

# globalpoint

## CSS - CURRENT AFFAIRS

SEPTEMBER - 2017



COMPILED, ARTICLES, EDITORIALS & NEWS FOR THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER - 2017

10/5/2017  
THE CSS POINT  
COMPILER: SHAHBAZ SHAKEEL

[WWW.THECSSPOINT.COM](http://WWW.THECSSPOINT.COM) | [WWW.CSSMENTOR.COM](http://WWW.CSSMENTOR.COM) | [WWW.CSSBOOKS.NET](http://WWW.CSSBOOKS.NET)

# DOWNLOAD

**CSS Notes, Books, MCQs, Magazines**



**THE CSS POINT**  
Yes We Can Do It!

**WWW.THECSSPOINT.COM**

- **Download CSS Notes**
- **Download CSS Books**
- **Download CSS Magazines**
- **Download CSS MCQs**
- **Download CSS Past Papers**

*The CSS Point, Pakistan's The Best  
Online FREE Web source for All CSS  
Aspirants.*

Email: [info@thecsspoint.com](mailto:info@thecsspoint.com)



BUY CSS / PMS / NTS & GENERAL KNOWLEDGE BOOKS  
ONLINE **CASH ON DELIVERY** ALL OVER PAKISTAN

Visit Now:

[WWW.CSSBOOKS.NET](http://WWW.CSSBOOKS.NET)

For Oder & Inquiry  
Call/SMS/WhatsApp

**0333 6042057 – 0726 540316**

*“A unique book with an unprecedented utility for CSS aspirants.”*

-Prof. Muzaffar Bokhari (r), Govt.  
College University, Lahore



*“Unarguably the best book on CSS so far.”*

-Omer Randhawa (PAS - 22nd position)

**ORDER NOW**

03334588588, 03324437060

[www.facebook.com/foliobooks.pk](http://www.facebook.com/foliobooks.pk)

[www.foliobooks.pk](http://www.foliobooks.pk)



**PRICE 950/-**

# Table of Contents

## PAKISTAN

Assistance in Energy Sector   Editorial .....	7
Foreign Policy Imperatives By Ayaz Ahmed .....	8
What Does BRICS Declaration Mean For Pakistan? By Imtiaz Gul.....	11
Population Census 2017 By Dr Hafiz A Pasha .....	14
Pak-US: Regional Power Politics By Ghazanfar Ali Garewal.....	18
Evaluating Our Foreign Policy By Kashif Ahmad Mohar .....	21
Pakistan's Looming Water Crisis By Yasmeen Aftab Ali.....	25
Quest For Nuclear Energy By Dr Zafar Nawaz Jaspal .....	28
In The National Interest By Hassan Javid .....	31
Pak-Afghan Ties   Editorial .....	34
Failed Indo-Pak Water Talks By Dr Muhammad Khan .....	35
Peace And Development By Ahsan Iqbal .....	38
US, Pakistan and the APR By Imran Malik.....	41
Growing Pak-Russia Relations   Editorial.....	45
Pakistan's NSG Membership By Dr Zafar Nawaz Jaspal.....	46
Is Mending Relations With the US Possible? By Talat Masood .....	49

## ECONOMY

Pakistan Capable of Tackling Its Economic Problems By Syed Ali Sajjad .....	52
Pakistan Needs to be Part of New Economic Alliances.....	55
A New Look at the Economy By M. Ziauddin .....	57
Is Gwadar A Toll Plaza? By Hassnain Javed .....	62
Can We Avoid The IMF? By Waqar Masood Khan .....	66
Knowledge-Based Approach to CPEC By Abid Hussian.....	69

## EDUCATION

Digital Literacy And Education Reforms By Hammad Asif .....	72
Education: A Solution for Pakistan By Fiza Farhan .....	74
Education Goals And Outcomes   Editorial .....	76
Education Challenge By Huma Yusuf .....	77

Restoring the Essence of Education By M Omar Iftikhar .....	80
The Deficiencies in Our Education Systems By Shagufta Gul.....	83

**WORLD**

Of Hawks and US Foreign Policy By Omer Azhar Bhatti.....	86
China vs. America By Graham Allison .....	89
Possible Results of Trump’s Afghan Approach By Shahid Javed Burki .....	100
Genocide and Beyond By Kamal Siddiqi .....	103
A Reset for Iran and the United States By Hamid Biglari .....	106
Growing Nuclearisation of the Indian Ocean Region By Muhammad Sarmad Zia .....	115
The North Korean Nuclear ‘Crisis’ is an Illusion By John Mecklin .....	118
Rohingya Persecution By Rasul Bakhsh Rais .....	121
The Wrong Way to Coerce China By Omar S. Bashir and Louis T. Laverone .....	123
Another Push For The CTBT By Rizwan Asghar .....	128
The Worst 1st Year of Foreign Policy Ever By Melvyn P. Leffler .....	131
American Endgame in Afghanistan By Zamir Akram .....	139
Will Iran Become the Next North Korea? By Philip Gordon and Amos Yadlin.....	142
Deterrence in US-North Korea Tension By Maimuna Ashraf.....	147

# PAKISTAN

---

## Assistance in Energy Sector | Editorial

Policy analysts are never mere handmaidens to power. Policy is supposed to give voice to the voiceless, and act as a balance in terms of power structures. It is part of their job, and a role that the best of them play well, to advocate the policies that they think right. It becomes vital to recognise that policy must be action oriented, organised around questions of what we as a political community should do, rather than what it should be. It is a concern with consequences. Although excessive help from the World Bank and the IMF are known to have detrimental long-term repercussions, it is worthwhile for Pakistan to seek and receive guidance from the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Policymaking is especially needed in the energy sector of this country, an arena whose failings are clear and palpable. The ADB has agreed to assist Pakistan in formulation of a new energy policy for the medium term covering 2018 to 2023. In this manner, ADB has approved 'knowledge and support' technical assistance worth \$5 million to carry out key energy sector analyses and an assessment of the progress made during 2010-16, the findings of which will provide options for the policy for the next six years.

Lessons learned from the changing global realities in the past years will be analysed, and then new recommendations will be proposed as inputs for a new energy policy for the medium term (2018 -2023). The findings will be designed to inform the government of Pakistan on past progress and provide options for the future energy strategy of the country. This technical assistance is included in ADB's current country operations business plan, 2018-20 for Pakistan.

A dependable and sustainable energy sector is indispensable to Pakistan's economic growth and sustainability. Economic growth upgraded between fiscal years 2010 and 2016, but was still subordinate to the earlier decade. A major obstacle to achieving further progress is the intense energy shortage.

Source: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1495972/assistance-energy-sector/>

## Foreign Policy Imperatives By Ayaz Ahmed

Pakistan has lacked a pragmatic and well-articulated foreign policy since 2008. What is more worrying is that the PML-N led incumbent democratic dispensation displayed an outright reluctance to appoint a competent and astute foreign minister for almost four years.

Because of Pakistan's entrenched foreign policy crisis, the world is rather unwilling to appreciate the invaluable sacrifices rendered by the country during the course of the costly war on terror. This unfavourable situation has immensely helped India make Islamabad's regional enemies friends, and bank on them to clandestinely fan and sponsor terrorism and insurgency deep inside Pakistan. This can be termed as the diplomatic masterstroke of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi; he has somehow succeeded to isolate Pakistan regionally and make the US stop providing military assistance to Pakistan.

Being a responsible nuclear power with a moderately growing economy, Islamabad badly needs to adopt a coherent and robust foreign policy designed to maximise its security and economic objectives in the region. If the present leadership further remains apathetic regarding its external affairs, this will probably strengthen the hands of Pakistan's regional competitors and enemies to systematically isolate and encircle Islamabad in turbulent South Asia.

In effectively formulating a country's foreign policy, both military and political leaderships are required to hold extensive deliberations regarding all possible pros and cons. In Pakistan, the military leadership largely appears to be calling the shots with regard to crafting and executing the country's external policy. Resultantly, this has led to a largely militarised policy with the two major western neighbours of Pakistan. Such a policy can scarcely be reflective of the country's (oft-disregarded) public opinion.

There is no gainsaying that domestic policies and developments leave lasting impacts on the timely formulation and execution of a nation's foreign policy. Pakistan's internal political, socio-economic and security conditions seem to be rather unsatisfactory: the economy is grappled with ever-increasing debts and stagnation; the democratic order is under ominous threat and the monster of terrorism and militancy still continues to haunt the nation. Such obstructive



conditions have hindered the incompetent leadership from seriously concentrating on reforming the ingrained structural flaws in the country's foreign policy.

An industrialised and robust economy helps a nation play a dominating role in regional and global matters in today's globalised world. For instance, Great Britain dominated the politics of European continent till 1933 because of its highly industrialised economy and invincible naval power. At present, the US is playing the overarching role of the global hegemon owing to its industrialised economy and potent military power. And China's rapid rise as a superpower is also due to its industrialised economy and modernised defence sector.

Pakistan, on the other hand, is heavily reliant on its export of agriculture related products. Such dependence on agriculture goods and the dearth of industrialised productions has brought about a deep-rooted imbalance in the country's trade, mostly in the favour of Islamabad's partners. The export of Al-Khalid tanks and JF-17 Thunder aircraft to Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka and Nigeria has proved too inadequate to turn the balance of trade in Pakistan's favour.

What is abundantly clear from today's highly anarchic world is that spiralling insecurity is the major bugbear of almost all countries, especially of the developing nations. So, if Islamabad wishes to play a stronger role in regional and global affairs, then it should steadily industrialise its agricultural-dominated economy and substantially increase its arms production and exports to developing countries.

Given Pakistan's potential resources and its significant geo-strategic location, the country should have been the dominant economic and military power in the South Asia region. Unfortunately, it currently does not have working relations with all of its neighbouring countries except China. Such regional aloofness is partly due to a leadership crisis and partly owing to India's attempts at isolating Islamabad regionally. Our leaders should not forget that the country cannot prosper economically and become powerful militarily in Asia without having effective ties with its immediate neighbours.

Because of our ill-conceived regional policy and sluggishness of the democratic leadership, Afghanistan and Iran have either partially or completely jumped on the Indian regional bandwagon. This has provided India an opportunity to count on some underdeveloped areas of Iran's Sistan-Balochistan and eastern provinces of

war-ravaged Afghanistan to foment and finance terrorism deep inside Pakistan. What Islamabad should be aware of is that India will probably bank on Iran's geoeconomically important Chabahar Port to outshine Pakistan's deep sea Gwadar Port and Chinese-funded CPEC.

Arguably, without all-out Afghan and Iranian military and intelligence coordination, Pakistan will not fully succeed against the battle-hardened and regionally-funded terrorists and militants. More importantly, Islamabad needs the strategically important Wakhan Corridor to access the energy-rich Central Asian region in order to import oil, gas and coal. And Pakistan's developing economy also badly needs Iran's growing market and its vast energy resources to export agriculture products and meet its ever-growing energy needs.

Though Islamabad appears to have abandoned the disruptive policy of strategic depth towards Afghanistan due to the US pressure, both Kabul and Washington are still suspicious of Islamabad harbouring some operatives of the Haqqani Network and the Afghan Taliban in Quetta and Peshawar. Such a policy has so far backfired as seen from Indo-Afghan sheltering of Pakistani terrorists and insurgents on the Afghan soil.

Pakistan should work with China to make Iran and Afghanistan major stakeholders in CPEC by including them in this grand regional economic connectivity project. Having its own economic stakes, Kabul would presumably agree to establish a strategic partnership with Islamabad, allowing the Pakistan Army to train and militarily assist the chronically underequipped, undertrained and underfunded Afghan Army. Moreover, we will also be able to rely on our deepening economic relations with Iran to prevent Iranian territory from being used for fuelling insurgency and sectarianism in Balochistan.

This diplomatic and military masterstroke will immensely help Pakistan take strategically-important Afghanistan and energy-rich Iran away from the disruptive Indian influence in the region. To attain this objective, the civilian leadership should work with the military establishment to provide a clear-cut direction to the country's currently flawed foreign policy.

Source: <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/227848-Foreign-policy-imperatives>

## What Does BRICS Declaration Mean For Pakistan? By Imtiaz Gul

The section on International Peace and Security (from point 35 to 52) of the 60-point declaration released at end of the BRICS summit held over the weekend in China has evoked mixed reactions in and outside Pakistan.

Point 47 of the declaration reflects concerns shared by China, Russia, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey regarding the situation in Afghanistan. It not only condemns the continued spate of violence there but also supports 'Afghan-led and Afghan-owned' initiatives focused at promoting peace including the Moscow Format and the Heart of Asia-Istanbul.

Several other points reflect BRICS countries' continued support for Palestinians, commitment and determination against trans-border terrorism, terrorist financing, and denial of space to foreign fighters as well as desire for negotiated settlement to other conflicts in the Middle-East and Africa.

Point 48, in particular, has triggered a quasi-celebration among perennial critics and skeptics, in particular those who would draw sadistic pleasure over anything that would slur or defame Pakistan. The full-text of the point is as follows:

"We support efforts of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces in fighting terrorist organisations. We, in this regard, express concern on the security situation in the region and violence caused by the Taliban, ISIL/DAISH, Al-Qaida and its affiliates including Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement,

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, TTP and Hizb ut-Tahrir."

Former Pakistani High Commissioner to India Abdul Basit has expressed surprise at some of the reactions to this part of the BRICS declaration. "These terror outfits are already proscribed in Pakistan. They were also mentioned in the Amritsar Heart of Asia conference in December last year with Pakistan on board," Basit has been quoted as saying. He has also pointed out that the Xiamen Declaration mentions the TTP, which Pakistani officials believe is funded by India.

The jubilation by some Pakistanis over Point 48 also drew dismissive reaction also from Chinese officials. Lijian Zhao, the deputy ambassador of China in Islamabad, took to the Twitter to explain his country's position. He said, "BRICS summit is a multilateral meeting. If the UNSC named these organisations, is it such a surprise for BRICS to repeat the same words?"

Indeed, there's nothing new in the point 48. Most of the US civil-military briefings, including those by the commander-in-chief in Afghanistan Gen. John Nicholson and the secretary of state in recent years, have been regurgitating nearly the same content. Having said that, the BRICS declaration goes off to show that myriad of challenges that have been staring Pakistan in the face for a decade and a half remain un-addressed.

The first challenge is to tailor a narrative on our counter-terror strategy and actions that dampens and blunts noises raised by India and Afghanistan. Most of the US leaders and their European friends still tend to use the Indo-Afghan prism for scrutinising Pakistan. Their combined global resonance and appeal far outweighs that of Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, Ankara and Islamabad put together.

Pakistan can offset this imbalance only through an astute and farsighted inclusive approach. Secondly, Islamabad would need to work harder than ever to convince friendly countries such as China, Russia, Iran and Turkey of the veracity of its anti-terror campaign.

For now, all of these countries endorse and support Pakistani actions on ground and are aligned with its Afghanistan policy. Hopefully, key civilian and military leaders understand the intricate nature of international relations: that policies are driven by national interests. The aforementioned countries will stand by Pakistan as long as their national interests would dictate that. Meanwhile, corrective, remedial measures, wherever needed, must be taken on an as-soon-as-possible basis to prevent dents to relations with Moscow and Beijing.

Thirdly, Islamabad and Rawalpindi shall have to pursue an immaculate and passionate but non-emotional approach to diplomacy to mend relations with Afghanistan. President Ashraf Ghani's readiness for resumption of talks after the Eid prayers reopens the window for dialogue. But Pakistan will need to reach out

to its neighbour with compassion and sagacity. Fourth, actions against all non-state actors, including the jaishs and lashkars, under the National Action Plan (NAP) shall have to be re-energised and sequenced in a credible way. Pakistan shall have to demonstrate that it does not consider obscurantist forces as partners for peaceful and progressive development that is in step with the rest of the world.

Lastly, the boon, i.e. China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), can in all likelihood turn into a bane as well if Islamabad fails in dispelling reservations on counter-terror and counter-extremism front by friendly countries. The only silver lining for Pakistan – and it rests on the sustenance of CPEC – is Chinese support to Pakistan at international fora such as the UN. Only sustained and visible actions against religious militancy can help preserve relations with Beijing and Moscow and secure a better future for Pakistan.

The writer is Editor, Strategic Affairs

Published in Daily Times, September 6th 2017.

Source: <http://dailytimes.com.pk/pakistan/06-Sep-17/what-does-brics-declaration-mean-for-pakistan>

## Population Census 2017 By Dr Hafiz A Pasha

The massive undertaking of the Population Census has finally been completed after a big gap of nineteen years. Thanks are due to the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, to the hundreds of thousands of enumerators and army personnel who performed the task diligently and without any delays. In particular, the Census Commissioner must be recognized for having managed the process well.

Given the big gap between the two censuses of 1998 and 2017 respectively there was inevitably some uncertainty about the size and distribution of Pakistan's population. There were bound to be some surprises. During the intervening years the country had witnessed relatively slow economic growth, interspersed with a few years of fast growth. Different regions of the country had shown substantial variation in performance. This was bound to be reflected in the pattern of increase and movement of the people within the country.

The summary provisional results have just been released. There are, in fact, many surprises in the estimates, some of which are discussed below. It would, however, have been appropriate if detailed explanatory notes had been presented along with the results.

**Issues** The first basic question relates to the census methodology. There are two approaches to census enumeration. The first is the de-jure approach in which persons are counted at their usual place of residence. The second is the de-facto approach, in which persons are counted where they are found on the census date.

The 1998 Census applied both the approaches simultaneously during enumeration. However, the data was tabulated and published on de-jure basis for comparability with the previous censuses.

The Census Commissioner has indicated that the results of the 2017 Census are based on application of the de-facto approach. This could create a serious problem in analysis of trends since 1998. The provisional results may need to be modified by reverting to the de-jure approach to estimation, as was done in the 1998 Census.

The second question relates to the definition of 'urban area'. The approach adopted is based on the list of urban areas notified by the Provincial Governments. As such the areas covered by metropolitan corporations, municipal corporations, municipal committees, town committees and cantonments are treated as urban. This is consistent with the definition of urban areas used in the 1998 population census. However, it may have led to some understatement of the size of urban population.

Beyond the above definitions and approaches, the explanatory notes to the 2017 Census estimates should clarify the definitions of 'household' and, 'place of usual residence'. Also given the large number of refugees, where they are located in the Census is of some importance. Apparently, Afghan refugees and other aliens have been counted in the census process and allocated on the basis of their location at the time of enumeration. It is not clear, however, as to how Temporarily Displaced Persons (TDPs) have been treated. Perhaps in this case the de-jure approach ought to have been adopted. Also, there is a case for separately presenting the number of refugees and TDPs by province.

The final issue relates to the role of different governments in the undertaking of a census. According to the Constitution of Pakistan, census is part of the Federal Legislative List – Part-II. As such, decisions regarding the census have to be taken by the Council of Common Interests (CCI), which has been the case. The question is the extent to which Provincial Governments should actually have been involved in the conduct of the census. The explanatory note should also clarify in some detail the role that was actually played by these governments. The CCI will also have to formulate a policy of resolving dissent on the estimates from any province, Fata or the Islamabad Capital territory.

Some of the major findings from the 2017 Population Census are described below.

**Population** The provisional results indicate that the population of Pakistan has reached 207.8 million. Agencies like the UNFPA and the World Bank had estimated the population at 193 million in 2016. The Annual Plan for 2017-18, prepared by the Planning Commission, had projected the population at 198.4 million, almost 9.4 million less than the new census estimate. Interestingly, the only agency which predicted a population above 200 million in 2016 was the CIA of the US.

Pakistan has been ranked as the sixth largest country in terms of population. Brazil, with a population of 211.2 million, is just ahead of Pakistan. The gap is small at 3.4 million. With a higher growth rate, Pakistan could catch up in the next few years. We are doing well in at least one ranking.

The higher population implies that Pakistan is now an even more 'water stressed' country. Also, there is a danger of the forest area of the country being depleted at an even faster rate. The expansion of urban areas could also reduce the availability of prime agricultural land for cultivation of crops at the periphery of cities, especially in Punjab.

**Rate of population growth** The most common prior estimate of the population growth rate of Pakistan was 2.1 percent per annum. The latest Annual Plan assumed an even lower growth rate of 1.9 percent. The growth rate revealed for the period, 1998 to 2017, is significantly higher at 2.4 percent. This is perhaps one of the most worrisome outcomes of the census. It has fallen only marginally by 0.2 percentage points in relation to the last inter-censal growth rate from 1981 to 1998.

The growth rate is also significantly higher than the underlying natural growth rate revealed by the various Demographic Surveys in Pakistan. Perhaps one of the reasons is that the number of refugees and aliens in Pakistan was understated earlier. If their number has increased by say 3 million between 1998 and 2017, especially with the exodus from Afghanistan after 2001, then this alone raises the growth rate by more than 0.1 percentage point. Also, there is the possibility of some overstatement by groups of respondents who know that public resources, government employment, political representation, etc., are largely distributed on the basis of population.

A comparison of the population growth rate with other South Asian and/or Muslim countries reveals the magnitude of the problem. Bangladesh, India and Nepal have a substantially lower growth rate at close to 1.4 percent, while Sri Lanka has an even smaller growth rate of only 0.7 percent, between 1998 and 2016. Large Muslim countries also have lower growth rates, ranging from 1.3 percent in the case of Indonesia to 1.9 percent in Egypt.



The central and most fundamental message is that Pakistan has failed to arrest the pace of population growth. We are not far from the 'Malthusian population trap' according to which the rate of population growth eventually outpaces the rate of increase in food production. Between 1981 and 1998, food production per capita grew by 1.6 percent per annum. In the latest inter-census period, it has fallen to below 0.9 percent per annum. It is not surprising that nutrition levels have fallen in the lower quintiles of the population.

Another way of highlighting the problem of the population explosion in Pakistan is that if the present rate of growth continues, the population will nearly double to 400 million by 2050. Our children could grow up to find themselves in a world of shortages and large megacities characterized by excessive pollution and congestion. Needless to say, population control must now rank as one of the most important objectives of our policies and programmes.

The next article will focus on the results of the census regarding the sex ratio, share of urban population, growth of Provinces and cities and the trend in household size. The implications of these magnitudes will be highlighted.

(The writer is Professor Emeritus and a former Federal Minister)

Source: <http://fp.brecorder.com/2017/09/20170905215336/>

# Pak-US: Regional Power Politics By Ghazanfar Ali Garewal

If history is any guide, the US has always used Pakistan to gain its strategic interests by limiting the bilateral relations to its on-and-off engagements in the South Asian region.

It is about time, the US admits that it has been utterly failing in resolving the Afghanistan Conundrum.

Ironically, for face saving, it blames the other regional stakeholders.

With Trump's eccentric presidency, Washington's trend of blaming others instead of coming up with a clear policy is accentuated.

When it comes to the North Korean issue, the US chooses to put the blame on China and when it comes to Afghanistan, the US holds Pakistan responsible for its failures.

Afghanistan has become an arena where the US faces a humiliating defeat on all fronts, be it military, diplomatic or political.

It is about time that the US admits its failure in settling the Afghan problem.

Pak-US relations has always been on a rocky road but Trump's episodic fiery commentary has deteriorated the already conflictual Pak-US ties.

He accused Pakistan of sponsoring cross-border-terrorism and providing safe heavens to terrorists' outfits and their leaderships, particularly Haqqani Network. He warned, "if Pakistan would not change its policy it loses a lot.

" The US military general conveyed the same message earlier but in a mellowed-down tone.

Pakistan, in an expected response, denied all the US allegations and enumerated the losses it suffered in terms of human lives and economic damages.

Is the recent strain in the bilateral relations any different from the previous ones?

Though Trump's accusation doesn't come as a surprise, the recent low in bilateral relations is a different chapter of strategic distrust in the bilateral relations.

It has much to do with the dynamic shifts that have been taking place at the regional and global level.

The US approach needs to be understood in the context of changing regional dynamics.

In fact, the US is losing its control of South Asia this power vacuum is being filled by China at a certain level.

The Belt and Road Initiative is an indication of China's emerging economic and political influence in the regional affairs.

On the other hand, deepening cooperation between China, Russia, and Pakistan is testifying the post American regional order.

The US-India are trying to contain the Chinese emergence at one level and they are balancing against evolving triangle of China, Russia, and Pakistan at the same time.

Trump stated that US troops will stay in Afghanistan for an indefinite period which means the US is not ready to hand over Afghanistan to regional powers, namely China and Russia.

India is very much supportive of the US in this great game.

Another important factor is China's growing economic and political clout in the region, which has made New Delhi rush to the US for help.

The rivalries between China and India has grown too intense, therefore, the South Asian region appears to be a chessboard of power politics where India and China are busy in countering each other.

To the west, India is troubled by tribal uprisings in Burma and its economic partnership with China.

To the north, it is embroiled in a longstanding border demarcation issue with China. Now, to the South, it is facing a Chinese port in Sri Lanka.

These developments have resulted in a marriage of convenience between Trump's anti-China administration and the Indian statecraft, which is hostile towards Beijing and Islamabad.

These developments suggest no radical improvement in bilateral ties for long-term as long as the China and India factor have a major role to play in Pak-US relations. So, what policy options does Pakistan have to counter expected US military and non-military moves?

Irrespective of the future course of Pakistan's foreign policy, the country's civil and military leaderships must be more vocal and articulated than apologetic.

The message should be very loud and clear that Pakistan will forcefully retaliate against any US military strike in any part of the country.

Pakistan's response should be divided into internal and external dimensions.

Internally, the government should call an All Parties Conference to build consensus vis-à-vis Pak-US relations.

And of course, the military leadership must be a part of building an across-the-board consensus.

At the international level, the Pakistani government and the Foreign Office should approach to China, and Russia on this issue.

All diplomatic and political support by these regional powers must be won by Pakistan to counter US-Indian expected/unexpected military non-military initiatives.

It is time to learn from history and draw a cost- benefit analysis to be made of Pak-US relations.

The changing regional scenarios guide us to distance ourselves from the US to a certain extent and to get closer to the regional powers.

Pakistan should draft such a foreign policy which could strike a balance between the growing regional rivalries and the global power transition.

The writer is a political scientist.

Source: <http://nation.com.pk/columns/07-Sep-2017/pak-us-regional-power-politics>

# Evaluating Our Foreign Policy By Kashif Ahmad Mohar

Padelford and Lincoln define foreign policy as: “the key element in the process by which a state translates its broadly conceived goals and interests into concrete course of action to attain these objectives and preserve interests”. Thus, Foreign policy is a set of rules that guides the realization of one state’s goals in the international system. These goals are characterized by national interest. So, it is the national interest that derives the foreign policy of a country. In other words, foreign policy is the maximization of national interest at global level. In order to analyse foreign policy of a country we need a critical evaluation of her national interests and objectives. This article endeavours to evaluate Pakistan’s foreign policy with particular reference to USA.

There are many factors that determine foreign policy of a country. It is impossible to evaluate each one of them in a brief article. However, most important and critical one is the rationality that guides the behaviour of states in the formulation, implementation and realization of foreign policy objectives. However, a retrospective look reveals that Pakistan has failed to rationally materialize her foreign policy objectives. In Pakistan, a reactive, short-term, and emotional decision making has overtaken the arena of a proactive, long-term, and rational foreign policy making. For example, Pakistan’s relations with its immediate neighbours, excluding only China, have been strained in the recent past. In addition to that, recent US bashing of Pakistan’s role against war on terror is a manifestation of foreign policy failure of the country. Had our diplomats and foreign office been rationally and proactively played their due role, the US’ Asia strategy would have had different dimensions.

When all this had happened, a consensus was developed in Pakistan against the American accusations. The country had a befitting response rejecting all the unrealistic US allegations. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan has expressed his intentions for a “paradigm shift” in foreign policy of the country. Is it a realistic position which Pakistan is going to adopt? Is the confrontation with US in the best national interest of Pakistan?

