon need to reimpose economic constraints on the country.

European countries also have a role to play in protecting Western interests and values in Asia. There, China has claimed sovereignty and built military bases in disputed areas of the South China Sea. At the same time, it has wielded its growing economic power to try to extort political concessions from other Asian countries. In 2010, for instance, the Chinese government blocked some exports of rare-earth minerals to Japan until the Japanese government released a Chinese fisherman

it had arrested near the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, an archipelago in the East China Sea. Earlier this year, in response to an agreement between Seoul and Washington to deploy a U.S.-made system of ballistic missile defenses in South Korea, China began an unofficial economic campaign against the country, banning certain imports and pressuring Chinese travel agencies to halt sales of trips to South Korea.

The United States and Europe have already taken significant economic steps to support their fellow democracies in Asia. In the future, European countries should participate in multinational efforts to resist Chinese economic pressure, through compensation to targeted countries, counterboycotts, or sanctions. To be sure, to expect European voters to make economic sacrifices for the sake of faraway countries is asking a great deal of them. But such global economic and political solidarity may prove necessary to cope with China's expansive ambitions.

For Western responses to expansive Chinese and Russian conduct to succeed, the United States must lead the way. Only it has the power and the standing to launch global initiatives of this kind, as it did, for example, in 1990, when President George H. W. Bush assembled the worldwide coalition that evicted Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Unfortunately, Trump has shown neither the inclination nor the ability to exercise such leadership.

Forming a global coalition to resist Chinese economic bullying and Russian aggression will also require a broad sense of community among democracies, based not only on shared interests but also on common values. At the core of European leaders' unconcealed distaste for Trump seems to be their dismay that, unlike his predecessors since at least Franklin Roosevelt, and despite giving a rousing defense of Western values in Warsaw in July, he does not subscribe to the idea of a global democratic community.

Europe must take more responsibility for defending Western interests and values, but it cannot replace the leadership of the United States. Without that leadership, the world that the democracies made with their victories in the three great global conflicts of the twentieth century—the two world wars and the Cold War—a world freer, more peaceful, and more prosperous than at any other time in history, will not endure.

BERMUDA

NEW HORIZONS, NEW OPPORTUNITIES

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660 miles off the United States coast, the North Atlantic islands that constitute Bermuda are hardly lost at sea. Officially a British overseas territory, Bermuda has developed into a major hub for the offshore industry. By applying a competitive tax regime, Bermuda has managed to attract international businesses and finance, turning 54 square kilometers of land into one of the world's most affluent economies. Following a period of recession, Bermuda is – more than ever – open for business.

In spring of this year, the eyes of the sporting world were collectively turned to Bermuda. The world's fastest sailing yachts competed for the 35th America's Cup in the Great Sound of Bermuda. The high-profile event was the culmination of years of preparation and hard work on the part of the small island territory. For Bermuda, the America's Cup was not just a commercial feat, but also a symbolic turning point, marking a return to economic growth and opportunity.

Bermuda's economy depends on a services sector that is vulnerable to changes in demand. Services account for almost 95% of the territory's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), mostly in international business and tourism. This dependence and low external demand in the (re)insurance and tourism sectors had pushed Bermuda into a six-year recession.

The territory is now returning to positive growth – proof of Bermuda's resilience. As Former Premier Michael Dunkley explains, "We are used to withstanding storms, we are used to getting back on our feet and we know how to get things done."

In 2016, real GDP grew by 0.6%, a clear departure from the negative 2% average of the five previous years. Growth is expected to accelerate further in 2017 on the back of increased economic activity related to the America's Cup, higher investment in the construction sector, positive growth in tourism and demand for services in the international business sector.

The government, when first elected in 2012, had promoted a two-track strategy to restore confidence in Bermuda: stimulating economic growth and controlling government spending. "The government was running huge deficits. If we did not demonstrate that we were getting our own house in order, nobody was going to have confidence in Bermuda," explains Everard Bob Richards, Former Minister of Finance. "We have reduced the budget deficit every year and are now in the second year of a three-year plan to eliminate the deficit."

Hon. Michael Dunkley
Former Premier of Bermuda

Government, business and the regulatory authorities have been cooperating more closely, while an Economic Development Committee was established under the chairmanship of the Premier. The committee meets on a weekly basis, bringing together key ministers and senior secretaries to discuss progress on projects and make sure that investors are given all due attention and are not faced with delays.

The territory's size plays to Bermuda's advantage. "We are big enough to punch above our weight, but we are small enough for you to access the people needed to get things done, and get the connections you need. We are open for business," says Former Premier Dunkley.

***This report was printed in the magazine the day of the announcement of Bermuda's General Election results, and before the formation of a new government.**

Investing in Bermuda's Future

Particular effort has gone into reviving Bermuda's tourism sector, the territory's second largest industry and an important employer for the islands. Bermuda's beaches, architecture, culture, golf courses and subtropical climate have long attracted an affluent clientele. Yet the sector had suffered a steady decline, following the financial crisis and the failure to renew Bermuda's tourism offer.

A major step in the revitalization of the sector was the establishment of the Bermuda Tourism Authority (BTA) in 2014, which was given the responsibility to market Bermuda as a destination and to manage and evolve the tourism product. The sector has since turned a corner. In 2016, the number of vacation air arrivals rose by 17%, while the associated spending increased by 18%, 76% of that increase coming from visitors under 45.

"We have found that the repositioning and the rediscovery of Bermuda by a new generation of travelers is working and that we are now able to attract and cater to younger visitors without alienating our traditional visitors," says Kevin Dallas, CEO of the BTA. "I believe that tourism can reemerge as a much stronger pillar of the Bermudian economy. I expect that over the next 3 to 5 years our share of GDP will actually outgrow the other pillars of the economy."

The America's Cup positively served as a catalyst for a number of investments. Nine acres of land were reclaimed for the America's Cup village, while renovation of the Royal Naval Dockyard created new commercial spaces. Hundreds of millions of dollars are going into new hotel developments, such as the St. Regis in St George, Reserve by Ritz-Carlton at Caroline Bay, and the recently opened The Loren, as well as renovation of the Hamilton Princess & Beach Club, and the future redevelopment of Ariel Sands.

More than $1.8 billion are earmarked to be spent on infrastructure projects over the next five years. This includes $274 million for the construction of a new terminal at Bermuda International Airport, scheduled to be completed by 2020, $100 million for the Causeway linking the airport to the mainland, and $1 billion for the development of Morgan's Point. "The new airport will allow us to potentially become a transit hub. Considering our strategic location in the middle of the Atlantic, you can get to just about anywhere from here in a very short period of time. This opens new markets for us," says Craig Cannonier, Former Minister of Public Works. "While Morgan's Point and other sites offer great opportunities for further thoughtful development."

World-class Exchange

The Bermuda Stock Exchange (BSX) plays a separate role in facilitating the continued growth of the domestic economy. It operates as a fully-electronic, offshore securities exchange platform, providing full exchange services for domestic and international securities.

"There are over 800 securities listed, 13 of which are domestic securities," says Gregory Wojciechowski, CEO of the Bermuda Stock Exchange. "Our aggregate market capitalization exceeds $300 billion, while the market capitalization for the domestic market is over $2 billion."

"The fundamental premise of the BSX is to create a solid foundation for the continued development of Bermuda's domestic capital market. This is our primary focus," says Wojciechowski. "We provide a mechanism for the deployment of capital and investment into the domestic capital market. This is yet another form of foreign direct investment into Bermuda's economy."

The BSX has also been instrumental and committed to Bermuda becoming the world leader for the creation, support and listing of Insurance-Linked Securities (ILS). In 2008, Bermuda launched a regulatory framework to support the creation of Special Purpose Insurers (SPI), the corporate risk transfer vehicles through which ILS are created. Today, a significant portion of global ILS Catastrophe Bonds are listed on the BSX. Currently, the BSX has 216 ILS vehicles listed with a market capitalization in excess of $24 billion.

"ILS is yet another example of innovation that has taken place in the industry that found Bermuda's regulatory and legal framework, coupled with world-class infrastructure and services providers to be the perfect mix for the development and continued growth of the asset class," says Wojciechowski.

A Global Insurance and Reinsurance Hub

Insurance and reinsurance remain the bedrock of Bermuda's economy. In 2015, companies in the sector contributed 28% of Bermuda's total GDP.

The Bermuda Monetary Authority (BMA) confirmed Bermuda to be the global leader in the captive insurance market in 2016, with more overall captives registered than any other jurisdiction. Bermuda also ranks as one of the largest reinsurance markets in the world. Bermuda-based reinsurers' total net written reinsurance premiums exceed those of London-based reinsurers.

In 2016, after years of efforts by the BMA and public and private sector stakeholders, Bermuda was granted full equivalence in compliance with the European Commission Solvency II directive, meaning that Bermuda's commercial (re)insurers and insurance groups would not be disadvantaged when competing for and writing business in the European Union.

The U.S. National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) also designated Bermuda and the BMA a "qualified jurisdiction", thereby allowing cross-border reinsurance trade with the U.S.

"This bilateral recognition by the world's two largest trading blocs ensures Bermuda's status as one of the three leading reinsurance domiciles in the world," says Bradley Kading, President and Executive Director of the Association of Bermuda Insurers and Reinsurers (ABIR).

Mike McGavick, CEO of the XL Group Ltd., which is headquartered in Bermuda, says, "We encourage tough regulation in insurance; it is to our own benefit. The duality of good regulation and business opportunity is unique in the world. The BMA has done a fantastic job, solvency equivalence was and has been a huge success."

XL Group is a leading global insurance and reinsurance company that declared total assets worth $58.4 billion and total revenues of $10.5 billion in 2016. The company provides property, casualty and specialty products to industrial, commercial and professional firms, insurance companies and other enterprises world-wide, through its subsidiaries and under the XL Catlin brand.

"We rank among the 10 largest commercial insurers and among the 10 largest property and casualty reinsurers," says McGavick. "We service the market on a global scale and we are overwhelmingly good at insuring physical things. At the same time, we are investing heavily in targeting the insurance of ideas and the transformation of global wealth."

XL Group continues looking for opportunities to grow its global footprint. "We have been rounding out our global presence and we want to keep deepening our penetration with the world's largest commercial enterprises. We are one of the few insurance and reinsurance companies that has the capability to serve them."

Despite or because of this global orientation, XL Group is comfortably based in Bermuda. As McGavick explains, "You have only a few places in the world with both the capital and the underwriting talent concentrated in one place. Bermuda and London are the two places that really have that concentration."

"This is still the best place in the world to set up an insurance company," says Everard Bob Richards, Former Minister of Finance. "Even though Bermuda is a relatively expensive jurisdiction, we have advantages over the combination of cost and availability of expertise."

McGavick agrees that Bermuda is the right choice for XL Group. "This is an incredibly efficient place to be. The regulator is well respected, the legal system, everything makes Bermuda ideal – we are proud to be part of it.

Produced by: www.worldprofilegroup.com

What America Owes Its Veterans

A Better System of Care and Support

Phillip Carter

Each year, the U.S. military recruits some 175,000 young Americans. At the heart of its pitch is a sacred promise to take care of those who serve—what President Abraham Lincoln described in his second inaugural address as the national duty "to care for him who shall have borne the battle and for his widow and his orphan." Today, this promise is enshrined in the ethics of each service: members of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard pledge to never leave a fallen comrade behind. After their service, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) works to fulfill this same promise on behalf of a grateful nation, enabled by a budget larger than those of the State Department, the Department of Homeland Security, and the entire U.S. intelligence community combined.

Most national security discussions focus on strategy or policy. To the extent that ways and means get considered at all, the talk tends to center on weapons systems, budgets, bases, and buildings. These matter, but people matter, too. Service members are an irreplaceable component of U.S. national security. And because the United States relies on an all-volunteer force, how the country treats its troops during and after their service matters when it comes to sustaining this critical component of national strength.

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq saw incredible advances in body armor, battlefield medicine, and medical evacuation, all of which dramatically improved the likelihood that soldiers would survive injuries.

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Deaths from nonbattlefield injuries and illnesses, historically far more deadly than combat, have also fallen greatly, thanks to aggressive public health efforts and fitness requirements for troops. In this respect, the United States is keeping its most sacred pledge to those it sends into harm's way: to bring them home.

But despite some recent improvements, the VA and other federal agencies struggle to keep other promises to active service members and veterans after they come home. Aging bureaucracies struggle to meet the needs of a diverse and dispersed population. Educational and economic support programs fail to keep pace with the changing needs of veterans and their families. To fix these problems, the United States must rewrite the contract it strikes with its service members, building a support system that not only ameliorates their battle wounds and financial losses but also helps them thrive after their service in a twenty-first-century economy.

AT YOUR SERVICE

The social contract with veterans has changed considerably since the founding of the United States. For economic and political reasons, the framers of the Constitution envisioned a small standing military, supported in peacetime by a citizen militia. When wars did break out, white male citizens were expected to volunteer. Aside from small pensions for war widows or severely disabled veterans, the government offered little in return.

This model persisted through most of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Then came the Civil War. Following the lead of the French during the Napoleonic Wars, both the North and the South eventually resorted to conscription for the first time in U.S. history. By the time the war was over, in 1865, some 3.3 million Americans had served, out of a total population of 35.2 million. Of these, nearly 500,000 were killed, with tens of thousands more wounded. During the war, each side set up battlefield hospitals; afterward, they established convalescent homes to rehabilitate the injured and veterans' cemeteries to inter and memorialize the dead.

Civil War veterans dominated U.S. political life for the next half century. Veterans' organizations, such as the Grand Army of the Republic and the United Confederate Veterans, became powerful domestic lobbies. They successfully campaigned for expanded government benefits, such as bigger pensions for disabled veterans and widows

and more hospitals, veterans' homes, and cemeteries. But Washington didn't think to combine these services into a single federal agency, since the U.S. government wasn't in the habit of providing social services at the time. Apart from these new benefits, support for veterans remained largely the province of charities and local governments.

This arrangement changed with the advent of industrialization, the experience of two world wars, and the implementation of the New

Deal. During World War I, the United States mustered 4.7 million troops to fight, including 2.8 million conscripts. Over 115,000 died and 200,000 were wounded. Just as had happened after the Civil War, veterans' organizations that formed in the wake of this war accrued tremendous political influence. This time, however, they used that power to secure more expansive health care, life insurance, vocational rehabilitation, and other programs. In 1930, President Herbert Hoover worked with Congress to create the Veterans Administration, the forerunner to today's VA, consolidating health care, benefits programs, and cemetery administration into a single agency for the first time. After the Great Depression struck, President Franklin Roosevelt responded by fundamentally changing the role of the federal government in society, vastly expanding social welfare programs—eventually including those for veterans.

The U.S. military has grown increasingly distinct from the population as a whole: a part of society, but also apart from it.

The government's role in veterans' affairs increased again during World War II, in which 16 million men and women served, 400,000 of whom died and 670,000 of whom were wounded. To prepare for the return of so many troops, in 1944, Congress unanimously passed the Servicemen's Readjustment Act, better known as the GI Bill. It contained three main provisions: 52 weeks of unemployment compensation, a veterans' home loan program offering zero-down-payment mortgages, and subsidies for higher education. It also appropriated $500 million for new VA hospitals, authorized the VA to take over existing military hospitals, created a veterans' employment program, and established a small-business loan program. Together with Roosevelt's earlier reforms, these benefits added up to a new social contract with service members. The government would not simply treat the wounds of war and compensate the disabled and the widowed for their suffering; it would recognize and reward military service, too.

The GI Bill helped the massive cohort of World War II veterans make the transition back to civilian life. One congressional study from 1988 estimated that for every $1 the government spent on educational benefits, veterans returned nearly $7 to public coffers in increased tax revenue or added economic output. In the ten years after the war, the government issued 4.3 million home loans to veterans, contributing

to a housing boom that stimulated the economy and changed the postwar American landscape.

Even during these halcyon days, however, the VA labored to fulfill its expanded role. To address its various problems, in 1954, President Dwight Eisenhower appointed his former colleague, General Omar Bradley, to lead a study of the future of the VA. The Bradley Commission took a conservative view of what veterans were owed, concluding, "Military service in time of war or peace is an obligation of citizenship and should not be considered inherently a basis for future Government benefits." Helpful as the GI Bill had proved to millions of veterans, Bradley saw it as unnecessary and unsustainable, particularly since new programs such as Social Security were intended to provide economic security for all Americans.

But Bradley ultimately lost the debate. Veterans fought back hard against the attempt to cut their cherished programs, and they found allies in broader society, which had benefited from the tidal wave of former soldiers buying homes, going to college, and starting businesses. As the Cold War took off, the Defense Department continued to recruit or conscript hundreds of thousands of young men, establishing the first large peacetime military in U.S. history (and contributing to a veteran population that would peak at over 28 million in 1980). That military would go to war in Vietnam. As the conflict began to wind down in 1973, President Richard Nixon ended the use of conscription, eliminating one of the great contributors to the antiwar movement. So began the era of the all-volunteer force, which remains in place today.

In the wake of Nixon's decision, the demographics of the U.S. military began to shift dramatically. Although the military had been formally desegregated for decades, the military (and veteran) population became more racially and ethnically diverse as the self-selection dynamics of the all-volunteer force took root and as minorities increasingly saw service as a form of economic mobility. The military also began to include more women, who gained access to new roles across the force and now make up the fastest-growing demographic within the veteran population. Yet without conscription, which drew young Americans from all classes and regions, the military began to recruit disproportionately from certain parts of the country and society: the South, the Midwest, the middle and working classes, and military families. Among those, the military also recruited a relatively elite group, since not everyone

could pass its rigorous entry requirements regarding education, health, and criminal history. The effect of these changes was to produce a military that has grown increasingly distinct from the population as a whole: a part of society, but also apart from it.

During this period, the social contract behind military service also shifted. Today's promise to veterans still includes the core components provided to previous generations: health care and compensation for wounds and other injuries sustained in the line of duty, help with readjusting to civilian life, and support for indigent veterans and survivors of those killed in the line of duty. But now it also includes programs—from the Post-9/11 GI Bill's educational assistance initiatives to the Small Business Administration's programs for veteran entrepreneurs—that reward and encourage service by enabling veterans to outperform those who have not served.

Yet the shift to giving veterans a leg up in the workplace is not complete. The VA's largest program, disability compensation, effectively encourages disability by paying veterans according to the degree to which they are disabled, offering no incentive for them to improve their conditions or leave the disability roster. A related VA program, aimed at vocational rehabilitation and education, aims to get disabled veterans back to work, but it serves a relatively small population and should be broadened to help all disabled veterans. The dissonance between these programs—with one compensating veterans for losses incurred during service and the other seeking to improve their performance after service—creates mixed incentives for veterans.

GET WELL SOON

Of the three categories of veterans' benefits—health care, economic aid, and crisis support—health care is the largest and most used. By law, nearly all of the country's 21 million former service members are eligible for VA health care; of these, nine million have enrolled, and almost seven million used the system in 2016, at a cost of $63 billion. This system provides comprehensive coverage, not only for injuries and illnesses sustained in the line of duty but also for any other medical needs that may arise at any point. To do this, the VA runs 144 hospitals, 800 clinics, and 300 mental health Vet Centers and employs more than 300,000 people. In addition to treating veterans, the VA trains nearly half of U.S. doctors and two-thirds of U.S. nurses at some point in their careers and conducts more than $2 billion in research each year.

Generally speaking, the VA provides outstanding medical care. The problem, however, is that many veterans struggle to access it. The VA's complex bureaucracy is hard to navigate, so many eligible veterans don't receive care in a timely, convenient manner. The VA system erupted in scandal in 2014, when CNN discovered that employees at a VA hospital in Phoenix were manipulating recorded wait times to make it seem as though veterans were receiving timely care. The incident prompted Eric Shinseki, the secretary of veterans affairs, and Robert Petzel, the VA's top doctor, to resign.

The VA also has difficulty maintaining quality and patient satisfaction. It relies on an antiquated health records system that once led the country in terms of innovation but now lags far behind those in the commercial sector. (In June, the VA announced that it plans to replace this system with commercial software, but doing so will likely take years.) Because of its size and geographic dispersion, the VA struggles to be good at all things in all places. Hardly a month passes without a scathing report from the VA's inspector general about flaws in care or squalid conditions at some VA facility. In May 2017, for example, a report on the VA hospital in Hines, Illinois, described cockroaches on patient food trays and transportation carts.

Until the Phoenix scandal, proposals for reforming VA health care generally involved pouring more resources into the existing system. Afterward, however, conservatives, such as Arizona Senator John McCain, won a major debate over whether to rely more on the private sector to improve care. For years, McCain and others had called on the VA to privatize in a variety of ways, in part by relying more on contractors. In 2014, the VA contracted out ten percent of its appointments to private-sector providers; that figure rose to 32 percent by late 2016 and, if the Trump administration gets its way, will increase further. In the years to come, the VA will likely reshape its health-care system into a hybrid public-private model that current VA leaders hope will better and more cheaply serve the shrinking, dispersed veteran population. But this evolution is fraught with peril. It remains unclear whether the VA can maintain its high quality of care or large research and educational missions when a significant number of veterans receive services outside the system.

THE BENEFITS OF SERVICE

The federal government runs a dizzying array of economic support programs for veterans. Some, such as disability compensation, trace

their roots back to the Revolutionary War and the core idea of caring for those wounded in war. Others, such as offering veterans small-business loans or giving them preference in receiving government contracts, reflect the more modern aim to reward veterans and attract new recruits.

Of these various efforts, disability compensation and pensions are the most expensive: in 2016, the VA spent $77 billion on payments to roughly five million people eligible for such benefits. It devoted another $14 billion to educational and training programs, including the Post-9/11 GI Bill; these helped just over one million veterans attend college or receive vocational training. Alongside these forms of assistance, the VA also administers life insurance programs and home loans. Meanwhile, the Department of Labor runs a veterans' employment service, the Small Business Administration offers support for entrepreneurial veterans, and every federal agency provides contracting and hiring preferences for veterans.

