

HIERARCHY



in

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

DAVID A. LAKE

*Hierarchy in
International Relations*

David A. Lake

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*For my sons,
Brenden and Dylan*

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Preface

I was compelled to write this book by the United States's invasion of Iraq. As war edged ever closer in late 2002 and early 2003, I grew increasingly concerned that the unilateralism of President George W. Bush, and especially his insistence on preventive war despite the expressed opposition of stalwart allies, was undermining the international legitimacy of the United States. I worried that the absence of any evident plan to reconstruct the Iraqi state would create instability and disorder throughout the region and show the United States incapable of fulfilling its promises to protect and provide order to other states as well. These anxieties were rather inchoate at the time. I had difficulty expressing my concerns to those who would listen and found to my dismay that the concepts and tools of my professional discipline were of limited use. When I spoke of the dangers of undermining the international authority of the United States, I was acutely aware that this concept was alien, denied, and excluded by the theories that I taught to students and used as guides to develop my own understanding of world politics. The core assumption of the discipline of international relations is that the international system is anarchic or devoid of authority. But if the international system is anarchic, and states lack authority over one another, how could the nonexistent authority of the United States get weaker? What did it mean to say that the legitimacy of the United States was fraying or that the allies were defying Washington when commonsense definitions of these concepts were ruled out by our established theories of international relations?

In working through these questions, I have come to view international politics through a new lens—one that is explained and focused in this book. Today, I see authority as a form of international power, coequal with and perhaps even more important than coercion. As a political construct, authority does

not exist absent the legitimacy conferred by subordinates. By engaging in preventive war against Iraq, the United States overstepped the limits of the international authority that it had previously earned. In turn, I recognize that authority rests on an exchange of political order for legitimacy and compliance. To give up some portion of their sovereignty, subordinate states must get something in return—usually international security—that is equally if not more valuable. By failing to ensure stability in Iraq after the toppling of Saddam Hussein, the United States reneged on its end of the bargain. Rather than creating order in the region, and the world more generally, the United States exaggerated threats to justify an invasion and then, as of this writing, failed to build a new and effective state to replace the one it destroyed. Finally, I appreciate that the decision of one state to subordinate itself to another is a profound act. Not only does the state yield to the other the right to enforce commands, but the dominant state also can use its authority opportunistically in ways that violate the original compact. To induce others to accept its rule, therefore, the dominant state must commit credibly to only limited authority. By going to war even in the face of international opposition, the United States broke the fetters it had previously used to tie its hands and violated its commitment to act only within the bounds of its legitimate authority.

Although prompted by a concern with the abuse of American authority, this book has grown far beyond this single episode into a more general statement about the nature and implications of international hierarchy for international relations. Authority is a constant but evolving feature of world politics with substantively important effects on state behavior. International hierarchy did not disappear in 1648 with the birth of the supposedly sovereign territorial state nor after World War II with the death of Europe's overseas empires. It remains a core, if frequently overlooked, feature of modern international relations. By understanding the nature and practice of international hierarchy, my hope is that we can better explain patterns of international order and learn to respect its role in international politics.

This book explicates the concept of international hierarchy, establishes its existence in the modern international system, deduces implications for the behaviors of states, and tests these hypotheses empirically. In ways that may leave some readers dissatisfied, I do not provide a complete theory that explains variations in international hierarchy. This was the subject of an earlier work (*Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in Its Century*). This study also limits its purview to dyadic relations between dominant and subordinate states. Although I expect the core logic to apply, I do not examine the creation of supranational or federal authorities in which two or more potentially sovereign states create a third party to rule them all, although I expect this form of gov-

ernance to become more prevalent in the future. Nor do I examine the reemerging practice of international trusteeship over failed states, which appears to respond to a similar logic of authority and hierarchy. In focusing on dyadic relations, I abstract from the role and influence of domestic politics within states. As I discuss in the conclusion, this is clearly the next important step in research on international hierarchy.

Some readers will undoubtedly find my account of international hierarchy insufficiently social. Analysts of “social power” focus on how interests or, in their language, identities are themselves socially constituted. That is, analytic weight is placed on how the interactions and normative understandings of agents create particular conceptions of identity. Behavior and outcomes, in turn, are treated as flowing from identity in a relatively straightforward manner. Since identity is based, in part, on socially appropriate roles, knowing how agents *should* act is expected to explain how they *do* act. The epistemological bet is that if we understand how actors come to possess certain identities—or “thick” interests—we can then understand and answer the interesting questions of world politics. In this book, I take a different tack that begins with a minimalist or “thin” conception of interests, usually stated in universal terms, and then seeks to explain behavior and outcomes as the product of the strategic interactions of states. The epistemological bet here is that the interesting puzzles and their solutions follow largely from dilemmas of strategic interaction, in this case from the exchange between dominant and subordinate states. As the use of similar terms is intended to suggest, the difference between these approaches is not about the real world or the nature of authority and hierarchy, but rather about how we can best study and understand world politics. Although I make a different epistemological bet than do analysts of social power, which bet will prove more profitable remains—and should remain—an open question at this stage in our inquiry.

Analysts of social power also tend to give great weight to the role of ideas and norms in shaping identity. I do not deny that intersubjective understandings matter in defining and shaping the contours of international authority. They form an important part of the interests, however defined, of actors in world politics. Certainly, the rise of the principle of juridical sovereignty has greatly constrained the extent of international authority in the present world system—often with the strategic and paradoxical effect, I argue in chapters 1 and 4, of actually promoting “lighter” forms of hierarchy. Nonetheless, I maintain that at its root, authority rests on the largely material exchange of order for compliance and legitimacy. If the ambition is to understand hierarchy in the modern world, I do not believe that ideas and norms are a particularly promising avenue down which to travel. The principle of juridical sovereignty

that dominates contemporary international politics is explicitly hostile to international hierarchy and denies the legitimacy of any country's rule over another. Nor do I see in current discourse any positive set of ideas that would justify the legitimate domination of one state by another. In this case, international hierarchy exists largely despite, not because of, transnational ideas and norms.

This is only a first step in studying the forms, causes, and consequences of international hierarchy. I do not claim that my approach is the only right way to think about this complex phenomenon. But it is not sufficient to simply assert that domestic politics are important or that ideas and norms matter. If others believe that a social contract is an insufficient approach to understanding hierarchy between states, they should develop alternative theories, deduce their implications, and compare the evidence for and against their theory relative to mine. Scientific progress is the displacement of one flawed theory by a less-flawed theory. If this work stimulates such progress and leads to a better appreciation of international hierarchy, it will have succeeded in my largest ambition.

Before developing these arguments in greater detail, I want to address briefly the normative implications of writing about hierarchy in international relations, especially in the case of the United States. At the risk of a Nixonian denial that may only prove the charge, let me state clearly at the outset that I am not an American triumphalist, an advocate of the "new imperialism" seeking to bolster U.S. power, nor an apologist for past (or future) interventions by the United States. I will admit to a preference for American-led international political orders over any alternatives dominated by any other single country. The United States governs others more lightly and pursues policies closer to the general interest than would any viable competitor. To the extent that the United States biases its international orders, I share its preferences for democracy, economic liberalism, and political freedom.

Yet, I also recognize that politically and diplomatically it is sometimes inappropriate to speak openly of hierarchy in modern world politics. Even if the concept of international hierarchy is useful for theorizing about contemporary world politics and explaining patterns of state behavior, by calling attention to its pervasive and enduring nature I risk legitimating (in my own small way) practices that many would prefer to sweep into the dustbin of history.

Acknowledging the harsh realities now masked by the principle of juridical sovereignty is undoubtedly painful, especially for subordinate states whose patina of equality is thereby stripped away. Obviously, declaring that Saudi Arabia ceded control over its foreign policy and became a protectorate of the United States during the Persian Gulf War of 1991, for example, would have

been politically difficult, and this accounts for the symbolic but no less important efforts taken to conceal this fact. Calling the relationship what it is might, at the time, have made it even more difficult to accomplish the goals for which the protectorate was formed. Similarly, naming inequalities and highlighting their prevalence in international politics risks normalizing practices that some wish to repress, especially intervention in the internal affairs of states. To the extent that states find Westphalian sovereignty attractive, showing that practice differs systematically and frequently from this aspiration undermines its salience and utility as a justification for other practices. I recognize this problem. But the academy should not fail to take up analytically useful concepts or raise important issues simply because they are politically charged and contentious.

Uncovering now-hidden forms of hierarchy in international politics is, however, a double-edged sword. It may be politically difficult for states to acknowledge publicly their subordination. But many states have used the principle of sovereignty to conceal abhorrent behavior. It is not always the case that international hierarchy is more offensive to human dignity and welfare than the practices of corrupt and autocratic rulers. Indeed, the United States is often criticized both for tolerating despicable dictators and simultaneously for not doing enough to remove them from power. Many of the same people who criticize its "imperialism" also call for the United States to do more to promote democracy abroad. The reality is that sovereignty is not always and everywhere a goal for which those concerned with human happiness should strive.

Revealing hierarchy may also constrain and inhibit imperial projects by powerful states. This is, perhaps, the more important effect. Hierarchy today is cloaked, submerged, and itself undisciplined because both dominant and subordinate states prefer not to acknowledge its existence. Revealing now-hidden hierarchy exposes it to debate and analysis within both dominant and subordinate states. In today's unipolar world, and in the wake of the on-going misadventure in Iraq, there may be no more important service that scholars of international relations can provide than to subject the existence, causes, and consequences of hierarchy to informed scrutiny.

DAVID A. LAKE

Introduction

Political philosopher Thomas Hobbes famously explained the birth of the state as an attempt by anomic individuals to escape from anarchy. By subordinating themselves to a sovereign—"a common power to keep them all in awe"—individuals previously living in a state of nature entered a civil society.¹

Having established a degree of security under a sovereign, Hobbes believed that civil society naturally culminated in political units approximating the modern territorial state. Though the flight from anarchy required the formation of states, it did not require a universal authority. Even as their peoples were freed from their previously dismal lot, Hobbes asserted, the several sovereigns with no common power above them could prosper in a state of nature. Although he wrote to justify the absolutist monarchies of his era, Hobbes (and his followers) privileged states as primordial political units.² Yet, there is no inherent reason that the process of building authority must terminate at the level of the state.

Following Hobbes, nearly all scholars presume that world politics is anarchic, or lacking in any authority superior to that of states.³ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Locke, and other classic philosophers did not differ with Hobbes in their conception of the state of nature as anarchy, but did disagree

1. In Brown, Nardin, and Rengger 2002, 337.

2. Deudney (2007) offers a contemporary version of this argument, for instance, in differentiating between "first anarchies," where the threat of violence is so intense that individuals are willing to accept authority, and "second anarchies," where the threat is not so intense as to lead to voluntary subjugation.

3. On the assumption of anarchy in international relations, see Milner 1991 and Schmidt 1998.

on the nature of humans and civil society. These disagreements, in turn, had fundamental implications for how they understood the consequences of anarchy and hierarchy.⁴ Similarly, scholars of international relations do not differ in their conception of anarchy but only on its purported effects. For realists, states pursuing power or even security under uncertainty necessarily implies zero-sum conflicts and a Hobbesian war “of every man, against every man.”⁵ For neoliberal institutionalists, utility or wealth-maximizing states face dilemmas of collaboration or coordination rather than inherent conflicts and invest in institutions that facilitate cooperation.⁶ For constructivists, the purpose of states is socially constructed, variable in nature, and possibly benign.⁷ Even as the nature of states interacts with the state of nature to determine the meaning of anarchy, virtually all scholars agree that relations between states are anarchic and that this is one of the most unique, important, and enduring features of world politics.

Yet, international hierarchies are pervasive. Both in the past and present, states subordinate themselves in whole or part to the authority of other, dominant states.⁸ Some subordinate states acknowledge the authority of another in only limited areas, recognizing as legitimate perhaps just the right of a dominant state to regulate their interactions with third parties, traditionally known as a sphere of influence, in military affairs, or an economic zone, in trade and financial relations. This was the price paid by the states of Western Europe during the Cold War for joining their American-led international orders. Following Washington’s lead, they sided with the United States against the Soviet Union, foreclosing a possible “third way” in the East-West split, and gave up imperial preferences in economic relations with their current and former colonies. Other subordinates grant a dominant state deeper and more extensive authority, ceding the right to make security policy in a protectorate or economic policy in a dependency. The states of the Caribbean littoral are informal U.S. empires, with Washington exercising substantial but not complete authority over their security and economic policies since the late nineteenth century. A few states, at an extreme, may even yield complete authority over their security and economic affairs, as in the classical European empires and found most often today in weak form in the “residual” European colonies, be-

4. See Doyle 1997.

5. In Brown, Nardin, and Rengger 2002, 337. See Jervis 1978; Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001.

6. Keohane 1984; Oye 1985; Stein 1990.

7. Wendt 1992; Wendt 1999; Reus-Smit 1999.

8. For other studies that use a related conception of hierarchy, see Cooley 2005; Donnelly 2006; Hobson and Sharman 2005; and Weber 2000.

tween Russia and the states of the “near abroad,” or between the United States and its formal dependencies. These relationships—and especially their labels—may seem archaic, but such international hierarchies continue to exist in today’s world and, indeed, continue to be formed. Hierarchies remain a fact of international politics. They affect the actions of both dominant and subordinate states in profound ways. Explicating these hierarchies and their consequences reveals a very different picture of international relations from that usually portrayed.

Seeing now-hidden international hierarchies requires two analytic moves. First, I advance a relational conception of authority rather than the formal-legal view now dominant in international relations theory. In a relational approach, the right to rule rests on a social contract in which the ruler provides a political order of value to the ruled, who in turn grant legitimacy to the ruler and comply with the restraints on their behavior necessary for the production of that order. This conception is entirely consistent with Hobbes’s original formulation of the escape from the state of nature, but it does not require that authority derive from some prior, lawful institution. By conceiving of authority in relational terms, the rich tapestry of hierarchy is illuminated and the varying hues and textures are revealed.

Second, following revisionist studies of international practice, I assume that sovereignty is a bundle of rights or authorities that can be divided among different levels of governance and different rulers.⁹ Thus, authority over some areas of economic policy, such as fiscal and employment policy, might be reserved to the state, whereas others, such as monetary or trade policy, may be transferred to a foreign country. Similarly, a state might retain authority over its general diplomacy but confer authority over its defense policy to some other state. Political philosophers have argued that sovereignty is in principle indivisible, and this assumption was implicitly incorporated into international relations theories in the earliest days of the discipline. Yet, there is little evidence—almost none outside European great power relations—to support this view. Treating sovereignty as divisible allows authority between states to vary along continua of lesser or greater hierarchy.

All theories are based on sets of simplifying assumptions that help render a complex reality more easily understood. Assumptions are judged by the explanatory power of the theories they generate.¹⁰ There is nothing wrong in principle with the assumptions that authority derives only from formal-legal

9. See Krasner 1999; Krasner 2001; and Osiander 2001.

10. On the role of simplifying assumptions in international relations theory, see Waltz 1979, chap. 1.

institutions, and thus that all relations between states are anarchic, or that sovereignty is indivisible. But it is important to recognize that these are not empirical descriptions of reality, but merely assumptions that we can accept or reject on their explanatory power. Yet, these assumptions obscure important facets of international politics. As I shall show in summary form below and in more detail in subsequent chapters, assuming instead that authority follows from a social contract based on the exchange of order for compliance and legitimacy and that sovereignty is divisible reveals new and important patterns of world politics.

The Not So Strange Case of the Dominican Republic

The informal empire between the United States and the Dominican Republic formed in the early years of the twentieth century reflects the social contract between states in all its complexity. The relationship between the two countries is not unusual, but it is informative as both Washington and Santo Domingo have repeatedly tested the limits of their authority or autonomy, respectively, thereby throwing the practices of hierarchy into sharp relief.

From the time it was first ceded by Spain to France in 1795, the Dominican Republic has eagerly and consistently sought to subordinate itself to a foreign protector. After decades of intermittent rule by Spain, France, and Haiti, it offered itself to the United States in 1854 and again in 1870, but was rebuffed both times by Washington. An impending financial crisis, brought on by decades of looting from the public treasury by corrupt presidents, finally brought the United States into the Dominican Republic in 1904.¹¹ With European powers threatening to collect their debts by force, President Theodore Roosevelt assumed responsibility for the troubled republic's finances at the request of then President Carlos Morales. Justifying this action in his famous corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, Roosevelt declared that "Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power. . . ." In first an executive agreement and later a treaty between the two states, the United States took over the management of the republic's customhouses, the primary source of government revenue.

11. Atkins and Wilson 1998, 32–35, 42–43.

The republic also bound itself to neither increase debts nor lower taxes without the consent of the United States and consolidated its foreign debt in a new loan, making its northern neighbor its sole foreign creditor.¹²

Following the outbreak of civil war in 1913, the United States dramatically expanded its rule. Landing the Marines in 1916 to uphold the country's "lawful authorities," the United States declared martial law, revised the financial receivership agreement to preserve American control, and eventually placed the armed forces under American command.¹³ After Washington's handpicked candidate won new elections in 1924 and ratified decisions taken under martial law, the American troops withdrew and the Dominican Republic was "given a formal kind of partial independence in return for signing a treaty which makes it an actual protectorate."¹⁴

It is important to recognize today, when the norm of sovereignty and right of national self-determination echo loudly in diplomatic forums, that even as the United States transformed the republic into an informal empire, it enjoyed substantial support from the Dominicans themselves.¹⁵ There was also broad agreement between the two countries over the limits of the Dominican Republic's autonomy and the rights possessed by the United States. After 1924, the Dominicans could exercise some measure of choice in selecting their own rulers, subject to an American veto through its control over the country's finances and a residual right of intervention. Most important, the Dominican Republic was restricted in its foreign policy to contracting only with the United States for finance and security. Under no circumstances could it conduct an independent foreign policy that might undermine the exclusive rights the United States possessed over the country.

Having extended an informal empire over the Dominican Republic, the challenge for the United States then became disciplining a country that occasionally tested the limits of its subordination. Seizing power in fraudulent elections in 1930, General Rafael Leonidas Trujillo y Molina successfully anticipated American wishes and was careful, until the very end of his regime, not to cross the United States.¹⁶ As President Franklin D. Roosevelt allegedly remarked about the dictator, Trujillo may be an S.O.B., but "at least he's our S.O.B."¹⁷ Over the course of his rule, however, Trujillo gradually became more

12. LaFeber 1994, 247–248; Smith 1996, 57.

13. Smith 1996, 57.

14. Nearing and Freeman 1994, 10.

15. In an 1870 plebiscite, Dominicans supported annexation by the United States by a vote of 16,000 to 11. Crandall 2006, 41.

16. Atkins and Wilson 1998, 79–84, 87–92; Lowenthal 1995, 10.

17. Lowenthal 1995, 24.

repressive. Fearing it would be held responsible for his actions, the United States eventually withdrew its support.¹⁸ The dictator then threatened to align with the Soviet bloc, offering détente to Fidel Castro, legalizing the Dominican Communist Party, and sending emissaries to the Soviet Union.¹⁹ Threatening to leave the informal empire, however, was not acceptable. The Central Intelligence Agency, under a directive signed by President Kennedy, encouraged, organized, and planned Trujillo's assassination, carried out in May 1961 by a group of disaffected associates.²⁰

Continuing political instability after Trujillo's assassination further threatened the informal empire. A series of coups and countercoups came to a head in April 1965. When the American embassy in Santo Domingo reported that "Castro-type elements" might seize power, and with the pro-American junta requesting troops on the grounds that its opponents were "directed by Communists," the United States quickly intervened, landing five hundred Marines within days and ultimately deploying twenty-three thousand troops.²¹ As President Lyndon Johnson explained to an American television audience, a "communist dictatorship" threatened an outcome "the American nations cannot, must not, and will not permit."²²

Both the United States and the Dominicans arguably profited from the informal empire, although for reasons I discuss in chapters 1 and 4, the costs and benefits to both parties are typically hard to discern. Under American administration, customs revenues steadily improved, as did the island state's economic infrastructure and material conditions of everyday life. The cycle of domestic political violence was broken, although political opponents were brutalized by Trujillo, and the republic was secured against its historic rivalry with neighboring Haiti. In return, the United States gained a compliant subordinate that followed the twists and turns of its own foreign policy, allying against the Axis powers in 1941, against communism during the Cold War, against Castro's Cuba, and even joining the "coalition of the willing" against Iraq in 2003. Moreover, the United States secured exclusive access to a strategic outpost in

18. Atkins and Wilson 1998, 87, 111–117.

19. *Ibid.*, 88, 117–118.

20. On Kennedy, see Crandall 2006, 48. On the role of the United States in the assassination more generally, see Atkins and Wilson 1998, 119–120.

21. Lowenthal 1995, 100 and 102; Atkins and Wilson 1998, 135; LaFeber 1994, 608; Smith 1996, 169; Crandall 2006, 59.

22. LaFeber 1994, 608; Lowenthal 1995, 26–31. There is little doubt that the United States overreacted in the crisis. Fearing a "second Cuba," key decision makers were too quick to believe the flimsy evidence that the opposition was communist and allied with Castro. Smith 1996, 170–71; Hartlyn 1991, 198. At worst, the leftist opposition would most likely have continued to be a compliant subordinate had it gained power. Lowenthal 1995, 31; Crandall 2006, 50.

the Caribbean and prevented other peer competitors from using the island to threaten its southern flank—a not inconsiderable benefit.

Yet, the United States and Dominican Republic certainly did not benefit equally from their relationship. The United States clearly governed in its own interests rather than those of the Dominicans. But does this mean that the Dominicans were, on average, worse off than otherwise? This depends on the counterfactual one holds. Critics of American rule over the Dominican Republic implicitly accept one of two idealistic visions. The Dominican Republic might have enjoyed full sovereignty, domestic harmony, and peaceful relations with its neighbors, but this would have been unlikely given political instability, factional infighting, and regional rivalries that predated American rule. Even in the civil war in 1965, there was no clear winner; in the absence of intervention, the outcome might well have been a long and bloody conflict.²³ Alternatively, the United States might have ruled the republic to maximize the welfare of the Dominicans. But this is unrealistic. No state pays the costs of governing another from altruism alone. The more appropriate counterfactual is a Dominican Republic in a state of nature in which local elites would have been free to fight, other great powers would have been free to meddle, and regional rivals from Haiti to Cuba would have been free to make outrageous demands or wage war. Is the hierarchy between the United States and Dominican Republic fair? Hardly. But life in the state of nature might be far worse.

This not so unusual case illustrates two key points. First, states do willingly subordinate themselves to another, but typically only for something in return—most often, as in the Dominican Republic, protection from internal or external threats. In turn, providing a political order of benefit to a subordinate is costly and will be supplied if and only if the dominant state also receives something it values, especially compliance with its commands and legitimacy for its actions. This is the essence of a relational authority contract. Second, sovereignty or, inversely, international hierarchy is not an all-or-nothing status. Although the authority of the United States reached deep into the government's finances in the first half of the twentieth century, it did not acquire full and absolute authority over the Dominican Republic. Today, the United States is largely restricted to ensuring only that the country retains favorable foreign economic and security policies. Sovereignty can be—and is—divisible.

23. Crandall 2006, 38, 53–94.

International Hierarchy

Authority is, simply stated, rightful rule. That is, an authoritative ruler has the right to command subordinates to perform certain actions and, because the commands are rightful, the ruled have a duty to comply. In this way, authority is a type of power over others.

Since authority does not exist without recognition of their duty by the ruled, it rests not on assertions of rights by the ruler, but on the conferral of rights by the ruled. In turn, authority relationships are not devoid of coercion but are defined by the status or legitimacy of force when it is used. Given the duty of subordinates to comply, the ruler possesses a correlative right to enforce commands through coercion, if necessary. Authority differs from simple coercion in the bundle of accepted rights and duties—the legitimacy—of the particular relationship within which coercion is used.

Legitimacy is a political construct that derives from many sources: tradition, divine revelation, charisma, formal-legal rules. In modern international relations, I argue, legitimacy is rooted in a social contract in which the dominant state provides a political order to the collection of individuals who compose the subordinate state, and those individuals confer rights on the dominant state to restrict their behavior and extract resources necessary to produce that order. More generally, although I do not prove this point, I suggest that relational authority is fundamental or necessary for other forms of authority to exist as well.

Following Hedley Bull, a political order is “a pattern of human activity that sustains elementary, primary, or universal goals of social life,” including security against violence resulting in death or bodily harm, an assurance that property will not be subject to challenges that are constant or without limit, and an expectation that promises and agreements, once made, will be kept. In a form of shorthand, then, we can think of political order as the protection of persons, property, and promises.²⁴

Subordinate states benefit from political order in at least three major ways: their security and territorial integrity are enhanced; property rights at home

24. Bull 1977, 5. Unlike Bull, however, I do not attribute to political units the primary goals of preserving “the system and society of states itself” nor “maintaining the independence or external sovereignty of individual states” (Bull 1977, 16–17). States may forsake these “systemic” goals—and may even wholly subordinate themselves to others—in pursuit of the other goals already identified by Bull. The protection of persons, property, and promises are essential goals; the scope and independence of the political units individuals choose to live within should be treated as endogenous.

and more so abroad are more clearly defined and protected, reducing uncertainty, the potential for disputes, and the transaction costs of international exchange; and general standards of international behavior, including rule compliance, are defined and enforced even in the face of regimes that regard such rules as illegitimate. Although political orders vary in degree, and persons, property, and promises are likely to be more thoroughly protected within states than between them, the state of nature otherwise confronting subordinates is mitigated, at least in part. In return, subordinate states yield some portion of their sovereignty over these and other issues. To accept the protection of a dominant state and live within the rules it imposes is necessarily to limit a subordinate state's rights and abilities to pursue its own policies and set its own rules in those same areas.

Dominant states benefit from setting the rules of political order in ways that reflect their interests or advantage themselves in particular ways, subject to the constraint that these rules must be accepted by a sufficient number of subordinates to gain legitimacy. Their ability to enforce these rules, in turn, is enhanced by the legitimacy and support they are accorded. Rather than continuously coercing others into abiding by their will, it is far cheaper and more efficient for dominant states if subordinates comply with rules regarded as rightful and appropriate. Yet, the governance costs to dominant states can be substantial. They must provide orders of sufficient value to subordinates to earn their support, discipline subordinates who violate the rules of that order, and credibly constrain their own ability to act opportunistically and exploit their subordinates in the future. With great power comes great responsibility.

As a bundle of rights and duties, authority can be expansive, conferring on the ruler the ability to command legitimately a great range of actions on many issues, or limited, granting the ruler only very restricted rights. Totalitarian and liberal democratic states differ profoundly in their authority or the extent to which they can legitimately regulate the possible actions of their citizens. Similarly, states possess and exercise more or less authority over other states, ranging from prohibiting the subordinate from entering preferential agreements with third parties, as in a sphere of influence, or exerting more complete control over their internal affairs, as in an empire.

Hierarchy is defined by the extent of the authority exercised by the ruler over the ruled. The greater the number of possible actions by the ruled that the ruler can legitimately regulate, the more hierarchical is the relationship. In international relations, hierarchy varies across at least two continua of economic and security policy, creating a two-dimensional authority structure that appears to capture the historic forms of what was once called "restricted sov-

ereignty” as well as its contemporary manifestations.²⁵ Indicators of international economic and security hierarchy and patterns of hierarchy since 1950 suggest that the United States is relatively hierarchic over many states in Latin America, especially those on the Caribbean littoral, and somewhat hierarchic over many states in Western Europe and Northeast Asia. Conversely, it has relatively few subordinates in Africa, the Middle East, or the rest of Asia.

Implications of International Hierarchy

After “seeing” hierarchy, international relations looks different. Hierarchy does not eliminate coercion but changes its role and meaning in those international relationships where it exists. Nor does hierarchy imply that relationships between states are equally rewarding or fair for both dominant and subordinate states, as noted in the case of the Dominican Republic. Nonetheless, hierarchy alters the behaviors of dominant and subordinate states and the practice of international relations in important ways.

International hierarchies promote mutual aid between states. Based on a social contract, hierarchy implies rights and duties and, more important in terms of actions, commitments by both dominant and subordinate states to one another. International politics is not strictly a realm of self-help.²⁶ Dominant states protect their subordinates by building a political order in which coercion is relatively rare and come to their aid in countering specific threats or actual violence. The protection provided by the dominant state will not be absolute, except in the most extreme forms of empire. Guarantees of security by a dominant state in which the subordinate nonetheless retains significant autonomy creates a problem of moral hazard, where the subordinate has an incentive to engage in riskier or more aggressive behavior than would otherwise be prudent. Nonetheless, as did the United States throughout the Cold War, the dominant state will provide extended deterrence and generalized defense for its subordinates.

Knowing that they are protected in part by their dominant states, subordinate states will reduce their own defense efforts, increasingly so with greater hierarchy. Since they retain more or less autonomy and do not possess an absolute guarantee from the dominant state to defend them at any cost, most subordinates will still attend to their own defense. Nonetheless, they will exert less

25. For a sampling of works discussing restrictions on sovereignty, see Willoughby and Fenwick 1974; Dickenson 1972; and Reid 1932. Donnelly (2006) resuscitates some of these concepts.

26. On anarchy and self-help, see Waltz 1979. 111.

TABLE 1.1.
Key differences between anarchy and hierarchy for international relations

Anarchy	Hierarchy
Requires self-help	Promotes mutual aid
Requires balancing against powerful states	Induces bandwagoning with dominant state
Increases defense effort	Reduces defense effort
Limits functional differentiation	Encourages functional differentiation
Inhibits trade between states	Promotes trade between states
	Induces acts of symbolic obedience
	Requires disciplining of subordinates
Induces maximization of power and interests	Requires limits on ability to abuse authority

defense effort relative to those states not in a hierarchical relationship. This may appear to be “free riding” or failing to pay one’s fair share of the costs of collective defense—an accusation frequently leveled at America’s subordinates—but this perception crumbles when we ask why any international commitment under anarchy is sufficiently credible that a state would risk placing its security in the hands of another.²⁷ Rather, their lower defense efforts are better understood as the key benefit subordinates receive from having ceded a measure of authority over their security or economic policies to a dominant state.

More generally, subordinates will not balance against their dominant states, choosing instead to bandwagon with them against possible challengers or threats.²⁸ With dominant states having credibly committed to restraints upon their power (see below), subordinates are not unduly threatened by them despite their typically greater coercive capabilities. This helps explain why the countries of Latin America are wary but not especially restive despite the overweening coercive capabilities of the United States, why Western Europe did not pursue a third way during the Cold War, and why a counterbalancing coalition has not arisen against the United States after the collapse of bipolarity.²⁹

27. On free riding in alliances, see Olson and Zeckhauser 1966; Hartley and Sandler 1999; Murdoch and Sandler 1982; and Oneal and Whatley 1996.

28. On the choice to balance or bandwagon with the dominant state, see Walt 1987; Schweller 1994.

29. On the expectation of the reemergence of a balance of power after the Cold War, see Mearsheimer 1990; Mearsheimer 2001; Layne 1993; Waltz 1993; Waltz 2002. For alternative views, see Ikenberry 2002; Mastanduno 2002; Risse 2002; and Walt 2002. Walt 2005 is an extended treatment of this puzzle. More recently, the debate has evolved into whether countries are engaging in “soft balancing” against the United States, which appears to be nearly indistinguishable from international bargaining more generally. See Pape 2005; Paul 2005; Brooks and Wohlforth 2005; Lieber and Alexander 2005.

International hierarchy creates functional differentiation and mutual dependence between states. For neorealists, anarchy necessarily implies functionally undifferentiated units. As Kenneth Waltz writes, "Anarchy entails relations of coordination among a system's units, and that implies their sameness. . . . [S]o long as anarchy endures, states remain like units."³⁰ Yet, in addition to the security dependence of subordinates just explained, hierarchy also breeds proportional security specialization, as in the reliance of Germany and Japan on the nuclear umbrella of the United States, the United States on the United Kingdom for minesweepers during the Cold War, and many states on the "lift" capability of the United States for rapid deployment forces around the globe.³¹ Similarly, reflecting both an enhanced security and the wishes of essentially liberal dominant states, subordinate states are more open to trade and enjoy, by implication, a deeper level of economic specialization and differentiation. Given the possibly greater risks involved in security specialization, economic specialization is likely to be deeper and more important.

To acknowledge and, indeed, demonstrate respect for the authority of their dominant states, subordinates will not only comply with their commands, but also perform symbolic acts of obeisance, such as following their dominant state into war. Similar to various patriotic acts within countries—saluting the flag or standing for the national anthem—acts of symbolic obeisance both affirm individual deference to authority and signal the community of subordinates that others respect that authority. Such acts are usually not very costly, lest actors opt out and thereby undercut their community-affirming role. But some, such as the rush of individuals to join the military in the opening stages of wars, can require substantial individual sacrifice. All such acts, however, are important in both bolstering authority and, for analysts, revealing the authority that might otherwise lay hidden—and increasingly so the more costly the act. Symbolic obeisance can take many forms at the international level. Most important, because they carry the highest potential cost, are decisions to join the dominant state in major conflicts. Even though subordinates may contribute little to the actual fighting, to follow in the wake of a dominant state's declaration of war on some distant country carries some substantial risk. Thus, "following the leader" is an effective and revealing signal of the subordinate's deference to the authority of the dominant state. Symbolic obeisance has no

30. Waltz 1979, 93. For a critique, see Ruggie 1986.

31. Lake 1999a, 47–49. Incomplete specialization in defense is not surprising; even in more hierarchical and well-protected domestic societies with efficient police forces, individuals insure their homes against theft, lock their doors and windows, install house alarms, and even sometimes hire private security forces or live in gated communities.

equivalent in extant theories of international relations, but uncovers a new class of behaviors expected in international hierarchy.

As part of constructing a political order, dominant states discipline wayward subordinates. In equilibrium, both dominant and subordinate states honor the social contract, with the former providing the order demanded by the latter and the latter complying with the rules of that order. At the same time, however, discipline is an inherent element of any authority relationship; it is, in fact, what separates authority most clearly from simple voluntary cooperation. If the rules promulgated by the dominant state constrain subordinates, the latter can be expected to defect when and if they can do so without penalty. In a dynamic and ever-changing world, the social contract is constantly evolving and equilibrium is a moving target. As the social contract is always incomplete, like all contracts, situations will inevitably arise in which the actors disagree over the rules and discipline is needed to bring expectations back into alignment.³² Finally, authority is always the object of political struggle, at least at the margin. Discipline is an inherent part of the broader fight over who has what authority over whom and, indeed, it plays a major role in constituting this authority. In day-to-day interactions, in turn, subordinates will undercomply, perhaps inadvertently, in acts of “everyday” resistance or in open defiance, and dominant states will overreach or ask too much from a subordinate given the social contract.³³ Undercompliance will be punished by dominant states, at least on a probabilistic basis, and overreaching will be resisted by subordinates who can withdraw their legitimacy.

Discipline, of course, is not a category of actions normally associated with relations between states, but it encompasses a wide range of sanctions. Authority is also strongest where discipline is least evident. Thus, while a certain amount of discipline may be necessary to sustain authority relationships, especially in dynamic environments, too much discipline is a sign that the hierarchy is fraying and in danger of collapse. As in the United States and Dominican Republic, discipline is a sign that the relationship is out of equilibrium and is being contested by one or both sides. Nonetheless, recasting dominant-subordinate state interactions as possible discipline sheds new light on some old patterns of international politics. Military intervention, for example, is the most extreme form of punishment available to any dominant state. Although subject to changing justifications over time,³⁴ as would be expected

32. On incomplete contracting, see Williamson 1985.

33. On forms of resistance, see Scott 1985.

34. Finnemore 2003.

as its interests and hierarchies change, the United States is far more likely to intervene militarily in the Caribbean littoral, for instance, than in other regions where it has fewer subordinates. The possible counterargument that the United States has greater interests, more at stake, and a freer diplomatic hand in the region simply remakes this same point.

Dominant states must credibly commit to limit their authority and power. In a wholly anarchic world, self-restraint is an oxymoron.³⁵ In a Hobbesian state of nature, the failure to acquire as much power as possible places a country's security at risk. Yet, in a world of hierarchies, dominant states must demonstrate that they cannot or will not abuse the authority that subordinates have entrusted to them. Subordinates will not enter or remain within a social contract unless they are assured that the authority they grant to the dominant state will not be used against them. Some mechanism of restricting opportunism by dominant states is necessary. This requires that dominant states tie their hands, giving up policies or options they would otherwise have enjoyed, or send costly signals of their benign intent or willingness to act only within the bounds of what their subordinates regard as legitimate.

There are many ways of tying hands or sending costly signals. Great power rivalries and democratic political institutions are two exogenous constraints that naturally tie the dominant state's hands. Competition with other great powers gives subordinates the ability to exit more easily from any abusive relationship. Should a dominant state try to exceed its authority, subordinates can switch their allegiance. This explains why the end of the Cold War has rendered American authority more evident; subordinates are more sensitive to potential opportunism, and the United States itself is less constrained in its actions. Similarly, democratic states are more transparent, may face higher audience costs for renegeing on promises, and have less volatile policies. As more "reliable partners," they are less likely to overstep the boundaries set by their subordinates.³⁶

In addition, dominant states can impose costs on themselves to demonstrate their willingness to abide by the social contract. Multilateralism has been a key signaling mechanism for the United States since 1945.³⁷ By submitting its proposed actions for public scrutiny and debate, the dominant state runs the risk of public disapproval and, thus, revealing to all its lack of international support. This may not prevent a dominant state from taking action, as witnessed in the

35. On maximizing power, see Mearsheimer 2001, 32–36. On self-restraint in international relations, see Ikenberry 2001 and Deudney 2007. On the paradox of too much power, see Hirschleifer 1991 and Durhan, Hirschleifer, and Smith 1998.