Obviously, the answer is no. The confrontation would only aggravate the prevailing complex regional problems. First, the actors are different but the script of criticism is the same as we have heard time and again. It is Pakistan's diplomatic failure that it couldn't propagate her view of the Afghan war in the US, let alone at global level. Had Pakistan properly addressed the US concerns and propagated its own narrative of war, the outcome would have totally different.

Second, Pakistan and USA are decade long allies. Adopting a policy of confrontation would not benefit any one of them. For US, it would exacerbate the Afghan problem. And for Pakistan, it would create a vacuum for its enemy to fill. Third, in case of a collision, a game changer project that Pakistan is enthusiastically working upon (CPEC), would be under severe threat. In that scenario, Pakistan's economic survival will be at stake. Then it will be in no position to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Fourth, no other country will fill the vacuum created by USA in Pakistan's strategic chess board. So, the policy of confrontation is neither in Pakistan's national interest nor rational.

As far as the resolution is concerned, negotiations are the best possible solution to resolve this impasse. First, USA should not blame Pakistan for her policy failures in the Afghan war. Instead, she must acknowledge Pakistan's efforts against war on terror. The US led war on terror has incurred unbelievable collateral damage and a bad name to Pakistan. However, Pakistan has sacrificed thousands of soldiers, men, women and children to get rid of this menace. Pakistan is the only country which has overcome the monster of terrorism in such a short span of time. US must acknowledge and respect these time tested efforts of Pakistan. Also, United States must address Pakistan's grievances on her new South Asia strategy. A constructive diplomatic engagement would serve the purpose. Second, US should not get her opinion hijacked by anti-Pakistan lobby. The former should realistically evaluate Pakistan's role as her ally. Lastly, with the Russian resurgence in Afghanistan, US should be cognizant that Pakistan's support is an imperative for her victory in afghan war. The unfolding regional changes in Afghanistan demand a convergence of US interests with Pakistan. So, US should correspondingly adopt her foreign policy goals.

First, Russian resurgence in the region has forced United States to re-evaluate her Afghanistan policy. This has forced US to prolong her military presence in Afghanistan. Because, US withdrawal from Afghanistan would mean handing it

over to Russia. Second, Indo-china strategic competition in the region has opened up new avenues for realignments. Therefore, a convergence of interests has bonded Pakistan, China and resurgent Russia in a triangle on the one hand and US, India, and Japan on the other. While addressing a news conference on the conclusion of a three-day envoys' conference in Islamabad on 7th Sep., the Foreign Minister Khawaja Asif said that "unprecedented geopolitical changes are taking place in the world." He further said, "We have to quickly adjust our direction. We need to review these situations" and suggested a "paradigm shift" in foreign policy of Pakistan. In these circumstances how Pakistan should redesign and readjust her foreign policy?

First, Pakistan should engage in a constructive dialogue with USA. So that both the countries can address each other's grievances in order to minimize any possibility of confrontation. Second, Pakistan should skilfully construct and propagate her narrative of war against terror. It can be made possible only by activating diplomatic means of the country. A changed global opinion, in favour of Pakistan, would serve in the best national interest of the country. Third, Pakistan should not rely on any one of the super powers. Instead, given geostrategic importance, Pakistan should adopt a holistic, proactive and long-term foreign policy. In this regard two prong strategy may be adopted. One is, friendly relations with immediate neighbours. Particularly, in this domain, Pakistan must endeavour to get Afghanistan on its side. Second, Pakistan should also consult with the countries that have unanimity of views with Pakistan on the Afghan war. These include Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey. Pakistan should manage their perception regarding Pakistan's role in the region with special reference to war on terror. Yesterday, Foreign Minister of Pakistan held a bilateral dialogue with his Chinese counterpart. Both discussed post-Trump regional and global issues. They had unanimity of views regarding the prevailing strategic environment in the region. It is a right step in the right direction, more need to follow. Fourth, Pakistan should simultaneously concentrate on both domestic and foreign policies. Foreign policy goals must not shift the country's focus away from domestic policies. A consensus in political, economic, and social realm is need of the hour.

In order to conclude, a changing geostrategic environment has provided Pakistan with an opportunity to re-evaluate and reformulate her foreign policy. As described earlier, regional and global realignments suggest a holistic, proactive, and long-

term foreign policy. This is the way forward to maximize Pakistan's national interest at global level.

Source: <http://nation.com.pk/columns/11-Sep-2017/evaluating-our-foreign-policy>



# Pakistan's Looming Water Crisis By Yasmeen Aftab Ali

In 1947 Pakistan was affluent in water. It had 5,000 cubic meters per capita renewable water that is now down to 1,000 cubic meters per capita. Population boom, is a major contributing factor. But there are others. Out dated irrigation system being one. In a country where 90pc of water is used in irrigation of crops using maximum water are two other reasons. Sugar cane, rice and wheat all use extensive water.

Many water scarce countries have opted for better water management systems like sprinkler systems and drip irrigation system. Whereas we use the method of flooding the crops. Water leading to areas of irrigation from rivers lack lining, this in turn reportedly causes a loss of 40pc of water en route. Pakistan has also over decades worked at increasing her water reservoirs.

Pakistan is dependent for water from a single source: the Indus River basin. Indian building of hydroelectric power project at Sawalkot can only cause further water stress to Pakistan. The project of Sawalkot is on the Chenab River in Jammu and Kashmir.

“The article III of the Indus Water treaty, binds the Government of India not to hinder the flow of the western rivers, i.e. Indus, Jhelum and Chenab, to Pakistan, and India cannot store any water or construct any storage works, on the above cited rivers, having been given total rights since march 1973, of Ravi, Beas and Sutlej, we get flood surplus of these rivers which is released in case of excessive rains, which helps in recharging our ground waters levels, but that too will cease after the second Ravi-Beas Link is made.

Today while we slumber, India has started works on, the following projects; Pakal Dul 1000MW, Kiru 600MW, Karwar 520 MW, Baglihar (eventual 900MW), Sawalkot 1200MW (two 600mw units), Salal 390 MW, Sewa-II 120 MW, and finally the Bursur project on the Marusudar river, which, is a major tributary of Chenab river, here the Foxland intends to build a massive water storage dam, which will control and regulate the flow to maintain levels of Pakal dul, Dul Hasti, Rattle, Baglihar,

Sawalkot and Salal Hydro-projects, on the Chenab.” (Naveed Tajammal, March 6, 2012)

Climate change is another factor contributing to decline of water provision as glaciers of the Hindu Kush-Karakorum-Himalaya mountains are lost and do not flow into the Indus Water basin. This decline has to be balanced against an increase in water demand owing to hotter season. Water will evaporate quicker leading to increasing water demand by irrigation sector. This will be coupled with decreased levels of soil moisture.

Pakistan’s thermal sector is responsible for roughly 60 to 65pc of energy provision. Thermal energy depends largely on steams and their cooling. “As higher air temperatures decrease the efficiency of the thermal conversion process (Makky & Kalash, 2013), greater volumes of water will be required by this sector to maintain production levels.” (IISD Blog)

Diminished water levels can lead to greater difficulty in clean drinking water to the populace in quantity.

Water quality is yet another issue. According to a recent research more than 50m people across Pakistan are in danger of poisoning from contaminated water containing high levels of arsenic. The study was conducted on samples from 12,000 wells across the country.

The flow of water varies widely in summers and winters. 84pc in summer with a mere 16pc in winter. “According to the report, with a Kharif to Rabi ratio of two to one, the seasonal needs were about 66pc in summer and 34pc in winter, showing surpluses of 18pc in summer and shortages of 18pc in winter.” Local newspaper Feb, 6, 2017)

Also, due of a high degree of groundwater mining a high risk exists of the wells running dry.

The flow of surplus water in summers cause floods causing damage to our crops and as a result thereof to the economy.

Water is back bone of our economy. “The role of regional politics too cannot be denied in aggravating Pakistan’s water woes as the relationship dynamic with India determines the flow in the western rivers since the source lies in disputed territory Kashmir and as a corollary, has implications for internal politics vis-à-vis distribution of water within the provinces. With the once mighty Indus delta now reduced to a mere canal, there is more cause to worry as the inland flow of sea water can render cultivable land unfit for cultivation and hence, completely useless.” (Spearhead Research Special Report)

Unfortunately our policy makers have not focused on this looming disaster. Water scarcity can have severe economic and social backlash. We need immediately multifaceted water based policies dealing with a) conservation and storage of excess water in summers b) a smart updated irrigation policy for water carriage, new methods and lining the path from the river to area of use c) new dams, many small ones and d) a vigorous presence to deflect India’s steps at violation of Indus Treaty d) Upgrading the old and dated irrigation system that causes water wastage owing to seepage.

One hopes the policy makers’ wake up to the need of the hour!

Source: <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/09/11/pakistans-looming-water-crisis/>

# Quest For Nuclear Energy By Dr Zafar Nawaz Jaspal

THE nuclear power generation is very efficient, environment friendly and economical source of energy. Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission is intelligently using nuclear technology for power generation to resolve the soaring energy deficiency in the country. It has been constructing new nuclear power plants with the assistance of China under the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

Prime Minister Shahid Khakan Abbassi inaugurated country's fifth nuclear power plant Chashma-4 on September 8, 2017. This plant is build with the assistance of China at the Chashma Nuclear complex, Mianwali. It is capable to add 340 MW of electricity in the national grid. The plant is operational on trial basis and will pass through various functional and safety related tests at full power. Notably, the Chashma Nuclear Power complex contains three operational Chinese origin power plants, i.e. C-1, C-2 and C-3. They have been successfully contributing to the national Grid with an excellent performance since 2000, 2011 and 2016, respectively. The three Chashma units collectively supply over 950 MW to the national grid with availability factors of around 99 percent.

The nuclear energy is a clean cum sustainable source of energy. United Nations has been encouraging and facilitating the development of nuclear power industry for the prosperity of less developed nations. On October 29, 2007 during the 62nd Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, a resolution appealing to Member States to continue to support the International Atomic Energy Agency's indispensable role in 'encouraging and assisting the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses' was adopted.

There are some 439 nuclear power reactors operating in 31 countries plus Taiwan, with a combined capacity of over 370 GWe. Around 15.2% of the world's electricity is produced from nuclear energy. According to reports 67 reactors are under construction in 13 countries. The majority of the operating reactors is located in United States, Europe and Russian Federation, but the most reactors on order or planned are in the Asian region. The international nuclear commercial lobby has been advocating the merits of nuclear energy and also encouraging the nuclear reactor material and technology transfer to the developing states, especially

India—a non-member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—to boost the use of nuclear energy.

The NPT Articles III and IV facilitate transfer of nuclear technology from nuclear supplier states to nuclear recipient states, and also ensure that the recipient states should not exploit this trade for developing their nuclear weapons program. The Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) is a voluntary group of nuclear supplier states. It works by consensus. Since its creation in 1975 to September 2008, it had followed a very simple rule that it would assist only that nuclear recipient state, which was observing comprehensive safeguards of International Atomic Energy Agency. In September 2008, it amended its trade rules on the behest of United States to facilitate India's growing nuclear industry. The India specific amendment severely undermined the credibility of the Nuclear Supplier Group.

The probability of accidents or deliberate sabotaging act by the insider or outsider at the nuclear power plant cannot be ignored. Simultaneously, exaggerating as well as dramatizing the probability of accident at the nuclear power plants generates misperceptions about the nuclear energy efficacy. The safety and security of a power plant is a legitimate concern, but is not irresolvable problem. The security problem could be resolved by the development of a strong security culture—in which the relevant individuals hold a deeply rooted belief that insider and outsider threats are credible. The 60-year-long recorded history of nuclear energy programs worldwide germinates confidence in the safety and security apparatus of nuclear power plants. Notably, during the six decades history of nuclear power plants, there have been only three major accidents leading to the release of radiation, i.e. Three Mile Island, Chernobyl nuclear power plant, and Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plants. Among these, the Chernobyl was the only one of these incidents that resulted in human casualties and significant damages to the environment. Nonetheless, the Chernobyl accident formally introduced the concept of 'safety culture' to the vocabulary of nuclear safety.

Since the very beginning, the transfer of nuclear technology and material is limited and controlled by the developed countries. The Nuclear Supplier Group has adopted a discriminatory approach towards Pakistan. Despite it, currently, Pakistan's four nuclear power plants—KANUPP, C-1, C-2 and C-3—are in operation and generating 1030 MW. Another 340 MW electricity has been added with the inauguration of C-4. Two large size nuclear power plants, K-2 and K-3,

are under construction near Karachi, and are scheduled to be operational in 2020 and 2021 respectively, adding another 2200 MW to national grid.

To conclude, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission engineers and scientists are proficient in constructing and operating safely nuclear power plants. The inauguration of Chashma-4 proves that the discriminatory approach of Nuclear Supplier Group has failed to obstruct the nuclear energy quest of Pakistan.

— The writer is Associate Professor, School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.

Email: jaspal\_99@hotmail.com

Source: <http://pakobserver.net/quest-nuclear-energy/>

## In The National Interest By Hassan Javid

We in Pakistan are repeatedly told that decisions taken by the government will always be in the greater national interest.

Whether it is trade with China, relations with India, Afghan policy, or dealings with the United States, ministers, generals, and other government functionaries continuously inform us that pursuing Pakistan's national interest is of paramount importance.

In and of themselves, statements of this kind are not surprising. As 'realists' would point out, all states put their own interests before those of others, and will utilise any and all means at their disposal to achieve them, even if success comes at the expense of others states and people. This, in turn, is simply a function of the anarchic structure of the global order; in the absence of an overarching authority possessing both the legitimacy and capacity needed to discipline states and ensure their compliance with international norms and law (whatever those might be), states are essentially free to do as they please given the power and resources at their disposal, as well as the constraints and opportunities imposed and provided by other states. Seen this way, states that do not put their own interests first simply leave themselves open to the predations of other, less scrupulous competitors.

This particular view of international relations is often countered by pointing out how trade, ideological norms and predilections, and the existence of cross-cutting and mutually beneficial interests and objectives can lead states to cooperate and work together for some kind of greater good. This is all correct but, as the case of Pakistan amply illustrates, it may also make sense to critique the concept of 'national interest' by focusing on precisely how this comes to be defined. Indeed, while the existence of something called the 'national interest' is largely taken to be obvious, very little attention is paid to the question of precisely who is involved in determining what this is, and the process through which such determinations are made.

At a purely procedural level, it might make sense to begin with the assumption that state elites, drawn from relevant government departments, play the most important role in shaping the trajectory taken by a country in terms of domestic and foreign policy. In democracies, the bureaucrats involved in policymaking will coordinate

with, and usually be subordinate to, ministers and other elected representatives who, as members of parliament, might reasonably be expected to articulate a policy agenda that is in line with the aspirations and inclinations of the electorate. In developed democracies, therefore, it could be argued that the national interest is ultimately derived from a participatory democratic process in which citizens and their representatives play a fundamental role in determining state policy. That this is not always the case – as demonstrated by the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq by the US and UK despite tremendous domestic opposition – does not invalidate the idea that democratic governments should ideally take the will of the people into account when making decisions.

While Pakistan is formally a democracy, it is an open secret that the civilian government has little, if any, control over foreign policy and matters related to internal security. In these two policy domains, it is widely recognised that the military establishment plays a dominant role in determining precisely how Pakistan navigates its international relationships and deals with the various internal threats to its wellbeing. The military's role in policymaking is one of the legacies of decades of authoritarianism, and is reinforced by the propagation, over time, of the idea that the military alone possesses the integrity and expertise required to be the arbiters of what is or is not in the national interest.

Militaries are not supposed to be organisations that are inclined towards diplomacy or even a relatively benign view of the world. The entire rationale for their existence is the possible threat of conflict with other states, and the foundational assumption militaries make is that the world is a hostile place. This, paired with the kind of 'realist' view of the world described above, is what arguably leads the Pakistani military to insist on, amongst other things, the notion that the threat posed by India is constant and unceasing, that continued involvement in Afghanistan is necessary to prevent Pakistan being encircled by hostile foreign states, and that continuing support for anti-India (but supposedly pro-Pakistan) Islamist militant groups is necessary to counter India's conventional military superiority.

The paranoia inherent to this worldview is hardly surprising, coming as it does from an organisation that is designed to expect, and prepare for, the worst. Problems arise, however, when this becomes the only worldview on offer, and alternative perspectives are simply ignored or dismissed. The enmity between Pakistan and India might necessitate taking protective measures, but that does not automatically



mean that conflict between the two states should be seen as inevitable, or that any attempts at forging peace through diplomacy and trade should automatically be eschewed in favour of an approach that supports confrontation.

In response to recent statements by the US condemning Pakistan for its role in the Afghanistan conflict, as well as a declaration by the recently concluded BRICS summit which designated Pakistan-based militant groups sympathetic to the Kashmiri cause as being terrorists, various official spokespersons in Pakistan have mouthed the usual platitudes – Pakistan has suffered tremendously at the hands of terrorists, has done more to fight them than any other country, and continues to suffer due to the machinations of hostile foreign powers. What is still not acknowledged, however, is that Pakistan has supported militant groups in the past and arguably continues to do so today. Even more disheartening is the apparent refusal to admit that the damage wrought by these groups and their ilk within Pakistan has been far more destructive than any plots hatched on foreign soil, and that Pakistan's descent into religious intolerance and bigotry can be attributed in no small part to the sympathy and support that has historically been given to the most reactionary and violent elements of society. If this is what it takes to protect the 'national interest', perhaps it is time to revisit precisely what that term means.

Source: <http://nation.com.pk/columns/10-Sep-2017/in-the-national-interest>

## Pak-Afghan Ties | Editorial

In the aftermath of two separate grenade attacks on the Torkham border, Pak-Afghan forces have jointly worked to resume duties as per schedule. The attacks which led to six people being injured was followed by a meeting between the two countries soon after.

The meeting was attended by personnel of Pakistan and Afghan militaries who discussed ways to mitigate further attacks in the area. The Pakistan side at the meeting maintained that terrorists were common enemies of both countries and joint action was necessary. The need for installing fences, concrete walls, cameras and barriers for disposing off further threats was discussed. Moreover, a return to order highlighted the strong ties between the two countries as school children from Afghanistan cross Torkham border to attend school and perishable goods are transported through the border daily.

The efforts indicate at Pakistan's pressing need to maintain cordial relations with Afghanistan especially following India's involvement. Indeed, Pakistan needs to work towards improving relations. Afghanistan regularly blames Pakistan for attacks on its soil. The same rhetoric has lately been adopted by the US as well.

Pak-Afghan cross border relations had started deteriorating following an attack on census teams by the Afghan Border Police in May. The repatriation process of thousands of Afghans back to Kabul also remained mired with issues.

A close working relationship with all of our neighbours — India, Afghanistan, Iran, besides China — which does not involve suspicion or under hand deals is necessary for the country's stability. This can ensure that our neighbours can be our strategic partners as well.

The latest round of talks represent the on-ground positive efforts between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Despite Trump's call for India's involvement in Afghanistan it is important that Pakistan continues maintaining a good relationship with Afghanistan. We hope that the these will translate into better ties between the two countries on a national and international level. \*

Source: <http://dailytimes.com.pk/editorial/18-Sep-17/pak-afghan-ties>

## Failed Indo-Pak Water Talks By Dr Muhammad Khan

THE second round of talks between Pakistan and India over Indian violations of Indus Water Treaty (IWT)-1960 ended inconclusively in Washington. The first round of talks was also hosted by World Bank in Washington from July 31 to Aug 1, 2017. The recent round of talks (September 14-15, 2017), carried out under the World Bank, the sole guarantor of IWT, focused on technical aspects of two dams; being constructed by India in violation of the treaty. Kishenganga, a 330 Megawatt project is being constructed on Neelum River, a tributary of Jhelum River and Ratle, 850 Megawatt hydroelectric projects on Chenab River.

According to World Bank spokesperson, "While an agreement has not been reached at the conclusion of the meetings, the World Bank will continue to work with both countries to resolve the issues in an amicable manner and in line with the Treaty provisions." Despite remaining inconclusive, the World Bank appreciated the talks, hoping to preserve the IWT-1960. This treaty has a historic significance, reached over after nine years of negotiations and stood the trying moments of a turbulent indo-Pak history. Furthermore, contrary to the international norms of dividing water, rivers were divided under IWT-1960.

Though the current debate is focusing on Kishenganga and Ratle projects, the water issues between Pakistan and India are wide ranging in number and complicated in nature. Indeed, India has already constructed many water dams, storages and hydroelectric power projects on the western rivers, exclusively reserved for Pakistan. As per satellite imagery and other authentic sources, 'India is in different phases of planning or construction of some 60 storages of varying capacity over the Indus Rivers system.' This would allow India a leverage of water manipulation (increase / decrease in downstream flow) as per its convenience, ignoring the Pakistani needs of water. As per past practices, India has been manipulating the flow of water, allowing reduced water down stream flow during irrigation and increase flow during monsoon, thus causing flood in low laying areas of Pakistan.

There are obvious differences in the interpretation of IWT-1960 by India and Pakistan. In the Pakistani interpretation, the water of Indus, Chenab and Jhelum are exclusively reserved for Pakistan; therefore, India has no right over their water.

The Indian interpretation however differs and it considers that IWT allows other uses of the water of these rivers like; construction of hydro-electric plants, dams and even water storages. In essence, the IWT allows a limited uses of water to upper riparian, not the one, India is exercising or asking for. Then, there is also a provision in the IWT, binding India to leave a certain amount of water in the eastern rivers for the maintenance of environment along the old bed of eastern rivers. India does not leave water in these eastern rivers as mentioned in the IWT-1960, except during monsoon to flood Pakistan.

Although, the 'World Bank' has been facilitating both countries for adhering the treaty in good faith and with complete impartiality and transparency, the Indian attitude has been against the implementation of treaty in letter and spirit. The gradual constriction of dams, hydroelectric projects and water storages are aimed controlling the water sources of western rivers and compelling Pakistan to react or accept the Indian hegemony. The reaction will be in the form of water based conflicts, if India continues with its current strategy of hegemony over the water of western rivers.

Despite the fact that, India has been an exploiter and manipulator, the decisions of previous arbitrations like Baghliar Dam and even Kishinganga dam have not been in the favour of India. Kaiser Bengali, an economist feel that, Pakistan, "has no strategy on dealing with water issues with India. Pakistan's chief negotiator for more than a decade and a half had limited intellectual capacity to lead on such a strategically life and death issue." This chief negotiator, Syed Jamaat Ali Shah (former Indus Water Commissioner of Pakistan), who was allowed to escape to Canada, now accuses state for not doing proper homework before such negotiations. Bengali feels that Pakistan has been pursuing the water issues with India through "intellectually deficient and politically inane manner", which is really a criminal act.

The Indian farsightedness, a proper homework, dedicated national approach, superior diplomacy and an effective lobbying has made possible for India, which even is against the essence of the IWT-1960. Internationally, a situation has arrived where legal view point of Pakistan is turned-down and illegal Indian stance has acceptability. Why after all, Pakistani side is essentially lack the above mentioned character traits and then, those who commit blunders are not held accountable too. The question arises, why Jamaat Ali Shah was allowed to leave

Pakistan without a proper accountability procedure. May be there will be many in the chain of command and his absence from scene will keep them veiled.

On the sensitive issues like water, there has been criminal negligence by the officials, deputed for this job and even the successive governments. The incumbent Government and stakeholders must devise a strategy to effectively counter the Indian water offensive against Pakistan at all level. Besides, all those previously involved in the negligence, which allowed India to construct dams, hydroelectric projects and water diversions on western rivers must be put through a strict accountability process, which will serve as deterrence for others.

— The writer, Professor of Politics and International Relations, is based in Islamabad.

Email: [drmkedu@gmail.com](mailto:drmkedu@gmail.com)

Source: <http://pakobserver.net/failed-indo-pak-water-talks/>

## Peace And Development By Ahsan Iqbal

Pakistan is celebrating the International Day of Peace today alongside all other peace-loving nations of the world. The people of the country value the importance of peace and stability more than anyone else as they have lost thousands of men and women in uniform and civilians in the war on terror.

With every sacrifice, the resolve of our nation against violent extremism and terrorism has strengthened over time. Pakistan has made it clear that it will continue to fight terrorism until it is completely eliminated from the country once and for all. Pakistanis aspire to lead a peaceful and prosperous life. The political and democratic history of the country is a testimony to the fact that its people have always rejected the forces of extremism and violence and sided with the forces of peace and development.

Pakistan has celebrated its 70th anniversary this year. One of the country's biggest assets is its youth. They are a force of positivity and progress. It is essential that we leave a peaceful and prosperous Pakistan for our future generations. Therefore, we must learn from our past and avoid repeating the same mistakes. It is a healthy exercise to critically reflect on our past and pragmatically plan for our future.

In hindsight, one thing has remained obvious over the past seven decades: Pakistan has yet to fully achieve its true potential. In 1965, the GDP per capita of Pakistan was \$116 whereas China and South Korea's GDP per capita were only \$98 and \$109, respectively. Today, Pakistan's GDP per capita is around \$1,600 while the GDP per capita of China and South Korea are around \$8,123 and \$27,538, respectively. The primary cause of this divergence is the lack of political stability in Pakistan. The by-product of the lack of political stability is the inconsistency in policies. As a consequence, the economy of Pakistan has been the main casualty.

We have seen how long periods of undemocratic regimes have fractured the unity of the nation. As a result, we lost half of our country in 1971. Unity does not originate from administrative measures. It requires the continuity of the political process. Our history shows that non-organic solutions, such as the one-unit system, are unlikely to work in a diverse and pluralistic society like Pakistan. We

cannot afford any more experimentation. For diverse and pluralistic country like Pakistan, democracy is the key binding factor. Today, I am pleased to note that the entire nation agrees that the continuation and solidification of democracy and rule of law is the only way forward for Pakistan.

As a federal minister in charge for planning, development and reforms for the past four years, I have firsthand experience in understanding the nature of economic development challenges. I am pleased to share with you that the highest-ever allocation of funds have been channelled towards the historically disadvantaged regions of Pakistan over the past four years. This is an important aspect of security because regional inequalities fuels anger and mistrust towards the state.

Inclusive and sustainable development is the best way to ensure long-lasting peace. Similarly, providing security and maintaining law and order are the necessary prerequisites to execute development projects. In other words, peace and development are intertwined. To put it in Hegelian terms, there is a dialectical relationship between peace and development.

The restoration of peace was on top of the government's agenda. Following the successes of military operations Zarb-e-Azb and Raddul Fasaad, terrorists are under the siege of the state. Similarly, the successful Karachi operation has dramatically improved the law and order situation of the economic hub of the country.

We are now supplementing kinetic measures with soft interventions to consolidate the gains made over the past four years. To ensure the effective implementation of National Action Plan (NAP), I have consulted all four provincial chief ministers, the PM of AJK, the CM of Gilgit-Baltistan and the governor of KP to immediately address any roadblocks. After consultation with various provinces, I have decided to form the Inter-Provincial Coordination Committee of Home Ministers on NAP to facilitate smooth coordination between the provinces and centre and launch a robust campaign of developing a counter-narrative to extremism.

Pakistan lies at the heart of different historical civilisations. Our diversity is our beauty. Our adversaries have tried to use our diversity to pit us against each other. But this will not be tolerated anymore. Let me reassure everyone that there will be zero-tolerance towards discrimination or the victimisation of religious or ethnic

minorities in Pakistan. Protecting the rights of every single Pakistani – irrespective of his or her religion, ethnicity and gender – is the constitutional duty and a priority of the government.