Like Social Security, most VA benefits programs run on autopilot. Unlike the VA's health-care system, which is classified as discretionary spending, its benefits system is considered by Congress to be mandatory spending. Once a veteran earns a benefit, it is paid until it is exhausted, as with the Post-9/11 GI Bill (which runs for 36 months) and disability compensation (which generally lasts for a veteran's lifetime). Controversy arises only when the system runs aground, as it did in 2011, when the disability claims backlog reached nearly one million, as veterans of all ages simultaneously pursued claims for disability from an overworked system. It also encounters problems if it makes systemic errors, such as denying claims for Agent Orange–related illnesses or posttraumatic stress disorder because the evidence of a causal link between military service and these ailments is tenuous (although, of course, battlefield conditions are not the best laboratories for randomized controlled trials). But veterans have come to accept a certain level of friction in the system, not unlike what they experienced in the military itself.

Yet many of these benefits fail to fully support modern soldiers' transitions to civilian life. The VA's disability compensation scheme, for example, matches neither the realities of contemporary service nor the American workplace. With longer terms of enlistment and more frequent deployments, service members often end their tours with at least some physical effects, from hearing loss to orthopedic injuries or worse. The current disability system treats every one of these injuries,

no matter how minor or treatable, as a potentially lifelong disability, rather than as the normal wear and tear of service. Veterans have increasingly claimed these injuries as disabilities, taxing the VA's resources. The system also primarily addresses physical injuries rather than cognitive or mental impairments, an outmoded approach.

In addition, over the past eight years, the unemployment rate for recent veterans rose above the overall national rate. By 2011, the unemployment rate for post-9/11 veterans was 12 percent, compared with just nine percent for the overall population. (The total veteran unemployment rate was lower than the national rate, owing to older veterans, who tend to do better than average in the work force.) Starting that year, the Defense Department, the VA, the Department of Labor, and other agencies worked to address this crisis by revamping the civilian transition training given to service members before discharge and working with companies to establish private-sector hiring goals. Those efforts, plus an improving economy, brought unemployment among recent veterans down to parity with the national unemployment rate by 2016.

But the unemployment spike highlighted a problem. Although the government provides substantial benefits in education and health, it can do much more to facilitate veterans' transitions into the work force. For example, it should offer programs that subsidize vocational training, such as coding boot camps, and provide seed capital for start-ups, which could help veterans who want to start a business instead of going to college. The Trump administration has pledged to facilitate public-private partnerships to serve veterans and hold the VA accountable. Although such efforts will help, the continued gulf between the culture of the military and that of the civilian work force makes for a difficult shift no matter what services the government provides.

REMEMBER THE NEEDIEST

Although crisis support—programs for homelessness, addiction, and legal problems—represents a small share of veterans' benefits, it responds to an acute problem. The VA and other federal agencies provide billions of dollars to veterans living on the margins of society, offering a lifelong social safety net that far exceeds what is available to nonveterans.

For years, veterans have been chronically overrepresented in the nation's homeless population. In 2009, Shinseki announced an audacious goal of reducing the number of homeless veterans to zero. From

fiscal year 2009 to fiscal year 2017, the VA poured $65 billion into housing, mental health treatment, and other services for veterans in need. The effort made a huge dent, reducing the number of homeless veterans from 73,367 in 2007 to 39,471 in 2016. Shortly after Trump took office, David Shulkin, his secretary of veterans affairs, announced that the effort would continue, but that instead of simply counting the absolute number of veterans on the streets, it would instead aim for the more realistic target of "functional zero," a goal that measures the number of homeless veterans against the housing capacity of a given community.

Veterans are also disproportionately afflicted by alcohol and substance abuse. Self-medication of posttraumatic stress appears to be one driver; another may be the tendency of VA and military hospitals to overprescribe medication for everything from sports injuries to combat stress and sleep disorders. The VA has set up clinics to treat addicted veterans, but these lack the resources to meet demand, and other veterans fail to seek any care at all.

Veterans have also historically been overrepresented in the nation's courts, jails, and prisons, although less so in the era of the all-volunteer force. Across the country, local courts and law enforcement agencies have joined with social service agencies to form veterans' courts, which resemble diversionary programs for other populations, such as juveniles. For nonviolent, nonserious crimes, these courts can match veterans with supportive services, such as substance-abuse counseling and job placement, in exchange for dismissing or expunging their charges when they complete these programs. The number of veterans entering these courts remains small, but they have no doubt helped many avoid a lifetime of dependency and incarceration.

Another previously marginalized group of veterans has risen to prominence over the past few years: those discharged with "bad paper," frequently the result of minor misconduct while in service, for which the root cause is often posttraumatic stress. By statute, these former service members aren't classified as veterans and are thus denied access to veterans' health care and other benefits. But they are far more likely to struggle with unemployment, homelessness, substance abuse, and suicide than other veterans. Since they are ineligible for VA support, the burden of supporting these veterans falls on state and local governments and charities, often costing tens of thousands of dollars per veteran. In recent years, veterans' groups, social service

organizations, and public interest lawyers have argued that these veterans should at least have access to life-saving health care, if not the full benefits. Shulkin recently embraced this cause, too, although it will likely take action from Congress to make real headway.

TIME TO RETHINK

In all these areas, change will undoubtedly prove slow and challenging. Each VA program has a constituency that depends on it and might oppose reform. Long-overdue adjustments to the system for disability compensation, for example, could include updates to the antiquated schedule used to rate disability percentages or changes to the process for evaluating disabilities. Because these changes would reduce benefits for some, however, for political reasons, current veterans would have to be grandfathered in. On the health-care side, increasing the VA's use of private-sector doctors could shorten wait times, but it could also weaken the agency's teaching and research capacity and thus lower the quality of care for those patients who continue to receive treatment from VA doctors. Those veterans who are generally satisfied with the status quo will look at any major changes with skepticism.

Cost must factor into the equation, too. The federal government already spends more on veterans now, in both absolute and per-veteran terms, than at any point in history—but some reforms will cost even more. Trump requested a VA budget for 2017 totaling $186 billion, covering health care, benefits, cemeteries, and the administration of the VA. This represents a four percent increase from the previous year but may still fail to meet veterans' needs through the existing agency structure. Over the past 15 years, even as the overall veteran population has shrunk, the VA budget has grown enormously, since veterans of all generations are increasingly using the system. And over the next 15 years, demand will no doubt rise, as the VA serves both the Vietnam-era cohort and the post-9/11 cohort. The Defense Department has reported that as of May 2017, 2,874,820 service members had deployed to Afghanistan, Iraq, or other theaters of war since 9/11. The Harvard scholar Linda Bilmes has estimated that the total cost of veterans' support for the post-9/11 generation will likely exceed $4 trillion. The majority of this bill will come due sometime around 2050, because expenditures typically peak when a cohort reaches its 70s.

With the veteran population evolving and existing programs straining to meet its needs, it is time for the U.S. government to fundamentally rethink the social contract underlying service. If the goal of veterans' programs is merely to compensate individuals for injuries, hardships, and the costs of service, then they are doing a decent job. But if the goal is to help veterans thrive, then the programs are faring poorly. And leaving veterans better off than their peers is crucial, since it will make service appear more attractive to future generations weighing the military as an option.

With that goal in mind, Washington should redesign the system for supporting veterans. Without scaling back programs such as disability compensation and health care, which primarily ameliorate the harms of service, the government should expand benefits such as the Post-9/11 GI Bill and small-business financing, which can create enormous economic opportunities for those who serve. It should also find ways to leverage the enormous social capital that veterans develop during their service for economic and societal gain. In Israel, for example, veterans of elite intelligence and special operations units move seamlessly into the technology and start-up world, drawing on their connections in much the same way that Stanford graduates do in Silicon Valley. Although Israel is much smaller and maintains conscription, both of which help build a tight-knit entrepreneurial military community, the United States could replicate elements of that ecosystem within parts of its military, especially the intelligence and special operations fields, both of which rely on advanced technology. The Defense Department should also explore ways to more closely link active and reserve units with businesses, particularly those that provide critical infrastructure, such as telecommunications and energy firms. These service members could draw on their hard-earned experience to help defend the private sector against cyberattacks and economic espionage, while fostering a virtuous cycle of innovation between the military and the private sector.

The federal government already spends more on veterans now than at any point in history.

Washington should also be mindful of the ways in which the increasing civil-military divide exacerbates the struggles of veterans—for example, fueling veteran unemployment because of the cultural gap between civilian employers and their veteran employees. This divide

may also hinder veterans' reintegration into communities and their willingness to seek mental health care, because of a fear of social stigma. Absent a foreign invasion or a crisis on the scale of World War II, the country is unlikely to return to conscription or increase the size of the military to the point where it would fundamentally change its relationship to the rest of society.

To repair the split, then, the military should seek greater geographic and socioeconomic diversity among its recruits. It should establish public-private partnerships to support veterans in the work force. And it should rely on reserve units so as to broaden the military's geographic footprint to include communities away from major base towns such as Killeen, Texas, and Norfolk, Virginia. Veterans have a role to play, too. A recent study by the advocacy group Got Your 6 found that veterans are not always likely to self-identify as veterans after service, and civilians often think veterans are worse off than they are. Veterans, particularly those who succeed after service, must represent the military and explain their service to the wider population.

For the foreseeable future, the United States will rely on a relatively small, volunteer military. Its success depends on its ability to draw in high-quality recruits. And that, in turn, depends on the perception that service will benefit soldiers, their families, and their country.

Global Health Gets a Checkup

A Conversation With Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus

The World Health Organization was established in 1948 as a specialized agency of the United Nations charged with improving global public health, coordinating the international response to epidemics, and the like. In the ensuing decades, its dedicated staff has served on the frontlines of public health battles, from the eradication of smallpox to the fight against AIDS to the challenges of noncommunicable diseases. In May, the WHO's member countries elected Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus as its new director general. A malaria researcher, Tedros, as he is known, served as the health minister of Ethiopia from 2005 to 2012 and as foreign minister from 2012 to 2016. He spoke with *Foreign Affairs*' deputy managing editor Stuart Reid in New York in July.

What keeps you up at night?

Epidemics or pandemics. Immediately after the First World War, in 1918, the world encountered the Spanish flu. It was airborne and killed more than 50 million people. Ebola is lousy compared to that. That sometimes keeps me awake at night, because we have to do a lot, especially considering the serious gaps we have. I think the world should unite and focus on strong health systems to prepare the whole world to prevent epidemics—or if there is an outbreak, to manage it quickly—because viruses don't respect borders, and they don't need visas.

What do you see as the WHO's core mission?

The WHO has a responsibility to prevent, early-detect, and manage outbreaks, and it can do this by strengthening countries' capacity. But we have to do more. Ebola has already shown the weaknesses that we have. So the WHO should start by strengthening epidemiological surveillance and investing in countries' health systems.

You've identified health coverage as one of your top priorities. What does that mean in practice?

About a third of countries are covered, a third are progressing towards universal health coverage, and the last third haven't started. We will focus on speeding up the progress of those who are making progress and influencing those who haven't started. The aim of the SDGs [the UN's Sustainable Development Goals] is to leave no one behind by 2030.

This interview has been edited and condensed.

DENIS BALIBOUSE / REUTERS

Tedros in Geneva, May 2017

Political commitment is very important here. Expanding health coverage is not a technical issue but a political one; it should be seen as a right and a means to development.

What role does the WHO have when it comes to noncommunicable diseases?
First of all, it's important to recognize that noncommunicable diseases are on the increase globally, both in developing countries and in the developed world, due to urbanization and changing lifestyles. We know many noncommunicable diseases are related to risk factors such as smoking, alcohol consumption, inactivity, and diet. We can address them by building or strengthening health systems focused on prevention and health promotion. Primary health care is especially important. Using the media is important. And in the education sector, it's important to, as part of the curriculum, educate children on risk factors and help them choose a healthy lifestyle.

Another threat to public health is irrational beliefs. In some of the richest communities, parents don't vaccinate their children because they falsely believe vaccines cause autism. What can be done about the spread of misinformation?
Governments have to communicate well with the community, and the WHO can help. In addition to that, we have to use the media. The media is very important on this. And we can use faith-based organizations and civil society to teach the society to accept vaccination as an important part of child development.

Resources—both attention and money—are finite. Is there anything the WHO does now that it should not be in the business of doing?
Of course, the WHO should prioritize. I've said we need to focus on universal health coverage, emergency response, women and children in adolescence, and climate change and health. So anything outside this will be less of a priority and get fewer resources.

You've also said that you want to professionalize the WHO's fundraising operations. But how can the WHO get more funding from countries when officials in those countries often can't get the resources they need to run their own health ministries properly?
I think the WHO in this case is shy. The WHO only contacts ministries of health, but it should also work with other ministries, like the ministry of finance, the ministry of foreign affairs—even heads of state and government. The WHO should play its technical leadership role but at the same time its political leadership role. If you say, "health for all," it's political. And unless you take it to the highest level possible, it cannot happen.

What do you plan to do to increase the funds available to the WHO from governments and private groups that are not earmarked for specific projects? Take those earmarked for polio. Seventy-four percent of your employees in Africa get their salaries from polio funds. We're now on the verge of eradicating polio, but after the eradication of smallpox—arguably the WHO's greatest success—the infrastructure and funding sources used in that effort fell apart. How do you make sure that doesn't happen again?
We should be creating value for money—

using all the available money wisely. We should expand the donor base. We need to look for new donors apart from the traditional donors, not only governments but foundations and the private sector, as well. We should ask for flexible funding rather than earmarked funding. We also need to strengthen our resource-mobilization capacity. If we can address these key areas, then we can reduce our dependency on earmarked funding. For polio, we have already developed an exit strategy.

But donors might walk away after victory is declared. What rationale would you give to, say, the Rotary Club, to keep giving money to the WHO? Or to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation?
Polio is being finished, but there are other areas that need a joint effort. The same children saved from polio will need support for other health problems—could be measles, malaria, or other problems.

Another relevant nonstate actor is the pharmaceutical industry. Some have criticized its priorities—for instance, producing drugs for restless leg syndrome while tuberculosis still kills more than a million people every year. Should more pressure be placed on the industry?
The private sector will always go for profits. If you put pressure on [companies not to do this], I don't think they will succumb. It doesn't work that way.

They should see in their business plan whether or not they can get funding, so one area to consider is what Gavi [the Vaccine Alliance] does, with an advance market commitment that helps pharmaceutical companies invest in vaccines that are only important for the developing world. The other option

is for governments to invest, because it's a public good.

Many feel that the WHO responded too slowly to the 2014–15 Ebola outbreak. How can it respond faster in the next emergency?
My predecessor, Dr. Margaret Chan, worked on reforming emergency response, and a new program for it is now in place. One good experience with using the new system is the recent report of Ebola from the DRC [Democratic Republic of the Congo]. It was detected early and reported immediately, and the country mobilized partners and addressed it. We need to make the program even stronger, and we should build it up with a sense of urgency. We have learned a lot from Ebola. We have to implement those lessons aggressively.

Some also feel that the WHO has been too accommodating of governments. Is that accurate?
I don't agree that the WHO only follows what the members states say. It goes both ways. Member states should listen to what the WHO says, and at the same time, the WHO should listen to them.

But sometimes a government may not want to raise the alarm about an outbreak because it fears a drop in tourism. What can be done in cases like that?
On that one, it's not an issue between the WHO and the member state in question; it's about the overall implementation of the International Health Regulations [the rules that govern how states respond to outbreaks]. That involves not only the country in question but other countries, as well. For instance, a country may fear the impact on the economy if it reports a certain disease. And if the other countries, instead of banning travel or other measures, could be supportive and implement the IHR, then the country could be encouraged to report immediately.

What were your biggest accomplishments and challenges during your time as Ethiopia's health minister and foreign minister?
Our biggest achievement was health-sector reform. The success was in making sure that primary health care was the center of gravity in our health system. People prefer to focus on building hospitals and so on, so it was difficult to convince many to accept primary health care as a priority. Ethiopia achieved most of the MDGs [the UN's Millennium Development Goals] because it focused on health promotion and prevention.

You said earlier that the media is crucial to the spread of public health information. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, in 2016, Ethiopia imprisoned 16 journalists, making it one of the five worst countries in the world in terms of jailing reporters.
This interview is of me representing the WHO. So do you think it's a good idea to talk about [something] country specific? It's unrelated to the job I'm doing now.

What is your response to people who say that in your current role, your association with the Ethiopian government could undermine your work?
It's not related, but I can answer. First of all, when I was there, as far as I know, journalists were not jailed because they spoke their mind. It was because

they trespassed. We have rules and laws, like any country. Journalists may or may not like a particular law, including in the U.S., but even if you don't like a law, you don't break it. That was the problem.

Otherwise, the media is actually important. It's the eyes and ears of the society. And the government uses this as feedback to intervene where there are problems, and that's how we used to see it when I was part of the government. But be it a journalist or a politician or a businessman, no one can be above the law, because if you do that, it's very difficult to govern a country.

Critics have also accused you of covering up cholera epidemics in Ethiopia. Neighboring countries have tens of thousands of cases, and experts say that Ethiopia is currently suffering from an outbreak. Why not just admit it?

I think you have read in *The New York Times* what Tom Frieden [the former director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention] said [in a letter to the editor responding to an article about the allegations]. It doesn't even make any difference whether you call it "cholera," because the management is the same. The most important thing is to respond immediately.

You're the first African head of the WHO. Should developing countries get a greater voice in global institutions more generally?

I think any position in any international organization should be merit-based. When I competed, that was my platform. It's not about developing or developed world; it's about selecting the right people for the position, and there are many able people from the developing world who can run organizations. By the way, the UN has been run by Africans before: Kofi Annan and Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

The World Bank has been getting increasingly involved in public health, not just in funding but also in directing policy—developing its own guidelines for universal health coverage, for instance. Shouldn't that fall under the WHO's mandate?

The global challenges we are facing are getting more complex, so having more players is not a problem. I don't think the WHO should compete with the World Bank, and the World Bank doesn't need to compete with the WHO. We can work together. On many of the things that the WHO does, if the World Bank has a competitive advantage, the WHO should let the World Bank do it. If the Global Fund [to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria] has a better comparative advantage, the Global Fund can do it, or Gavi can do it. At the end of the day, the important thing is building effective partnerships to achieve our global health objectives.

U.S. President Donald Trump's proposed budget cuts include a 17 percent decrease for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and an 18 percent cut for the National Institutes of Health. What would that mean for global public health?

That's not yet finalized. The United States normally takes a bipartisan position on these issues. I expect that the U.S. will contribute its share.

REVIEWS & RESPONSES



Tens of thousands of people did not cross continents and seas to fight for a third-string al Qaeda franchise. They came to fight for a kingdom of heaven on earth.

—Graeme Wood

THAIER AL-SUDANI / REUTERS

True Believers

How ISIS Made Jihad Religious Again

Graeme Wood

Anatomy of Terror: From the Death of bin Laden to the Rise of the Islamic State BY ALI SOUFAN. Norton, 2017, 384 pp.

In the last two decades, the story of global jihadism has had more plot reversals than a daytime soap. Moribund groups have sputtered to life, former brothers-in-arms have declared one another apostates, and erstwhile hunters of jihadists have joined their ranks. These twists have bewildered governments and analysts, and anyone who claims to have recognized them and their importance as they were happening is probably lying.

The most important development is contained in two easy-to-remember numbers: 400 and 40,000. On September 11, 2001, al Qaeda commanded an army of 400. A decade and a half later, the Islamic State (or ISIS) had mobilized some 40,000 people to travel to Iraq and Syria, mostly from the Muslim-majority countries but also from Western countries with sizable Muslim communities and even from places with relatively few Muslims, such as Chile and Japan. The challenge for today's terrorism experts is to explain how 400 grew into more than 40,000, despite the combined counterterrorism efforts of dozens of countries.

If anything, the figure of 40,000 understates the proliferation of jihad. It does not include the thousands loyal to the Taliban, or the tens of thousands of violent extremists in North Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Caucasus. Nor does it include people who would have traveled to Iraq or Syria to join ISIS if their home governments hadn't made such trips illegal or impossible. Meanwhile, the 40,000 figure does include noncombatants—which actually makes it a more impressive indicator of the group's appeal. Young men can be counted on to show up in large numbers for just about any war, but a violent cause that inspires elderly people and women—including some who are pregnant or caring for young children—must be doing something special.

The latest effort to explain this orders-of-magnitude increase in the number of jihadists is Ali Soufan's *Anatomy of Terror*. Soufan had a short but successful career as an FBI counterterrorism agent and interrogator of jihadists. He was born in Lebanon and speaks Arabic, which is still the indispensable language of Sunni jihadism (although these days, one can get far with English, French, and perhaps German and Russian). He retired from the bureau in 2005, while still in his 30s, after breaking with the CIA over its torture of detainees. (He had also accused the agency of improperly withholding from the FBI intelligence that might have helped prevent the 9/11 attacks.) Soufan now runs a security firm.

Anatomy of Terror begins with the 2011 U.S. raid in Pakistan that killed

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Osama bin Laden. After a long examination of the wounded remains of the core al Qaeda organization, Soufan ends with ISIS. The book's most insightful passages follow the life of Saif al-Adel, perhaps the most important al Qaeda operative to have evaded apprehension. (Recent reports place him in Syria, working to coordinate terrorist cells.) In previous eras, he traveled through Afghanistan, his native Egypt, Iran, Somalia, and Sudan, supervising jihad like an Islamist Che Guevara. Soufan notes that Adel has a record of being creative and effective—unlike al Qaeda's stodgy, possibly cave-bound leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri.

In ISIS, Soufan sees little that is innovative, and he proposes that this troubling new phenomenon is a manifestation of a familiar one. "For twenty years, the global body politic has been infected with a virulent disease," he writes. "The name of this malady is Bin Ladenism, and the self-proclaimed Islamic State is merely its most recent symptom." He downplays the rifts between al Qaeda and ISIS and minimizes the latter's religious claims by suggesting that it is primarily a political phenomenon—even, to some degree, an outgrowth of the secular Iraqi Baath Party of Saddam Hussein. (A number of former Baathist Iraqi army officers worked for ISIS in its early days.)

Soufan gets many things right. He identifies strategic differences between al Qaeda and ISIS, including ISIS' decision to overcome bin Laden's aversion to state building and declare a "caliphate" in its territory. Bin Laden advised his followers to avoid that step; controlling territory and basing al Qaeda leaders there would create targets for the group's enemies and demands from local populations for security and other services that al Qaeda could not hope to provide. Instead of creating a state, bin Laden encouraged fragmentation. Soufan likens this strategy to that of McDonald's, which offers its franchises significant autonomy. Compare that model to that of Starbucks or White Castle, whose every branch is overseen by a corporate mother ship.