36. Fearon 1994; Martin 2000; Schultz 2001. The phrase is from Lipson 2003.

37. Lake 1999a, 217–220; Thompson 2006.

case of the United States and the Iraq War, but it pays a substantial price for this step, as suggested by the frequent charges of “imperialism” against the United States since 2003.³⁸ Likewise, the United States has sunk costs by adopting an explicitly anticolonial stance in world politics. By foregoing opportunities for expansion itself and working to undermine the European empires after 1945, the United States has helped make credible its limited objectives in ruling foreign lands. By supporting anticolonialism and accepting the principle of juridical sovereignty, the United States has made itself a more trustworthy ruler and, paradoxically, rendered its more limited hierarchies even more attractive to potential and actual subordinates. These self-abnegating policies are puzzling unless they are placed within the larger need to build and sustain authority.

International hierarchy does not eliminate international bargaining but displaces it from brute force to the nature and extent of the authority exercised by the dominant state and the rules it imposes. Order limits the freedom of action of subordinates. They are not free to adopt any policy they choose but rather transfer some portion of their sovereignty to the dominant state. The dominant state, in turn, uses its authority to regulate the actions of subordinates in ways that produce a mutually beneficial but not necessarily equitable order. And when subordinates violate the dominant state’s commands, they open themselves to discipline and punishment. As in Hobbes’s account of the escape from the state of nature, freedom from fear requires some loss of freedom of choice. Even as subordinates demand order, they will—as we see in the checkered history of U.S.–Latin American relations—chafe under its restrictions and seek to renegotiate the social contract in ways that preserve the order they enjoy while imposing fewer restraints. Under hierarchy, political struggle shifts from raw interests to debates over rules and rights, which in turn embody or reflect questions of interests. Hierarchy, like all political relations, is always contested terrain.

We have all seen Gestalt shift pictures. In one, we naturally focus on the white outline and observe a goblet, but when we focus on the black outline, we see, often with some initial difficulty, two faces in profile. These “trick” pictures are designed to remind us that our initial perception may not be accurate, that what we observe may actually be more than it might at first ap-

38. Daalder and Lindsey (2003b) observed that the phrase “American empire” had appeared more than one thousand times in news stories between December 2002 and May 2003. A quick look at the current affairs section in any bookstore reveals a shelf of new releases on this theme. For a sampling of this literature, see Bacevich 2002; Calhoun, Cooper, and Moore 2006; Ferguson 2004; Harvey 2003; Hoffmann 2004; Johnson 2004; Lal 2004; Mann 2003; Norton 2004; and Odom and DuJarric 2004.

pear. and that we need to look differently at the world around us. Hierarchy in international relations is like such a picture. We are drawn by our dominant theories to see the international system as an anarchy, a state of nature, a world of self-help. Refocusing on hierarchy, however, alters that perception. States possess and exert authority over other states, they command and receive compliance, and they create political orders with differing roles, responsibilities, and benefits. Seeing hierarchy does not erase the previous vision, just as seeing the faces does not mean that the goblet has literally disappeared. To accept that hierarchy can and does exist within the international system does not negate everything we once knew about world politics. States may still respond to and adjust their defense efforts to the threats they confront. Great powers may still engage in *realpolitik* in their more anarchic relations with each other. But refocusing on hierarchy shows us an alternate, more complex, and less unique political world that affects international politics in profound ways—whether we choose to see it or not.

This book combines a variety of approaches and methods to explicate the concept of hierarchy and its implications for international relations. Chapters 1 and 2 are theoretical, drawing on political philosophy and the sociology of knowledge to explore key assumptions that have guided inquiry in the field of international relations. Chapter 1 develops the concept of relational authority previewed above. In the process, it criticizes the formal-legal approach that dominates the discipline of international relations. Chapter 2 develops the construct of hierarchy that is central to this book. In explicating this concept, I dispute the assumption that sovereignty is indivisible and, drawing on both political thought and practice, show that hierarchy is, indeed, a continuous variable. Chapter 3 operationalizes the concepts of security and economic hierarchy and presents data for the United States on the pattern of authority in the world since 1950. Particular attention is paid to the validity of the indicators and how they differ from measures of coercive capabilities typically used as measures of power in international relations.

The remaining chapters turn to the effects of hierarchy on the international behaviors of dominant and subordinate states. Chapter 4 examines how dominant states create political orders even when it is costly for them to do so, discipline subordinates, and constrain their own freedom of action to commit credibly to subordinates that they will not abuse the authority they have been granted. Chapter 5 focuses on the effects of hierarchy on subordinate states and, in a series of large-*n* statistical tests, finds that they spend a smaller share of gross domestic product (GDP) on their own defense, are more open to trade, and are more likely to join a U.S.-led coalition. The final chapter summarizes the argument and develops its implications for theories of international relations and the future of U.S. foreign policy.

International Authority

The international system is often described as anarchic because it lacks a single, overarching political authority. At the broadest level, this is a truism.¹ But it does not follow from this fact that relationships between units within that system are necessarily anarchic. Indeed, it is a fallacy of division—albeit one commonly made—to infer that since the system is anarchic, all relationships within that system must also be anarchic. Hierarchy does not stop at a nation's borders or, in that famous phrase of foreign policy, “at the water's edge.” Rather, hierarchy between units is consistent with and possible within systemic anarchy.

Scholars of international relations have long relied upon a formal-legal conception of authority that precludes by definition the possibility of hierarchy between states. At best, this formal legal approach is but one possible view of authority. At worst, it is deeply misleading. This chapter develops an alternative, relational conception of authority that is not only more appropriate for the study of international politics, but also allows us to see now-hidden hierarchy between states. I begin with an overview of the concepts of authority, coercion, and power. I then distinguish between formal-legal and relational approaches to authority and their implications for international politics.

Political Authority

Political authority is rightful or legitimate rule.² When political authority is exercised, the ruler, A, commands a set of subordinates, B, to alter their actions,

1. The possible exceptions to this rule may be the ancient Roman and Chinese empires that dominated their known worlds. Even here, however, these civilizations recognized an ungoverned periphery and, indeed, were aware of one another's existence. See Buzan and Little 2000.

2. The literature on authority is substantial. For an introduction to the various approaches and debates, see Simmons 2002. Many of the most useful pieces are reprinted in Raz 1990b.

where command implies that A has the *right* to issue such orders.³ This right, in turn, implies a correlative obligation or *duty* by B to comply, if possible, with A's order. As Richard Flathman observes, "If A has authority X, those persons (B) who are in A's jurisdiction therefore have an obligation or obligations Y."⁴ In short, B "surrenders judgment" and accepts the force of A's command.⁵

B's obligation implies a further correlative right by A to *enforce* its commands in the event of B's noncompliance.⁶ As John Day notes, "those who possess authority in political life, the rulers, are authorized not only to make laws and take decisions, but also to use coercive power when necessary to ensure obedience to those laws and acquiescence in those decisions."⁷ In an authority relationship, individuals choose whether to comply with a ruler's commands, but are bound by the right of the ruler to discipline or punish their noncompliance. Many drivers exceed the speed limit, for instance, but if caught, they accept the right of the state to issue fines or other punishments for breaking the law.

Authority and, specifically, the right to punish noncompliance ultimately rests on the collective acceptance or legitimacy of the ruler's right to rule. As Thomas Hobbes himself recognized, "the power of the mighty (the Leviathan) hath no foundation but in the opinion and belief of the people."⁸ Flathman develops this point more fully, arguing that "sustained coercion is impossible without substantial agreement among the members of the association about those very propositions whose rejection commonly brings coercion into play."⁹ If recognized as legitimate, the ruler acquires the ability to punish individuals because of the broad backing of others. In extremis, an individual may deny

3. Throughout, A will be used to refer to the ruler, B to the ruled or subordinates. Although B is used in the singular, it is always a set of subordinates conceived as individuals as the fundamental units of analysis. Where otherwise unavoidable, I use the gendered pronouns of "she" for A and "he" for B.

4. Flathman 1980, 35.

5. Since authority can only exist between sentient beings who recognize rights and duties, the relationship and ensuing political struggle is often expressed in principles that are independent of specific commands that might be issued by the ruler. Commands may be assessed for whether they meet the conditions of legitimate action by the ruler, but subordinates are not passing judgment on her commands *per se*. See Friedman 1990, 64; Raz 1990a, 125; Finnis 1990, 176.

6. Anscombe (1990, 162) insightfully argues that what is unique to authority is the right to coercion that cannot be possessed by men in the state of nature. Entering an authority relationship, therefore, is not yielding rights to the ruler but the creation of collective rights that cannot otherwise exist.

7. Day 1963, 260.

8. Quoted in Williams 2006, 265.

9. Flathman 1980, 29. On punishment and discipline as both created by and imposed on a community, see also Foucault 1977.

any obligation to comply with A's laws, but if the larger community of which he is part recognizes the force of A's commands and supports A's right to punish him for violating these commands, then that individual can still be regarded as subordinate to and bound by A's authority.¹⁰ Similarly, rulers can enforce specific edicts even in the face of opposition if the general body of commands is accepted as legitimate by a sufficiently large number of the ruled. In both cases, A's capacity to enforce her rule rests on the collective affirmation and possibly active consent of her subjects.¹¹ Because a sufficient portion of the ruled accept the ruler and her edicts as rightful, the ruler can employ force against individual free riders and even dissidents. Knowing that a sufficient number of others support the ruler, in turn, potential free riders and dissidents are deterred from violating the rules, and overt force is rendered unnecessary or, at least, unusual.

In this sense, political authority is never a dyadic trait between a ruler and a single subject, but rather derives from a collective that confers rights upon the ruler. In international relations, and this book, subordinate states are thus appropriately understood as sets of individuals that make up separate collectivities. Recognizing the collective conferral of rights on the ruler helps resolve the apparent contradiction that, from the perspective of a collectivity, compliance with legitimate authority is voluntary, but from the standpoint of any particular individual, compliance is mandatory. Even as individuals obligate themselves to follow the commands of A, they choose collectively whether to accept A's authority.¹² In this way, authority is the bridge between compulsion and choice, the alchemist's dross through which pure coercion is transformed into rightful rule. As Peter Blau clarifies, from the perspective of the collectivity of subordinates, compliance with authority is voluntary, as subjects confer rights on the ruler. But from the standpoint of any individual subordinate, compliance is the result of "compelling social pressures" rooted in that collective practice. As Blau concludes, "the compliance of subordinates in authority relationships is as voluntary as our custom of wearing clothes."¹³

10. Flathman 1980, 30.

11. Bernard 1962, 169; Lasswell and Kaplan 1950, 133. Consent-based theories of authority have been criticized on the grounds that no individual or even no community can reasonably be considered as having "consented" to rule by an on-going and long-lived state. See Green 1990. In my view, however, authority (and legitimacy) is an equilibrium that is produced and reproduced by the actions of ruler and ruled. This need not be the product of conscious intent or consent, of course, but can nonetheless be considered as a form of collective affirmation of the ruler's rights to rule.

12. Day 1963, 268.

13. Blau 1963, 312.

The Political Nature of Authority

Authority is a political construct created and sustained through practice by a ruler and the ruled. This has several noteworthy implications. First, authority is not a claim made by the ruler, but a right granted by the ruled. A does not possess authority unless B acknowledges a duty to comply with A's will.¹⁴ Obedience springs not from A's assertions. Rather, A's ability to expect compliance derives from B's conferral of the right to rule.

Second, authority is not a constant, but a variable that exists in greater or lesser degrees in different times and places. Most important, authority varies in strength, measured by the maximum divergence between A's command and B's preferences under which B will still comply. A is weak when she is limited to willing only that which B would do anyway. A is strong when B is willing to undertake abhorrent actions at A's behest. At the same time, authority is never absolute. There is always some command that A could issue that B would defy. Operationalizing authority, of course, is not easy for reasons that follow from this implication. In equilibrium, A will request only that which she knows B will consent to do; whether B would have wanted to undertake the action anyway, or did so only at A's command, is difficult to discern without an investigation of B's preferences, which are typically hard to uncover.

Third, authority is always a product and site of political struggle as both ruler and ruled contest at the margins the rights and duties and privileges and limits of their relationship. What it means to be authoritative and what rights both the ruler and ruled may legitimately possess is continually negotiated and renegotiated, as suggested by the on-going struggle over reproductive rights even within a well-established legal system such as the United States. Acts of noncompliance by subordinates designed to test the ruler's tolerance, and acts of discipline by the ruler to demarcate those limits, are an inherent part of this struggle. Authority is a dynamic and constantly evolving relationship of domination and subordination.

Finally, the key problem in any hierarchy is limiting abuses of authority by the ruler.¹⁵ Granting authority to the ruler to issue and enforce commands also gives her the ability to use coercion in her own self-interest. For instance, A may decide to coerce B to ensure her hold on office, to extract economic benefits for herself or her principal supporters, or simply for her own, megalomaniacal purposes. Thus, to grant authority to A, B must be relatively con-

14. Bernard 1962, 163–165; Simon 1976, 146. A claim to authority that is not supported by the ruled is sometimes referred to as *de facto authority*. See Raz 1990a, 3. I do not use this term or meaning in this book.

15. Simon 1976, 134.

fidant that the authority conferred will be used appropriately. To receive this grant, therefore, A must commit to limits on her authority that are acceptable and credible to B. Within states, the creation of relatively more democratic institutions that diffuse power and ensure that popular preferences are represented in the policy process is one common method of creating credibility.¹⁶ Between states, democracy within the dominant power and multilateralism abroad have been similarly used to enhance credibility. Nonetheless, limiting potential abuses by the ruler is a necessary and typically first step in any grant of authority. It is this implied self-restraint by the ruler that most clearly separates authority from coercion and legitimate order from pure power politics in international relations.

Authority, Power, and Coercion

Power is the primary medium of international politics. As classically defined by Robert Dahl, power is the ability of A to get B to do something he would otherwise not do.¹⁷ Power derives from many sources and comes in many forms.¹⁸ Authority is simply one form of power.¹⁹ In an authority relationship, A commands B, but B still does something he would otherwise not do. The commonly asserted opposition between power and authority is thus ill-founded.²⁰

What distinguishes authority from other forms of power is not the result—B's compliance—but the mechanism through which power is exercised. In international relations, the analysis of power is typically limited to coercion. In coercion, A threatens or uses violence—the “power to hurt”—to get B to alter his actions.²¹ B may choose to comply with A's demand to avoid pain (threatened violence) or remove it once imposed (actual violence). Indeed, it is precisely A's purpose to alter B's incentives so that he chooses to behave in the manner A directs. The classic example of coercion is the mugger who stops you on a dark street and demands “your money or your life.” The threat (a presumably high cost) is intended to motivate you to part with your wallet (usually a lower cost). Although compliance in the face of threatened force may be wise, no obligation to do so exists. Coercion can fail, obviously, in that A's threats and uses of violence may not always generate compliance by B. A may

16. North and Weingast 1989.

17. Dahl 1957, 202.

18. See Lukes 1977; Barnett and Duvall 2005.

19. Friedman 1990, 59.

20. Among many, see Reus-Smit 2007, 160.

21. Schelling 1966, 2.

not be able to inflict sufficient pain to outweigh B's loss of utility in complying, or she may underestimate B's resolve and not impose a severe enough threat. Similarly, B may fear future demands and choose to resist now rather than later. Finally, A's promise not to impose or to remove the pain may not be credible. Muggers fail to enrich themselves at the expense of their victims for many reasons. Nonetheless, as a general rule, the greater the pain threatened or inflicted by A, the more likely B is to comply with A's demand.

As legitimate power, however, authority is analytically distinct from coercion in the rights and obligations of the parties. Although it may be prudent to comply with the demands of a mugger applying superior force, his demand is not rightful, and you, the victim, have no obligation to hand over your money. Coercion is regarded by neither the perpetrator nor the victim as legitimate. Conversely, we typically recognize that governments have a right to seize a portion of our income or assets as taxes and that we have an obligation to pay. As taxpayers we may complain, seek out loopholes, and begrudge the government its due, but we generally accept the state's claim on our resources. As with the mugger, assets are transferred from taxpayer to the state, but in the case of taxes, the extraction is regarded as rightful or legitimate. It is the duty to comply with the ruler's commands—or, alternatively, the legitimacy of those commands—that renders authority and coercion conceptually distinct.²²

Although distinct, political authority and coercion are intimately related in the use of violence to enforce commands. The capacity for violence, if not actual violence, is necessary to buttress or sustain authority in the face of incentives to flout rules designed to constrain behavior. Even as he recognizes that he should comply with A's edicts, any individual may choose to violate any rule. A duty creates only an expectation of compliance, but this does not produce or require perfect obedience. One can cheat on one's taxes, for instance, without calling into question the government's authority to impose taxes. The obligatory nature of A's command, however, also permits her to punish B for noncompliance, implying that in choosing to violate a command, a subordi-

22. This distinction between authority and coercion is nicely captured in Waltz's first and third dimensions of political structure. The first dimension is the ordering principle, or the way in which the units stand in relation to one another. In Waltz's conception, this refers to the authority relationship between the units, embodied in the difference between hierarchy and anarchy. The third dimension is the distribution of capabilities, often mistaken for the distribution of power. Capabilities matter for Waltz because they create opportunities for coercion. More capable states can impose their will on others, up to and including eliminating states as independent entities; less capable states suffer the will of others (Waltz 1979, 118). Waltz remains true to his realism in emphasizing power, but in a way that is not widely appreciated, his dimensions of political structure are defined by different forms of power.

nate is also choosing to accept the sanction that the ruler may impose. We typically recognize, for instance, that the government has the right to punish us should we fail to pay an appropriate amount of taxes. Given incentives by subordinates not to comply in specific instances, the ruler must use violence to enforce edicts and, by example, to deter defection by other subordinates. Especially in large groups where free riding is likely, violence may be necessary to prevent widespread violation of commands and, thus, the erosion of authority.

Yet, even as authority and coercion are complements over some range, they can be substitutes as well in the short run or when the ruler has exogenous sources of coercive capability. When authority is contested, the ruler may use coercion to attempt to stay in power, employing the proverbial policeman on every corner and informant in every group to deter challengers. This may serve to reinforce authority in the short term by stifling dissent, but ultimately fails as the ruler cannot count on compliance with the taxes or other extractions necessary to sustain the coercive apparatus. Regimes that rely upon coercion at home instead of authority are often called (ironically) *authoritarian* or, more graphically, *tyrannies*.²³ In international relations, states that rely on coercion rather than authority in their relationships with others are often referred to as *imperialist*, reflecting the strategy of rule rather than the fact of one state governing another people.²⁴ In a strategy of imperialism, one state tries to dominate another through force. In this way, imperialism is the international analog to tyranny.

Despite their clear analytic differences, authority and coercion are hard to distinguish in practice. They are deeply intertwined, making it difficult for analysts to conclude whether, in any given instance, a subordinate state followed a dominant state's command out of duty or force. There is no bright line separating these two analytic concepts, and I offer none here. In chapter 3, I operationalize hierarchy and the authority that underlies that variable in ways that aim to capture the legitimacy of an authority relationship between dominant and subordinate states. But even in these measures, authority is buttressed by the capacity for violence. This is not a failure of the analysis or measures but a reflection of the intimate connection between political authority and coercion.

Types of Authority

As rightful rule, all political authority shares the characteristics and implications just described. Authority is a particular form of power in which subordinates grant certain rights to a ruler. Types of authority, in turn, are differentiated by the origin of this grant. The right to rule has been variously understood to derive from the charisma of individual leaders (charismatic authority), tradition that is socially accepted and reproduced through ritualized ceremony (traditional authority), or religious deities (religious authority).²⁵ All have played a role in legitimating political leaders and institutions in different historical moments and continue to play a role in the world today.

In the modern world, however, political authority largely rests on one of two primary foundations: law or, I will argue, a social contract. Formal-legal authority, rooted in juristic theories of the state, is the dominant approach in political science and, especially, international relations. It precludes the possibility of authority by one state over another. Relational authority, derived from a social contract between states, is the primary source of hierarchy in the actual practice of international relations today.

Formal-Legal Authority

In formal-legal authority, A's ability to command B, the community of subordinates, and the willingness of B to comply, follows from the lawful position or office that A holds.²⁶ In this conception, A, the person (or unit) in authority, possesses the right to issue laws and rules due to the office that A occupies and not to any personal qualities that A may possess. Authority does not inhere in A as a person, but in A as an officer. The formal-legal approach implies that "authority can be correctly predicated of A only if there are established rules by virtue of which A has authority."²⁷ In other words, and this is an important point to which I shall return, the formal-legal structure precedes authority and in turn confers authority on its officers. Formal-legal theory is a top-down conception of authority in which law legitimates officers when they act lawfully.²⁸ This view of authority resonates with common experience in

25. On types of authority, see Weber 1978, 31–38, 215–254.

26. This conception of authority is rooted in the work of Max Weber, who referred to it as rational or legal authority. See Weber 1978, 215–226. It was later incorporated into and evolved as the juristic theory of the state.

27. Flathman 1980, 35; see also 17.

28. Lukes (1990, 207) argues that formal-legal conceptions of authority derive almost exclusively from the perspective of the ruler.

institutionalized polities, reflected in expressions of support by citizens for their political leaders even though they may not respect them as individuals.

The formal-legal conception of authority or, more precisely, the absence of formal-legal authority lies at the heart of our prevailing theories of international relations. Political science began to emerge as a distinct discipline around the turn of the twentieth century.²⁹ Not only was the state then regarded as a normative ideal, but it was also the central analytic unit of the positive study of politics.³⁰ The prevailing juristic theory depicted the state as the expression of supreme authority over a territorially delimited political community. So defined, the state was, in turn, regarded as equivalent to a legal person with a will of its own.³¹ This early view of the state heavily influenced the development of key ideas in international relations and enjoyed a more enduring intellectual legacy than in other areas of political science.

Taking the state as the natural embodiment of supreme authority, juristic theory necessarily implied an international realm of formally equal and autonomous states interacting in what was already referred to as an anarchic system.³² As would later analysts, juristic theorists first excluded from the state system those entities that did not fit their definition of a proper state. "Internal anarchies" that lacked a clearly established hierarchy of authority or otherwise failed to conform to the European ideal were considered to be "uncivilized" and thereby outside the international system.³³ Having limited analysis to only those units that could be considered supreme authorities, juristic theorists then treated these primordially given states as equivalent to individuals and understood them to live within a state of nature.³⁴ Building on John Austin's conception of law as "a rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being by an intelligent being having power over him," this approach rejected the possibility of international law or authority more generally, seeing what others considered to be international law as norms or guidelines for behavior, but not "positive law or . . . law strictly so called. . ." Since law could only flow from duly constituted authorities, international law was conceptually impossible.³⁵

29. This discussion draws heavily on the intellectual history of the field by Schmidt 1998; see also Kahler 1997.

30. Schmidt 1998, 69.

31. *Ibid.*, 79, 88.

32. *Ibid.*, 79, 90, 171, 173.

33. *Ibid.*, 148–149.

34. *Ibid.*, 84, 159.

35. Quoted in *ibid.*, 65. Weber shared this view, writing that "as is well known, it has often been denied that international law could be called law, precisely because there is no legal authority above the state capable of enforcing it. In terms of the present terminology this would be correct, for we could not call 'law' a system the sanctions of which consisted wholly in ex-

In its earliest formulation, then, a particular conception of the state led directly to a particular conception of the international system: only duly constituted states were members, and all members were formally equal in a system that lacked any authority.³⁶ Since there is no duly constituted *legal* authority above the state, there could be no authority between states. Thus, even before the school of political realism came to dominate the study of international relations after World War II, the concept of anarchy was already firmly rooted in prevailing theories of world politics.

This formal-legal conception of authority, and the implication that international relations lack authority, are given their most modern and explicit form in the writings of Kenneth Waltz, the founder of the so-called neorealist school. In *Theory of International Politics*, Waltz posits three dimensions of international structure: the ordering principle, the differentiation of the units, and the distribution of capabilities.³⁷ Of these dimensions, only the first bears directly on authority and concerns us here. Emphasizing their formal attributes, Waltz defines the ordering principle by how the units stand in relation to one another. In hierarchic systems, according to Waltz, units "stand vis-à-vis one another in relations of super- and subordination . . . [in which] political actors are formally differentiated according to the degrees of their authority." In such systems, "some are entitled to command, others are required to obey." In anarchic systems, by contrast, "the parts . . . stand in relations of coordination. Formally, each is the equal of all others." Reversing the syllogism, he concludes that "none are entitled to command; none are required to obey."³⁸ Dependent on earlier juristic conceptions of the state in an often unrecognized way, Waltz reaches the same conclusion as earlier formal-legal theorists that the first and most basic dimension of a system is defined by the degree of authority possessed—or not—by the units. States themselves are characterized

pectations of disapproval and of the reprisals of injured parties, which is thus guaranteed entirely by convention and self-interest without the help of a specialized enforcement agency." Weber 1978, 34–35.

36. This juristic view of the state was challenged by the interwar pluralists, who denied the primordial status of states and refused to privilege state authority over that of the many groups that made up society and, in turn, the state itself. This was a radical reorientation that prevailed until the state was "brought back in" during the late 1970s and 1980s. See Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol (1985). Nonetheless, the conception of international relations as an anarchy of formally equal states endured without significant change. Pluralism was primarily a critique of the internal nature of the state, not its external status. Juristic theorists and pluralists clashed over the possibility of international law, with the latter arguing that law could be formed by member groups themselves and, as a result, that international law was possible. But neither school disputed the view that the international system was anarchic and lacked authority. Schmidt 1998.

37. Waltz 1979, chap. 5.

38. *Ibid.*, 81. ■■

by internal hierarchies and, in their relations with one another, external anarchy.

Waltz draws a bright line between domestic and international politics on the basis of their different ordering principles. Stepping back from this line, however, he later acknowledges that "all societies are organized segmentally or hierarchically in greater or lesser degree. . . . One might conceive of some societies approaching the purely anarchic, of others approaching the purely hierarchic, and of still others reflecting specified mixes of the two organizational types." In an important concession, Waltz then implies that variations in authority relationships can and possibly do exist within the international system. Nonetheless, Waltz returns to an absolutist view and concludes that "although . . . pure orders do not exist, to distinguish realms by their organizing principles is nevertheless proper and important."³⁹ Waltz justifies this line between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy, despite the intermediate cases he acknowledges, by defining the latter as holding only at the level of great powers, analytically equivalent to the distinction between civilized and uncivilized states drawn by earlier theorists. Recognizing that other types of units or actors might exist, he notes that "international structures are defined in terms of the primary political units of an era, be they city states, empires, or nations" and that "states are not and never have been the only international actors. But then structures are defined not by all of the actors that flourish within them but by the major ones." He concludes that "so long as the major states are the major actors, the structure of international politics is defined in terms of them."⁴⁰ Following this same logic, therefore, even if some non-anarchic relations exist, they are largely inconsequential and safely ignored. Throughout his analysis, international politics are defined by the great powers who clearly interact with one another on the basis of anarchy; therefore, in Waltz's widely shared view, the system is anarchic. Relying on a formal-legal conception, international relations thus rejects the concept of authority as "inappropriate to an international setting."⁴¹

Although perhaps useful for analyzing established domestic hierarchies, a formal-legal conception of authority is of dubious utility for the study of international relations.⁴² In the first instance, it contains an internal contradiction, and in the second, it produces misleading implications.

Despite its debt to Hobbes, formal-legal theory founders on how author-

39. *Ibid.*, 114–115.

40. *Ibid.*, 91, 93–94.

41. Clark 2005, 11.

42. For a similar critique of formal-legal authority in international relations, see Onuf and Klink 1989.

ity emerges from the state of nature. If political authority derives from lawful office, law must precede authority. But if political authority creates law, then authority must precede lawful office. In building the preconditions necessary to transcend the state of nature, we cannot conceive of law without authority or authority without law. Like the joke about which came first, the chicken or the egg, we are left with a conundrum, the only correct answer to which is "neither" or "both emerged simultaneously." Even if a formal-legal conception is useful once authority is created, such an approach cannot explain its own creation. The origins of authority, therefore, must rest on something other than a formal-legal order.

The misleading implication, in turn, is that absent a formal-legal structure, there can be no authority. If the previous conclusion is correct, this implication must be false. That is, if a formal-legal structure is necessary for authority, then that formal-legal structure itself could never come into existence. It must, therefore, be possible for authority to exist independently from any formal-legal structure. This has significant repercussions for the prevailing view of anarchy in international relations. In the standard argument, since there is no international formal-legal order to confer authority on any state, there can be no authority between states—the system, therefore, must be anarchic, as are all the relationships between units within it. But if authority cannot derive from a formal-legal order in the first instance, it must be that authority is compatible with or at least can arise in the state of nature with or before the formal-legal order. This does not necessarily imply that there *is* authority in the international system, only that there *can* be authority in such realms. We should not leap too quickly from the state of nature to international anarchy.

Relational Authority

Social contract theories contain within them a second conception of authority in which legitimacy follows not from the office of the ruler, but from an exchange or bargain between ruler and ruled.⁴³ Relational authority is premised

43. The notion of a social contract is questioned by political theorists on the grounds that in long-lived polities we cannot reasonably treat subjects as having consented to the authority of the ruler. I use the term here only in its positive sense of theorizing an exchange between ruler and ruled. On positive social contract theories, see Auster and Silver 1979; Barzel 2002; Levi 1988, 1997; North 1981; and Olson 2000. For recent extensions of this approach, see Lake 1992; Lake and Baum 2001; Baum and Lake 2003; Timmons 2004; Gilley 2006a; Hechter 2006; Levi and Sacks 2006. For an application to empires, see Barkey 2008. In addition, social contract theories of authority (often implicit) predominate in archeology and anthropology. See Diehl 2000; Earle 1997; Feinman and Marcus 1998. On contact era Melanesia, see Godelier and Strathern 1991; Sahlins 2000. On early America, see Redmond 1998. On Mesopotamia, see Mann 1986, esp. 146–155.

on an exchange between ruler and ruled in which A provides a political order of value to B sufficient to offset the loss of freedom incurred in his subordination to A, and B confers the right on A to exert the restraints on his behavior necessary to provide that order. In equilibrium, a ruler provides just enough political order to gain the compliance of the ruled to the taxes and constraints required to sustain that order, and B complies just enough to induce A to actually provide it. A gets a sufficient return on effort to make the provision of political order worthwhile, and B gets sufficient order to offset the loss of freedom entailed in consenting to A's authority. If A extracts too much or provides too little order, B can withdraw his compliance, and A's authority evaporates. In this way, relational authority, contingent on the actions of both the ruler and ruled, is an equilibrium produced and reproduced through on-going interactions.

Political order, defined in the introduction as the protection of persons, property, and promises, is a prerequisite for investment and other economic activities.⁴⁴ The "rule of law" is now recognized as a fundamental determinant of economic development.⁴⁵ At the level of individuals, political order produces large externalities. That is, the security of persons, property, and promises—and the prosperity that follows from such protections—are partially nonexcludable and non-rival in consumption within a given territory. As a result, individuals will typically seek to free ride on the efforts of others, purely voluntary efforts will produce less political order than desired, and the net outcome will be collectively suboptimal.⁴⁶

Despite the suboptimality of voluntary efforts, political order does not necessarily require an "orderer," an entity responsible for producing that pattern of activity. Hedley Bull argues that the society of states, even under anarchy, produces a rudimentary order.⁴⁷ And as a generation of research has shown, cooperation is clearly possible between formally equal actors both within and between states.⁴⁸ Hierarchy is not a prerequisite for political order. Nonetheless, hierarchy is generally a more efficient mechanism for producing order. Because holders of political authority can legitimately use violence to enforce rules, such actors are uniquely adapted to solve collective action problems. They can extract taxes, labor, or other resources necessary to pay for the production of political order and limit behaviors by individuals that would weaken that order. This can be done directly by the ruler. Alternatively, the ruler can produce order indirectly through what is commonly referred to as *leadership*.

44. On political order as a prerequisite, see Olson 2000.

45. For a review of this growing literature, see Carothers 1998.

46. On theories of externalities, see Olson 1965; Cornes and Sandler 1986.

47. Bull 1977.

48. Ostrom 1990; Oye 1985; Smdal 1985.

Rulers may not actually defend property rights themselves, for instance, but they may facilitate the organization of property holders to defend their own rights. As long as rulers are consequential for resolving such collective action problems, they can still be credited by the ruled with fulfilling their part of the social contract.⁴⁹ In turn, because the ruled anticipate the suboptimality of strictly voluntary provision, they grant authority to the ruler necessary to solve the free-rider problem and agree, through practice, to the extractions and constraints imposed by that ruler. It is the ability to use violence legitimately that makes the modern state so effective in producing political order on a large scale, and it is this same force that makes hierarchy between states viable and possibly even attractive.

THE SELF-ENFORCING CONTRACT Relational authority between ruler and ruled is a self-enforcing contract. Political order is the glue that binds ruler and ruled in an authority relationship. Without the desired political order, the ruled have no reason to subordinate themselves to the commands of the ruler. Without the compliance of the ruled, the ruler lacks the means to produce order.

This self-enforcing contract or equilibrium in turn becomes more robust as members of the community of subordinates are vested in the existing political order or acquire assets that are themselves specific to the particular order obtained. Actors acquire a wide variety of assets in everyday life, both at the individual and state levels. Individuals buy property, pursue an education, develop specialized knowledge and skills suited to particular occupations, and save for retirement. States invest in infrastructure, specialize in different industries or economic sectors, and develop the ability to project violence to some areas of the world (and not others). Some assets will be generic, easily switched with little loss in value from one use or regime to another. Other assets will be highly specific to a particular authority relationship and the policies it produces, and they can be redeployed to other uses or used under alternative regimes only with substantial loss in value.⁵⁰ As actors invest in relationally specific assets, they become dependent on the authority structure that produces a particular order and in turn acquire incentives to support the ruler and suppress possible dissidents who would overturn it. In this way, the ruled—as a community vested in a particular order and relationship—further legitimates the ruler's authority. Hierarchy becomes more robust—more legitimate—as subordinates acquire more assets that are dependent on that authority.

49. Blau 1964, 213–215.

50. On asset specificity, see Williamson 1975, 1985. On the role of specific assets in international hierarchy, see Lake 1999a.

Within the United States, for instance, farmers have considerable clout within Congress because of their broad geographic dispersion. They are also dependent on government subsidies. If these socially inefficient subsidies were withdrawn, crop prices would fall, land values would decline, and some now-poorer farmers would be forced to shift to new occupations and acquire new skills and assets. To forestall the decline in the values of their human and physical capital, farmers fight hard to maintain their current subsidies and would fight even harder to preserve their representation in Congress, were it ever challenged. Similarly, groups within countries dependent on international trade have vested interests in continued international leadership by the United States as embodied in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The rules governing international trade were initially set by the United States in consultation with its subordinates in Western Europe and Latin America.⁵¹ The United States also took the lead in liberalizing trade within these rules. As free trade grew and prior systems of imperial preferences and protectionism were dismantled, economic actors in all member states gradually accommodated their strategies and investments to the new world of open markets. As trade was reallocated on the basis of comparative advantage, exporters expanded, importers fought rearguard actions but ultimately shrank economically and politically, and multinational corporations arose to capture the economies of scale and lower transactions costs made possible by economic openness. As economic assets were redeployed from comparatively disadvantaged to comparatively advantaged sectors within each country, and as corporations disaggregated their production chains and spread them across the globe, opponents of free trade within countries grew weaker and proponents of openness grew stronger, reinforcing the policy of free trade and, in turn, the international rules that produced that policy.⁵² Economic nationalism continues to arise in specific cases and industries. The mass-based antiglobalization protests of the late 1990s highlighted a potential backlash against open markets more generally. Yet, globalization appears to be accelerating and gaining political momentum not

51. Of the eighteen states that had joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade by the end of 1948, all were in North America, Western Europe, or South America, or were former American or British colonies. By the end of the third round of negotiations in 1953, when the organization and its rules had crystallized, the pattern was essentially the same, with the exceptions of Indonesia (a former Dutch colony) and Turkey. On the evolution of the international trade regime, see Barton et al. 2006.

52. On the purging of import-competing interests, see Hathaway 1998. On the growing presence of exporters, see Desler and Odell 1987; Milner 1988. As technology continues to evolve, the reallocation of assets through comparative advantage is always a dynamic process that continuously leaves some newly disadvantaged sectors or firms in its wake, implying that universal free trade coalitions will be very rare.

because of any natural law, like gravity, but because economic actors across the globe have become vested in the continued openness of international markets.

This self-enforcing contract, however, is vulnerable to two kinds of strategic miscalculations. The ruled, B, can demand more autonomy than warranted given the benefits of the political order received from A. Subordinates will always probe the limits of authority in seeking to expand their range of free choice. Such undercompliance is most likely, perhaps, when A's authority is naturalized or taken for granted by B—when it is legitimate!—and B fails to appreciate its dependence on the political order produced by A. In this case, the ruler is confronted by rule violations, insubordination, or possibly even defiance; A will either discipline B to restore its rule or eventually reduce the extent of the order it provides. For instance, as described in the introduction, the United States punished the Dominican Republic in 1961 and again in 1965 for threatening to leave its informal empire. The problems of insubordination and discipline are discussed at greater length in chapter 4.

Alternatively, the ruler can overreach by asserting rights that are not accepted as legitimate by subordinates.⁵³ In this case, A believes it possesses greater authority than it does. B can choose not to comply with A's illegitimate commands or more actively resist, often leading to the withdraw of legitimacy and the unravelling of the relationship. Particularly dangerous, overreaching by A signals to others that it cannot be trusted to abide by its authority contract and may prompt subordinates to withdraw their compliance more generally. When A overreaches or asserts authority that is not accepted by subordinates, it can either back down, revealing itself as a paper tiger, or try to enforce its will through coercion, which is costly. In either case, A reveals itself to be a tyranny or imperialist. It is now clear that President George W. Bush overreached in invading Iraq, failing to earn the support of the Iraqi people and creating widespread fears elsewhere over American imperialism.⁵⁴

In all authority relationships, vested interests form a shock absorber, if you will, that cushions the parties from strategic mistakes. In subordinates, vested interests will act to restrain insubordination and defiance and attempt to prevent possible breaks in relations that would otherwise lead to significant disorder. If a ruler overreaches, vested interests will press for renewed restraint. Nonetheless, authority is always fragile, subject to disruption from above and below.