Extremism and terrorism are the exact opposite of the core values of Islam. The message of Islam is of peace and inclusiveness. There is a hadith in Muslim and Bukhari: “Do you know what is better than charity, fasting and prayer? It is keeping peace and good relations among people as quarrels and bad feelings destroy humankind”. This provides us the foundation of the counter-narrative to extremism. To disseminate and popularise this counter-narrative, we plan to work closely with academics, the media and the civil society.

I would also like to point out that as a nation we must not fall into the trap of developing low self-esteem and a negative self-image. The myth of Pakistan’s preoccupation with negative characteristics needs to be shunned. Nations with low self-esteem are susceptible to violence. Pakistan faces similar problems – as most developing countries do. Unnecessary cynicism must be avoided. In order to grow faster, we have to develop self-confidence as a nation that can eventually stir positive thinking. The gains made over the past four years in terms of security and economic development are unprecedented. Pakistan is destined to achieve sustainable and long-lasting peace and prosperity once we channel our collective efforts towards realising Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s vision of an inclusive Pakistan.

On the occasion of the International Day of Peace, I would urge all of you to take concrete action by making peace with at least one individual or family member with whom you have a conflict.

The writer holds the portfolio of the minister for interior as well as planning and development in the government of Pakistan.

Source: <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/231518-Peace-and-development>



## US, Pakistan and the APR By Imran Malik

President Trump's vicious diatribe against Pakistan has forced a paradigm shift in its policies in the Afghan-Pakistan Region (APR) and beyond.

The ingresses made by Iran, India, China and Russia in the region are critically redefining and reshaping it.

The region is fast polarising between US-India and China-Russia-Iran-Pakistan (CRIP- a veritable subset of the SCO) poles.

The proverbial great game is acquiring far more critical dimensions in the region now!

The biggest obstacle to peace and stability in Afghanistan, the APR and the larger South Central Asian Region (SCAR) is the US.

It has precious little to show for its sixteen years in the region and its losses in men, materials and costs.

The TTA, its nemesis, now controls 40-45% of the country.

The ANSF, its protégé, has been a dismal failure too.

It has shown no urgency to either egress the region or find a political or a military solution to an essentially lost cause.

Rather it appears to be reinforcing one failure after another; aimlessly adding an inconsequential number of troops to its already stressed forces in Afghanistan.

It has shown scant will or military acumen to defeat the TTA and has been singularly unsuccessful in coercing or luring them onto the negotiations table; a comprehensive failure of policy- or is it pursuing a deeper strategic design?

The compulsions for the US to remain singularly central to and dominant in the APR are manifold and portend serious strategic connotations.

First, it is currently sitting atop a trillion dollar minerals treasure trove in Afghanistan and will want to exploit it exclusively.

It will not leave till the last ounce of Lithium amongst the many other rare minerals has been extracted, processed and exported by its own corporations.

Second, from this central position the US can maintain strategic reach and oversight on West, South and Central Asia.

Third, it blocks the Russians and the CARs from access to the Mekran Coast/Arabian Sea region.

Fourth, it can maintain a strict watch on Iran's and Pakistan's nuclear and missile programmes from here.

Fifth, it can deny/ maintain oversight on all inter, intra and trans-regional movements of men, materials, minerals, trade corridors, oil & gas pipelines et al.

Sixth, it can keep the larger region destabilised albeit in a state of controllable chaos employing India and the various terrorist groups in Afghanistan for the purpose.

Seventh, it can use the APR as a testing ground for its new military technologies/weapon systems like the MOAB and further the cause of its domineering military-industry complex.

Eighth, it can maintain its intelligence gathering and communication centers/stations overlooking West, South and Central Asia from here.

Ninth, the US might feel compelled to station missile and/or anti ballistic missile forces here sometime in the future.

Tenth, and most important of all, it endeavours to neutralise China's deep maneuver to establish global and regional economic domination (OBOR/CPEC) and to outflank the choke point of the Malacca Straits in one fell swoop!

Having persistently berated Pakistan for its so called "double-dealing" in the war on terror the US is readying a series of coercive measures to "punish" it for its so-called indiscretions.

First, the US could destabilise Balochistan and FATA by instigating and supporting RAW-NDS operations to scuttle the OBOR/CPEC.

Two, the US could declare Pakistan a state sponsor of terror, and penalise it hugely in trade, economic, political, diplomatic and military terms.

Three, it could get the IFIs to curb their support for Pakistan's economy.

Four, it has actually restarted its drone campaign against "so-called safe havens" in Pakistan violating its territorial sovereignty with ruthless impunity.

Five, it can revoke its Major Non-NATO Ally status, although that has been rather redundant in effect.

Six, the US has already imposed sanctions stopping the CSF, most economic and all military aid as well.

Seven, it may even place restrictions on the movement of some citizens and certain key officials of the Pakistan government.

The worst case scenario could be an attempt to orchestrate the secession of Balochistan from Pakistan.

It kills two birds with one stone – cuts Pakistan to size (literally) and destroys/thwarts China's OBOR/CPEC initiatives.

Such a move will have the support of some US Congressmen like Ted Poe, and Dana Rohrabacher etc.

With superb timing, a RAW controlled and funded free Balochistan campaign is already gathering pace in Switzerland at this very moment!

The US approach could have two prongs.

The first one will target the OBOR/CPEC with the help of the CIA, RAW, NDS, MOSSAD etc.

The US will outsource the task to India and its proxies like the IS, TTP, Jamaat ur Ahraar and others from Afghanistan and Iran and the BLA and BRA from within Balochistan.

In the garb of attacking so-called terrorist safe havens the US drone strikes in Balochistan and FATA could target nodal points of the CPEC and also provide direct/indirect fire support to the secessionists and terrorists against Pakistan's Armed Forces.

The second and rather more extreme prong would threaten Pakistan's territorial integrity.

The Indo-US combined could encourage the few dissident Baloch tribal leaders in Europe to unilaterally declare independence of Balochistan and then recognise it. Once it is recognised as an independent state (by other camp followers like India as well) then all actions taken by the Pakistan Armed Forces to regain control and retain the territorial integrity of the country may be seen as aggression against a newly independent state and may, under US instigation, attract international opprobrium, UN/UNSC sanctions and even international military intervention – against a nuclear power?!

On a reciprocal basis, recognition of Khalistan, Mizoram, Nagaland, Orissa and other Indian states with movements for independence and of an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan by Pakistan may create far too many complications for the Trump and Modi Administrations to comprehend, much less handle!

Attacking Pakistan's territorial integrity will evoke compatibly extreme responses from Pakistan.

It will invariably suck China, the most unknown factor in this entire equation, into the quagmire taking the whole issue into entirely new dimensions.

Do the US and its coterie of allies have the heart for such a (mis)adventure!

The author is a retired Brigadier and a faculty member of NUST (NIPCONS).

im.

k846@gmail.

com

@imk846m

Source: <http://nation.com.pk/columns/25-Sep-2017/us-pakistan-and-the-apr>

## Growing Pak-Russia Relations | Editorial

IN the face of fast changing geo-political changes, new alliances are taking shape. Once considered as adversaries are warming up to collectively address the challenges. Over the last few years, one has seen a paradigm shift in relationships and convergence between Pakistan and Russia.

The two countries are especially building strong relations in the realm of defence. In October last year, the two countries held their first-ever joint military exercise in Pakistan while a two-week long joint exercise named DRUZBA (friendship) 2017 between the special forces of both countries kicked off in Minralney Vody Russia on Monday. The joint exercise would focus on counter terrorism operations, hostage and rescue, cordon and search operations. We expect that the joint exercises will help both the countries to share their experiences and tackle the scourge of terrorism. In the realm of defence cooperation, both the countries can prove to be reliable allies. Russia's technological expertise, advanced weapons systems and experience in terms of conventional war can prove to be highly beneficial for Pakistan. Likewise, Russia deems Pakistan's experience in fighting militancy, insurgency and terrorism to be very important and the recent joint military exercise validates it. Moreover, Pakistani scientists, engineers and technicians can be trained in Russia and prove to be mutually beneficial. Both the countries also appear to be on the same page on the Afghanistan issue as they have been calling for political solution to the long running conflict. The two countries need to engage more closely with each other and with Afghan government in order to take the matters towards improvement in the war-torn country. Over and above, we also expect the relations between the two countries would not remain confined to security and defence matters but more attention should be given to economic relations. Russia has already expressed desire of signing FTA with Pakistan and its joining of the CPEC indeed will open new vistas of opportunities for both the countries to take forward their relations on a strong footing.

Source: <http://pakobserver.net/growing-pak-russia-relations/>

# Pakistan's NSG Membership By Dr Zafar Nawaz Jaspal

THE full membership of the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) is significant for Pakistan. The inclusion in the Group not only enhances its prestige or status in the global politics but also legitimises its import and export of nuclear-related material, equipment and technology for peaceful application. The NSG membership facilitates Islamabad to do nuclear trade with both nuclear supplier states as well as nuclear recipient states. In addition, it endorses Pakistan as a responsible nuclear weapon state. Unfortunately, the trends in the global politics are not supportive for Pakistan's bid for the membership of the nuclear cartel.

Nuclear Supplier Group is a voluntary and consensus-based organization of 48 states. The participating governments in the Group seek to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of two sets of Guidelines for nuclear-related exports. They also endeavor for 'the full, complete and effective implementation of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime.

Since its operational in 1978, the NSG has been obstructing the nuclear-related materials, equipment and technology to Pakistan. France, for example, quashed nuclear reprocessing plant deal with Pakistan in 1978. The NSG members have been pressurizing China to not assist Pakistan in the construction of nuclear power plants under the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards. Ironically, the nuclear supplier states have been penalizing Pakistan due to the crime committed by India.

The nuclear renaissance and trends in global politics indicate the probability of change in the current membership of the NSG in the near future. India and Pakistan had formally applied for the membership in May 2016. Since then, both states have been lobbying for the full membership. However, the probability of their membership in the near future seems remote due to the demand of criteria based approach by a few NSG members. The criteria based demand is not acceptable to the supporters of India.

India received a special treatment by NSG in 2008. Consequently, it has been receiving nuclear-related material, equipment and technology assistance from United States, France, Britain, etc. Since then, it has been under the impression that it would always be treated individually or granted special status by the members of the NSG. Therefore, without taking into account the current trends in the global strategic environment India applied for the membership and demanded special treatment again. Nevertheless, India's bid for NSG membership in May 2016 failed to receive a favourable response from the participating members of the club in the 2016 NSG Seoul Plenary meeting.

The NSG members had approved stringent membership criteria during their May 10-11, 2001 Aspen, Colorado, United States Plenary meeting. According to it the requirements are: the candidate ought to have the ability to supply items (including items in transit) covered by the Annexes to Parts 1 and 2 of the NSG Guidelines; its adherence to the Guidelines and action in accordance with them; the applicant should abide by the enforcement of a legally based domestic export control system which gives effect to the commitment to act in accordance with the Guidelines; the NSG aspirant express adherence to one or more of the NPT, the Treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Tlatelolco, Bangkok, Semipalatinsk or an equivalent international nuclear non-proliferation agreement, and full compliance with the obligations of such agreement(s); applying state support of international efforts towards non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and of their delivery vehicles.

The twenty-seventh Plenary Meeting of the NSG was held in Bern, Switzerland, on 22 and 23 June 2017. The NSG had discussions on the issue of "Technical, Legal and Political Aspects of the Participation of non-NPT States in the NSG". The Group decided to continue its discussion and noted the intention of the Chair to organize an informal meeting in November 2017. The forthcoming informal meeting of NSG members ought to be taken serious by Islamabad. It is important for Pakistan because the participating members in the meeting will set the agenda for twenty-eighth Plenary meeting of the Group.

According to NSG guidelines, Pakistan would have to commit to full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition for the transaction. It's not acceptable because it exposes country's nuclear weapon program. Therefore, the rational approach is that Pakistan instead of asking for favor or special treatment only maintains its

principle stance on NSG membership. It continues demanding non-discriminatory criteria for non-NPT states for entry into the NSG. It accentuates that an equitable criteria-based or norm-based approach ought to be adopted for the membership of non-NPT nuclear weapon states. To conclude, the NSG membership is important because it would facilitate export of nuclear-related materials, equipment, and technology for generating finances for Pakistan nuclear industry. Simultaneously, it qualifies Islamabad to import sophisticated nuclear-related material, equipment and technology for improving the quality of its nuclear power plants, cancer hospitals and nuclear agriculture research centres. Despite the advantageous of NSG membership, compromising on country's defence arrangements is not acceptable. Hence, maintaining minimum credible nuclear deterrence capability is more important for the sovereign defence of Pakistan instead of NSG membership.

— The writer is Associate Professor, School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.

Email: jaspal\_99@hotmail.com

Source: <http://pakobserver.net/pakistans-nsg-membership/>



# Is Mending Relations With the US Possible? By Talat Masood

Pakistan is experiencing a prolonged period of highly strained relations with the US and the prospects in future do not seem bright. President Trump's speech last August that was meant to give out the broad contours of his Afghan policy included a blistering attack on Pakistan. He focused on the oft-repeated accusation that Pakistan harbours terrorist organisations and implied that the US could no more tolerate it. Trump, however, offered a sort of carrot by saying that Pakistan had much to gain by supporting US policies in Afghanistan and abandoning its support of terrorists, implying thereby the Taliban.

Pakistan rightly rejected these allegations and put across its point of view as to how effectively and at a heavy price it has been fighting the terrorist groups. It also reiterated that Afghanistan requires a political solution and Pakistan policies are a manifestation of it.

The prime minister at the recent United Nations General Assembly also tried to project Pakistan's fight against militancy and the successes achieved so far. What the West refuses to recognise that Pakistan cannot invite the enmity of the Afghan Taliban when it is fighting its own war. Moreover, with Afghanistan leaning heavily on India and pursuing a hostile policy towards Pakistan and Washington fully supportive of it to expect it will add the Taliban to its list of enemies would be unrealistic. The presence and support of the TTP, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and other anti-Pakistan terrorist groups by India and Afghanistan with the US turning a blind eye is another point of serious concern to Pakistan. In this volatile situation, India and Afghanistan have given the TTP and other groups a free rein to commit acts of terrorism in Pakistan.

Despite current serious differences with the US, Pakistan's leadership would like to mend its relations with it. It realises the unique position of the US as a superpower and is aware that it is likely to stay in Afghanistan up to 2020 and beyond. In any case it is never helpful to be on the wrong side of a superpower. The striking feature is that it is not looking to Washington for financial or military aid, as was the case in the past. But it would justifiably expect that its role in the fight against terror would be recognised. COAS Gen Qamar Bajwa stated this in

unequivocal terms. The prime minister has sent out a similar message. Pakistan expects the US to be sensitive to its interests, which it has been ignoring and looking at it through the lens of Afghanistan or India. More worrying is Washington unfairly scapegoating Pakistan for its failure in Afghanistan. President Trump wants India to play a major role in Afghanistan. Pakistan has serious reservations about this policy as India has been using Afghan territory to encircle it. With India there are other major issues the most important being that of Kashmir and lately on the division of water resources.

Washington is also wary of Islamabad's close political, economic and strategic relations with Beijing. It views the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) with suspicion and although it is not as vocal as India, it is opposing the project.

In the past, Pakistan had successfully managed to maintain very good relations with both the US and China. In fact, it had played a vital role in bringing these two countries closer by arranging Henry Kissinger's secret trip to Beijing in July 1971.

During the 1970s, the US wanted to befriend China to counter the influence of the erstwhile Soviet Union.

The situation now is very different as the US allied with India now wants to checkmate China's growing economic and political clout.

Despite the long history of US-Pakistan relations it remains transactional and has been heavily tilted towards security issues. The US has been a key procurement source for major weapon systems especially fighter aircraft, armoured personnel carriers, artillery guns, communication equipment and sophisticated radars. But lately due to various restrictions and high costs Pakistan has been mainly relying on China for all its fundamental weapon systems and equipment. Nonetheless, the US remains a major export destination of textiles and leather goods. Its universities and academic institutions due to their high quality and reputation are a great attraction for the Pakistani youth. Pakistan's diaspora in the US serves as an important source of remittances and at the personal level acts as a bridge between the two countries.

Another great challenge for Pakistan is to rehabilitate its soiled image in the US. Congress in particular is rather hostile and introduced several legislative measures

to curtail funding and is generally opposed to sale of military hardware. Foreseeing it, Pakistan over the years has been relying primarily on the Chinese for acquisition of weapon systems. And where feasible have explored European sources for procurement of weapons and technology. Interestingly, the positive outcome has been that it has strengthened Pakistan's indigenous capability.

Despite the current US hostility it would be in Pakistan's interest to remain engaged with important members of Congress and counter the Indian lobby. The role of the US media too has been very damaging for Pakistan's reputation. Of late, signs of improvement have been seen. Pakistan needs to be more open and less restrictive on its visa policy if it is serious about improving its international image.

Washington applies different standards while dealing with New Delhi and Islamabad on nuclear issues. It has been continuously facilitating the development of India's nuclear programme. The US has fully backed India's membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and it is only because of the opposition by China and other states that it has not succeeded. India, with the support of the US, has become a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime in 2016. Whereas it been generally opposed to Pakistan's nuclear programme and opposes its entry to any of these groups. Despite these challenges and conflicting strategic interests, there remain areas of common interest on which both countries should continue to build for their common advantage.

Published in The Express Tribune, September 27th, 2017.

Source: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1517037/mending-relations-us-possible/>

## ECONOMY

---

### **Pakistan Capable of Tackling Its Economic Problems By Syed Ali Sajjad**

KARACHI: Pakistan is facing a dollar crisis. Our exports are not picking up and our inelastic import bill is not reducing. To top it all, remittances do not paint a promising picture keeping in view situation in the Middle East. So what do we do? That's the million dollar question.

In my article dated July 31, 2017, I reported a fact from the speech of former finance minister that Pakistanis have \$200 billion in Swiss banks.

This may seem like too big a number. But this is what the finance ministry states when it looks to address the issue and hence, would be used for the purpose of my argument.

Minister says economy is back on track

I also proposed that if the business community brings back these dollars it would be a win-win situation for all. Our dollar deficit will subside and the businessmen will make most profits as Pakistan will grow faster than most economies and will offer best returns on investments. In due course of time, the business community has also proposed a similar solution. According to the Pakistan Business Council (PBC), Pakistanis have wealth of around \$150 billion in foreign countries. This figure is less by \$50 billion from the figure presented above. Now, they are claiming that out of \$150 billion of Pakistani wealth stashed abroad, they can bring back at least \$20 billion, provided that an amnesty scheme is designed for them.

Just to share a statistical observation, we must bear in mind that our external debt is around \$80 billion only and the business community has \$150 billion parked abroad. This means that we Pakistanis are capable of solving this problem on our own. Things are not as gloomy as they seem. This proposal of the business community has been reported in the press and no one is sure of its future. But one cannot deny the apparent attractiveness of this proposal. The policymakers must

go through a rigorous cost and benefit analysis before taking any decision regarding such an apparently attractive solution.

However, we must realise that this incoming wealth would have purposes beyond the current dollar problem only. If this wealth is not channelled properly, the problem will recur in the future. But if we manage to develop our economic potential through these inflows, we can get out of this vicious cycle of trade/current account deficit once and for all.

This beneficial outcome will depend on our investment priorities that we will set for this wealth. The most popular investment avenues in Pakistan are real estate and the stock exchange. They have offered returns with much less effort in the past. Therefore, natural direction of this wealth will be towards these two avenues.

However, if this is the case we will be standing at this same juncture few months or maybe few years down the road. What we really need is to take a long-term approach. We need to invest and we need to invest in productive avenues that create exports, jobs and economic activity. This incoming wealth should be converted into a vaccine against financial instability and imbalances in the balance of payments. It should not be a tranquiliser for us to make us forget our problems for some time.

It has been reported that the business community (PBC) has shown interest in channelising these investments towards productive sectors like LNG etc. One cannot comment on the feasibility of this proposition but one can definitely suggest that productive, employment generating and export enhancing avenues of investment must be given a priority.

Most of Pakistan's recent growth is contributed by the service sector and our industrial growth has remained dismal. In Karachi, industrial property in Port Qasim is cheaper than residential properties in most areas. Unbelievable and ironic isn't it?

Economy needs structural change, but transition is painful

But it is the industry that produces export goods. It is the industry that creates jobs and cascades the fruits of growth to the downtrodden in the economy. The

government has missed all its targets regarding industrial growth in recent times. This makes a strong case for the industry to be on top of the priority list. Pakistan's dollar crisis is an urgent issue but we are more than capable of handling it ourselves. Dwindling remittances have made circumstances rather unusual for us; however, the business community has proposed an unprecedented solution.

Now it is up to our policy makers to make the best use of this opportunity to bring back our wealth and to channel it into productive/industrial growth

The author is a corporate banker and teaches economics

Published in The Express Tribune, September 11th, 2017.

Source: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1502913/pakistan-capable-tackling-economic-problems/>

# Pakistan Needs to be Part of New Economic Alliances

LAHORE – Geopolitical changes and formation of new trade and economic alliances around the globe have underlined the need for new strategic economic foreign policy of Pakistan.

This was upshot of the speeches delivered at a seminar on “Defining Guidelines for New Strategic Economic Policy of Pakistan vis-à-vis China-Iran-Russia-Turkey”, joint organised by the LCCI and Golden Ring Economic Forum (GREF) at the Lahore Chamber of Commerce & Industry. LCCI President Abdul Basit, Senior Vice President Amjad Ali Jawa, Vice President Muhammad Nasir Hameed Khan, former LCCI senior vice president Almas Hyder, President GREF Husnain Reza Mirza, former finance minister Dr Salman Shah, former secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Shamshad Ahmad, senior vice president GREF Lt Gen Sikander Afzal were prominent amongst the other experts from different economic sectors. LCCI Executive Committee members Zeeshan Khalil, Awais Saeed Piracha, Moazzam Rasheed and Tariq Mahmood were also present.

The experts said that being an economically challenged country, Pakistan needs to be part of new economic alliances to reap the benefits of globalization. They said that over the last two decades, globally escalation of trade with new partners has played a powerful role in economic and political integration while our dependence on a few countries for trade created severe challenges for economy. They said that axis of Pakistan’s new strategic economic foreign policies should be expansion of trade & economic relations with China, Iran, Russia and Turkey.

LCCI President Abdul Basit said it is a good omen that Pakistan has already changed its priority and looking for new supportive economic partners. He said that emerging alliance of Pakistan, Russia, China and Iran can change the fortune of this region where half of world’s population lives. Pakistan would have enough electricity by the end of 2020 and our road and railway network will also be upgraded that will help country to become part of any trade block.

While analyzing Pakistan’s trade and economic relations with Russia, Iran, Turkey and China, experts said that Pakistan’s share in total foreign trade of Russia is

very insignificant while trade balance is also in the favor of Russia. Though bilateral trade between the two countries is increasing gradually but it is not satisfactory and there was a lot of scope to enhance mutual trade volume. Russia helped Pakistan establishing a mega steel mill at Karachi, which has played a crucial role in the development of the country. Such more initiatives by Russia would be crucial for Pakistan's economy. They said that being neighboring brotherly countries, Pakistan and Iran should give priority to each other for import of goods rather than buying from distant countries.

Regarding Pak-Turk relations, the experts said that Pakistan and Turkey are enjoying close cultural, historical and military relations which are now expanding into deepening economic relations. Both countries are also planning to strengthen their close ties into a strategic partnership but this process should be expedited.

They said that China is already contributing to the Pakistani economy. They said that China-Pakistan Economic Corridor has grabbed the attention of world and important countries like Russia and Iran have expressed the desired to be part of this mega project. They said that China should also be focused as export hub for Pakistani merchandise. All the experts concluded with the opinion that public and private sector should join heads to form such powerful economic policies that can help Pakistan secure its share in the regional and international trade.

President of Golden Ring Economic Forum Husnain Reza Mirza threw light on the aims and objectives of the GREF. He said that the economic bloc comprising Pakistan, China, Iran, Turkey and Russia has 20% of the world resources and their collective efforts can make this bloc the focal point of future economic development.

Source: <http://nation.com.pk/business/10-Sep-2017/pakistan-needs-to-be-part-of-new-economic-alliances>



## A New Look at the Economy By M. Ziauddin

Pakistan's economy has remained as unpredictable as our cricket team all these 70 years of our existence.

We have recorded growth rates of 10-12 per cent in some years.

And found ourselves in the pits with 2-3 per cent in some years.

We have been known as a middle income country for some years.

But it is more of statistical garbage than a reality as there exist some small little islands of prosperity surrounded by a vast sea of poverty.

So what do we do now?

Continue living with such a depressing scenario and suffer the imminent consequences.

Or try looking for ways to break the shackles of the model in vogue?

Let us take a look at our comparative advantages:

1) We are an agricultural country;

2) We are a market of about 200 million people;

3) Pakistan is located at the crossings of trade routes from Casablanca in Africa to Kashgar in West China's Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region and from Thailand in Southeast Asia to Turkey beyond the Middle East.

These advantages can be exploited to the maximum if we become a trans-shipment economy.

Rather than continue to hanker for an export-led economy.

Which we have been trying all these last 30 years or so to achieve but without any success.

Converting our economy to a trans-shipment one would require a well-thought-out trade policy.

That would allow almost free-of-duty entry of raw materials, intermediaries and equipment in knock-down condition.

To be warehoused in Pakistan and then forwarded to final destinations after the required value addition.

Such a regime would also require letting the rupee float on its own without the support of any artificial crutches.

Such a policy would also attract foreign direct investment.

In avenues in which it would be more economical for the sponsors to fabricate items inside Pakistan for local consumption.

And also to re-export them to the four-corners from the 'hub'.

This will also facilitate the transfer of technology and training of skilled manpower.

Transfer of appropriate technologies would also open the way for Pakistan to graduate from being an agricultural country to a leading high quality processed-food and light manufactured goods exporter.

#### New Opportunity

Luckily for Pakistan a new opportunity in the form of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has opened up between Balochistan—which is said to be gifted with mineral riches amounting to trillions of dollars—and Western China—where industrialization is taking place at an accelerated pace.

The trade quantum that would be passing through between Gwadar port of Balochistan and Xingjian in Western China in the next ten years or so—is estimated to amount to a trillion dollars annually.

To make the best of this opportunity we need to invest in developing a huge mass of educated and skilled manpower out of the youth bulge with which Pakistan is endowed.

Approximately \$28 billion worth of fast-tracked “Early Harvest” projects are to be developed by the end of 2018—— because China wants its shortened global trade routes to start paying without much loss of time.

#### Avenues of Investment

With extensive roads, railways, ports, and energy infrastructure being laid down, businessmen all around Pakistan would be finding new opportunities worth their money and time.

The Corridor is facilitating enhanced connectivity and power to the otherwise diffracted and energy hungry economic centers of Pakistan.

With many projects being developed on fast-track as part of the Early Harvest Projects, multiple business opportunities across the value chains of industry are set to open up.

#### Regional connectivity

CPEC and its connectivity with Central Asia, Middle East and Africa will help reshape the entire region. The corridor will transform Pakistan into a regional economic hub. It will be a confidence booster for investors and attract investment not only from China but other parts of the world as well.

Other than transportation infrastructure, the economic corridor will provide Pakistan with telecommunications and energy infrastructure.

#### China’s Western Region

Pakistan also needs to do some original thinking for economic exploitation of land-locked Western part of China for mutual benefit.

China's Western region is spread over 71 % of mainland China, but has only about 29% of its population, and generated 20% of its total economic output, as of 2009. The main components of the strategy chalked out to develop the region include the development of infrastructure —transport, hydropower plants, energy, and telecommunications—, enticement of foreign investment, increased efforts on ecological protection such as reforestation, promotion of education, and retention of talent flowing to richer provinces.