Soufan also places deserved emphasis on Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian founder of the al Qaeda–linked group that broke away and became ISIS. As Soufan writes, Zarqawi pushed al Qaeda's brutality to unprecedented levels and followed bin Laden's sectarianism to its logical conclusion. Bin Laden and Zawahiri agreed with Zarqawi in theory but objected in practice; they pleaded with Zarqawi to restrain himself, for example, in his massacres of Iraqi Shiite civilians. (The older jihadists argued that although many Shiites were wicked, many others were just ignorant, and that, in any case, butchering them on camera did not advance the Sunni cause.)

But an uptick in savagery was not by itself responsible for the changes of the last decade. And the factor that most distinguishes ISIS from its predecessor is precisely the one Soufan overlooks: its emphasis on Islamic theology and law. Soufan assures readers that jihadists are not experts on religion. "Believe me, I have interrogated enough of them to know," he writes. "Put four in one room and they will state fifty different opinions [and] pronounce twenty fatwas."

That may have been true in 2005. Since then, ISIS has made religious questions the core of its mission. It enforces orthodoxy on topics such as who qualifies

as a Muslim, whether Muslims may live in non-Muslim lands, how an Islamic state should administer itself, and when Muslims should overthrow their leaders. Al Qaeda was political first, religious second; it was conspiratorial—an exclusive club of operatives—and practical. ISIS is religious first and political second; it is public, nonexclusive, and religiously uncompromising. No explanation of the past decade's jihadist Great Awakening makes sense without taking into account that contrast.

In preferring to see continuities between al Qaeda and ISIS, Soufan joins numerous other terrorism analysts who were caught flatfooted when ISIS went global in 2013 and 2014. He is somewhat rarer in maintaining that view three years later. Back then, those who saw ISIS as just another al Qaeda franchise tended not to worry much about its novelty and ambition as a terrorist organization. Unlike al Qaeda's affiliate in Yemen, ISIS didn't have a known wing devoted to spectacular attacks, such as airline bombings. Unlike the Taliban, it didn't seem determined to march on a national capital. Instead, it appeared content to putter in the desert, pathetic and mostly harmless. It controlled nothing of value. It threatened no interests of the United States. In early 2014, U.S. President Barack Obama famously referred to the group as the "JV team" of jihad. It is strange to say this now, but at the time, it seemed that the best strategy for defeating ISIS was to let it do its thing and eventually wither.

But what looked like the runt of the al Qaeda litter was in fact another species altogether. ISIS asked its followers to join not because it was fighting U.S. troops—an orthodox bin Ladenist goal—but because it had established the world's only Islamic state, with no law but God's, and with a purity of purpose that even the Taliban had not envisioned. Tens of thousands of people did not cross continents and seas to fight for a third-string al Qaeda franchise. They came to fight for a kingdom of heaven on earth.

LEAP OF FAITH

Unlike Soufan's previous book, *The Black Banners*, which relied on firsthand accounts and primary sources, his new one draws almost exclusively on secondary sources, chiefly the work of journalists, academics, and other analysts. The lack of primary sources is curious, because such sources, once scarce, are now easily accessible on the Internet—and sometimes in real life, as well. Al Qaeda documents seldom became public. ISIS and its followers, by contrast, have flooded the Internet with official and unofficial statements, transcripts of recruitment interactions, and exhortations to operatives outside ISIS territory. Anyone with an Internet connection and language skills can read them.

This glut of material has turned the field of jihadism studies on its head. Once, experts waited for scraps of data—a rare glimpse of a document, for example. But even though they had too little information, they thought they knew how to analyze what they had. Now they have truckloads of data, and it is the analysis that needs an upgrade. Soufan's book suffers from this fault to an uncommon degree.

In letters that U.S. forces captured during the raid on bin Laden's compound, one finds few signs of original religious thinking. But religious matters pervade the conversations and correspondence of ISIS leaders. The few non-ISIS scholars of Islam who deign to read such texts

tend to come away appalled by the conclusions but sometimes grudgingly impressed by the erudition on display.

Of course, ISIS foot soldiers lack the scholarly sophistication of the leaders. But even they drench themselves in religion. Two sociologists from the University of Waterloo who conducted online interviews of ISIS foreign fighters last year reported that faith was "a primary motivator" and "the dominant frame" through which the fighters saw their entire existence.

Soufan, however, passes over almost all discussion of religion and tends to pathologize religious sentiment in glib tones. While Zarqawi was fleeing U.S. forces in Iraq, Soufan writes, his "behavior became increasingly neurotic." As signs of this neurosis, Soufan cites Zarqawi's habit of quoting Islamic Scripture and imitating the Prophet Muhammad, "down to cleaning his teeth with a twig, scenting his body with musk, and keeping to what he believed were the [Prophet's] waking and sleeping hours." It's not clear why Soufan sees these as signs of a mental disorder rather than as manifestations of intense religious zeal. Zarqawi evolved from a petty thug into a master terrorist only after he grew devout. The devotion seems to have changed his life, as it did for most of his followers.

Soufan points to the worldly transgressions of individual terrorists to cast doubt on the sincerity of their religious devotion. Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the lead planner of the 9/11 attacks, visited prostitutes in the Philippines, Soufan reports; Mohammed Atta, one of the 9/11 pilots, "pounded shots of vodka before boarding American Airlines Flight 11." To Soufan, such sins nullify not only the men's professions of faith but even their faith-based explanations for actions they took—such

as flying airplanes into buildings—that made little sense except in the context of their religious beliefs.

This is an analytic blunder common to secular people. Devout Christians sometimes commit adultery; observant Jews sometimes break the Sabbath. Those more intimately acquainted with the nature of religious belief know the role of human frailty. They recognize that sin is not a nullifier of belief but a fortifier: sinners, not saints, require redemption—or, as the Gospel of Luke puts it, "They that are whole need not a physician." ISIS promises absolution; those who feel no need for absolution show up in smaller numbers.

"Perhaps Zarqawi, [Khalid Sheik Mohammed], and the 9/11 hijackers would not go so far as to say that God is a stupid idea," Soufan concedes. But what, he asks, "motivates people like [them], if not religious fervor?" His answers: "nationalism, tribalism, sectarianism." Sectarianism can, of course, be a form of religious fervor. Soufan's other two hypotheses are baffling. On behalf of what nations or tribes do today's multinational, multiethnic jihadist groups fight?

BAATH TIME

If there is one country lurking behind ISIS, Soufan believes it is Saddam's Iraq. He suggests, following the lead of several others, that ISIS is a crypto-Baathist organization rather than a religious one that incorporated former Baathists for specific purposes—and after they had repented. The argument begins by noting that ISIS has used the tactics of terror and population management and that "former officers in Saddam Hussein's sprawling security establishment" joined ISIS and put their talents to use. These included Haji Bakr and Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, who served as top strategists in ISIS' early years. Soufan stresses Bakr in particular and relies on an oft-cited cache of captured documents, first reported by *Der Spiegel*, that revealed Bakr's plan to declare a caliphate and spread it across Syria with a combination of religious missionary work and Stasi-like population control. Soufan claims that the members of the caliphate's executive council are "predominantly former servants of Saddam" and that ISIS' leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, is surrounded and controlled by "Baathist minders."

But as Craig Whiteside of the U.S. Naval War College recently showed, the ex-Baathists were recruited and used mostly to fill military roles during ISIS' embryonic stage, with the stipulation that they be "Salafi first, former military officers second, and then former Baathists." Their levels of religious commitment were indistinguishable from those of other ISIS leaders. Those who joined or allied with ISIS but retained aspects of their Baathist identity were sidelined or purged. For every former Baathist running ISIS, there were multiple other veteran jihadists untainted by any association with Saddam. By the time Baghdadi established the caliphate in mid-2014, most of the former Baathists who had joined ISIS were dead or would be soon. Soufan and other analysts maintain that ISIS cynically uses religion for political ends. That might be precisely backward: the secular Baathist politicians were used for religious ends.

THE JOY OF JIHAD

In June, the BBC's Quentin Sommerville and Riam Dalati published a moving multimedia piece that reconstructed the lives of a few ISIS fighters whose corpses

had been found, rotting and picked over by dogs, on the shore of the Tigris River near Mosul, Iraq. The photographs on the mobile phone of one of the fighters revealed details of their training and their personal lives. They were barely men. Their beards were wispy, and their recreations adolescent. They smiled and joked with friends. The religious side of their existence was evident: they followed their imam; they memorized Scripture; they aspired to die in the path of God.

Jihadism has democratized and has ceased to be solely a project for elite militants such as bin Laden and Zawahiri. One consequence for counterterrorism is that mapping organizational charts and command structures is less critical than understanding the stories of young men such as the ones whose bodies were found near Mosul. Once, one could follow the words and deeds of bin Laden, Zawahiri, Adel, and perhaps a dozen others and obtain a highly accurate picture of global jihad. Now, the puppet masters matter less and the interior lives of the fighters matter more. That means studying how they understand and practice their religion, and how they develop camaraderie and purpose. There is a perverse joy in jihad, a feeling of belonging and brotherhood, of happiness and fulfillment. (Soufan declares that in ISIS territory, "practically anything remotely enjoyable—including a picnic in the park—is banned." In fact, ISIS features picnics in its propaganda, and the citizens look like they enjoy life in the caliphate; that is the point of the propaganda.) If even a counterterrorism expert of Soufan's caliber can omit this part of ISIS' appeal, the group will remain mysterious and difficult to counter.

Indeed, Soufan's policy prescriptions are vague. He urges officials to understand jihadist ideology better and identify the currents of Salafism that have fed it. This is strange advice given his lack of interest in religion elsewhere in the book. Needless to say, understanding Salafism won't help much if ISIS is secretly Baathist. Alas, it is not.

The suggestion that policymakers try to understand ISIS' ideology better is nonetheless a sound one. One of the key developments in the group's rise is the way it has leveraged local political conflicts—Sunni grievances against Shiite-dominated governments in Iraq and Syria—to create religious confrontation. The group is now in a shambles compared with two years ago—but it is strong compared with just four years ago, when it could still be mistaken for a JV team. Its loss of territory has not been accompanied by a proportional loss in its ability to inspire. The land may be gone, but the dream will remain, and there will continue to be dreamers in dozens of countries, ready to die for the cause. There is still time to learn more about what the dream is and who is dreaming it.

Kleptocracy in America

Corruption Is Reshaping Governments Everywhere

Sarah Chayes

The Corruption Cure
BY ROBERT I. ROTBERG. Princeton University Press, 2017, 400 pp.

"Drain the swamp!" the U.S. Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump shouted at campaign rallies last year. The crowds roared; he won. "Our political system is corrupt!" the Democratic candidate Bernie Sanders thundered at his own rallies. His approval rating now stands at around 60 percent, dwarfing that of any other national-level elected official. Although many aspects of U.S. politics may be confusing, Americans are clearly more agitated about corruption than they have been in nearly a century, in ways that much of the political mainstream does not quite grasp. The topic has never been central to either major party's platform, and top officials tend to conflate what is legal with what is uncorrupt, speaking a completely different language from that of their constituents.

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Although the political establishment, including the justices of the Supreme Court, may cling to a legal notion of corruption, ordinary Americans' more visceral understanding is in line with an anticorruption Zeitgeist that has swept the world in the past decade. In Brazil, huge, ongoing street protests over the course of two years have bolstered the federal police force and a crusading jurist, Sérgio Moro, as they have investigated and brought to justice high-ranking perpetrators in a web of corruption scandals. Their work has already led to the impeachment of one president, Dilma Rousseff, and her successor, Michel Temer, is also in the cross hairs. A similar movement has shaken Guatemala, where a UN-backed commission has helped prosecutors bring charges against dozens of officials, including Otto Pérez Molina—who was the country's president until 2015, when he resigned and was arrested on corruption charges. Earlier this year, South Korean President Park Guen-hye met the same fate.

In countries as varied as Bulgaria, Honduras, Iraq, Lebanon, Malaysia, Moldova, Romania, and South Africa, where governments haven't been toppled, citizens have nonetheless shown remarkable collective energy in protesting corruption. Taken together, these disparate movements add up to a low-grade worldwide insurrection. Elsewhere, taking the pulse of their people, governments such as China's have launched top-down initiatives targeting crooked officials.

Despite paying lip service to the problem of corruption for decades, leaders in rich, developed countries have never treated it as more than a second-order foreign policy concern.

After all, corruption is hard to measure and easy to brush away with arguments about differing cultural norms and the value of "facilitation payments" in greasing bureaucratic wheels. But lately, it has become harder to deny that corruption lies at the root of many first-order global problems, such as the spread of violent religious extremism or the civil strife and mass casualties witnessed in South Sudan and Syria—not to mention the refugee crises that have followed on their heels. Corruption also plays a major role in the one truly global existential threat: the destruction of the environment.

When speaking about the causal relationship between corruption and such issues, I'm often asked questions along these lines: "OK, corruption's a bad thing, but is there anything that can be done about it? Are there examples of countries that have pulled themselves back from the brink?" The political scientist Robert Rotberg has surely fielded the same questions countless times during his distinguished career. He has now published a comprehensive and detailed response.

His book's answer to the second question is important: some places have indeed dramatically reduced corruption. A few names on that list are familiar success stories, such as Hong Kong and Singapore. Others—Botswana, Georgia, Rwanda—might surprise some readers. Rotberg examines these cases, alongside those of both poorer performers and longtime paragons such as Denmark and Finland, in order to figure out what works. His conclusions are scattered throughout the book and then tabulated at the end in a single 14-step program.

The book offers authoritative perspectives on a variety of devices that different regimes have applied to the task of fighting corruption. But Rotberg's analysis fails to spell out a reality that his own most fundamental conclusion suggests: corruption is not so much a problem for governments as it is an approach to government, one chosen by far too many rulers today. His suggestions may be helpful to countries that have already undergone some sharp transitions fueled by anticorruption sentiment, such as Brazil, Burkina Faso, Guatemala, South Korea, Tunisia, and Ukraine. *The Corruption Cure*, however, is less helpful when it comes to hard-boiled kleptocracies, such as Angola and Azerbaijan. Rotberg also downplays the role of developed countries in facilitating such regimes' corrupt practices. And he sidesteps the rather pressing reality of developed countries—including the United States—beginning their own unmistakable slides toward kleptocracy.

CLEANING HOUSE

To fight corruption, a good domestic legal framework is "at least a start," Rotberg writes, as long as it clearly defines illegal behavior and its consequences. In the exemplary case of Singapore, anticorruption laws include "stiff monetary fines and five-year terms of imprisonment for convicted offenders." Civil servants found guilty of corrupt acts can "lose their jobs, their benefits, and their pensions." Apart from punishing acts of corruption after the fact, Singaporean law also does what the U.S. Constitution was at least partly designed to do: prevent corruption before it takes place. (That was the purpose of the Emoluments

Clause, which prohibits U.S. officials from receiving gifts from foreign governments—and which is currently the subject of renewed attention owing to three lawsuits charging that Trump has violated it.) In Singapore, Rotberg writes, public servants are prohibited from "borrowing money from or financially obligating themselves to any person with whom they did or could have official dealings," whether or not they have corrupt intentions. Botswana's expansive legislation in this area defines an illegal emolument as "any gift, benefit, loan, or reward; any office, employment or contract, any payments or discharges of obligations or loans; [or] 'any other service,'" Rotberg writes. But too often, Rotberg notes, such laws are just words on paper; what really matters is whether and how they are enforced.

Another remedy he examines is anticorruption commissions. In Hong Kong in the 1970s, the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) made significant inroads against long-standing traditions of illicit gift giving and profiting from official positions. To help the commission carry out its enforcement responsibilities, legislation placed the burden of proof in cases of unexplained wealth on the accused. The commission's independence was bolstered by a generous fixed annual budget and by the fact that the group reported directly to the colonial governor dispatched from the United Kingdom—an official who, Rotberg writes, was considered incorruptible because of his allegiance to London. The ICAC was also subject to oversight by a group of prominent citizens and elected officials. And the commission was charged with corruption prevention and public education, as well as the investigation of wrongdoing. Within a few years of its launch, the ICAC was investigating numerous corruption networks, in which so-called triad gangs worked hand in glove with the police. The commission's prevention department visited government agencies,

analyzed their permitting and inspection processes, and recommended improvements. Later, it helped reform the stock exchange and the professional ethics code for lawyers.

But such commissions are no panacea, either, Rotberg finds. In many countries, including several in Africa, anticorruption commissions have been worse than ineffective: they have been weaponized to punish opponents of corrupt regimes. In Malawi, for example, Rotberg reports that local observers "believed that the 2004–2006 anticorruption blitz was essentially an exercise in political persecution," since some of its main targets were

ranking members of the opposition party.

Transparency measures, such as making asset declarations mandatory for public officials, also appear on the list of measures taken by several of Rotberg's "most improved" countries. So do the streamlining of bureaucratic procedures (to remove red tape that might otherwise require a bribe to cut through) and increasing the salaries of civil servants (to reduce the material need to demand or accept bribes). Norms and standards promoted by international institutions can sometimes help, too. In Georgia, Macedonia, and Montenegro, eligibility requirements for EU membership, which all three seek, have catalyzed significant reforms. (Montenegro's efforts so far, however, seem aimed more at checking boxes than at genuinely transforming the way authorities behave.)

The list of effective measures also contains several drastic steps, including staff purges at agencies widely seen as thoroughly corrupt. Rotberg reports that when Mikheil Saakashvili came to power in Georgia in 2008, "the new reformers discharged the entire staff of the ministry of education and recruited new employees by competitive examination"; they also sacked 15,000 police officers. In President Paul Kagame's Rwanda, it was "all 503 members of the Rwandan judiciary, from top to bottom," who got the ax, in 2004. And almost immediately after her 2006 election as Liberia's president, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf fired "virtually all" the civil servants who had worked in the prior regime's Ministry of Finance.

THE MAFIA STATE

The drastic nature of such measures reveals a fundamental weakness in the way *The Corruption Cure* frames its eponymous problem. Rotberg, like so many authors before him, depicts corruption as an inchoate, corrosive force that seeps into governments that readers might presume are otherwise sound. The metaphor he keeps reaching for is a medical one. Corruption is "an insidious cancer," a "plague" that "infects," "metastasizes," and "cripples." Cure the disease, as the title of the book suggests, and the healed body politic can go out and play.

But where does the sickness come from? In explaining how such a malady might take hold, Rotberg resists the temptation to moralize, venturing that corrupt officials may be behaving rationally. "By adopting a conscious strategy of self-enrichment through corrupt behavior, they merely . . . act within the often zero-sum expectations of their class and their condition," he writes.

Yet that portrait of widespread but uncoordinated opportunism miscasts the nature of contemporary corruption. Rather than a weakness or a disorder, it is the effective functioning of systems designed to enrich the powerful. Rotberg gestures at this fundamental reality toward the end of the book, when he paraphrases an assessment made by Guatemala's UN-backed anticorruption commission: That country's ruling Patriotic Party "was more a criminal gang than a political party. Its role was to 'rob the state,'" Rotberg writes. In Guatemala, elites "constituted a criminal organization—a kleptocratic conspiracy capable of capturing a national revenue stream, a mafia running a state."

This is what corruption looks in at least 60 countries where I have researched

the problem: the deliberate operating system of sophisticated networks bent on self-enrichment and remarkably successful at achieving it. For officials in these places, corrupt acts often do not represent rational responses to a permissive environment, as Rotberg would have it; rather, they are a professional requirement. If you are a police officer in Afghanistan or Nigeria, a customs agent in Uzbekistan, or a top administrator in the Honduran environment ministry, you owe your superiors certain things: a cut of your harvest of small bribes, certainly, and perhaps some duly signed and stamped paperwork greenlighting activities that violate regulations. Those who do not perform these allotted tasks are demoted or sidelined—if they're lucky. Sometimes they are shot. It's the old Mafia choice: *plata o plomo*, "silver or lead." Take the money or take a bullet.

These networks come in different forms in different countries. They can be highly structured or fairly diffuse, with varying degrees of internal rivalry and disrupting daily life where they hold sway. Depending on the sources available to them, they capture different revenue streams, including luxury tourism, oil sales, or high-end agricultural exports, such as succulent dates from Tunisia, green beans from Kenya, or the opium whose harvest absorbs much of the labor force in southern Afghanistan each spring. The networks weave together categories that people in developed countries tend to keep separate in their minds: public sector and private sector, black markets and stock markets, professional and personal.

Consider the roles played by the Karzai family in post-9/11 Afghanistan,

which I had the opportunity to observe at close quarters when I ran a nongovernmental organization established by President Hamid Karzai's older brother Qayum. Karzai served in office for nearly 13 years. Qayum acted as a behind-the-scenes power broker, with a stake in a consortium that won millions of dollars in contracts from the U.S. government. Another brother, a self-proclaimed apolitical businessman, owned a cement factory and part of the country's largest private bank, which was later found to operate like a Ponzi scheme. And a third brother served as both a local official and a main facilitator of the region's prodigious opium traffic.

In countries such as Azerbaijan, the overlap between the public and private sectors is even more complete, with the ruling family controlling no fewer than 11 banks and sprawling consortia that net the vast bulk of public procurement. In Egypt, the military's control over the economy has vastly expanded under the presidency of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. The kleptocracy over which Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández is striving to gain control remains somewhat more loosely structured: private-sector actors, government officials, and drug traffickers exchange favors and often overlap but maintain a certain degree of separation.

In such networks, the role of members who hold public office is to craft laws and regulations and tailor their enforcement in ways that serve the network's aims. In return, they get to loot public coffers or siphon off government revenues; they also get cuts of the bribes extorted at the street level or shares in the companies that their practices benefit.

If their activity "destroys developmental prospects" and is "antithetical to economic growth and social betterment" in their country, as Rotberg puts it, that is of no concern whatsoever. Bettering their country's prospects is not their objective. Making money is.

SWAMP THING

Although Rotberg's disease metaphors elide this reality, his suggested anticorruption program is entirely shaped by it. The first of his 14 steps for a country fighting corruption is that it "seeks, elects, or anoints a transformative political leader." In other words, reforming a severely corrupt country requires nothing short of regime change. In this sense, *The Corruption Cure* offers a critical warning: once you've toppled your government, make sure you pick a new chief of state on the basis of his or her concrete intentions with respect to corruption. Don't be distracted, for example, by a prospective leader's identity as a political outsider or stance on religious law: look closely at the actual content of his or her anticorruption platform.