53. Overreaching by dominant states is similar but not identical to the idea of imperial overstretch in which a great power expands beyond the point where its marginal returns equal its marginal costs. See Kennedy 1987; Snyder 1991.

54. On overreaching in Iraq and the failure to consolidate support within the country, see Allawi 2007; Chandrasekaran 2006; Packer 2005; and Ricks 2006.

Once lost, authority is hard to regain. If subordinates withdraw their support from the ruler, they no longer accept the previous authority contract or do not believe the ruler will abide by that contract. The ruler must, as a result, work harder to rebuild the order on which authority rests, if it has frayed, or to restore confidence in its willingness to live within the limits of the contract, if it has overreached. The first task is directly costly. The second requires that the ruler bind itself even more tightly to convince subordinates that it can be trusted with the authority they grant it. Both make hierarchy less valuable to the ruler and, therefore, less likely to be pursued.

CUI BONO? RELATIONAL AUTHORITY AS POLITICAL STRUGGLE In equilibrium, both ruler and ruled must benefit from a relational authority contract. The ruler benefits from the political order herself, but pays the costs of providing that order. The subordinates benefit from order and the greater prosperity it generates, but give up some measure of autonomy and accept commands to act in ways they otherwise would not choose. The ruler must gain sufficiently to offset the costs of providing order. The ruled must find that political order provides greater net benefits than their next best alternative, which following standard international relations theories can be presumed to be an anarchic relationship in which persons, property, and promises are insecure and wholly dependent on self-help.⁵⁵

That both actors benefit, however, does not mean that each is as well off as it might be in some ideal world. The authority exercised by the ruler is not necessarily optimal from the point of view of the dominant or subordinate parties. A single ruler who creates a uniform political order for all might be superior to multiple rulers directing competing orders, or it might not, especially if the ruler is insufficiently accountable. Yet, optimality is not required. For relational authority to be an equilibrium, all that is necessary is that the exchange leave both ruler and ruled better off than in their next best alternative.

It is also not required nor implied that ruled and ruler benefit equally from the relationship. In some cases, the subordinates may be able to exploit the ruler and extract a disproportionate share of the joint benefits created by order—the proverbial strong power of weak allies.⁵⁶ But more frequently, the ruler

55. Dworkin (1990, 221) criticizes the assumption that authority is justified by comparison to life in the state of nature. In his view, it is “too easy to satisfy” this condition and therefore “justifies too much.” Yet, it is precisely this weak condition that many attribute to international relations. I consider alternative conceptions of the state of nature in chapter 4 in assessing the value of hierarchy for states.

56. Keohane 1971. This is most likely when appropriate quasi-rents favor the subordinate party. See Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978.

will use her ability to set the rules to bias the political order toward her own interests. The power to write rules has been long recognized as an awesome power, and it may be one of the most important benefits of being in authority. Indeed, at the extreme, the ruler may skew the rules to such an extent that subordinates are indifferent to either remaining in the hierarchy or reverting back to anarchy, although most rulers likely value future gains sufficiently not to push subordinates toward such fragile, knife-edge equilibria that can be easily perturbed by exogenous shocks. The bias in the ruler's favor is ultimately constrained only by the willingness of the ruled to comply with her commands. As already suggested in the case of U.S.-Dominican relations discussed in the introduction, nothing in a relational conception of authority implies that hierarchy is "fair" or equitable or that fairness is a requirement for legitimacy.⁵⁷ Again, all that is necessary is that both parties be marginally better off under hierarchy than in the anarchic state of nature they would otherwise inhabit.

But because orders are not all created equal and possess different distributional implications, ruler and ruled will continuously struggle over the nature, meaning, and limits of the authority possessed by the former and conferred by the latter. Even within a robust authority relationship with significant vested interests supporting it, ruler and ruled will dispute the nature of the political order produced, especially the distribution of its benefits, and the limitations on the subordinates that are necessary to the production and reproduction of that order. Authority is always contested terrain. How much protection of persons, property, and promises is the dominant state to provide? Which persons, property, and promises are to be protected? What restrictions on individual autonomy or national sovereignty are necessary to provide this order? These are the issues likely to divide ruler and ruled within any authority relationship premised on a social contract.

RELATIONAL AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Although the hegemony of formal-legal theory has largely prevented analysts from describing states as authoritative, scholars have certainly recognized traces of relational authority in international relations. This recognition is embodied in several theories of international relations. Standard accounts of decolonization, for instance, typically emphasize the changing social contract between an imperial metropole and its subordinates. In the American Revolution, for example, the initial radicalization of the colonists is commonly attributed to Britain's over-

57. Work on the psychology of legitimacy, which emphasizes notions of fairness, would disagree. See Tyler 1990; Tyler 2001. But nearly all of the empirical work in this approach has been done in settings with a secure political order.

reaching in its attempts to shift the burden of defending North America onto the colonists' shoulders.⁵⁸ Similarly, the postwar decolonization movement is often attributed to the Great Depression and World War II, which led to a substantial reversal in the flow of benefits produced by the British empire: not only did Britain fail to defend its colonies in Asia from Japan, but it also called upon its colonies for over five million troops to fight in Europe.⁵⁹ To maintain their support, Britain was forced to offer ever greater concessions to its colonies, including promises of eventual independence.

More subtle traces of relational authority have also been observed in other, nonimperial relationships between states. Although not linked directly to authority and hierarchy as here, hegemonic stability theory also posits a social contract in which the hegemon is understood to produce an international order—the *Pax Britannica* or *Pax Americana*—that is either based on or leads to policies of economic openness and interstate peace that benefit all or most states.⁶⁰ Power transition theory also posits that powerful states secure their positions over others by providing an international order in which “everyone comes to know what kind of behavior to expect from others, habits and patterns are established, and certain rules as to how these relations *ought* to be carried on grow to be accepted by all the parties.”⁶¹ John Ikenberry develops a similar intuition about hegemonically produced orders in his concept of international “constitutional orders,” as does Michael Mandelbaum in his “case for Goliath.”⁶² Joseph Nye captures elements of authority in his concept of “soft power,” which by its charismatic qualities draws people into wanting to follow a leading state.⁶³ Even realists such as Stephen Walt recognize that legitimate power is often more effective than coercion and that it rests in part on its “positive consequences” for other states.⁶⁴ It would be odd indeed if re-

58. Historically, Britain had provided the public good of security to the American colonies largely at its own expense. After defeat in the Seven Years War led France to cede Quebec to Britain and to stop aiding Native Americans in their wars with the settlers, Britain attempted to force the colonies to contribute to the costs of their own protection. In other words, at the precise historical moment when that protection was no longer demanded by the colonists, Britain decided to charge them for it. On the changing bargain between England and its colonies, see Tucker and Hendrickson 1982 and Cook 1995.

59. Ferguson 2002, 304, 341. For recent histories of the British empire in India that focus on this changing contract, see James 1994; James 1997.

60. Gilpin 1981, 30–31, comes closest to my formulation. Without explicating the foundations of authority or its implications for international relations theory, he nonetheless introduces the concept, redefines it as prestige, and then equates prestige to a reputation for power.

61. Organski 1968, 354; italics in original.

62. Ikenberry 2001; Mandelbaum 2005.

63. Nye 2002, 8–12.

64. Walt 2005, 160–178, esp. 163–166.

lational authority is as important for international relations as I claim and no one has touched upon this in past analyses. But even as they grasp part of the concept, few analysts link their arguments explicitly to the concept of authority and its practice in international relations.

It is perhaps not entirely surprising that contemporary observers would fail to see fully the nature and extent of international authority. Today's hierarchies are more constrained or attenuated than in the past and thus more easily overlooked. In defense of their hard-won independence, developing countries have wielded principled ideas of human equality and juridical sovereignty to both express their opposition to external authority and, in turn, to shape directly the political terrain on which hierarchies continue to be negotiated. Developing states have succeeded in delegitimizing the concepts of empire and hierarchy such that these phrases are now seldom used in political discourse. Analysts have bought into the myth of Westphalian sovereignty (see chapter 2), reinforcing this trend. These principled ideas and the movements they embody undoubtedly serve to limit the extent of modern international hierarchies. They have not, however, led to the demise of all forms of international hierarchy and, paradoxically, may even make more limited hierarchies more attractive and credible. Hierarchy is a dynamic, evolving relationship, not a static institution frozen at some prior moment of creation.

The benefits of the social contract continue to exert a strong pull on states to yield some measure of sovereignty to gain protection for their persons, property, and promises. As President Charles de Gaulle of France remarked to his aide in the early 1960s, "Western Europe has become, without even being aware of it, a protectorate of the Americans. It is now necessary to free ourselves of this domination. But the difficulty in this case is that the colonies are not really trying to emancipate themselves."⁶⁵ An opinion poll in the Dominican Republic taken in the fall of 1965, after the invasion, indicated that 64 percent of the population viewed the intervention by the United States positively.⁶⁶ In exchange for defending the kingdom against a possible Iraqi invasion, Saudi Arabia became a protectorate of the United States during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Similarly, the countries of Eastern Europe have encouraged the United States to build military bases on their territories to insure them against a renewed and potentially more threatening Russian imperialism, even as they recognize that integration into American-led orders will restrict their foreign policy autonomy and sovereignty and perhaps even

65. Quoted in James 2006, 67–68.

66. Crandall 2006, 92.

force them to join the United States in conflicts, like the 2003 Iraq War, they could otherwise avoid (see chapter 5).

On this contested political terrain, countries in the developing world have successfully carved out greater realms of autonomous policy over the last six decades than had previously been thought possible. Potentially subordinate states have intentionally promoted the liberal principle of human equality to delegitimize direct “foreign” rule. European empires were long based, and even justified, on a norm of racial inequality. Taking up the “white man’s burden,” Europeans denied the natural rights of people of color, who were perceived as technologically, economically, or culturally inferior to the civilizations of the more advanced West. This “principled” imperialism was especially strong in the late nineteenth century, when social Darwinism predominated and Christian missionaries relayed tales of primitive tribes back to their congregations to build support for their activities. Although the norm of racial inequality was never accepted as deeply by subordinate peoples as by their imperial masters, of course, the Europeans nonetheless obtained a measure of legitimacy that permitted them to subjugate people around the globe between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries. Although hard to see when viewed through contemporary lenses, only with the legitimacy granted by a collective to a dominant state could Britain have ruled all of South Asia, for instance, with a mere 75,000 troops (in 1898).⁶⁷ This is not to blame the victim, but only to acknowledge that the European empires rested at least partially on beliefs of racial inequality that were internalized by dominant and subordinate peoples alike.

These beliefs, however, were assaulted by reformers in the imperial states and indigenous elites over the course of the nineteenth century. In the struggle against slavery, reformers promoted the liberal notion of human equality, arguing that no person had the right to subjugate another. With abolition, this same idea was taken up by critics of empire and, more important, indigenous elites.⁶⁸ With the principle of human equality central to political structures in the dominant states, especially with the advent of democratization, and to relations between states themselves (see below), when subordinate peoples began denouncing empire on the grounds that it violated the equality of all humans, they were pushing on a door already opened by prior and broadly accepted liberal principles.⁶⁹

67. Ferguson 2002, 245. There were 41,000 troops elsewhere in the empire.

68. Crawford 2002, esp. chap. 7.

69. On the importance of liberal norms of human equality, see Keck and Sikkink 1998, 27. On how the fit between new and existing norms facilitates emergence, see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 897.

The norm of racial inequality has now been broadly rejected and with it the moral foundations of empire. What was once legitimate and acceptable is now deemed illegitimate and offensive. Although some dependencies continue to ratify their subordination through popular referenda, such as the United States's possession of Puerto Rico, it is increasingly difficult to justify external rule.⁷⁰ Full empires similar to those of the nineteenth century are now at least morally suspect.

Potentially subordinate states have also employed the liberal principle that all humans are inherently equal to promote the idea that all states are formally equal or sovereign. This link has long intellectual roots. Writing in 1758, Emerich de Vattel drew an analogy between individuals and states and argued that if individuals in the state of nature have certain natural rights and are therefore equal before the law, then states in the same original condition must also possess natural rights and stand in relationships of strict equality. In a highly evocative phrase, Vattel asserted that "a dwarf is as much a man as a giant is; a small republic is no less a sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom."⁷¹ With equal rights under international law, no matter how weak or powerful they might be, Vattel concluded that all states are therefore formally equal. Vattel's ideas became central to modern notions of international legal or juridical sovereignty.⁷² This view ultimately led to the concept of national self-determination, introduced by President Woodrow Wilson at the Paris Peace Conference at Versailles following World War I and later codified into the United Nations Charter.⁷³

The concept of sovereignty, born with the modern state, has always been a political project used for political ends. Jean Bodin, Hobbes, and other early theorists asserted the principle of sovereignty in the midst of profound conflict and, eventually, transformation. They wrote, in part, to justify the creation of a central authority in the wake of internal unrest and, in the case of England, civil war. They also wrote at the dawn of modernity to legitimate and propagate a centralized secular state against the internal remnants of feudalism

70. Puerto Rico has had three local plebiscites in recent decades to decide between pursuing independence, enhanced commonwealth status, or statehood within the United States. The status quo of continued commonwealth status has won in narrow votes against statehood. The number of supporters for complete independence remains small, varying between 3 and 5 percent of all voters.

71. In Brown, Nardin, and Rengger 2002, 322–323. On Vattel's conception, see Goebel 1923; Dickenson 1972; Hinsley 1986. Where Grotius and earlier theorists argued that states had equal status in international law, Vattel was the first to claim that states possessed equal rights. Efrain 2000, 66, 69.

72. Krasner 1999, 14–20.

73. United Nations Charter, chap. 1, art. 2 § 1.

and the external vestiges of the universal church. It was their experience and their fervent hope that centralized and ultimate authorities would bring stability and order to their world. In this way, the principle of sovereignty that these early thinkers developed—and that we have largely inherited—was never meant as a description of practice nor as a foundation for a positive theory of international politics but rather as a normative ideal in the service of the project of state building. Today, the principle of juridical sovereignty is likewise asserted by fragile states against the vestiges of colonialism. Just as the early European states had to be consolidated in the face of competing feudal and religious loyalties, so these new states use the idea of sovereignty in an attempt to overcome the continuing allegiances and authority of former colonial rulers.⁷⁴ Sometimes lacking the ability to govern their territories effectively, a traditional requirement for recognition by other sovereign states, these “quasi-states,” as Robert Jackson terms them, cling to and promote the notion of juridical sovereignty to justify their rule.⁷⁵

Where subordinates have met with some success in delegitimizing empire, they have had far less success in promoting practice consistent with the positive principle of juridical sovereignty. As Stephen Krasner shows, this principle is often breached by dominant or formerly dominant states seeking to preserve their authority.⁷⁶ Great powers routinely ignore the principle of equality when it serves their interests. Despite vigorous and repeated assertions by the smaller powers of the principle of formal equality, the great powers have insisted upon and won extraordinary rights of decision making within the United Nations and many other international bodies.⁷⁷ Even while proclaiming that the various charters are based on sovereign equality and pledging to consult with all members, the great powers have either restricted the participation and voting of lesser states or insisted upon a veto over any significant policy decisions. Current debates over principles such as the “responsibility to protect” reflect continuing challenges to the notion of sovereign equality.⁷⁸

It is quite likely that the United States would today rule more fully and directly over its subordinates if empire were not illegitimate and support for the principle of sovereign equality were not so strong. But it does not follow from

74. The principle of sovereignty is also promoted in a nationalist project as an counterpoise against tribal, group, clan, or other sub- or transnational loyalties.

75. Jackson 1990. See also Herbst 2000; Boone 2003.

76. Krasner 1999; Krasner 2001. Dickenson (1972, 221–279) provides a detailed summary of the many ways in which the principle of equality has been abridged.

77. Simpson 2004, chaps. 4–7.

78. Evans and Sahnoun 2001.

these constraints on international authority that hierarchies are impossible or that all relationships between states are necessarily anarchic. Indeed, the practical effect of these changes in principled ideas may be to promote "lighter" or less extensive forms of hierarchy that actually encourage more states to yield some degree of sovereignty to another.

Given the still tenuous status of the principle of sovereign equality, the expectation that normative hostility will lead to the end of international hierarchy rests entirely on the assumption that dominant states cannot adapt their policies, but there is no particular reason to believe this is so. To gain the same degree of hierarchy as in the past, dominant states can in principle offer potential subordinates a more attractive social contract, including both a more secure and equitable political order. To attract subordinates, in other words, dominant states can provide better protection for persons, property, and promises and create and enforce rules less biased toward their own interests. In practice, this reduces the net benefits to the dominant state and implies that at the margin, they will pursue less hierarchical relationships than in the past. Yet, as suggested by Gier Lundestad's description of postwar American foreign policy as an "empire by invitation," this does not imply that the United States or other potentially dominant states will forgo all hierarchies, only that they will take a lighter or more attractive form than in the past.⁷⁹

In turn, by rendering claims to limited rule more credible, the new hostility to international authority may actually enhance the ability of dominant states to form limited hierarchies. As discussed above, one of the key concerns in establishing any authority relationship is limiting the potential for future opportunism by the ruler. As discussed in chapter 4, the United States has effectively used its own anticolonial stance to signal its limited ambition to govern other countries. Perhaps more confident that small grants of authority will not be used to carve out greater authority in the future, subordinates may now be more willing to enter limited hierarchies in which only some, partial sovereignty is transferred to the dominant state. We should not infer conclusions about the prevalence of hierarchy in the contemporary world from the presence of hostile principles. Norms of human equality and principles of juridical sovereignty may serve to limit the extent of hierarchy, but these same factors may have the effect of making more limited forms even more attractive than in the past.

RELATIONAL AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS A focus on relational authority suggests that the primary difference between do-

79. Lundestad 1990.

mestic and international politics is not the nature of authority or the origins of legitimacy, but the extent of hierarchy and, in turn, the depth of the vested interests that support that hierarchy. States normally exert a greater degree of authority domestically over their citizens in more policy areas than does one state internationally over another. Although there is variation in both domestic and international hierarchies, even in the most libertarian societies where citizens have a large sphere of private action, state authority is likely to be greater than the authority exerted by, say, the United States over the Dominican Republic.⁸⁰ Only in the great empires of the past was international authority likely as extensive as present-day domestic authority. It is important to note that these are assessments of degree, not kind.

In turn, the interests that are vested in domestic hierarchies are greater than those vested in international hierarchies.⁸¹ Simply, more groups have more at stake in their relationships with their governments than with their dominant states, and they can be expected to fight harder to preserve their domestic contracts than they will their international authority contracts. International hierarchy, as a result, is generally less robust politically than most domestic hierarchies. With fewer and less-intense supporters, international authorities can be more easily challenged and changed. This is not to suggest that international hierarchies are not legitimate: international hierarchies are likely to matter more than anarchic international institutions, increasingly so as the degree of hierarchy increases. As hierarchies, dominant states do exercise (more or less) authority over subordinate states and will eventually create interests vested in the relationship.

Since there are typically fewer or less-deeply vested interests in international hierarchies than domestic hierarchies, however, authority between states is more fragile and fluid than authority within states. International legitimacy must be carefully nurtured and protected if it is to endure. If lost, legitimacy can be restored only with substantial effort. In most cases, the relationally

80. Of course, we lack a metric for making precise comparisons here. This assessment is impressionistic.

81. It is in this sense that international institutions—typically taken to be anarchic in the extant literature—“matter” less than domestic institutions, a subject of much debate and prior analysis. See Martin and Simmons 1998. As anarchic institutions that exercise little authority over states, most international organizations create fewer vested interests and, in turn, weaker constituencies. With few supporters, these institutions can be more easily cast off or changed, and thus actors have little incentive to invest in assets that depend on the persistence of those institutions and their corresponding policies. There is a strong catch-22 at work here. Anarchic institutions exerting little authority do not develop strong vested interests and are, thus, easy to change; since the institutions are easy to change, actors do not invest in assets that are specific to that relationship. As a result, under anarchy, politics is often generic, lacking actors who have strong interests in any particular institution.

specific assets that create vested interests do not depreciate or lose all value immediately. Even as these assets are less valuable in some new set of relationships, or even in anarchy, they can regain at least some of their former value by a return to the status quo ante. Thus, vested interests will continue to advocate for the *ancien régime* even in the face of change. Fifty years after Castro's revolution, for instance, Cuban émigrés in the United States continue to support the overthrow of the regime and advocate a restoration of the American-dominated informal empire under which their agro-exporting and capitalist forefathers prospered. Vested interests can remain a potent force in politics for a long time. Nonetheless, the fewer vested interests in international hierarchies relative to domestic hierarchies makes the former less robust and more easily broken than the latter.

It is also easier and more likely for dominant states to overreach in their relations with subordinates than it is for states to overreach in their relations with their citizens. As a result, strategic miscalculations are more frequent in international than domestic politics, also rendering international authority more fragile and transient.

Most modern states are dependent upon their citizens for the resources necessary to produce the political order central to the authority contract and to discipline members should they fail to comply. In the exchange of order for support, a large measure of what it means to comply is to pay the taxes necessary for the state to carry out the business of rule. This was not always so, of course, and does not always hold today. In feudal systems, for instance, the king often had weak powers to tax and generated resources largely from his own lands. This gave the king more freedom, but placed severe limits on his power relative to other groups or even individuals in society. As the scale of warfare grew, kings needed greater revenue than they could generate from their personal lands. They gradually advanced their ability to tax subjects by granting them some say in how the revenue was used. From the need to tax grew the early institutions of political accountability.⁸² The king now had greater resources through which he could exercise authority over his people and extend his rule over others, but at the cost of tying his hands through new institutional fetters. Today, rentier states enjoy—if that is the right term—a situation similar to that of feudal monarchs. Natural resources such as oil and minerals or primary products such as coffee are either state-owned, with revenues being directly appropriated by the government, or easily taxed at the point of export. With a steady and readily available stream of revenue, rentier states—like feudal lords—are more limited in the resources they can potentially control,

82. See Downing 1992; Ertman 1997; Tilly 1990.

but do not need to bargain directly with their citizens nor develop institutions of political accountability. This creates the widely known “resource curse” through which extractive wealth enriches state elites, permits a lack of accountability, and typically promotes corrupt and inefficient government.⁸³ For most states today, however, the government is dependent on its citizens and taxpayers for the revenue necessary to carry out its responsibility of preserving order and enforcing rules. This mutual dependence of ruler and ruled constrains states and makes them more sensitive to the limits of their support.

By contrast, dominant states are often less dependent on the extraction of resources from their subordinates in international hierarchies than are states from their citizens. Although they are still dependent on subordinates to comply with the rules they create and enforce, and thus exist within a social contract, dominant states typically do not expropriate significant resources from their subordinates in return for providing order. Only in rare cases, the Spanish Empire in Latin America, the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe in the first decade after World War II,⁸⁴ and Germany and Japan today, who contribute significantly to the costs of maintaining American bases and troops on their soil, does the dominant state directly “tax” its subordinates in ways similar to states in relation to their own citizens. Instead, much like feudal lords constrained by the wealth of their manor or rentier states favored by natural resources, dominant states depend on their internal resources to provide order and enforce rules over subordinate states. It is taxes on American citizens, for example, that fund the military used by the United States to establish and secure its hierarchies over others. This resource independence imposes a smaller or less-binding constraint on dominant states than on rulers within states. Dominant states are accountable more directly to their own citizens, not to their subordinates in other states. This lack of accountability to subjects permits dominant states to make mistakes—to overreach—and when faced with resistance to attempt to impose their will on others through coercion. These independent resources do not necessarily lead to arbitrary rule or tyranny—rulers can be saintly—but it does permit dominant states to slip more easily from authority into imperialism.

The prevailing view of international anarchy as a systemic condition is derived from a formal-legal conception of authority that was imported into the discipline in its earliest days. But this is only one of several possible conceptions of authority. Developed to describe and fit the mode of authority that

83. Ross 1999; Sachs and Warner 2001.

84. Brzezinski 1967, 285–286.

characterizes modern states, there is no reason to privilege it in international relations.

The key analytic step in this chapter is to reveal an assumption implicit in current analysis, that authority can only derive from law, and to rebuild theory on a foundation more appropriate for international relations. In this alternative approach, authority is conceptualized as a contract between ruler and ruled, continuously renegotiated, based on the provision of a political order produced by the ruler in exchange for compliance by the ruled with the commands and extractions necessary for that order. Where formal-legal conceptions of authority exclude the possibility of authority between states by definition, relational authority permits and even encourages hierarchy between states.

The next two chapters develop and operationalize the concept of international hierarchy and describe the pattern of U.S. hierarchy over the last fifty years. The social contract in all such authority relationships is premised on the exchange of political order by a dominant state for compliance by subordinates. This has clear implications for policies in both dominant and subordinate states, which were previewed in the introduction and are traced in more detail in later chapters. The evidence presented there not only confirms the presence of hierarchy in international relations, but also suggests its importance in explaining patterns of world politics.

International Hierarchy

Authority is a relationship between ruler and ruled. Hierarchy is a variable defined by the authority of the ruler over an increasing number of issues otherwise reserved to the ruled. When there are relatively few actions that the ruler can legitimately regulate, hierarchy is low. Conversely, when there are relatively many actions that the ruler can legitimately command, hierarchy is high. States differ in their degree of internal hierarchy, with liberal democracies being less hierarchical and totalitarian regimes being more hierarchical.¹ States also differ in their authority over one another, with each subordinate governed more or less hierarchically, depending on the number of issues the dominant state can legitimately regulate. A few states, like the United States since 1945, possess at least some small degree of hierarchy over many subordinate states, a pattern documented more extensively in the next chapter.

In developing this conception of international hierarchy, I first examine the widely held notion that sovereignty is indivisible. This is neither true in principle nor practice. I then outline my definition of hierarchy in detail and present a typology of hierarchical relationships on the continua of security and economic policy. In closing, I briefly discuss alternative conceptions of hierarchy in international relations, nearly all of which focus on variations in coercive power and use hierarchy as a synonym for the distribution of capabilities.

Sovereignty in International Relations

One of the impediments to seeing hierarchy between states is the assumption made by classical and many contemporary scholars that sovereignty is inher-

1. This reformulates the weak-strong state distinction. See Katzenstein 1978 and Lake 1999b.

ently indivisible. If sovereignty is indivisible, then states that are even a little bit sovereign cannot be subordinate to another. States may be under the influence of another state, but not under its authority. Yet, in principle, sovereignty is eminently divisible and, in practice, has been divided in many ways. Like the notion of juridical sovereignty more generally (see chapter 1), the assumption of indivisibility is a political aspiration and normative program of would-be state builders who wish it were so.

The principle of sovereignty is said to have been established in the Peace of Westphalia (1648), itself composed of the treaties of Münster and Osnabrück. The conclave and associated treaties ended the Thirty Years War between the “universalist” Habsburg dynasty, in league with the pope in Rome, and the nascent “particularistic” states seeking to escape from imperial hegemony.² In affirming the principle of *cuius region, eius religio* (whose kingdom, his religion), first articulated in the Peace of Augsburg (1555), the victors gathered at Westphalia are widely understood to have elevated secular rulers to positions of ultimate authority in their realms and secured the dominance of political authority over other possible authorities, especially that of the universal church. As described by Leo Gross, Westphalia is the “majestic portal” through which the age of sovereign states supposedly arrived.³

The principle of sovereignty is commonly understood to possess three primary components.⁴ These components are often thought to be constitutive; that is, to be sovereign confers these characteristics on states. First, the sovereign possesses absolute authority over the people and territory of a given realm. Absolute authority does not mean total or complete authority—a phenomenon, as we saw in chapter 1, that is impossible—but final or ultimate authority. As argued by Jean Bodin in his *Six Books of the Commonwealth* (1576), the first major treatise on the subject, “persons who are sovereign must not be subject in any way to the commands of someone else and must be able to give law to subjects, and to suppress or repeal disadvantageous laws and replace them with others—which cannot be done by someone who is subject to the laws or persons having power of command over him.”⁵ To paraphrase President Harry Truman, sovereignty is where “the buck stops.”

Second, external actors are excluded from possessing or exercising authority over the people and territory governed by the sovereign. This is a corollary to the first component. If to be sovereign means that one is the ultimate au-

2. Ostander 2001.

3. Gross 1948.

4. Formal equality can be considered a fourth component, but it is derivative of the third on indivisibility. This construct is associated with the work of Vattel, discussed in chapter 1.

5. In Brown, Nardin, and Rengger 2002, 273.

thority in a given domain, it necessarily implies that no one else can exercise authority in that same area or over the same people. By extension, no other power can intervene legitimately in the “internal” affairs of a sovereign state. Stephen Krasner describes this principle of exclusion as the primary trait of Westphalian sovereignty.⁶

Third, sovereignty is indivisible—of a single piece, a whole that cannot be disaggregated, shared, or divided between different authorities. Wherever ultimate authority is sited, be it in a king or the people, there can be only a single sovereign or ultimate authority within any political community. The idea of unitary or indivisible sovereignty originates with Bodin, who concluded that if sovereignty was absolute, it could not be divided between branches or levels of government or between different actors. Sovereignty by its very nature, he claimed, could only be located in a single person or institution within a political community.⁷ This view was echoed by other jurists, including Hugo Grotius, the Dutch legal theorist whose *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* (1625) was the first major work of international law, who wrote that “sovereignty is a unity, in itself indivisible.”⁸

Along with the first two components, the assumption of indivisibility implies that authority must culminate in a single apex at the level of the state; indeed, it is this apex that defines the state. This conclusion is one of the foundation stones of the juristic theory of the state. John Austin, in particular, was committed to this view and derided the idea that sovereignty could be divided as “absurd,” “nominal,” and “illusive.”⁹ Incorporated into juristic theory, the assertion that sovereignty is indivisible was smuggled into the theoretic foundations of international relations.¹⁰

This classical view of sovereignty is much disputed. Revisionist scholars have searched in vain for Gross’s mythic gateway to the modern world.¹¹ Even the treaties of Münster and Osnabrück themselves contained numerous violations of the nascent principle of sovereignty. It is now clear that what was actually agreed on at Westphalia and codified in the treaties is substantially different from the received wisdom. Whether the princes at Westphalia actually intended to establish principles of international order is a topic of continuing debate, but the record makes plain that they did not intend to create the

6. Krasner 1999, 20–25.

7. Keene 2002, 43.

8. Quoted in *ibid.*, 44.

9. Quoted in *ibid.*, 107.

10. See Schmidt 1998. This view is still held today. For example, Deudney (2007, 52) writes that “sovereignty is by definition indivisible.”

11. See, especially, Krasner 1993; Osiander 2001.

specific principle of sovereignty as we know it today. Yet, subsequent observers and practitioners have nonetheless interpreted Westphalia as creating—by design or not—a particular conception of sovereignty that has now been passed down through generations. It is the myth of Westphalia, rather than Westphalia itself, on which today's understanding of the principle of sovereignty rests.

Accepting the first two components of sovereignty, that it constitutes ultimate and exclusive authority, it is nonetheless possible to challenge and relax the third component. That is, authority can be disaggregated into pieces defined by policy or issue area, but each piece may be sited in a different actor with ultimate and exclusive rights over that domain.

The principle of indivisibility has been criticized as unrealistic since its inception. Indeed, Grotius, after agreeing with Bodin on its indivisible nature, immediately acknowledges that when discussing sovereignty, "a division is sometimes made into parts designated as potential and subjective." He then enumerates several examples in which the conferral of sovereignty was not absolute but, in fact, divided. Most important, Grotius recognizes that unequal treaties can, in practice, lead to a division of sovereignty that favors the superior party: "He who has the vantage in a treaty, if he is greatly superior in respect to power, gradually usurps the sovereignty properly so called." Grotius also recognizes that unless the weaker party resists, over time "the part of the weaker passes over into the right of ruling on the part of the stronger . . . then either those who had been allies become subjects, or there is at any rate a division of sovereignty."¹² Even from its inception, as implied in Grotius's own writings, the principle of indivisibility was inconsistent with observed reality.

Other legal theorists repeated and amplified Grotius's practical observation, especially when they were forced to confront the variety of authority relationships that lay outside Europe. Disputing the by then hegemonic juristic view, Henry Sumner Maine, a late nineteenth century legal theorist, writes that

it is necessary to the Austinian theory that the all-powerful portion of the community which makes laws should not be divisible, that it should not share its power with anybody else, and Austin himself speaks with some contempt of the semi-sovereign or demi-sovereign states which are recognized by the classical writers on international law. But this indivisibility of sovereignty, though it belongs to Austin's system, does not belong to international law. The powers of sovereigns are a bundle or collection of powers, and they may be separated one from another. Thus a ruler may administer civil and criminal justice, may make

12. Quoted in Keene 2002, 44–45, 49.

laws for his subjects and for his territory, may exercise power over life and death, and may levy taxes and dues, but nevertheless he may be debarred from making war and peace, and from having foreign relations with any authority outside his territory.¹³

Focusing on the circumstances of the British Dominions, Arthur Berriedale Keith agreed, observing "that sovereignty can be divided, and that in any country both internal and external sovereignty may be shared by various authorities." Claiming that "international law has suffered for a long time from the theory of the indivisibility of sovereignty," Hersch Lauterpacht maintained in 1940 that "from the point of view of international law, sovereignty is a delegated bundle of rights. . . . and therefore divisible, modifiable, and elastic."¹⁴ As noted by these legalists, especially those concerned more with practice than principle and the world as a whole rather than just Europe, sovereignty is in reality readily divisible.¹⁵

The divisibility of sovereignty is even more evident in practice. Within states, there are public and private spheres, with the latter sometimes governed by "private authorities." In a way that is quite inconsistent with a formal-legal approach, in all societies, even the most totalitarian, there are areas where the ruled restrict the reach of the state. Limiting the authority of their rulers, people carve out a sphere of private action, in the market, for instance, or private rights, as in abortion in the United States today. What gets defined as public or private, of course, is part of the social contract between ruler and ruled and is continually contested and renegotiated. Attempts by the ruler to extend her authority to previously private spheres can be rebuffed by the concerted actions of the ruled. And as technology, norms, and interests change, what is private can expand or shrink. Within these private realms, in turn, there can be authorities that govern collectivities, such as firms, unions, families, clans, and various other forms of association. The private sphere need not be entirely libertarian. These authorities do not, however, exist at the sufferance of the ruler, as would be the case if sovereignty were indivisible, but are created as part of the larger contract between ruler and ruled.¹⁶

13. Quoted in *ibid.*, 108.

14. Quoted in *ibid.*

15. For further discussion, see Donnelly 2006, 145–146.

16. Reflecting the continuing importance of juristic theory in international relations, political realists still maintain that states in principle can exert authority over all in their realm. Gilpin (1971, 1975), for instance, has argued persuasively that interdependence is a political choice that persists only because states allow it. Were it to cease to be in the interests of states, he claims, the enormous economic flows that create interdependence could be prohibited or more tightly regulated. That states could control interdependence if they wanted to ultimately rests on the as-

Similarly, just as private authorities can exist and create multiple apexes of authority within a state, so can states exercise more or less authority over other partially sovereign states. Classic diplomacy recognized large variations in status, ranging from semisovereign states to protected independent (and dependent) states, guaranteed states, vassal states, administered provinces, autonomous colonies and dependencies, and members of imperfect unions.¹⁷ The authority exercised by dominant states covered both the subordinate's external relations and internal practices and policies. This authority was sometimes codified in so-called unequal treaties, such as those between European states and China, Japan, the Ottoman Empire, and Siam. More often, though, the authority rested on informal practices of domination. Donnelly has usefully consolidated the types of restrictions on sovereignty into (1) *rights of protection or guarantee*, which grant the protecting/guaranteeing state powers to assure that the subordinate acts to retain a particular internal status or external alignment (e.g., U.S.—Federated States of Micronesia and Republic of the Marshall Islands; India—Bhutan); (2) *rights of economic and financial control*, including supervision of customs houses and priority claims over state resources (e.g., U.S.—Dominican Republic, 1904–1941; U.S.—Ecuador and other countries that have “dollarized” their economies); (3) *rights of servitude*, requiring the subordinate to allow foreign armies to transit territory, provide access to rivers and other waterways, maintain free cities, create demilitarized zones, and adopt neutrality (e.g., U.S.—Japan regarding military base rights); and (4) *rights of intervention*, permitting the dominant state to act to preserve the balance of power, rights of its nationals, and so forth, but recently extended to humanitarian practices (e.g., U.S.—Panama).¹⁸

As argued by its critics and implemented by diplomats, sovereignty is and has been easily divided throughout history. The assumption that sovereignty is indivisible is not warranted. By preventing analysts from seeing hierarchy between states, it actually has a pernicious effect on the study of international relations. Identifying deviant cases and highlighting anomalies is necessary to challenge the prevailing conception of sovereignty in world politics. This is the powerful contribution of the growing number of empirical investigations into

sumption that authority is vested in and only in the state. Divisible sovereignty that allows for multiple independent realms of authority sees interdependence as a product of negotiated rights in which firms within—and increasingly parallel to—states have carved out a substantial realm of “private” practice over which public authorities hold little sway. See Lake 1999a.

17. Willoughby and Fenwick 1974, 5–13; Dickenson 1972.

18. Donnelly 2006, 149–151. Historical cases are numerous. I focus on contemporary examples of U.S. hierarchy to suggest the continuing relevance of these forms of restricted sovereignty. Servitudes are equivalent to “rights on easement” on private property. See Reid 1932.

the practice of sovereignty.¹⁹ But at present, we lack any metric that allows us to aggregate anomalous anecdotes into groups of similar or like cases and eventually into patterns and data. Hierarchy provides just such a metric.