Pakistani entrepreneurs as well as officials responsible for formulating economic policies need to visit at least the immediately adjacent Chinese regions to Gilgit Baltistan and try to meet the game changer at its own game for mutual economic gains.

One cannot rule out the possibility of existence of opportunities tailor-made for exploiting by Pakistani entrepreneurs in these areas.

In the initial years while the CPEC project is being completed and perhaps even at least a decade from the completion Pakistan is likely to undergo a phased transformation from an overwhelmingly import-based economy to a lucrative trans-shipment economy necessitating speedy expansion in the capacities of Pakistan's ports and drastic reduction in turnaround time at these ports.

Indian ports are said to require an average of 84 hours to turn around a shipment. Busier ports like Hong Kong and Singapore get the job done in seven. At present, it takes more than a week to turn around a shipment in Pakistan.

The country's ware-housing capacity would also need to be expanded at least by 25 times over the period of completion of the CPEC project.

And with the increase in trans-shipment activity following the completion of the project this capacity would need to be kept expanding continuously dictated by the volume of shipments crossing the country.

Since a lot of raw materials, intermediaries and even durables in knock-down conditions plus finished and semi-finished products would be passing through with Pakistan serving as the hub to and from markets located in the immediate and not-so-immediate vicinities, ample opportunities are expected to open up for local reprocessing along with simple as well as high-end value additions.

The phased transformation of the economy from one based essentially on imports to trans-shipment or ware-house economy is expected to unleash widespread restructuring process with many of the currently viable economic activities becoming unviable and in their place brand new business opportunities would crop up and new entrepreneurs technologically well-versed and sharp enough business-wise would stand to take full advantage of the new opportunities.

In order for the trans-shipment economy to grow seamlessly, and at a faster pace the government of the day would need to realize that it would have to significantly lower the tariff barriers for a smooth and economic flow of goods in and out of the country.

In the beginning, government's income from trade-related duties would sharply decline in the process but the income from increased volumes of imports, toll taxes as well from GST on value additions in the domestic warehouses would more than make up the losses.

In fact the income from these sources would be many times more than the government would have collected from normal trade-related tariffs and levies in an import-based economy.

Relocation of Chinese units

Justin Yifu Lin, former Chief Economist and Vice President of the World Bank and current Councilor of State Council and Vice Chairman of All-China Federation of Industries and Commerce, while on a recent visit to Pakistan stated that:

“Pakistan has the potential to grow as dynamically as China if Pakistan government were to proactively create conditions to capture the pending relocations of light manufacturing from China and facilitated Chinese firms to enter those industries.”

Professor Justin suggests Pakistan to focus on attracting light manufacturing from China as it moves away from labor intensive to capital intensive industries.

Professor Justin also suggested removing constraints on private companies operating in light or higher value adding industries and if there are no local firms in an industry then the government must lure/attract foreign investment, support private sector innovations and provide tax incentives to pioneer firms.

A couple of Chinese entrepreneurs have already snapped up two major deals—the Karachi Electricity Supply Corporation and 40 per cent of Pakistan Stock Exchange.

Quoting some executives of Pakistan's biggest firms a foreign news-agency has reported that Chinese companies were looking mainly at the cement, steel, energy and textile sectors, the four which make up the backbone of Pakistan's \$270b economy.

Meanwhile, China's steel giant Baosteel Group is in talks over a 30-year lease for state-run Pakistan Steel Mills.

Chinese companies have also shown interest in investing in the telecom and auto sectors. More welcome is the fact that the Chinese interest in buying into Pakistani

businesses has emerged at a time when the interest of Western investors in Pakistan is on a steep decline.

And it is time as well for Pakistani hosts to be asking themselves, how best and quickly they can learn from the Chinese business practices, their work ethics and the high rates of productivity that the Chinese workers have achieved.

Source: <http://pakobserver.net/new-look-economy/>

## Is Gwadar A Toll Plaza? By Hassnain Javed

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a big business scheme with billions in Chinese investments spreading over the span of 15 years with a cumulative outlay of up to \$46 billion.

\$35 billion is to be spent on the energy sector in the mode of IPPs (Independent Power Producers) and remaining \$11 billion for infrastructure developments such as railways and industrial zones, roads etc.

An additional \$8.

5 billion of investment is recently approved for transport sector.

The blessing in disguise is that most of the investment project loans are from Chinese banks, whose details are still not made public.

Indeed, it is generating fears of further indebtedness of an already loan-riddled Pakistan.

The construction of a 3,218 km long route stretching from Chinese province of Kashghar to Pakistani port of Gwadar, is considered to be hallmark of this CPEC project.

By the construction of this shortest route, Chinese goods will have much easier and quick access to the Middle East, Africa and beyond.

As currently, these goods have to travel a long distance of approximately 10,000 km from the South China Sea through the Strait of Malacca to reach the Gulf.

A special force of 15000 Pakistani troops will be deployed to protect CPEC route.

The advocates of CPEC refer it as a game-changer for Pakistan and this region.

In contrast, opponents including some of the leading economists remain sceptical about the impenetrability of projects under CPEC and in specific the terms and conditions of loans Pakistan is acquiring from China under this project.

In my view, the government considers CPEC to be soothing for Pakistan economy, whereas for the experts and some economists, it is another form of "East India Company".

But, it requires detailed synopsis at end of both parties to build any constructive analysis.

If CPEC is viewed from objective perspective then it is not a gift for Pakistan, indeed it is a set of complicated riddles of infrastructural investments which will be

by and large paid by Pakistani investors, poor consumers and tax payers in the form of commercial loans from Chinese banks.

Now having a glance at the energy sector with \$35 billion investment with detailed investigation into independent power producers, (IPPs) the real players are bringing coal from China despite the extraction of coal- enriched deposits from Pakistan.

It clearly implies that China channelling a strategy with aid of these projects to dump its excessive resources such as coal in Pakistan.

Moreover, IPPs have further bound the government of Pakistan to buy electricity from their power houses for at least 30 years even if there is any need of it or not. In addition, it is a more expensive rate than offered in the international markets or existing electricity production in Pakistan.

In addition, for China CPEC provides an alternate secure route to import energy and find new markets for its goods and services.

Approximately 80% of the China's oil is currently transported via Strait of Malacca to Shanghai which almost covers a distance of 16000 km and travel time of 2-3 months.

In contrast, after the operations at Gwadar port distance will be reduced to less than 5000 km.

It will be great strategic benefit for China as it will provide access to convenient mobility with significant reduction in the travel time.

On the other hand, it will also benefit Pakistan by giving it an edge in the region, especially while countering Indian influence.

Moreover, it will also act as major transit point by connecting Eurasian region South Asia and South East Asia

In light of the CPEC project, there is no level playing field as Pakistan is not generating enough opportunities from the matrix other than the growing demand for learning Chinese language.

In my view, Chinese language is not enough to integrate, secure and equilibrate the dividends.

Indeed, there should be proper planning by government and immediate adoption of technology at research centres, local universities, technical and vocational institutes to attain fruitful outcomes of the projects.

Recently, a Shanghai based consortium bought 40% share in the Pakistan Stock Exchange amounting to \$85 million and in no time will take charge of its management as the size of market capitalization is around \$100 billion.

Now with this growing influence of China in Pakistan financial markets will definitely overshadow the authority of the IMF and World Bank.

Although IMF has also warned that CPEC could add to Pakistan's medium to long term risks by forecasting country's external financing requirements to rise by \$15.1 billion by 2018-19 with current financial year amounting to \$11.

41 billion.

It clearly indicates the Chinese ruling class has the full potential to emerge as new imperialist power in the region in short span of time.

Now, this makes CPEC a big mystery or an illusion; instead of reducing poverty it will foster exploitation and unemployment.

If the infrastructural development has prospects for poverty elimination then there should be no poor in India and China.

Chinese trucks will roll on the road from Kasghar to Gwadar, where Pakistan will merely act as a ticket collector on Gwadar toll plaza.

Indeed, Pakistan has to take care of the road maintenance from its very own pocket.

The plan of establishment of new industries along the CPEC route is still a dream for local Pakistan economy as they are still waiting for the promised industrial zones to be built along the Motorway many years ago.

Furthermore, it is claimed by the Pakistan government that CPEC project will generate somewhat 700,000 direct jobs by 2030.

But, rather than creation of jobs it is feared that with passing years of CPEC there will be closure of Pakistan local industry due to intense competition by Chinese high tech companies.

This seems like a horrific picture by all means.

Given the current scenario Pakistan may be facing a situation like Greece as there is no sign of us meeting financial requirements at our end.

There is little chance that Pakistan could effectively and technically exploit maximum benefits from CPEC.

Indeed, it will have to go back to IMF next year with high amount of debt on its shoulders.



But the government obsession with CPEC game is strong, which is like national anthem for them around which all the political parties revolve around.

The writer is a Master Trainer/Advisor at the Pakistan Industrial Technical Assistance Centre Lahore, under the Federal Ministry of Industries and Production, Islamabad.

Source: <http://nation.com.pk/columns/16-Sep-2017/is-gwadar-a-toll-plaza>

# Can We Avoid The IMF? By Waqar Masood Khan

In a recent interview, Prime Minister Abbasi remarked that he did not see the need for an IMF programme in the near future. This is the yearning of every Pakistani, as they have seen more than their due share of Fund programmes. However, the direction and pace of economic winds point to a gathering storm, threatening the serenity and tranquillity of the progress made in the last three years.

During 2013-16, Pakistan's economy showed unprecedented improvement. Earlier, stagnant and low growth, rising inflation, high fiscal deficit, falling revenues, rising circular debt in the energy sector, declining reserves, unstable exchange rate and declining private sector investments were the highlights of the economy.

A home-grown economic reforms agenda was implemented under a three-year IMF programme and the turnaround was impressive. Growth was revived, inflation was historically low, deficit was down to nearly 4 percent from 8.2 percent, revenues grew by a cumulative 60 percent, reserves increased to a historic high of \$24.5 billion in October 2016 and the exchange rate was stable.

Then in 2016-17, there was an unravelling of the gains, primarily due to an unprecedented surge in fiscal and current account deficits, leading to loss of reserves. What contributed to this development:

**Fiscal deficit:** The Fund programme aimed to reduce fiscal deficit from 8.2 percent to 3.5 percent in three years. In 2015-16 (third year) we achieved 4.3 percent against the target of 3.8 percent (including 0.3 percent one-off for security). The target for 2016-17 was 3.8 percent but final deficit was 5.8 percent. Both revenues and expenditures were off the mark.

A tax shortfall of Rs259 billion and a shortfall of Rs100 billion in gas cess were the main reasons on the revenue side. The expenditures were higher by Rs478 billion, showing explosive growth in spending. The provinces exhausted much of the surplus they had generated to enable the country to meet fiscal adjustment targets. Against a budgeted surplus of Rs300 billion, the provinces incurred deficit of Rs162 billion.

Had it not been for a clever use of selling security press to the SBP and invest-in and sell the LNG-based power projects (and other one-off adjustments), which yielded revenues of more than Rs300 billion, fiscal deficit would have shot-up to 7 percent. Despite this, the country is nearly back to where it stood in June 2013. Making appropriate adjustment for circular debt would take the deficit where it stood in 2013.

However, there is one major difference: we have an expanding and booming economy. We failed to exercise due care in economic management otherwise the opportunities reflected in spectacular growth in spending and imports would have meant a boon for the economy. It may still be so, if our house is put in order.

Current account deficit: The marked increase in fiscal deficit has translated into an explosive growth in the current account deficit (1.7 percent to 4.0 percent of GDP). On FOB basis, imports increased by 18 percent while exports were marginally down by 1.4 percent. Deficit in services account increased by 7 percent. Primary Income (interest and profit) showed a slight improvement of 11 percent. Secondary income deficit was nearly the same.

Thus, the marginal increase of \$7.3 billion, or nearly 2.5 percent of GDP, emanated from increased imports. The bulk of the increased imports were capital goods (37 percent) and petroleum products (30 percent), constituting 43 percent of imports. The quantity effect was 72 percent and price effect was negative 28 percent reflecting more quantities at lesser unit values, supporting an expanding economy.

Since increased imports are productive, why worry?

Loss of reserves: It is the loss of reserves, for the first time under this government. Though during the year, we lost about \$2 billion, it is about \$5 billion from the peak of \$24.5 billion last October. We failed to secure financing to fund the deficit.

In the capital account, there was only a marginal positive increase of \$100 million. In the financial account, there was a net increase of \$2.8 billion (despite a net inflow of \$3.9 billion (\$8.9b-\$5.0b)). Consequently, reserves fell by \$1.9 billion compared to a gain of 2.7 billion last year, implying a deterioration of BOP position by \$4.6 billion.

Why loss of reserves?: Three reasons: (a) Inability to access loans beyond the level contracted during the year, net of repayments; (b) Excessive demand for imports in the public sector due to import of capital goods (LNG-based power projects), increase in imported energy (LNG and Coal), and increased security spending with falling CSF receipts; and, (c) Steep increase in public spending (surge in deficit), a significant part of which translated into higher import demand using precious reserves.

Exchange rate stability: The loss of reserves of nearly \$4.6 billion in a year is effectively the cost of maintaining a stable exchange rate. The draw-down of reserves meant, in a highly competitive and transparent forex market, that whenever there was pressure on the exchange rate, the SBP stepped forward to supply the dollars, even if it meant losing reserves.

The country had painfully built these reserves on the back of privatisation proceeds, CSF receipts, auction of spectrum licenses, loans from IMF, World Bank and ADB, issue of Bonds and Sukuk and from the commercial banks. It is sad to note that precious resources are used to support the exchange rate, something IFIs or investors would not approve of.

Despite positive trends in leading indicators in Jul-Aug, the fundamental imbalances noted above are persisting. If they continue, it is not a matter of 'whether' but 'when' the country will go to the Fund. Given the security outlook facing the country, this is not a happy contingency. To avert this possibility, the prime minister, having taken the reins of economic management, should restore fiscal discipline and allow market forces to determine the exchange rate.

The writer is a former finance secretary. Email: waqarmkn@gmail.com

Source: <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/230717-Can-we-avoid-the-IMF>

# Knowledge-Based Approach to CPEC By Abid Hussian

The role of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has great significance for the region in terms of transportation infrastructure, energy, trade, commerce, industrial cooperation, agricultural cooperation, tourism, healthcare, personal contact, education, and much more. The value of CPEC projects is now worth 62 billion US dollars. Although various scholars have presented a lot of literature, the negative and positive aspects already elaborated upon; very few presented the alternative benefits of CPEC on Pakistani academia.

There are many ongoing projects that are relevant to the educational uplifting of Pakistan. The economic corridor between China and Pakistan will have a great impact on the culture of both countries, and academia should play a positive role by preparing the citizens of these two countries for the upcoming changes.

CPEC will also help Pakistan's education sector — various training centres are established in Gwadar and plans are underway to open universities along the route to bring China and Pakistan closer to each other. This gives Pakistani students the opportunity to study in China and encourages more teachers to work in schools in that area, and also real estate builders to build them.

Under CPEC, the youth of Pakistan has been availing scholarship opportunities in China. The Confucius Foundation will open more courses to enrol Pakistani students in various disciplines in the near future, which will be a great source of scholarship for those with financial problems. In the coming days, people will get more opportunities provided by those familiar with Chinese technologies and values. It is believed that the youth will have a better chance of improving their education with the cooperation of Chinese government in this regard.

CPEC also helps Pakistan's education sector — various training centres have been established in Gwadar and plans are underway to open universities along the route to bring China and Pakistan closer to each other. This gives Pakistani students the opportunity to study in China and encourages more teachers to work in schools in that area

Chinese envoy Sun Weidong, addressed a scholarship awarding ceremony in a local hotel in Islamabad. He said, under CPEC, 220 more students will get an admission in various disciplines of the top Chinese universities for the academic year. Students will be taught many disciplines, which will encourage them to secure admissions in Master, MPhil and PhD programmes in China.

Under this project, talented youth may be awarded an admission in technology, computer sciences, engineering, international relations, journalism, agricultural and natural sciences etc. The Ministry of Education in China supports Chinese universities in allocating special funds to all students coming from abroad including Pakistan.

It is worth mentioning here that there are total of 15,625 students enrolled in various universities of China out of them 2,700 students are being funded by the Chinese government's scholarship programme and over a thousand students are enrolled on other scholarships given by the universities. Under a separate scholarship programme, Chinese universities are offering scholarships to the underprivileged youth of Pakistan as well.

There are some achievements in the education sector by Pakistan also; two new universities are scheduled to be setup in Balochistan under CPEC. There are a number of Pakistani youngsters who are already enrolled in China and 131 students have gotten scholarship opportunities through CPEC this year. By enrolling under CPEC, Pakistan will be known as the largest scholarship winning country by the Chinese government in South Asia following the Vision of 2025.

Few recommendations for CPEC as academia are mentioned here:

In the current project within the framework of CPEC, universities in Pakistan will provide a more hands-on experience to students and universities, to ensure the transfer of technology by strengthening connectivity within the industry. Higher education experts should be involved in achieving goals set for CPEC and the Vision of 2025.

The Higher Education Commission (HEC) of Pakistan is an autonomous body working on regulations of universities, it should take initiative to start a conversation with research centres and other organisations, incentivising their

contacts with all companies to establish incubation facilities and grant access to various universities.

A comprehensive document will be prepared and submitted to the Planning Commission of Pakistan for the effective implementation of the various projects, and to determine the role of universities and researchers in achieving the goals of CPEC and the Vision of 2025.

The provision of Chinese language courses is another crucial element in achieving the success of CPEC. Universities in Pakistan can develop a strategy with a partnership with the Chinese embassy to establish more Chinese language centres as are already implemented by the Confucius Institute at COMSATS Institute of Information Technology in Islamabad since 2013.

The other final but crucial aspect is the tremendous research opportunity that Pakistani universities will get to map the social, economic, environmental and political impacts of CPEC. If it does not bring any benefits to the local people, all this massive investment will eventually be lost. All policy makers and think tanks should be involved in producing more research for boosting this mega project. Universities in Pakistan must sign more MOUs with Chinese universities for an exchange programme. It is expected that youth of Pakistan will gain more momentum by getting scholarship and higher education under CPEC.

The writer is working at Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) He can be reached at [abidhussain@issi.org.pk](mailto:abidhussain@issi.org.pk)

Published in Daily Times, September 25th 2017.

Source: <http://dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/25-Sep-17/knowledge-based-approach-to-cpec>

# EDUCATION

---

## Digital Literacy And Education Reforms By Hammad Asif

With over 2.5 billion internet users and a global penetration rate of internet connectivity at 35%, the world today is highly interconnected, fast paced and technology savvy. Education in today's world comprises technology as the core element of curriculum as it deeply affects our lifestyles. Education also creates the utility of and manages appropriate technological processes and resources to facilitate learning. New platforms and technologies are helping stakeholders get better outcomes — even with fewer financial resources.

This infusion of computers and other digital technologies in programme development and implementation is on a steady rise. Each day new applications and devices are researched, developed and put to use in improving outcome quality. In many interesting ways, technology has been able to resolve complexities and challenges of public service in education. Innovation has ensured effectiveness in programme management, classroom learning experience and professional development in the education system.

Managing education reforms involves many complex tasks and daily challenges. To succeed in delivering essential educational goals in our digital information age, we have to employ the latest technological tools for training, online learning and access to information, resources and services. These tools help us do more by simplifying complex tasks. Prior to 2016, absenteeism was a major issue in public schools in K-P. Implementation of an online action management system with biometric attendance and other advanced processes led to a decline in this. The K-P government recovered Rs2.7 million from absent teachers.

The application of technological developments has an overwhelming impact on our daily activities. This transformation has redefined literacy, and our education system has to align with these changing needs. The K-P government has established 1,340 up-to-date IT labs in government schools across the province.



Over 700 additional IT teachers and lab assistants have been recruited. These labs are equipped with the latest technology, interactive and virtual learning tools, and smart connected classroom tools.

K-P has now introduced learning methods using a combination of ICT learning tools. Around 1,100 interactive whiteboards (IWBs) have been installed in government higher secondary schools with solar panels backup. The IWBs offer immense potential to teachers to create as well as curate digital content. These technologies also promise to make the schools environmentally friendly.

Equipping public schools with educational technology has reversed the trend of school migration from public to private. More parents are responding to significant learning gains offered in public schools using digital technology. The pliability of blended learning has facilitated in creating a less stressful learning environment and offers a huge potential for learning gain.

Inclusivity lies at the core of education reforms. Every social group must have equal access to technology for a fair chance at availing opportunities of life in a digital world. Marginalisation of women is an issue of major concern and it reflects in gender statistics. Forty-one per cent of women in Pakistan are not active in the economy, with the lowest labour force participation in the world at 22 per cent.

The progress in changing these oppressive social norms means bridging the gap between women and technology. The K-P government has launched an initiative in 17 districts where 1,200 women from lower-income groups are being trained to use computers and technology in government schools during evening hours. Expert women trainers are hired to enable women enrollment that offers a world full of opportunities.

By making computer education easily available for girls, the K-P government is on its way to bring an educational revolution marked by technological advancement, which will go a long way in eliminating issues of concern in the education system. Such overhauling initiatives are necessary to make sure people are empowered technologically, financially and psychologically.

Source: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1521379/digital-literacy-education-reforms/>

# Education: A Solution for Pakistan By Fiza Farhan

Being a developing country and one with an almost exponentially growing population, Pakistan faces all sorts of socio-economic problems. But the underlying cause of these problems is the issue of illiteracy. Our government spends less than 3% on the education sector. Already an insufficient value for catering to the needs of a considerably large population, it is further misappropriated. According to a compilation of the World Literacy Foundation, more than 796 million people in the world cannot read and write, about 67 million children do not have access to primary school education and another 72 million miss out on secondary school education. Pakistan's situation is even more unfortunate as it is estimated that 26% of the countries that are poorer than Pakistan, send a larger proportion of their children to schools. The main finding of the report further states that putting an economic value on the cost of illiteracy, it is estimated at \$1.2 trillion to the global economy. Hence, this problem is not confined to the developing world.

Why is education so crucial to saving our economy? Literacy is the fundamental building block of education and as vaccine is a prevention measure for a disease, literacy works in the same way for preventing the spread of corruption, hunger, poverty, crime, poor health conditions and unemployment among other socio-economic problems. Education is an essential tool for breaking the rigid and harsh social cycles of poverty.

In Pakistan, the quality of education is as big a problem as lack of access to education starting from the primary level. Even if the net enrollment rate of children attending a primary school is 63%, half of them drop out due to several reasons and those who continue are also getting a substandard experience because of inadequate education facilities, lack of trained teachers, and a standard medium of instruction in all regions, outdated curriculum and absence of a standard assessment tool. Another worrisome issue is that textbooks and the way things are taught encourage rote learning and promote ideologies of certain powerful groups of the country instead of stimulating creativity and critical thinking.

Additionally, when we talk about gender inequality and discrimination faced by women at all levels, we are always lead to the question: how does one break through the rigid norms? This is again a problem that stems from the lack of access to education and poor quality education. Firstly, female enrolment is only 43.6% of the total enrollment which is significantly less than the male enrolment. Secondly, gender roles for men and women are enforced through education and the curriculum also promotes patriarchal ideologies to a great extent. Both these factors mutually contribute to the social problems that result from gender discrimination in our society. Hence, it is crucial for the progress of Pakistan as a nation that girls are provided with an equal access to education.

Pakistan needs an extensive educational reform which must begin with a policy reform that tackles the chronic under-investment in the education sector. Adding to that, the government and the private sector must work as partners to provide quality education especially primary education to all the school going citizens. It is a long-term process which requires effort from each one of us as individuals too, to work towards a quality education system along with providing the youth with hope, our undivided attention, and unwavering belief in their potential. Education is not only crucial for mitigating the socio-economic issues, it is important for psychological reasons too as it helps to make you feel worthwhile, gives a boost to morale and builds confidence and perseverance.

Published in The Express Tribune, October 1st, 2017.

Source: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1520294/education-solution-pakistan/>

## Education Goals And Outcomes | Editorial

Education in Pakistan is not making slow or steady progress. Educationists aver that although school enrolment across the country's rural areas has increased, students are not learning much. Figures reported in the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) Pakistan show that although more children are attending classes, they may not be utilising that time productively. Considering that the subject pool for the data was large with 255,269 students studied at 5,540 rural schools, the information should be heavily perused not only by those in the education department, but by all stakeholders, including the teachers themselves at the schools surveyed and the philanthropists who operate private schools through their goodwill and community fundraising. It would be prudent to use the data as a means to reset administrative goals. Primarily, though, the education department needs to spearhead the endeavour as 63 per cent of children between three and five and 74 per cent of students between six and 16 attend public schools, according to ASER.

Albeit, each province runs a separate education department, there needs to be a push towards a better standardised curriculum, one that incorporates multimodal strategies and must be complete with resources to be used to consolidate student learning. As with any curriculum, the learning objectives and mission statement should be outlined first. Another most crucial aspect is funding. There is a lack of resources that would otherwise aid in imparting quality education in the way of teacher training and aligning pedagogy with 21st-century practice. Better resources include appropriate learning material and teaching methodology.

The lack of attention paid to the education sector is becoming more apparent as our economy develops. It is time to raise the bar.

Published in The Express Tribune, September 28th, 2017.

Source: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1517790/education-goals-outcomes/>

## Education Challenge By Huma Yusuf

ONLY four Pakistani universities made it to the top 1,000 in the Times Higher Education's annual World University Rankings, down from seven last year. That's an appalling proportion given that Pakistan is the fifth-most populous country in the world, and with a significant youth bulge.

Cynics might marvel that any Pakistani universities feature on the rankings. Patriots might fume at the exclusion of prestigious institutions such as Lums, AKUH and IBA. Academics are likely to point to the many fallacies in the rankings themselves; for example, the focus on measurable factors such as funding and volume of research publications, rather than the quality of tuition. This critique is particularly relevant in Pakistan since a 2002 decision to link government funding to research productivity has led local institutions to game the system by churning out sham research in publications with a dodgy — or non-existent — peer review culture. But the ranking has value in that it is yet another reminder of the sorry state of higher education in Pakistan.

In recent months, we have been inundated with stories highlighting the crisis unfolding on our campuses. The issue of student radicalisation has been well documented thanks to Saad Aziz's violent activities, Naureen Leghari's recruitment by the militant Islamic State group, and the recent involvement of a former Karachi University student in the assassination attempt on MPA Izharul Hassan. These examples were preceded by tales of music departments being forced off campuses by the student wings of religious political parties, Al Qaeda militants seeking sanctuary in hostels, and militant groups targeting students through social media.

Critical thinking is urgently required.

But radicalisation is not the only challenge facing educational institutions. Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy has repeatedly highlighted the issue of corruption at universities resulting from cash incentives for research publications.

The politicisation of our campuses is another issue. Mashal Khan's heinous lynching was primarily viewed as a sign of growing extremism on campuses but as

the investigation into the murder showed it was more about campus politics. Khan's death occurred because of competing party interests, criminality and the complicity of university officials at the highest levels in corrupt behaviour, including politicised hiring practices and the fostering of armed wings of political parties on campus. Rather than insulting religion, it was criticising the university administration that probably cost Khan his life.

There are many who disagree with a focus on higher education, saying that Pakistan must first prioritise universal access to primary education. This is a simplistic argument — we cannot pick and choose. A country cannot advance without the input of independent thinkers and problem solvers. Indeed, it must be our university graduates who coin the policies that lead to a better public education system for all.

The HEC has taken a welcome step to call for universities to crack down on campus radicalisation. A recent letter by the commission's chairman calls for improved security, faculty monitoring of public spaces and more counselling of vulnerable students. More importantly, the letter recognises the need for extracurricular activities, sports, tutorials and public lectures to promote tolerance as ways to combat extremism.