For although regime change may be necessary to anticorruption reform, it is clearly not sufficient. Corruption networks are deceptively resilient. Many have survived dramatic efforts to uproot them, ranging from the imprisonment of their leaders to violent revolts against their power. Sometimes they have countenanced their own decapitation, sacrificing a Hosni Mubarak (in Egypt) or a Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali (in Tunisia) to the mob in order to rebound better. In other cases, such as China, they have tried to stay a step ahead of the public by initiating high-profile but self-serving anticorruption measures.

By focusing heavily on personal leadership, Rotberg implicitly acknowledges such phenomena without directly grappling with their implications. He thus circles around a crucial question: What is the relationship between kleptocracy and democratic practice? Modern democracy, after all, was developed as a means of guaranteeing government in the public interest. And yet an uncomfortable number of the leaders of Rotberg's "most improved" countries are authoritarians. If firm leadership from the top is so critical to reform, is it even possible for a democracy that has grown systemically corrupt to change course?

The United States has become a testing ground for that question. The country's slide into a kind of genteel kleptocracy began many years ago, arguably in the 1980s, when deregulation fever hit. The lobbying profession exploded, and industries began writing legislation affecting their sectors; public services such as incarceration and war fighting were privatized; the brakes on money in politics were released; and presidents began filling top regulatory positions with bankers. An economy of transactional exchanges took hold in Washington.

Last year was a watershed in this process. In June, the Supreme Court dramatically narrowed the legal definition of bribery when it overturned the corruption conviction of former Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell. Meanwhile, supporters of the Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton—including many progressive advocates of campaign finance reform—could be heard defending the propriety of questionable foreign donations to the Clinton Foundation. Although Trump's supporters may think otherwise, his victory and ascent to the White House did not represent regime change; they represented very much more of the same, with a president who has invited top corporate executives not merely to provide advice or draft legislation but also to actually join his team. Such a presidency will only cement the system rigging Trump once decried.

For Americans, as for the people of so many of the countries Rotberg discusses, the expulsion of one individual at the top will not be enough to repair the damaged republic. Americans should not fool themselves into thinking that all they must do is see Trump impeached or get out the vote for a standard Democratic or Republican alternative in 2020. The network that Trump is anchoring in Washington is exploiting a system that Americans have all allowed to evolve and from which they have averted their eyes. That network is empowered now and will prove resilient.

TURNING THE TIDE

I am a bit skeptical of "tool kit" approaches to fixing such deep-seated problems. But if a committed reformer (or, ideally, a network of reformers) were able to capitalize on the widespread indignation at the United States' brand of kleptocratic governance and gain power, he or she should focus less on punishing overt corruption after the fact than on establishing behavioral norms that would head off such wrongdoing before it takes place. This reform movement would bring an end to the practice of writing the rules of the political and economic games in ways that favor those who have already amassed excessive power in both domains. It would craft and enforce the rules so as to afford a dignified living

to those who perform underappreciated tasks (schoolteachers, those who care for the elderly, small farmers) or who have chosen to build their lives around nonmonetary values.

A policy program to achieve that kind of change would begin with placing sharp curbs on campaign contributions and ending the anonymity that many significant political donors enjoy. Shifting to public-only financing for campaigns may seem radical, but that would be the best solution. Lobbying regulations must be tightened and fiercely enforced. Conflicts of interest must be defined more broadly. Ethical breaches must be swiftly sanctioned in a rigidly nonpartisan fashion, so as to change the incentive structure that currently rewards impropriety and not simply single out isolated offenders. Recent events have demonstrated that the gentleman's agreement governing the ethical practices of officeholders is toothless in the face of a determined violator. Unfortunately, it is now clear that the U.S. Office of Government Ethics needs disciplinary, not just advisory, powers. In general, federal regulatory agencies must be provided with more resources and independence, not less.

But behavioral norms are not just a matter of legislation. They are a matter of culture, and those who would seek to improve the integrity of the U.S. government must address the cultural shifts that have made the slide toward American kleptocracy possible. For example, they could devise a detailed integrity pact and pressure elected officials across the political spectrum to sign it. It could include a pledge to release all tax filings and disclose all outside affiliations, to spend a certain minimum amount of time interacting with ordinary constituents, and to work for more stringent campaign finance, conflict-of-interest, and oversight legislation and enforcement. Voters could use such pledges as a base line for rating the performance of their representatives.

Most important, would-be reformers must develop an inspiring vision that elevates values other than material growth and the accumulation of money—a vision that celebrates being satisfied with having enough, for example, or the effort to repair battered people and things, or the nurturing of the beauty around us. They must seek to transform the way Americans understand and measure the success of their society.

What Kills Inequality

Redistribution's Violent History

Timur Kuran

The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality From the Stone Age to the Twenty-first Century
BY WALTER SCHEIDEL. Princeton University Press, 2017, 528 pp.

World War II devastated the economic infrastructures of Germany and Japan. It flattened their factories, reduced their rail yards to rubble, and eviscerated their harbors. But in the decades that followed, something puzzling happened: the economies of Germany and Japan grew faster than those of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Why did the vanquished outperform the victorious?

In his 1982 book, *The Rise and Decline of Nations*, the economist Mancur Olson answered that question by arguing that rather than handicapping the economies of the Axis powers, catastrophic defeat actually benefited them, by opening up space for competition and innovation. In both Germany and Japan, he observed, the war destroyed special-interest groups, including economic cartels, labor unions, and professional associations. Gone were Germany's partisan unions and Japan's family-controlled conglomerates; the U.S. Teamsters, the United Kingdom's Society of Engineers, and France's Federation of Building Industries all survived. A generation after the war, only a quarter of West Germany's professional associations dated back to the prewar era, whereas a full half of the United Kingdom's did. Olson's findings had a disturbing implication: in politically stable countries, narrow coalitions of business lobbies hold back economic growth through self-serving policies, and only a major military defeat or a grisly revolution can overcome the resulting inefficiencies.

Back when Olson was writing, few economists cared about economic inequality in advanced countries; unemployment and sluggish investment were the problems of the day. To the extent that experts did focus on inequality within countries, they did so with respect to the late industrializers, where migration from poor villages to richer cities was accentuating income disparities. Even there, however, inequality was considered a temporary side effect of development; the economist Simon Kuznets argued that it dissipated with modernization.

Had Olson considered inequality, he might have noticed that World War II had two other curious economic consequences. First, the devastation reduced inequality—not just in the defeated countries but also in the victorious countries, and even in neutral ones. Second, these reductions proved temporary. Around the 1970s, developed economies started becoming less and less equal, defying Kuznets' celebrated hypothesis.

Such puzzles lie at the heart of *The Great Leveler*, an impressive new book

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by the historian Walter Scheidel. Scheidel proposes that ever since foraging gave way to agriculture, high and rising inequality has been the norm in politically stable and economically functional countries. And the only thing that has reduced it, he argues, has been some sort of violent shock—a major conflict such as World War II or else a revolution, state collapse, or a pandemic. After each such shock, he writes, "the gap between the haves and the have-nots had shrunk, sometimes dramatically." Alas, the effect was invariably short lived, and the restoration of stability initiated a new period of rising inequality.

Today, the risk of violent shocks has fallen considerably. Nuclear deterrence has made great-power war unthinkable, the decline of communism has rendered wealth-leveling revolutions unlikely, powerful government institutions have staved off the risk of state collapse in the developed world, and modern medicine has kept pandemics at bay. However welcome such changes may be, Scheidel says, they cast "serious doubt on the feasibility of future leveling." Indeed, he expects economic inequality to keep rising for the foreseeable future.

The Great Leveler should set off loud alarm bells. Scheidel is right to call on the world's elites to find ways to equalize opportunities, and to do so before driverless cars, automated stores, and other technological advances complicate the task. The bloody history he

recounts suggests that reducing inequality will be difficult, even in the best of circumstances. But he also exaggerates his case; there are reasons to believe that societies can reform without an instigating catastrophe.

THE MARCH OF INEQUALITY

Jumping across civilizations and eras, *The Great Leveler* finds example after example of periods of rising inequality punctuated by cataclysmic events that suddenly flattened distributions of income and wealth. The range of evidence is breathtaking. Scheidel tracks the distribution of wealth between 6000 BC and 4000 BC through indications of physical well-being, such as skeletal height and the incidence of dental lesions; signs of conspicuous consumption, such as



lavish burials; and evidence of entrenched hierarchies, such as temples. He estimates inequality in the Roman Empire by looking at the assets of top officials and influential families, as reported in censuses. He measures Ottoman inequality by turning to records of estate settlements and official expropriations. For premodern China, fluctuations over time in the number of tomb epitaphs, which only the rich could afford, serve as a proxy for the shifting concentration of wealth. Specialists in particular eras and regions will undoubtedly quibble with some of Scheidel's assumptions, inferences, and computations. But no reasonable reader will fail to be convinced that inequality has waxed and waned across time and space.

Scheidel also seeks to explain what causes inequality. Thomas Piketty, in his best-selling *Capital in the Twenty-first Century*, answered the question by arguing that the rate of return on investment generally exceeds the rate of economic growth, causing people with capital to get even wealthier than everyone else. Scheidel accepts this mechanism but adds others. The most basic one involves predation. Until recently, the only way to become fabulously rich was to prey on the fruits of others' labor. Cunning people grabbed power and then accumulated wealth through taxation, expropriation, enslavement, and conquest. They also monopolized lucrative economic sectors, largely for the benefit of themselves and their relatives and cronies. Exercising all this power—and holding on to it—required maintaining a military capable of overpowering challengers, which itself served as an instrument of further predation. In ancient Rome, Scheidel writes, "commanders enjoyed complete authority over war booty and decided how to divide it among their soldiers, their officers and aides who had been drawn from the elite class, the state treasury, and themselves."

In the modern world, too, authoritarian states with ruling cliques preserve political power and acquire immense wealth through violence; consider China, Egypt, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. Where these differ from premodern states is that they share power with giant private companies. Premodern China had no equivalent of the e-commerce company Alibaba, nor did premodern Egypt have anything like the Bank of Alexandria, one of the country's largest financial institutions. The owners of such companies include billionaires who have become wealthy without relying on violence (or at least without relying on violence directly, since they may support it indirectly by paying taxes to repressive states). But Scheidel downplays the role that private companies play in creating and perpetuating inequality in modern autocracies, an error that leads him to make unduly pessimistic forecasts about the future.

Giant corporations also play massive roles in advanced democracies. In these countries, the military and the police are constrained by various institutions, and politicians must maintain popular support to stay in power. But it is one thing for citizens to have the right to boot out a corrupt administration and quite another for them to exercise that right. The U.S. tax system has plenty of loopholes that benefit the wealthiest 0.1 percent of Americans, but the other 99.9 percent, through their choices at the ballot box, have effectively allowed those privileges to persist. Recognizing this oddity, Scheidel suggests that voters

act against their own interests because of the power of elites. And so inequality keeps rising—until, that is, a shock sends it back down.

INEQUALITY, INTERRUPTED

World War II reduced inequality mainly by obliterating assets that belonged disproportionately to the rich, such as factories and offices. As Scheidel notes, a quarter of Japan's physical capital was wiped out during the war, including four-fifths of all its merchant ships and up to one-half of its chemical plants. Even though France was on the winning side, two-thirds of its capital stock evaporated. The war also depressed financial assets such as stocks and bonds, and it devalued surviving rental properties almost everywhere. In victorious and defeated countries alike, the rich lost a greater share of their wealth than did the rest of the population.

But it wasn't just destruction that lowered inequality; progressive taxes, which governments levied to fund the war effort, also helped. In the United States, for example, the top income tax rate reached 94 percent during the war, and the top estate tax rate climbed to 77 percent. As a result, the net income of the top one percent of earners fell by one-quarter, even as low-end wages rose.

The mass societal mobilizations that the war required also played a critical role. Nearly one-quarter of Japan's male population served in the military during the conflict, and although the share was lower in most other countries, nowhere was the number of enlisted men small by historical standards. During and after the war, veterans and their families formed preorganized constituencies that felt entitled to share in the wealth created through reconstruction. In the United States, the Supreme Court put an end to whites-only party primaries in 1944, no doubt partly because public opinion had turned against excluding African Americans who had shared in the wartime sacrifices. France, Italy, and Japan all adopted universal suffrage between 1944 and 1946. The war effort also stimulated the formation of unions, which kept rising inequality at bay by giving workers collective-bargaining power and by pressuring governments to adopt pro-labor policies. Mass mobilization for the purpose of mass violence thus contributed to mass economic leveling.

By this logic, modern wars fought by professional soldiers are unlikely to have a similar effect. Consider the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: although some U.S. veterans of these conflicts have returned embittered, they constitute too small a constituency to command sustained attention, and few Americans feel compelled to support substantial transfers of wealth to citizens who enlisted voluntarily.

Revolutions, *The Great Leveler* explains, act a lot like wars when it comes to redistribution: they equalize access to resources only insofar as they involve violence. The communist revolutions that rocked Russia in 1917 and China beginning in 1945 were extremely bloody events. In just a few years, the revolutionaries eliminated private ownership of land, nationalized nearly all businesses, and destroyed the elite through mass deportations, imprisonment, and executions. All of this substantially leveled wealth. The same cannot be said for relatively bloodless revolutions, which had much smaller economic effects. For example, although the Mexican

Revolution, which began in 1910, did lead to the reallocation of some land, the process was spread across six decades, and the parcels handed out were generally poor in quality. The revolutionaries were too nonviolent to destroy the elite, who regrouped quickly and managed to water down the ensuing reforms. In the absence of mass violence concentrated in a short period of time, Scheidel infers, it is impossible to meaningfully redistribute wealth or substantially equalize economic opportunity.

Indeed, Scheidel doubts whether gradual, consensual, and peaceful paths to greater equality exist. One might imagine that education lowers inequality by giving the poor a chance to rise above their parents' station. But Scheidel points out that in postindustrial economies, elite schools disproportionately serve the children of privileged parents, and assortative mating—the tendency of people to marry their socioeconomic peers—magnifies the resulting inequalities. Likewise, one might expect financial crises to act as another brake on wealth concentration, since they usually hit the superrich the hardest. But such crises tend to have only a temporary effect on elite wealth. The 1929 stock market crash, which permanently destroyed countless huge fortunes, was the exception to the rule. The crisis of 2008—which most wealthy investors recovered from in just a few years—was much more typical.

Scheidel argues that the democratic process cannot be counted on to reduce inequality, either. Even in countries with free and fair elections, the formation of bottom-up coalitions that support redistribution is rare. Indeed, the poor generally fail to coalesce around leaders who pursue egalitarian policies. Scheidel doesn't go into much detail about why, but the problem is largely one of coordination. According to the theory of collective action (popularized by Olson, as it happens), the larger a coalition, the harder it is to organize. This means that because of numbers alone, the bottom 50 percent will always have a harder time mobilizing around a common goal than will the top 0.1 percent. It's not just that the incentives to free-ride are larger in big groups; in addition, priorities within them can be more diverse. Most Americans agree on the need for education reform, but that majority disagrees hopelessly on the details.

Yet another obstacle to reform lies in efforts to discourage the bottom 50 percent from mobilizing. Across the world, elites have promoted ideologies that focus the poor's attention on noneconomic flash points, such as culture, ethnicity, and religion. They also spread conspiracy theories that attribute chronic inequalities to evildoers, real or imagined. Today's populist politicians—both the right-wing and the left-wing varieties—demonize particular groups, thereby deflecting attention from genuine sources of economic inequality. For U.S. President Donald Trump and France's Marine Le Pen, it is immigrants; for U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders and France's Jean-Luc Mélenchon, it is corporations. Even elites who disavow populism deflect attention from the real problems. Many American academics, for example, champion affirmative action, which tends to favor the wealthiest minorities and makes no real dent in inequality. Given all these barriers to reform, Scheidel's pessimism can seem well founded.

EQUALITY IN PEACE?

But Scheidel's own narrative also offers cause for hope: as *The Great Leveler* acknowledges, some countries have found ways to reduce inequality without a catastrophe. In the 1950s, Scheidel reports, South Korea undertook land redistribution in order to mollify its peasants and discourage them from allying with communist North Korea. During the same period, Taiwan, fearing an invasion from mainland China, ushered in similar reforms to consolidate domestic support. Both places thus managed to promote equality peacefully, in order to prevent violence that would have proved far costlier for elites. Scheidel explains away these cases by noting that World War II and the Korean War empowered the masses and softened the elites. Yet he also notes that Mesopotamian rulers from 2400 BC to 1600 BC repeatedly provided debt relief to counter potential instability. Although these resets did nothing to right the structural sources of inequality, they managed to keep economic disparities within bounds.

Scheidel could also have mentioned an instructive case from the Ottoman Empire. From the fourteenth century onward, Ottoman sultans regularly expropriated their subjects, including merchants, soldiers, and state officials. In the empire's heyday, the sixteenth century, abrogating that privilege would have been unthinkable. But beginning in the late eighteenth century, the economic, technological, and military rise of Europe caused the sultanate to worry that keeping that privilege in place would hold back economic growth, encourage secessions, and set the stage for foreign occupation. And so in 1839, Sultan Abdulmecid I peacefully gave up this privilege, along with several others that Ottoman elites had enjoyed for centuries. A few years later, he reformed the judicial system, setting up secular courts available to people of all faiths as an alternative to Islamic courts, which, by discriminating against commoners and non-Muslims, had long contributed to inequality.

In all these cases, the beneficiaries of entrenched privileges, recognizing a looming existential threat, chose to undertake reforms. Today's populist surge does not yet pose a serious threat to the fortunes of the very rich. But if Scheidel's forecast of ever-worsening inequality materializes, that might change. The trigger could come from, say, a takeover in some G-7 country by radical redistributionists. At that point, elites might form political coalitions to pursue top-down reforms now considered hopelessly unrealistic. In times of peace and stability, as Olson recognized in *The Rise and Decline of Nations*, elites form self-serving coalitions to increase their wealth. Faced with the possibility of losing all, they might do the same to stave off a more drastic redistribution.

As with any collective action, free-riding could get in the way. Certain superrich individuals might choose to let other elites bear the burdens involved in lessening inequality, such as funding a new bipartisan coalition, and if there were enough free riders, the overall effort would fail. Yet the very nature of rising inequality would lessen the disincentives to cooperate: the more wealth gets concentrated at the top, the smaller the number of people who must get organized to form a movement committed to slashing inequality. In the United States today, there are just over 100

decabillionaires—people with 11-digit net worths; if only half of them formed a political bloc aimed at raising estate taxes to equalize educational opportunities, the effort would likely gain traction.

There is another reason to scale down the pessimism, and it has to do with the relative salience of various types of inequality. *The Great Leveler* focuses on inequality within nations, paying little attention to inequality among nations. But the latter is becoming increasingly relevant to human happiness. Just as mass transportation made national disparities matter to people whose frame of reference had previously been limited to their own local communities, so the Internet is heightening the relevance of international disparities. It means more to today's Chinese, Egyptians, and Mexicans than it did to their grandparents that they are generally poorer than Americans. Technologies that give people in the developing world greater contact with people in the developed world—from video chat to online universities—promise to make such global differences matter even more, thus reducing the significance of the national inequality on which Scheidel focuses.

The good news is that global inequality has lessened dramatically since World War II, even as income and wealth have become more concentrated within individual countries. With economically underdeveloped countries growing more rapidly than developed countries—in large part thanks to falling trade barriers in the developed world—the gaps between people in different countries has narrowed. As late as 1975, half of the planet's population lived below today's poverty line of $1.90 a day, which the World Bank considers extreme poverty. That proportion has now fallen to ten percent. Countries that entered the early stages of industrialization just a few decades ago, from India and Malaysia to Chile and Mexico, now export high-tech goods. For anyone who finishes reading *The Great Leveler* in a state of despair, these massive and rapid transformations, achieved in a remarkably peaceful era, offer grounds for hope.

The Nuclear Option

Renewables Can't Save the Planet—but Uranium Can

Michael Shellenberger

Energy and Civilization: A History
BY VACLAV SMIL. MIT Press, 2017, 552 pp.

Around the world, the transition from fossil fuels to renewable sources of energy appears to finally be under way. Renewables were first promoted in the 1960s and 1970s as a way for people to get closer to nature and for countries to achieve energy independence. Only recently have people come to see adopting them as crucial to preventing global warming. And only in the last ten years has the proliferation of solar and wind farms persuaded much of the public that such a transition is possible. In December 2014, 78 percent of respondents to a large global survey by Ipsos agreed with the statement "In the future, renewable energy sources will be able to fully replace fossil fuels."

Toward the end of his sweeping new history, *Energy and Civilization*, Vaclav Smil appears to agree. But Smil, one of the world's foremost experts on energy, stresses that any transition to renewables would take far longer than its most ardent proponents acknowledge. Humankind, Smil recounts, has experienced three major energy transitions: from wood and dung to coal, then to oil, and then to natural gas. Each took an extremely long time, and none is yet complete. Nearly two billion people still rely on wood and dung for heating and cooking. "Although the sequence of the three substitutions does not mean that the fourth transition, now in its earliest stage (with fossil fuels being replaced by new conversions of renewable energy flows), will proceed at a similar pace," Smil writes, "the odds are highly in favor of another protracted process."

In 2015, even after decades of heavy government subsidies, solar and wind power provided only 1.8 percent of global energy. To complete the transition, renewables would need to both supply the world's electricity and replace fossil fuels used in transportation and in the manufacture of common materials, such as cement, plastics, and ammonia. Smil expresses his exasperation at "techno-optimists [who] see a future of unlimited energy, whether from superefficient [photovoltaic] cells or from nuclear fusion." Such a vision, he says, is "nothing but a fairy tale." On that point, the public is closer to Smil than to the techno-optimists. In the same 2014 Ipsos survey, 66 percent agreed that "renewable sources of energy such as hydroelectricity, solar and wind cannot on [their] own meet the rising global demand for energy."

Smil is right about the slow pace of energy transitions, but his skepticism of renewables does not go far enough. Solar and wind power are unlikely to ever provide more than a small fraction of the world's energy; they are too diffuse and unreliable. Nor can hydroelectric

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power, which currently produces just 2.4 percent of global energy, replace fossil fuels, as most of the world's rivers have already been dammed. Yet if humanity is to avoid ecological catastrophe, it must find a way to wean itself off fossil fuels.