Hierarchy Defined

Hierarchy exists when one actor, the ruler, or A as in chapter 1, possesses authority over a second actor, the ruled, or B, defined as a collective of individuals. Authority is never total, of course, but varies in extent. It may be that A possesses authority over B and issues commands regulating possible actions 1–5 but not on actions 6–*n*, which remain “private” to B or beyond A’s ability to expect compliance.²⁰ In other words, B may recognize the legitimacy of A’s commands regulating its economic relations with third parties (A commands B not to trade with others), but not that of any commands A may or may not issue on economic cooperation with itself (A cannot command B to follow its monetary policy). In this case, a partial hierarchy exists, characterized more completely below as an economic zone. In turn, hierarchy increases with the number of B’s actions A can legitimately regulate. If A previously possessed authority over actions 1–5 and now exerts authority over issues 1–10, A’s hierarchy over B has increased. To continue the example, if A now gains the authority to command B to adopt a particular monetary policy, A’s hierarchy over B has expanded at least to what I shall call a weak dependency.

All areas of political interaction can be partitioned into public and private spheres, with political authority exercised over subordinate units in the former and excluded from the latter. All sovereignty is divided, more or less. Hierarchy is simply the counterpart to this variable sovereignty. The greater the number of private actions unregulated by the political authority, the less hierarchical the relationship. Conversely, the greater the number of policy areas that are legitimately controlled by the political authority, the more hierarchical the relationship. So defined, hierarchy is a continuous variable that varies by the number of actions over which A can legitimately issue commands and expect compliance by B. At one extreme, A possesses no authority over any action B might perform. This is the ideal of “Westphalian sovereignty” and the

19. See Krasner 1999, 2001; Osiander 2001; Philpott 2001.

20. In more heteronomous systems, like feudalism, a second ruler A’ may have authority over B in some issues as well, say 6–8, reserving only issues 9–*n* as private to B. In the modern states system, there is usually only one external political superior, if any. I confine my analysis to this case throughout. But in principle, states may be subject to more than one external authority governing different issue areas. See Ruggie 1986.

condition of anarchy that is commonly (but mistakenly) thought to characterize all relationships within the international system. At the other extreme, A possesses the authority to regulate all actions B might perform. In this extreme of complete or pure hierarchy, B possesses no independent rights or autonomous ability to decide anything and is subservient to A in all aspects of political life. Except perhaps in cults and totalitarian states, this extreme is seldom approximated. Even within modern states normally regarded as hierarchies,²¹ substantial ranges of private action remain. In common language, therefore, in even relatively hierarchical relationships A possesses authority over many but not all actions by B. In international relations, the most hierarchical relationships take the form of empires, where B is subordinate to A in a broad range of economic and security actions.

Authority can be disaggregated and hierarchy constructed in any number of ways. Following common practice in international relations, I first distinguish between the broad issue areas of security and economics across which, as we shall see, the same polities often construct relations with different degrees of hierarchy.²² These broad issues are then disaggregated into the near infinite number of actions that B might perform that define security or economic policy (see figure 2.1).

Security Hierarchy

Security policy includes all diplomatic, military, and even economic actions available to a state to lower the risk and effectiveness of coercion from other, external actors. It entails efforts to increase one's own capabilities, to aggregate one's capabilities with those of others, or simply to adopt imaginative strategies to outwit those who would otherwise use violence to accomplish their aims.²³ So defined, a very large range of possible actions make up security policy, all united by the goal of lowering the threat of foreign coercion.

Security relationships (the horizontal axis in figure 2.1) vary from diplomacy, at the anarchic end of the continuum, to protectorates, at the hierarchic end.²⁴ In anarchic relationships, polities interact while retaining complete au-

21. Waltz 1979, 81.

22. Hancock (2001) first distinguished between these two dimensions. In Lake 2003, I include a third dimension on political rights, which I do not develop here. Most issues on this third dimension can be subsumed in the first two.

23. Waltz 1979, 118.

24. See Lake 1999a, 24–41 and Weber 2000, 4. In earlier versions of this continuum, I extended the range beyond protectorates to informal empires and empires. Defining protectorates as here, as the full control by A over B's security policy, informal empires and empires were defined by A's authority over increasing areas of "domestic" policy in B. Moving to two dimensions of




Figure 2.1 Dimensions of international hierarchy

thority over their own actions. This is the ideal of Westphalian sovereignty, again, but limited to the area of security policy. Diplomacy conducted between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War was, in this way, entirely anarchic. Although they competed with one another extensively, the superpowers also cooperated by negotiating arms control agreements aimed at reining in a more costly arms race. Even when entering into detailed agreements with one another, however, neither ceded to the other any control over its own foreign policy. Relations between the United States, China, and many other countries today take a similar form.

In a protectorate, one polity, B, cedes authority to another, A, over its security policy. In other words, A possesses authority over all actions that might possibly be undertaken by B to reduce the likelihood of successful coercion. As above, such extreme authority relationships are seldom observed, and I use

both security and economic policy makes clear that the true end point of the security continuum is actually a protectorate. As I elaborate below, informal and formal empires are defined by high levels of both security and economic hierarchy.

the term *protectorate* for security hierarchies in which A exercises authority over many (but not necessarily all) of B's possible security actions. For example, the Federated States of Micronesia and Republic of the Marshall Islands today are full protectorates of the United States.²⁵ Despite their sovereign status, the United States exercises substantial authority over their foreign policies. Indeed, under Compacts of Free Association signed four years after independence, the United States formally assumed complete authority over and responsibility for their defense and security relations. Micronesia and the Marshall Islands maintain independent diplomatic relations with other states but are obligated to refrain from taking actions that would be incompatible with the security and defense responsibilities of the United States.

Between these extremes lie a range of security relationships of increasing hierarchy. One particularly salient historical relationship is a sphere of influence in which a dominant state possesses the authority only to limit a subordinate's cooperation with third parties. In such spheres, the subordinate need not cooperate actively with its dominant state, but it is prohibited from entering into alliances or other interactions with others. The United States and Latin America under the Monroe Doctrine is a prominent example of (at least) a sphere of influence. The covert and diplomatic interventions of the United States in Western Europe after 1945, and especially in Italy and France, to prevent the election of communist governments also suggest at least a sphere of influence in that region as well.²⁶

A second intermediate form is a "weak" protectorate wherein the dominant state exercises substantial but limited control over the subordinate's foreign and defense policies. Once Saudi Arabia invited the United States to send over 250,000 troops in August 1990 to defend it against possible encroachments by Saddam Hussein's military, for instance, it became a weak protectorate and forfeited its ability to conduct an independent policy toward Iraq and Kuwait. Indeed, control over the conflict shifted almost entirely to Washington, which then decided if negotiations with Iraq would occur and on what terms. Symbolically, but nonetheless indicative of Saudi Arabia's subordinate position, President George H. W. Bush set the timing for the start of the air and ground campaigns and formally communicated their onset to King Fahd

25. These island states, formerly governed by the United States as strategic trust territories, became independent on May 1, 1979. Compacts of Free Association were negotiated in June 1983 between the United States and the two new countries and entered into force in October 1986. Renegotiations of the compacts occurred between 1999 and 2003, and new agreements entered into force in May 2004. The states became members of the United Nations in September 1991.

26. Miller 1986, 213–249; Wall 1991, 2–4, 63–95.

only hours before each began.²⁷ For the duration of the conflict, Saudi Arabia lost its ability to conduct an independent foreign policy toward Iraq and the surrounding region. At the same time, however, the authority of the United States was limited and did not extend to even the closely related issue of, say, Saudi Arabia's relations with Israel.

U.S.-German and U.S.-Japanese relations throughout the post-1945 period have also taken the form of weak but, in this case, more enduring protectorates.²⁸ Peter Katzenstein sees both as core regional supporters or intermediaries embedded in a postwar "American imperium."²⁹ The authority of the United States over these regional powers is aptly illustrated in the negotiations surrounding the infamous "Yoshida letter," in which the Japanese prime minister pledged not to conclude a separate bilateral treaty with the Communist regime of China. Writing to his British counterparts, future Secretary of State John Foster Dulles argued that "it is inconceivable that . . . Japan should pursue foreign policies which cut across those of the United States." Dulles later described the 1951 security arrangements with Japan as "a voluntary continuation of the Occupation."³⁰ The price of extending the American defense umbrella over its former enemy was a radical limit on the independence of Japan's foreign policy. West Germany was similarly constrained. Although as Katzenstein documents Germany's links to the American imperium were more multilateral in nature, it was not until 1963 that the American forces were transformed from an occupying army to invited guests of the Federal Republic.³¹ In its policy of *Ostpolitik*, where the Social Democratic government of Willy Brandt first demonstrated a measure of foreign policy independence by cautiously opening to the Soviet Union and East Europe ahead of President Richard Nixon's own policy of détente, Brandt was careful to declare he would "reject any German foreign policy that lessens the solidarity of [NATO] or limits the decisive participation of the United States in safeguarding freedom in Europe."³² Brandt was clearly aware of the limits of American tolerance.

Economic Hierarchy

Economic policy is quite broad and includes all actions that affect the accumulation and allocation of resources. It ranges from creating property rights and a monetary system to infrastructure, macroeconomic management, regulation, and, at an extreme, setting prices and output. Even though this list is far from exhaustive, it illustrates the incredibly diverse activities that are conceptually available to states at home and abroad for governing the economy.

Economic relationships between states vary from market exchange, at the anarchic end of the continuum, to dependency, at the hierarchic end (the vertical axis in figure 2.1). Under market exchange, in a manner similar to diplomacy in security affairs, parties choose to trade, invest, or otherwise engage in economic interactions while at the same time retaining full authority over their actions. Like diplomacy, market exchange approximates the ideal of Westphalian sovereignty. Examples include contemporary U.S. economic relationships with the states of Western Europe and Africa. With vigorous exchange relationships with the former and anemic relationships with the latter, the United States does not exert any significant authority over the economic policies of states in either region.

At the opposite end of the continuum, in a dependency, the subordinate state cedes authority over all of its economic policies, including its currency, to another polity. Again, "pure" dependency is rare, and I use the term to cover a range of relationships with near but not necessarily total transfers of authority from subordinate to dominant states. Relations between the United States and Dominican Republic in the early decades of the twentieth century came close to a full dependency, with the United States controlling virtually all government finance. "Dollarization," in which a subordinate adopts the dominant country's currency as its own and, as a result, imports its monetary and, indirectly, fiscal policies, also creates a dependency relationship. The most prominent cases of fully dollarized economies today are Ecuador and Panama, which rely exclusively on the U.S. dollar as their legal tender.³³

As with security relationships, we can identify several intermediate forms of economic relationships while recognizing the considerable variance around each ideal type. In economic zones, which are roughly equivalent to spheres of influence in the security arena, the subordinate state is restricted from giving market privileges to third parties or entering into economic transactions that give others influence over their affairs. Although it eventually extended far beyond this limited relationship, the United States created an economic zone over many Latin American states by replacing Europe as their primary

33. On monetary hierarchies, see Cohen 1998, 47–48.

trade and financial partner beginning in the 1890s. The successful American effort to break up the imperial preference systems developed by the European powers extended this zone to Europe and several developing regions.

In “weak” dependencies, the subordinate polity cedes some measure of authority over its external economic relations and domestic economic policy to the dominant state. This relationship may include a customs union with a common external tariff set by the dominant state or the fixing of the subordinate’s exchange rate to the dominant country’s currency, which transfers some authority over monetary policy to the dominant country. By transferring control over government finances to dominant states, many of the sovereign debt restrictions in which states engage imply a weak dependency as well.³⁴ Prominent examples of weak dependencies today come from Russia’s relations with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Kyrgyz Republic, which are locked together in a customs union with a common external tariff administered solely by Moscow.³⁵

Empire

Empire is a contentious term, subject to many competing definitions of varying breadth. Michael Doyle offers a widely cited consensus definition of empire as “a system of interaction between two political entities, one of which, the dominant metropole, exerts political control over the internal and external policy—the effective sovereignty—of the other, the subordinate periphery.”³⁶ This definition, in ways similar to the alternative conceptions of hierarchy below, is too broad in its focus on political control. Given the Latin root *imperium*—to rule, not to control—the term *empire* is more properly restricted, in my view, to authority relationships. Doyle’s definition, however, does appropriately capture the distinctive quality of empire as spanning domestic and foreign policy. When both security and economic hierarchies exist between two polities, the relationship captures what is commonly known as either informal empire or, at an extreme, empire (see figure 2.1).

The difference between formal and informal empire is typically defined in terms of formal-legal authority, as the adjectives imply. In this traditional definition, subordinate members of informal empires retain two characteristics. First, they possess an international legal personality. That is, even though they may be subordinate to the authority of another state, they retain the right to

34. Krasner 1999, chap. 5.

35. Hancock 2001.

36. Doyle 1986, 12.

enter into international agreements in their own name and to join international organizations as full and equal members. Second, in informal empires, subordinate states possess nominally independent governments. Even though the imperial state may actively select its leaders and orientation, a national government nonetheless exists. This government is often weak and dependent on the dominant state, but it is precisely this weakness that ensures it remains loyal and compliant.³⁷ Formal empires differ on both dimensions: the subordinate polity neither possesses an international legal personality nor a nominally independent government. Self-evidently, under a formal-legal definition of empire, the subordinate cannot negotiate agreements in its own name nor set its own policies. When Britain declared war in 1914 and 1939, for instance, British India was automatically at war as well. Under direct rule, in turn, the subordinate may possess delegated decision-making powers, but ultimate authority is vested in the imperial center. These two characteristics are useful in identifying empires and, especially, in distinguishing between informal and formal variants. But in a relational approach, as developed here, it is not the formal-legal characteristics that define the form, but the pattern of authority and the negotiated rights of both the dominant and subordinate polities. *Informal empire*, as I shall use the term, simply combines moderate levels of both security and economic hierarchy, with the subordinate polity ceding substantial but not all authority to a dominant state in both arenas. Empire combines high levels of both security and economic hierarchy.

As implied in the separate discussions of security and economic hierarchy, relationships between the United States and states on the Caribbean littoral, such as the Dominican Republic, often take the form of informal empire. Between 1898 and 1934, the United States intervened militarily over 30 times to install or protect friendly and compliant governments in the region. It continues to station troops in Panama as a quick-reaction force not only to protect the canal, but also to intervene elsewhere in the region if necessary. States have also been prohibited from forming alliances with powers other than the United States, and those that have sought to escape the American sphere of influence have been punished by economic sanctions, as in the case of Cuba, or proxy wars, as in Nicaragua during the 1980s (see chapter 4). Economically, regional states are highly dependent on the United States, and most have fixed their exchange rate to the dollar, thereby importing Washington's monetary policy, or actually adopted the dollar as their primary currency. Although *de jure* sovereign, the states of the region have in practice highly compromised their status by accepting and sometimes actively supporting the authority of

37. *Ibid.*, 38–40.

the United States over their international and domestic affairs. The Soviet Union's domination of Eastern Europe during the Cold War provides a second set of examples.

The classic cases of empire, of course, were the European empires first created during the age of discovery and lasting until after World War II. The Russian empire was revealed clearly only when internal instability in 1991 allowed the constituent republics to break free and form independent states, many of which remain in at least partly hierarchical relationships with Moscow.³⁸

With the Iraq War, the United States is increasingly described as an empire, but this is inaccurate. To write of the United States or any country as *an* empire or *an* informal empire is an unfortunate generality. Rather, as conceived here, a dominant country can possess a range of different relationships with different countries, and they will change and evolve over time. As the examples cited above suggest, the United States today possesses relationships of varying hierarchy across the globe. In only a very few dyads, however, does the United States possess anything approximating an empire. Panama, the Federated States of Micronesia, and its formal dependencies may fall into this category. Under the occupations, Afghanistan and Iraq might have been considered subordinates in American empires, but relations were contested and, therefore, not authoritative. Even if the United States lacks many dyadic relationships that reach a full, imperial form, however, it does, as we shall see, possess extensive authority relationships with a range of countries around the globe.

Alternative Conceptions of Hierarchy in International Relations

Although the meanings and implications of anarchy and sovereignty have long been debated in international relations, hierarchy has not received extensive attention. This makes sense given the discipline's past assumptions.³⁹ If relations between sovereign states are characterized by anarchy, then hierarchy can be safely ignored or consigned to the realm of domestic politics. Yet, at least three analytic approaches of long standing in the field have employed the term *hierarchy* in ways very similar to each another but different from that developed here.⁴⁰ By way of tying together the threads of my argument, it is useful to contrast this view of hierarchy with that discussed here.

38. Dawisha and Parrott 1997; Hancock 2001.

39. For a conception of hierarchy similar to that here, and an analysis of the terminological confusion that prevents the field from understanding hierarchy, see Onuf and Klink 1989.

40. These three approaches are not exhaustive, but do make up much of the relevant literature. Several recent approaches stimulated by the Iraq War and charges of American imperial-

Power transition theory posits global and regional hierarchies that produce struggles for system leadership and periods of intense warfare.⁴¹ Hegemonic stability theory predicts that a single, dominant country will produce higher levels of international public goods and economic openness. Although focused on hegemony, a trait never formally or consensually defined, this theory is at least implicitly about hierarchy.⁴² Dependency theory, in its various guises, also posits a hierarchy within the international economy defined by levels of development.⁴³

Although all of these approaches hint at aspects of authority, all treat hierarchy as a structural characteristic defined by coercive capabilities within either a global or regional system organized into a single pyramid for all relevant states. Synthesizing the existing literature, Ian Clark offers a consensual definition of hierarchy as

“a political arrangement characterized by stratification in which, like the angels, there are orders of power and glory and society is classified in successively subordinate grades. This *hierarchy is commonly assigned in terms of politico-strategic power*, yielding the traditional groupings of Great Powers, medium powers, and small powers. It may equally be described in economic terms, yielding the stratification into first, third and fourth worlds. Outside a statist perspective, it may be analysed in terms of centres or cores, semi-peripheries, and peripheries.”⁴⁴

Similarly, international lawyer Gerry Simpson writes, “the term hierarchy is . . . [typically used] by international relations scholars to describe a system in which political, economic, and political status among the actors is highly differ-

ism—hardly composing a coherent school of thought—also share this focus on hierarchy as coercive power and, more specifically, as unipolarity. For a sampling of this literature, see Bacevich 2002; Calhoun, Cooper, and Moore 2006; Ferguson 2004; Harvey 2003; Hoffmann 2004; Lal 2004; Mann 2003; Norton 2004; and Odom and Du jaric 2004. Drawing on the English school, Dunne (2003) explicitly contrasts hierarchy with international society.

41. Organski 1968; Organski and Kugler 1980; Lemke 2002. Related, see the various power cycle theories of Modelski 1987; Doran 1991; and Goldstein 1988. Power transition theory emphasizes the importance of international order provided by the dominant state, see Organski 1968, esp. 354. This is compatible with the view of relational authority developed here. Nonetheless, the principle proponents of the theory have not made the link to authority, see hierarchy as existing at the level of the system, and define hierarchy primarily in terms of coercive power capabilities. See Organski 1968, 364–371.

42. Major works of hegemonic stability theory are Kindleberger 1973; Gilpin 1975; and Krasner 1976. On hierarchy, see Gilpin 1981, esp. 27–34. On problems of definition and measurement, see Lake 1993.

43. Frank 1966; Sunkel 1969; Furtado 1973; Palma 1978; Cardoso and Faletto 1979. See also the world system theory of Wallerstein 1979 and the structural theory of Galtung 1971.

44. Clark 1989, 2; italics added.

entiated even though these actors enjoy some measure of formal sovereign equality. Hierarchy, here . . . simply refers to the *grading of states on the basis of relative capacity*.⁴⁵ Hierarchy is, thus, most commonly used as a synonym for the distribution of capabilities and, especially, for a highly skewed or unipolar distribution.⁴⁶

As variations in capabilities, in turn, hierarchy is compatible with realist and most other existing theories of international politics. Most important, hierarchy as stratified capabilities is entirely consistent with a view of international politics as a self-help system. As Clark again argues most clearly,

the description of the state system as hierarchical . . . is not intended to deny its "self-help" anarchical characteristics: hierarchy, thus viewed, collectivises decision making within the rank of Great Powers while retaining the anarchical form of politics as between that rank and the others. From the viewpoint of the smaller states, power politics is in no way diminished."⁴⁷

Used in this way, however, the term *hierarchy* adds little to our understanding of international relations. Indeed, like anarchy, it appears to be a constant and, therefore, of little use in explaining the dynamics of world politics. As Robert Tucker correctly notes, "The history of the international system is a history of inequality par excellence. This is so not simply because political collectives vary greatly in those natural endowments that contribute to their power and wealth but also because of the basic condition in which they have always existed."⁴⁸ And as a synonym for the distribution of capabilities, the concept of hierarchy necessarily has the same analytic implications as the other, clearer and more readily grasped term.

As authority is properly understood as a type of power, the views of hierarchy as differences in coercive capability and hierarchy as variations in authority are not unrelated. Nonetheless, the two conceptions are quite distinct. First, as developed here, hierarchy is a dyadic relationship between two polities that varies across pairs within any system from complete anarchy to full dominance. Unlike the other approaches that treat hierarchy as a systemwide attribute, a single state may possess relationships of varying degrees of hierarchy across many dyads, as does the United States today. A single state could exercise authority over only one other state, and that relationship would still, in my terms, constitute a hierarchy.

45. Simpson 2004, 65; italics added.

46. See Kang 2003a, 166.

47. Clark 1989, 3; italics added.

48. Tucker 1977, 3.

Second, and more important for this discussion, hierarchy rests on authority, as I conceive it, not simply coercive capabilities. Although a form of power, authority is distinct from coercion and the material capabilities that give rise to forcible influence. To sharply make the distinction between my view of hierarchy and the alternative, I define hierarchy as the antonym of anarchy and thus as varying in Waltz's first dimension of political structure, the ordering principle, rather than his third, the distribution of capabilities.⁴⁹ Contrary to the position outlined by Clark above, this view of hierarchy does challenge prevailing conceptions of international relations as a self-help system. I do not argue that the system as a whole is hierarchic—that would be a fallacy of composition—but hierarchical relations within the system mitigate self-help and allow some states to escape the state of nature. If hierarchy as stratified capabilities in no way diminishes power politics, hierarchy as variations in authority certainly does.

Hierarchy is a variable defined by the authority of the ruler over an increasing number of actions of the ruled. The greater the range of actions of the subordinate that the ruler can legitimately regulate, the more hierarchical is their relationship.

Building from the relational conception of authority advanced in the previous chapter, hierarchy can exist between states in two continuous dimensions, varying from no hierarchy (anarchy) to near complete authority over security and economic affairs. The key analytic move in this chapter and in understanding international hierarchy more generally is to recognize, as critics have long asserted, that sovereignty is divisible and has been divided between authorities at different levels, including between states. A two-dimensional view of hierarchy, in turn, captures many of the types of "restricted sovereignty" identified in classic diplomacy as well as contemporary forms.

The next chapter develops operational indicators of security and economic hierarchy and describes the pattern of U.S. authority in the world today. The following chapters examine the implications of hierarchy for the conduct of world politics.

49. Waltz 1979, chap. 5. See chapter 1, fn. 22, in this text.

Patterns of Hierarchy

The previous chapter developed an analytic scheme for identifying variations in hierarchy between states. Although past research has identified many deviations from the principle of Westphalian sovereignty, we lack a means of aggregating anomalies into patterns. The conception and dimensions of hierarchy outlined in chapter 2 provide one possible way of organizing this complex reality. Yet, theory without operational indicators is of limited utility. To understand the role and consequences of hierarchy for international politics requires that substantive form be given to the theoretical construct. This chapter undertakes this task with particular relevance to the authority of the United States in the modern international system. After discussing general problems of operationalization, especially the difficulties of distinguishing hierarchy from coercive capabilities, this chapter first develops two indicators each for security and economic hierarchy and examines their validity. The chapter then surveys patterns of U.S. hierarchy since 1950 based on these measures.

This chapter is premised on a critical realist approach to theory and measurement.¹ Because all measurement is fallible, the ambition is to build multiple indicators that are nonetheless relatively direct manifestations of behaviors associated with the theoretical construct of international hierarchy. In this sense, the indicators are objective and do not depend on either access to the relative experiences of different observers or the intersubjective understandings of the actors, although it is expected that the measures will approximate and correlate with these understandings. As I discuss, case studies focused ex-

1. Critical realism is a postpositivist approach to science that presumes an independent reality exists but that our knowledge of it will always be imperfect. For a brief introduction to positivist, postpositivist, and subjectivist approaches to knowledge, see Trochim 2001, 18–20.

PLICITLY on instances where authority is challenged by subordinates provide an alternative route to identifying international hierarchy and may get closer to the intersubjective understandings of authority held by states. However, case studies do not solve the fundamental problems of observing the inherently unobservable theoretical construct of international hierarchy, nor do they permit the sorts of large-*n* tests carried out in chapters 4 and 5. I recognize that in developing these behavioral indicators I am sacrificing context and nuance for an ability to generalize measures to more countries for more years. For this reason, I spend considerable time in this chapter establishing the validity of the indicators and, especially, distinguishing them from measures of coercive capabilities.

Some readers may be disappointed by the absence of surprises or counter-intuitive patterns in this chapter, but that is the wrong criteria for assessing the validity of indicators in general and measures of security and economic hierarchy in particular. Validity rests in part on the fit of the measures with our intuitive knowledge of international hierarchy in world politics. As a result, it would be odd and, indeed, troubling if the substantive patterns revealed were widely at variance with that implicit knowledge. The relationships revealed by these indicators are simply a more systematic rendering of our intuitions. The real test of the value of the measures is whether incorporating variations in hierarchy into international relations theory reveals something substantively important about world politics. This is the challenge of the next two chapters. Nonetheless, that effort rests on the success of the operationalizations developed here. Before testing for the effects of hierarchy, we first need to build the appropriate tools for measuring the theoretical construct.

Measuring Hierarchy

Theoretical constructs can never be measured directly. From quarks to gravity, scientists cannot observe directly the particles, forces, or other phenomena that theory implies. Rather, physical scientists have devised imaginative ways of capturing the reflections or traces of subatomic particles and physical forces. The problems of operationalization have been sufficiently difficult, and the solutions proposed so creative, that some of the top prizes in science have been awarded to those who have developed innovative means of measuring inherently unobservable constructs.² The same problems of operationalization plague political science as well. Although perhaps the most frequently refer-

2 For an interesting account, see Johnson 2008.

enced construct in international relations, for instance, coercive capabilities or “power” cannot be measured directly. Instead, analysts compile indicators of GDP, military personnel, population, major power status, and others that we believe capture more or less accurately the underlying construct of coercive capabilities. These are measures of power only because the community of scholars has agreed that they are reasonable proxies for a concept that can never be accessed directly. In one of the great paradoxes of science, we can never know for sure how accurate our measures are because the underlying theoretical constructs can never themselves be seen or touched. In most cases, all scientists can capture are the shadows on the wall created by constructs that are forever hidden from direct view. If theories are analogies to the “real world,” then indicators are analogies to our theoretical constructs. Indicators are evaluated not by whether they measure accurately something that cannot itself be observed, but whether they possess (1) face validity (they produce empirical patterns that make sense given our understanding of the theory); (2) convergent validity (multiple measures of the same construct correlate relatively highly); and (3) discriminant validity (measures of different, but closely related theoretical constructs, do not correlate highly).³

Even though all theoretical constructs defy direct observation, it is even more difficult than usual to identify and measure patterns of authority. In domestic political systems, long regarded as realms of hierarchy, no measures of variations in authority exist.⁴ In international relations, where scholars have for the better part of a century conducted research as if the international system is devoid of authority, problems of identifying and measuring authority loom even larger. Authority is especially difficult to operationalize because other forms of power can be observationally equivalent. As discussed in chapter 1, authority is a particular type of power in which A’s commands are followed by B because they are regarded as legitimate. Other forms of power also produce compliance by B in equilibrium, most often by manipulating B’s incentives through threats of coercion. When B complies with A’s commands we cannot immediately distinguish whether the act was taken out of obligation, fear, or perhaps even greed. When European countries gave up their systems of imperial preferences after World War II at the urging of the United States,

3. On the theory of measurement, see Trochim 2001, chap. 3. Measures are also validated by their predictive ability, which overlaps with tests of any theory. If the measure predicts what the theory suggests it should, this counts in favor of both the theory and measure. If the measure fails to predict accurately, we cannot know whether the failure is in the indicator or the theory. Rejecting a theory because of the failure of an indicator is criticized by Lakatos (1978) as “naïve methodological falsificationism.”

4. For one interesting attempt, see Gilley 2006b.

for instance, was this because the pressure exerted by Washington was regarded as authoritative, they feared reprisals if they failed to treat the goods of other states equally, or they anticipated receiving broader gains from trade? Without insight into the motivations of B, often difficult to acquire without substantial case-specific knowledge, identifying the different forms of power can be problematic.⁵

As suggested by the case of the Dominican Republic discussed in the introduction, authority may be best observed in out-of-equilibrium behavior by either the dominant or subordinate actor. Most of the time, authority is masked. Rulers do not command their subordinates to undertake tasks the latter are unwilling to perform for fear of exciting challenges that may reveal the fragile nature of their legitimacy. Subordinates, in turn, typically conform to the wishes of the ruler and perhaps even anticipate those wishes, both because they are rightful and to avoid punishment. In equilibrium, compliance with authority not only appears voluntary (taken outside the shadow of coercion), but may also masquerade as the exercise of free will. Yet, in every authority relationship, the ruler occasionally overreaches, making demands that her subordinates reject, and subordinates test the limits of authority by attempting to assert greater control over their own affairs. On these occasions, the ruler must use force to impose her will and discipline subordinates or retreat in the face of disobedience. If either party persists in making greater demands, the authority of the ruler may ultimately be rejected as illegitimate, in the case of overreaching, or renegotiated into a new, less hierarchic relationship, in the case of insubordination.⁶

It is in the rare but telling cases where the dominant party uses force to assert its will that the limits of authority become most clearly manifest. Just as the boundaries of the authority of the state are revealed most clearly when dealing with insurrections, the true nature and limits of international hierarchy are revealed when the dominant state uses force to impose its preferences in the face of resistance—as the United States did in the invasions of the Dominican Republic in 1905, 1916, and 1965. When does the dominant state assert its rights? Do subordinates then comply? Do subordinates accept the dominant state's use of force as legitimate and appropriate given the nature of the defiance? It is in the struggle over authority that its nature and boundaries are most likely to be clearly revealed.

5. Even when we know something about the motivations of actors, we do not necessarily know the origins of those motivations, which may themselves be rooted in power. This is the heart of Stephen Luke's three faces of power. See Lukes 1977.

6. Such out-of-equilibrium behaviors are discussed more extensively in chapter 4 in the context of disciplining subordinates.

Unfortunately, by their very nature these out-of-equilibrium events are unusual and not representative of "normal" authority relationships between dominant and subordinate states.⁷ If they occur frequently enough to produce an observable pattern of relations, uncertainty over the nature of the relationship is likely to be high or the relationship itself is most likely evolving under the press of environmental changes toward a new equilibrium between the parties. Although close examination of these events can be quite informative, they are neither unbiased observations nor likely to be regular enough for a systematic mapping of authority relationships over a large number of countries over an extended period of time. Although detailed analyzes of out-of-equilibrium events may be our most direct windows into the existence and nature of international hierarchy, the biased and episodic nature of these instances are a major impediment to systematic empirical investigation. For instance, does the 1965 invasion of the Dominican Republic by the United States, confirming the authority of the latter, imply that the United States had been continuously authoritative since 1916 or 1924? Or that it has been continuously authoritative ever since? It is difficult to interpret what the absence of intervention means for the preceding or ensuing years. For this reason, the remainder of this chapter focuses on perhaps less direct but more continuously and readily observable indicators of international political authority.

If hierarchy is difficult to operationalize, it is equally difficult to develop measures that discriminate between hierarchy, defined as variations in authority, and coercive capabilities, the next most closely related form of power. To test for the effects of hierarchy on state behavior, as in the next two chapters, it is important that indicators capture the construct of authority but not simultaneously correlate with the material capabilities normally associated with coercive potential. To be useful, indicators should converge on the construct of hierarchy and discriminate between authority and coercion. The indicators here, as a result, aim to capture the legitimacy of the unequal relationships between states, not just differential capabilities in coercion.

Despite the difficulties, several measures are available that signal the presence of relationships of varying hierarchy between states. As is appropriate for the relational conception of authority developed here, these measures are based on observable behaviors rather than institutions or intersubjective understandings. Focusing on behaviors associated with authority is not intended to slight parallel institutional or formal-legal forms where they exist, but only to emphasize measures that are closer to the relational construct developed here.

7. If they are the product of information asymmetries, these out-of-equilibrium "mistakes" will be essentially random and, therefore, unpredictable. See Gartzke 1999.

Most important, these measures imply discretion on the part of the subordinate state that suggests, in turn, a willingness to comply with the authority of the dominant state and a mutual recognition of their subordination. Sources for all variables are documented in the data appendix at the end of this book.

Indicators of Security Hierarchy

Security hierarchy can be captured by two sets of indicators, which I compile for the United States in relation to each country in the international system from 1950 to 2000. Unfortunately, similar data on these indicators are not available for other countries, limiting analysis here for practical purposes to patterns of U.S. hierarchy in the modern world system.⁸

First, authority is suggested by the presence of military forces from the dominant state, A, on the territory of the subordinate state, B.⁹ Military troops enable A to influence the security policies of B. State A can embroil B in foreign conflicts if it chooses; by launching attacks from B's territory, for instance, A automatically implicates B in the conflict and makes it a target for retaliation by A's antagonist, as was the case with the United States and Saudi Arabia in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In turn, military personnel enable A to restrain possible foreign policy initiatives of B. In South Korea, for instance, the American troops stationed near the border not only serve as a trip wire to immediately draw the United States into any possible conflict started by the North, but they also insulate North Korea from any potentially provocative actions by the South, important in the early years of the Cold War. Likewise, American forces in both Japan and Germany after 1945 not only protected those countries against a possible Soviet invasion, but also served to insure their neighbors against any revival of militarism. Thus, military personnel give A positive and negative control over B's security policy. The larger the deployment of A's forces in B relative to B's home population, the more control A can be ex-

8. The key indicator with data missing for other countries is military personnel stationed outside the home territory. *The Military Balance*, issued annually by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, is a likely source, but is not comprehensive. For the United States, the entry nearly always differs in absolute numbers of troops reported and fails to identify troops in many countries listed by the Department of Defense or other sources. The inconsistency in reporting data on the United States suggests that it would be an error to use *The Military Balance* for data on other countries and certainly to compare that data to the more complete series available for the United States. Data on troop deployments by other states is available in the secondary literature, but this data is sporadic and of uncertain completeness. I have not been able to identify comparable data on troop deployments for other great powers over a similar time frame.

9. Although I focus here on numbers of troops deployed, the issues are similar to those in basing rights. For a study of base politics sensitive to issues of hierarchy, see Cooley 2008. For a second study that focuses more on domestic politics, see Calder 2007.




Figure 3.1 U.S. security hierarchy, average score by year and indicator, 1950–2000

pected to exert.¹⁰ To the extent that B accepts A's personnel on a continuing basis, this control can be regarded as legitimate and, therefore, authoritative.

Overseas troop deployments by the United States are divided by national population to adjust for differences in country size. The indicator is then normalized to one by its highest value in 1995 (Panama) to make the measures comparable both over time and with the others, as explained below.¹¹ The average level of U.S. troop deployments relative to population has been falling each decade since the mid-1950s, except for the noteworthy increase in the late 1960s due to the Vietnam War (see figure 3.1). Larger patterns and descriptive inferences are discussed below.

A second indicator of security hierarchy is the number of independent alliances possessed by B, the potentially subordinate state.¹² Two states may share

10. Unfortunately, the available data do not allow us to distinguish whether U.S. troops are deployed under U.S., NATO, or United Nations command. Since the number under "foreign" command remains quite small, this is not considered a significant problem.

11. The year 1995 is an arbitrarily chosen base for all the indices reported here.

12. We might want to examine all security agreements between states, but we have systematic data only on alliances. By including only alliances, this measure is likely to undercount the number of security hierarchies because it does not include informal agreements and alignments that may nonetheless be important.

many alliances, indicating only that they are both embedded in a common security system. Such shared alliances may contain within them a security hierarchy, but this cannot be discerned simply by observing the pattern of relationships. If A and B possess an alliance, but also enter into alliances with other states that are not shared, referred to here as *independent alliances*, this is prima facie evidence of foreign policy autonomy. Neither is then obviously dependent on the aid of the other. Most important, B has an "outside option" that reduces A's ability to exercise control. Alternatively, if all of B's alliances are shared with A, this may indicate a security hierarchy. B is then dependent on A or A's other allies for assistance and has no established claims on others not allied with A. The larger the number of such independent alliances possessed by B, the less hierarchical the security relationship is likely to be. To the extent that B's lack of alternative alliance support makes it dependent on A and therefore subject, at least in part, to A's influence over its security policy, and B does not undertake actions to diversify its sources of support or break its own alliance and dependence on A, then B is likely to regard A's influence as necessary and legitimate and, like military personnel, authoritative.

The number of independent security alliances is an even more indirect measure of international hierarchy than is military personnel. Accepting foreign military troops is a conscious policy decision and implies at least a tacit acceptance by B of A's restrictions on its foreign policy autonomy. By contrast, the absence of independent alliances by B need not imply the same complicity in its own subordination. There are many reasons why B may not form alliances with states other than A and A's other allies, including the absence of significant external security threats. Yet, to be allied with A and A's other allies but not other states creates a dependence of which the subordinate state is surely aware. That it chooses not to alter this situation implies some implicit acceptance as well, suggesting that smaller numbers of independent alliances are, on average, associated with increasing security hierarchy.