Unfortunately, a securitised and censorial rather than discourse-driven approach is likely to be adopted in the fight against university radicalisation, and to the neglect of other issues plaguing institutions. Consider the recent proposal to open up student records to scrutiny by law-enforcement and intelligence personnel. As an editorial in this paper rightly pointed out, such access would be both useless in terms of identifying potential militants and counterproductive owing to the chilling effect it would have on the academic environment. Sadly, our state infrastructure is better equipped to monitor and harass than facilitate discourse.

Optimists have suggested that CPEC — the answer to all Pakistan's woes! — will also save its educational culture. Technology transfer centres and labs envisioned under the corridor are no doubt welcome. But the Chinese are hardly known for fostering the kind of critical thinking that is urgently needed for Pakistan's state and society to thrive. This is one challenge we will have to address without help from our friends.

There is an inherent irony in Pakistani culture. We have great regard for scholars (as reflected in media personalities' and politicians' need to cling to the honorific of doctor, even if it's not strictly accurate). But there is little interest in ensuring that the titles are meaningful and well earned. Indeed, the unthinking deference to so-called experts is itself a sign of the lack of critical thinking — and the submission to authority that it enables — in society at large. Better thinking is needed to help close the gaps.

The writer is a freelance journalist.

huma.yusuf@gmail.com

Twitter: @humayusuf

Published in Dawn, September 11th, 2017

Source: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1356918/education-challenge>

# Restoring the Essence of Education By M Omar Iftikhar

ESPIE the evolution of schools and schooling system with the incorporation of syllabus and course content to meet the needs of the time, the education system does not provide children what they need — room for creativity and learning. Schools operating in Karachi, for instance, despite charging high fee, which the lower and lower-middle class cannot afford, are not imparting quality education. The syllabus used by all English-medium schools may attract ‘image conscious’ parents, the teachers, however, do not give an education that may add value to the students’ character and personality.

Perhaps nothing is wrong with the education system but how education is disseminated. Consider the life cycle of a student in Pakistan who gets admission in kindergarten. The child’s mind is filled with questions, curiosity, and the quest to explore information. As a child enters school, soon this urge for knowledge suppresses. Some children remain inquisitive; however, their minds too succumb to the process of schooling where the structured syllabus deprives children of their creativity. Every school considers syllabus the holy grail of learning. Imagine how as a child you were asked to color a drawing while keeping the pencil strokes within the black borders of the object.

Even today, children are scolded when their pencil strokes reach out of the boundary. Similarly, when children are taught hand writing in primary classes, they are taught and more than often admonished when their pencil strokes run over the upper or lower lines marking the boundary within which the strokes should remain. This kind of forced learning does not bode well with the aptitude of children as they run away from studying as it becomes too conditional and restricted. Children are hyper, sensitive, impulsive, cheerful, imaginative and curious. They cannot be forced to follow a pattern or a structure every day at school. Teachers asking or most of the times demanding a child to sit in a dignified manner, learn what they are compelled to or complete tasks as per the teacher’s or school’s requirements destroy children from their ability to think, question and explore the world. Despite children being free from all structured norms and practices, they are compelled to memorize poems, alphabets, numbers, colours, and shapes and are reprimanded when failing to do so.



Certainly, learning such basic concepts are important for a child, however, schools should use better and effective ways. One example is using sing-a-long videos to teach children this basic information instead of teachers saying a word, letter or colour and students repeating it incessantly until they learn it by heart, whether they quite grasp their meaning or not. Much is the case with students pursuing their matriculation (grade 10) and intermediate (grade 11, 12) education. Authorities in the education sector of Pakistan should realize that changing the curriculum of Intermediate level would have a positive effect on the minds of the students. Unfortunately, rote learning is the call of the day when students prepare for examinations and therefore, real learning is lost.

The education system hits students in two ways. First, the content of the subjects taught in school and colleges are dry and do not offer any creative simulation nor breeds imagination. Second, rote learning does not lead to learning as students memorize text to reproduce it word-by-word in their examinations to score good marks. To facilitate real learning and to give students a chance to use their minds, the decision makers must include case study approach in the curriculum of Intermediate akin to the ones used in universities. Such case studies, simple in words and meaning, will allow students to use their cognitive thinking skills while jogging their minds, thereby, making them step out of the constrained thinking process where guess papers and classroom notes become their preferred choice while preparing for examinations. Another serious concern pertains to the textbooks and their content used in business management institutes. Unfortunately, the course syllabus imparts students with concepts and theories established and followed by the Western world promoted by their writers. Although such concepts have become a global standard, it is outrageous that students in Pakistan learn about these Western concepts pertaining to marketing, finance, human resource and others before entering the Pakistani market as graduates.

Such Western concepts do not suit the Pakistani market. It is high time Pakistani professionals and business leaders write and publish books to inform students about concepts, theories, best practices, case studies, and examples relating to the various industries and professions of Pakistan. Therefore, certain provisions, opportunities, and avenues should be created so Pakistan's professionals from major sectors can pen books to add value to the Pakistani mindset. Such provisions must be planned and turned into a reality to create a more erudite,

learned and cultured future generation of graduates. However, this change must come by restructuring the entire educational system beginning from the primary level.

— The writer is a freelance columnist based in Karachi.

Email:omariftikhar@hotmail.com

Source: <http://pakobserver.net/restoring-essence-education/>

# The Deficiencies in Our Education Systems By Shagufta Gul

Education is an enlightening experience; a process of learning from known to unknown. There are generally two types of education: formal education and informal education. Formal education is institution-based, like school, college, university; and informal is usually outside the classroom, in the community.

A successful system of education prepares the student for the future by inculcating both hard and soft skills. Hard skills are the skills which are measurable specific teachable abilities, such as reading, writing, mathematical skills, computer skills, and so on. Hard skill development in early years is at its best in the Montessori Method of teaching. The system provides the learner with a set of exercises called 'exercise of practical life': sensory education and mathematical exercises dealing purely with hard skill development.

Soft skills are abilities that pertain to personality, attitude, and behaviour, rather than the formal technical knowledge. Successful blending of hard and soft skills result in a balanced, composed, mature, tolerant, confident and self-aware generation beneficial for the society. The difference is that hard skills can be measured, but soft skills can't.

We know of different of parallel systems of education in Pakistan. Since public schools couldn't cater to the needs of growing number of students, and for parental concerns of individual attention for their child, the advent of the idea of child-friendly education – the private school systems – are still filling up the vacuum. Parents, though mostly a product of these schools themselves, are more concerned about the quality of education and individual attention for their child.

When we examine the three main streams of education, the public school in general is mainly focusing on development of hard skills like reading, writing, rewriting, mathematical skills, etc. In contrast, the private schools promoting conceptual learning are more attuned towards soft skill development. The Madrassa students are also more focused towards hard skills, with very little space for soft skills. The most developed nations of the world are following schemes of studies which drive students to master both hard and soft skills.

The two most important soft skills are communication and personal skills. Communication skills consist of verbal communication, written communication, listening, public speaking, and non-verbal communication. Personal skills consist of emotional intelligence, self-awareness, emotion management, tolerance of change and uncertainty, handling criticism, self-confidence, adaptability, enthusiasm, friendliness and empathy.

We have recently had interactions with various students from different institutions: and it was surprising to see that even university students – particularly Bachelors level students – would find it hard to share their views in a presentation, or in individual question-answer sessions. It could be clearly observed that the key communication skill with the aforementioned ingredients were not nurtured the way they should have been. At which level of education was the missing link; that remains to be diagnosed.

Communication is the key soft skill that is considered equally important for all professions and fields: in most cases, “excellent communication skills” are a requirement posted by many job advertisers. The teachers involved in teaching at public schools are hardly aware of the fact that they are in the classroom not to just make the ‘reading writing machines’, but they also have to integrate the taught lessons with personal skill development.

Integration is the concept of blending in two or three different subjects: the teacher has to find the connection between two subjects, and then the journey of interactive learning from known to unknown takes place. Integration can be done in various styles and with different methodologies. Integration of subjects is a very rare phenomenon as far as our public schools are concerned. For the student, each subject is a separate and different entity which needs to be understood from A to Z within its domain; plus the skill to rewrite the memorized stuff within a given time is perfected. In this scenario, there are hardly moments to inculcate these skills among the students; the result is that even a student attaining a higher degree is unable to express him or herself clearly whenever it comes to an interview or writing an application or résumé in most of the cases.

The teachers in public schools are hardly aware of the fact that they are in the classroom not just to teach reading and writing skills; they also have to integrate

taught lessons with personal skill development and ensure real life application of the material taught to students

Since the teacher is the main source of information and – due to time constraints -the only objective is to finish the lessons, so that is it. The schools that focus on conceptual learning are vice versa; their main focus is on verbal communication, presentation skills, etc. It's a race against time in both systems. The self-confidence and self-awareness which gives the feeling of self respect to an individual is the missing link in the parallel running systems. The practical implications are visible neither in society nor in educational institutions, at any level. The result is visible: an impatient generation trying to prove its point as correct by any means necessary.

Education reforms are an ongoing process. As per international standards, each national curriculum is to be reviewed after five years. Our national curriculum needs to be reviewed after the amendments and changes introduced in 2006. Designing and including soft skills learning material based on communication skills and personal skills as a component of the curriculum is desperately needed. And when we say communication, it means verbal, non-verbal, written, and all aspects that are to be inculcated with balance given the utmost importance.

The human resource engaged in teaching and learning must be well trained on the importance of these skills, and must have clarity on these concepts with reference to the methodologies and techniques applicable in a classroom environment. Provincial governments must engage civil society organisations or relevant private institutions for the capacity building of teachers. Informal educational activities can also be supported in this regard. The aim has to be a broader one; towards a generation equipped with the skills that can lead the society towards peaceful coexistence with itself, and with the world.

The writer has experience in the field of education and is currently working as a resource person in the development sector

Published in Daily Times, September 5th 2017.

## WORLD

---

# Of Hawks and US Foreign Policy By Omer Azhar Bhatti

When Jimmy Carter, American President in 1981, convened with his closest advisers in the White House on 11th of April to discuss solutions to the Iranian hostage crisis during the American election campaign, two broad overarching themes dominated the meeting: hawks and doves. Then National Security Advisor-Zbigniew Brezinski, Vice President-Walter Mondale, Joint Chief of Staff, Chief of Staff and Defence Secretary were the hawks in the group of advisers whose main policy proposal and focus was to ensure that aggressive and harsh action was taken against Iran for detaining Americans. After initial negotiation failure, some advocated for punitive strikes, others wanted a major military mission to free the hostages. In the midst of hawks, there was Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State who wasn't present on the 11th April meeting. The official explanation of his absence is much needed vacation but many historians argue that he was deliberately sent away because he was the 'dove', for he propagated for further negotiations, trade sanctions and non-military measures. Group-think, the practice of thinking or making decisions as a group in a way that discourages creativity or individual responsibility, dominated here. All the like-minded individuals reached a decision with an air of finality without paying heed to the secretary of state who disagreed.

Famous political theorist, Graham Allison answered this by saying 'you stand where you sit'. Both Vice-President Walter Mondale and Chief of Staff owed their positions solely to President Carter. Therefore, they couldn't make the man look weak during an election and vouched for aggression. Joint Chief of Staff, in command of the strongest military on the face of the planet wanted aggressive action to protect American honour and re-emphasise American military supremacy. But Cyrus Vance, then Secretary of State (in-charge of foreign relations), was the 'dove' because he feared a backlash in Middle-East and setbacks to American relations with other nations if any disproportionate force was used.

The two most influential men in the foreign policy administration aren't particularly concerned about the broader aims of the departments, and the ways these departments serve the interest of United States of America — rather they hold Trump's success and interest at their heart

President Trump's recent accusations against Pakistan of 'harbouring' terrorists and serving as a safe haven for them come as part of the new militarised Afghanistan foreign policy. The policy is centred on using further aggression in American battle tactics, harsher rhetoric and stronger narrative against terrorism which explains why Pakistan was asked to 'do more'. Just like President Carter succumbed to the hawks in his administration and had to carry out an armed rescue mission to keep his support base intact during the election campaign, Trump too has been toughening his stance and used harsh rhetoric against Pakistan to appeal to his voter base. A careful breakdown of the major components in American foreign policy administration is required to explain the outcry. Two personnel in particular have emerged as most prominent in Trump's foreign policy administration — Rex Tillerson and Jared Kushner. Rex Tillerson, Secretary of State, has no prior experience of holding a high ranking government office and owes his position entirely to Trump due to his lack of experience in this field. Tillerson has marginalised the State Department's role in foreign policy making by sticking close to and showing absolute loyalty to the person who picked him, not the department he is in charge of.

In other words, he is neither a career diplomat nor a seasoned government official. He knows nothing but to improve Trump's standing across the board. The same applies to Jared Kushner, the President's son in law, who is a trusted comrade despite zero knowledge of the intricacies of the world of diplomacy.

The two most influential men in the foreign policy administration aren't particularly concerned about the broader aims of the departments, and the ways these departments serve the interest of United States of America. Instead, they hold Trump's success and interest at their heart. It is for this reason that a further aggressive policy has been adopted on the war on terror because the administration is dominated by hawks who owe everything to Trump's presidency rather than their careers, and Trump coming across as antagonistic entails higher popularity and diversion from domestic woes. The hawks are hawks because instead of making a carefully planned, methodically constructed foreign policy accounting for all past failures, the aim is to make Trump appear tough, and the best way to do that is to command and deter other countries perceived as threatening by the American populace i.e. unfairly claim Pakistan to be a hub of terrorists.

Studying American history reveals that foreign policy toughness, initiating war and major foreign policy successes improve a President's popularity and rating. This is all the more significant for him considering he faces an investigation. Trump faces not only the lowest approval and popularity ratings by a US President in recent history, but is also confronted by serious investigations on his possible deep connections to Russia. It is, hence, in the interest of Donald Trump to chart a course of foreign affairs that makes him look different to his predecessor and look ready to use power and force to gain some acceptance domestically.

There is no truth to his allegations against Pakistan. It is important to be critical of Pakistan's flair for fundamentalism and extremism as seen by the creation of Mili Muslim League party by a banned militant outfit, but the claim that there is institutional, top tier and government support for terrorist organisations is diabolical and preposterous. What it is, however, is a domination of American foreign policy by hawks and an American President wanting to appear belligerent to rally everyone behind the American flag and divert attention from domestic troubles.

The writer is a student of International Relations at London School of Economics, President of the London School of Economics Pakistan Development Society and Vice President of LSE South Asia Society. Co-Founder-Future of Pakistan Conference. Twitter: @OmerAzhar96

Published in Daily Times, September 1st 2017.

Source: <http://dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/01-Sep-17/of-hawks-and-us-foreign-policy>



## China vs. America By Graham Allison

As Americans awaken to a rising China that now rivals the United States in every arena, many seek comfort in the conviction that as China grows richer and stronger, it will follow in the footsteps of Germany, Japan, and other countries that have undergone profound transformations and emerged as advanced liberal democracies. In this view, the magic cocktail of globalization, market-based consumerism, and integration into the rule-based international order will eventually lead China to become democratic at home and to develop into what former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick once described as “a responsible stakeholder” abroad.

Samuel Huntington disagreed. In his essay “The Clash of Civilizations?,” published in this magazine in 1993, the political scientist argued that, far from dissolving in a global liberal world order, cultural fault lines would become a defining feature of the post-Cold War world. Huntington’s argument is remembered today primarily for its prescience in spotlighting the divide between “Western and Islamic civilizations”—a rift that was revealed most vividly by the 9/11 attacks and their aftermath. But Huntington saw the gulf between the U.S.-led West and Chinese civilization as just as deep, enduring, and consequential. As he put it, “The very notion that there could be a ‘universal civilization’ is a Western idea, directly at odds with the particularism of most Asian societies and their emphasis on what distinguishes one people from another.”

The years since have bolstered Huntington’s case. The coming decades will only strengthen it further. The United States embodies what Huntington considered Western civilization. And tensions between American and Chinese values, traditions, and philosophies will aggravate the fundamental structural stresses that occur whenever a rising power, such as China, threatens to displace an established power, such as the United States.

The reason such shifts so often lead to conflict is Thucydides’ trap, named after the ancient Greek historian who observed a dangerous dynamic between a rising Athens and ruling Sparta. According to Thucydides, “It was the rise of Athens, and the fear that this instilled in Sparta, that made war inevitable.” Rising powers understandably feel a growing sense of entitlement and demand greater influence and respect. Established powers, faced with challengers, tend to become fearful,

insecure, and defensive. In such an environment, misunderstandings are magnified, empathy remains elusive, and events and third-party actions that would otherwise be inconsequential or manageable can trigger wars that the primary players never wanted to fight.

In the case of the United States and China, Thucydidean risks are compounded by civilizational incompatibility between the two countries, which exacerbates their competition and makes it more difficult to achieve rapprochement. This mismatch is most easily observed in the profound differences between American and Chinese conceptions of the state, economics, the role of individuals, relations among nations, and the nature of time.

Americans see government as a necessary evil and believe that the state's tendency toward tyranny and abuse of power must be feared and constrained. For Chinese, government is a necessary good, the fundamental pillar ensuring order and preventing chaos. In American-style free-market capitalism, government establishes and enforces the rules; state ownership and government intervention in the economy sometimes occur but are undesirable exceptions. In China's state-led market economy, the government establishes targets for growth, picks and subsidizes industries to develop, promotes national champions, and undertakes significant, long-term economic projects to advance the interests of the nation.

Chinese culture does not celebrate American-style individualism, which measures society by how well it protects the rights and fosters the freedom of individuals. Indeed, the Chinese term for "individualism"—*gerenzhuyi*—suggests a selfish preoccupation with oneself over one's community. China's equivalent of "give me liberty or give me death" would be "give me a harmonious community or give me death." For China, order is the highest value, and harmony results from a hierarchy in which participants obey Confucius' first imperative: Know thy place.

This view applies not only to domestic society but also to global affairs, where the Chinese view holds that China's rightful place is atop the pyramid; other states should be arranged as subordinate tributaries. The American view is somewhat different. Since at least the end of World War II, Washington has sought to prevent the emergence of a "peer competitor" that could challenge U.S. military dominance. But postwar American conceptions of international order have also

emphasized the need for a rule-based global system that restrains even the United States.

Finally, the Americans and the Chinese think about time and experience its passage differently. Americans tend to focus on the present and often count in hours or days. Chinese, on the other hand, are more historical-minded and often think in terms of decades and even centuries.

Of course, these are sweeping generalizations that are by necessity reductive and not fully reflective of the complexities of American and Chinese society. But they also provide important reminders that policymakers in the United States and China should keep in mind in seeking to manage this competition without war.

## WE'RE NUMBER ONE

The cultural differences between the United States and China are aggravated by a remarkable trait shared by both countries: an extreme superiority complex. Each sees itself as exceptional—indeed, without peer. But there can be only one number one. Lee Kuan Yew, the former prime minister of Singapore, had doubts about the United States' ability to adapt to a rising China. "For America to be displaced, not in the world, but only in the western Pacific, by an Asian people long despised and dismissed with contempt as decadent, feeble, corrupt, and inept is emotionally very difficult to accept," he said in a 1999 interview. "The sense of cultural supremacy of the Americans will make this adjustment most difficult."

In some ways, Chinese exceptionalism is more sweeping than its American counterpart. "The [Chinese] empire saw itself as the center of the civilized universe," the historian Harry Gelber wrote in his 2001 book, *Nations Out of Empires*. During the imperial era, "the Chinese scholar-bureaucrat did not think of a 'China' or a 'Chinese civilization' in the modern sense at all. For him, there were the Han people and, beyond that, only barbarism. Whatever was not civilized was, by definition, barbaric."

To this day, the Chinese take great pride in their civilizational achievements. "Our nation is a great nation," Chinese President Xi Jinping declared in a 2012 speech. "During the civilization and development process of more than 5,000 years, the Chinese nation has made an indelible contribution to the civilization and

advancement of mankind.” Indeed, Xi claimed in his 2014 book, *The Governance of China*, that “China’s continuous civilization is not equal to anything on earth, but a unique achievement in world history.”

Americans, too, see themselves as the vanguard of civilization, especially when it comes to political development. A passion for freedom is enshrined in the core document of the American political creed, the Declaration of Independence, which proclaims that “all men are created equal” and that they are “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights.” The declaration specifies that these rights include “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness” and asserts that these are not matters for debate but rather “self-evident” truths. As the American historian Richard Hofstadter wrote, “It has been our fate as a nation not to have ideologies, but to be one.” In contrast, order is the central political value for Chinese—and order results from hierarchy. Individual liberty, as Americans understand it, disrupts hierarchy; in the Chinese view, it invites chaos.

#### DO AS I SAY . . . AND AS I DO?

These philosophical differences find expression in each country’s concept of government. Although animated by a deep distrust of authority, the founders of the United States recognized that society required government. Otherwise, who would protect citizens from foreign threats or violations of their rights by criminals at home? They wrestled, however, with a dilemma: a government powerful enough to perform its essential functions would tend toward tyranny. To manage this challenge, they designed a government of “separated institutions sharing power,” as the historian Richard Neustadt described it. This deliberately produced constant struggle among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, which led to delay, gridlock, and even dysfunction. But it also provided checks and balances against abuse.

The Chinese conception of government and its role in society could hardly be more different. As Lee observed, “The country’s history and cultural records show that when there is a strong center (Beijing or Nanjing), the country is peaceful and prosperous. When the center is weak, then the provinces and their counties are run by little warlords.” Accordingly, the sort of strong central government that Americans resist represents to the Chinese the principal agent advancing order and the public good at home and abroad.

In some ways, Chinese exceptionalism is more sweeping than its American counterpart.

For Americans, democracy is the only just form of government: authorities derive their legitimacy from the consent of the governed. That is not the prevailing view in China, where it is common to believe that the government earns or loses political legitimacy based on its performance. In a provocative TED Talk delivered in 2013, the Shanghai-based venture capitalist Eric Li challenged democracy's presumed superiority. "I was asked once, 'The party wasn't voted in by election. Where is the source of legitimacy?'" he recounted. "I said, 'How about competency?'" He went on to remind his audience that in 1949, when the Chinese Communist Party took power, "China was mired in civil war, dismembered by foreign aggression, [and] average life expectancy at that time [was] 41 years. Today [China] is the second-largest economy in the world, an industrial powerhouse, and its people live in increasing prosperity."

Washington and Beijing also have distinctly different approaches when it comes to promoting their fundamental political values internationally. Americans believe that human rights and democracy are universal aspirations, requiring only the example of the United States (and sometimes a neoimperialist nudge) to be realized everywhere. The United States is, as Huntington wrote in his follow-on book, *The Clash of Civilizations*, "a missionary nation," driven by the belief "that the non-Western peoples should commit themselves to the Western values . . . and should embody these values in their institutions." Most Americans believe that democratic rights will benefit anyone, anywhere in the world.

Over the decades, Washington has pursued a foreign policy that seeks to advance the cause of democracy—even, on occasion, attempting to impose it on those who have failed to embrace it themselves. In contrast, although the Chinese believe that others can look up to them, admire their virtues, and even attempt to mimic their behavior, China's leaders have not proselytized on behalf of their approach. As the American diplomat Henry Kissinger has noted, imperial China "did not export its ideas but let others come to seek them." And unsurprisingly, Chinese leaders have been deeply suspicious of U.S. efforts to convert them to the American creed. In the late 1980s, Deng Xiaoping, who led China from 1978 until 1989 and began the country's process of economic liberalization, complained to a visiting dignitary that Western talk of "human rights, freedom, and democracy is

designed only to safeguard the interests of the strong, rich countries, which take advantage of their strength to bully weak countries, and which pursue hegemony and practice power politics.”

## THINKING FAST AND SLOW

The American and Chinese senses of the past, present, and future are fundamentally distinct. Americans proudly celebrated their country turning 241 in July; the Chinese are fond of noting that their history spans five millennia. U.S. leaders often refer to “the American experiment,” and their sometimes haphazard policies reflect that attitude. China, by contrast, sees itself as a fixture of the universe: it always was; it always will be.

Because of their expansive sense of time, Chinese leaders are careful to distinguish the acute from the chronic and the urgent from the merely important. It is difficult to imagine a U.S. political leader suggesting that a major foreign policy problem should be put on the proverbial shelf for a generation. That, however, is precisely what Deng did in 1979, when he led the Chinese side in negotiations with Japan over the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and accepted an eventual, rather than an immediate, solution to the dispute.

Ever more sensitive to the demands of the news cycle and popular opinion, U.S. politicians take to Twitter or announce alliterative, bullet-point policy plans that promise quick solutions. In contrast, Chinese leaders are strategically patient: as long as trends are moving in their favor, they are comfortable waiting out a problem. Americans think of themselves as problem solvers. Reflecting their short-termism, they see problems as discrete issues to be addressed now so that they can move on to the next ones. The American novelist and historian Gore Vidal once called his country “the United States of Amnesia”—a place where every idea is an innovation and every crisis is unprecedented. This contrasts sharply with the deep historical and institutional memory of the Chinese, who assume that there is nothing new under the sun.

Indeed, Chinese leaders tend to believe that many problems cannot be solved and must instead be managed. They see challenges as long term and iterative; issues they face today resulted from processes that have evolved over the past year, decade, or century. Policy actions they take today will simply contribute to that

evolution. For instance, since 1949, Taiwan has been ruled by what Beijing considers rogue Chinese nationalists. Although Chinese leaders insist that Taiwan remains an integral part of China, they have pursued a long-term strategy involving tightening economic and social entanglements to slowly suck the island back into the fold.

## WHO'S THE BOSS?

The civilizational clash that will make it hardest for Washington and Beijing to escape Thucydides' trap emerges from their competing conceptions of world order. China's treatment of its own citizens provides the script for its relations with weaker neighbors abroad. The Chinese Communist Party maintains order by enforcing an authoritarian hierarchy that demands the deference and compliance of citizens. China's international behavior reflects similar expectations of order: in an unscripted moment during a 2010 meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, then Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi responded to complaints about Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea by telling his regional counterparts and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that "China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that's just a fact."

By contrast, American leaders aspire to an international rule of law that is essentially U.S. domestic rule of law writ large. At the same time, they also recognize the realities of power in the Hobbesian global jungle, where it is better to be the lion than the lamb. Washington often tries to reconcile this tension by depicting a world in which the United States is a benevolent hegemon, acting as the world's lawmaker, policeman, judge, and jury.

Washington urges other powers to accept the rule-based international order over which it presides. But through Chinese eyes, it looks like the Americans make the rules and others obey Washington's commands. General Martin Dempsey, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, became familiar with the predictable resentment this elicited from China. "One of the things that fascinated me about the Chinese is whenever I would have a conversation with them about international standards or international rules of behavior, they would inevitably point out that those rules were made when they were absent from the world stage," Dempsey remarked in an interview with this magazine last year.

## YOU CAN GO YOUR OWN WAY

The United States has spent nearly three decades as the world's most powerful country. During that time, Washington's massive influence on world affairs has made it crucial for elites and leaders in other nations to understand American culture and the U.S. approach to strategy. Americans, on the other hand, have often felt that they have the luxury of not needing to think too hard about the worldviews of people elsewhere—a lack of interest encouraged by the belief, held by many American elites, that the rest of the world has been slowly but surely becoming more like the United States anyway.

In recent years, however, the rise of China has challenged that indifference. Policymakers in the United States are beginning to recognize that they must improve their understanding of China—especially Chinese strategic thinking. In particular, U.S. policymakers have begun to see distinctive traits in the way their Chinese counterparts think about the use of military force. In deciding whether, when, and how to attack adversaries, Chinese leaders have for the most part been rational and pragmatic. Beyond that, however, American policymakers and analysts have identified five presumptions and predilections that offer further clues to China's likely strategic behavior in confrontations.