Smil suggests that the world should achieve this by sharply cutting energy consumption per capita, something environmental groups have advocated for the last 40 years. But over that period, per capita energy consumption has risen in developed and developing countries alike. And for good reason: greater energy consumption allows vastly improved standards of living. Attempting to reverse that trend would guarantee misery for much of the world. The solution lies in nuclear power, which Smil addresses only briefly and inadequately. Nuclear power is far more efficient than renewable sources of energy and far safer and cleaner than burning fossil fuels. As a result, it offers the only way for humanity to both significantly reduce its environmental impact and lift every country out of poverty.

ENERGY'S HISTORY

Few scholars dominate a field of interdisciplinary study the way Smil does that of energy, on which he has published over 20 books. *Energy and Civilization* synthesizes his canon, offering a broad picture of the evolution of *Homo sapiens*, the rise of agriculture, and the very recent emergence of a high-energy industrial civilization.

The core of Smil's argument is that the history of human evolution and development is one of converting ever-larger amounts of energy into ever more wealth and power, allowing human societies to grow ever more complex. "To generalize, across millennia, that higher socioeconomic complexity requires higher and more efficiently used inputs of energy is to describe indisputable reality," Smil writes. That striving for more energy began with prehuman foragers, who craved energy-dense foods, such as oils and animal fats, which contain two to five times as much energy by mass as protein and ten to 40 times as much as fruits and vegetables. The harnessing of fire let prehumans consume more animal fats and proteins, allowing their intestinal tracts to shrink (since cooked food requires less digestion) and their brains to grow. The final outcome was the human brain, which demands twice as much energy by mass as the brains of other primates.

Around 10,000 years ago, humans gradually started to shift from foraging for food to farming and began to tap new forms of energy, including domesticated animals for plowing, wind for powering mills, and human and animal waste for fertilization. Permanent farms allowed human societies to grow in size and power. "Even an ordinary staple grain harvest could feed, on the average, ten times as many people as the same area used by shifting farmers," Smil notes. Yet those societies' individual members saw little benefit. Smil records the remarkable fact that "there is no clear upward trend in per capita food supply across the millennia of traditional farming." A Chinese peasant ate about as much in 1950, before the arrival of synthetic fertilizers and pumped irrigation, as his fourth-century ancestor.

That's in part because for most of human history, societies increased their food and energy production only when they were forced to, by factors such as

Death panels: a solar farm in Yinchuan, China, April 2017

CHINA STRINGER NETWORK / REUTERS

rising population or worsening soils. Even in the face of recurrent famines, farmers consistently postponed attempts to increase production, because doing so would have required greater exertion and longer hours.

Then, as farming became more productive in England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, farmers were freed up to move to the city and work in manufacturing. Urbanization and industrialization required a far larger leap in energy consumption than the one involved in moving from foraging to agriculture. The shift was made possible by a rapid increase in coal mining. Coal offered roughly twice as much energy by weight as wood and by the mid- to late nineteenth century provided half of all the fuel consumed in Europe and the United States. Despite the obvious benefits, the transition from biomass to fossil fuels is not yet complete. In India, 75 percent of the rural population still relies on dung for cooking, despite a push by the Indian government and international agencies to replace it with liquefied petroleum gas. And as Smil points out, thanks to population growth, humans today use more wood for fuel that at any other time in history.

The transition from a low-energy, biomass-dependent agricultural life to a high-energy, fossil-fuel-dependent industrial one came at a high human and environmental cost but also delivered significant progress. As terrible as industrial capitalism, particularly in its early forms, could be for factory workers, it was usually an improvement over what came before it, as Smil documents in a series of delightful boxes peppered throughout the book that feature obscure old texts reminding the reader of the brutality of

daily life before and during the Industrial Revolution. "Ye gods, what a set of men I saw!" wrote the second-century Roman scholar Lucius Apuleius, describing Roman mill slaves. "Their skins were seamed all over with marks of the lash, their scarred backs were shaded rather than covered with tattered frocks."

The shift from wood to coal was, especially in its early years, painful for many workers. In another box, Smil quotes from "An Inquiry Into the Condition of the Women Who Carry Coals Under Ground in Scotland," published in 1812. "The mother sets out first, carrying a lighted candle in her teeth; the girls follow . . . with weary steps and slow, ascend the stairs, halting occasionally to draw breath. . . . It is no uncommon thing to see them . . . weeping most bitterly, from the excessive severity of labor." Yet as cruel as coal mining could be, over time it helped liberate humans from agricultural drudgery, increase productivity, raise living standards, and, at least in developed nations, reduce reliance on wood for fuel, allowing reforestation and the return of wildlife.

WHY RENEWABLES CAN'T WORK

Smil argues that moving to renewable sources of energy will likely be a slow process, but he never addresses just how different such a move would be from past energy transitions. Almost every time a society has replaced one source of energy with another, it has shifted to a more reliable and energy-dense fuel. (The one exception, natural gas, has a larger volume than coal, but extracting it does far less environmental damage.) Replacing fossil fuels with renewables would mean moving to fuels that are less reliable and more diffuse.

Many advocates of renewables argue that hydroelectric power can solve this problem. They suggest that upgraded dams could supplement the unreliable electricity from solar and wind power, yet there are not nearly enough dams in the world to hold the necessary energy. In a study published in June in the *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, a team of energy and climate researchers found that the most prominent proposal for shifting the United States to completely renewable energy had inflated estimates of U.S. hydroelectric capacity tenfold. Without the exaggerated numbers, there is no renewable energy source to replace the power generated from the sun and the wind during the long stretches of time when the sun doesn't shine and the wind doesn't blow.

Moreover, all three previous energy transitions resulted in what's known as "dematerialization": the new fuels produced the same amount of energy using far fewer natural resources. By contrast, a transition from fossil fuels to solar or wind power, biomass, or hydroelectricity would require rematerialization—the use of more natural resources—since sunlight, wind, organic matter, and water are all far less energy dense than oil and gas.

Basic physics predicts that that rematerialization would significantly increase the environmental effects of generating energy. Although these would not be uniformly negative, many would harm the environment. Defunct solar panels, for example, are often shipped to poor countries without adequate environmental safeguards, where the toxic heavy metals they contain can leach into water supplies.

Given that Smil has done more than anyone to explain the relationship between

energy density and environmental impact, it's surprising that he spends so little time on this problem as it relates to renewables. In 2015, Smil published an entire book, *Power Density*, on the general subject, showing how large cities depend on dense fuels and electricity. Renewables, he concluded, are too diffuse and unreliable to meet the vast material demands of skyscrapers, subways, and millions of people living and working close together. Yet he fails to mention this obstacle when discussing the fourth energy transition in his new book.

THE POWER OF THE ATOM

In both *Energy and Civilization* and *Power Density*, Smil introduces the concept of "energy return on energy investment" (EROEI), the ratio of energy produced to the energy needed to generate it. But Smil again fails to explain the concept's implications for renewable energy. In *Power Density*, Smil points to a study of EROEI published in 2013 by a team of German scientists who calculated that solar power and biomass have EROEIs of just 3.9 and 3.5, respectively, compared with 30 for coal and 75 for nuclear power. The researchers also concluded that for high-energy societies, such as Germany and the United States, energy sources with EROEIs of less than seven are not economically viable. Nuclear power is thus the only plausible clean option for developed economies.

Taking the rest of the world into account strengthens the case for nuclear power even further. Since two billion humans still depend on wood and dung to cook their supper, Smil notes that "much more energy will be needed during the coming generations to extend decent life to the majority of a still growing global population." But he goes on to claim that the environmental consequences of dramatically increasing global energy consumption are "unacceptable." He might be right if the increase were achieved with fossil fuels. But if every country moved up the energy ladder—from wood and dung to fossil fuels and from fossil fuels to uranium—all humans could achieve, or even surpass, Western levels of energy consumption while reducing global environmental damage below today's levels.

That's because far more energy is trapped in uranium atoms than in the chemical bonds within wood, coal, oil, or natural gas. Less than half an oil barrel full of uranium can provide the average amount of energy used by an American over his or her entire life. By contrast, it takes many train cars of coal to produce the same energy—with correspondingly larger environmental effects.

Renewables also require far more land and materials than nuclear power. California's Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant produces 14 times as much electricity annually as the state's massive Topaz Solar Farm and yet requires just 15 percent as much land. Since those vast fields of panels and mirrors eventually turn into waste products, solar power creates 300 times as much toxic waste per unit of energy produced as does nuclear power. For example, imagine that each year for the next 25 years (the average life span of a solar panel), solar and nuclear power both produced the same amount of electricity that nuclear power produced in 2016. If you then stacked their respective waste products on two football fields, the nuclear waste would reach some 170 feet, a little less than the height of the Leaning Tower

of Pisa, whereas the solar waste would reach over 52,000 feet, nearly twice the height of Mount Everest.

Nuclear power is also by far the safest way to generate reliable energy, according to every major study published over the last 50 years. Even the worst nuclear accidents result in far fewer deaths than the normal operation of fossil fuel power plants. That's because of the toxic smoke released by burning fossil fuels. According to the World Health Organization, the resulting air pollution from this and burning biomass kills seven million people every year. Nuclear power plants, by contrast, produce significant pollutants only when radioactive particles escape as a result of accidents. These are exceedingly rare, and when they do occur, so little radioactive material is released that vanishingly few people are exposed to it. In 1986, an unshielded reactor burned for over a week at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, the world's worst-ever nuclear accident. Yet the WHO has estimated that among the emergency workers at the scene, only about 50 died, and over the course of 75 years after the disaster, the radiation will cause only around 4,000 premature deaths.

The real threat to the public comes from irrational fears of nuclear power. The Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan in 2011, for example, did not lead to any deaths from direct radiation exposure. Yet public fear led Japan's prime minister to intervene unnecessarily, prompting a panicked and needlessly large evacuation, which led to the deaths of over 1,500 people.

To his credit, Smil acknowledges nuclear power's environmental and health benefits, but he goes on to suggest that for nuclear power to be economically viable, engineers will need to make a "breakthrough" in reducing the construction times of new nuclear power plants. But a comprehensive study of nuclear power plant construction costs published in *Energy Policy* last year found that water-cooled nuclear reactors (which are far less expensive than non-water-cooled designs) are already cheap enough to quickly replace fossil fuel power plants. And where nuclear power plant builders have shortened construction times, such as in France in the 1980s and South Korea more recently, they did so not by switching to different designs—a sure-fire recipe for delays—but rather by having the same experienced managers and workers build the same kinds of units on each site.

Despite his skepticism, Smil does leave the door open to nuclear power playing a role in the future. But he overlooks the fact that an entirely nuclear-powered society would be far preferable to a partially nuclear-powered one, as it would have no need for fossil fuels or large, wasteful, and unreliable solar or wind farms.

In the 1960s and 1970s, some of nuclear power's opponents regarded the technology as dangerous because it would provide humanity with too much energy. In 1975, the biologist Paul Ehrlich wrote in the Federation of American Scientists' *Public Interest Report* that "giving society cheap, abundant energy at this point would be the moral equivalent of giving an idiot child a machine gun." "It'd be little short of disastrous for us to discover a source of cheap, clean, and abundant energy because of what we would do with it," the energy guru Amory Lovins told *Mother Earth News* in 1977.

Smil does not share those extreme views, but he is concerned about the effects of excessive energy use. In *Energy and Civilization*, as in his other books, he skewers hyperconsumerism with relish, lambasting, for example, the "tens of millions of people [who] annually take inter-continental flights to generic beaches in order to acquire skin cancer faster" and the existence of "more than 500 varieties of breakfast cereals and more than 700 models of passenger cars." "Do we really need a piece of ephemeral junk made in China delivered within a few hours after an order was placed on a computer?" he asks.

As entertaining as Smil's outbursts are, restricting high-energy activities would do more harm than good. Cutting down on jet travel would crimp trade, investment, and international political cooperation, all of which would slow global economic growth and prevent poor nations from catching up to rich ones. And although consumer culture does generate a rather ridiculous array of breakfast cereals, it also delivers life-saving drugs and medical devices.

A high-energy society also allows continuing technological advances that often reduce humanity's environmental impact. Fertilizers and tractors, for example, have dramatically increased agricultural yields and allowed poorer soils to return to grasslands, wetlands, and forests and wildlife to return to their former habitats. For that reason, a growing number of conservationists support helping small farmers in poor nations replace wood with liquid fuels and improve their access to modern fertilizers and irrigation techniques in order to both feed the world's growing population and reverse deforestation.

Breakthroughs in information and communications technology are leading to forms of dematerialization unimaginable just a decade ago. Consider smartphones. They require more energy to manufacture and operate than older cell phones. But by obviating the need for separate, physical newspapers, books, magazines, cameras, watches, alarm clocks, GPS systems, maps, letters, calendars, address books, and stereos, they will likely significantly reduce humanity's use of energy and materials over the next century. Such examples suggest that holding technological progress back could do far more environmental damage than accelerating it.

Despite Smil's omissions and oversights, *Energy and Civilization* is a wise, compassionate, and valuable book. Smil helps readers understand the relationships among the energy density of fuels, the shape of human civilization, and humanity's environmental impact. The lesson Smil does not draw, but that flows inevitably from his work, is that for modern societies to do less environmental damage, every country must move toward more reliable and denser energy sources. In recent decades, governments have spent billions of dollars subsidizing renewables, with predictably underwhelming results. It's high time for countries to turn to the safer, cheaper, and cleaner alternative.

Terror in the Terroir

The Roots of France's Jihadist Problem

Jytte Klausen

Terror in France: The Rise of Jihad in the West BY GILLES KEPEL. Princeton University Press, 2017, 220 pp.

Since the start of 2015, jihadists have killed over 300 people and injured thousands more in a string of gruesome attacks in European cities. The assailants have driven trucks and vans into crowds, detonated suicide bombs, carried out mass shootings, and used knives and axes to attack, even behead, their victims. By and large, the attackers have been locals, but they have often received ideological support and practical instructions from members of the Islamic State (also known as ISIS).

In his new book, the French political scientist Gilles Kepel argues that among European countries, France has experienced the worst of this new wave of terrorism. Although the phenomenon of Islamist extremism "is not exclusively French," he writes, "the French case is stronger and deeper" than the cases of other countries. Some 6,000 people, around 1,800 of them from France, have traveled from western Europe to join ISIS in Iraq or Syria or in one of the so-called caliphate's "provinces" in Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mali, or Yemen. When they return home, they form terrorist cells. The French-Belgian jihadist network, largely made up of returning ISIS fighters, has proved the largest and deadliest of Europe's terrorist gangs, killing 162 people in multiple attacks in Brussels and Paris in 2015 and 2016.

Kepel's aim in *Terror in France* is to place the recent burst of jihadism in his country in the context of the political upheaval that France has undergone in recent years. He primarily blames Islamist fundamentalism for the terrorist threat but sees it as just one part of a larger rise in identity politics. In his view, this broader trend presents a profound threat to French society, as it is incompatible with traditional French ideals. For this reason, the book is not really about jihad "in the West," despite its English subtitle. (The title of the French version of the book translates as *The Genesis of French Jihad*.) Rather, Kepel offers an impassioned indictment of religious and nationalist extremism in French politics, which, despite the recent election of the centrist Emmanuel Macron to the presidency, remains deeply divided.

THE RISE OF IDENTITY

Kepel identifies two main causes of the jihadist surge in France: the Internet and the emergence of "ethnoreligous fissures in the social fabric," which he believes are breaking the French Republic apart. "The departure [of young Frenchmen] for Syria to engage in jihad and undergo martyrdom there is the natural and concrete sequel of their virtual indoctrination," he writes, although he

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does not provide much evidence to support this idea. He highlights the online publication, in 2005, in Arabic, of *The Call for a Global Islamic Resistance*, a long historical analysis of terrorist tactics written by the al Qaeda member Abu Musab al-Suri. Kepel mentions Suri's manifesto at least 20 times. But as he acknowledges, there is little chance that many French jihadists have ever read it. Nevertheless, he suggests that Suri's ideas inspired a new generation of French terrorists.

Kepel argues that France is particularly susceptible to online jihadist propaganda because of a breakdown of allegiance to the once fundamental French principles of secularism and colorblindness. On the political left and right alike, a defection from core French republican virtues has created "ruptures" within the nation and given rise to a new form of identity politics. On the left, multiculturalism and an insistence on respect for difference are usurping *laïcité*, the traditional French republican ideal of civic secularism. (Anti-Semitism, long present on the French right, now taints the left as well.) On the right, xenophobia and ultranationalism have pushed voters into the arms of the populist, anti-immigrant National Front, the party led by Marine Le Pen. Although their adherents consider themselves adversaries, Kepel sees "right-wing ethnic nationalism and Islamism as parallel conduits for expressing grievances."

Successive presidents have stoked these fires, Kepel argues. Nicolas Sarkozy, for example, played on both Muslim and nationalist identities simultaneously. On the one hand, he gave Muslim organizations the official recognition they had been calling for, while on the other, he turned tough on immigration in order to take votes away from the National Front. In the 2012 presidential election, some 700,000 newly registered voters from immigrant backgrounds—what Kepel calls "the 'post-colonial' immigrant vote"—supported the Socialist candidate, François Hollande. (French law prohibits polls from registering people's religion but not their former nationalities.) Kepel predicted in *Terror in France* that when Hollande failed to help these supporters, they would turn to identity politics and the Muslim voters among them would start supporting candidates running on explicitly Muslim platforms.

Kepel devotes an entire chapter to the failure of economic reform and the effects of globalization on the French population, in particular the descendants of immigrants. But he does not argue that economic stagnation or the inability to integrate immigrants has driven terrorist recruitment. Instead, he blames dangerous forms of Islam. He points to the emergence of ultraconservative Salafi enclaves, which have bred a new generation of violent Islamists. Salafi preachers advocate a "whole-life" version of Islam that isolates Muslim communities and encourages confrontation with the infidel French state, which Salafists regard with "suspicion, fear, or indifference," Kepel writes. And lax government supervision of mosques has allowed non-Francophonic imams to preach on the evils of French society.

Kepel accepts that the French right has fueled the rise of Muslim identity politics by lending credence to the view that Muslims are unwelcome in France. But he charges the French left with "criminal blindness" for failing to understand the

threat posed by identity politics to the French Republic and for casting French Muslims as victims of Islamophobia. He calls this tendency "Islamo-gauchism" (Islamic leftism). Kepel also decries the appearance of new Muslim political parties that aim to mobilize Muslims to vote and stand for office, which he lumps together with Islamists, Salafists, and jihadists under the label of "communitarianism."

American readers may be surprised to see bloc votes regarded as suspicious and even illegitimate, but many French intellectuals are deeply distrustful of communitarianism, the catch-all label for any acknowledgment of religious or ethnoracial identity as a source of civic engagement.

Macron's election seems to run counter to Kepel's predictions about the imminent collapse of the republic. In his campaign, Macron emphasized universalism and secularism and affirmed his allegiance to the EU and to traditional French republican values—and won decisively. (Kepel is a committed supporter of Macron.) But there was enough ambiguity in the election results to support Kepel's view that all is not well. In the second round, 20.7 million voters turned out for Macron, but 10.6 million voted for Le Pen, and 12 million eligible voters stayed home or submitted blank ballots, the highest abstention rate in decades.

RELIGIOUS WARS

Kepel's views have made him a deeply controversial figure in France. (They have also earned him jihadist death threats, leading the government to provide him with 24-hour security.) In 2015, a public fracas broke out between Kepel and another French political scientist, Olivier Roy. In an essay titled "Jihadism Is a Generational and Nihilistic Revolt," published in *Le Monde* just two weeks after a jihadist group had killed 130 people in a series of suicide bombings and mass shootings in Paris that November, Roy argued that most experts, including Kepel, had misunderstood the jihadist movement. France's problem with angry young Muslims had nothing to do with Salafi fundamentalism, Roy maintained. The new generation of extremists wasn't genuinely interested in religion; its members knew hardly anything about Islam. In Roy's words, France was dealing "not with the radicalization of Islam but with the Islamization of radicalism." Groups of young men from poor urban communities were turning to Islamist extremism in a nihilistic rejection of society. In the process, they were abandoning their parents and the wider Muslim community. "They have no place in the Muslim societies that they claim to defend," Roy wrote.

The French edition of *Terror in France* appeared shortly after Roy's essay. As Kepel made the rounds on French talk shows promoting his book, he called Roy an "ignoramus" and derided him for not speaking Arabic. (Kepel trained as an Arabist and wrote his Ph.D. dissertation on Islamist movements in Egypt.) Then Kepel published a critique of Roy in *Libération*, a left-leaning newspaper. Making a pun on Roy's last name, which is pronounced like the French word for "king," *roi*, the headline read, "Le roi est nu" (The King Is Naked). Roy responded in *L'Obs*, a weekly magazine, by accusing Kepel of seeking fame and money at the cost of his intellectual integrity.

Kepel and Roy's disagreement resembles the long-standing debate

Under siege: a victim of the Bataclan theater attack, Paris, November 2015

PHILIPPE WOJAZER / REUTERS

among scholars of migration over whether push factors, such as wars and natural disasters, or pull factors, such as economic opportunities, do more to explain why, when, and how people move. Roy focuses on the push toward extremism, which he believes comes from social exclusion and the discrimination experienced by second-generation immigrants. Kepel, on the other hand, sees growing extremism as the result of the pull exercised by Salafi preachers.

Despite their differences, Kepel and Roy agree that push factors matter. They both point to the failure of the French government to provide opportunities for the children of immigrants. Poor housing and an underfunded educational system have landed many young men on the street, without jobs or any realistic prospects of setting up their own households. Kepel and Roy both decry the dislocation and stagnation caused by globalization and blame successive French governments for failing to address these problems. Where they part ways is over the role of religion, which Roy mostly dismisses and Kepel regards as far more significant than economics.

One significant pull factor is social pressure. To become a jihadist, you have to already know one. Members of a group tend to see themselves as similar to other members and are therefore predisposed to value the same ideas and behaviors. Most jihadists, however, do not emerge from the public housing projects in the *banlieues*, or suburbs, on the outskirts of Paris, where isolated Muslim groups have traditionally proliferated. In recent years, the fastest-growing jihadist enclaves have cropped up in the south of France. In one of the most interesting passages in *Terror in France*, Kepel discusses the

small town of Lunel, near the Mediterranean coast, which has fallen prey to competing forms of extremism. In 2014, it sent more young men to fight for ISIS per capita than any other town in France; that same year, the National Front became the town's largest political party.