Independent alliances are defined as one divided by the number of alliance partners of B that are not also alliance partners of A.¹³ Higher values represent fewer independent alliances and, by implication, greater hierarchy. In cases where A and B are not themselves allied, the number of independent alliances is treated as zero (no security hierarchy). This measure is also normalized to one by its highest value for 1995 (shared by nearly all countries in the Americas and Western Europe). A striking fact is that in the modern world alliance patterns are almost entirely exclusive; if a state is allied with one great power, it possesses no other alliances outside the web of alliances held by that great

13. B is assumed to be allied with itself: the denominator is always at least one.

power.¹⁴ The index of independent alliances, on average, declined substantially from the 1950s to the 1960s, but has remained relatively constant since then (see figure 3.1); this is a product not of change in individual countries, but of more countries entering the international system, especially through decolonization, and not allying with the United States.

Although figure 3.1 suggests strong correlation of the indices over time on average, the cross-sectional correlation between the number of troops deployed and the number of independent alliances averages 0.21 for the period 1950 to 2000. This implies that the two indicators are potentially capturing slightly different dimensions of the underlying construct of security hierarchy (convergent validity is discussed in more detail below). I also compute an aggregate indicator of U.S. security hierarchy as the simple sum of the indices of U.S. troops deployed per capita and the number of independent alliances, again normalized to one for 1995. For 1995, according to the aggregate index, Panama is the most subordinate state in the system, with all others taking lower values (Germany follows at 0.65). As the normalized sum of two component indicators that follow a similar trend over time, the aggregate index takes an intermediate value, as seen in figure 3.1. Overall, security hierarchy has declined over time, with the largest change occurring in the 1950s and 1960s (see figure 3.1).

In principle, there is no particular reason to prefer one of these indicators over the others. Without being able to observe the inherently unobservable, we cannot know which of these indicators is capturing more (or less) of the construct of hierarchy. Tests of face, convergent, and discriminant validity (see below) do not by design differentiate between measures of the same construct. In the statistical analyses reported in chapters 4 and 5, which reflect the predictive validity of the measures, different indicators perform more or less well in different tests and even different models. In the remainder of this chapter, I focus on the aggregate indicator only for convenience, not necessarily because it is a better indicator of security hierarchy than its components.

Indicators of Economic Hierarchy

Economic hierarchy is similarly captured by two indicators. First, economic hierarchy varies inversely with a country's monetary policy autonomy, which

14. The exception is NATO, which though an exclusive network has three great power members (the United States, Great Britain, and France) and Canada, which hosts British troops and is connected to Britain through NATO but is also connected through the United States to a distinct set of alliances.

is defined, in turn, by its exchange rate regime.¹⁵ Key to any economy's prices and monetary stability is how the price of its national currency is set relative to the price of other currencies. At one extreme, a country can allow its currency to float against other currencies, with its exchange rate being determined by demand and supply in financial markets. Under floating exchange rates, domestic monetary policy is freed from concerns about the current account balance and, thus, implies no economic hierarchy.¹⁶ At a second step, a country can fix its exchange rate to a single foreign currency, most commonly the dollar, the French franc (now the euro), or the British pound. By fixing to a single foreign currency, B indirectly "imports" or adopts A's monetary policy. As the international demand or supply of dollars shifts, for instance, and the American exchange rate falls (rises), the country's own exchange rate must also fall (rise) relative to other currencies. Fixed exchange rates nonetheless retain the potential for reevaluation should the economic fundamentals of A and B diverge sufficiently, and B typically maintains some foreign reserves to cushion the effect of adverse price shocks, partially insulating B from A's exchange rate perturbations. Although the dominant state, A, may not necessarily set its monetary policy to influence B's economy, the consequences of changes in A's policy may nonetheless have significant implications for B. Fixed exchange rates imply some degree of economic hierarchy as A acquires (perhaps unwanted, but nevertheless real) influence over B's domestic economy. Intermediate between these first and second steps of monetary hierarchy are "crawling pegs," which adjust to and vary within a narrow band (usually plus or minus 2 percent) around a target. When tied to a particular currency, crawling pegs are more restrictive than floating exchange rate regimes but less constraining—and thus, less hierarchical—than fixed exchange rates. At a third step, a country adopts the currency of a foreign state as its own, a process known as "dollarization" but actually more general than the name implies.¹⁷ Even though small amounts of the national currency may remain in circulation, the country uses the foreign currency as its primary legal tender. At this step, without variable foreign reserves to cushion the impact of external shocks, the coun-

15. See Cohen 1998, esp. chap. 5.

16. Floating exchange rates can be managed or free (not managed), but the difference is not important for my purposes here. A country may also fix its exchange rate relative to a "basket" of foreign currencies or some international asset such as the International Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Rights (itself a composite of national currency prices). Since the nominal anchor for the currency is diverse, fixing the exchange rate limits domestic monetary policy autonomy but does not give significant influence to any other state. This regime also implies little economic hierarchy, and I treat it below in the same category as floating exchange rates.

17. Several countries in francophone Africa retained the French franc as their legal tender, for instance.

try directly imports A's monetary policy; the quantity of currency in circulation depends not on B's policy decisions, but entirely on A's monetary policy. Fixed exchange rates and dollarization differ only in the ease with which B can change the value of its currency. In dollarization, B can alter its exchange rate only by "de-dollarizing" and reissuing its own national currency, which can involve considerable transactions costs and financial penalties as international investors may interpret B's decision to reissue its own currency as a decision to inflate its money supply at a faster rate than A's. Through dollarization, or its close cousin, currency boards, A acquires substantial control over B's monetary policy.

Since the decision to end circulation of a national currency and adopt another country's currency as one's own has enormous symbolic significance—akin to adopting another country's flag—it is not made lightly.¹⁸ Debates over fixed exchange rates and, especially, dollarization typically focus on issues of economic independence and foreign control. To take these steps is to formally and consciously acknowledge that the country is subordinating itself, at least in part, to the decisions of another. That dollarization is symptomatic of great hierarchy is supported by the long list of "microstates" that have adopted a foreign currency as their legal tender, including Andorra (euro), Northern Cyprus (Turkish lira), Liechtenstein (Swiss franc), and the Marshall Islands (U.S. dollar).¹⁹ Since exchange rate regimes are typically chosen with only minimal pressure from the anchor country, but are nonetheless constraining, it can be presumed that the control acquired by the dominant state has at least some measure of legitimacy.

Exchange rate regimes are coded here into a four-point scale ranging from various floating exchange rate mechanisms, to a crawling peg relative to the dollar, a fixed exchange rate to the dollar, and finally to a "merged" currency in the form of either a currency board or dollarization.²⁰ At each step on this scale, the tie between the country's currency and the dollar becomes tighter

18. Cohen 1998, 35–39.

19. Cohen 2003, 165.

20. Exchange rate regimes have been studied in some detail and coded in standardized form by the IMF. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), in turn, differentiate between the formal or announced exchange rate regime reported by the IMF and the de facto exchange rate regime actually followed by countries, which is preferred because it is closer to the relational conception of authority used here. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) provide a "fine" fifteen-point scale of exchange rate regimes, but this is far more detailed than necessary for my purposes here. Steps 9–15 of their scale are recoded as zero, steps 8–5 are recoded as one, steps 3–4 are recoded as two, and steps 1–2 are recoded as three. This conforms with Reinhart and Rogoff's "coarse" scale, with the exception of the final two categories, which they treat as a single step. Meissner and Coomes (2004) have extended Reinhart and Rogoff's data to identify the "anchor" currency (if any), or the currency to which another fixes its currency.




Figure 3.2 U.S. economic hierarchy, average score by year and indicator, 1950–2000

and more costly to break, giving the United States more control over the subordinate country's monetary policy. This index is also normalized by its highest value in 1995 (common to eleven countries, mostly on the Caribbean littoral). Figure 3.2 displays the global average of the index from 1950 to 2000. As countries fixed their exchange rates to the dollar over the 1950s and 1960s, the index steadily rose, then declined with the end of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate regime, recovered with the Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the International Money Fund (IMF) (adopted in January 1976, codifying the new floating rate system), and then declined again with the movement toward the European Monetary System and eventual monetary union. The index began to rise after 1990 as several emerging markets started to fix their currencies to the dollar once more and countries on the Caribbean littoral began to dollarize.

Economic hierarchy is also implied by trade dependence. Trade has long been understood to create the potential for political influence.²¹ This key insight parallels that of independent alliances in security hierarchies. If a state has many trade partners, it is likely to have greater political autonomy and any at-

21. Hirschman 1980; Keohane and Nye 1977; Baldwin 1985.

tempt to manipulate trade for political purposes will be ineffective. If a country is highly dependent on trade with another, however, it is vulnerable to the influence of that state. Countries trade for many reasons. In most cases, governments only indirectly influence the dyadic pattern of trade as firms and entrepreneurs make the microlevel decisions on imports and exports that aggregate into trade dependence. Unlike military personnel and exchange rate regimes, and more like independent alliances, trade patterns may well arise without explicit government decisions being made.²² Nonetheless, the failure of governments over the long term to diversify their trading partners indicates a tacit acceptance of the dominant state's potential influence and therefore its legitimacy and authority.

Relative trade dependence is measured as each country's total trade with the United States divided by its own GDP, minus similar ratios for the other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (China, France, Great Britain, and Russia, along with the United States, collectively known as the P5). The index is truncated at a zero (no hierarchy) and normalized to one for the highest value in 1995 (Canada). Countries that trade with the United States more (as percentage of their GDP) than with all the other P5 states combined are relatively trade dependent, and countries that trade more with the other P5 states than with the United States are relatively independent.²³ The average level of relative trade dependence has fluctuated over time, reaching highs in the 1970s as trade reoriented itself to the United States in North America, South America, and the Middle East in the wake of the oil shocks and recessions in Europe, and then returned to its historic range (see figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2 suggests that until the late 1970s the indices of exchange rate regime and relative trade dependence moved in opposite directions. The average cross-sectional correlation between the indices is 0.30, stronger than the equivalent correlations between the component indicators of security hierarchy. As with the security measures, I compute an aggregate indicator of U.S. economic hierarchy as the simple sum of two indices, again normalized to one

22. On government's strategic manipulations of trade, though, see Kastner 2009.

23. Although capturing some portion of the variance in outside partners, this measure is imperfect in two ways. It depends on actual rather than potential trade with other partners. Even though a country presently trades disproportionately with the United States, it may import or export relatively standardized commodities that could quickly and easily be diverted to other countries. In addition, a country may have significant trade relations with states other than the P5 members, most likely Japan and other European Union (EU) members. Nonetheless, this measure provides a "first cut" at capturing a country's alternatives to trade with the United States. This measure captures something closer to the notion of sensitivity rather than vulnerability dependence as developed by Keohane and Nye (1977, 12–17).

for 1995 (Canada). Given the countervailing trends in the components, the aggregate measure declines steadily until the late 1980s, when it starts to rise again in response to globalization.

As with the measures of security hierarchy above, there is no principled reason to choose one of these measures of economic hierarchy over the others. In the statistical analyses in chapters 4 and 5, the index of relative trade dependence does appear to possess somewhat greater predictive validity than the index of exchange rate regimes, suggesting that it may be capturing something closer to the construct of economic hierarchy. Again, I focus on the aggregate indicator simply for convenience in the remainder of the chapter.

Construct Validity

The measures described above are intended to capture not purely coercive relations between states but rather the authority and legitimate coercion that are central to hierarchical relationships. All four indicators reflect the more or less discretionary nature of the ties between dominant and subordinate states and thus the implicit conferral of authority by the latter to the former. As Kenneth Waltz argues, the distribution of capabilities is beyond the ability of any one country to change; even if a country attempts to gain advantage by spending more on defense or growing more rapidly, its opponent can counter these moves by redoubling its own efforts. It is these inequalities in capabilities that allow one state to coerce another.²⁴ The measures here, however, imply a measure of choice and, unlike the distribution of capabilities, an ability to alter outcomes unilaterally. As noted, subordinates confer authority on a dominant state when they accept its troops on their soil or use its currency as their own. Likewise, states are indirectly signaling that they recognize the authority of the dominant state when they fail to make efforts to diversify their alliances or trading partners. Without detailed, case-specific information, we cannot know whether subordinate states and their populations accept these hierarchical relationships as truly legitimate or not, and even in specific cases legitimacy is not directly knowable given incentives for strategic misrepresentation. But the discretion in these policies and their enduring nature clearly separate these measures analytically from those intended to capture more purely coercive relationships between states.

Like all measures of theoretical constructs, these indicators of security and economic hierarchy are undoubtedly imperfect reflections of an inherently unobservable reality. Nonetheless, the proposed measures possess some degree

24. Waltz 1979, 97–99.

of face validity. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 array countries for 1965 and 1995, respectively, across the two aggregate indicators of security and economic hierarchy described above. These figures are the empirical counterparts to the analytic diagram presented in figure 2.1. The years are selected somewhat arbitrarily—other years would look quite similar—but they illustrate nicely both the cross-sectional variation in hierarchy and changes over time. For presentational reasons, not all countries can be identified, but as many as possible are listed. Readers should also note that, in an effort to display as many countries as clearly as possible, the scale on the horizontal axis is different in the two figures.

Security hierarchy is measured along the horizontal axis. Panama is the most subordinate country in both periods, but its security hierarchy measure declined by more than half over 30 years as the number of United States troops was reduced. Other countries map onto an intuitive pattern, with nearly all Latin American and European states reflecting a degree of security hierarchy in their absence of any independent alliances. Those states commonly regarded as American “clients,” such as the Philippines, or “supporters,” such as Japan, generally take on higher values. Economic hierarchy is displayed along the vertical axis. Canada is the most economically subordinate country in both periods. Again, providing a measure of face validity, countries fall mostly into natural categories, with many states on the Caribbean littoral and widely regarded clients of the United States such as Saudi Arabia taking relatively high values in both periods due to their dependence on trade. Taken together, the overall pattern that emerges is relatively intuitive. The states of the Caribbean littoral cluster toward the north-central portion of the figures, representing relatively high levels of both security and economic hierarchy. European countries cluster in the south-central portion of the diagram and move further south over time, indicating relatively high levels of security hierarchy throughout, but declining economic hierarchy, especially as the continent becomes more economically integrated. Although only a few country labels can appear in the southeast corner, many countries are not subordinate to the United States in both periods.

Since these indicators are all normalized by the most hierarchical dyad in each dimension in 1995, it is unlikely that Canada or similar countries are in relationships of empire with the United States, although Panama in the 1960s with very high scores on both dimensions is undoubtedly an informal empire and perhaps more. This method of empirically scaling the various relations of countries with the United States does not permit easy conversion to the analytic categories of figure 2.1, a topic to which I shall return below. Nonetheless, the countries that intuition suggests would be most subordinate to the United States typically fall in the southeast quadrant of the figures, suggesting




Figure 3.3 U.S. security and economic hierarchy, 1965

that they are subordinate in security affairs; the northwest quadrant, indicating that they are subordinate in economic policy; or the northeast quadrant, implying that they are subordinate to some degree in both security and economic relations. That these arrays generally make sense suggests that the indicators possess at least some measure of face validity.

There is, of course, some error in capturing security or economic hierarchy by these measures. Most important, there are several "false negatives" in which countries that I suspect are subordinate to the United States fail to score positively on one or more indicators. In chapter 2, for instance, I describe the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands as quintessential cases of protectorates, but neither country is formally allied with the United States, an act rendered unnecessary after ceding control over their foreign policies to Washington, nor hosts any American troops, which are deployed nearby in Guam (a formal dependency of the United States). Despite their clearly subordinate status, they score relatively low on these indicators. Similarly, Saudi Arabia is at least partially subordinate to the United States but, except for the period following the Persian Gulf War in 1991, does not possess any significant number of American troops on its soil or an alliance, even though its military bases in the northern desert were built to American military specifications in the 1970s and 1980s and remain ready to receive Amer-




Figure 3.4 U.S. security and economic hierarchy, 1995

ican forces on short notice when necessary.²⁵ Likewise, countries are coded as economically subordinate to the United States only when their currency is fixed directly to the dollar. This excludes many indirect monetary linkages. Thus, the Federal Republic of Germany is coded as fixing the deutsch mark to the dollar from 1950 to 1970, but Belgium, which fixed its currency to Germany's from 1956 on, is not considered to be fixed to the dollar, although it is indirectly. In the same way, many countries in francophone Africa fixed their currencies to the franc while the franc was fixed to the dollar. The number of countries linked to the dollar is, thus, biased downwards, especially in the first two decades of the period studied here. This may account for the lack of predictive validity of the index of exchange rate regimes in some subsequent tests.

In all of these cases, the measures used appear to undercount the degree of subordination that exists; analyzing the unique situations of particular countries confirms the relevance of the general measures, but also serves as a caution in interpreting the results. On the other hand, there are no obvious "false

25. This measurement problem may become worse in the future as the United States increasingly shifts to a "lily pad" strategy of fewer forward bases and more rapidly deployable forces. At the same time, such a strategy would represent a real reduction in authority as the United States would no longer exert the same degree of control over the foreign policies of its subordinates.

positives" in which the indicators imply some measure of hierarchy, but intuition or a knowledge of the country's unique circumstances suggests otherwise. This implies that the patterns reported here are likely to be biased against finding U.S. hierarchy even where it exists and the tests conducted in later chapters will be similarly biased against the propositions being analyzed.

In addition to face validity, which rests mostly on the fit between the measures and our intuitive understanding of the theoretical construct, validity can be more systematically assessed by examining whether the measures of security and economic hierarchy, respectively, correlate relatively highly with one another (convergent validity) and, in turn, fail to correlate highly with the next most closely related analytic construct (discriminant validity), coercive capabilities or "power" as it is traditionally conceived in international relations theory.²⁶ Table 3.1 presents the averages of fifty-one annual correlations between the measures of security hierarchy, economic hierarchy, and coercive capabilities. Table 3.2 presents the averages of these correlations by category.

Coercive capabilities are traditionally measured by material resources, especially by population, GDP, major power status, the number of military personnel, or the state's overall capability score (a composite indicator). As we would expect, and as a baseline for further comparison, the various indicators of coercive capabilities correlate with one another at 0.47 (table 3.2). Although not perfectly congruent, this implies that these widely used indicators are all capturing the same (or similar dimensions) underlying theoretical construct of coercive capabilities. Likewise, the indicators of security hierarchy are closely related to one another, averaging 0.58, as are the indicators of economic hierarchy, averaging 0.61. Like the indicators of coercive capabilities, the measures of security and economic hierarchy possess relatively strong convergent validity.²⁷ Interestingly, the indicators of security and economic hierarchy do not correlate well with each other—the average correlation is 0.19—implying that it is not inappropriate to treat these two dimensions as separate and autonomous spheres of political authority.²⁸

26. Trochim 2001, 71–73.

27. One possible objection is that the average correlations are inflated by including both the component measures and the aggregate measures of security and economic hierarchy in their respective matrices. However, the capability score is also an aggregate indicator composed of measures of energy consumption, iron and steel production (both highly correlated with real GDP), military expenditures, military personnel, total population, and urban population. Not surprisingly, the highest correlations between the various measures of coercive capacity are those between capability and its components.

28. Even though the average correlations within the dimensions of security and economic hierarchy are relatively high, some of the intradimensional correlations, such as that between the indices of military personnel and independent alliances, are similar to this average between all

TABLE 3.1.

Average of annual bivariate correlations between indicators of security hierarchy, economic hierarchy, and coercive capability, 1950–2000^f

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.
1. Index of military personnel	1.0										
2. Index of independent alliances	0.21	1.0									
3. Index of security hierarchy	0.80	0.73	1.0								
4. Index of exchange rate regimes	0.04	0.25	0.17	1.0							
5. Index of relative trade dependence	0.05	0.33	0.24	0.30	1.0						
6. Index of economic hierarchy	0.07	0.34	0.26	0.95	0.57	1.0					
7. Population	<i>0.04</i>	<i>-0.05</i>	<i>-0.00</i>	<i>-0.04</i>	<i>-0.05</i>	<i>-0.04</i>	1.0				
8. Real GDP (1996 dollars)	<i>0.19</i>	<i>0.32</i>	<i>0.32</i>	<i>0.03</i>	<i>0.04</i>	<i>0.05</i>	<i>-0.06</i>	1.0			
9. Major power (dummy)	<i>0.16</i>	<i>0.05</i>	<i>0.15</i>	<i>-0.04</i>	<i>-0.07*</i>	<i>-0.01*</i>	0.52	0.20	1.0		
10. Number of military personnel	<i>0.14</i>	<i>-0.03</i>	<i>0.08</i>	<i>-0.06</i>	<i>-0.09</i>	<i>-0.06</i>	0.76	0.06	0.73	1.0	
11. Capability score	<i>0.24</i>	<i>0.08</i>	<i>0.21</i>	<i>-0.05</i>	<i>-0.03</i>	<i>-0.01</i>	0.68	0.19	0.77	0.90	1.0

Security hierarchy indicators in boldface.

Economic hierarchy indicators in boldface italics.

Coercive capability indicators in italics.

Security hierarchy indicators by economic hierarchy indicators in regular font.

Security hierarchy indicators by coercive capability indicators in regular font underscored.

Economic hierarchy indicators by coercive capability indicators in italics underscored.

^fNote: Number of observations varies by variable and year.

*1991–2000 only. Prior to 1991, all major powers are also permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and are used in the computation of the relative trade dependence indicator. As a result, it is impossible to compute the relative trade indicator for those countries and they are coded as missing. In turn, STATA cannot compute a correlation for which there is no variation in one of the variables. After 1991, Germany and Japan are coded as major powers.

TABLE 3.2
 Convergent and discriminant validity: Average correlations from Table 3.1, by category of indicator

	Security hierarchy indicators	Economic hierarchy indicators	Coercive capability indicators
Security hierarchy indicators (1-3 in Table 3.1)	0.58		
Economic hierarchy indicators (4-6 in Table 3.1)	0.19	0.61	
Coercive capability indicators (7-11 in Table 3.1)	0.13	-0.03	0.47

Perhaps more important, neither security nor economic hierarchy is closely related to measures of coercive capability. The correlations between the indicators of security hierarchy and coercive capabilities are quite low, averaging only 0.13. Surprisingly, security hierarchy is usually *positively* and sometimes strongly related to the measures of coercive potential, especially GDP, major power status, and capability. This implies, contrary to realist expectations, that the countries normally considered to be among the most capable of exerting coercion in international affairs are also likely to be among those most subordinate to the United States. Indicators of economic hierarchy and coercive capabilities are virtually unrelated to one another, averaging -0.03 . Thus, not only do the hierarchy indicators possess convergent validity, they also possess strong discriminant validity. This does not necessarily prove that these indicators are capturing the inherently unobservable construct of hierarchy, of course, but it shows that these measures are capturing something distinct from traditional measures of power in international relations.

Patterns of U.S. Hierarchy

The most striking fact about the pattern of authority in the modern world system is the global reach or breadth of the security and economic hierarchies controlled by the United States. Although there is considerable variation, the United States dominates at least one and typically more than one country in every region of the world except Central and South Asia. Even without systematic data for other potentially dominant states, as explained above, it seems

the indicators of security and economic hierarchy. It remains a matter of judgment whether to treat the indicators of hierarchy as single or multiple dimensions.

safe to conclude that no other country in the period discussed here—and probably not even Great Britain at the height of its empire—possesses similar global reach.

In addition, the dominance of the United States is multidimensional, built on both security and economic hierarchy, especially earlier in the period under review. As suggested in figures 3.1 and 3.2, the two pillars of American dominance have evolved at different times and different rates. Overall, security hierarchy peaked in the early 1950s and then declined, reaching a plateau by the early 1970s. While America's coercive capabilities have skyrocketed in relative terms after the Cold War, inspiring talk of a unipolar era, these indicators suggest there was little change in the authority of the United States after 1990.²⁹ Given the weak correlation between indicators of security hierarchy and coercive capabilities (see tables 3.1 and 3.2), this divergence should not be surprising. While the "power" of the United States has risen over the last two decades, its authority appears to have remained relatively static. Perhaps more than any other fact, this divergence highlights that hierarchy and coercive capabilities are different and independent theoretical constructs.

The pattern of economic hierarchy is somewhat more complicated, with the index of exchange rate regimes increasing until the end of the Bretton Woods monetary system in 1971, declining sharply in the 1980s, then rising slowly in the 1990s, and the index of relative trade dependence declining steadily over time except for the dramatic surge in the 1970s. Overall, economic hierarchy appears to decline throughout the period until the takeoff of globalization in the early 1990s. Here, again, there appears to be a growing divergence between the declining economic "power" of the United States, which continues to erode with its mounting debt and increasingly uncompetitive industry, and its resurgent economic hierarchy.

As implied in figures 3.3 and 3.4, there is a strong regional clustering to the hierarchies possessed by the United States.³⁰ Regionally, the United States

29. See Krauthammer 1990/91.

30. Region is used here largely for descriptive convenience. Region may also have an independent analytic importance, given the ability of the United States to project power over distance. Troops may be concentrated in one or two countries in a region, but nonetheless play a political role in other nearby countries. Most American forces in Central America are stationed in Panama, but their presence there extends over neighboring countries. Similarly, most American troops in Europe are stationed in Germany but play a more expansive role in West European politics. These regional "spillover" effects introduce some thorny problems into the analysis. Even though America's troops in Panama loom large in Central America as a whole, because they have not themselves consented to the presence of these troops, other countries may not regard them as legitimate and, therefore, may reject the authority of the United States that they imply. For this reason, I use country-level observations in this study even though these may underestimate the extent of U.S. hierarchy. Nonetheless, because of the clustering of similar relationships, re-




Figure 3.5 U.S. hierarchy in North America, average score by year and indicator, 1950–2000




Figure 3.6 U.S. hierarchy in South America, average score by year and indicator, 1950–2000

dominates more states in North and South America, its traditional areas of concern, than elsewhere. The United States possesses at least a measure of hierarchy over nearly every country in its hemisphere (see figures 3.5 and 3.6). What Senator Henry Clay originally termed the “American system” begun under the Monroe Doctrine and expanded over the nineteenth century persists to this day. This dominance is especially strong over states on the Caribbean littoral. Many countries in the hemisphere possess an exclusive alliance with the United States through the multilateral Rio Pact, more formally known as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, which entered into force in 1948.³¹ It is this exclusive alliance, described by historian David Green as creating “a militarily closed hemisphere under United States domination,” that most clearly manifests the sphere of influence in the hemisphere.³² The United States also has extensive deployments of troops in states bordering on the Caribbean. Even though the size of the deployments is small compared to other regions, and is declining, only Western Europe has a greater proportion of countries hosting American troops. The large deployment in Panama, ostensibly to guard the canal, also gives the United States considerable reach within the region.

Economically, a relatively large proportion of countries in North and South America link their currencies to the dollar and possess high levels of relative trade dependence. Of the thirteen countries that had merged their currencies with the U.S. dollar in 2000, either adopting a currency board or dollarizing, nine were in Latin America, and of those, eight countries bordered on the Caribbean. And even though most countries are dependent on trade with the United States, only in North America are countries exclusively dependent on that trade, exchanging a greater share of their GDP with their northern neighbor than with all the other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council combined. The economic hierarchy of the United States in the region is both deep and broad. In both 1950 and 2000, nine of the ten countries that are most subordinate economically to the United States were found in the Western Hemisphere (table 3.3). America’s regional dominance appears strong and robust.

Although an exact mapping of countries onto the analytical categories of figure 2.1 is not possible, the countries on the Caribbean littoral, with relatively high levels of both security and economic hierarchy, approximate an in-

gion is used here as a convenient shorthand for summarizing key differences in U.S. hierarchy in different areas of the globe. On regional hierarchies, see Lake 2009.

31. Few countries that became independent after 1948 have joined the Pact. Mexico formally withdrew in 2004, calling for a new hemispheric agreement.

32. Green 1971. 260.

TABLE 3.3.
Countries most subordinate to the United States, 1950 and 2000

Index of security hierarchy		
	1950	2000
1	Panama	Iceland
2	Canada	Bahamas
3	Denmark	Grenada
4	Cuba	United Kingdom
5	Italy	Germany
6	Portugal	Belgium
7	Guatemala	Japan
8	Iceland	Italy
9	Belgium	Greece
10	Bolivia	Portugal
Index of economic hierarchy		
	1950	2000
1	Venezuela	Panama
2	Panama	Argentina
3	Canada	St. Vincent and the Grenadines
4	Liberia	Grenada
5	El Salvador	Malaysia
6	Nicaragua	Ecuador
7	Guatemala	Canada
8	Costa Rica	St. Kitts and Nevis
9	Haiti	Honduras
10	Mexico	Antigua and Barbados

formal empire, especially in the 1950s and 1960s. The countries of South America, on average, appear to be within only a sphere of influence in which they retain a large measure of foreign policy autonomy, but are proscribed from entering into security relationships with countries other than the United States, and in a weak economic zone dominated by Washington. Within each of these regions, however, there is considerable variation in the degree of hierarchy exercised by the United States, with countries such as Cuba actively denying and, in fact, challenging America's authority in the region.

After World War II, the United States extended its security and economic hierarchies beyond its immediate environs to Western Europe and Northeast Asia (see figures 3.7 and 3.8).³³ Perhaps reflecting the importance it attached to controlling the economic and security policies of its allies in the Cold War, the United States deployed troops and established exclusive security agreements that not only effectively deterred the Soviet Union, but that also lim-

33. Lake 1999a, chap. 5.




Figure 3.7 U.S. hierarchy in Western Europe, average score by year and indicator, 1950–2000




Figure 3.8 U.S. hierarchy in Northeast Asia, average score by year and indicator, 1950–2000

ited the foreign policy autonomy and potential for opportunism by its subordinates. Until the 1990s, the countries of Western Europe shared the largest overseas deployments of United States military forces. These same states were also embedded into an exclusive alliance network centered on NATO. Similar to the countries of South America, the states of Western Europe appear to form at least a sphere of influence, clearly so in the early postwar years. With the end of the Cold War, America's security hierarchies in Western Europe showed the first signs of transformation, with the number of troops and the range of countries in which they were stationed starting to decline after 1990. Nonetheless, a number of important countries, including the United Kingdom and Germany, remained highly subordinate to the United States (see figure 3.4 for 1995). In 2000, a larger proportion of the countries most subordinate to the United States in security were in Europe than in the 1950s (table 3.3).

Likewise, the United States used its relative prosperity during and after World War II to assert new economic dominance over its former great power rivals. Partly by plan and partly due to an unexpected dollar shortage after the war, the Bretton Woods monetary institutions created a *de facto* exchange rate regime in which the major countries in the region fixed their currencies to the dollar. Thus, the United States dollar became the effective medium of international exchange and gave Washington unprecedented leverage over and responsibility for the international monetary system and, more important, the monetary policies of many countries in Western Europe. The United States also insisted that its new subordinates end their systems of imperial preference and liberalize their trade. This suggests that the United States possessed at least a weak economic zone over the region. Combined with the strength of the American economy, this led to a radical reorientation of trade flows and created a degree of relative trade dependence upon the United States. Unlike in the Western Hemisphere, however, the economic dominance of the United States did not endure. By 1975, the United States had broken the fixed exchange rate regime, largely for domestic political and economic reasons,³⁴ and replaced it with a floating rate system that reduced the special role of the dollar in the international economy and allowed other states, especially in Europe, to reassert a measure of monetary policy autonomy. After 1975, with the rise of floating exchange rates and various attempts at European monetary unification, eventually realized in the creation of the euro in 1999, the special role of the dollar in maintaining America's economic hierarchy was lost. Starting in a weak economic zone, by the early 1970s America's economic hierarchies in Western Europe had clearly vanished.

34. See Gowa 1983.

The relationship of the United States with Japan and South Korea, forming the core of Northeast Asia, in many ways looks and follows a trajectory similar to that of Western Europe, especially in security.³⁵ From the early 1950s, and spiking in the Korean War, Japan and South Korea hosted large numbers of American military forces and were partners in exclusive bilateral agreements that gave them virtually no "outside options." By the 1960s, in turn, security hierarchy had reached a relatively stable plateau representing a solid sphere of influence. Although security hierarchy has trended gradually downwards over time, the end of the Cold War did not lead to a significant change before 2000 as in Western Europe. With Japan and later South Korea emphasizing export-led growth to the United States in response to the oil shocks, economic hierarchy increased dramatically in the 1970s, but returned to its historic levels after 1980, probably constituting an even weaker economic zone than in Western Europe. Economic hierarchy fell significantly in the late 1990s. At most, the United States today possesses only a weak sphere of influence over the countries in Northeast Asia.

The average level of U.S. security or economic hierarchy is significantly lower in all other regions. The hierarchies of the United States in Southeast Asia remain limited primarily to the Philippines (in both security and economics), Australia (in security), Singapore and Thailand (in economics). On average, security hierarchy is quite low, while economic hierarchy has been growing steadily over time (see figure 3.9). Central and South Asia, by contrast, is the one region where the United States has had no subordinates in security policy during the last 50 years (figure 3.10). In the Middle East and North Africa, the United States dominated particular countries, especially Saudi Arabia (in economics and possibly in security) and Turkey (in security), but never exercised significant authority over most states in the area (see figure 3.11). Sub-Saharan Africa is even less under the sway of the United States, although Liberia was highly subordinate in economic relations in earlier years and Guinea, Malawi, and Zimbabwe become more subordinate for brief periods starting in the late 1980s as they experimented with various forms of dollarization (see figure 3.12).

Overall, and despite the end of the Cold War, the security and economic hierarchies of the United States remain surprisingly robust, especially in the

35. Northeast Asia is defined as North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. Unfortunately, data are missing entirely for economic hierarchy in North Korea and Taiwan, leaving only South Korea and Japan "in" the region. Data on Japan for security hierarchy are missing for 1950 and 1951. Because of the war, U.S. troops deployed in South Korea are unusually high; I exclude South Korea from the index of security hierarchy until 1955. De facto, this region is smaller than the others defined here and more sensitive to changes in individual countries.




Figure 3.9 U.S. hierarchy in Southeast Asia, average score by year and indicator, 1950–2000




Figure 3.10 U.S. hierarchy in Central and South Asia, average score by year and indicator, 1950–2000




Figure 3.11 U.S. hierarchy in Middle East/North Africa, average score by year and indicator, 1950–2000




Figure 3.12 U.S. hierarchy in Africa, average score by year and indicator, 1950–2000

regions it has historically dominated. Although the proportion of countries subordinate to the United States in security relations has declined, with the most significant drop occurring between the early 1950s and early 1970s, the overall level of security hierarchy has remained relatively constant for the last three decades. Military deployments may fluctuate in number, but the countries hosting those troops and the alliance structures more generally are quite static, evolving only very slowly even after the end of the Cold War. Similarly, after falling steadily, the average level of economic hierarchy started to rise again in the mid-1980s, before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite the ebbs and flows of economic competition, these indices suggest the United States continues to exert remarkable authority over the economies of many countries but, as always, hierarchy is a shifting and dynamic relationship.

Constructs without empirical indicators are of little practical use and ultimately cannot be shown to be more useful in explaining real world politics than the alternatives. For this reason, this chapter has devoted substantial attention to developing original measures of security and economic hierarchy, assessing the validity of these indicators, and sketching the general empirical pattern they reveal.

I do not claim that military personnel per capita, independent alliances, exchange rate regimes, and relative trade dependence are perfect measures of security and economic hierarchy in the modern world system, only that they are reasonably valid indicators that appear to capture some portion of the theoretical construct of authority relations between states. Other measures may be more valid, and I hope that more creative readers will see new and better ways to measure the concepts I have tried to advance here. More studies, better insights, and more complete data will be necessary before we can fully map out the variations in international hierarchy.

One strong conclusion of this chapter, however, is that the measures of hierarchy are capturing something different about world politics than the usual measures of power in international relations, or what I more precisely refer to here as coercive capabilities. The measures of hierarchy successfully discriminate between the two forms of power and closely related concepts of authority and coercion. The reason is simple, but telling. Although some small countries are subordinate, other small countries are not. Conversely, even as some large countries are completely autonomous, others are highly subordinate to the United States. Any attribute that indicates that one country is more "powerful" than another will thus fail to correlate closely with U.S. hierarchy. The authority relationships featured in this study cannot be reduced either analytically or empirically to traditional conceptions of power in international relations.

Domination

Wielding authority over others alters the behavior of states. To earn and sustain their authority, dominant states must (1) produce political orders that benefit subordinates, even when they have no immediate interest in doing so; (2) discipline subordinates who violate rules and, especially, threaten or reject their authority; and (3) commit credibly not to abuse the authority they have been granted.

Taken together, this chapter on dominant states and the next on subordinate states identify the substantive behaviors that make up authority contracts in international relations and the conditions necessary for these contracts to be stable. Both dominant and subordinate states have to be better off in hierarchic than in strictly anarchic relations for the contract to be fulfilled. Subordinates must yield some portion of their sovereignty and accept their status as legitimate, appropriate, and perhaps even necessary. In return, they receive a political order that allows them to escape in part the state of nature that is international anarchy. Dominant states, in turn, get to set the rules of their international orders in ways that benefit not only others, but also themselves. Yet, at the same time, they must bear the governance costs of producing those orders, disciplining subordinates, and credibly committing not to misuse the authority they earn.¹ This is the price they pay for dominance.

1. On governance costs, see Lake 1999a, 58–65. For their effect on the conflict behavior of states, see Wimberley 2007.

International Political Orders

The core of any relational authority contract is the provision of a political order by the dominant state in exchange for compliance and legitimacy by the subordinate state. All political orders must include security against violence resulting in physical harm, an assurance that property will not be subject to constant challenges, and an expectation that promises and agreements will be kept. Protection of persons, property, and promises benefits subordinate and dominant states alike and greatly facilitates economic exchange and cooperation. Creating order, on the other hand, carries inescapable costs for dominant states.