First, in both war and peace, Chinese strategy is unabashedly driven by realpolitik and unencumbered by any serious need to justify Chinese behavior in terms of international law or ethical norms. This allows the Chinese government to be ruthlessly flexible, since it feels few constraints from prior rationales and is largely immune to criticisms of inconsistency. So, for example, when Kissinger arrived in China in 1971 to begin secret talks about a U.S.-Chinese rapprochement, he found his interlocutors unblinkered by ideology and brutally candid about China's national interests. Whereas Kissinger and U.S. President Richard Nixon felt it necessary to justify the compromise they ultimately reached to end the Vietnam War as “peace with honor,” the Chinese leader Mao Zedong felt no need to pretend that in establishing relations with the capitalist United States to strengthen communist China's position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, he was somehow bolstering a larger socialist international movement.

Just as China's practical approach to international politics arguably gives China an edge over the United States, so, too, does China's obsessively holistic strategic



worldview. Chinese planners see everything as connected to everything else. The evolving context in which a strategic situation occurs determines what the Chinese call shi. This term has no direct English translation but can be rendered as the “potential energy” or “momentum” inherent in any circumstance at a given moment. It comprises geography and terrain, weather, the balance of forces, surprise, morale, and many other elements. “Each factor influences the others,” as Kissinger wrote in his 2011 book, *On China*, “giving rise to subtle shifts in momentum and relative advantage.” Thus, a skilled Chinese strategist spends most of his time patiently “observing and cultivating changes in the strategic landscape” and moves only when everything is in optimal alignment. Then he strikes swiftly. To an observer, the result appears inevitable.

War for Chinese strategists is primarily psychological and political. In Chinese thinking, an opponent’s perception of facts on the ground may be just as important as the facts themselves. For imperial China, creating and sustaining the image of a civilization so superior that it represented “the center of the universe” served to deter enemies from challenging Chinese dominance. Today, a narrative of China’s inevitable rise and the United States’ irreversible decline plays a similar role.

Traditionally, the Chinese have sought victory not in a decisive battle but through incremental moves designed to gradually improve their position. David Lai, an expert on Asian military affairs, has illustrated this approach by comparing the Western game of chess with its Chinese equivalent, weiqi (often referred to as go). In chess, players seek to dominate the center of the board and conquer the opponent. In weiqi, players seek to surround the opponent. If the chess master sees five or six moves ahead, the weiqi master sees 20 or 30. Attending to every dimension in the broader relationship with an adversary, the Chinese strategist resists rushing prematurely toward victory, instead aiming to build incremental advantage. “In the Western tradition, there is a heavy emphasis on the use of force; the art of war is largely limited to the battlefields; and the way to fight is force on force,” Lai wrote in a 2004 analysis for the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute. By contrast, “the philosophy behind go . . . is to compete for relative gain rather than seeking complete annihilation of the opponent forces.” In a wise reminder, Lai warns that “it is dangerous to play go with the chess mindset.”

LET’S MAKE A DEAL

Washington would do well to heed that warning. In the coming years, any number of flash points could produce a crisis in U.S.-Chinese relations, including further territorial disputes over the South China Sea and tensions over North Korea's burgeoning nuclear weapons program. Since it will take at least another decade or more for China's military capabilities to fully match those of the United States, the Chinese will be cautious and prudent about any lethal use of force against the Americans. Beijing will treat military force as a subordinate instrument in its foreign policy, which seeks not victory in battle but the achievement of national objectives. It will bolster its diplomatic and economic connections with its neighbors, deepening their dependency on China, and use economic leverage to encourage (or coerce) cooperation on other issues. Although China has traditionally viewed war as a last resort, should it conclude that long-term trend lines are no longer moving in its favor and that it is losing bargaining power, it could initiate a limited military conflict to attempt to reverse the trends.

The last time the United States faced extremely high Thucydidean risks was during the Cold War—especially during the Cuban missile crisis. Reflecting on the crisis a few months after its resolution, U.S. President John F. Kennedy identified one enduring lesson: “Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or nuclear war.” In spite of Moscow's hard-line rhetoric, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev ultimately concluded that he could compromise on nuclear arms in Cuba. Likewise, Kissinger and Nixon later discovered that the Chinese ideologue Mao was quite adept at giving ground when it served China's interests.

Xi and U.S. President Donald Trump have both made maximalist claims, especially when it comes to the South China Sea. But both are also dealmakers. The better the Trump administration understands how Beijing sees China's role in the world and the country's core interests, the better prepared it will be to negotiate. The problem remains psychological projection: even seasoned State Department officials too often mistakenly assume that China's vital interests mirror those of the United States. The officials now crafting the Trump administration's approach to China would be wise to read the ancient Chinese philosopher Sun-tzu: “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer

a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”

Source: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-08-15/china-vs-america>

# Possible Results of Trump's Afghan Approach

## By Shahid Javed Burki

While some of the commentary in the United States on the content of President Donald Trump's August 21 speech on the Afghan strategy may have dismissed it simply as old wine in a new bottle, there is little doubt that if all the elements it articulated become the United States' policy, there will be enormous consequences for South Asia. We can already spot at least half a dozen of these. I will mention these and then briefly discuss them.

First, the on-going war in Afghanistan will not have a clear winner for years to come. There will be more destruction and more contestants will be drawn into the fray. These will probably include the Islamic State (IS) as that organisation of extremists, squeezed in Iraq and Syria, seeks new grounds for its continued existence. A troubled Afghanistan will offer an attractive place from where to launch operations possibly into South Asia. The IS could also find the ground in the Indian-occupied Kashmir throwing the welcoming mat.

Second, the Americans are unlikely to extend their stay in Afghanistan for any length of time. The strategy announced by President Trump was drafted by the senior military personnel who have joined his administration. The militarisation of the approach would not have civilian support, at least of the people who were behind the president's 'America First' thinking. Some of these people — Stephen Bannon and Sebastian Gorka, for instance — have been pushed out of the White House by the president's military associates. They have, however, not lost their influence in the Trump camp and are debating the wisdom of the Afghan policy. The August 21st speech, therefore, may not be the final word. President Trump has not shown perseverance to be one of his strengths. He is likely to get tired of the course he has set for himself and his administration and call off the American involvement in Afghanistan.

Third, in the meantime, the American rift with Pakistan will most likely become unbridgeable. This will be the case in particular if Imran Khan, not keen on keeping Pakistan closely aligned with the United States, gains political strength in the country. He has not made any secret of his desire to pull out of the US orbit.

Fourth, Pakistan will get even closer to China as Beijing extends its reach in the country by way of the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative. The OBOR will prove to be a game changer for Pakistan even if the absence of peace in Afghanistan does not yield its full potential. Pakistan's delinking from America and India's drawing closeness to that country will reorder geopolitics in South and Central Asia. While the United States and India could become the main building blocks of what Donald Trump in his speech passingly referred to as the Indo-Pacific configuration, China, Russia and Pakistan may come together as partners in the other geographic configuration.

Fifth, it is not totally unlikely that Iran will join this grouping, especially if the Trump administration continues in its attempt to isolate that country. From the perspective of the Muslim world, this may not be an unwelcome development as it will soften the sectarian divide that has been exacerbated by Trump's Washington. The US president's May speech in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, was read as an invitation to the Sunni world to align itself with the United States in the latter's distrust of Tehran.

It is the sixth consequence of Trump's Afghan strategy that may prove to be most distressing. The pressure on Pakistan to do more to eliminate radical Islamists from its soil may produce an unintended result. The Pakistani military has been active in doing precisely that for the last couple of years, especially after the Afghan-based Taliban's attack on an army school in Peshawar. The attack in December 2014 resulted in the launch of an operation by the country's military on the Pakistani side of the border. In a conversation with me in May 2015, Ashraf Ghani said that the Pakistanis, while cleansing their areas of militants, have shoved the "world's filth towards us in Afghanistan." The reference was to the Islamists from Central Asia and Russia who had gathered in Pakistan's North Waziristan to wage war against their perceived enemies. Dislocated, they have established havens in the border regions of Afghanistan. These are peopled by Pashtun tribes, a fact not fully comprehended by the West's policymakers.

The Taliban are Pashtuns. Numbering about 42 million, this ethnic group is divided between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan has 26 million Pashtuns, Afghanistan about 14 million. The remaining two million are spread over the world, in India and the Middle East. Like the Kurds in the Middle East, the Pashtuns have a distinct culture, language and history. If they are not made part of the Afghan polity and

economy, which can be done by bringing in the Taliban into the system, they may create a political entity of their own, separate from the Afghan state. Unlike the Kurds, the Pashtun are strict observers of the Islamic faith. Their political entity would have a definite Islamic identity. Trump's August speech may therefore create a quasi-autonomous state in the Pashtun areas on the Afghan side of the border pursuing a strong and uncompromising Islamic ideology. If that were to happen, there will be serious problems for both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Published in The Express Tribune, September 5th, 2017.

Source: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1497848/possible-results-trumps-afghan-approach/>

## Genocide and Beyond By Kamal Siddiqi

On August 15, 2015, I had the pleasure of standing at the shrine of Bahadur Shah Zafar in Yangon. Attending a seminar as fellow of Stanford University's Centre for Democracy, Development and Rule of Law (CDDRL), it was all very fascinating. The mazaar was a highlight — here was buried the emperor of what was once one of the largest empires in the world. A handful of people had shown up to offer their respects. There was little to remind us of what was once a world power, only some faded pictures on the walls and some of the emperor's own poetry.

The year 2015 was the year of hope in Myanmar. Meeting political workers and people from different occupations, one got some idea of the hardships endured at the hands of the military. By then the winds were blowing in favour of Aung San Suu Kyi, the mercurial opposition leader, who eventually wrested power from the military high command. And even in that circle, the Burmese never acknowledged the plight of the Rohingya community in the Arakan province.

The Rohingya are Muslim. They go against the concept of Burmese nationalism which was introduced by another military strongman, Ne Win. Other communities will tell of the terrible times when they were forced to leave Rangoon (now Yangon) in the '60s because they did not fit in.

For the Rohingya, the Burmese answer is simple — they are Bangladeshis. Under a consistent policy, the Arakan province and all those areas where the Rohingya have been living for generations, have been neglected and left to decay. The Rohingya themselves have been targeted, attacked, violated and pushed into Bangladesh, which Burma claims is where they came from.

For Suu Kyi to support such a policy is unacceptable. For any sane country to target and murder innocent people on grounds that they are outsiders cannot be condoned. And yet, this is exactly what has been happening for the past several decades.

The first Rohingya to arrive in Pakistan came in the '60s escaping the marauding men of General Ne Win. The Ayub Khan government welcomed this first intake and settled them near Landhi in what is now called Burmee Colony.

While the Muslim world has watched largely in silence, Pakistani Nobel laureate Malala Yousafzai has tried to awaken the world's conscience. She said in a statement that she has seen "pictures of small children killed by Myanmar's security forces." Even though these children attacked no one, their houses were burnt to the ground, she added.

Malala also called upon Myanmar to give citizenship to Rohingya Muslims because it is the country they were born in. "If their home is not Myanmar, where they have lived for generations, then where is it?"

Fed up with waiting, this year the Rohingya took matters into their own hand. On August 25, fighters from a small militant group, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, staged surprise raids on 30 police stations and an army base in Rakhine State, where many Rohingya live. The attacks, in which 110 people died, including 10 policemen and many of the militants, triggered a crackdown by Burma's military.

Witnesses said soldiers torched villages and sent thousands of Rohingya fleeing across the Naf River to Bangladesh, which is already home to about 400,000 Rohingya refugees who have fled Burma in recent years. Desperate to escape the retaliation, Rohingya took to flimsy vessels poorly equipped for rough waters.

This conflict is already finding sympathisers. Turkey's foreign minister has urged Bangladesh to open its doors for Rohingya Muslims fleeing violence and offered to bear their expenses. Vying for leadership of the Muslim world, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has found a cause he can use to win the minds of Muslims all over.

Of course in this the real challenge is to the government of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. If the Rohingya are to take up an armed struggle, there are groups in Bangladesh that would happily supply them with weapons. This in turn would lead to increased militancy in Bangladesh. This is what happened when Mujahideen in Afghanistan were armed via Pakistan, how Syrian fighters got help through the Turks.

The Burmese government must see the folly of its ways. The Rohingya must be given their rights otherwise there is a chance that this armed separatist activity will



not only spread but find support and funding. And before you know it, it will become another flashpoint for the world.

Published in The Express Tribune, September 5th, 2017.

Source: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1497853/genocide-and-beyond/>

# A Reset for Iran and the United States By Hamid Biglari

It remains conventional wisdom in many U.S. foreign policy circles that Iran's government is ineluctably hostile to U.S. interests by virtue of its ideology and thus is impervious to conciliation. According to this school of thought, there are few differences among the competing forces in Iranian politics, and the labels of "moderate" and "hard-line" used by some Western observers are misplaced. Since anyone standing for election must be approved by Iran's Guardian Council, an unelected body of Shiite jurists, all candidates must support the fundamental revolutionary tenets of the Islamic Republic. Measured by a properly balanced political scale, all Iranian politicians are therefore hard-liners, and the government is monolithic. As such, this thinking runs, Iran's presidential elections are less an expression of popular will than a mechanism for the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, to rotate power among loyalists while maintaining control.

Proponents of this line of thinking point to the record of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, a moderate who overwhelmingly won reelection to a second term in May. Rouhani's first term, they note, brought few improvements to domestic human rights conditions, nor did it appear to moderate Iran's foreign policies. They point to Iran's support for the regime of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria, for Hezbollah in Lebanon, for Houthi forces in Yemen, and for Shiite militias in Iraq, as well as to Tehran's provocation of U.S. warships in the Persian Gulf. They point to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp's (IRGC) continued development of medium-range ballistic missile technology as evidence of the offensive threat that Iran poses to Israel and the region. And they note some Iranian officials' bellicose rhetoric against Israel and the United States. These facts, it is commonly argued, show that Iran is not ready for responsible international engagement.

American expectations about the pace of change in Iran need to be tempered. Current U.S. policy is therefore built around containing and isolating Iran, using a Sunni cordon sanitaire centered on Saudi Arabia, and a variety of U.S.-led economic and military sanctions. A number of influential observers and officials have also recently expressed at least implicit support for regime change, including Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who stated in Senate testimony in June that, although Iran policy is still under review, the United States would work with Iranian

opposition forces “towards the peaceful transition of that government.” Based on this thinking, the more isolated Iran becomes and the more tightly it is squeezed politically and economically, the more likely Iran’s regime is to capitulate to Western interests or transform its approach to governance.

There are elements of truth that support the conventional wisdom about the nature of Iran’s government. However, the reality of Iran’s character four decades after its 1979 revolution is more nuanced than the charges leveled against it suggest. As has been the case in many other postrevolutionary states, Tehran’s earlier zeal to export its cause across the region is waning, even if it has not come to an end.

Broadly speaking, the United States will have three options with respect to Iran in the years ahead. The first is to try to contain the country through intensified U.S.-led sanctions and a coalition of regional states led by Saudi Arabia (and separately, Israel). The second option, which is not mutually exclusive to the first, is to seek regime change. The third is to use a variety of behavior-driven inducements to preserve the regional balance of power through détente. The third option is politically unpopular in the United States, would take much longer than the others to show its effects, and would be considerably more difficult to execute. It also offers the best combination of risks and rewards for the United States.

## THE TROUBLE WITH CONTAINMENT

The rationale for containing Iran is clear. Washington could kill two birds with one stone by using Sunni states’ fears of Iranian hegemony to gather opposition to Tehran while creating common cause between Israel and Arab states, thus also helping to mitigate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But such a policy would work only if three conditions hold. First, a coalition of Sunni states would have to stick together to credibly deter Iran. Second, economic sanctions would have to continue to undermine the growth of Iran’s economy by blocking the business community’s access to badly needed investment and financing. And third, if regional tensions did escalate into outright conflict, the fighting would have to be contained.

much on their plate. Under the leadership of Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, Saudi Arabia has embarked on an ambitious program of domestic economic reforms that requires substantial changes in the fabric of Saudi society,

including its welfare system—actions that will face stiff resistance from the country's sizeable Wahhabi community. Moreover, the kingdom is bogged down in a war in Yemen that may have no clear resolution, and Riyadh's authority remains vulnerable in Saudi Arabia's oil-rich northeast, where its Shiite minority is concentrated, as evidenced by the continued unrest that followed its execution of local Shiite cleric and regime critic Nimr al-Nimr last year. Nor is this all. The ongoing confrontation between Saudi-led Arab states and Qatar has illustrated the limits of Arab solidarity, a prerequisite for any anti-Iran configuration. It is also unlikely that a regional coalition would be credible as a deterrent force without Turkey's involvement—and that country would have far more to lose than gain by being drawn into such a group, given its greater sense of urgency about aligning with Iran against Kurdish separatists as well as the two countries' deep economic interdependence. (Iran supplies nearly one-fifth of Turkey's oil and gas needs, whereas Turkey is critical to Iran's land-based trade with Europe.)

Regardless of which version of events one believes, what matters is that the original narrative of a CIA-led coup is the one broadly accepted inside Iran. As for sanctions, they clearly placed enormous pressure on Iran during the negotiations that led to the 2015 nuclear deal. At the time, however, much of the sanctions' power came from the fact that they enjoyed broad international support—a product of the perception that former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had placed Iran on a fast track to developing a nuclear weapon. There is little such support today, mostly because Iran has upheld its side of the nuclear deal, the Rouhani government has been reasonably open to international engagement, and the secondary sanctions tied to the agreement have already been lifted. This year's spats between the United States and its European allies have made it even less likely that Europe would follow the lead of the United States to tighten economic sanctions against Iran. Perhaps more important, even if Washington could gather international support for them, harsher economic sanctions would undermine Iran's reformists to the benefit of its hard-liners, who see opposition to the United States as their *raison d'être*. Officials from both the reformist and hard-line factions may answer to the supreme leader, but the contention between the two groups is real, as demonstrated by the friction and harsh rhetoric between President Rouhani on the one hand and the supreme leader, the IRGC, and the judiciary on the other during this year's presidential elections.

Finally, a regional confrontation with Iran could easily lead to accidental clashes and undesired escalations, and those could quickly transform into outright conflict. Such a confrontation could be far more consequential than any other conflict in the Middle East has been so far. Given Iran's proxies across the region, the effects on the broader Middle East and on the global economy would probably not be contained.

## CHANGE BY FORCE

The second option for the United States' Iran policy would be for Washington to covertly or overtly back the overthrow of the country's theocratic government and its replacement with a secular democracy. Regime change would rest on three pillars: supporting dissident forces; fomenting popular opposition to the state, especially among young people; and fueling ethnic unrest in Iran's Sunni-majority provinces.

None of those pillars withstand scrutiny. Consider the question of support for dissident forces. Iran's only operational dissident group is the Mujahideen-e Khalq, or MEK, a resistance organization with somewhere between 5,000 and 13,500 members. The MEK's small size and the fact that most of its members are scattered outside of Iran mean that it does not have the power to destabilize Iran's government. More important, most Iranians disdain the MEK because it sided with Saddam Hussein in the bloody eight-year war between Iraq and Iran and because many believe that it is backed by Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Iran's youth, meanwhile, are unlikely to seek regime change by force, especially if the pressure for change comes from abroad. Even at the height of the international sanctions against their country, few Iranians saw their situation as desperate: they were prepared to sacrifice to make ends meet. What's more, Iran's educated youth understand that, in recent history, attempts at regime change in their region have led to massive civil wars (as in Iraq and Syria) or to domestic chaos (as in Egypt). Only if the regime completely crushes the current reform movement would most Iranians even consider backing change by force. Although Iran's hard-liners are radical, they are not irrational enough to attempt that, particularly in the aftermath of the 2009 Green Movement, which posed an existential threat to the regime.

As for fomenting an uprising through ethnic dissent, to call for doing so misreads Iran's history. Iran's territories are connected neither through imperial conquest (as was the case in the Soviet Union) nor through the drawing of artificial boundaries by outside powers (as in Syria and Iraq) but through thousands of years of shared history. There are about a dozen different ethnic groups that can trace their histories in Iran back almost three millennia: the country's Sunni-Shiite differences are insignificant compared to this common bond. And although religion has been a source of tension in Iranian provinces with large Sunni populations, Sunnis' qualms are generally with the Shiite hard-liners in the judiciary and the IRGC responsible for religious discrimination, not with the Iranian state itself. (It is worth noting that Rouhani won all major Sunni-populated provinces by overwhelming margins in this year's election, and that in those provinces voter turnout exceeded national averages.)

Finally, the very talk of regime change among American political leaders plays into the hands of Iran's hard-liners, who use it to undermine reformist policies and Iran's economic engagement with the West. Such talk ignores the lesson of the United States' previous intervention in Iran's domestic affairs in 1953, when the popularly elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh was overthrown in a CIA-backed coup. Some observers have recently sought to interpret the events leading to Mossadegh's ouster as primarily domestic initiatives led by the Iranian military and clergy, discounting the role played by the United States. But regardless of which version of events one believes, what matters is that the original narrative of a CIA-led coup is the one broadly accepted inside Iran. Indeed, a quarter century later, in 1979, Iranian revolutionaries cited that grievance more than any other as the motive for their 444-day occupation of the U.S. embassy in Tehran. The embassy takeover was rightly condemned around the world as an egregious breach of international law, but many Iranians viewed it as an acceptable retaliation. What would Iranians consider a proportional response if there were another attempt at regime change today?

## TURNING DOWN THE HEAT

That brings us to the third option for the United States: détente with a mix of behavior-based rewards and penalties aimed at maintaining the regional balance of power. Such a policy would seek to turn down the heat of the Saudi-Iranian

rivalry and induce Iran to act more responsibly in its neighborhood in exchange for strategic accommodations acceptable to the United States and its allies.

One would have to believe three things to pursue this policy: that reducing tensions between Iran and its rivals would serve the interests of all; that Iran could be convinced to act responsibly given the right accommodations; and that the timing is right for such a course.

When it comes to the first point, it is hard to dispute that the Middle East has entered an unsustainable cycle of conflict and that it is a disproportionately large distraction and drain on U.S. resources. War and the absence of economic opportunity have turned much of the region into a breeding ground for international extremism. Yet a century of Western attempts to impose solutions without understanding the region's cultural undercurrents has backfired. Stability will come only if there is a regional balance of power, and that balance can develop only if the strategic interests of the region's major players are respected.

It is also not in Iran's interests to fear for its security. The country's reliance on regional Shiite proxies has left it logistically and financially overextended. Perhaps because of the cushion provided by its abundant natural resources, Iran's economy will probably not enter a crisis anytime soon. But the opportunity cost of supporting proxies is high and has come at the expense of the country's economic health. Indeed, those in Iran's political elite fearing regime instability need look no further than the former Soviet Union, whose geopolitical overextension and misallocation of resources were responsible for its demise. What Iran needs for regime stability is economic growth. That won't happen without access to massive international financing, which will remain severely constrained by the United States unless Iran adopts a more accommodating regional posture. That, in turn, won't occur unless Iran feels that it is not militarily threatened. It is in everyone's interest to find a path out of this vicious cycle.

As for Iran's ballistic-missile development program, Tehran is unlikely to curtail it without being offered a credible alternative security arrangement. The source of the insecurity driving the missile program goes back to Iran's experience during the Iran-Iraq war, when Saddam Hussein bombarded Iranian cities with ballistic missiles in a campaign of mass terror. Iran was initially unable to get missiles of its own, thanks to U.S.-led sanctions. It eventually secured some from Libya and

North Korea and then launched an indigenous missile research-and-development effort.

That historical background needs to be considered in today's environment, in which Iran's adversaries far outspend it on military hardware. Saudi Arabia, for example, outspent Iran by a factor of 6.7 in the years between 2013 and 2016. (Saudi Arabia spent \$300 billion; Iran spent \$45 billion.) This context is important. No state would cede its national defense just to overcome economic sanctions. Pressuring Iran to that end would disillusion those Iranians who have so far been favorably disposed toward the United States.

Finally, the timing matters. A policy of détente toward Iran during the Ahmadinejad era, for example, would have been ill timed; neither his rhetoric nor his actions offered the basis for rapprochement. It may also have been premature to explore détente until the more urgent question of Iran's ability to develop nuclear weapons technology had been either significantly postponed or set aside. Although that issue was a priority during Rouhani's first term, the foundation for a transition in the relationship was nonetheless put in place during the Barack Obama administration, when regular, direct channels of communication between the Iranian and U.S. foreign ministers were established for the first time in almost four decades. The Donald Trump administration, however, appears to be reversing that trajectory, just at the moment with the most potential to seriously explore détente with Iran.

## A SEAT AT THE TABLE

A change in relations between the United States and Iran could only come if there is a reset on both sides. Finding common ground would require direct channels of communication among high-ranking political and military officials. The United States would need to acknowledge Iran as a regional power with a seat at the table on all issues of regional security and stability, while Iran would need to acknowledge an active U.S. presence in the Middle East aimed at preserving stability. In return for a package of security guarantees and sanctions relief, Iran would need to rein in its proxies.

There may be too much distrust between Iran and the United States for these issues to be tackled bilaterally. One possible diplomatic arrangement could be a



regional security summit, attended by Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, and sponsored by the P5+1, building on that group's success in negotiating the 2015 nuclear deal. (At least initially, it could prove too disruptive for Israel to participate in such a forum, in which case its interests would have to be represented by the United States; ultimately, however, it would be in Iran's own interest for Israel to be a signatory to any regional security agreement.) Regional ballistic missile reduction as well as a ban on nuclear weapons development would be on the agenda. Respect for territorial integrity, mutual non-interference in each other's affairs, safe shipping passage in the Persian Gulf, and the eradication of terrorism and religious extremism would also need to be negotiated.

None of this would be easy, given the serious grievances each side holds against the other. But consider the alternatives. If the current regional cold war is not addressed, one of two possibilities is likely. In the worst-case scenario, there could be an escalation, perhaps accidental, that could make the Middle East's conflicts so far look tame by comparison. In the best-case scenario, tensions could continue to simmer unresolved—and soon enough, the ten-year horizon of the nuclear deal will arrive without any constructive developments having occurred in the interim. Then the same tensions that preceded the deal could reemerge and trigger a new crisis. Over the same period, a regional security forum could at least create a mechanism for progress. Its odds of success may be low, but the chance that the nuclear deal could have succeeded were not much greater at a comparable point in time, and the prospects of the alternatives are far worse.

Détente is politically unpopular in the United States and opposed by Iranian hard-liners. Even if it were achieved, profound differences would remain between the United States and Iran, just as there remained disputes between the United States and the Soviet Union after the improvement in their own ties in the 1970s. The regional rivalry among Iran, Turkey, and the Arab states will not go away, and relations between Iran and Israel will remain fraught. The United States, however, is the only power with the influence to ease the Middle East's four-decade regional Cold War. It would be a serious blunder if Washington forfeited this position by using blunt instruments to seek narrow, ill-defined objectives, such as regime change.

Henry Kissinger once observed that Iran had to decide “whether it is a nation or a cause.” To the extent that Iran continues to see itself as a cause—or insists that it

can be both a cause and a nation—there can be little prospect for regional stability. Yet American expectations about the pace of change in Iran need to be tempered. The internal debate around Iran’s future could continue without a clear resolution for another decade or more, and its domestic situation could get worse before it gets better. What is true is that the more Iranian citizens participate in the debate about their country’s destiny and the more Iran is connected to the rest of the world, the greater the prospects for political moderation. A smart U.S. policy would rest on this long-term expectation of change, riding the momentum of a leader who has just been reelected with a mandate to bring Iran into responsible engagement with the rest of the world. Such a policy would require both patience and courage, because it would be politically unpopular. But none of the popular alternatives are in the long-term interests of the United States.