As Kepel acknowledges, French jihadists also do not usually come from Salafi homes. The Kouachi brothers, who shot and killed 12 people at the offices of the satirical newspaper *Charlie Hebdo* in January 2015, were French citizens of Algerian descent who grew up as Catholics. Their friend Amedy Coulibaly, who in the days after the *Charlie Hebdo* attack killed five people in a string of shootings in Paris, was a French citizen of Malian descent who came from a secular background. These men encountered jihadist networks not in the *banlieues* but in the prisons of the French state.

Although young men clearly reach jihadism in complex ways, Roy goes too far by dismissing the role of religion altogether. He suggests that because many terrorists use drugs, watch pornography, and eat non-halal food, they are not truly Muslim. But smoking marijuana and breaking dietary restrictions do not matter to someone about to commit the ultimate sacrifice for Allah. ISIS, for example, hands out amphetamines to its fighters to improve their stamina. Jihadists justify their religious transgressions by citing a saying of the Prophet Muhammad that however much a Muslim prays, if he acquiesces to the infidels, he won't get to paradise. Most Muslims see the adage as an injunction to do good deeds. But it serves as a convenient way for recruiters to convert people with violent tendencies and a desire for perverse heroism who are unfamiliar with mainstream Islamic teachings. In their reading, the Prophet was saying that a Muslim who picks up a gun to fight for Allah is guaranteed a fast track to heaven.

Kepel and Roy also disagree over how the French government should deal with extremism within religion. Kepel argues that it should tackle the problem directly by enforcing the principle of *laïcité,* which banishes most religion from the public sphere. According to Roy, rather than suppressing Islam in public, the government should make more room for mainstream Islam to express itself. Doing so, he thinks, would restrict the space available to jihadist recruiters. After the London transport bombings in 2005, the British government tried that approach, paying imams and theologians opposed to jihadist violence to tour mosques and provide "faith-inspired guidance" to young Muslims. The problem with that experiment was that when some of the government-funded preachers proved less moderate than expected, the British government found itself in the untenable situation of having to express opinions on what was good Islam and what was bad.

FIGHTING BACK

As the British government's struggles with jihadism have shown, the problem is not confined to France. In fact, both Kepel and Roy exaggerate the extent to which jihadism in France is specific to that country. Jihadists everywhere tell the same stories about how and why they joined this or that jihadist group abroad and returned to "do something"

back home. Isis' and al Qaeda's propaganda outlets pump out the same narrative, with some localized content, to all potential Western recruits. It seems to work well enough everywhere.

There is also scant evidence that France is particularly vulnerable to jihadism. In March, a report prepared by a committee created by the French Senate to investigate radicalization in the country listed 17,393 people who had been classified by the French government as possible terrorist threats. In the United Kingdom, which has roughly the same population as France, the government said in May that it had identified some 23,000 jihadist extremists living in the country as potential terrorist attackers.

Moreover, many of the perpetrators of recent terrorist attacks in France came from abroad. The November 2015 attacks in Paris were carried out by teams of assailants who had driven down from Brussels. The network included some Frenchmen who had relocated to Brussels, French-speaking Belgians, and two Iraqis who had apparently never traveled to France before. Dutch, German, and Swedish militants were involved on the edges of the network, as well. None of the men was the product of specifically French dysfunctions.

This means that there are practical steps all European governments can take to reduce the likelihood of future attacks. Most important, they must fix the methods by which security agencies evaluate and monitor people and groups they consider dangerous. Thousands of people have embraced the idea of martyrdom, most of them young men. Not all will carry out a terrorist attack, so governments need to distinguish

the truly dangerous from the merely noisy. This is a massive task, and authorities can manage it only with the help of families, neighbors, local mosques, and community groups. Law enforcement should reach out to these communities not because there is much hope of changing the minds of extremists (that approach has failed repeatedly) but because only those close to potential terrorists can help the authorities identify and stop them before they act.

It is painful that many of the perpetrators of recent attacks were already known to the police or security agencies. Often, they slipped through the cracks because governments did not have the resources to monitor every threat. In the short term, governments need to hire more analysts, social workers, and probation officers to keep track of the men and women who have been flagged as dangerous.

But simply hiring more people will not solve the problem if different law enforcement agencies fail to communicate with one another. In the United States, the 9/11 Commission found that repeated failures by the CIA and the FBI to share information with each other played a large role in the country's inability to prevent the 9/11 attacks. European countries, especially France and Germany, face the same problem. For example, Anis Amri, who drove a truck into a crowded Christmas market in Berlin last December, killing 12 people, was already on the German terrorist watch list and was being considered for deporation. But the decentralized nature of German law enforcement meant that the authorities had no idea where he was. Legal restrictions often make sharing information difficult or impossible. Those laws were largely designed to protect citizens' privacy and keep them safe from police excesses. But those concerns are becoming increasingly outdated. Only by breaking down the silos of law enforcement will European states be able to prevent large, fluid terrorist networks from carry out more mass attacks.

Taking these steps would not solve Europe's terrorist problem. But doing so would reduce the number of attacks and, by breaking up dangerous jihadist networks, make those that are carried out less lethal.

Recent Books

Political and Legal

G. John Ikenberry

Democracy: Stories From the Long Road to Freedom
BY CONDOLEEZZA RICE. Twelve, 2017, 496 pp.

At a moment when so many democracies appear beleaguered, Rice's book presents an inspiring dose of hope. The stories that the former U.S. secretary of state tells all advance a central message: the desire for political rights and self-rule is deeply rooted in the human condition. But the book's focus is political struggle and the contingent character of democratic movements: history, Rice makes clear, does not end. She weaves her own biography into the book, reflecting on her experiences as an African American woman in institutions dominated by white men and as a diplomat with a front-row seat to post-Soviet political transitions in eastern Europe and to Russia's failed experiment with democratization. She also details fights for democratic change in the Middle East and in Colombia, Kenya, Poland, and Ukraine. Elections are not enough, she demonstrates: aspiring democracies need bedrock political institutions that create opportunities for people to exercise power. Authoritarian regimes are gaining ground today, but Rice is not convinced they are as strong as they look. Democratic breakthroughs are difficult to pull off, she concedes, but the human yearning for freedom is impossible to extinguish.

The H-Word: The Peripeteia of Hegemony
BY PERRY ANDERSON. Verso, 2017, 208 pp.

In this short, engaging book, Anderson traces the term "hegemony" from its ancient Greek origins to the contemporary era. Thinkers of all the major schools of international relations theory have used the term. Realists employ it in describing the long sequence of order-building projects that the European great powers pursued in their bids for mastery. Marxists use it to characterize the way leading capitalist societies project their power. For liberals, "hegemony" often refers to the distinctively open and rule-based international orders established by the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century and the United States in the twentieth. Across these intellectual traditions, the impulse is similar: to describe a kind of preeminence that differs from empire by resting as much on consent and influence as on force and outright domination. Anderson, however, dismisses the arguments of theorists (including this reviewer) who have emphasized the "liberal hegemonic" features of the Western postwar order as mere window-dressing for American empire. But he offers his views about world order only indirectly, from the relative safety afforded by explaining other people's ideas without clearly articulating his own.

The Emergence of Globalism: Visions of World Order in Britain and the United States, 1939–1950
BY OR ROSENBOIM. Princeton University Press, 2017, 352 pp.

During and after World War II, intellectuals and scholars in the United Kingdom and the United States engaged in a vigorous and wide-ranging debate about the future of world order as the global calamity forced the Western world to grapple with elemental questions about the character of modernity and the nature of democracy. This impressive book provides the best intellectual history yet of that tumultuous era. Some theorists, such as Raymond Aron, David Mitrany, and E. H. Carr, reimagined the role of the state. Others, such as Owen Lattimore and Nicholas Spykman, contemplated the effects of geography and regionalism. Clarence Streit pondered the possibilities of a union of democracies, Friedrich Hayek and Lionel Robbins debated the limits of welfare capitalism and economic federalism, and H. G. Wells and Michael Polanyi explored the transformative roles of science and technology. Rosenboim argues that what united these disparate thinkers was their shared conviction that the scale and scope of world politics were rapidly changing and that new ideas about political authority and cooperation were needed.

Aftershocks: Great Powers and Domestic Reforms in the Twentieth Century
BY SEVA GUNITSKY. Princeton University Press, 2017, 304 pp.

The political scientist Samuel Huntington famously depicted the spread of democracy over the last two centuries as a series of "waves": periodic moments when many countries jumped more or less simultaneously on the democratic bandwagon. In this landmark study, Gunitsky goes further and illuminates the deep connections between global shifts in power and waves of domestic regime change. His book reveals how a series of geopolitical disruptions in the twentieth century created "hegemonic shocks" that triggered movements across the globe toward or away from democracy. In the aftermath of the two world wars and after the end of the Cold War, the United States and western European states became hegemonic powers and catalyzed independence movements and democratic transitions. The rise of German power in the 1930s spurred shifts toward fascism elsewhere, and the emergence of Soviet power in the 1940s led to a raft of communist insurgencies and Soviet-backed regimes. No book has made a stronger case that the fate of democracy is tied to the rise and fall of great powers and the leadership of liberal hegemonic states.

All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the Twenty-first Century and the Future of American Power
BY THOMAS J. WRIGHT. Yale University Press, 2017, 288 pp.

If the U.S.-led liberal international order erodes, what will take its place? In this smart book, Wright argues that the world is slowly inching back to its normal state of great-power competition and zero-sum conflict. What many observers saw as a post–Cold War global victory of liberalism and multilateral cooperation

was, in Wright's realist interpretation, just the temporary dominance of the United States and its ideas. China and Russia were never on a path toward liberal democracy; they were simply waiting until they were strong enough to push back against the West. Wright contends that the triumphalist liberal narrative omits the fact that for large parts of the non-Western world, ethnic and nationalist traditions have been strengthened and not weakened by the forces of globalization. In the coming era of geopolitical competition, he warns, multilateral cooperation will recede and the United States will lose its grip on global institutions. Curiously, despite this bleak prognosis, Wright argues against a U.S. grand strategy of offshore balancing or of managing regional spheres of influence. He argues instead for a strategy of "responsible competition," in which Washington would seek to preserve the international liberal order and would step up its diplomacy, alliance maintenance, and deep engagement with the world.

Economic, Social, and Environmental

Richard N. Cooper

The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas
BY AGNIA GRIGAS. Harvard University Press, 2017, 416 pp.

In the past decade, the development of hydraulic fracturing (or fracking) in a competitive energy market has produced an abundance of relatively cheap natural gas in the United States. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) can be shipped to any country with a terminal capable of receiving it. As Grigas' book ably explains, fracking has had economic and environmental effects that will become more profound over time. So, too, will the geopolitical consequences, as the increasing supply of LNG puts pressure on Qatar, Russia, and other gas exporters and makes it less costly for countries such as China and India to reduce their dependence on coal to meet their growing needs for electricity. A truly global market in LNG is emerging and rearranging an energy economy built on long-term bilateral contracts. In particular, LNG will reduce the heavy dependence of many European countries on Russia's monopolistic Gazprom for gas supplies.

What We Owe: Truths, Myths, and Lies About Public Debt
BY CARLO COTTARELLI. Brookings Institution Press, 2017, 180 pp.

Cottarelli, who once headed the Fiscal Affairs Department of the International Monetary Fund, has put together a primer on public debt, primarily in relatively rich countries. He sets out to debunk a number of common misconceptions about government borrowing, especially the idea that unless a government pays off its debts, it is fiscally unsound or is somehow cheating future generations. He draws on extensive scholarly research about debt, much of it carried out by IMF staff, and presents his findings in comprehensible, nontechnical language. The book reports on how high public debt (relative to GDP) must be, and under what circumstances,

before it becomes a drag on economic growth. Cottarelli also includes an informative discussion of the various ways to reduce the burden of public debt, along with their often painful side effects, focusing on Greece and his native Italy. This is essential reading for all those concerned about current high levels of public debt—and for those who are not concerned but should be.

The Despot's Guide to Wealth Management: On the International Campaign Against Grand Corruption
BY J. C. SHARMAN. Cornell University Press, 2017, 274 pp.

Forty years ago, the U.S. Congress made it illegal for Americans to bribe foreign officials. It took decades, but the rest of the world's rich countries eventually followed suit and instituted similar laws. More recently, many countries began to establish a legal basis for recovering illegally acquired assets in their jurisdictions and returning them to the countries from which they were stolen, usually placing conditions on their use. This informative book documents the sparse success of such recovery schemes, with special emphasis on the United States, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Australia, listed roughly in order of how much they've accomplished. Sharman also discusses several celebrated attempts to get back money stolen by some of the world's biggest kleptocrats, including Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, Sani Abacha of Nigeria, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, and Muammar al-Qaddafi of Libya. In the author's view, the overall track record of recovery has been poor, partly because of weaknesses in the laws. However, the more pernicious problem, he notes, is lax enforcement of the rules that govern the gatekeepers who make it possible for kleptocrats to squirrel away illegally acquired assets: banks, of course, but also lawyers, brokers, and real estate firms.

Adaptive Markets: Financial Evolution at the Speed of Thought
BY ANDREW W. LO. Princeton University Press, 2017, 504 pp.

In this long, rambling, and frustrating but still fascinating work, Lo turns to neurobiology, psychology, and ecology to gain insight into the behavior of buyers and sellers of financial products. The book doubles as a kind of intellectual history of the global financial system and the innovations that have shaped it. Lo argues that modern economics mistakenly draws inspiration from the static quality of the laws of physics—think of the artificial *Homo economicus* of economics textbooks, with his unchanging preferences from which he maximizes utility—rather than from the field of biology, which explores the adaptability of systems to changing physical, technological, and social environments. The book abounds with interesting anecdotes drawn from many fields, including the author's own experiences. (Readers learn, for example, that in an experimental setting, students who have studied banking are more likely to cheat at a game than those who have not.) Lo concludes with some concrete suggestions for how to better align the incentives of market

actors and regulators with the goal of a sustainable, resilient, and efficient financial system.

A Farewell to Ice: A Report From the Arctic
BY PETER WADHAMS. Oxford University Press, 2017, 256 pp.

The surprisingly rapid melting of the icecap of the Arctic Ocean has been widely reported. In this book, Wadhams, an oceanographer, describes in simple terms the basic physics of what has been happening and why and puts forward a brief history of the role of ice on earth. He goes on to conjecture about some of the consequences of the almost certain continuation of Arctic melting, including both some economic advantages (such as increased ocean navigability) and some disastrous outcomes: the release of methane hydrates trapped under Arctic ice, which would aggravate climate change, and the relative cooling of Europe that might result from a southward shift of the Gulf Stream. Wadhams also discusses Antarctica, where, in contrast to the Arctic, the sea ice seems to be growing. The book would have benefited from more material on the land-based ice in Greenland, which is distinct from the sea ice around Greenland and which influences sea levels.

Military, Scientific, and Technological

Lawrence D. Freedman

The Mirror Test: America at War in Iraq and Afghanistan
BY J. KAEL WESTON. Knopf, 2016, 585 pp.

Illusions of Victory: The Anbar Awakening and the Rise of the Islamic State
BY CARTER MALKASIAN. Oxford University Press, 2017, 280 pp.

War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success Into Political Victory
BY NADIA SCHADLOW. Georgetown University Press, 2017, 344 pp.

The U.S. military has little difficulty winning battles, but once it begins to occupy territory, it gets into trouble, no matter how benign its intentions. Both Weston and Malkasian saw this phenomenon firsthand as civilians working closely with the U.S. military in Afghanistan and Iraq. Weston details his experiences with U.S. marines and Iraqis in Fallujah, trying to make the city function, and then reflects on a similar stint in the Afghan city of Khost, close to the Pakistani border. He attempts to come to terms with the human impact of the wars, visiting the graves of 31 marines whose helicopter was brought down in a mission for which Weston feels responsible. This is a book of bitter and mournful reflections, of lives lost, and of failures to think through the

consequences of individual actions. The "mirror test" in the title refers to the moment at which a wounded veteran is allowed to look at his or her "new self." Weston's aim is to force the United States to take a hard look in the mirror after the "heedless, needless" wars of the post-9/11 era.

Malkasian's book is shorter and more analytic but written in the same spirit. His focus is Iraq's Anbar Province. In 2007, after many false steps, U.S. counterinsurgency strategy appeared to hit its stride as Anbar's predominantly Sunni residents turned on the al Qaeda forces that had controlled the area for years. Al Qaeda's defeat in Anbar became a model, with the hope that the U.S. success there might be replicated in Afghanistan. Sadly, in 2014, with the tribal forces of Anbar divided, Baghdad insensitive to Sunni interests, and the U.S. role in Iraq subsiding, the jihadists of the Islamic State (or ISIS) launched their own "surge" and took the province. In making sense of those developments, Malkasian emphasizes the importance of tribal politics, the resolve of local leaders, and the ruthlessness of the jihadists. The takeaways from the U.S. experience in Anbar, he concludes, are the importance of preparing for the long term once military forces commit to an intervention abroad, the need for a continuing presence on the ground, and a sober appreciation that, no matter how well the military plans and prepares, it all might come apart. He concludes by warning not to overestimate Washington's "ability to change foreign lands."

Schadlow explains why the United States struggles with that task: the military does not like the idea of governing. Military leaders would rather be fighting enemies than addressing the security and welfare of foreign populations, which they see as a job for civilian agencies. But civilians unfortunately lack the capacity to cope with the many problems resulting from a military occupation, so the task of maintaining order has to be led by fighting forces. Schadlow describes the refusal within the U.S. military to accept that truth as "denial syndrome." Yet past campaigns offer some evidence that good outcomes can result from energetic, military-led governance efforts—for example, the ones that followed World War II. Schadlow's survey of 15 cases of postconflict military governance, starting with the aftermath of the Mexican-American War, is meticulously researched and presents readers with clear lessons. I would urge policymakers in the Trump administration to read it, but that might be unnecessary: Schadlow recently joined the staff of the National Security Council.

The Causes of War and the Spread of Peace
BY AZAR GAT. Oxford University Press, 2017, 320 pp.

Gat addresses two of the biggest questions in international relations: Why do wars still occur? And is the world becoming more peaceful? His answer to the second question is close to the one offered by the cognitive scientist Steven Pinker, whose optimistic thesis holds that violence has declined over the course of human history and will continue to do so. Gat, however, does not promise that the trend will continue—a wise move, in light of recent events. After opening chapters on prehistoric war, which Gat describes as vicious and ubiquitous, his

book goes on to argue for the importance of modernization in dampening violent urges, which it does by making peace seem so much more attractive. With the rise of U.S. power, the modernization process took a distinctly liberal turn and served as the basis for optimistic post–Cold War visions of a peaceful future. That optimism has been dented. Gat is less than confident that benign trends will continue, noting the challenge posed by more authoritarian forms of modernization, exemplified by China, and the risks to peace from societies that have turned against modernization altogether, especially in the Middle East.

At the Edge of the World: The Heroic Century of the French Foreign Legion
BY JEAN-VINCENT BLANCHARD. Bloomsbury, 2017, 272 pp.

The French Foreign Legion was established in 1831 at a time of disorder in France. At first it was composed of only foreigners (French citizens were able to join after 1881), and a recruit had to offer only a name and a healthy body to join. The legionnaires' loyalty was largely to one another, but France fashioned the recruits into an effective force available for tough situations, especially in the French colonies. A mythology developed around the legion, promoted in books and movies in which the legionnaire appeared as a brooding but brave outcast, wearing a trademark kepi and accepting the hazards of war to escape a murky past. Blanchard's scholarly but entertaining book shows that the mystery and romance associated with the legion had some basis in reality. Blanchard uses the career of Marshal Louis-Hubert Lyautey, who was involved in campaigns with the legion from Algeria to Indochina to Madagascar, to explore the legion's character, role, and fights.

The United States

Walter Russell Mead

The Ideas Industry: How Pessimists, Partisans, and Plutocrats Are Transforming the Marketplace of Ideas
BY DANIEL W. DREZNER. Oxford University Press, 2017, 360 pp.

In this iconoclastic look at "the ideas industry" formed by universities, nonprofit think tanks, for-profit consultancies, newspapers, magazines, and online sources of news and analysis, Drezner offers an engaging perspective on the state of the U.S. foreign policy world. He also makes a spirited, if not totally convincing, defense of his own discipline of political science and takes some well-aimed swipes at the pretensions of economists. Few in the United States are better placed to describe this world: Drezner is a tenured professor at a major university (Tufts), a widely admired columnist for *The Washington Post*, and a former think tanker. Drezner believes that despite its problems, the world of American intellectual debate is in reasonably good shape. Vigorous competition among intellectuals for attention and influence, Drezner argues, ensures that new ideas get a hearing and that well-established ones can be toppled. Although every component of the marketplace of ideas faces both financial and intellectual challenges, it continues to grow, and both

elite and popular audiences continue to engage in the argument over the United States' place in the world.

The Financial Diaries: How American Families Cope in a World of Uncertainty
BY JONATHAN MORDUCH AND RACHEL SCHNEIDER. Princeton University Press, 2017, 248 pp.

Morduch and Schneider carried out a fascinating research project: they and a team of associates worked with more than 250 U.S. households over a year collecting detailed information about how much they earned, how much they spent, and why they made the decisions they did. What the authors found was that income for lower- and lower-middle-income households often varies from month to month, and those variations are responsible for much of the emotional stress and economic difficulty such families experience. For retail workers whose hours and schedules change, or waiters whose tips go up and down depending on the season, or sporadically employed people who endure gaps between temporary jobs, the erratic nature of their income compounds the problems of poverty. The book's portrayal of its subjects often seems too earnest and one-dimensional: the poor are always sincere strivers; big corporations are invariably greedy. If there were any alcoholics or drug addicts among the families who blew their money on substance abuse, the authors don't tell readers. The book recycles and repeats its core ideas more than needed. Nevertheless, its main point is important and holds up well: policies aimed at alleviating poverty need to look harder at increasingly erratic income streams.

The Making of Black Lives Matter: A Brief History of an Idea
BY CHRISTOPHER J. LEBRON. Oxford University Press, 2017, 216 pp.