It is typically in the interests of dominant states to provide international orders for themselves and their subordinates. Yet, as dominant states benefit not only from order, but also from the authority they acquire over subordinates, we can expect them to pay the costs of producing order for subordinates even when they receive no direct benefit from doing so. After exploring the benefits of order for dominant states, I examine the corresponding costs. To capture whether dominant states produce order when they otherwise would not, I then test whether the United States is more or less likely to come to the aid of subordinate states involved in international crises. I defer the larger question of whether hierarchy "pays" to the final section of this chapter. A full accounting requires not just the costs and benefits of producing order but must also weigh the costs of disciplining subordinates and credibly limiting the dominant state's potential for opportunism.

The Benefits of Order

Dominant states benefit from international order in three substantial ways. They need not fear threats to their security from subordinates. They can bias the rules of the order in ways that favor themselves. And they gain legitimacy from subordinates for actions against third parties, especially those who would otherwise disrupt the status quo. Dominant states also gain a host of secondary benefits from order, foremost of which is greater economic exchange and deeper economic integration and specialization.

Dominant states enjoy a type of segmented security in which they are less likely to be threatened by and do not need to protect themselves to the same extent from their subordinates as they do from other states. In their realms, dominant states exercise a "police power," as President Theodore Roosevelt asserted in his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, but not necessarily the more extensive and costly military power they wield against those outside their realms and with whom they interact in more anarchic relations.

The United States, for instance, has long benefited from the absence of direct military threats from subordinates in the Western Hemisphere. Strikingly, there are no military fortifications or defenses along either its northern or southern borders, although the border with Mexico is being increasingly sealed against illegal immigrants and justified as part of the larger "war on terror." Indeed, reflecting their unusual nature, those instances when external powers have sought to advance their interests against the United States in league with disaffected subordinates in the region stand out as significant diplomatic crises in American history. In the infamous Zimmerman telegram of 1917, for instance, the German foreign minister offered Mexico the "lost provinces" of Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas if it would declare war on the United States should Washington join the Allies in the war against his country. In this overture, Germany was attempting to play off tensions between the United States and Mexico, which were at the boiling point after the American occupation of Veracruz in 1914 and General Pershing's 350 mile incursion into Mexico following Pancho Villa's cross-border raids. Although the telegram was likely not decisive, it confirmed German perfidy in the eyes of President Woodrow Wilson, who brought the United States into World War I only weeks later.² Similarly, Russia's support for the revolutionary regime of Fidel Castro, a nationalist leader who opposed America's historical and economic dominance, and its placing of missiles in Cuba sparked the most dangerous nuclear crisis of the Cold War.³ That the United States responded so vigorously to these threats underscores both how vigilant the country is in maintaining its informal empire and how rare are the challenges to its dominance in the region. Such crises, although important in themselves, also reveal the highly unusual nature of "normal" hemispheric relations and the largely demilitarized relations between the United States and its subordinates. Relieved of the burdens of militarizing its borders and maintaining troops for continental defense, the United States has been able to deploy its unprecedented military forces for use further abroad.

Similar benefits derive from America's less hierarchical relations with Western Europe, relations characterized by Karl Deutsch as a pluralistic security community in which the use of force is not contemplated between members.⁴ Even as the United States has accepted partial responsibility for protecting the countries of Western Europe against external threats since 1945, it has not had

2. Knock 1992, 116–117; LaFeber 1994, 293.

3. On U.S.-Cuban relations after the revolution, see Smith 1996, 164–168. On the missile crisis itself, see Allison 1971, and the voluminous literature that has grown up around this event.

4. Deutsch 1957. See also Adler and Barnett 1998. On Europe as a security community, see Buzan and Wæver 2003, chap. 11.

to prepare itself for threats from within that community, which contains some of the richest and most technologically capable states who might otherwise be rivals on the world stage. As in the Western Hemisphere, albeit to different extents and in different ways, the political order that mitigates threats to the security of subordinate states in Europe also serves to reduce threats to the United States as well. Although the absence of threats from its closest neighbors and some of its most capable potential competitors has acquired a taken-for-granted quality, the security provided by these demilitarized relations is of immeasurable benefit to the United States.

Dominant states also benefit from their ability to bias the political order in ways that advantage themselves. Not all political orders are alike. Even if all are better off having some rules over none, any set of rules will benefit some actors relative to others. Rules are rarely neutral. They define whose security is defended, whose property is protected, and whose promises are enforced.

Dominant states—or any ruler—can be expected to establish rules that are relatively beneficial to themselves, constrained only by their need to secure the compliance of their subordinates. As argued throughout this book, rulers are dependent upon the legitimacy of their rule, which can only be conferred by their subjects. The rules set by a dominant state must benefit subordinates on net relative to their next best alternative. Within this constraint, however, dominant states may have considerable latitude in defining the particular sets of rules that apply.

Bias in political orders exists in numerous ways. Threats to the security of the United States, for instance, take precedence over other possible threats. In the first nine months of the administration of George W. Bush, for instance, the president and his advisors were sounding alarms about the emergence of China as a peer competitor and were seeking to build international cooperation around a new policy of containment, a view that was shared by some in Asia, but certainly not all, and treated quite skeptically in Europe.⁵ All this changed after September 11, 2001, when terrorism was elevated to top priority in American security policy. Both China and terrorism pose threats to American-led international orders and affect different subordinates in different ways. Japan, for instance, is likely to be far more affected by the first than the second. Nonetheless, the priority attached to each threat is decided almost exclusively by the United States.

Similarly, property rights at the international level are unevenly defined and enforced and are often biased toward the economic interests of the United States. Indeed, the United States has been instrumental in defining what can

be “owned.” As the comparative advantage of the United States moved increasingly toward knowledge-intensive industries in the 1980s and 1990s, for instance, new demands arose from American firms for greater protections for intellectual property. With support from Europe and Japan, and over the opposition of most developing countries, the United States became the primary advocate of the successful push to incorporate intellectual property rights into the World Trade Organization (WTO), codify the rules in ways that advantage producers of intellectual property, and subject those rules to the WTO’s binding dispute settlement mechanism.⁶ Facing technological change in the same period, the United States also altered property rights in aviation and telecommunications in ways that advantaged its national firms.⁷

In a similar manner, the United States benefits from a privileged position in the international monetary and financial regime, which allows it to finance its global role and high rates of current consumption at relatively lower cost than other countries. The special role of the dollar as an international medium of exchange earns substantial seigniorage for the United States. Technically, *seigniorage* is the excess of a nominal value of a currency over its cost of production, but practically it is an alternative source of revenue for the state, sometimes referred to as the “inflation tax,” that accrues when governments print money to cover current expenditures. In relatively high-inflation countries, seigniorage can range as high as 2–4 percent of GDP per year.⁸ The wider the use of a nation’s currency, in turn, the greater the opportunity for seigniorage. In the case of international monies, those used outside their countries of national origin for transactions or as a store of value, the issuing country earns “international seigniorage” in the form of an interest-free loan through which it pays for current consumption with paper money that is then not used as a claim on assets. In 1995, the foreign circulation of dollars was conservatively estimated at some \$250 billion.⁹ The special role of the dollar also indirectly supports the ability of the United States to cover both its government and current account deficits by borrowing abroad more cheaply than would otherwise be possible.

It is impossible to identify, never mind measure, the benefits of all the various policy biases that favor the United States today. Yet, it is undeniable that

6. Barton et al. 2006, 139–143, 165–170.

7. Richards 1999; Cowhey and Richards 2006; Cowhey, Aronson, and Richards 2008. In most cases, the new property rights were set by the United States in league with industry allies in other key countries. The United States has agenda-setting power and can veto proposals, but it typically sets rules by creating new coalitions in partner countries to support its preferred outcomes.

8. Cohen 1998, 39–41.

9. *Ibid.*, 123–124.

the rules producing political order in its various hierarchies matter and that these rules are often slanted toward American interests. Cumulatively, the bias in favor of the United States may be quite substantial.

Finally, dominant countries also benefit from material and moral support for actions taken against third parties that threaten their interests or the order they create. The loyalty of subordinates, and the broader legitimacy conferred by their approval, facilitates action on the world stage by muting criticisms and, in some cases, providing additional resources in joint undertakings. Great Britain's "special relationship" and steadfast support for the United States since 1945, for example, has been central to America's foreign policy successes. Both publicly and behind the scenes, British leaders have been able to challenge critics of the United States more directly than could American presidents themselves, prevent the emergence of unified blocs of opposition within Europe and elsewhere, and serve as intermediaries to estranged friends as well as foes. This support has enlarged the scope of American action and, by reducing opposition, lowered the costs of policies pursued by the United States. This international support has, at times, also helped reduce domestic opposition to a president's policies.¹⁰

International support has often been central to the ability of the United States to isolate and sometimes retaliate against states that actively reject its authority and challenge the political orders it produces. Following the lead of the United States, for instance, the Organization of American States (OAS) suspended trade with Cuba in military goods in 1962 and imposed mandatory sanctions in 1964 by a vote of sixteen to one (four abstentions).¹¹ The efforts to punish Libya after the bombing of an American airliner over Scotland, in turn, would have been far less successful without the support of the many states in the international community who joined the economic actions and muted criticisms of America's uses of force. The coercion employed by the United States was generally accepted as necessary against a persistent challenger to its international orders.

More generally, as demonstrated in chapter 5, subordinates follow the leader by engaging in acts of symbolic obeisance and legitimating actions by dominant states. As shown there, subordinate states are far more likely to join multi-

10. For an interest-based account of the special relationship, see Louis and Bull 1986; for an affinity-based account, see Dumbrell 2001; and for a review of the recent period, see Riddell 2004. Despite their differences, all point to the valuable role of Britain as an intermediary for the United States in its relations with the rest of the world.

11. As the United States liberalized the embargo in 1975, the OAS repealed its sanctions. When the United States began to tighten the sanctions again in 1981, few Latin American countries followed suit. For a brief history of the Cuban sanctions, see <http://www.petersoninstitute.org/research/topics/sanctions/cuba.cfm> (accessed March 17, 2008).

national coalitions led by the United States than are nonsubordinates. Despite noteworthy exceptions such as Germany, for instance, America's subordinates in 2003 rallied to its side in the Iraq War even in the face of widespread opposition from other states. Although the material support of the coalition members was trivial, the diplomatic backing of over forty-nine countries was nonetheless important. The Bush administration labored to point out that the members of the coalition summed to approximately 1.23 billion people with a total GDP of \$22 trillion; represented peoples from every major "race, religion, and ethnicity in the world"; and included "nations from every continent on the globe." On this basis, the administration could still claim to have broad-based international support even after it failed to get approval for the war from the United Nations.¹²

In addition to these direct benefits of international order, dominant states also receive a range of secondary or indirect benefits as well. Foremost among these secondary benefits is deeper specialization and greater economic exchange and welfare. In chapter 5, I show that subordinates are more likely to be open to trade and that this effect is larger in economic relations between states that are both subordinate to the United States. The United States also gains from this greater economic specialization and exchange. International orders benefit American business and the economy more generally by permitting and facilitating unprecedented levels of international trade and investment. Globalization is not exogenous, but rests on the presence of effective political orders. In this way, the enormous benefits of economic integration for the United States must also be credited, in part, to the other substantial benefits of hierarchy.

The Costs of Producing Order

Dominant states provide order for their subordinates in many ways, at least three of which are essential. First, they assure the survival and territorial integrity of subordinates and limit coercion attempts by third parties. This external assurance of the security of subordinates is not an ironclad guarantee, for reasons of moral hazard (see below), but rather a form of extended deterrence contingent on reasonable action by the subordinates themselves. By stationing troops in the country, the dominant state both makes deterrence credible and, as a further check against opportunism, establishes a measure of authority over the subordinate's foreign policy.

12. Found at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030327-10.html>, accessed April 6, 2003. This site and list of participants is no longer available. Indeed, the list appears to have been modified without acknowledgment over time. See Shanker 2008.

Second, dominant states write and enforce rules on what can and cannot be owned and the conditions under which assets can be exchanged. As explained above, these property rights will most likely be biased in favor of the dominant country itself, but they are rules nonetheless that guide behavior in the contracting states and between private actors within those states. Memorably, Britain fought against the slave trade in the nineteenth century, just as the United States today pursues a war on international drug trafficking.¹³ These cases are notable for the conflict they engendered as changing norms in dominant states about what is and is not acceptably owned and traded clashed with vested interests in subordinate states. Similar tensions abound over the rules governing foreign investment in the world today, with the United States opposing expropriations, often with coercive force, and supporting principles of national treatment. But rather than indicating the absence of international property rights, these tensions suggest instead the very broad range of goods and services governed by clear and generally accepted rules and the enforcement powers that underlie these rules.¹⁴ Without necessarily requiring any particular set of domestic property rights or policies of free trade and investment, although that is preferred by the United States today, the setting and enforcement of property rights creates the conduits of international commerce through which globalization runs. Rules governing property rights, in turn, need not be limited to only economic goods. Dominant states also set rules on what weapons other countries are allowed to possess (e.g., nuclear weapons) and the conditions under which component and final military goods can be exchanged.

Third, dominant states establish general rules of international conduct and enforce these rules by punishing defections. In doing so, they help ensure that promises, once made, will be kept. By setting standards of behavior, dominant states help define cooperation in different issue areas and what constitutes defection that should be appropriately subject to retaliation. Doing so avoids cycles of mutual recriminations and retaliations set off by misperceptions and disagreements.¹⁵ In this way, authoritative rules are similar to self-enforcing

13. On anti-slavery, see Ray 1989; Kaufman and Pape 1999; Keene 2007. On drugs, see Friman 1996; Mares 2005.

14. While many rules governing property rights are generally accepted, some remain ambiguous or contested. The most interesting cases arise when new economic interests or norms in dominant states clash with rules they have already promulgated. Under pressure from environmentalists in the first instance and a varied coalition of gaming interests and moralists in the second, the United States sought to ban imports of non-dolphin-safe tuna and overseas internet gambling. In both cases, it was found in violation of the rules of the WTO. These cases defy easy resolution and differ from the more traditional Costa Rican case, discussed later in this chapter, where the rules and interests at stake were unambiguous.

15. Stein 1990, chap. 3; Downs, Rocke, and Siverson 1986.

international regimes negotiated between states under anarchy, but the rules may be limited to the dyad of a dominant and a single subordinate state or, perhaps, to a local network of subordinates, much as the international trade regime embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was limited in its initial membership to countries more or less subordinate to the United States.¹⁶ But in producing political orders, dominant states also go beyond setting rules to enforcing rules of behavior, discussed in more detail below as disciplining subordinates. This conception goes beyond standard regime theory in allowing for—and indeed, even expecting—enforcement of rules by dominant states wielding legitimate coercion against wayward subordinates.

With agreed upon and enforced rules—promises that are kept—information failures between states are less likely to occur or to escalate to conflict. This is, perhaps, one of the most beneficial activities carried out by dominant states. To the extent that violent conflicts arise because of asymmetrical information, or misperceptions about that information, strong and clear rules governing behavior will dampen the likelihood of war between dominant and subordinate states and between networks of states linked under a common leader.¹⁷ Authoritative rules within hierarchies allow states to escape at least in part the anarchic state of nature in which they would otherwise find themselves.

Dominant states need not carry out these tasks unilaterally in all cases. As noted in chapter 1, they may lead by coordinating the actions of others and helping resolve collective action problems that thwart effective cooperation. Yet, whether they carry out these tasks directly or indirectly, dominant states must have the ability to project coercive force to defend and discipline subordinates. Establishing that ability, whether by ruling the waves as Britain did in the nineteenth century or ruling the skies as the United States does today, is the central cost of dominance. The ability to project force over distance cannot simply be developed overnight, but rather rests on a substantial infrastructure of ships, aircraft, communications networks, forward deployments, and the like that must be built and sustained even when it is not being actively used.

One immediate measure of the costs of producing political order is, thus, overall defense spending. Unfortunately, annual military budgets blend together many different activities, including efforts by dominant states to defend themselves, to protect others, and to discipline subordinates. Total defense spending is not a very discriminating measure. In 1995, to focus on an aver-

16. Keohane 1984; Krasner 1983.

17. On bargaining theories of war, see Fearon 1995; Powell 1999. On misperception, see Jervis 1976.

age year after the end of the Cold War, defense spending by all countries around the world was approximately 1.6 percent of GDP. In that same year, U.S. defense spending was 3.7 percent of GDP, slightly less than one standard deviation higher.¹⁸ Had the United States been merely average that year, defense spending would have been about \$155 billion (current dollars) lower by this simple metric. Clearly, the United States carries a higher defense burden than the average country, though not significantly so.

Perhaps a more relevant comparison set is that of the other great powers. Evaluating defense spending in these countries, however, is complicated by the small number of cases and the unique international roles of each. Russia and China, great powers who are not themselves subordinate to any other state and who have few subordinates of their own to protect, devoted approximately 7.9 and 0.9 percent of GDP to defense spending in 1995, respectively. American defense spending was near the midpoint of this range. The Soviet Union consistently spent more on defense as a proportion of GDP than did the United States throughout the Cold War. In 1985, for example, Moscow spent 14.1 percent of GDP on the military, while the United States, at the height of the Reagan arms buildup, spent 5.9 percent. Given the difficulties of economic conversion, and perhaps reflecting continuing efforts to retain some world role, Russian defense spending in 1995 might be higher for "domestic" or residual reasons, suggesting that China might better reflect defense spending in a great power without responsibilities for producing order. By contrast, Great Britain and France are both linked to American hierarchies and, in turn, possess some residual subordinates from their former empires. Defense spending was 3.0 percent of GDP in Britain in 1995, and 4.0 in France, about the same as that in the United States. This suggests that the United States is not carrying a disproportionate cost due to its many hierarchies, or that perhaps because of its many hierarchies and the reduced threats to the United States from its many subordinates, its defense costs are not on average high, even relative to the other great powers.

Yet another metric is the share of global defense spending accounted for by the United States. This provides a sense of proportion not relative to GDP, as above, but relative to likely opponents. The United States averaged about 34 percent of worldwide military expenditures in the period from 1950 to 1989, declining by decade until the 1980s, while the Soviet Union averaged 31 percent during this same period. This reflects the strong competition of the bipo-

18. All defense expenditures discussed in this section are drawn from the data on military spending provided by the National Capabilities dataset of the Correlates of War project; these are the same data used to calculate defense effort in chapter 5. See data appendix, country-year variables.

lar system and the threat each superpower posed to the other. Since 1989, however, the United States has accounted for roughly 35 percent of global defense spending, with Russia following far behind at 9 percent. Relative to the defense spending of its plausible rivals, the United States not only did not receive the expected "peace dividend," but it appears to be carrying a higher burden now than during the Cold War. Even if its defense spending were cut by half, it would still be spending more than any combination of two other great powers. This "excess" defense spending cannot be explained by foreign threats but rather suggests the general magnitude of the costs to the United States of providing political orders and maintaining its international hierarchies.

Firm conclusions are elusive. The United States spends more on defense as a share of GDP than the average state, but not more than the other great powers. In relative terms, however, its defense spending is roughly double that of any combination of other great powers than might plausibly threaten it in the foreseeable future. Some portion of this spending by the United States must be charged against the responsibility of maintaining its international authority. Yet, if hierarchy is costly to the United States, it does not appear to be an overwhelming burden, especially when calculated relative to its national wealth.

In addition to defense spending, a proper accounting of the costs of hierarchy would also include some portion of the costs of foreign and military aid to subordinates, diplomatic and consular activities in subordinates, national intelligence gathering and analysis, and a myriad of other activities. A full measure would also include attacks on the United States or its citizens by countries and groups opposed to American hierarchy or the political order it produces. Terrorists unhappy with the political status quo attack not only their own states, but, to the extent that the United States dominates areas of policy in their countries, also American interests and institutions.¹⁹ In subordinate countries, both the domestic governments and the United States are objects of political struggle. Thus, the deaths on 9/11 and in other terrorist attacks must be counted as "blowback" from America's international authority.²⁰ These deaths and, equally, the psychic toll terrorism imposes on Americans are equally difficult to weigh accurately. Producing order is, no doubt, costly, but just how costly depends on one's basis for comparison. Overall, even allowing for the tremendous costs of the global war on terror on the United States, it does not appear that the marginal costs of producing order are exorbitant or

19. Sobek and Braithwaite 2005.

20. On blowback from America's hierarchies even before 2001, see Johnson 2000.

necessarily greater than the marginal benefits, all things considered. I return to this issue in the final section of this chapter.

Intervention in Interstate Crises

Although the costs of producing order are difficult to measure, it is possible to track the behavioral manifestations of these costs in a more systematic fashion. Joining conflicts that threaten to escalate to violence is always costly. It follows from the relational conception of authority that dominant states will be more likely to intervene to protect subordinate than nonsubordinate states should they become involved in serious interstate crises. If subordinates are exchanging sovereignty for protection, in equilibrium dominant states must actually provide the promised defense or else the former will withdraw their legitimation. Both dominant and subordinate states must fulfill their parts in the exchange for any authority relationship to endure. This implies that the United States is more likely to join interstate crises in which its subordinates are implicated than it is to join other crises. This allows us to draw some tentative and preliminary assessments of the marginal costs of hierarchy that are absent from the absolute benefits and costs discussed above.

The theory here does not expect any particular pattern of conflict involvement by subordinate states. Much of the existing literature on this topic, usually grouped under the headings of extended deterrence, horizontal escalation, or conflict diffusion, predicts and tests whether a great power's promise to defend its client deters challenges or stimulates further escalation.²¹ Although sophisticated analytically and empirically, this literature by and large focuses on the challenger and the great power defender and ignores the policies and choices of the target state. In the otherwise sophisticated model developed by Suzanne Werner, for instance, the target state is not itself an actor in the game, but is assumed to respond to all attacks with certainty.²² This is obviously incomplete.

Allowing the target to be a strategic actor in its own right adds a level of complexity to the problem of extended deterrence that may overturn some of its primary predictions. A promise by a great power to protect a subordinate state may deter challenges, as current models expect, but it may also prompt a target state that retains some autonomy to engage in more risky behavior by

21. Huth 1988.

22. Werner 2000. See Signorino and Tarar 2006 for a similar "state-of-the-art model. Morrow (1994b) takes a step in the right direction by including the target as an actor in the game, but limits the target's choices to resisting or not. To capture the moral hazard problem below, the target should be allowed to make counteroffers to the challenger's demands, creating a game of alternating offers.

provoking potential challengers or taking a more intransigent stance in negotiations. This is the classic problem of moral hazard.²³ The net effect of a promise to protect a subordinate is thus ambiguous, most likely deterring some challenges but also leading the subordinate to act more aggressively toward others. In turn, the dominant country exercises increasing control over the subordinate's foreign policy as hierarchy increases. Indeed, it is precisely to limit the risks of opportunistic behavior by partners, such as that stimulated by guarantees of protection, that prompts dominant countries to invest in more hierarchical relationships.²⁴ It is possible that at lower levels of hierarchy the promise to protect may not be sufficiently credible to deter some challengers but may stimulate riskier behavior by subordinates, actually increasing the risk of conflict. Likewise, it is possible that at higher levels of hierarchy, the promise to protect may deter challengers and the dominant state's control over subordinates may be sufficiently great to limit opportunism, thereby decreasing the risk of conflict. Or neither. Without a fully developed model and theoretical expectations about where and how these thresholds might possibly operate, the net effect of hierarchy on conflict behavior is ambiguous. At this point, there is no clear expectation on the relative frequency by which subordinate states will become engaged in crises. For this reason, I treat the breakdown of negotiations into crises as essentially a random event.²⁵

The theory does clearly imply, however, that given a conflict, a dominant country will be more likely to come to the aid of subordinate than nonsubordinate states and that this effect will increase with the level of hierarchy. The dominant country has an obligation to come to the assistance of states over which it exercises authority. This obligation is not ironclad, however, as one means of limiting moral hazard by subordinates is to avoid making absolutely binding commitments to their defense, thereby hoping that the uncertainty surrounding the promise will deter opportunism by the subordinates more than it fails to deter possible challengers. Not all promises will be fulfilled; some fraction of the time, in fact, the dominant state will not intervene precisely in order to keep subordinates uncertain about the extent and nature of the guarantee.²⁶ Nonetheless, some number of promises must be honored for the subordinates to benefit, on average, from the dominant state's protection. Thus, I hypothesize that the United States is more likely to join conflicts in which a

23. Kreps 1990, 577.

24. Lake 1999a, 52–58. Moral hazard does not apply in empires in which subordinates give up all independent actions. Rather, it arises only when subordinates retain sufficient autonomy that they can act independently against the interests of the dominant state.

25. On the largely random nature of war, see Gartzke 1999.

26. This pattern of restraint will be random or certainly hard to predict. If a dominant state always supports its subordinates in identifiable circumstances, the moral hazard problem reappears.

subordinate is involved than crises in which no subordinate is involved, where joining means that the United States itself becomes a crisis participant by bringing its diplomatic support or military force to bear on events. This relationship, moreover, is continuous: the more hierarchical the relationship between the United States and the subordinate state, the more likely it is to join an ongoing conflict.

There is considerable anecdotal evidence in support of this proposition. The United States came to the aid of the Dominican Republic in April–May 1963, for instance, in the midst of an escalating international crisis. The always tense relations with Haiti were at a high point after Trujillo's assassination as his family took refuge in Haiti and openly plotted to assassinate the newly elected President, Juan Bosch. Relations broke down completely when the Dominican Republic granted asylum in its embassy in Port-au-Prince to conspirators charged with an attempt on the lives of the children of Haitian dictator François "Papa Doc" Duvalier. Haiti then stormed the embassy and arrested the conspirators and other opponents of the regime harbored on its grounds. Bosch escalated the crisis by issuing an ultimatum threatening force against Haiti unless the situation were "rectified" within a day and mobilizing military forces along the border and at sea. As tensions grew, the United States joined the Dominican Republic as the victim in this struggle and sent a naval task force to Haiti "to evacuate nationals" should it be necessary, an implicit threat of force against Duvalier. With this show of combined force, Haiti released the hostages and normal diplomatic relations were restored.²⁷

More systematically, we can test whether the United States is more likely to join an international crisis or conflict by using both the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) data set, compiled by the Correlates of War project, and the International Crisis Behavior project (ICB) data set, compiled by Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld.²⁸ I include all eligible crises between 1950 and 2000. The dependent variable is whether the United States joined an ongoing conflict. In both data sets, I exclude from analysis all crises in which the United States is coded as an original participant (MID) or an actor in the crisis (ICB).²⁹ If the United States is an originating actor, it cannot be considered to "join" in any meaningful sense. This may misidentify cases, of course,

27. Atkins and Wilson 1998, 139–140. See also the International Crisis Behavior project (ICB) summary for Dominican Republic–Haiti II, available at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/dataviewer/>, crisis number 198.

28. For the MID data set, see <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/> and Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004. For the ICB data set, see <http://www.icbnet.org/> and Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997.

29. In the ICB tests, I include a handful of cases in which the United States became an actor one week or more after the crisis began. Excluding these cases does not materially change the results reported below.

where the United States enters a conflict immediately or even preemptively to assist a subordinate, but I err on the side of exclusion.

The MID data set includes 1,218 disputes between 1950 and 2000 in which the United States is not an originating party. A state "joins" an ongoing dispute when it initiates a militarized action or is the target of a militarized action by a state already involved in the crisis. By requiring some military action, this creates a relatively high threshold for "joining." Of the 764 disputes for which we have complete data, the United States joined only 20 (approximately 2.6 percent).³⁰ The MID data set specifies which side in the dispute the United States joined.

Hierarchy is operationalized as in chapter 3. For those MIDs that the United States did not join, I use the highest level of hierarchy on each measure of any originating state. In MIDs that the United States did join, I code for the highest level of hierarchy on each measure of any originating state on the side it eventually supported. It should be noted that this construction biases the test against finding any significant effect for hierarchy on conflict joining. By coding for the highest level for any originator in those cases where the United States did not join, it raises the hurdle over which levels of hierarchy must pass in those instances where it did join.

The effects of hierarchy on the likelihood that the United States will join a MID are presented in table 4.1. Since joining is measured as a dichotomous variable and is a rare event, I use Rare Events Logit to estimate the models.³¹ All independent variables are lagged one year from the start of the crisis to deal with potential problems of endogeneity. I include as covariates the duration of the crisis and the highest level of violence eventually reached in the crisis to control for the joint possibility that states at risk of longer and more intense conflicts may seek shelter in a hierarchical relationship with the United States and that the United States itself may join longer and more violent crises (see the appendix for definitions and sources for all variables).³² By controlling for

30. Although the United States is frequently involved in militarized disputes, according to the full data set, it is most typically an originating state and not a joiner.

31. King and Zeng 2001.

32. As the discussion of the strategic incentives of subordinates suggests, it is not clear in theory which factors, if any, both drive states to subordinate themselves to the United States and prompt the United States to intervene in a conflict. The existing empirical literature finds that alliance ties, geographic proximity, foreign trade, and the immediate balance of forces influence whether or not states join ongoing conflicts. See Siverson and Starr 1991; Siverson and King 1980; Alfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979; Gartzke and Gleditsch 2003; Huth 1998; Signorino and Tarar 2006. Alliances and foreign trade are already incorporated into the security and economic hierarchy indices, and there is no reason to expect that the local balance of power will covary with hierarchy. Given the pattern of alliances since 1945, the presence of an alliance with the United States will be a perfect predictor of the absence of any alliances independent from

TABLE 4.1.
U.S. hierarchy and the probability of joining a militarized interstate dispute,
1950–2000

	Model 1 β /se	Model 2 β /se
Index of security hierarchy _{t-1}	1.1146** 0.3559	
Index of military personnel _{t-1}		0.7488*** 0.1860
Index of independent alliances _{t-1}		-0.6961 0.7760
Index of economic hierarchy _{t-1}	1.6458* 0.7039	
Index of exchange rate regimes _{t-1}		1.7747* 0.7671
Index of relative trade dependence _{t-1}		2.0501*** 0.4264
Duration of dispute	0.0009 0.0006	0.0007 0.0007
Level of violence in dispute	0.4650** 0.1776	0.4950** 0.1738
Constant	-5.2409*** 0.4825	-5.2642 0.5579
Observations	761	760

Dependent variable: U.S. joins an ongoing MID (no join = 0; join = 1).

Rare event logit

* $p < 0.05$

** $p < 0.01$

*** $p < 0.001$

Excludes three high leverage outliers.

related determinants of crisis joining, the coefficients on the several hierarchy measures capture the effect of hierarchy on the propensity of the United States to aid its subordinates, and thus the marginal costs of its hierarchical relations with them.

As expected, the United States is significantly more likely to join a dispute the greater its level of hierarchy over an originating party. Since the coefficients cannot be interpreted directly, the easiest way to understand these results is by calculating the relative risk that the United States will join a conflict as each hierarchy indicator is increased from its minimum value (zero) to its seventy-fifth percentile while holding all other variables at their mean values.³³ These

the United States (see Chapter 3). Although the constructs might differ slightly, the two measures are observationally identical.

33. Relative risk will be familiar to most readers from medical studies, which typically report results in the form of, say, smoking increases the risk of lung cancer by some specified percentage, bike helmets reduce the risk of serious injury in an accident by some percentage, and so on. The percentage change figures in the final column of table 4.2 should be interpreted in the same way.

TABLE 4.2.

United States hierarchy and the relative risk of joining a militarized interstate dispute, 1950–2000

Index of security hierarchy $_{t-1}$ (model 1)	75
Index of military personnel $_{t-1}$ (model 2)	6
Index of independent alliances $_{t-1}$ (model 2)	ns
Index of economic hierarchy $_{t-1}$ (model 1)	103
Index of exchange rate regimes $_{t-1}$ (model 2)	83
Index of relative trade dependence $_{t-1}$ (model 2)	19

All estimates significant at $p < 0.01$.

ns = coefficient not significant.

Based on models reported in Table 4.1, increase in the likelihood (in percent) of the United States joining an ongoing MID as each index increases from its minimum value (zero, no hierarchy) to its 75th percentile.

estimates are presented in table 4.2. The substantive effect of hierarchy is large. Increasing economic hierarchy to the seventy-fifth percentile, for instance, increases the likelihood that the United States will join a crisis by 103 percent. Thus, at the margin, the United States bears a substantial cost from its hierarchies by intervening in disputes at roughly double the baseline rate.

The ICB data set identifies a smaller number of international crises. Between 1950 and 2000, the data set includes a total of three hundred crises in which the United States is not an actor. In turn, it codes for a range of possible levels of U.S. involvement: (1) no activity; (2) low-level political activity (including statements of approval or disapproval by government officials, economic involvement, such as the withholding of foreign aid from a participant, or propaganda involvement); (3) covert or semimilitary activity (aid or military advisors without actually participating in the fighting); and (4) direct military activity. Due to the relatively few cases of direct U.S. military involvement, I collapse the last two categories, creating a trichotomous variable of no involvement, diplomatic or economic involvement, and military involvement. The ICB data set does not indicate which side of the conflict the United States joined. In some cases, this can be inferred from the case histories, but given the range of behaviors coded and the undirected nature of much diplomatic or low-level military activity, I focus here simply on whether the United States was involved in the crisis or not and at what level. Focusing on levels, Multinomial Logit is the appropriate model; no involvement is the excluded category. In addition to covariates for the duration and level of violence in the crisis, I am also able to include a measure provided in the ICB data set of the geopolitical salience of the region in which a crisis occurs; the greater the salience of the region, the more likely the United States is to desire hierarchical relationships with states in the area and to intervene should a conflict arise.

As predicted, the results in table 4.3 show that security hierarchy is strongly and positively related to the probability of joining a crisis. The results in model

TABLE 4.3.
U.S. hierarchy and the probability of joining an international crisis, 1950–2000

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Diplomatic or Economic Activity (USINV = 2)	Indirect or Direct Military Activity (USINV = 3/4)	Diplomatic or Economic Activity (USINV = 2)	Indirect or Direct Military Activity (USINV = 3/4)
Index of security hierarchy _{t-1}	3.1731*** 0.8739	3.0357*** 0.9537		
Index of military personnel _{t-1}			0.7159 0.5578	0.4538 0.6731
Index of independent alliances _{t-1}			1.6102*** 0.4837	1.9471*** 0.6030
Index of economic hierarchy _{t-1}	-0.4549 0.4527	0.5977 0.5004		
Index of exchange rate regimes _{t-1}			-0.0956 0.4549	0.0627 0.5513
Index of relative trade dependence _{t-1}			-1.0365 0.6643	0.5602 0.4605
Duration of crisis	0.0017 0.0009	0.0017 0.2216	0.0018* 0.0009	0.0019 0.0011
Level of violence in crisis	0.4058* 0.1794	0.7200*** 0.2216	0.4146* 0.1722	0.7087 0.2296
Geopolitical salience of crisis	0.4367 0.2679	1.0423*** 0.2627	0.5080 0.2671	1.1866*** 0.2717
Constant	-1.8368*** 0.5075	-4.5752*** 0.7104	-1.9086*** 0.5156	-4.7824*** 0.7819
Observations	218		225	
Pseudo R ²	0.1391		0.1523	

Dependent variable: U.S. joins an ongoing crisis (excluded category, no involvement)

Multinomial logit with robust standard errors

* p < 0.05

** p < 0.01

*** p < 0.001

1, perhaps because they do not differentiate by which side the United States joined, are equally significant but substantively weaker than those in table 4.1. As security hierarchy increases from its minimum to the seventy-fifth percentile, the likelihood that the United States will become involved in a crisis economically or diplomatically increases by 35 percent and militarily by 31 percent. Interestingly, although not statistically significant, greater economic hierarchy may reduce the likelihood that the United States will become involved economically or diplomatically in a crisis and increase the likelihood that it will become militarily involved. A similar pattern is found in model 2. As the index of independent alliances increases from its minimum to seventy-fifth percentile, the likelihood that the United States will join a crisis diplomatically or economically increases by 21 percent and militarily by 35 percent. The indicators of economic hierarchy also reverse sign between these two levels of involvement. The differences in the effects of economic hierarchy on different levels of crisis joining is suggestive and requires further investigation that goes beyond the tests and data now available. Just as in the MID results, however, the marginal costs of hierarchy to the United States created by its greater likelihood of joining a crisis appear to be significant.

The United States is more likely to come to the aid of its subordinates than it is to join other states, and this effect is increasing in the level of hierarchy. States that condition their levels of defense effort on their subordination to the United States have some justification for expecting their protector to, in fact, fulfill its commitment to help defend them from foreign threats (see chapter 5). More important here, though, is that as part of its costs for creating order, the United States is significantly more likely to intervene in crises on behalf of its subordinates. Even though it is difficult to convert interventions into dollars and cents, this, too, is part of the costs of dominance. The results clearly show that, controlling for potentially confounding determinants of intervention, the United States is more likely to come to the aid of subordinates than nonsubordinates in international conflicts. At the margin, then, the United States is becoming involved in conflicts that it otherwise could and presumably would prefer to avoid. This supports the hypothesis that dominant states will act to produce political order for their subordinates, even when they have no immediate interest in doing so, in order to bolster their authority.

Implications

The evidence in this section opens up an important difference between traditional theories of international politics that assume all states interact under anarchy and the theory here that posits that states possess varying relations of

hierarchy. To the extent that order approximates a public good, standard theories predict that larger states, often the dominant members of dyads, will pay disproportionate costs for providing that good.³⁴ Yet, even so, traditional theory would not expect larger states to provide order beyond the point at which their own marginal benefits equal their marginal costs. Alternatively, in hierarchical relations, the motivation for dominant states is more complex. Dominant states not only gain directly from political order, but, importantly, they also benefit from the bias in the rules they create and the authority they obtain over their subordinates. These benefits give the dominant state additional incentives to provide order and bear higher costs for doing so. In a strict accounting sense, it is impossible at present to discern whether the United States provides order beyond the level at which its marginal costs equal its marginal *national* benefits. Nonetheless, its significant tendency to join crises in which its subordinates are implicated, controlling for other motivations to join that are correlated with hierarchy, suggests that it is bearing costs to defend its subordinates that it would otherwise choose not to pay.