Source: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2017-09-06/reset-iran-and-united-states?cid=int-lea&pgtype=hpg>

# Growing Nuclearisation of the Indian Ocean Region By Muhammad Sarmad Zia

With the introduction of new naval nuclear powers, the security dynamics of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is undergoing a rapid change. There is a dawn of a new era wherein the geo-political and economic alignment of states is shifting from the Atlantic to the Indian and the Pacific Ocean regions. The US cites the security situation in the Middle East and Afghanistan as its anchors for presence in the IOR. The US policy of 'Pivot to Asia' required a more active and concentrated role in this zone. Similarly, China's security requirements pertaining to its trade routes and the growing Indo-US partnership, such as Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement, are causing it to increase its presence in the region as well. Currently, the trade passing through the IOR amounts close to \$777 billion.

With the advent of naval powers with nuclear submarines and nuclear-tipped ballistic and cruise missiles, the contours of strategic security in the IOR are evolving. The US and China are taking up an increased role in the Indian Ocean and the littoral states are also vying to push their weight.

'Militarisation of Indian Ocean threat to peace'

For China, its trade route's security impels a stringent security regime. That the choke points at the Malacca Strait can potentially be used for a full blockade of Chinese ships during war time makes it important for China to be able to deter any such moves by hostile navies. Likewise, as the Indo-US partnership takes shape, the threat threshold for China is inching towards its lower limit. To cater for such expeditions, Beijing has been building up ports in other countries such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan amongst others to secure its commercial activities. This initiative was termed by the US a 'string of pearls' weaved by China in the Indian Ocean. The US firm, Booz Allen Hamilton, in 2005 postulated that China will try to expand its naval presence by building civilian maritime infrastructure along the Indian Ocean periphery. Therefore, the deployment of a Type 093 Shang-class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) and its docking at Colombo and Karachi imply an intention of building up towards nuclearisation and militarisation of the IOR. For China, it is important to match the capabilities of the US.

India's nuclearisation in the IOR began with the induction of INS Arihant nuclear submarine in August 2016 — equipped with nuclear warheads — into its naval nuclear command. Delhi refers to the Indian Ocean as an area of strategic influence. Currently, India possesses two nuclear-powered submarines, one of which is a Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN). This SSBN known as INS Arihant was commissioned into the Indian Navy in 2016, while the SSN INS Chakra was procured from Russia in 2012 on a 10-year lease. Arihant comes equipped with two types of missiles; K-4, which is an intermediate range nuclear capable submarine that can launch ballistic missile with an upper range of 3,500km. It gives India the ability to target its adversaries from almost anywhere in the north Indian Ocean. The second one is K-15 which is a short range nuclear capable submarine that can launch ballistic missile with a range of 700km. By completing the third leg of its nuclear triad, it triggered Pakistan to come up with a solution to maintain its strategic balance vis-à-vis India.

Therefore, Pakistan's recent initiative of building a credible nuclear triad came in the shape of submarine launched cruise missile (SLCM). This year, Pakistan successfully tested a SLCM to be retrofitted to French-designed Agosta 90B submarines, thereby providing the quickest way to a second-strike capability. As Pakistan's current economic conditions do not permit it to develop an SSBN, Pakistan chose the next best option to ensure a second-strike capability to maintain deterrence. Utilising available resources, it developed Babur-3, a short-range submarine launched cruise missile with a range of 450km. This diesel submarine equipped with an SLCM is Pakistan's effort to thwart India's malintentions.

As a diesel-powered submarine does not afford Pakistan the same freedom, speed and viability that a SSN or SSBN can, the country's options are limited. While it is a step towards further nuclearisation of the IOR, Pakistan's entry into the third leg of the nuclear realm is prompted by a 'quadrilemma' that starts with any strategic action by the US in the IOR. It automatically warrants reciprocation from China. India claims that China's security readjustments apropos the US, prompts it to calibrate its own security regime. In doing so, it triggers security issues for Pakistan which then causes Islamabad to readjust itself. Thus, Pakistan is essentially caught in the cross hairs of great power politics.

## Chinese naval commander appreciates PN for collaborative security in Indian Ocean

Nonetheless, the growing nuclearisation is going to be increasingly problematic for both littoral states as well as the region at large. As the number of nuclear players increases in the Indian Ocean, the issues related to security, balance of power and naval dominance are bound to multiply. With India wanting to assert more control over the sea to keep other states out, it would lead to confrontation with China or vice versa. Additionally, Pakistan being a smaller state would use nuclear signalling to imply its readiness to retaliate if India shifts its conventional or nuclear posture. This is despite the fact that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is kept in dematerialised form to avoid any mishaps or accidents.

Overall, the nuclearisation of the Indian Ocean would prove to be a challenge for the states in the region. The nuclear states would have to keep adjusting and readjusting their nuclear postures and policies to address the challenges that would arise owing to the building of arsenal and ramifications of nuclear policies of the powers in the region. This would also entail massive problems for strategic stability in the region as any state that feels threatened could wrongly indicate its readiness to undertake actions, in effect causing a conflict situation.

Published in The Express Tribune, September 9th, 2017.

Source: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1501355/growing-nuclearisation-indian-ocean-region/>

# The North Korean Nuclear ‘Crisis’ is an Illusion

## By John Mecklin

Although it has involved disturbing events — ballistic missile launches, nuclear weapons tests, military exercises, inane bombast — the North Korean “crisis” of recent months is largely an invented one.

A year ago, the probability that North Korea would fire a nuclear-tipped missile at the United States was essentially zero; the North did not have the capability to make such an attack. Pyongyang has made technological advances since then. But despite what some analysts believe, others say there is no definitive, publicly available proof that North Korea has a missile with the range to strike the continental United States, a miniaturized nuclear warhead to mate with it, and the shielding technology to make sure the warhead survives the heat and pressure of reentry to the atmosphere.

That doesn't, of course, mean the show is harmless. But even if the North acquires those technical capabilities, the likelihood it might attack the United States with a nuclear missile will remain exceedingly low, for one overriding reason: North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is, as former Obama administration arms control director Jon Wolfsthal has explained in authoritative detail, neither crazy nor suicidal. The North Korean leader knows his regime would be erased within hours (more likely minutes) of his use of a nuclear weapon. Roughly 1,590 nuclear warheads deployed on U.S. ballistic missiles and bombers ensure that result. (The North has acquired the fissile material to build only 10 to 20 nuclear warheads, according to the most authoritative public reporting on the subject.)

It is also quite unlikely that the United States will make a preemptive military strike — conventional or nuclear — on North Korea, because doing so would almost certainly lead to hundreds of thousands of casualties in South Korea, and perhaps many more. Even without recourse to nuclear weapons, the North could fire thousands of rockets and artillery rounds in the early hours of a war, in a barrage of conventional explosives that would, as the North Korean state-run news service has threatened, turn Seoul into a “sea of fire.” Pyongyang also has huge stores of chemical artillery shells and rocket warheads and the capability, therefore, to also turn the South Korean capital into a sea of sarin and VX nerve gas.

In light of the undeniable reality of mutual deterrence, the North Korean “crisis” of 2017 can most accurately be seen as a media puppet show put on by Chairman Kim and President Trump for their own public relations purposes. Nonetheless, it’s a dangerous play. In the current overheated media environment, some piece of international theater by Kim or Trump — undertaken for political effect or negotiating edge or ego gratification — could become so magnified by breathless, 24-7 repetition on cable TV and the Internet that it becomes seen as a humiliating national insult. An emotional response to that insult could initiate a spiral of escalation that leads to catastrophe. To put things in more concrete terms: if U.S. forces had shot down the North Korean missile recently fired through Japanese airspace, might Kim, in an act of pique or bravado, have fired another missile, perhaps in the general direction of Guam? Would Trump have then felt compelled to craft a macho response? Etcetera — with a possible end result of mushroom clouds.

The best way to reduce the threat of inadvertent war posed by the invented theatrical crisis in Northeast Asia would be to persuade the prime thespians — Kim and Trump — that the show they have been putting on is unbelievable and unlikely to get either what he wants. But I don’t really expect that my views will motivate two world leaders of high (if largely unearned) self-regard to quickly change their policies on matters of life, death, and television ratings.

So I propose a next-best approach: Journalists should stop writing and broadcasting about the North Korea situation as if everything had changed and war is very near. North Korea has been seeking a usable nuclear arsenal for years. Its latest underground nuclear test had a higher yield than earlier detonations, producing the explosive power of somewhat more than 100,000 tons of TNT, meaning it was four to five times the size of the bomb dropped on Nagasaki. The larger yield could have come from a fission bomb “boosted” with hydrogen isotopes or a true fusion weapon, commonly known as a hydrogen bomb; experts cannot be sure which, based on the information currently available.

But even if the September 3 test involved a true hydrogen bomb, Sig Hecker — former director of Los Alamos National Laboratory and one of the country’s foremost experts on North Korea’s nuclear program — has told the magazine I edit, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, that it wouldn’t be “a game changer.” If

delivered to an American city, any North Korean nuclear bomb — whether based on nuclear fission or fusion, whether its yield is 20 or 100 or 800 kilotons — would produce devastation and the instant death of tens of thousands. That’s a devastating prospect. But again, North Korea’s leaders know that to fire a nuclear weapon at the United States or its allies would constitute certain national suicide.

Clearly, North Korean nuclear bomb and ballistic missile tests are important events that the international news media must report. But the urgency that world news media are imparting to the “crisis” is, actually, a factor in extending it, thereby creating opportunities for miscalculation and war. The North Korean situation might begin to devolve into the kind of long slog of difficult diplomacy that leads to an acceptable resolution if more journalists downplayed the Chairman Kim and President Trump Puppet Show and focused on reality: North Korea is a tiny, impoverished country that would be instantly vaporized if it ever launched a serious attack on the United States, and so the probability of such an attack is vanishingly small. Absent a media environment that encourages a perception of crisis, the likelihood of an American preemptive attack is equally small.

Journalists can’t make U.S. and North Korean leaders behave responsibly. But the media can help audiences understand that the Korean “crisis” is really a Korean standoff, and that a puppet show full of bluster is a rather pathetic substitute for professional diplomacy.

Source: <http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-mecklin-nkorea-commentary/commentary-the-north-korean-nuclear-crisis-is-an-illusion-idUKKCN1BM2HA>



## Rohingya Persecution By Rasul Bakhsh Rais

Tyranny against the Rohingya Muslim minority in Myanmar has gone on and on for decades. They have been denied access to public education, health facilities, employment, property rights and even free movement and mobility within the country. Whatever rights and privileges they had under the British colonial rule have been systematically denied to the Rohingya. The authorities have converted their region into a concentration camp, making it deliberately hard for them to even meet their basic needs of food and shelter. Several reports prepared by rights groups confirm the worst possible conditions in which the Rohingya minority has been forced to endure. They also rightly warn that the conduct of the security forces borders on genocide and constitutes a crime against humanity. Even worse, the Myanmar state has allowed anti-Rohingya Buddhist extremists to raid villages, burn houses and lynch innocent men, women and even minor children. Some of the scenes captured on camera are just horrible and the stories of systematic violence heart-wrenching.

The world media and civil society have taken notice of what is going on in Rakhine state bordering Bangladesh. The world community is not going to accept either conduct of indiscriminate violence or the state policy of stripping of the Rohingya minority of its citizenship rights, terming millions of them outsiders — refugees from Bangladesh. This is an absurd claim which cannot be supported by history. The Rohingya are a native people, an ethnic as well as a religious minority, and as such, citizens of Myanmar with all the legal rights and privileges.

By denying citizenship and perpetrating terror against the Rohingya population Myanmar's conduct not only be condemned but punished by the international community. Hiding behind 'sovereignty' of the state would allow this state of terror to perpetuate, and impunity may encourage the security forces to continue committing terrible acts of violence. The international community is already too late, and doing very little to save the millions of destitute within their own land, and hundreds of thousands starving on the border between Bangladesh and Myanmar. Equally condemnable is the 'shameful' silence and complicity of its leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. It is a justified call to strip her of her Nobel prize. She has not only allowed violence against the minority — for pragmatic reasons to maintain her popularity among the Buddhist population — but has justified it terming the most

persecuted minority in the world “terrorist”. Sadly, this sense of justice and conduct is not worthy of Nobel laureate. Now she is conniving with same junta.

The plight of Rohingya is a humanitarian issue, and as such, it must be a concern of the international community beyond religion, race and ethnicity. Pope Francis, a leading and strident voice in the world, has expressed his ‘closeness’ to the persecuted minority and asked for recognising Rohingya rights. This issue, like many others in the past, shouldn’t be reduced to a Buddhist-Muslim problem, as it is not a religious issue, as some of the clerics here would like to reduce it to. It is essentially an ethnic, minority and citizenship issue on the agenda of the international community.

However, the world community must act fast to address the dire situation of suffering of the Rohingya refugees. Also, it must pressure the Myanmar government to stop violence against the civilian population, and eventually force it to accept the Kofi Annan report, and grant citizenship rights to the Rohingya.

Published in The Express Tribune, September 13th, 2017.

Source: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1504431/rohingya-persecution/>

## The Wrong Way to Coerce China By Omar S. Bashir and Louis T. Laverone

In late June, U.S. Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin announced at a press conference that the United States would be taking action against the Bank of Dandong, a small lender based in a northeastern Chinese province near the North Korean border. He accused the institution of serving as Pyongyang's conduit to U.S. financial institutions, thus helping channel "millions" toward Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program. In fact, according to the U.S. Treasury Department, between 2012 and 2015, 17 percent of the customer transactions that the Bank of Dandong directed through the U.S. financial system were sent on behalf of companies tied to North Korean entities sanctioned by the United States and the United Nations.

In clarifying his remarks, Mnuchin stressed that Washington was not targeting China, per se, only "individuals and entities in China." The coincidental timing of the announcement suggested otherwise. Just a week before, U.S. officials met with their Chinese counterparts in Washington in an attempt to pressure Beijing to do more about North Korea. It appeared that they were unsuccessful. It was no surprise, then, that Washington's move against the Bank of Dandong was widely interpreted by the media and pundits alike as a "sanction," intended to coerce change in China's North Korea policy. It didn't help matters that Mnuchin himself threw around the term, saying, "Whether they're in China or they're anyone else, we will continue with sanctions."

Although it's clear that President Donald Trump did mean to send a signal to China, his administration didn't apply sanctions. Instead, it chose to invoke Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act, which is a regulatory tool intended to thwart illicit money from flowing into the United States. The Trump administration, however, is effectively deploying Section 311 as if it were a sanction—to pressure foreign governments, in this case China, to change their behavior. This misuse is problematic. The two tools have separate purposes, targets, requirements, and processes for repeal. While sanctions are an offensive mechanism, used to influence other nations' behavior in line with U.S. foreign policy, Section 311 is a defensive instrument, employed domestically to protect U.S. financial institutions from inadvertently facilitating funds from bad actors, such as terrorists and drug

traffickers. By misusing Section 311, the Trump administration is undermining a valuable and nonpolitical instrument of U.S. security.

## AN UNINTENDED DISCOVERY

Although Section 311 is no longer a sanction, it was initially intended to be one. It was adopted into law under former President George W. Bush after 9/11, but was conceived during the administration of Bill Clinton at a time when the comprehensive sanctions available were felt to be too blunt an instrument for pressuring other countries to change their foreign policies. It was thought that Section 311 could remedy that gap by serving as a gentler type of sanction.

The law enables the U.S. Treasury to require U.S. banks to take certain “special measures” against foreign institutions, governments, or individuals that it designates a “money laundering concern.” These special measures can include stronger background investigations into the targets in question and special recordkeeping and reporting requirements, among others. The one most commonly used is the closing of “correspondent” accounts for any foreign banks that the U.S. Treasury identifies as lacking the systems and controls needed to keep the proceeds of organized crime, human trafficking, official corruption, and other unlawful activities out of the United States. Since correspondent accounts enable foreign banks to conduct business outside their home countries, disabling them means that a foreign bank cannot conduct critical cross-border payments for its customers in the United States, which effectively closes off the target’s access to the U.S. dollar. Without the ability to do business in the world’s de facto global currency, cross-border trade is severely limited. This effectively quarantines targets from the U.S. financial system, and by extension, the global dollarized economy. By cutting off their access to the U.S. system, Section 311 slows the spread of funds that sustain criminals and terrorists, and aids efforts to weed out these bad actors. Further, because actions under Section 311 go through a standard regulatory process that delays implementation, the mere proposal of a Section 311 action can prompt the target to begin corrective action even before the special measures can go into effect.

When Section 311 first rolled out after 9/11, however, the effect was not gentle at all. The global scope of the response surprised U.S. officials who were expecting it to serve more as a scalpel, delicately extracting bad actors, rather than as the

axe that it turned out to be. Non-U.S. bankers voluntarily cut off all business transactions with targets that the U.S. Treasury labeled as at high risk of financial crime because they feared becoming the next target of U.S. and local regulators, as well as being shunned by other U.S. financial institutions, by continuing to do business with the marked party. The strong reaction stemmed from the fact that by the time Section 311 was finally enacted, norms related to anti-money laundering had become fairly embedded in other countries and across the global financial system. The tool has since earned a reputation in the international banking community as an exceptionally powerful way to isolate institutions that have failed to fulfill their responsibility to combat financial crimes. Because Section 311 proved so effective at incentivizing banks to protect their financial integrity, the U.S. Treasury learned to use it as a regulatory tool to safeguard against illicit financing, rather than as a sanction, despite its original intent.

Sanctions, on the other hand, are used as a political tool and are intended to change a country's behavior. One kind—secondary sanctions—is often confused with Section 311. Both can have similar effects, but their purposes remain entirely different. Secondary sanctions are distinct from regular sanctions in that they do not target rogue countries but rather, foreign persons and entities that do business with those countries. In 1996, for example, when Washington launched secondary sanctions against Iran under the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, it threatened to penalize non-Iranian companies doing business with Iran's energy sector, even when those businesses fell outside of U.S. jurisdiction. This was possible because the range of penalties under the sanctions act included, for example, a prohibition on loans from U.S. financial institutions to parties abroad that had been designated by the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control. These sanctions also called for the closure of U.S. correspondent accounts for foreign designated banks. Thus, it is true that both secondary sanctions and actions under Section 311 can be said to cut foreign banks off from the U.S. financial system.

The purpose of most sanctions against Iran, however, was to get it to negotiate with Washington over its nuclear weapons program. Others targeted human rights abuses, ballistic missile development, support for terrorism, and activities in the Middle East considered destabilizing by the United States. Section 311, in contrast, is designed to protect the integrity of the U.S. financial system. In this regard, banks have an understanding that the U.S. Treasury will only rescind a 311 finding or rule when the targeted banks can demonstrate that they have the proper controls in

place—not when a country alters its foreign policy, for example. The U.S. Treasury’s track record on unwinding sanctions, meanwhile, is tied to changes in the political behavior that brought sanctions on in the first place. In short, Section 311 is the wrong instrument for coercing foreign governments to serve ends that are unrelated to protecting the financial system.

## NOT A BARGAINING CHIP

If Section 311 is applied or revoked too often in service of politics, the tool will lose its main source of strength: international support for the measure and trust that the U.S. Treasury’s professed concerns over illicit finance are made in good faith and independent of political calculation. In other words, if bankers around the world see Section 311 as just another sanctions measure, as opposed to a mechanism to help protect the integrity of their institutions, they will lose the incentive to isolate designated banks even when not legally required to do so. What’s more, foreign financial institutions with poor controls for monitoring illicit financing may be less motivated to improve their systems. After observing the repeated political use of the tool, they will stop seeing Section 311 designation as a threat.

From time to time, the use of Section 311 may coincide with foreign policy initiatives, just as it has in the past. In 2005, for example, as China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States engaged in multilateral talks with North Korea, the U.S. Treasury acted against the Macao-based Banco Delta Asia, accusing the bank of laundering money for the regime of former leader Kim Jong-il. Even so, the United States must guard its financial tools carefully. For starters, the Trump administration should refrain from including the 311 measures against the Bank of Dandong on its agenda for negotiations with Beijing. The U.S. Treasury should rescind the restrictions only when the Bank of Dandong addresses all the deficiencies that were identified in the June findings, and not when or if Beijing cracks down more harshly on Pyongyang.

Going forward, the U.S. Treasury should deploy Section 311 in more non-crisis situations to demonstrate the tool’s apolitical nature. Most importantly, the United States should employ sanctions, not Section 311, when it intends to coerce another country to change its foreign policy. If the U.S. Treasury identifies banks that do not have sufficient controls for identifying illicit funds, it should consider applying both options simultaneously so that each can be reversed when

appropriate. And the next time Section 311 is used during a crisis or diplomatic impasse, the U.S. Treasury should send a strong message to remind banks around the world that Section 311 is a tool meant to protect financial integrity—and not intended for use as a bargaining chip.

Source: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-09-13/wrong-way-coerce-china>

## Another Push For The CTBT By Rizwan Asghar

Over the past two decades, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) has emerged as one of the top-tier international organisations with an impressive record of achievements. The International Monitoring System and on-site inspection capabilities have made it impossible for any state to conduct nuclear tests without being caught.

The world has been waiting for a complete ban on nuclear testing for almost five decades. However, despite having worldwide support and state-of-the-art detection capabilities, the CTBT languishes in a state of limbo created by an unwillingness on the part of certain countries to ratify the treaty. The lack of concrete progress on the nuclear test accord has led to frustration among many non-nuclear weapon states. Yet, holdout states are not ready to reconsider their positions due to unfounded fears and domestic political concerns. Such behaviour on the part of P-5 states is a clear violation of Article VI of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

The failure of the US to ratify the test ban treaty in 1999 struck a major blow to the existing global nonproliferation disorder. After 2008, the Obama administration expressed a commitment to move forward on the nuclear disarmament agenda. But the CTBT remains unfinished business. The Obama administration's efforts to start negotiations were hamstrung by partisan differences and a strained relationship between the White House and Congress.

Under the Trump administration, the likely prospects of US Senate holding another vote on CTBT's ratification are not too bright because the ratification of the treaty requires a significant investment of political capital from the White House. Influential Republicans in the Senate are also opposed to the idea of taking another look at the nuclear test ban treaty. While opponents of the CTBT frequently mention the possible vulnerability of America's nuclear arsenal, domestic politics will shape any future outcome of the treaty.

However, the history of nuclear arms control shows that neither of these challenges are insurmountable. The coming into force of the CTBT is important to pursue the long-term goal of global disarmament and the American public needs to realise that. A de facto test ban is already in force. Once the CTBT enters into



force, it will go a long way in strengthening global security by substantially reducing the risk of future nuclear proliferation.

Some experts argue that the political circumstances for the ratification of the CTBT might not be ripe today. Notwithstanding the plausibility of this view, pitching nuclear testing ban as an issue of national security in the US can help prevent it from once again becoming a victim of partisan politics.

One of the reasons why the CTBT was rejected by the US Senate in 1999 was the lack of knowledge about its security benefits in the days leading up to the vote. Opposition to the treaty was based on a misguided notion that it would make the US lose confidence in its nuclear deterrent. However, that concern has now been resolved since, under the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), the US can assess and sustain the reliability of its nuclear arsenal without having to resort to underground nuclear tests. Similarly, many other reasons for which the CTBT was rejected in 1999 are not valid anymore.

There is a strong political imperative for the US Senate to reevaluate the merits of CTBT with a fresh perspective. Strong bipartisanship and a well-executed ratification campaign can help CTBT advocates turn the tide in their favour. Any future vote on the CTBT must be preceded by extensive hearings that address the concerns of the treaty's opponents. A multi-pronged strategy is required that is aimed at build bipartisan support in US Senate. Disarmament advocates should approach those Republican senators who have not been exposed to this debate before and educate them about the benefits of the treaty.

The stakes are high. There is no doubt that a second rejection of the CTBT would be disastrous. It would discourage other countries from ratifying the treaty. If the US takes the lead and ratifies the treaty, it will restore its credibility on nuclear nonproliferation issues. It will serve as a catalyst for similar action by other states. US ratification will set in motion a good domino effect, pushing many other states – including China, India, Pakistan and possibly Iran – to ratify the treaty.

The road to the twin goals of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament goes through a universal ratification of the CTBT. A test ban treaty would prevent China from further advancing its nuclear capabilities and stop the vertical proliferation of

nuclear weapons in the existing nuclear states. Since CTBT imposes a zero-yield ban on the testing of nuclear weapons, it will be difficult for other nations to cheat.

The technological data gathered by the CTBTO's monitoring network can be applied for many purposes. During a recent visit to Vienna, an Italian scientist told this writer that the data collected by the CTBTO can be used to strengthen early warning systems for monsoon in Pakistan.

Email:rizwanasghar5@unm.edu

Source: <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/230307-Another-push-for-the-CTBT>

# The Worst 1st Year of Foreign Policy Ever By Melvyn P. Leffler

Most experts agree that President Donald Trump's foreign policy and national security strategy have been disappointing so far, if not disastrous. But historians also know that this isn't entirely surprising. Since the United States became a global power after World War II, most administrations experienced difficulties getting started. Some — like Ronald Reagan — entered office with a real sense of strategy but floundered at the outset because of bureaucratic infighting or slow staffing. Others — like John F. Kennedy and Bill Clinton — disdained strategy and sought to improvise, and they suffered.

Studies my colleagues and I have conducted at the University of Virginia's Miller Center demonstrate that administrations typically flounder during their first year. That's because presidents often focused on domestic policy and resisted efforts to think through a comprehensive national security strategy. Sometimes, presidents selected able leaders to head key departments and agencies but these appointees had trouble collaborating with one another. In other administrations, presidents have disregarded the importance of process or ignored linking foreign policy making to budgetary planning. Often, they failed to nurture allies in Congress and, in recent decades, have been slow to staff key agencies.

Despite their difficult beginnings, many administrations go on to gain their footing and experience real accomplishment in foreign policy. So there is still hope for Trump. But it's important to first understand that he isn't just repeating all the early errors that beleaguered his predecessors — he is magnifying them in unprecedented fashion.

First, he has no strategy. Consider the "America First Foreign Policy" that is outlined on the White House website, which appears to be the official expression of Trump's nationalist populist foreign-policy vision. The Trump administration is "focused on American interests and American national security" and seeks "peace through strength." Its top priority is fighting "radical Islamic terror groups." Through aggressive military operations and other initiatives, it seeks to destroy and defeat these groups, cut off their funding, expand intelligence sharing, and engage in cyberwarfare. Next, the administration aims to rebuild the American military and

gain “military dominance.” And, lastly, it plans to jettison the rotten trade deals of the past and negotiate new ones that “put American workers and businesses” ahead of the “interests of insiders and the Washington elite.”

That’s it. Note the bewildering absence of any mention whatsoever of allies and adversaries. The statement says not a word about China, not a word about Russia, not a word about NATO. The statement says not a word about North Korea or nonproliferation.

In the past, poor strategy often resulted from failures to rank priorities, reconcile values and interests, and link means and ends, resources and commitments, and budgeting and policymaking. Trump is guilty of all of the above. “America First” seeks to achieve a “stronger and more respected America.” Yet by embracing authoritarian leaders — from Vladimir Putin in Russia, to Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, to Najib Razak in Malaysia, to Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Egypt — and by renegeing, denigrating, or disdaining key agreements and alliances like NAFTA and NATO, Trump has put his personal imprimatur on a strategy that conveys contempt for the values and the relationships that have buttressed America’s image around the world for generations. Michael Anton, his National Security Council strategist and spokesman, likes to say that “America First” policy aspires to enhance America’s prestige and stature around the world. Yet a recent poll covering 37 countries by the Pew Research Center shows that only about 22 percent of the people in those countries have confidence that President Trump will do “the right thing” when it comes to international affairs. This number compares to 64 percent who previously had said that they believed in the ability of Barack Obama to make the right choices. At the same time, favorable views of the United States have plummeted from about 64 to 49 percent.