Lebron takes a deep, compelling dive into the intellectual and cultural background of the Black Lives Matter movement. The concrete demands of the movement for safer and less violent law enforcement are important, he argues, but the movement flows from a deeper source: the quest of African Americans to live rich lives in a society that all too frequently devalues black humanity and blocks black achievement. In his view, the political push for black rights has always been the external aspect of a movement whose center is the inner, spiritual struggle of black Americans to assert and protect their dignity in a harsh environment. A vital element of the struggle, Lebron argues, involves maintaining the capacity to love white people even in the midst of injustice—a position that evokes Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Christian roots of the African American political tradition. For Lebron, to lose that capacity would mean a diminished self; in his view, the Black Lives Matter movement derives its deepest meaning from simultaneously struggling against injustice and fighting the corrosive effects of that injustice on its victims.

Shattered: Inside Hillary Clinton's Doomed Campaign
BY JONATHAN ALLEN AND AMIE PARNES. Crown, 2017, 480 pp.

As Americans struggle to come to terms with the consequences of the remarkable presidential election of 2016, Allen and Parnes take a comprehensive look at the

dysfunctional campaign of Hillary Clinton that failed to stop Donald Trump's improbable march to the White House. It is a gripping read about a dispiriting team. One of the interesting phenomena of recent American elections has been the increasing mismatch between the quality of the reportage and the quality of the candidates; rarely in the long annals of political history have so many good books been produced about such mediocre figures. Anyone with an interest in the U.S. political process will want to consult this book, but in the end, it is hard to believe that the root causes of Clinton's failure lay with the team she assembled. Future historians seeking to understand her defeat will learn less from tales about squabbling among her aides than from the story of the troubled American polity outside the bubble they inhabited.

Ike and McCarthy: Dwight Eisenhower's Secret Campaign Against Joseph McCarthy
BY DAVID A. NICHOLS. Simon & Schuster, 2017, 400 pp.

The rise in President Dwight Eisenhower's reputation is one of the most striking trends in the historiography of U.S. politics. Mocked and scorned by liberals as an inarticulate bumbler during his presidency, Eisenhower has had his strategic gifts, strong values, and prudent statesmanship come into clearer relief with the passage of time. One of the deep stains on his reputation, and a key reason why so many liberals disliked him so strongly in the 1950s, was the perception that he avoided confrontations with Senator Joseph McCarthy, the flamboyantly demagogic anticommunist. In *Ike and McCarthy*, Nichols argues persuasively that Eisenhower was in fact deeply engaged in the fight against McCarthy and even orchestrated a series of attacks, culminating in the famous Army-McCarthy hearings of 1954, that ultimately destroyed McCarthy and his movement. The story draws attention to Ike's darker side: deliberate perjury by government witnesses was part of the strategy that brought McCarthy down. Love of covert operations was a central feature of Eisenhower's "hidden hand" approach to foreign policy. In suggesting that the same tendencies helped defeat McCarthy, Nichols reminds readers that Eisenhower's legacy is more complex and shadowy than some of his more earnest defenders care to admit.

Western Europe

Andrew Moravcsik

The Politics of Opera: A History From Monteverdi to Mozart
BY MITCHELL COHEN. Princeton University Press, 2017, 512 pp.

Toscanini: Musician of Conscience
BY HARVEY SACHS. Liveright, 2017, 944 pp.

For centuries, opera was not only the most prestigious form of Western music but also the most political. Cohen observes that the invention of opera coincided with the emergence of the modern nation-state, and the art form's subsequent evolution has mirrored changes in state power. Many of the greatest operas raise profound questions of

political philosophy. Claudio Monteverdi's operas portray the ruthless political intrigue that the composer saw around him in small Italian courts. Operas by Jean-Baptiste Lully and Jean-Philippe Rameau explore how absolutist monarchs, such as the Bourbon kings for whom the two composers wrote, can wield their power for moral ends. Mozart's three great Da Ponte operas trace subtle shifts in eighteenth-century society and question whether a social hierarchy headed by aristocratic men is truly consistent with Enlightenment values. This subtly insightful book helps readers experience these timeless masterpieces anew.

Composers have not been the only figures in the opera world to take on politics; conductors have as well, including Arturo Toscanini, one of the greatest in history. From the moment in 1886 when Toscanini, then a 19-year-old cellist and chorus master, stepped in as a last-minute substitute and conducted Verdi's *Aida* from memory, he excelled not just at Italian operas but also at those by Beethoven, Wagner, and many others. Other books have analyzed his exceptional musical interpretations and traced his impact on the way we listen to music today. This long biography updates Sachs' two previous books on Toscanini and seeks to be the final word on the conductor's life and times. Much of the book concerns his intimate personal life, which was at times risqué. Yet the author also emphasizes Toscanini's role as the most prominent antifascist musician of the mid-twentieth century. His courageous opposition to Francisco Franco, Adolf Hitler, and Benito Mussolini made headlines worldwide. Eventually, violent assaults on him in Italy, along with Hitler's success, forced him to flee to the United States. Yet he won in the end when, after the war, the octogenarian returned to Italy to inspire a new generation. His life stands as a lesson that artists can be the most visible conscience of an era.

Hitler's American Model: The United States and the Making of Nazi Race Law
BY JAMES Q. WHITMAN. Princeton University Press, 2017, 224 pp.

Historians of the twentieth century often represent the New Deal–era United States and Nazi Germany as polar opposites. This unsettling book demolishes that orthodoxy. It carefully documents how the tradition of racist laws in the United States inspired and instructed Adolf Hitler and Nazi lawmakers in fashioning their own racist policies. Many forget that as late as the 1930s, the United States remained one of the world's most salient models of legally institutionalized racism. Nazi lawyers closely studied Jim Crow laws imposing segregation, denying equal citizenship, banning nonwhite immigration, and criminalizing miscegenation. Hitler himself praised the United States for its record on race relations, not least for its westward expansion through the conquest and extermination of Native Americans. Whitman is admirably careful not to exaggerate the influence of the U.S. model on Nazi Germany: he recognizes that twentieth-century American southern racism was decentralized rather than fascist and incapable of inspiring mass murder on the industrial scale of the Holocaust. Indeed, Nazi jurists criticized their American counterparts for their hypocrisy in publicly denying

yet locally practicing systematic racism. Whitman reminds readers of the subtle ironies of modern history and of the need to be constantly vigilant against racism.

Exception Taken: How France Has Defied Hollywood's New World Order
BY JONATHAN BUCHSBAUM. Columbia University Press, 2017, 424 pp.

Today, global capitalism pervades nearly every nook and cranny of national economies. Some believe resistance is futile. Yet Buchsbaum describes the French government's surprisingly successful defense of French cultural identity in the face of winner-take-all globalization. His book traces in precise but engaging detail France's preservation of its cinema industry. By the early 1990s, U.S. films controlled 60 percent of the French market, and that proportion was rising steadily. Since then, the French state has systematically deployed its power to reverse that trend. At the center of this effort has been a program of domestic state subsidies to filmmakers, theaters, and television stations, all linked to maintaining quotas for French-produced content. Stiff opposition from Hollywood followed, as did a concerted U.S. effort to get the World Trade Organization to ban such subsidies and liberalize trade in films. French diplomats and regulators went on the offensive, forming alliances with other countries, notably Canada, and successfully pushed for the establishment of an international legal right to cultural sovereignty. EU regulations and Europe's ability to negotiate lent France clout. For those who prize global cultural diversity, this is a hopeful tale.

Faster, Higher, Farther: The Volkswagen Scandal
BY JACK EWING. Norton, 2017, 352 pp.

In 2015, a scandal rocked Volkswagen, the world's largest automobile company, when investigators found that it had equipped its diesel-engine cars with computer code that allowed them to evade antipollution regulations. Nitrous oxide is responsible for asthma, heart attacks, and other health risks, and Volkswagen's "defeat devices" hid emission levels that were up to 20 times as high as the legal limits. In the end, the fraud cost the company over $10 billion in fines and restitution. This book by a reporter who covered the story has the vices and virtues of a journalistic account. It is repetitive, peddles cheap stereotypes of Germans and business executives, and struggles to develop a bottom line: indeed, readers never learn exactly who in the company knew about the fraud. Yet the book is nonetheless quite readable—and worth reading for its insights into global corporations and efforts by governments to regulate them. Readers learn how assiduously the German government protects its big businesses from national and EU regulations, how easily large organizations can be directed to harmful and illegal purposes, and how essential academic scholars and independent government regulators are to the protection of the public interest.

The Holocaust: A New History
BY LAURENCE REES. PublicAffairs, 2017, 552 pp.

The Holocaust has become an iconic event in modern history, known to almost everyone across the globe. It is also one of the most widely studied: an interested reader can now choose among a dozen good general histories and tens of thousands of specialized volumes. Rees has compiled a readable, moving, and comprehensive overview of this scholarship, enlivened by vivid first-person reminiscences. He highlights three critical points of historiographic consensus. First, the mass killing was not inevitable. Although Adolf Hitler was a vicious anti-Semite, the extermination of the Jews was not his initial conception of the Final Solution. Nor did the mass murder result from a single, clear decision. Rather, it evolved out of incremental bureaucratic escalation and adaptation during wartime and was pursued unevenly. Second, the Jews were neither the only group nor even the first one that the Nazis targeted for industrial extermination. They pioneered concentration camps to house political and war prisoners and invented the technique of gassing individuals in showers to liquidate disabled people. Third, neither the Jews nor the Germans were passive. Many, perhaps most, concentration camp guards simply followed orders, but some went to special lengths to be inhumanly cruel, and a few others engaged in acts of humanity. And contrary to common misunderstandings, Jews organized defiance and armed opposition, most notably in the Warsaw ghetto. Readers looking for a single-volume history of the Holocaust will have trouble finding one better than this.

Western Hemisphere

Richard Feinberg

Better Neighbors: Toward a Renewal of Economic Integration in Latin America
BY CHAD P. BOWN, DANIEL LEDERMAN, SAMUEL PIENKNAGURA, AND RAYMOND ROBERTSON. World Bank, 2017, 199 pp.

If the Trump administration adopts the economic protectionism that the U.S. president threatened to pursue during his 2016 campaign, the countries of Latin America could respond with "open regionalism"—bringing their economies closer together while deepening their integration into other inviting global markets. Although crafted prior to the U.S. election, the message of this volume by World Bank economists is even more pertinent today. It offers a warning to those who imagine that Latin America has no alternative to U.S. markets and so can be readily bullied into unilateral trade concessions. The authors recognize that advocates of open regionalism—hardly a new concept—have failed to raise intraregional exports beyond 20 percent of total exports. But a cold shoulder from the Trump administration might act as a catalyst. The authors recommend further trade liberalization, especially between Mexico and countries in Central and South America, and argue

that the region's governments should harmonize their countries' rules and regulations, expand their investments in regional infrastructure and logistics, and, most controversial, remove barriers to the migration of workers across national borders.

Puerto Rico: What Everyone Needs to Know BY JORGE DUANY. Oxford University Press, 2017, 208 pp.

Duany, a Puerto Rican intellectual now based at Florida International University, was an inspired choice to write a primer on an island that an important 1901 U.S. Supreme Court ruling described as "belonging to the United States, but not a part of the United States." Duany reviews Puerto Rico's political history, its economic booms and busts, and, most brilliantly, its bountiful cultural production. He argues persuasively that, although it lacks full sovereignty, Puerto Rico meets most of the criteria for being considered a nation-state, including a shared territory, language, and history. A national identity has survived through the Spanish language and through distinctly Puerto Rican art and culture, despite the imposition of U.S. commercial capitalism. But the island's economy is performing poorly, a result of fiscal mismanagement, relatively high labor costs, and the loss of federal tax subsidies. Meanwhile, the population has declined because of massive emigration. In 2016, the U.S. Congress enacted the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act to deal with the island's severe debt crisis. Although it promised financial relief, the legislation was a blow to the island's sovereignty.

Argentina's Economic Reforms of the 1990s in Contemporary and Historical Perspective BY DOMINGO CAVALLO AND SONIA CAVALLO RUNDE. Routledge, 2016, 296 pp.

From the early 1980s through the early years of this century, Domingo Cavallo served in a series of top economic policy posts in the Argentine government. Making use of his insider perspective, Cavallo and his co-author—his daughter, also an economist—seek to explain the extreme volatility of the Argentine economy. They divide Argentine economic history into two long eras: the Golden Age (1870–1914), when governments pursued a market-driven open economy and spent productively, but with restraint, on education and infrastructure; and 1945–90, a period marked by irresponsible populism, distortive state interventions, fiscal deficits, and runaway inflation. During the 1990s, Cavallo struggled mightily to dismantle the populist legacy, but ultimately, the authors lament, "politics crushed policies, and corporatism and special interests prevailed." Why did the Argentines fail to learn the right lessons from their repeated calamities? Reasonably, the Cavallos blame unresolved divisions among stubborn political factions, distributive tensions (debtors versus creditors, workers versus capitalists, rural inhabitants versus city dwellers), impossibly complex and unstable rules, and weak institutions (including a corrupt and politicized judiciary)—in short, a devastating shortage of civic culture.

This is a compelling book, although its omissions suggest another problem: few Argentines are willing to accept some blame for their national tragedies.

The FBI in Latin America: The Ecuador Files
BY MARC BECKER. Duke University Press, 2017, 336 pp.

Before the creation of the CIA, in 1947, U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt turned to J. Edgar Hoover's FBI to gather intelligence in Latin America. During World War II, some 700 FBI agents worked the region—45 in Ecuador alone. Mining previously overlooked FBI archives, Becker, an expert on Ecuadorian history, finds that the FBI reports from that period contain valuable primary-source information on Ecuadorian politics. Since political activists tended not to be very good archivists of their own activities, the FBI agents ironically became the region's historians—and not bad ones at that, Becker recognizes, especially as the agents gained experience in the field. Roosevelt was concerned about Nazi infiltration of Ecuador, but Becker finds that Hoover's agents focused more on local leftists. Nevertheless, Becker gives the FBI agents points for not exaggerating external influences, appreciating the weaknesses of the Ecuadorian Communist Party, and acknowledging the role of poverty and inequality in fostering political dissent. Becker also notes that the available archival record does not reveal any FBI attempts to actively infiltrate or disrupt the activities of leftist political parties in the country.

The Fate of the Furious
DIRECTED BY F. GARY GRAY. Universal Pictures, 2017.

The 15-minute opening sequence of *The Fate of the Furious*, the eighth installment of the blockbuster *Fast and Furious* film franchise, paints an alluring portrait of Havana: the city's bright sunlight, color-drenched architecture, exuberant youth, and ethos of innovation and openhearted generosity. The hero of the series, Dom (played by Vin Diesel), best sums up the defining premise of the Havana segment when he explains what led him to choose to honeymoon in Cuba: "The same things that bring everyone to Cuba: culture, people, beauty." In the sequence's dramatic climax, Dom wins a hard-fought drag race against a tough local competitor, by a nose. The loser is gracious: "You won my car, and you earned my respect." Dom's response is equally magnanimous: "Keep your car: your respect is good enough for me." In that instant, the film astutely captures the essence of relations between the United States and Cuba: a striving for mutual respect. After enjoying the biggest worldwide opening-weekend box-office revenues of all time, the film—the first major Hollywood production to be shot in Cuba since the revolution in 1959—grossed over $1 billion globally in the two months following its release. Cuba's tourism bureau could never dream of affording such powerful advertising. Despite U.S. President Donald Trump's harsh anticommunist rhetoric, the new administration's Cuba policies appear unlikely to stem travelers' interest in visiting the irresistible island.

Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Republics

Robert Legvold

Russia in Revolution: An Empire in Crisis, 1890 to 1928
BY S. A. SMITH. Oxford University Press, 2017, 448 pp.

Caught in the Revolution
BY HELEN RAPPAPORT. St. Martin's Press, 2017, 464 pp.

Was Revolution Inevitable? Turning Points of the Russian Revolution
EDITED BY TONY BRENTON. Oxford University Press, 2017, 384 pp.

The centenary of the 1917 Russian Revolution has brought forth a number of excellent new histories, including these three, which differ from one another in striking ways but all feature superb insight into one of the last century's turning points. Smith's book is the most comprehensive of the three. Indeed, in many respects, it is the most expansive history of the 1917 revolution available. Smith traces the revolution in detail, as well as its prelude and aftermath. Every step of the way, he draws in the many different elements of the period—not just the political tumult but also the changing character of Russian society, economic developments, cultural trends, and the impact of a turbulent international context. Throughout, Smith fairly and intelligently arbitrates the great debates among historians over how to interpret the revolution. Were readers to look for one book to read on the subject, this should be it.

Rappaport's account takes a very different tack. Hers is an almost day-by-day, street-level portrait of life amid the violence, disorder, and drama during and between the revolutions of February and October 1917 (which are together referred to as the Russian Revolution). She constructs her story out of hundreds of eyewitness accounts by foreigners who found themselves in Russia's capital—either by choice or because they were trapped when the paths of escape closed. They included British volunteer nurses, American socialites on goodwill missions, and journalists, bankers, businessmen, and diplomats from many countries. Their diaries and correspondence represent a treasure-trove that Rappaport deftly mines. Her book transports the reader into the melee, conveying what it felt like to be in surging crowds of striking workers as a Cossack cavalry charged, sabers drawn; to take cover as machine guns blazed atop buildings; to witness infuriated mobs turn on the police; to experience the sharp contrast between the uninterrupted extravagance of the privileged few and the exploding misery of most others as the war's costs mounted; and to observe overheated workers' meetings and quarrelsome government sessions alongside the British writer W. Somerset Maugham, who was living in Petrograd and working as a spy for the United Kingdom.

But what if none of those things had ever happened at all? Brenton assembles a team of premier historians to wrestle with the twists of fate that might have averted the Bolshevik

Revolution or altered its subsequent course. They examine 14 such moments, stretching from the assassination of Russian Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin in September 1911 to the radical surge in the Bolshevik regime's ruthlessness in 1922. Dominic Lieven tackles the counterfactual likelihood that, had it not been for the onset of World War I, foreign powers, particularly Germany, would have intervened to strangle the revolution. Richard Pipes untangles the confusion surrounding the "Kornilov affair," the abortive August 1917 military coup that, he argues, "made the Bolshevik seizure of power all but inevitable." Erik Landis wonders whether, had the Bolshevik regime heeded Leon Trotsky's plea to cease grain requisitioning in 1920, rather than a year later, the massive violence that ensued might have been avoided. Counterfactual history is always contentious, but this book embodies the genre's best qualities.

Gorbachev: His Life and Times
BY WILLIAM TAUBMAN. Norton, 2017, 880 pp.

In this combination of deeply penetrating history and engrossing psychological study, Taubman draws on a wide range of sources and interviews (including seven with his main subject) to render every major development of the former Soviet leader's six-year tenure with depth and completeness. The biography spans Mikhail Gorbachev's entire life, up to the present day, which finds him despairing over the direction that Russia has taken under President Vladimir Putin. The book grants the reader behind-the-scenes access to Politburo meetings, Gorbachev's private conversations with aides, and his give-and-takes with foreign leaders. "His strengths made everything possible," Taubman concludes, "but his weaknesses undermined his whole project." The first half of this sweeping judgment refers to the nobility of Gorbachev's hopes, his stalwart idealism, his moderation and aversion to the use of force, and his forbearance (except when it came to Boris Yeltsin, whom Gorbachev came to loathe). But in leading his country out of the Soviet era, Gorbachev was ultimately hobbled by his determination to plunge ahead without a clear sense of what came next and by the stubborn misapprehension that he could reconcile political forces that were irreconcilable.

Everyday Law in Russia
BY KATHRYN HENDLEY. Cornell University Press, 2017, 304 pp.

Law in Russia has long been viewed by outsiders as a tool used arbitrarily by those who rule—an image strengthened in the Putin era. Hendley, one of the most seasoned students of Russian law, would not deny that any country where the law is twisted to serve the political and venal interests of those with power does not live under the rule of law. However, she estimates that in Russia, only three percent of all instances of law enforcement involve such perversions. She does not question the damage done to democracy by such abuses, but she is more interested in the ways in which most citizens typically engage with the law: divorce proceedings, personal-injury suits, common misde-

meanors, and so on. After two decades of close study, a good deal of it conducted in courtrooms, she paints an authoritative picture of how the law works for ordinary Russians and what they think of it. Russians normally try to resolve their problems out of court. But when they do seek legal recourse—and they increasingly do—they do so without misgivings. Hendley provides a fine example of how Russian reality is often much more complicated than those on the outside believe.

Moscow 1956: The Silenced Spring
BY KATHLEEN E. SMITH. Harvard University Press, 2017, 448 pp.

Nineteen fifty-six was an important year in Russian history, not because a war or a revolution began that year but because that is when Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev gave a speech to a Communist Party congress in which he unmasked the monstrous crimes and mistakes of his predecessor, Joseph Stalin. The content of the "secret speech," the motivations behind it, and in broad terms the waves it created are all familiar. But until this book, the intricate and fraught ways that the confession played out in the Soviet Union were not. Smith proceeds month by month, choosing a theme for each: for March, the disorientation of the party faithful and their awkward effort to explain how Stalin's abuses could have happened; for April, the impeded process of rehabilitating Stalin's victims; for May, the struggle of prison camp victims to regain normal lives. The thoroughness with which she introduces her characters lends the account a riveting immediacy. De-Stalinization unleashed forces that the regime could not bear, and which it had crushed by the end of 1956. But the changes that started that year forever marked a generation, one that would continue to chip away at the Soviet system and that would ultimately bring it down.

Russia: The Story of War
BY GREGORY CARLETON. Harvard University Press, 2017, 304 pp.

It is common for histories of Russia to stress how much the state and society have been subordinated over the centuries to the military enterprise. Carleton does not contradict that judgment but turns it around, arguing that war is central to Russia's historical identity: indeed, since the thirteenth century, Russia's capital, Moscow, has been a battlefield in every century except one (the eighteenth). Deeply etched into the Russian mind is the aggrieved sense that the country's fate has been to be civilization's savior—aggrieved because others, rather than appreciating Russia's noble role, have usually viewed the country as aggressive and barbarous. Carleton explores elements of Russian self-image as they appear not only in official narratives but also in literature and film: the endurance and bravery of the solitary soldier, a people rising to defend the Motherland, the ever-present threat of war and the unspeakable toll it takes. To understand Russia in the Putin era, Carleton argues in this spare, original book, one must recognize the mental and emotional outlook that near-constant war has produced.