Moreover, standard theory works in this instance only if political order approximates a global public good. Otherwise, there is no explanation for why larger states willingly bear a larger burden. In fact, although there may be some positive externalities or spillovers from political order in one country for others, dominant states need not protect all countries, all property, or all promises. Indeed, it appears that most commitments to political order are made to specific countries and not as blanket statements of support for all. Were order truly a global public good, the United States would have little incentive to join crises in which its subordinates are involved over those in which they are not. All would matter equally. Similarly, subordinates would not manifest different behaviors from that of nonsubordinates (see chapter 5). Alternatively, the local nature of political order, unequal burden sharing, and especially costly provision of order are entirely consistent with the dyadic foundation of the theory developed here. Dominant states provide political order not just for their own immediate benefit, but to uphold their end of the authority contract and to legitimate their rule over others.

Discipline

As part of producing any international order, dominant states must enforce the rules they have promulgated and, by implication, discipline those subordinates

34. Olson and Zeckhauser 1966; Snidal 1985; Sandler 2004. It is not clear that political order is, in fact, a public good. See Sandler 1992, 5–6.

who transgress. The practice of discipline—and especially military interventions, the most extreme form—is difficult to explain by extant theories of international relations.

As explained briefly in chapter 1, the construction and maintenance of political authority necessarily involves a degree of coercion to enforce rules and sustain compliance in the face of individual incentives to defect from that order. Any authority must police its subordinates to maintain its rules. Precisely because political order is not generated spontaneously by the egoistic actions of all members, the rules constrain the behavior of those members. Subordinates can be expected to defect when possible in ways large and small, and a failure to enforce the rules will soon lead to a fraying and possible disintegration of the order. Coercion is not only compatible with political authority, but also is necessary for its success. It follows that dominant states, just like rulers within countries, will act to discipline individual subordinates within the limits set by the community of subordinates.

The need for discipline also follows from the continuously contested nature of political authority and hierarchy. Dominant and subordinate states constantly struggle, at least at the margins, to define the scope of their rights and duties. In this process, subordinates push at the limits of their obligations to see what they can “get away with” while retaining the benefits of the political order provided by the dominant state. In return, dominant states use discipline to demarcate the limits of their tolerance. Thus, discipline helps define the equilibrium that creates legitimate action.

Finally, discipline may also result from disagreements over what the terms of the authority contract imply at any particular moment in time. Even dominant states that sincerely want to act within the boundaries of their authority and subordinates that sincerely want to follow legitimate commands may clash over what is and is not authorized in a given situation. Contracts, especially those between countries, are often tacit and always incomplete. Disagreements are especially likely when the external environment is changing rapidly and churning up new circumstances that the parties have not previously encountered. In this way, overreaching by the dominant state or undercomplying by the subordinate can simply be out-of-equilibrium behavior that is easily corrected through disciplinary actions that bring the expectations of the parties back into line.

In the extreme, defiance or general challenges to their authority are particularly troubling for dominant states for, if successful, they can quickly lead to the unraveling of their legitimacy. The peaceful but nonetheless revolutionary movements in Eastern Europe in 1989 provide a particularly clear example. As opposition to the status quo became increasingly evident and formerly suppressed individuals grew more confident that their opposition to the state was

widely shared, protests snowballed and ultimately led to the collapse of whatever legitimacy the regimes possessed.³⁵ In country after country, citizens withdrew their support and the communist regimes fell like dominoes. Even some of the most authoritarian leaders, such as Nicolae Ceausescu in Romania, had no choice but to concede power once citizens revoked his right to rule. The authority of the Soviet Union over the states of this informal empire crumbled as well. Like rulers within countries, dominant states will, therefore, be very likely to punish and make an example out of any subordinate that renounces their authority, not only in an effort to regain their dominance over that individual (or set of individuals), but also to deter further challenges by others. This need to punish defiance is not simply a function of the dominant state's desire to safeguard its reputation, although that may matter.³⁶ Rather, the failure to stand up to defiance—or worse, to condone it, even implicitly—threatens the collective's agreement on the rights of the ruler and their individual duties. As any domestic government knows well, active and sustained defiance risks authority slipping into anarchy. Governments often try to suppress challenges before they take hold and spread. The same holds for international hierarchies. Thus, dominant states will be particularly harsh in their opposition to rebel groups within subordinate states who oppose the status quo, including continued subordination to the dominant state, and to states as a whole that reject the dominant state's rule or are seized by groups who then reject that rule. This need to punish those who defy its authority can appear counterproductive or even irrational in that the punishment can be more costly to the dominant state than the loss of a single subordinate suggests. Nonetheless, discipline is necessary if the dominant state is to defend its authority more generally.

Discipline may take many different forms, impossible to catalog completely here, and thus make measurement difficult. Violations of the rules can vary from small infractions to complete rejection of the authority of the dominant state. In turn, discipline may range from expressions of support for an opposition candidate in elections, to funding for pro-democracy movements, foreign aid, economic sanctions, and ultimately military interventions to overthrow a regime. The greater the infraction, most likely the more severe and certain the punishment. In the remainder of this section, I examine only the most intense and extreme forms of discipline, military interventions, because they are easiest to observe. As the “most solemn, and potentially the most costly, instru-

35. Kuran 1991; Lohmann 1994.

36. The role of reputation in international relations continues to be a subject of debate. For an argument about its lack of importance, see Press 2005. For an alternative view, see Walter 2006.

ment a state has at its disposal," interventions are "a sign that central decision makers place a very high value on the objective they are pursuing" and thus are likely to be confined to instances of willful disobedience and defiance.³⁷ This does not imply, however, that challenges to authority are the only actions that invoke discipline or that military interventions are the only form of discipline used by dominant states.

Empirical Patterns

The need to discipline disobedient or defiant subordinates implies that coercive interventions by dominant states in their subordinates will be most frequent in regions with relatively many subordinates who might potentially challenge or express displeasure at the dominant state's rule. Conversely, it suggests there will be fewer interventions in (a) regions with many subordinates where authority is stable and robust and (b) regions with few subordinates. In both, the defiance of a single subordinate is less likely to escalate out of control, in the first instance because authority is less likely to unravel and in the second because there are not enough subordinates to matter. In the case of the United States, this implies that Washington will be most likely to intervene militarily in states on the Caribbean littoral or Latin America more generally, where nearly all countries are to one extent or another subordinate to the United States and frequently possess different policy preferences. It is less likely to intervene in Europe, where, despite broad subordination, policy preferences are more similar and defiance is infrequent, or Africa or Central and South Asia where it possesses few subordinates.

The United States has a long history of intervening in the domestic political affairs of Latin American countries. In his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, President Theodore Roosevelt explicitly asserted the right of the United States to "exercise an international police power" in this hemisphere, a claim not made about any other region. Interventions in the Caribbean littoral were frequent from the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries when the United States was first consolidating its informal empires in the region. Once established, the number of interventions greatly diminished, reflected in President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy, less a change in hierarchy than an indication of its success. Nonetheless, the United States has continued to intervene to punish states that threaten its rule.

Between 1900 and the present, the United States has engaged in twenty-two militarized disputes with the ambition of changing the regime or gov-

37. Krasner 1978, 275.

ernment of the opposing state.³⁸ Of these twenty-two disputes, seventeen occurred in states on the Caribbean littoral, including the 1914 intervention by the United States in the Dominican Republic.³⁹ Between 1950 and 2000, the time period used in the statistical tests reported in this volume, nine of ten attempts by the United States to change the regime of another state occurred in this same region. Before 1950, the most frequent target of American efforts at regime change was Mexico, and since 1950, the most frequent target has been Cuba (five disputes), followed by Nicaragua (two disputes). These regime disputes are also especially likely to escalate to higher levels of hostility and violence.⁴⁰ As in the Dominican Republic, the early interventions were frequently driven by fears of European intervention into bankrupt states on America's doorstep. In nearly all postwar cases, intervention was motivated primarily by a threat by the regime to exit the United States's informal empire and possibly to ally itself with the Soviet Union as a counterweight to American dominance.⁴¹ The pattern and motivations behind these interventions are consistent with what we would expect from a dominant state disciplining its subordinates and attempting to preserve its position of authority within a community of subordinate states.

Interestingly, the 1990s were a period of relative calm in U.S.-Latin American relations. Following the debt crisis of the early 1980s, a wave of neoliberal economic reformers who accepted and pursued the aptly named Washington Consensus rose to power in a series of democratic elections across the region.⁴² With sympathetic regimes in office, the United States did not need to intervene in the internal affairs of its subordinates. The big exception was Haiti, of course, where the United States had a mercurial relationship with leftist President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.⁴³ Although some officials voiced concern that Aristide might pursue ties outside the region and opposed restoring him to

38. This includes all MIDs in which the issue in dispute for the United States was the regime/government (Mid variable RevType1 = 3). Most aid to insurgents, support for coups, or covert interventions do not rise to the level of conflict necessary for a MID. Thus, the number of U.S. interventions is undoubtedly undercounted here, but this includes the most significant and contentious episodes.

39. Of the remainder, four were disputes with the Soviet Union (three immediately after World War I), and one was the invasion of Afghanistan following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

40. MID hostility levels are coded on a five-point scale. Regime disputes average 3.63 on this scale, with all other types of disputes averaging 2.97 ($t = -7.0890$; $df = 5,600$; $p < 0.001$). Regime disputes involving the United States were slightly less hostile than others, averaging 3.41 on the five-point scale.

41. The exceptions are Panama in 1989 and Haiti in 1994–1996.

42. Smith 1996, chap. 10.

43. *Ibid.*, 284–290.

office, the popularly elected leader made a concerted attempt to reassure Washington that he did not reject American dominance over his country. Despite considerable misgivings, the United States eventually intervened to restore Aristide to power in 1994.⁴⁴ This intervention appears less motivated by the need to discipline an independent-minded subordinate and more by a general concern with ensuring political order in the poorest country in the region and a proven source of politically contentious refugees escaping to the United States. The Washington Consensus is now eroding as a wave of democratically elected leftist presidents sweeps across Latin America in the new century, bringing to power Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, and Evo Morales in Bolivia. Chavez in particular has emerged as a vocal critic of the United States and allied himself politically and ideologically with Cuba. The support of the United States for the failed coup in Venezuela in 2004 may presage a return to the exercise of its international police power and more tempestuous relations between the United States and its subordinates in the region.⁴⁵

By contrast, the United States has been far less interventionist in other regions of the globe. In contrast to Latin America, the United States has never intervened in a regime dispute in postwar Europe.⁴⁶ This absence reflects the existence of stable, pro-Western governments that largely share America's policy preferences and do not challenge its authority. With little need to intervene, the police or disciplinary power of the United States remains latent.

Similarly, the United States has never intervened in a regime dispute in Africa.⁴⁷ In Central and South Asia, also a region with virtually no subordinates, the United States did not become embroiled in any militarized dispute in the region until relations deteriorated with Afghanistan starting in 1998 and culminating in the invasion of 2001.⁴⁸ Despite numerous conflicts and problems in these regions, and many instances in which countries aligned themselves with great powers other than the United States, the relative absence of military interventions in these areas is most likely a function of the lack of sub-

44. Clinton 2005, 616–619; Harris 2005, 133–141; Soderberg 2005, 43–53.

45. For a related interpretation, see Sweig 2006.

46. The United States intervened militarily only once in Europe in the postwar period, providing covert support for the right in the Greek civil war (1947–1949). This was not a case of regime change, as in the Caribbean and Central American disputes above, but of support for an existing regime. As a result, this is not coded as one of the twenty-two regime disputes in the MID data set.

47. The United States joined the Sudan in a *nonregime* dispute with Libya in 1981.

48. The United States, of course, supported the Afghan resistance in their struggle against the Soviet Union in the 1980s, but its covert role in that conflict did not rise to the level of a MID participant.

ordinates for whom the United States is compelled to provide order or discipline.⁴⁹

The pattern of U.S. military interventions is consistent with the ambition of maintaining discipline within hierarchies. Although the United States has been active in the Caribbean littoral, it has not intervened militarily in other countries and regions where similar ideological and economic threats have arisen but it lacks subordinates.

Implications

Disciplining subordinates is not a behavior predicted by traditional theories of international relations. That states would carry out costly actions to enforce rules and maintain their authority is obviously inconsistent with theories that deny states possess authority over one another. According to theories rooted in political realism, states should not engage in costly action simply to sustain political order and, more important, to preserve their authority over subordinates. States should act to counter threats or, perhaps, for material ends, but risking escalation and possibly conflict to enforce a set of rules would appear to contradict central tenets of realism.⁵⁰ Neoliberal institutionalist theories expect that states will use strategies of reciprocal punishment to support cooperation under anarchy, but these theories hold equally for all states and do not posit any special status for dominant states.⁵¹ Although we lack data on the pattern of "punishments" carried out by all states, it appears to be relatively

49. America's more frequent interventions in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, including several full-scale wars, do not appear to be disciplinary efforts intended to enforce compliance by wayward subordinates, but rather efforts to protect and defend subordinates against threats by others; they count neither for nor against the theory's expectations about the pattern of interventions.

50. The pattern of intervention points to a central and still unresolved tension in realist thought in general and Waltz's statement of systemic theory in particular. See Waltz 1979, 67–68. Within any anarchic system, Waltz argues forcefully, insecurity drives states to compete intensively for resources and allies, tending to produce balances of power. This competition, he reasons further, leads great powers, especially under bipolarity, to compete fiercely in the periphery of the international system even though—and here the tension arises—the allegiance of no minor state could possibly affect the balance of capabilities between the great powers themselves (see 169–171). But if no development in the periphery can affect the central balance, then there is no reason for the great powers to compete vigorously. If the periphery does not matter, then great powers should expend little effort to control the allegiances of its members. We might be able to explain a few interventions that imposed costs on the United States and distracted it from the great power competition as anomalies produced by unit-level factors, but again, a century-long pattern of intervention is more consistent with a view that sees these actions as intended to discipline defiant subordinates and deter further defections from America's regional hierarchies.

51. On reciprocal punishment, see Axelrod 1984, Oye 1985.

concentrated and selective, with dominant states disciplining others more frequently and targeting wayward subordinates more often. This central role of dominant states as disciplinarians follows from hierarchy.

This pattern is also either not predicted by or inconsistent with other, more eclectic theories. First, American intervention in the Caribbean is frequently understood as a product of the Cold War, with the United States intervening against leftist regimes that sought support from the Soviet Union. This proposition appears superficially plausible. Nonetheless, U.S. intervention in the region predates bipolarity and the Cold War. Indeed, the United States intervened just as frequently in the first half of the twentieth century as in the second. As Kenneth Waltz writes, "When seeming causes vary more than their supposed effects, we know that causes have been incorrectly or incompletely specified."⁵² Uniting these explanations and connecting the post-1945 pattern to the history of earlier American interventions in the region, we understand the pattern better as an effort by the United States to discipline regimes that challenge and possibly reject its security and economic hierarchy. In nearly every case, justifiably or not, the United States believed that the regime in power might leave its informal empire. Across the decades, the unifying theme behind these interventions has been to enforce American domination and suppress challenges to its authority in the region.

Second, the pattern of intervention has also been understood to follow from America's economic interests in various regions. In some cases, intervention can be related to the interests of particular American firms and industries, but in many it can only be reconciled with support for capitalism in general, not support for individual capitalists.⁵³ Yet, the persistent hostility of the United States toward "revolutionary" regimes, and especially the extreme case of its decades-long opposition to the government of Fidel Castro in Cuba, are hard to reconcile with either an ideological or structural Marxist interpretation—or, for that matter, with the realist explanation just addressed. In particular, the hostility toward Castro appears out of proportion to any security or economic incentive. The United States has enacted against Cuba one of the toughest economic embargoes in modern history. Between 1960 and 1963, the United States progressively prohibited all trade with the island, all goods containing Cuban materials even if made in other countries, travel to Cuba, and all commercial transactions between Cuban and U.S. citizens.⁵⁴ Although relaxed in the late 1970s, the embargo was tightened again in the early 1980s and, in fact,

52. Waltz 1979, 67–68.

53. Krasner 1978, chap. 8.

54. For a history of the embargo, see <http://www.petersoninstitute.org/research/topics/sanctions/cuba.cfm> (accessed March 17, 2008).

strengthened under the Mack Amendment of 1990 and the Helms-Burton Act of 1996. The Mack Amendment prohibits all trade with Cuba by subsidiaries of American companies located outside the United States, and the Helms-Burton Act imposes penalties on foreign companies doing business in Cuba and allows U.S. citizens to sue foreign investors who make use of American-owned property that was seized by the Cuban government. Remittances and travel by Cuban Americans were further tightened in 2003 and 2004.

The hostility of the United States and the embargo is, as Stephen Krasner notes, nonlogical, if considered only in the context of this single case.⁵⁵ Long ago, the policy lost any connection between the costs to the United States and the value of Cuba as a subordinate. Not only do American businesses forgo profitable trade and investment opportunities in Cuba now enjoyed by entrepreneurs from other countries, but the hostility of the United States and especially the embargo arguably forced Castro to forge tighter relations with Russia, at least in the early decades after his revolution. It is unlikely that Castro's regime would have survived politically had it not found in the Soviet Union an alternative market for its sugar and another source for oil and foreign aid. In turn, the Mack Amendment and Helms-Burton Act have been vigorously opposed by foreign countries and American investors alike. The United Nations General Assembly has passed a resolution each year since 1982 by growing and now near universal majorities requesting that the embargo be lifted. That the embargo should be tightened rather than loosened after the Cold War, when the examples of both the fall of the Soviet Union and the economic liberalization of China suggest a policy of opening from within is far more effective, seems particularly ineffective and counterproductive. Perversely, the embargo today is likely reinforcing rather than undermining the regime, even as the aging Castro moves off the political scene. As Jorge Domínguez observes, "Washington's rigid opposition continue(s) to allow Castro to rally citizens to defend what many Cubans are able to recognize as the regime's legitimate successes. The United States has been a staunch enemy of Castro, but with an enemy like this one, he may not need friends."⁵⁶ Indeed, the only logical construction that President Clinton could ascribe to Cuba's shooting down two planes flown by the exile group Brothers to the Rescue in early 1996, which led to a sharp deterioration in relations, was that Castro "was trying to force us to maintain the embargo as an excuse for the economic failures of his regime."⁵⁷

55. Krasner 1978, 286–291.

56. Quoted in Smith 1996, 301.

57. Clinton 2005, 701.

The excessive hostility of the United States toward Cuba is typically explained as the result of the active Cuban expatriate community in Florida, a quintessential vested interest that continues to lust after assets expropriated by Castro's regime after it came to power. The anti-Castro lobby is no doubt influential. But Florida's electoral votes hardly seem to account for the continuing antagonism toward Cuba by the U.S. government in the face of shifting attitudes in the Cuban-American community, indifference by the general public, interest by the business community in improving economic relations with the island, and strong opposition to the continuing American economic embargo abroad.⁵⁸ Moreover, there does not appear to be a partisan basis for the policy, as might be expected. The embargo has been maintained and strengthened by Democratic and Republican administrations.

Rather, this hostility makes most sense when placed in the broader context of a subordinate state defying the authority of the United States in a region of many other subordinates, a concept that has no meaning in terms of standard international relations theory. American policy toward Cuba appears better explained as an attempt to discipline a defiant subordinate and to deter others from challenging its regional domination. Understood in this way, it might appear that the stakes are sufficient to justify an extreme response. Moreover, once enacted, discipline is difficult to retract without a change in behavior, implying that even a counterproductive policy can get locked in by the need to maintain discipline. Giving up on even clearly ineffective punishments undermines the credibility of future threats of discipline. In this case, the anti-Castro lobby may simply be pushing the U.S. government where it already wants to go, but the basic direction and continuity in policy appears more closely related to a desire to retain and bolster its authority in the region.

The very idea of discipline fits poorly with theories that rule out the possibility of hierarchy between states. The pattern of interventions by the United States is not predicted well by traditional theories that posit states interacting under anarchy. Moreover, the counterproductive nature of interventions, and particularly the hostility toward Cuba, appears to be out of proportion to the national interests at stake or the power of a concentrated but still relatively small lobby; rather, the United States appears driven to make an example of Cuba and to deter further challenges to its authority within the Caribbean. We do not normally think about coercive interventions in international relations as discipline. Yet, seen through the lens of international hierarchy, discipline appears to be a real and salient phenomenon in world politics.

58. On the Cuban American community, see Rieff 2008.

Tying the Suzerain's Hands

In all hierarchies, the dominant state must commit credibly not to violate its contract with its subordinates and, especially, not to abuse the authority it has been granted. Before any state will give up some measure of its sovereignty and subordinate itself to another, it must be confident that the terms of the authority contract will be honored. It must be assured that the dominant state will exercise its authority appropriately, and it must be confident that the dominant state will not use its limited grant of authority to claim even greater authority in the future. Most central, by legitimating the coercive powers of the dominant state, subordinates open themselves to potentially costly discipline. Before doing so, subordinates must be confident that the dominant state's authority will be exercised only within acceptable bounds. This problem of credible commitment is universal and holds for rulers in any authority relationship. As Douglass North and Barry Weingast memorably asked regarding early modern states, how is it possible to tie the sovereign's hands?⁵⁹ Here we ask, how is it possible to tie the suzerain's hands? There are many ways to bind a dominant state, some natural or exogenous, others contrived and intentional. This chapter does not attempt a complete catalog, but focuses on those fetters used by the United States in its relationships with subordinates over the last half century or more.

"Natural" Constraints

Fortunately for the United States, there are two exogenous constraints on opportunism that, by tying its hands, have made it relatively safer for other states to accept a subordinate status. These natural constraints serve to make its promises inherently more credible and have greatly enhanced its ability to dominate others. These are permissive conditions that have allowed the United States to build more hierarchical relationships than would otherwise have been possible.

First, the long struggle with the Soviet Union during the Cold War effectively constrained the United States in its relations with its subordinates. The struggle was, as Waltz theorized most elegantly, rooted in realpolitik and the bipolar struggle of material capabilities.⁶⁰ It also possessed an ideological component that led to a break in relations right after the Russian revolution, reflecting two very different views on the rules on which international orders

59. North and Weingast 1989.

60. Waltz 1979.

should be structured. Most important, however, by creating an alternative pole around which countries could cluster, the Soviet Union provided an "exit option" for states at risk of being exploited by the United States. Although it was never easy for states to switch sides in the Cold War, and in a few cases the Soviet Union imposed an even more hierarchical relationship in return for its aid, the possibility that a state could escape Washington's control constrained the United States from acting opportunistically. If the United States attempted to abuse the authority it received, subordinates could, at some cost to themselves, appeal to Moscow for help in breaking free of Washington's grip.⁶¹

As with the exercise of discipline discussed above, the effects of the superpower competition on relations between the United States and its subordinates is seen most clearly in the case of Latin America. As noted, Cuba would most likely not have succeeded in escaping America's informal empire had it not subordinated itself to the Soviet Union. Fear that others might follow Cuba's path clearly drove United States policy toward the rest of the region, causing it to tighten its discipline and opposition to leftist regimes wherever they emerged. This same fear, however, also led the United States to "lighten" the form of hierarchy through which it ruled the area.⁶² As long as the countries of Latin America, and especially those on the Caribbean littoral, agreed to stay firmly within their American hierarchies, governments were given wide latitude in the conduct of domestic affairs. The informal empire was lightly imposed.

Ironically, as the Cold War waned, and especially since 1989, the United States has broadened the scope of its concerns in Latin America to include demands for better human rights practices, greater democracy, more effective drug interdiction, and neoliberal economic development policies.⁶³ Absent the constraints of the Cold War, the United States has arguably tried to impose even greater hierarchy on its subordinates in the region, becoming more rather than less intrusive in the otherwise internal affairs of its subordinates. The wave of leftist, anti-American governments coming to power in Latin America after 1999 may be evidence of a backlash against this greater American domination.

More generally, the superpower competition constrained the United States in its relations with its subordinates in Western Europe, Northeast Asia, and elsewhere, perhaps also ensuring that its rule was lighter and less heavy-handed

61. The United States today may be performing a similar role for states afraid of Russian domination within the former Soviet Union, including Azerbaijan, Georgia, and others not yet incorporated into NATO.

62. LaFeber 1983.

63. Smith 1996, chaps. 9–11.

than otherwise. Equally, the end of the Cold War has encouraged the United States to extend its authority over new states and new issues, undertaking to develop new subordinates in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and now Iraq, and to take on new responsibilities for state building around the globe. Yet, the absence of competition with the Soviet Union that makes these new initiatives possible also frees the United States to act opportunistically and makes other states more reluctant to accept American authority over their affairs. This is manifested most clearly in the assertive unilateralism or cowboy diplomacy of the administration of George W. Bush and, in turn, the lack of international support for the Iraq War. As discussed in the conclusion, the rise of China may, in the future, create a new pole around which disaffected subordinates can rally.

Second, the dominance of the United States has also been facilitated by its democratic and highly decentralized domestic political regime.⁶⁴ Democracies are generally considered to be more reliable partners in international relations for three main reasons.⁶⁵ Democracies are more transparent than nondemocracies and provide more information to others about their policy preferences and likely actions.⁶⁶ Political competition at home requires politicians to articulate and commit to policy platforms, and these platforms are credible because of the need for subsequent reelection. The policies of the government in power, as a result, will be more predictable to others than are government policies in nondemocratic regimes. This will be especially so for policies on which the government and opposition do not disagree, including those that are never discussed because everyone in fact concurs on the proper course of action.⁶⁷ Because they provide more information about their policy preferences and likely actions to other states, democracies may lose leverage at the negotiating table since it is harder to bluff. But at the same time, they are much less likely to enter agreements that they do not expect to fulfill.

Democratic leaders face audience costs—penalties at the ballot box—for reneging on commitments.⁶⁸ It is not necessarily clear why publics would

64. Its political institutions are less wholly exogenous to the hierarchies created by the United States than was the Cold War, of course. The United States was designed at least in part to facilitate westward expansion and the creation of a federal but nonetheless hierarchical continent-wide polity. Hendrickson 2003, Tucker and Hendrickson 1990, Hietala 2003. Yet, the institutions that proved central to this imperial project were not designed with America's hierarchical relationships with "foreign" polities in mind, so I count them as exogenous or "natural" for purposes of this analysis.

65. Lipson 2003.

66. Schultz 2001a.

67. *Ibid.*, 95–97.

68. Fearon 1994. Schultz 2001b.

punish politicians who act in the national interest, which may include failed bluffs now and then, but it is possible that voters use a leader's commitment to international agreements as a cue for integrity and competence.⁶⁹ If democratic leaders face higher penalties for defecting from international agreements than do nondemocratic leaders, those agreements will be more credible.⁷⁰

Since parties compete for the median voter in democracies and are driven to similar policy positions in their quest for the median voter's support, alternations in power are less likely to produce policy changes than are changes in governments in nondemocracies.⁷¹ Different electoral systems will, of course, affect the incentives of parties to compete for the median voter and will affect how responsive policy is to popular wishes.⁷² But in virtually any democracy, the government will be more constrained by the policy preferences of the median voter than in any nondemocracy, and thus less susceptible to radical changes in policy. Once adopted, therefore, policy is likely to be more consistent and predictable in democracies than in other regimes.

For all three reasons, democracies are more likely to honor their authority contracts with others or, to say the same thing, are less likely to abuse those grants of authority they receive from other states. Just as the Cold War made the United States a more credible leader, so do its democratic institutions make it a more trustworthy ruler even over other states. It is perhaps no coincidence that two of the countries with the largest sets of subordinates in modern history—Great Britain in the nineteenth century and the United States in the twentieth—have been among the most democratic states of their eras. Democracy appears to be an important facilitator of international hierarchy.

In addition to its democratic institutions, the United States is also a highly decentralized political system with many "veto players" and points of access.⁷³ This further reinforces the credibility of commitments. Veto players are any actors that can block a change of policy. In a parliamentary system with a majority party, there are few veto players; the prime minister can typically force through policy changes under strict party discipline. But in the intentionally fragmented American political system, with two legislative chambers that can be led by different parties, a president, and an independent judiciary, the number of veto players is much larger. There are many "veto gates" along the leg-

69. Smith 1998. For evidence that voters are likely to punish leaders who bluff and then back down, see Tomz 2007a.

70. Eyerman and Hart 1996; Partell and Palmer 1999; Schultz 2001b.

71. A classic formulation of the median voter model is Downs 1957. For an introduction to the model as it has developed, see Persson and Tabellini 2000. For variations in regime, see Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003.

72. Cox 1997.

73. Tsebelis 2002, Cowhey 1993.

islative process at which any player can block a proposed policy change. A large number of veto players induces a status quo bias in policy. As a result, in countries such as the United States, policies once enacted are more credible than in those with fewer veto players.⁷⁴ For subordinates already in a hierarchical relationship with a dominant state with a decentralized political system, promises to continue the current relationship are inherently more credible.

Highly decentralized systems are also more permeable. In any democracy, of course, citizens have some say over policy. Decentralized systems, however, often permit foreign interests to penetrate the political process directly or, in league with related domestic interests, indirectly to make sure that their voices are heard.⁷⁵ In this way, subordinates can be more confident that their concerns will at least be listened to by the dominant state's leaders. This is no guarantee that these concerns will be acted upon, unless the domestic constituency itself is large and influential, but they are more likely to gain an audience than in more centralized political systems. This also makes subordinates more confident about entering hierarchical relationships with dominant states.

Thus, the United States might be uniquely favored as a dominant state by its democratic and highly fragmented domestic political institutions. Those factors that make democracies more reliable partners in international agreements also make the commitments of the United States to its subordinates more credible. The institutions that are often bemoaned by critics at home as fetters on the president's ability to conduct foreign policy as he sees fit—those institutions that make policy change so hard—also make the United States a more credible ruler over other states.

Costly Signals

When potential subordinates are unsure whether they are facing an opportunist that will exploit them in the future or a ruler with limited ambitions who will abide by the authority contract, a dominant state of the latter sort can reveal its type by engaging in costly actions that the former would not.⁷⁶ Since 1945, the United States has imposed upon itself two costly constraints that help demonstrate its preference for only limited hierarchy over others and thus its limited desire to exploit subordinates.

Institutionally, the United States has used multilateralism to demonstrate its

74. Likewise, promises to change policy are less credible. See MacIntyre 2001.

75. On permeable institutions, see Katzenstein 1978 and Krasner 1978. For a recent argument on the role of external pressure groups and U.S. foreign policy, see Walt 2005, 194–216.

76. On costly signals, see Morrow 1994a, 222–227; Dixit and Skeath 1999, chap. 9; and Watson 2002, 282–285.

commitment to working within the international consensus on legitimate action.⁷⁷ The dominant state, of course, retains the right and the ability to act even in the face of widespread disapproval, as did the United States in the 2003 war on Iraq. But three features of multilateralism as practiced by the United States are important in signaling its benign intentions toward subordinates.

First, the United States pays some cost for bringing a proposal to a multilateral organization such as the United Nations Security Council, NATO, or the OAS, even if this is only the transactions costs of bringing the issue to another decision-making forum.⁷⁸ The discretionary but costly nature of multilateralism matters, as a state that plans to violate the policy as approved would not be willing to pay the cost of seeking support in the first place.

Second, the United States, despite its privileged position of leadership and its superior international power, must adhere to the same rules and restrictions as other states. This is analogous to following the rule of law within states or demonstrating that a head of state or any politician is not above the law. Respecting these rules when it might not suggests its willingness to follow the rules of the authority contract, even when they may prove restrictive. Assessing compliance, of course, is always a tricky business, and whether the United States complies with international rules more or less often than others is hard to discern.⁷⁹ Nonetheless, the United States has complied with international rules even when it was inconvenient to do so. In December 1995, for instance, Costa Rica brought a suit against the United States through the WTO's dispute settlement process, the first developing country to initiate a complaint against the world's largest trader and, tellingly, also its dominant state.⁸⁰ Six months earlier, the United States had imposed restrictions on the import of cotton and synthetic fiber underwear from Costa Rica and several other countries. Costa Rica claimed that these restrictions violated the rules of the WTO because Washington had acted unilaterally and without proof that the domestic industry was actually in danger. The following year, the panel appointed to adjudicate the case ruled in Costa Rica's favor, a ruling later upheld on appeal. The United States subsequently allowed its import restrictions to expire, bringing its trade policy into compliance. To support the general rule of international law, the United States had to comply in this instance, and others,

77. Multilateralism also serves as a monitoring device and ex post safeguard against future opportunism. See Lake 1999a, 243–244.

78. Thompson 2006.

79. On the compliance debate in international relations, see Chayes and Chayes 1993; Chayes and Chayes 1995; Downs, Rocke, and Barsom 1996.

80. For more on this case, see John Breckenridge, "Costa Rica's Challenge to US Restrictions on the Import of Underwear," available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case12_e.htm. Accessed 9 February 2007.

and in doing so it affirmed its commitment to following the body of laws that regulate behaviors between states. No one example, of course, can prove a rule. But the case makes clear that to bind others, the United States must also agree to bind itself as well.

Third, the multilateral body has the right and ability to turn down a proposal made by the United States. To send a costly signal, the international organization cannot simply be a rubber stamp, otherwise it would communicate no information to others. There must be a real opportunity for member states to reject the proposal. Approval explicitly indicates that the United States has the authority to pursue the policy as proposed. By contrast, disapproval renders the proposed action illegitimate, much as Secretary General Kofi Annan later declared the invasion of Iraq by the United States "illegal." It is the risk of disapproval that makes approval meaningful. The United States has clearly engaged in multilateral "forum shopping," turning to NATO in the case of the intervention to liberate Kosovo from Serbian control, for instance, once it became clear that Russia would block the proposed intervention in the United Nations Security Council. The broader and more diverse the membership of the multilateral organization, and the greater the risk that it will turn down the proposed policy, the greater the legitimacy conferred by its approval. Narrow organizations composed mostly of compliant friends are less likely to reject a proposal and, in turn, confer less legitimacy by their support. Thus, there is a constant trade-off between the value of that consent and the likelihood of approval.

Multilateralism has been central to American foreign policy and its regional hierarchies, especially in Europe.⁸¹ Multilateralism was also key to the New World Order envisioned by President George H. W. Bush and pursued in very similar terms, though not by name, by President Bill Clinton. Through multilateralism, the United States has sought to make American hierarchy safe for the world. In the 2003 Iraq War, however, the United States sought approval from the United Nations and received support in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 (UNSCR 1441), but it ultimately failed to receive explicit and final approval for the war. The loud and vigorous dissent from other permanent members of the Security Council and the inability of the United States to get even a simple majority to support a second resolution eventually undercut the broad authority it possessed under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and the specific authority claimed by President Bush under UNSCR 1441. The tenuous diplomatic position of the United States during and after the war—when supporters who might assist militarily or even

81. Ruggie 1993. On Asia, see Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002 and Katzenstein 2005.

financially in the reconstruction of Iraq have been few—confirms the importance of multilateral approval in other cases.

The United States has also enhanced the credibility of its hierarchical contracts through its ideological and practical stance against colonialism, adopted after the turn of the twentieth century. By opposing imperialism by others, often at the risk of worsening relations with key allies, and forgoing opportunities for empire itself, the United States has signaled in costly ways that it does not desire to rule other countries directly and, more generally, does not want to impose greater hierarchy than necessary.

The United States likes to think of itself as an anti-imperialist state, being the first country to overthrow colonial rule in the modern era. Its own history is more complicated. All of its own territory was seized, often coercively, from indigenous Native American polities. Following the annexation of Texas, the United States waged an imperialist war against Mexico (1846–1848), claiming all of New Mexico, Arizona, and California as the spoils of victory. Throughout the nineteenth century, American imperialists had similar designs on Canada.⁸² Acquiring its first “overseas” dependencies in Alaska (1867) and Hawaii (1898), its empire expanded further in the Spanish-American War (1898) when it occupied Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. Despite this record of imperialist ambition, Americans recoiled from empire after the turn of the twentieth century.⁸³ Facing the prospect of joining Europe in carving up the remainder of the world, the United States pulled back from this course and began to advocate an “open door,” especially in economic relations.⁸⁴ For-saking empire, while at the same time intervening frequently in the internal affairs of countries in the Caribbean and Central America, the United States began to burnish its anti-imperialist credentials by opposing systems of imperial preferences in trade during the Great Depression and, during World War II, by advocating an end to empire as a means of rallying support for itself and its allies in Asia, where Japan’s similarly anti-imperialist propaganda was making significant inroads among colonial peoples.⁸⁵

By the end of World War II, the country’s anti-imperialism was a central tenet of foreign policy and, no doubt, sincerely believed, at least by Americans themselves.⁸⁶ But it was also quite strategic. On the one hand, the United States promoted anti-colonialism in the Third World to counter the equally anti-imperialist platform of the Soviet Union. Although espousing a broad

82. LaFeber 1994, 19, 166.

83. Beisner 1968.

84. Lake 1988, chap. 4.

85. Hager and Lake 2000.

86. Louis 1977.

program, the United States supported anticolonial movements only when the prospective nations appeared likely to join the Western system as potential American subordinates.⁸⁷ Pro-communist independence movements were consistently opposed. On the other hand, the United States also supported colonial independence as a means of weakening its European allies and, by limiting their ability to turn inward on their diverse empires, locking them more securely into its own economic zone. This opposition to empire frayed relations with Europe, especially with Britain on whom it depended as an intermediary with the rest of the continent.⁸⁸ This cost was especially evident in its public opposition to the effort of Britain, France, and Israel to retake the Suez Canal from Egypt in 1956.⁸⁹ But by supporting independence for pro-Western colonial peoples at some cost to its relations, the United States successfully signaled its preference for only limited domination of other states.