There are plenty of other strategic contradictions. Trump seeks to enhance America’s position around the world while cutting hundreds of positions and proposing slashing billions of dollars from the State Department. He hopes to contain or constrain China yet jettisons the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the key instrument for preserving America’s future influence in Asia. He yearns to achieve military hegemony yet shows no sign of reconciling his defense buildup with other budgetary priorities. He needs to build relationships with key legislators but clearly has undermined the confidence of Tennessee Republican Sen. Bob Corker, the

chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who has publicly voiced skepticism about Trump's competence and stability.

History suggests that administrations head toward disaster when presidents hand off too much responsibility in foreign policy to subordinates, when top advisors compete to be the top dog and can't get along with one another, and when Cabinet officials are slow to fill key positions. We see signs of all these things in this administration.

Trump's first national security advisor, Michael Flynn, was dismissed; his secretary of state seems to be sidelined; and key positions throughout the Department of State and the Department of Defense remain unfilled. More significantly, Trump's most consequential advisors seem to be at odds with one another and with the president himself about the administration's trade policy and its relationships with China, Russia, and America's closest allies in Europe. His trade representative, Robert Lighthizer, and Wilbur Ross, his secretary of commerce, clearly are on a different page than his key economic advisor Gary Cohn and his secretary of state, Rex Tillerson. We see little sign that Trump is inclined to or knows how to resolve these differences.

Meanwhile, the president refuses to say negative words about Putin's Russia, but James Mattis, his secretary of defense, and H.R. McMaster, his national security advisor, clearly see ominous signs of Russian expansionism in Central Europe and the Baltic and seek to offer diplomatic support and military aid. Trump's advisors want to reassure and collaborate with South Korea in the face of North Korean nuclear testing and bellicose posturing, yet the president is inclined to threaten Seoul with a termination of the U.S.-Korean trade pact. And, meanwhile, the president veers wildly in his dealings with Beijing: from recasting his anti-Chinese campaign rhetoric to depending on Chinese assistance restraining Kim Jong Un to threatening expansive trade sanctions if President Xi Jinping does not succeed.

The trends are bad for the Trump administration, but perhaps not hopeless. As noted above, many administrations falter at the onset. Perhaps no president stumbled as much as did Harry S. Truman after he took over the Oval Office upon the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt in April 1945. His first 12 or 18 months were filled with challenges, frustrations, and failures. He witnessed Soviet inroads throughout much of Eastern Europe, Soviet probes in Iran and Turkey, communist

advances in China, financial strife in Great Britain, and political instability, economic disarray, and revolutionary nationalist rumblings in the Third World. Reconstruction in Western Europe proceeded slowly and occupation policies in Japan, southern Korea, and western Germany floundered. At home, he faced labor unrest, rising prices, and partisan furor. Yet Truman recovered. From defeat and disarray came a strategy, a process, and a team that set in place a foreign policy that revitalized America's posture in global affairs and that positioned Truman to win an unexpected victory in the 1948 presidential election.

How did Truman manage his turnaround? First, he dismissed his secretary of state, James F. Byrnes, whose stature at Foggy Bottom was dismal and whose loyalty the president doubted. In his place, Truman appointed Gen. George Marshall, the former army chief of staff, orchestrator of victory in World War II, and arguably the most respected man in America at the time. Marshall was disciplined, cared about strategy, focused on planning, and grasped the importance of process and teamwork. Marshall formed a new office, the Policy Planning Staff, and appointed George F. Kennan to head it. He also worked closely with Army and Navy military officers and civilian officials whom he knew well, supporting the passage of the National Security Act that was designed to enhance political-military-economic coordination. More than anything, Truman and Marshall ranked priorities. Was the threat of economic disaster and communist subversion more likely than Soviet military aggression? They said yes and supported the Economic Recovery Act, which included what became known as the Marshall Plan. Should America pay more attention to western Germany and Western Europe or to China? Western Germany and Western Europe were put at the top of the list.

In addition to strategy, process, and personnel, Truman and Marshall grasped that they needed to link foreign-policy priorities to a budgetary strategy and domestic goals. Much to the chagrin of James Forrestal, the newly appointed and first secretary of defense, and much to the annoyance of his former military colleagues, Marshall supported a budget that constrained defense expenditures and highlighted economic aid abroad. Truman demanded that his military chieftains fall in line and abide his budgetary ceilings. And meanwhile, in 1947 and 1948, with the help of Marshall, Dean Acheson, and Robert Lovett, the president cultivated relations with Republican foes in Congress and put together a bipartisan consensus that was critical to the success of his policies in the early stages of the Cold War. This meant legislative support for a gigantic foreign aid program as well

as incurring ongoing military commitments in Europe — the origins of NATO — that would have been regarded as unthinkable just 18 months before.

There are some lessons here for the Trump administration.

First, a president needs to take charge. When taking office, past presidents have often been inclined to rely on their foreign policy, intelligence, and national security advisors and focus on their domestic priorities. Certainly, this was the case for Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama. In the early months of every administration, process often is inchoate and the vetting of important options improvised. Presidents are bombarded with information, bludgeoned by pressure groups, and distracted by never-ending crises of the day. Trump wants to focus on health care, tax cuts, infrastructure, and immigration, and he turns his attention to foreign policy episodically when faced with unexpected and portentous actions like Syrian use of chemical weapons and North Korean nuclear testing, or when visiting dignitaries trek into the White House. He must learn, as did his predecessors, that national security requires his systematic attention, that quick decisions based on a momentary crisis or an initial conversation invite larger problems down the road. In short, Trump needs to get involved in a sustained way and think strategically. Whether he has the personality and temperament to do so is another question, but that is how other presidents have recovered from the trying experiences of their first months in office.

Thinking strategically means ranking threats, delineating priorities, and linking means and ends. Today, there are many threats, including China's growing power, Russia's adventurism, nuclear proliferation, radical Islamic terrorism, and climate change. Trump must decide which of these is most worrisome, which requires his greatest attention, and which should command the greatest allocation of America's resources. These choices are incredibly difficult to make, and reasonable people will disagree, but having a strategic perspective is essential in order to allocate budgetary resources appropriately, redeploy military assets, and prioritize weapons programs. If you are fighting terrorism as your first priority, you need different assets than if your main focus is on containing Russian inroads in Ukraine and the Baltic; if you think thwarting North Korea's nuclear arsenal is your overriding priority, your dealings with China need to be reconfigured accordingly. Thinking strategically is essential for defining priorities, resolving the tradeoffs between competing goals, and making budgetary decisions.

Thinking strategically also demands ongoing efforts to reconcile interests and values. All U.S. presidents since World War II have put America first, all of them have pursued U.S. interests, all of them have been attentive to U.S. military power, and most have quested for military dominance. But all of them also have grasped that America's values and cultural influence — its soft power — constitute key ingredients of America's influence and appeal. To their credit, Trump's advisors like Cohn, McMaster, and even Tillerson occasionally have tried to say that "America First is rooted in confidence that our values are worth defending and promoting." But the president's relentless stress on "interests" and his dalliances with ruthless and repressive authoritarians tarnish America's image abroad, agitate democratic allies, and demoralize courageous proponents of liberal values around the globe. "Making America great again" cannot possibly mean obfuscating or demeaning America's values.

Abandoning human rights, democratization, and multilateral economic and legal agreements would guide U.S. foreign policy in new and dangerous directions. Perhaps that is what Trump wants, but a purely transactional foreign policy erodes trust and predictability, essential ingredients for world order and U.S. national security. Reliability is what reassures friends and deters adversaries.

Thinking strategically also means integrating foreign policy with a sensible domestic agenda. We should not forget that when Roosevelt and Truman embraced the Bretton Woods monetary system after World War II, their intent was to use institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to foster international financial stability and commercial growth abroad while allowing for macroeconomic management at home. When this system collapsed in the 1970s, these goals were not abandoned. Today, as in the past, Trump's overriding goal of domestic economic growth should not be incompatible with a well-conceived strategic agenda abroad. But it is. The president wants better jobs, higher wages, and improved living standards and opportunities for U.S. workers. Yet Trump's mantra, "buy American, hire American," actually endangers U.S. interests abroad and undermines his goals at home. America's best-paying jobs are located in its export sector, and the factory jobs that have disappeared, according to most economists, are the result of automation. If "buy American, hire American" means repudiating NAFTA, terminating bilateral free trade accords with nations like South Korea, and retaliating against China, the resulting higher prices



paid by most workers for many of their necessities will hurt them in the aggregate far more than they will benefit by the marginal increase in jobs. And, meanwhile, the retaliatory countermeasures will hurt American workers in America's best-paying manufacturing sectors.

In reality, the economic nationalism that Trump espouses jeopardizes his relations with key allies, interferes with his efforts both to contain and to cooperate with China, and offers little help to U.S. workers. That is not to say that Trump and his advisors should not negotiate to redress infringements on patents, curtail foreign governments' inappropriate subsidies, and remove their illegal impediments to U.S. exports. But if Trump wants to "make America great again" he must not undermine the liberal international order on which America's greatness has been premised. He must make that order work better by embracing a strategy that seeks to redresses its defects while ameliorating the conditions of American workers at home. To do so, he must jettison the rhetorical trope "hire American, buy American" and embrace policies that stimulate demand at home, promote the competitive ability of American businesses abroad, and support displaced, unemployed, and underemployed workers. This could be done through infrastructure expenditures, tax reforms (not tax cuts), antitrust practices, and retraining programs. Such domestic priorities could harmonize with a far-sighted strategic program abroad.

Thinking strategically requires teamwork and process. One can imagine that with the dismissal of Flynn, Steve Bannon, and Reince Priebus, Trump's first chief of staff, there is the prospect for improved process, coordination, and staffing. Retired Gen. John Kelly, the new chief of staff, like McMaster and Mattis shares a commitment to the alliances that the United States has forged and to the global order it has managed. As military men, they also grasp the importance of a disciplined process and collaboration. But they remain hampered by a president who has failed to fill critical positions in the Defense and State departments and ambassadorial posts abroad. Dealing with the Korean crisis without an ambassador in Seoul and announcing new tough policies toward Pakistan without an ambassador in Islamabad invite unnecessary difficulties. Trying "to make America great again" with a decimated and demoralized State Department is a recipe for failure. These problems are easy to solve if there is the will to address them.

Forging an effective national security policy is a formidable enterprise, but other presidents have recovered from shaky beginnings. It takes more than a formal strategy paper, which this administration, like its predecessors, is now preparing. It requires a president and a group of advisors who can think strategically, rank threats, agree on priorities, link means and ends, and work with Congress. It requires a president and a group of advisors who can work collaboratively, respect one another, abide by a process, and forge trusting relationships with key legislators. It takes a president who is more than a dealmaker.

Transactional predilections based on expediency cannot substitute for strategic thinking, orderly process, and capable staffing. Past presidents often have learned these lessons after bitter setbacks, but they did learn. We'll all soon learn whether Trump can do the same.

Source: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/19/the-worst-first-year-of-foreign-policy-ever/>

# American Endgame in Afghanistan By Zamir Akram

Does America have a strategy to end the longest war in its history? After 17 years, a trillion dollars in costs and thousands of casualties, Americans do not appear to be anywhere near a solution in Afghanistan. More importantly, there is a lack of clarity about American objectives. The much-awaited Trump administration's Afghan and South Asian policy has added to the confusion and controversy. America's endgame in Afghanistan, therefore, remains a matter of intense speculation.

Ever since the 2001 American intervention in Afghanistan, the lack of a clear political objective has undermined its war effort. President George Bush sought elimination of terrorists but then got into nation-building. He also shifted focus towards the war in Iraq, providing critical space for the Taliban to regroup. The Obama administration sought a phased withdrawal by 2014, preceded by a troop surge and enabling Kabul to take over the fight against the Taliban, while paying lip service to a political solution. Trump has added to this mess.

World responds to Trump's new Afghan strategy

While there are various interpretations of Trump's policy, most observers argue that it essentially amounts to more of the same — to stay the course towards a military "victory". The coterie of former and serving American generals along with the intelligence community seem to have got their way in persisting with the only option they know — use of military force. Trump acknowledged that he has been persuaded by them to abandon his earlier conviction to withdraw.

But within 24 hours Secretary of State Rex Tillerson emphasised the need for dialogue to evolve a political solution in Afghanistan. While this may have been an afterthought, it has added to the confusion about America's Afghan strategy.

Neither Trump nor Tillerson have provided any specifics about how the military or the political option would be pursued especially in view of past failures on both tracks. Trump's boast that "win, we will", presumably by adding 5,000 more troops, seems unlikely since the much larger surge under Obama failed to deliver. Since

the US military effort at full strength failed to defeat the Taliban or to eliminate terrorists, how will it succeed now at much lower troops levels?

On the contrary, the Taliban have expanded their influence to nearly half of Afghanistan while a new terrorist threat by the IS is fast emerging. Blaming this failure on Pakistan's alleged support to the Taliban is a lame excuse, not a strategy. The fact is that neither the Taliban nor the IS need Pakistani sanctuaries since they already control vast areas of Afghanistan from where they operate. The parallel objective of building up Afghan security forces is also untenable given the extent of corruption, lack of discipline and inadequate funding that plagues the Afghan forces.

Similarly, Tillerson's advocacy of a political solution is a hollow claim. The stated option of weakening the Taliban to the point that they are willing to accept a political solution on American terms is unrealistic because the Taliban will not fight and talk at the same time. Also the US will not be able to win on the negotiating table what they have failed to achieve on the battlefield. The American expectation that Pakistan will compel the Taliban towards an eventual dialogue is misplaced as well since Pakistan simply does not have the requisite leverage with them.

The other main elements of Trump's policy — to punish Pakistan for allegedly harbouring the Taliban and inviting India to play a greater role in Afghanistan are red lines for Pakistan. In response, it could shut down US supply routes through its territory, cease intelligence cooperation and begin supporting the Taliban.

What Americans have failed to grasp apparently is that Pakistan's Afghan policy has always been a function of its relations with India. Indo-Afghanistan collaboration, such as support to TTP terrorists based in Afghanistan, poses an existential threat for Pakistan. And on the issue of its national security, there will be no compromise, just as in the case of the country's nuclear programme. Consequently, pursuit of Trump's policy will make matters only worse.

Moreover, Pakistan is no longer dependent on the US as in the past. Actually, its policy for an Afghan political solution is supported by major powers like China, Russia, Iran and Turkey, with whom it can pursue this option independently of the US. Pakistan's economic and military reliance on the US has also declined with new options emerging with China and Russia.

## Suicide bomber kills NATO soldier in Afghanistan: official

It beggars belief that the US security establishment is incapable of recognising these ground realities and persists with the failed option of continued war in Afghanistan. This gives rise to the alternative argument, that the American establishment is really not interested in withdrawing but prolonging the Afghan conflict, in order to justify their continued military presence in the region. This also explains the justification for the six American military bases in Afghanistan which the Obama Administration forced on the Afghans in 2014, complete with wide-ranging extra-territorial powers. Such presence is not only meant to “monitor” Pakistan’s nuclear assets, which has already been acknowledged by the Americans, but also to check Chinese, Russian and Iranian influence in the region, apart from interfering in the internal affairs of all these countries. The US has also evinced its interest in Afghanistan’s mineral wealth which it wants for its exclusive benefit. Keeping the Afghan pot boiling also favours India in order to continue trying to destabilise Pakistan. Hence the Indo-American convergence in Afghanistan. With Kabul’s forces in the forefront of the fighting, US casualties would be manageable so as not to create any domestic backlash while the high cost of the campaign will continue to be profitable for the American military-industrial complex. The US can, therefore, afford to fight till the last Afghan.

Is this then the real American endgame in Afghanistan? Pakistan needs to consider this possibility seriously and work with regional partners like China, Russia and Iran, to protect shared security interests in the long war ahead.

Published in The Express Tribune, September 15th, 2017.

Source: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1506520/american-endgame-afghanistan/>

# Will Iran Become the Next North Korea? By Philip Gordon and Amos Yadlin

## Avoiding a Nuclear Nightmare in the Middle East

North Korea's most recent long-range ballistic missile tests, which demonstrate progress toward an ability to strike U.S. soil with a nuclear weapon, mostly concern the United States and its Asian allies. But the repercussions of the test are felt well beyond Asia and North America. Across the Middle East, the inevitable question is whether Washington's apparent willingness to live with North Korean nuclear weapons—even those that can now be delivered to the United States itself—foreshadows what is to come in Iran. Leaders and populations around the region, especially in Israel and the Gulf states, fear that they may be watching a movie play out in East Asia that will soon be screened closer to home.

The concern is not misplaced, and the similarities between the two cases are disconcerting. In 1994, the Bill Clinton administration announced an "Agreed Framework" that would "freeze and then dismantle" the North's nuclear program, promising that "South Korea and our other allies will be better protected," "the entire world will be safer," and "the United States and international inspectors will carefully monitor North Korea to make sure it keeps its commitments." But Pyongyang cheated, the deal collapsed, and, within a decade, North Korea was back on the path to the bomb.

The George W. Bush administration tried a more confrontational approach, but it failed, too. Despite a new doctrine of preemption and pledges to prevent hostile actors such as North Korea from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, Bush could do nothing but "condemn this provocative act" when Pyongyang tested a weapon in 2006. And despite pledges that North Korea would be held "fully accountable" if it proliferated nuclear weapons or materials, the administration stood by without acting as Pyongyang proceeded to build a secret, plutonium-producing heavy-water reactor in Syria. According to senior U.S. intelligence officials, that effort was only stopped when Israel took matters in its own hands and bombed the site in 2007.

Even though a military option for Iran is far from ideal, the United States and its allies need to keep the option viable.

Seeking to avoid military confrontation, but also refusing to reward North Korea's behavior with talks, the Barack Obama administration in 2009 turned to a policy of "strategic patience," but then could only patiently watch as Pyongyang built up a significant nuclear arsenal and advanced its delivery systems.

Next up was the Trump administration. When, in January 2017, North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un signaled an intention to test a long-range ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, Trump famously boasted on Twitter that "It won't happen!" and later announced that he was sending "an armada" to the region. Vice President Mike Pence reinforced Trump's message by traveling to the Korean demilitarized zone and warning Pyongyang not to "test [Trump's] resolve or the strength of the armed forces of the United States." But test it they have, and all indications are that the U.S. response will be no more effective than it has been in confronting other North Korean advances over the past 20 years.

With this track record, leaders and publics across the Middle East could be forgiven for wondering whether American efforts to prevent an Iranian bomb will prove any more successful. But there are key differences between the two situations, and it is important to draw the right lessons from the North Korean experience. There is still time to prevent Iran from following in North Korea's footsteps, but only if leaders in Washington and elsewhere are honest about the challenge and recognize not just what is familiar about it but what is different as well.

Some would argue that because diplomacy failed in North Korea, the United States and its partners should eschew any attempt at negotiations and simply focus on economic and diplomatic isolation until the Iranian regime caves or collapses. But that would be a mistake for a number of reasons. In the North Korean case, the Agreed Framework collapsed in part because the U.S. Congress, determined not to "appease" Pyongyang, refused to live up to commitments to provide the North with energy supplies, as stipulated by the deal. And the absence of a negotiated deal resulted in neither North Korean collapse nor compromise but rather a paranoid nuclear-weapons state with intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities—hardly an advertisement for that strategy. The right approach to Iran today is thus

not to give up on negotiations, which would leave the disastrous alternatives of accepting an Iranian bomb or bombing Iran, but to make such negotiations work.

Iran is a more open and dynamic society than North Korea. It has an unpopular government, an educated middle class, and a young population eager to join the international community, which makes the regime more susceptible to pressure and to incentives. Although far from guaranteed, it is at least possible that by the time some of the current restrictions on Iran's nuclear program start to expire nearly a decade from now, Tehran will be under different leadership, with which more constructive dialogue, nuclear assurances, and even regional cooperation might be possible.

would entirely abandon decades of work to develop a nuclear energy industry. But it would also be unwise not to test the proposition that the right combination of incentives and disincentives could lead different Iranian leaders to accept meaningful limits and effective monitoring of that industry. Pyongyang made a different choice and it is now one of the poorest and most isolated countries in the world. Tehran, or more realistically, the Iranian people, might look at that precedent and decide that they prefer a different future.

Another key difference is that a military option to prevent Iran from acquiring the bomb remains viable as a last resort. In North Korea, military preemption has long been precluded by the strategic reality that most of the South Korean population, including the capital city of Seoul, lies within range of thousands of North Korean rockets, and all of North Korea's neighbors, including South Korea, oppose military action to prevent proliferation. A preemptive strike against Iran's nuclear program would of course be costly and problematic as well, but given the costs and consequences of an Iranian nuclear capability, it remains a real option—one many of Iran's neighbors would support.

Thus, even though they must understand that a military option for Iran is far from ideal, the United States and its allies need to keep the option viable. That means maintaining and further developing capabilities such as the Massive Ordnance Penetrator, the 30,000-pound bomb capable of destroying underground bunkers, preserving the declaratory policy that the United States will not allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon, and deploying effective missile defenses in Israel and the Gulf



states to ensure that their capitals are not held hostage by Iran in the same way that Seoul is by North Korea.

Tehran might look at Pyongyang's precedent and decide that it prefers a different future.

A final difference is that although North Korea has now become a nuclear-weapons state armed with long-range missiles, there is still time with Iran. Even those leaders in Washington and the Middle East who opposed the nuclear deal with Iran should acknowledge that it has, at least for now, stopped Iran's nuclear program from advancing, and they should use that time wisely. Washington should accept the conclusions of the International Atomic Energy Agency and others that Iran is complying with the agreement and continue to provide the periodic extensions of sanctions waivers necessary to keep the agreement alive. A unilateral decision by the Trump administration to declare Iran in noncompliance, or to provoke an artificial crisis over inspections, as some in the administration are reportedly planning, would only serve to isolate the United States and give Iran a pretext to resume its nuclear activities.

Instead, the United States and other international actors should take advantage of the time bought by the nuclear deal to start planning for the possibility that Iran will forego its opportunity to reassure the international community and instead seek to follow the North Korean script. The United States should launch an honest strategic dialogue with all its international partners about how to verify and enforce the Iran nuclear deal while it remains in place, as well as what to do if Iran violates it now or in the future.

The nuclear deal was designed to give Iran the opportunity over 10- to 15 years to demonstrate that its nuclear energy program is exclusively peaceful. If at the time the restrictions are lifted, Iran remains a major state-sponsor of terrorism unwilling to live in peace with its neighbors and has failed to provide assurance that it is not seeking a nuclear weapon, the United States and its partners in the region and around the world will have to decide then how to deal with Iran—a discussion they would do well to initiate already today.

North Korea has always had an ally, China, that is unwilling to punish its nuclear transgressions for fear of precipitating a regime collapse and losing a proxy. Iran

has, and should have, no such protector. If it fails to use the time bought by the nuclear deal to reassure the world that “under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons,” the world’s major powers should agree that all options remain on the table, including a military option and a return to the sanctions that led Iran to negotiate in the first place.

It would be naive to deny the troubling similarities between the cases of North Korea and Iran. But it would be equally wrong to ignore the differences. If the leaders of the United States and its Middle Eastern partners draw the right lessons from the North Korean experience, they have a chance to avoid repeating it.

Source: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2017-08-01/will-iran-become-next-north-korea?cid=int-lea&pgtype=hpg>

# Deterrence in US-North Korea Tension By Maimuna Ashraf

In the pre-nuclear age, the question of credibility in executing the threat was not a vital problem because the mighty side having the military means could carry out threat or launch an offensive while the weaker side was not allowed to take an aggressive action. Thus, the military means and the willingness were two foremost factors requisite to fulfilling the threat whereas after nuclear revolution, the deterrence theory speaks predominantly about the credibility. In literary sense, 'deterrence means to prevent people from doing something by frightening them, particularly through threats of severe consequences.'

Later, the concept of nuclear retaliation further consolidated the threat by permitting vigorous punishment without allowing realistic defence, because after the introduction of nuclear or strategic weapons, the cost of nuclear weapons is no more restricted to the battlefield or front line and the nation's infrastructure, population and industries cannot remain intact in modern conflict.

The general realisation is that in a nuclear conflict, either side would lose more than it gains. Thomas Schelling argues that in nuclear coercion, actors can credibly threaten or take steps on the route that may eventually result in the situation getting out of control.

The destruction done by nuclear weapons was first witnessed by the world in the Second World War when Hiroshima and Nagasaki were hit by the atomic bomb. The general perception is that since the advent of the nuclear weapons, the sense about major world war has grown. The potential impact and efficacy of nuclear weapons spurred a debate between proliferation optimists, the more the better, and pessimist, more will be worse.

It is yet to be seen whether North Korea will be deterred from developing nuclear weapons by threat of destruction or through by a mix of incentives, disincentives and sanctions. The cost of failed deterrence will be immense

On the notion of deterrence, optimist argue that the nuclear proliferation decreases the likelihood of war. Kenneth Waltz opined that nuclear weapons can increase stability among states because due to deterrent factor and nuclear retaliation, the

states will tend to avoid war; both conventional and nuclear. Whereas, the nuclear pessimists argue that states possessing nuclear weapons may not necessarily come in mutually deterring pairs or stable relationships which would increase the risk of accidental nuclear war. Pessimist also contend about the possibility of preemptive strike between two hostile states possessing nuclear weapons and sharing common borders although deterrence till now worked in such cases, for instance between US-USSR, Soviet Union-China, India-China and Pakistan-India.

The cold war model is the most recounted to explain this phenomenon as the hostility between United States and Soviet Union did not escalate into direct military conflict despite the height of tensions.

On the contrary, with reference to ongoing US-North Korea tensions, the US President's national security adviser HR McMaster, in an interview, disagreed with the perception that "US and its allies will tolerate nuclear weapons in North Korea and rely on traditional deterrence to prevent the North from using them, just as they had deterred the Soviet Union from using its much more massive nuclear arsenal during the Cold War".

However, there are other Trump advisers who think that deterrence can work with North Korea. On the other hand, Pyongyang claim to complete the miniaturisation of hydrogen bomb capable of being fitted to an intercontinental ballistic missile is also important component of the North Korea's deterrent strategy.

The country is showcasing its capabilities to demonstrate that it can cause significant damage to adversary. Thus, the derivatives of deterrence are certainly functional in current tensions. Yet a noticeable fact or limitation is that even if deterrence can stop a state to launch an aggressive action, it cannot prevent a country to further develop nuclear weapons.

Nonetheless, if North Korea is not deterred, then it will go on and make nuclear weapons which can be one of the most dangerous weapons in the world. Robert Gallucci, a former Clinton administration official, rightly questioned that "what makes deterrence unreliable in North Koreans case as it is certainly not the quality or quantity of North Korea's nuclear weapons because Soviet Union had about thousands of weapons at height of Cold War while North Korea have less than 20". The United States have so far deterred governments in past from using nuclear

weapons that include Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union and Mao Zedong in China. However, whether North Korea would be deterred by destruction or change its calculus on the development of nuclear weapons by the incentives, disincentives or sanctions is yet to be seen but the cost of failed deterrence is unimaginable.

The writer is a Senior Research Associate at an Islamabad-based think tank, Strategic Vision Institute (SVI). She works on issues related to nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and South Asian nuclear equation. She writes for South Asian Voices, international blogs and national dailies. She can be reached at [maimuna.svi@gmail.com](mailto:maimuna.svi@gmail.com)

Published in Daily Times, September 26th 2017.

Source: <http://dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/26-Sep-17/deterrence-in-us-north-korea-tension?>