Middle East

John Waterbury

Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea
BY SHIRAZ MAHER. Oxford University Press, 2016, 256 pp.

In the recent flood of accounts of radical Islam, this one stands out. Maher's compelling exploration of Salafi jihadism achieves a level of clarity that perhaps could be produced only by someone who, like Maher, once adhered to that strain of thought. The book is exceptional also in its focus on theology: although Maher is a specialist in jihadist radicalization, he dwells little on jihadists' motivations, paying much more attention to their beliefs. Salafi jihadism rests on five doctrinal building blocks that together create a coherent and consistent ideology: jihad (holy war), *tawhid* (the oneness of God), *hakimiyya* (true Islamic government), *al-wala wal-bara* (loyalty to divine truth and disavowal of untruth and polytheism), and *takfir* (the naming of disbelievers). (There are some partially irreconcilable tenets, however, when it comes to the killing of innocents.) This extremist creed reflects core Islamic beliefs. But the contemporary appeal and spread of Salafi jihadism have been most profoundly shaped by the civil war in Algeria in the 1990s, the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, and the ongoing turmoil in Afghanistan. The unending conflict in Syria will lead to the further refinement and growth of this form of radicalism, and not to its demise.

The Islamic Enlightenment: The Struggle Between Faith and Reason, 1798 to Modern Times
BY CHRISTOPHER DE BELLAIGUE. Liveright, 2017, 432 pp.

De Bellaigue is an erudite journalist and historian who takes on a vast subject: the Middle East's incomplete coming to terms with the Enlightenment. His book tells a sweeping story of how the three great centers of Middle Eastern society and religion—Cairo, Istanbul, and Tehran—have ridden a roller coaster in dealing with the West, and he peppers his tale with marvelous portraits of leaders, thinkers, and activists. De Bellaigue blurs the plot a bit by using terms such as "Enlightenment," "modernity," and "liberal values" interchangeably. But he makes a strong case that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the Middle East has not suffered from intellectual torpor but in fact often creatively incorporated and developed many ideas that originated in the West. He also describes, however, a reactionary "counter-Enlightenment" that is now more powerful than ever and whose origins he locates in the 1928 founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. De Bellaigue posits that the intellectual history of the region has been too often told by "triumphalist" Western historians and "renegade" Muslims who have turned on their religion. But his references suggest otherwise, and his own arguments echo those of advocates of "defensive modernization," who in the 1950s and 1960s argued that the main problem facing the Middle East was how to absorb the military and engineering prowess imported from an aggressive West.

False Dawn: Protest, Democracy, and Violence in the New Middle East
BY STEVEN A. COOK. Oxford University Press, 2017, 360 pp.

"The Middle East looks the way it does because the confluence of uprisings (not revolutions), institutions or the lack of them, and the search for identity and authenticity have conspired to thwart" the region's dreams of democracy. So argues Cook, a seasoned analyst of the Middle East, in this highly readable, sometimes chatty, and ultimately very pessimistic book. All four of the countries he examines—Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Turkey—have fallen victim to unresolved identity crises and "sticky institutions" that refuse to reform. Even in Tunisia, often held up as the sole success story of the mostly failed Arab revolts of 2010–11, progress has been precarious. The factors that fueled those movements and the large protests that erupted in Istanbul in 2013 will persist for at least a generation. The United States, Cook argues, had little to do with the uprisings and could not have done much to affect their outcomes; it is hubris to think otherwise. But Cook suggests, somewhat forlornly, that Washington can still play the long game, using foreign aid to foster social change that may alter political realities far down the road.

Arab Fall: How the Muslim Brotherhood Won and Lost Egypt in 891 Days
BY ERIC TRAGER. Georgetown University Press, 2016, 296 pp.

Trager's book is based on extensive interviews with senior and midlevel leaders of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, which in 2012 captured the country's presidency and a parliamentary plurality in Egypt's first free elections in decades. Trager chronicles the 891 days that followed at a level of detail that only Egyptoholics like me might appreciate. Trager asks a very big question and delivers an unequivocal answer: Are the Brotherhood and its offshoots the face of moderate Islam, capable of sharing power in a democratic, pluralistic system, or is the group a totalitarian entity that tolerates no internal debate about its mission of bringing Islamic government to Egypt and the world? Trager believes the totalitarian face is real, and the moderation mainly a mask. For that reason, he argues, the efforts of the Obama administration to engage with the presidency of Mohamed Morsi, a former Brotherhood leader, were misguided and ultimately unproductive, although Trager notes that there were no good alternatives. But if Trager is right, and if political Islam is here to stay, the Egyptian story has bleak implications for the future of the Muslim world.

Fractured Lands: How the Arab World Came Apart
BY SCOTT ANDERSON. Anchor Books, 2017, 240 pp.

Anderson believes that beginning with the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003—and despite the brief promise offered by the popular revolts of 2010–11—the Arab world started a steady descent into wars over identity, as defined by religion, sect, ethnicity, and tribe. Anderson, a veteran journalist, uses portraits of three Arab men, two Arab women, and a Kurdish man to illustrate this process

in personalized terms. He doesn't quite pull it off, but the stories are compelling and well told, depicting jarring life choices in the face of horrifying circumstances. The resurgent "primordialism" that Anderson identifies is captured by an Iraqi Kurd he meets who wants to raze homes in his village so that their former occupants can never try to reclaim them. Sentiments such as that one have led some observers to conclude that only polities built on primordialism can survive in the region. Anderson doesn't take a position on that question. One problem with Anderson's overall argument is that by using the invasion of Iraq as a kickoff, it neglects the 50-year Sudanese civil war, the Lebanese civil war, the Iran-Iraq War, and three Arab-Israeli wars, all of which were steeped in the same kind of primordialism that Anderson laments in today's Middle East.

Asia and Pacific

Andrew J. Nathan

A New Literary History of Modern China
EDITED BY DAVID DER-WEI WANG.
Harvard University Press, 2017, 1,032 pp.

One hundred and forty-three authors contributed 161 short chapters to this monumental survey of modern Chinese literature in all its forms, from the late eighteenth century to the present. Yet the book reads like the work of a single versatile author: vivid, probing, and occasionally playful. It raises to a new level the knowledge available in English about this vast topic, presenting a literary culture more complex, cosmopolitan, and profound than even many specialists might realize. The book presents a wealth of detail about personalities and events throughout the Chinese-speaking world and connects them to cultural forms ranging from poetry, fiction, and opera to pop songs, cartoons, photographs, and film. It challenges much of the received wisdom about how literary history should be written, refutes the cliché that Chinese literature in the modern and contemporary periods has been derivative and mediocre, and opens up inspiring prospects for future scholarship.

Incarnations: A History of India in Fifty Lives
BY SUNIL KHILNANI. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2016, 464 pp.

With 50 biographical sketches, Khilnani builds a mosaic of India's history since the time of the Buddha, paying less attention to the distant past and more to the last couple of centuries. Some of the subjects, such Mohandas Gandhi and the poet Rabindranath Tagore, are familiar, whereas many others—seers, rulers, slaves, poets, artists, yogis, engineers, and entrepreneurs—will be new to most non-Indian readers. As the stories accumulate, they bring into focus the diversity as well as the interconnectedness of Indian society, the strictness of social hierarchies along with the power of individuality, the intensity of religious commitment and the clash of different faiths, the gradual construction of a sense of nationhood and the long struggle for independence. In almost every sketch, Khilnani shows how the past has been remade to serve

present-day agendas. The book reads like the BBC radio series from which it was adapted: punchy, personal, and quick moving, creating an incentive to learn more.

Cyber Dragon: Inside China's Information Warfare and Cyber Operations
BY DEAN CHENG. Praeger, 2016, 290 pp.

As the Internet and social media have surged in Chinese civilian life since the 1990s, communications technology has also taken an important place in Chinese war planning. The Chinese term for cyber-enabled warfare is "war under conditions of informatization." Cheng expertly interprets the wealth of data available in Chinese-language open sources on what this means in practice, including not only the use of technology to gather battlefield intelligence, coordinate joint operations by different military arms, and assist in targeting but also its use to influence public attitudes in target countries, conduct espionage, and gain access to adversaries' military and civilian cyber-infrastructures. The boundary is also blurring between external warfare and internal control. As technology advances, information warfare becomes as all-encompassing as information itself.

When Crime Pays: Money and Muscle in Indian Politics
BY MILAN VAISHNAV. Yale University Press, 2017, 440 pp.

India is one of many democracies, past and present, where voters do not "throw the bums out" but instead pack their state

and national legislatures with people who have been charged with (if not always convicted of) serious, sometimes violent crimes. The money such reprobates can muster helps them gain office, but Vaishnav argues that the two real enablers are ethnic rivalries and weak institutions. When courts and administrative agencies don't work, voters in ethnic or religious communities may rationally prefer representatives who can protect their interests by whatever means necessary, which allows criminal-minded musclemen to shift from merely supporting candidates to running for office themselves. Vaishnav makes a convincing case by telling tales from the campaign trail, analyzing the conditions that breed crime and corruption, and probing survey data that reveal that voters who are particularly focused on their ethnic identities are more willing than others to vote for candidates charged with crimes. His study reinforces the growing consensus that healthy democracies require strong institutions not only of accountability (such as elections) but also of governance, and he concludes with a robust set of recommendations for how to clean up Indian politics.

Japan's Security Renaissance: New Policies and Politics for the Twenty-first Century
BY ANDREW L. OROS. Columbia University Press, 2017, 320 pp.

Over the past decade, intensifying Chinese and North Korean threats to Japan have accelerated a long-brewing shift in what Oros calls Japan's "security identity," from a country that can never use force to one that must play a larger role in defending itself. Although a national consensus remains elusive, the center of public discourse on this subject has moved to the right, even if not all the way to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's preferred stance of revising the "peace constitution." So-called conservative realists have taken over the mainstream in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, new parties have emerged to the LDP's right, the main opposition parties on the left have become more pragmatic about security issues, and the military has gained greater influence. Signs of the resulting "security renaissance" include Japan's acquisition of sophisticated new ships and antimissile systems, the redeployment of Japanese forces to defend the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, strengthened military cooperation with the United States, an embrace of a larger role in collective defense beyond East Asia (including in the Middle East), and outreach to regional neighbors such as Australia, India, and Vietnam. Japan is not reverting to militarism, but it has become a more formidable security actor.

North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: Entering the New Era of Deterrence
EDITED BY SUNG CHULL KIM AND MICHAEL D. COHEN. Georgetown University Press, 2017, 240 pp.

Although the United States insists that North Korea must give up its nuclear weapons, most analysts agree that won't happen. Nor is the regime in Pyongyang likely to solve the problem by collapsing. A military attack to end North Korea's nuclear program is close to unthinkable because of the huge cost it would impose on South Korea, which would face immediate retaliation from the North. What

remains as the most likely scenario, this book's contributors argue, is nuclear deterrence. Although deterrence theory is highly developed, few have discussed how it may apply to this case. The contributors warn that deterrence between Washington and Pyongyang may be less stable than it was between Washington and Moscow during the Cold War. North Korea would likely take advantage of the standoff to proliferate nuclear technology and to increase its nonnuclear provocations, and the lack of communication between the two sides would generate a higher risk of escalation than existed during the Cold War. Because a nuclear strike on North Korea would damage China, fear of Beijing's response would make U.S. resolve less credible. Japan and South Korea might not trust the United States to protect them to the same degree that Washington's European allies did, and they could go nuclear themselves. Deterrence may be the least worst option for dealing with a nuclear-armed North Korea, but it would be no panacea.

Viet Nam: A History From Earliest Times to the Present
BY BEN KIERNAN. Oxford University Press, 2017, 656 pp.

This ambitious survey is pathbreaking not only in its chronological scope (from prehistory to the present) and the breadth of its sources but also in its thematic reach. Kiernan explores Vietnam's ecological diversity, from mountains to lowlands to coastal regions; the country's environmental changes and their effects on Vietnamese society; Vietnam's evolving literary genres; and the changing role of its women. He emphasizes Vietnam's complexity as "a series of homelands" for more than 50 distinct ethnic groups that forged a common identity as Vietnamese only in the last couple of centuries and that even now only partially adhere to that identity. The territory was divided and redivided by successive chiefdoms and kingdoms; invaders came and went. Languages and religions were formed and reformed by migration, trade, and conquest. Although the war against the United States is an important part of Vietnam's story, it takes its place in the broad sweep of history as just one episode in a long series of struggles that people have waged over this piece of land.

Africa

Nicolas van de Walle

Warlord Democrats in Africa: Ex-Military Leaders and Electoral Politics
EDITED BY ANDERS THEMNER. Zed Books, 2017, 264 pp.

In a number of African countries, civil conflicts have ended with awkward transitions from military rule to civilian leadership. Regular multiparty elections have become the norm in most of these countries, leaving former guerrilla leaders, military officers, and other assorted "big men" with little choice but to put away their guns and begin second careers as politicians, asking citizens for votes. This collection of essays assesses how this phenomenon has shaped African democracy. A probing essay discusses the career of Rwandan President Paul Kagame and makes clear

that the strategic skills he developed as a guerrilla commander have helped him entrench himself as a strongman ruler. Other informative chapters profile less well-known figures, such as João Bernardo "Nino" Vieira of Guinea-Bissau, Afonso Dhlakama of Mozambique, and Riek Machar of South Sudan. The book's main takeaway is that the role of such men in postconflict democracies remains generally negative, in part because once in power, they tend to adopt approaches anchored in their pasts.

The African Union: The First Ten Years
BY OMAR ALIEU TOURAY. Rowman & Littlefield, 2016, 260 pp.

The African Union emerged in 2001 as a replacement for the dysfunctional Organization of African Unity. With its 55 members, the AU is the premier intergovernmental organization on the continent. Touray's balanced survey of its record during its first ten years argues that the AU hasn't made much more progress than the OAU achieved in realizing the longstanding pan-African aspirations of its architects, who hoped to promote economic integration and improve national governance. Both organizations have failed in part because their member governments have treated them as clubs for heads of state and in part because of a chronic lack of resources. Compared with the OAU, however, the AU has played a much more productive role in international peacekeeping operations, where it has proved useful to both African countries and Western governments. Touray also argues convincingly that the AU has helped change norms in the region on issues such as the legitimacy of military rule.

Rogue Empires: Contracts and Conmen in Europe's Scramble for Africa
BY STEVEN PRESS. Harvard University Press, 2017, 384 pp.

Decolonization: A Short History
BY JAN C. JANSEN AND JÜRGEN OSTERHAMMEL. Princeton University Press, 2017, 272 pp.

These two first-rate books respectively examine the beginning and the end of the colonial enterprise in Africa. Press' book details the events leading up to the Berlin conference of 1884–85, at which the European powers carved up the African continent and divided it among themselves. The book expertly steers through fairly familiar stories of interstate competition and of adventurers such as Henry Morton Stanley, whose peregrinations in the Congo River basin provided the basis for King Leopold II of Belgium's personal claim to the vast territory. (Press also relates the less familiar tale of how Leopold first sought to establish a fiefdom in Borneo before turning to central Africa.) Press' originality lies in adding a thorough analysis of the private companies, typically chartered or at least encouraged by European governments, that paved the way for colonization. In many instances, agents working on behalf of private firms made deals with local traditional chiefs and kings in the African interior, which later formed the basis for the legal claims to territory that European states made during the Berlin conference.

Jansen and Osterhammel have written a concise history of the end of the colonial enterprise, analyzing the political and economic dynamics of decolonization and its implications for Africa and the

Caribbean. Jansen and Osterhammel usefully distinguish between the nationalist and the anticolonial ideologies that started to emerge prior to World War II. African and Caribbean intellectuals and elites who protested against colonial rule often initially sought only limited reforms, well short of independence; an array of grievances typically competed with nationalist motivations. The emergence of a cohesive nationalist anticolonialism came only late in the struggle and remained partial in many colonies of the region. Jansen and Osterhammel nicely contrast the clear break with colonialism represented by political independence with the fuzzier continuity that has characterized economic relations between ex-colonies and their former rulers. Finally, the book shows that, although important intellectual and political movements in the colonies had long advocated a loosening of ties for a combination of ideological and pragmatic reasons, it was the Cold War competition between the West and the Soviet bloc that really made decolonization inevitable, thanks to communist opposition to colonialism and to Western fears that nationalist groups in the colonies would turn to the Soviet Union for support.

Understanding Eritrea: Inside Africa's Most Repressive State
BY MARTIN PLAUT. Oxford University Press, 2017, 264 pp.

Since gaining its independence from Ethiopia in 1993 after a long and bitter war, Eritrea has retreated further and further into itself. A secretive, narrow-minded elite helps the president for life, Isaias Afwerki, run the country with an iron grip. Afwerki's rule combines old-fashioned authoritarian repression (inspired by Maoist doctrines) with unrestrained corruption: the handful of profitable businesses in the country are controlled by regime cronies—with the help of banks in nearby Dubai, according to Plaut. Because the regime has never conducted a real census, keeps no official economic statistics, and refuses to publish a national budget, analysts have been left to merely guess at the extent of the government's economic malpractice. Plaut has written a well-informed and useful introduction to the country. He argues that the long-standing border dispute with Ethiopia is sustained by Afwerki's growing paranoia but that the Ethiopians have also helped keep the conflict going for their own purposes, even though international law is pretty clearly on Eritrea's side.

Letters to the Editor

DISORDER UNDER HEAVEN

To the Editor:

I appreciate Bilahari Kausikan's review of my book *The End of the Asian Century* ("Asia in the Trump Era," May/June 2017). He is correct to point out my focus on the economic, political, and security risks that may derail Asia's future stability. But his misinterpretation of my argument at several points, although not fatal to an understanding the book, gives a misleading impression of some of its more significant claims.

First, Kausikan writes that I misread history by asserting that Asia never recovered politically from the fall of the last stable political order, the Qing dynasty, in 1911, and that I suffer from "nostalgia for the traditional Chinese order." But to identify a regional political vacuum after 1911 is far from indulging in nostalgia for a sclerotic, premodern dynastic system; rather, it is an acknowledgment of the failure of any successor state to create a system, ritual-based or otherwise, that most regional players interpret as legitimate and in which they willingly participate.

Second, Kausikan claims that I dismiss the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and initiatives such as the East Asia Summit as "insufficiently ambitious" in replacing the Qing order. Actually, I devote extensive space to ASEAN but never claim that it was designed to replace the Qing order; moreover, examining its limitations is not the same as dismissing it. And Kausikan himself then acquits me of his own charge by reprinting my own words to the effect that ASEAN never sought to become an Asian variant of the EU or a dominant political player.

Third, Kausikan makes grander claims for my "concentric triangles" initiative than I do. I never assert that it should become a new regional security architecture or that it should replace the current U.S. hub-and-spoke alliance system. Rather, I argue that Washington should update its current strategy and have a clearer objective for engaging on a multilateral basis with allies and partners alike, linking them in an endeavor to create more durable bonds of trust and cooperative activity so as to promote order and commonly accepted rules of behavior.

Finally, Kausikan writes that "it is delusional to think that the Chinese Communist Party" would interpret U.S. attempts to promote liberalization around the region, including in China, "as anything but a blatant attempt to undermine its rule." I make that very claim myself, but argue that the United States should return, in part, to a values-based diplomacy, to help create a robust liberal community of interests. Engaging with the Chinese people, when possible, is part of that approach, and it is no less legitimate for being opposed by Beijing.

MICHAEL AUSLIN
Williams-Griffis Research Fellow in Contemporary Asia, Hoover Institution, Stanford University

Kausikan replies:

I thank Michael Auslin for his attempt to clarify his arguments. But they still

leave me puzzled about what he considers a desirable East Asian order.

He writes in *The End of the Asian Century* that "in some ways, Asia has never recovered from the fall of the Last Emperor, the Qing ruler Puyi, in 1911 during the Chinese Revolution." Later, he argues that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations could not "ever be a replacement for the last stable political order in Asia, the Qing Empire." Such statements certainly suggest nostalgia. If that was not his intent, he should have resisted using historical references that convey an air of erudition but get the facts wrong.

In fact, the "last stable political order in Asia" was the U.S.-led one. Because that system is no longer sustainable in its present form, the issue that seizes East Asia is how—or whether—it can maintain peace and prosperity by reconciling the existing order with China's legitimate ambitions.

Auslin correctly notes that "ASEAN's primary goal has always been to forge closer ties among its own members." But most of his discussion of ASEAN betrays a lack of understanding of the practical realities of East Asian diplomacy. This is evident from his references to the EU and NATO, which he apparently considers desirable models. The issues are complex, but, in short, it is pointless to criticize a cow for being an imperfect horse.

Auslin argues that I make "grander claims" for his "concentric triangles" initiative than he does. But in his book, he writes, "At its best, the concentric triangles strategy will encourage Beijing to adapt its policies around accepted rules and norms." That is a desirable outcome, but it is also surely a grand claim. Auslin argues that his design will give the United States a "clearer objective." Maybe. But if it does, it will be one that increases the risks rather than reduces them, particularly if coupled with, as he advocates, a greater "commitment to reaching out to ordinary Chinese" to "provide an insight into democratic thinking, to encourage those voices in China struggling for civil society, and to let them know they are not alone."

To think that China would not regard such actions as attempts at regime change and that they would not destabilize the region is delusional.

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A Major Climate Setback?

Foreign Affairs Brain Trust

We asked dozens of experts whether they agreed or disagreed that President Donald Trump's decision to withdraw the United States from the Paris agreement will have a significant negative impact on global efforts to combat climate change. The results from those who responded are below:



Agree

"Because the Paris agreement is quite limited with regard to targets, timetables, and compliance, the link between ratifying the agreement and actual outcomes on emissions, adaptation, and finance is primarily symbolic. That said, symbols matter."

AMANDA H. LYNCH is Professor of Earth, Environmental, and Planetary Sciences at Brown University.

Disagree

"The challenges in decarbonizing a growing global economy that is still more than 80 percent dependent on fossil fuels—and with several billion people still lacking decent energy services—transcend a single presidency, even this one."

ANDREW REVKIN is Senior Reporter for Climate and Related Issues at ProPublica.

See the full responses at ForeignAffairs.com/ParisWithdrawal

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

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