The United States also foreswore an empire of its own when it clearly could have acquired one after World War II.⁹⁰ This was partly ideological, in respect for the spreading principles of juridical sovereignty and national self-determination, but it was also instrumental in consolidating hierarchy. It freed the Philippines in 1946. It made clear its ambition to return Germany and Japan, defeated nations, to sovereignty as soon as practicable, and then did so in 1949 and 1951, respectively. And it did not seize Japan's colonies taken during World War II, even those crucial to its new forward-based defense strategy. In the case of Micronesia, where the war had demonstrated the necessity of controlling the islands surrounding its vulnerable naval base on Guam, the Navy argued vigorously to keep the islands under American rule. Playing a card from the multilateral deck, however, the United States eventually requested and received from the United Nations a special status for these islands as Strategic Trusts, a status tantamount to empire but explicitly temporary in design and legitimated by the multilateral organization.

Thus, as it consolidated its hierarchies over its many subordinates, the United States paid significant costs in its commitment to colonial independence. Its opposition to empire was never wholly consistent. Tensions with the Soviet Union and its own defense needs occasionally trumped its anti-imperialist stance, muddling the signal being sent. But at the margin, it was able to persuade others of its limited ambitions in governing subordinates.

The costs of multilateralism and anti-imperialism signal others that the United States is less likely to abuse the authority it receives from subordinates

87. Hager and Lake 2000.

88. Clarke 2008.

89. LaFeber 1994, 556–560.

90. Lake 1999a, chap. 5.

to carve out even greater authority for itself in the future. To paraphrase Geir Lundestad, this limited ambition has allowed the United States to enjoy hierarchy “by invitation”—the ability to dominate others not only with their acquiescence, but sometimes with their eager support.⁹¹ Ironically, by demonstrating its limited ambitions, the United States has more easily established its dominance over others.

Implications

In relations of anarchy and pure coercion, dominant states are free to pursue their unmitigated self-interests within the limits of their power and the strategies of other states. In relations of hierarchy and authority, however, dominant states must be attentive to the legitimacy of their actions and accept constraints on their own freedom of action. To govern others, in whole or part, the dominant state must accept a degree of governance over itself as well. Although both realist and neoliberal theories expect states to tie their own hands to commit credibly to particular courses of action in specific bargaining situations, neither predicts that dominant states will tie their hands as a matter of course or as a general policy of sustaining international authority. Indeed, both expect states to maximize their advantages over others. Nonetheless, the United States has, over the last half century, enjoyed natural advantages and used a variety of strategies to signal that it is a “trustworthy” leader. It has given up opportunities to maximize its own returns so as to credibly demonstrate its limited ambitions in ruling other states. Looking at the policies of dominant states through the lens of international hierarchy allows us to explain these otherwise anomalous behaviors.

Both G. John Ikenberry and Daniel Deudney have argued in different but related ways that states engage in “institutional binding” or “cobinding” to secure international orders and their security.⁹² Ikenberry argues that strategic restraint has been an essential feature of all postwar “constitutional orders” since Napoleon, but especially so in the American-led order after World War II that persists today. Deudney reasons from observed domestic political systems to a republican security theory of interstate relations. Each contrasts hierarchy with constrained forms of systemwide governance. For Ikenberry, hierarchy is stratified coercive capabilities that lead to domination, whereas constitutional orders are legitimate.⁹³ For Duedney, hierarchy places no lim-

91. Lundestad 1990.

92. Ikenberry 2001; Deudney 2007.

93. Ikenberry 2001, 27, 52.

its on a ruler, whereas negarchy divides her power.⁹⁴ Neither makes the link from self-limiting institutions to international authority or hierarchy that I do here or recognizes that all authority implies some limitations on the power of the ruler, but it is a short step from their approaches to mine.

Yet, the bottom line remains that all forms of self-binding are inconsistent with established theories of international relations that presume all relations between states are anarchic. That some states would bind themselves so as to increase their authority over others cannot be reconciled with anarchy and the derived principle of self-help. Nonetheless, credible commitments are essential to establishing the authority of dominant states. And despite opposition from neoconservatives who today call for the unfettered use of American power, the United States has in practice understood that to induce other states to subordinate themselves to its rule, it must credibly commit not to abuse its authority in the future.

Does Hierarchy “Pay”?

Dominant states, and the United States in particular, benefit from international orders. They also incur governance costs for producing order, disciplining subordinates, and constraining their own behavior to sustain their authority. We might ask, then, do the benefits of hierarchy outweigh the costs? Or to quote Robert Jervis, is the “game worth the candle”?⁹⁵ That we observe hierarchies persisting over time, as with the United States and Latin America and Europe, implies that hierarchy is in the interests of dominant states, at least sometimes and in some places. But this is a tautology. Unfortunately, no precise accounting is possible for three reasons.

First, dominant states are likely to produce order and exert hierarchy approximately where the marginal benefits of these activities equal their marginal costs. At this point, to produce more order or exert greater hierarchy would increase costs faster than benefits, and to provide less order or accept less hierarchy would imply that all possible benefits are not being realized. If levels of order and hierarchy are interrelated choices, as they are throughout this analysis, there will not be obvious cases where benefits exceed costs or vice versa. In equilibrium, benefits and costs will roughly balance each other at the margin.

The only possible exception to this competitive equilibrium would be in

94. Deudney 2007, esp. fig. 1.8, 49.

95. Jervis 1993.

periods or relationships in which dominant states exercise monopoly power over their subordinates by underproviding order or imposing too much hierarchy given a level of order. Yet, the fact of systemic anarchy and the usual presence of more than one state vying for international dominance over others implies that the monopoly power of dominant states will usually be naturally constrained, as above. Though any given relationship between a dominant and subordinate state is exclusive, that relationship is *contestable*, even if not actively contested.⁹⁶ It is the possibility of defection by a subordinate to a rival that limits the power of any state to exploit its subordinates. In the absence of strong monopoly power, then, we can expect most dominant states to set their different relationships approximately where marginal costs and benefits are equated. If so, net benefits of dominance will not be large, at least relative to those returns earned by other countries, and will in practice be difficult to isolate.

Second, the various benefits and costs identified above, ranging from reduced threats from subordinates or greater economic exchange, on the one hand, to intervening in regional conflicts or tying hands, on the other, lack a single metric or scale. We are faced with the problem of not only adding apples and oranges, as the old adage goes, but also summing the value of a range of exotic fruits of incommensurable tastes and textures. Lacking convenient measures that can be converted into a single metric, no simple accounting is possible.

If the benefits and costs of hierarchy defy precise measurement for observers, they are equally difficult for states themselves to assess. Accepting the previous point that dominant states will typically equalize marginal benefits and costs, there is a substantial margin of error for both dominant and subordinate states that will lead to episodes of overreaching, where the dominant state claims more authority than it actually possesses, or equally underreaching, where the dominant state does not use all the authority it might. Because of the difficulty of assessing costs and benefits, relations between dominant and subordinate states will be sites of constant tension and struggle. This struggle, however, is not necessarily a sign that authority is weak or fraying, but rather that it is important to both sides, even while they are uncertain about its precise parameters.

Third, and perhaps most difficult, any conclusion on the net benefits of hierarchy must rest on a counterfactual assessment of outcomes likely in the absence of hierarchy. Here, we have only theory to guide us.⁹⁷ As noted re-

96. On the restraint of monopoly power by the possible entry of competitors, see Baumol, Panzar, and Willig 1982.

97. On counterfactual analysis, see Fearon 1991; Tetlock and Belkin 1996; and Tetlock, Lebow, and Parker 2006.

peatedly in this study, traditional international relations theory assumes away international hierarchy. Its predictions, as a result, should speak directly to the course of international politics in a world without hierarchy. Unfortunately, although all of the variants lead us to expect that the relevant counterfactual is the state of nature, traditional theory does not speak with a single voice on politics within that initial condition. At least three schools of thought exist, each suggesting a different scenario if present world politics were to suddenly revert to the state of nature, a reasonable test case.

What might be called the “back-to-the-future” or neorealist school envisions that, with the end of bipolarity and the Cold War, the United States would withdraw from Europe and, in so doing, prompt a return to competitive balance of power politics, widespread nuclear proliferation, and increased interstate conflict.⁹⁸ This breakdown in political order, moreover, would likely lead to a corresponding closure of the international economy, ushering in a return to the economic nationalism and beggar-thy-neighbor politics of the Great Depression of the 1930s.⁹⁹ In this approach, the consequences of an American withdrawal from its hierarchies in Europe, and possibly elsewhere, might well be catastrophic—suggesting that the benefits of hierarchy are large indeed!

Ignoring the role and benefits of international hierarchy, the back-to-the-future school predicts that the United States will inevitably withdraw from its global responsibilities.¹⁰⁰ This retrenchment has not happened, of course. Rather, the United States has broadened its hierarchies, seeking a New World Order, enlarging NATO, and expanding the zone of democracy. Three successive post-Cold War presidential administrations have recognized the substantial benefits to the United States from its international hierarchies.

The “new imperialism” school predicts that, in lieu of exercising international authority, the United States can impose its will on others through coercion while reaping many of the same rewards it now receives. Few academic theorists espouse this view, but it is the animating idea behind neoconservatism.¹⁰¹ In this school, demonstrating overwhelming force—and importantly, a willingness to use that force—will prompt other states to acquiesce in and perhaps embrace American-led international orders. Once established, moreover, this willingness to use force will deter states from challenging those orders. Thus, American objectives can be obtained with little additional cost.

98. Mearsheimer 1990, Mearsheimer 1993, Mearsheimer 2001.

99. Gilpin 1975, Gilpin 1977, Gilpin 1981.

100. Layne 1993.

101. For an extended academic treatise, see Lieber 2005. On neoconservative theory and practice, see Bacevich 2002; Daalder and Lindsay 2003a; Mann 2003; and Mann 2004.

John Brady Kiesling, a foreign service officer who resigned in protest over the Iraq War, captured the essence of the new imperialism in an aphorism credited to the Roman emperor Caligula, asking "has *oderint dum metuant* (let them hate as long as they fear) really become our motto?"¹⁰² By shedding the fetters of multilateralism, this school predicts that the United States will be able to create international orders closer to its own preferences. Without the need to accommodate others, the United States can create a world more in its own image. In this view, coercion can easily substitute for authority.

This theory, such as it is, appears to have shattered in Iraq. Proponents may argue that mistakes in implementing the policy are really to blame, but the war has demonstrated the high costs of attempting to impose one nation's will on a hostile society in the face of indifference if not active opposition from the other members of the international community. Just as it is expensive and typically difficult for tyrants to rule societies only through coercion, so Iraq makes clear the costs of attempting to govern other countries through force alone. Multiplied by the many relationships possessed by the United States, this implies that hierarchy produces substantial benefits at lower costs than a strictly coercive alternative.

A third and final school, the new institutionalism, predicts strong continuity with present American policy and international affairs even without hierarchy.¹⁰³ Although hegemony facilitates interdependence and the construction of international regimes, once created, institutions can autonomously facilitate cooperation, help preserve international order, and sustain globalization. Moreover, faced with suboptimal outcomes produced by egoistic defections, states can engage in mutual cooperation and build institutions to regulate their affairs even without hegemony.¹⁰⁴ Since cooperation is possible with and without hegemony and is guided by building institutions to constrain the behavior of all member states, this school expects a world without hierarchy to look very similar to the one we live in today.

The new institutionalism comes out of the same intellectual tradition as the approach developed in this book, but stops short of seeing authority and hierarchy as central attributes of international relations.¹⁰⁵ There is much to recommend in this school. Although debate continues, I think it is clear by now

102. Kiesling's letter of resignation is available at: <http://www.commondreams.org/views/03/0227-13.htm>. Accessed July 11, 2008.

103. Wallander 2000, Wallander and Keohane 1999.

104. Keohane 1984.

105. Keohane's work begins with Coase 1960, whereas the analysis here begins with Williamson 1975, 1985, but both draw on transactions cost economics or the economics of organizations.

that states do create international institutions to guide behavior and that such institutions do facilitate cooperation.¹⁰⁶ Institutions mitigate some of the less desirable consequences of systemic anarchy. At the same time, however, the new institutionalism may be a misleading guide to the nature of world politics in the absence of hierarchy. Most important, the strongest and most consequential institutions created over the last half century—the GATT/WTO in the international economy, NATO in security affairs—overlap in essential ways with the hierarchies dominated by the United States. By ignoring the possibility of hierarchy, and in fact assuming that international hierarchy does not exist, this school attributes to institutions alone the combined effects of institutions and hierarchy. In formal research design terms, institutionalism suffers from an omitted variables bias that leads scholars to systematically but unwittingly overestimate the effect of institutions on observed state behaviors.¹⁰⁷ We cannot yet calculate the magnitude of this likely bias, but the effects of hierarchy on subordinates, examined in the next chapter, and on dominant states, probed in this chapter, suggest that it may well be substantial.

A final thought experiment implies a similar conclusion. Imagine an international system similar in all respects to ours but in which the United States is simply first among equals, possesses no authority over others, and carries no special responsibilities for promoting order. Even though it would still be in the interests of states to form institutions like NATO to promote the common defense and the GATT/WTO to liberalize trade, would they choose to do so without the underlying guarantees and order provided by the United States? Without the basic protections for people, property, and promises provided by America's hierarchies, would others open themselves to the risks of opportunism in collective defense or economic interdependence?

The interwar system actually approximates this counterfactual. The United States was large and important, but possessed no authority anywhere outside of Latin America.¹⁰⁸ The inability of states to organize collectively to deter German expansionism and manage the international economy in that system suggests that states would have similar difficulty in creating institutions, collaborating on the common defense, and liberalizing trade in other wholly anarchic worlds. If institutions do not substitute fully for authority, the benefits of hierarchy will be greater than institutionalists now suggest.

Even though the total costs and benefits of hierarchy are hard to measure,

106. For contrasting positions, see Mearsheimer 1994; Keohane and Martin 1995; Martin and Simmons 1998.

107. On omitted variables bias, see King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 168–182. On the resulting bias, see Lake 2001.

108. Lake 1988, chaps. 5 and 6.

international relations theory and experience suggest that the current gains are substantial. Without hierarchy, the United States would retrench, rule by force, or depend on institutions, but any alternative to the international orders that exist today would likely be substantially weaker and more fragile, and the avenues of commerce now supported by its authority would be far less busy.

Dominant states are not altruists. They benefit from political order, they can bias the rules they establish to their advantage, and the legitimacy conferred by subordinates reduces the cost of actions against states that would disrupt the status quo. Yet, creating order is costly. Enforcing rules and supporting subordinates in crises imposes real costs on dominant states. Disciplining subordinates is also costly, as the otherwise seemingly counterproductive sanctions on Cuba attest. Tying one's own hands to achieve authority over others may be the most subtle but also most important and irritating burden on dominant states. No ruler wants to bind herself. Dominant states are always tempted to use their great strength to break free of the fetters imposed upon them by their own authority, but in doing so they undermine and weaken the very foundation on which their dominance rests. On balance, we expect dominance to "pay," even if the net benefits are hard to measure, and rest in part on conjectures about the alternative nature of world politics under anarchy.

Producing order absent any immediate benefits is not predicted by any major extant theory of international relations and, indeed, is inconsistent with theories that assume states are strictly motivated by national interests. Yet, consistent with the theory here, dominant states do appear to engage in costly actions to provide order to subordinates, even when it is inconvenient to do so. Strikingly, they are more likely to intervene in crises to support subordinate than nonsubordinate states. Building authority by providing political order alters the behaviors of dominant states and leads them to undertake actions and incur costs they could otherwise avoid. Yet, hierarchy affects not only the policies of dominant states, but, as we shall see in the next chapter, it also alters the behavior of subordinate states in profound ways.

Subordination

Hierarchy affects the choices and policies of subordinate states in profound ways. The last chapter addressed how hierarchy affects policy in dominant states. This chapter focuses on three behaviors of subordinate states that follow from their submission to external authority. These behaviors are, if not inconsistent, at least unexpected in current theories of international relations. Taken together, they demonstrate that hierarchy is substantively important for international politics.

First, security hierarchy reduces the level of defense effort in subordinate states. Subordinate states depend upon dominant states for political order and, having received a measure of protection for their persons, property, and promises, they divert scarce resources to other valued uses. This is a key national benefit for which states are willing to give up or "sell" some measure of their sovereignty. This pattern stands in sharp contrast to balance of power theory in which anarchy is treated as a universal condition that requires, at a minimum, that states rely upon self-help and balance against rather than bandwagon with dominant states.

Second, security and economic hierarchy increase trade openness in subordinate states, and this effect is stronger in pairs of countries that are subordinate to the same dominant state. Hierarchy promotes openness both by providing political order, thereby encouraging subordinates to risk greater dependence on one another, and promoting compliance with the liberal policies of the United States as institutionalized in the GATT/WTO. Although this empirical pattern was anticipated by the theory of hegemonic stability, the causal mechanism is distinct, as is the new state and dyad-level evidence on the impact of hierarchy on trade openness.

Finally, security and economic hierarchy induce subordinates to join

wartime coalitions led by their dominant state. In return for political order, states legitimate the dominant state's authority by engaging in acts of symbolic obeisance that publicly acknowledge their subordination. Joining wartime coalitions strikes at the heart of a state's sovereignty and is, thus, one of the most politically salient symbols of international obeisance. Following the leader into war contradicts balance of power theory. Rather than balancing against the dominant state, subordinates are bandwagoning with it in symbolic but nonetheless costly acts. It also contradicts collective action theory, which expects small states to free ride on the efforts of larger powers. In many wars, the subordinates who lend their names to the cause could have easily escaped attention or retribution for not joining the collective effort. Nonetheless, in acknowledgement of their subordination, they step forward to support their dominant state in the face of—indeed, partly because of—varying international opposition.

Hierarchy and Defense Effort

Central to the relational approach to authority is the exchange between ruler and ruled. The ruler provides a political order of value to the ruled while the ruled confer legitimacy on the ruler and accept those commands necessary to bring about that order. In short, the ruled give up some measure of their autonomy—or, in the case of states, their sovereignty—in exchange for valued services provided by the ruler. Political order provides a degree of security for the subordinate in return for its compliance. This provision of security from within the authority contract affects strongly the defense efforts of subordinate states.

To deduce specific predictions about state behavior from this relational conception of authority requires additional assumptions. I have already assumed throughout that states as aggregations of individuals are capable and, indeed, make tradeoffs between sovereignty and protection or political order; if sovereignty is inalienable, no exchange between dominant and subordinate states is possible. In this chapter, I assume further that states receive utility from or desire security, sovereignty, and at least one other (and typically many more) valued goods. A state's utility function thus embodies what Thomas Jefferson memorably identified in the Declaration of Independence as the rights of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."¹ In practice, this assumption declares that

1. The Declaration of Independence, of course, identifies these as "unalienable" rights; it is, however, mute on trade-offs between these three goals.

states give up autonomy, security, or other desired objectives only for something equally if not more valuable.

Combined with the notion of authority as a social contract, this assumption implies that states will sacrifice some measure of sovereignty for security provided by a dominant state and will divert some (or all, depending on the marginal rate of substitution between these goods) of the resources that otherwise would have been devoted to defense to other purposes. It follows, therefore, that countries in hierarchical relationships should, all else considered, spend fewer of their own resources on security and rely more on the efforts of their dominant protector.² This relationship, moreover, will be continuous: the greater the hierarchy, the less effort the subordinate country will expend to provide for its own defense. This does not imply that subordinates will give up entirely on providing for their self-defense. For reasons discussed in chapter 4, guarantees of protection are never absolute; all subordinates will retain, as a result, at least a residual defense capacity. Yet, lower defense expenditures are one of the benefits that subordinate states receive from giving up a measure of their sovereignty.

Evidence

Anecdotal evidence supports this hypothesis. Japan, a near protectorate of the United States after 1945 and still in a sphere of influence, enjoyed legendarily low levels of defense effort through the postwar era. Even in the 1990s, Japanese politicians were reluctant to acknowledge that they were breaking a self-imposed cap on defense spending of 1 percent of GDP and engaged in some creative accounting to maintain the fiction (standard methods put Japan's defense spending at about 1.4 percent of GDP during this period). By comparison, West European countries, also in at least a sphere of influence, were spending on average 1.8 percent of GDP on defense, and the United States itself was spending 4 percent. States on the Caribbean littoral, which the United States has long dominated in an informal empire, spend about 26 percent of the global average on their militaries—the exception being during the 1980s when the conflicts in Nicaragua and surrounding states raised the regional average to 58 percent of the global level. In South America, in a sphere of influ-

2. This hypothesis is similar to that in Altfeld 1984 and Morrow 1991, 1993. These works limit the range of variation in external ties to alliances, however, which are a relatively anarchic type of security relationship in which states give up comparatively little sovereignty for little security. Morrow (1991, 909) defines autonomy as the ability to alter the status quo. In the approach here, states are simply giving up their ability to set their policies free from external control for greater security, regardless of their preferences over the status quo.

ence dominated by the United States, countries also spend relatively little on defense, averaging only about 47 percent of global expenditures, despite numerous territorial disputes and provocative actions by long-standing rivals.³ States and regions subordinate to the United States appear to spend significantly less on defense than others.

To assess this hypothesis more systematically, I undertake a time series cross-sectional analysis of defense spending in all states from 1950 to 2000 (see the appendix for definitions and sources for all variables). Defense effort is operationalized as military expenditures as a share of GDP and then regressed on the indicators of U.S. security and economic hierarchy described in chapter 3.⁴ In most models, I employ panel-corrected standard errors to mitigate possible heteroskedasticity and a lagged dependent variable and an AR(1) correction to address problems of serial autocorrelation. In model 2, I use a country fixed effects specification to capture possible omitted variables. For reasons explained in chapter 3, the hierarchy measures are only available for the United States, implying that at least some countries subordinate to other states within the international system are classified as being only in anarchic relationships when, in fact, they are subordinate to some other dominant state. In all the tests reported below, this misclassification problem cuts against finding any significant effect of U.S. security or economic hierarchy.⁵

In identifying the effects of hierarchy on defense effort, it would be naive to assume that hierarchy is entirely exogenous. If states intentionally choose one or another type of relationship with the United States, it is important to control for the possible determinants of this decision in order to estimate accurately the effect of hierarchy on defense effort. This chapter does not present a fully developed theory of the formation of hierarchy.⁶ Prior theory and an eclectic set of auxiliary arguments suggest three sets of control variables.

3. On security rivalries in Latin America, see Mares 2001.

4. Surprisingly, defense effort has attracted relatively little attention. For work by economists using this same definition, see *Aufrant 1999; Smith 1995; and Hartley and Sandler 1999*. Related literatures focus on burden-sharing in alliances; see *Oneal and Whatley 1996*. In an extension of the democracy and victory literature, political scientists have begun to look at defense effort and regime type. See *Fordham and Walker 2005; Goldsmith 2003; Goldsmith 2007*. There is no canonical model of defense effort against which we can test the effect of hierarchy.

5. In essence, this is an omitted variables bias introduced by lack of data on other hierarchies. In theory, and the available evidence appears to support this inference, states are subordinate to only one other power, implying that measures of other hierarchies would be inversely related to measures of U.S. hierarchy. This suggests that if measures of other hierarchies were available, the coefficients on U.S. hierarchy would actually be larger (and most likely more significant) than those reported below. This expectation, however, is tempered by the results on Warsaw Pact membership discussed below.

6. But see *Lake 1999a* for an attempt.

First, countries that are more threatened by others are more likely to subordinate themselves to a dominant state in exchange for protection and thus are more likely to enter hierarchical relationships. The countries that are most threatened, in other words, are most likely to be willing to yield the sovereignty that subordination entails. In the absence of a hierarchical relationship, we would therefore expect these same states to carry a higher than normal defense burden. To identify the effect of hierarchy, therefore, I control for foreign threats and measure them in two ways. I create a dummy variable indicating whether the country was involved in a militarized interstate dispute (MID), as defined by the Correlates of War MID data set. Involvement in a MID indicates the presence of issues between the country and others with a strong potential to escalate to violence. Somewhat more indirectly, I also count the number of allies (other than the United States) possessed by the country. This measure is conceptually different from the number of alliances that are independent of the United States, one of the component variables of security hierarchy. A large number of allies—whether or not they are independent of the United States—suggest a strong need for assistance, which would follow from a perception of external threat.⁷

Second, richer countries possess smaller opportunity costs in defense spending. They may therefore be less willing to trade sovereignty for external protection and less likely to enter hierarchical relationships. If security is a normal good whose consumption increases with income, this implies that richer countries will both spend more on defense and enter fewer hierarchies. We would expect richer countries, all else constant, to carry a higher defense burden. GDP per capita is included as a control.⁸

Third, to the extent that democracies are more likely to “flock together,” they may also be more willing to enter into hierarchical relationships with the United States.⁹ If democracies are also more efficacious in their use of military force, they may bear a smaller defense burden, on average.¹⁰ To separate the effects of hierarchy on defense effort from that of democracy, I include as another control the level of democracy.

7. The correlation between the index of independent alliances and the number of other allies is a relatively high 0.72, potentially introducing problems of multicollinearity. Nonetheless, both variables are consistently significant in the regressions below. Dropping number of other allies from model 3 does not change the sign or significance level of the index of independent alliances. The total number of alliances might also substitute for hierarchy, in which case we would expect a negative sign on this variable. In all of the regressions reported below, this variable is always positive and significant.

8. In the next test on trade openness, per capita income is found to have diminishing marginal effects. The square of GDP per capita is not significant when entered into the model here.

9. Siverson and Emmons 1991.

10. See Lake 1992; Reiter and Stam 2002; Goldsmith 2007.

The results are presented in table 5.1.¹¹ Security hierarchy is, as predicted, consistently negative and statistically significant. Countries that are subordinate to the United States on the security dimension do spend proportionately less of their national income on defense. The substantive impact of security hierarchy is large.¹² Within the sample of countries used in this estimate, the average country spends approximately 2.57 percent of its GDP on defense each year (standard deviation = 4.74 percent). A one-unit increase in security hierarchy alone, equivalent to moving from no hierarchy to the level of Panama in 1995, reduces defense effort by 1.1 percent of GDP, or by about 43 percent of the mean level (based on model 1). A maximal increase in security hierarchy, from zero to the highest level observed in the sample for South Vietnam in 1968, reduces defense expenditures by 5.6 percent of GDP. Model 3 breaks the aggregate indicator into its component indices. Both the coefficients for the index of military personnel and the index of independent alliances are negative, but controlling for the effects of the other, only the latter is statistically significant. This suggests that the measure of independent alliances has greater explanatory power in this test. Economic hierarchy is never statistically significant and indeed carries the wrong sign.¹³ Countries that are economically subordinate to the United States do not enjoy lower defense expenditures. This contrasts with the results on trade openness discussed in the next section.

11. There is no consensus on the appropriate model for time-series cross-section data. This is especially true when serial correlation is a significant problem, as it is in this study even after including a lagged dependent variable. Given this lack of consensus, the model is estimated in two ways in Stata (version 8.0). Models 1, 3, and 4 are estimated with panel-corrected standard errors (xtpcse). See Beck and Katz 1995. Model 2 is estimated with country fixed effects (using xregar). With the exception of two control variables, the results are robust to these alternative specifications. Stata is unable to calculate panel-corrected standard errors with country fixed effects for these models.

12. For criticism of this model, see MacDonald 2008. Excluding up to ten high-leverage country-year outliers does not alter the signs or general significance of the security hierarchy coefficients, but does reduce the estimates of their substantive effects. These outliers are all cases in which defense spending skyrocketed during war or major conflicts. Indeed, the excluded country-years with the greatest leverage in the results are Kuwait between 1990 and 1993, during which defense spending rose to more than 100 percent of GDP. Dropping these high-leverage cases, however, eliminates important variation in the dependent variable. Lagged defense effort, which carries a coefficient of 0.66 (table 5.1, model 1), increases to almost 0.94 once the outliers are excluded. This implies that last year's defense effort is a near perfect predictor of this year's defense effort. With the lagged dependent variable absorbing nearly all the variance in the data, it is not surprising that the coefficients for security hierarchy and all covariates decline proportionately. Indeed, perhaps the only surprise is that there is any statistically significant effect of any variable on defense effort once the lagged value is "corrected" for the largest cases of year-to-year change.

13. Interestingly, the two component indices reported in model 3 carry opposite signs, implying that, controlling for the other, they are exerting countervailing effects on defense effort within the aggregate indicator. Note, however, that the negative effect of the index of exchange rate regimes is very small and statistically indistinguishable from zero.

TABLE 5.1.
U.S. hierarchy and defense effort, 1950–2000

	Model 1 β /pcse	Model 2 β /se	Model 3 β /pcse	Model 4 β /pcse
Index of security hierarchy $_{t-1}$	-0.0109*** 0.003	-0.0084* 0.0034		-0.0095*** 0.0027
Index of military personnel $_{t-1}$			-0.0018 0.0018	
Index of independent alliances $_{t-1}$			-0.009*** 0.0027	
Index of economic hierarchy $_{t-1}$	0.0015 0.0013	0.0011 0.0016		0.0002 0.0012
Index of exchange rate regimes $_{t-1}$			-0.0000 0.0012 0.0077 0.0075	
Index of relative trade dependence $_{t-1}$				
Defense effort $_{t-1}$ (lagged DV)	0.6653*** 0.0701	0.6856*** 0.0115	0.644*** 0.0728	0.6218*** 0.0743
Mid involvement $_{t-1}$	0.0033*** 0.001	0.0015 0.0008	0.0033*** 0.001	0.003** 0.0009
Number of other allies $_{t-1}$	0.0002** 0.0001	0.0002* 0.0001	0.0003** 0.0001	0.0002** 0.0000

GDP per capita _{t-1}	6.64e-07*	-9.64e-08	7.24e-07*	4.65e-07
	3.28e-07	1.32e-07	3.47e-07	2.79e-07
Democracy _{t-1}	-0.0003*	-0.0002*	-0.0003*	-0.0001
	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001
Coldwar _{t-1}				0.0055***
				0.0012
Middle Eastern member of OPEC _{t-1}				0.0234**
				0.0073
Civilwar _{t-1}				-0.0000
				0.0012
Member of Warsaw Pact _{t-1}				0.0074*
				0.003
Constant	0.0023	0.0064***	0.0026	-0.0011
	0.0016	0.0013	0.0017	0.0018
Country fixed effects?	No	Yes	No	No
Observations	4522	4396	4522	4522
Countries	126	125	126	126
R ²	0.46	Within 0.46	0.44	0.47
		Between 0.97		
		Overall 0.68		

Dependent variable: Defense expenditures/GDP.

Panel corrected standard errors or country fixed effects, AR(1) correction.

* p < 0.05

** p < 0.01

*** p < 0.001

In all the models, the covariates carry the anticipated sign and are generally statistically significant. Accounting for levels of security and economic hierarchy, greater external threats and wealth lead to higher levels of defense effort, and democracy leads to lower levels of effort.

To check for robustness, I also include controls for four potentially confounding variables not predicted by theory (model 4). A dummy variable for the Cold War era is positive and significant, suggesting that countries spent on average more on defense prior to 1991 than afterwards. The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) countries located in the Middle East, who have both the motivation and the means to spend more, also exert significantly greater levels of defense effort than others. Contrary to intuition, the presence of a civil war does not appear to increase defense effort. This result is most likely a product of selection bias: states that are unable to extract or borrow enough resources to defend themselves are more likely to experience a civil war.¹⁴ Finally, members of the Warsaw Pact spent considerably more on defense than other states. This final result is partially inconsistent with the larger argument made in this study. The most likely set of hierarchical relationships in the period covered here, other than those possessed by the United States, is the Soviet Union's informal empire in Eastern Europe.¹⁵ Although this is undoubtedly an inadequate measure that fails to capture variations in hierarchy across the Eastern European states, the theory here implies that Warsaw Pact members should spend less rather than more on defense as a proportion of GDP. This suggests that the Soviet Union was extracting more from its subordinates for the common defense than was the United States, an observation that is consistent with the apparently greater levels of coercion generally used by Moscow over the region. Adding these additional controls, however, does not affect the statistical significance nor the estimates of the substantive importance of the measure of security hierarchy for the United States, giving us some confidence in the general magnitude of the relationships found in the base model (model 1).

A final set of models examine the relationship between hierarchy and defense effort controlling for alternative indicators of coercive capabilities (see table 5.2). These results demonstrate clearly that measures of coercive capability are not systematically related to defense effort.¹⁶ Countries with larger ca-

14. On state weakness and civil wars, see Fearon and Laitin 2003.

15. Lake 1996; Lake 2001; Wendt and Friedheim 1995.

16. This model is, admittedly, not designed as a test of coercive capability on defense effort. Most important, the covariates for coercive capability are not likely to be the same as for security and economic hierarchy. Before concluding that coercive capabilities have little or no effect on defense effort, one would want to identify and control for those variables that correlate with both coercive capabilities and defense effort.

TABLE 5.2.
U.S. hierarchy and defense effort with alternative measures of coercive capability, 1950–2000

	Model 5 β /pcse	Model 6 β /pcse	Model 7 β /pcse	Model 8 β /pcse	Model 9 β /pcse
Index of security hierarchy $_{t-1}$	-0.0110*** 0.0030	-0.0100*** 0.0027	-0.0107*** 0.0030	-0.0108*** 0.0030	-0.0117*** 0.0031
Index of economic hierarchy $_{t-1}$	0.0015 0.0013	0.0014 0.0013	0.0015 0.0013	0.0015 0.0013	0.0016 0.0013
Defense effort $_{t-1}$ (lagged DV)	0.6664*** 0.0700	0.6699*** 0.0695	0.6678*** 0.0698	0.6659*** 0.0700	0.6573*** 0.0716
MID involvement $_{t-1}$	0.0032** 0.0010	0.0034*** 0.0010	0.0033*** 0.0010	0.0034*** 0.0010	0.0027** 0.0010
Number of other allies $_{t-1}$	0.0002** 0.0001	0.0002** 0.0001	0.0002** 0.0001	0.0002** 0.0001	0.0002*** 0.0001
GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	6.60e-07* 3.29e-07	6.99e-07* 3.57e-07	6.71e-07* 3.34e-07	6.54e-07* 3.30e-07	6.85e-07* 3.30e-07
Democracy $_{t-1}$	-0.0003* 0.0001	-0.0003* 0.0001	-0.0003* 0.0001	-0.0003* 0.0001	-0.0004* 0.0001
Capability score $_{t-1}$	0.0154 0.0294				
Real GDP $_{t-1}$		-3.02e-09 1.97e-09			
Major power $_{t-1}$			-0.0060 0.0038		
Population $_{t-1}$				-4.87e-09* 2.46e-09	
Military personnel $_{t-1}$					7.98e-06** 2.84e-06
Constant	0.0023 0.0015	0.0023 0.0016	0.0023 0.0016	0.0025 0.0017	0.0017 0.0015
Observations	4522	4522	4522	4522	4505
Countries	126	126	126	126	126
R ²	0.46	0.47	0.46	0.46	0.46

Dependent variable: Defense expenditures/GDP.

Panel corrected standard errors, AR(1) correction.

* $p < 0.05$,

** $p < 0.01$,

*** $p < 0.001$

pability scores do not spend significantly more or less on defense as a share of GDP than others (model 5), nor do countries with larger economies or major power status (models 6 and 7). More populous countries do expend significantly less defense effort (model 8), while states with larger numbers of personnel in the military—not surprisingly—spend significantly more (model 9). Most important, controlling for coercive capabilities does not alter significantly the effect of security hierarchy on defense effort. As seen in table 3.1, there is a small but positive correlation between GDP and the capability score, on the one hand, and the measures of security hierarchy, on the other. Yet, controlling for coercive capabilities does not alter the central effect of security hierarchy on defense effort. The coefficients on the index of security hierarchy in models 1 and 5–9 are nearly identical, confirming that the effect of security hierarchy is not spurious or produced by some process related to overall international “power” as traditionally conceived.

These results generally support the hypothesis that hierarchy leads to lower levels of defense effort. Countries subordinate to the United States in security affairs enjoy lower defense expenditures as a proportion of national income. Economic hierarchy, though, appears not to produce lower defense efforts. Why this is so requires further investigation. Overall, the strong effect of security hierarchy implies that states do not rely upon self-help or balance against their dominant protectors. Rather, they trade subordination for protection, or at least take advantage of their subordination to lower their military burdens and place some responsibility for their defense on the dominant state. Countries do not give up their sovereignty lightly, of course, but the material benefits of subordination can be substantial.

Implications

Balance of power theory, as Kenneth Waltz writes, is the most “distinctively political theory of international politics.”¹⁷ The finding that subordinate states expend less on defense than others is inconsistent with and, indeed, contradicts this theory. Central to balance of power theory is the assumed condition of international anarchy. As Waltz again states most forcefully, “balance of power politics prevail whenever two, and only two, requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive.”¹⁸ International hierarchy produces a pattern of behavior that is quite different from what balance of power theory expects.

17. Waltz 1979, 117.

18. *Ibid.*, 121.

Balance of power theory comes in many variants, of which Waltz's systemic version is merely the most spare.¹⁹ Key to all variants, however, is the hypothesis that, in anarchy, all states must attend to their own security (i.e., engage in self-help) and will increase their own defense efforts (internal balancing) or combine into coalitions (external balancing) to counter the most powerful or, allowing for varying intentions, the most threatening states within the system. For Waltz, this implies that the system as a whole will tend toward roughly equal balances, although there may be substantial variation in individual state behavior.²⁰ For others, the theory predicts more specific patterns of alliances, at least over the long run.²¹ Waltz claims empirical support for balance of power theory from particularly "hard" cases, such as the United States and Soviet Union in World War II, whose ideological antagonism should otherwise have precluded security cooperation.²²

The evidence here, however, appears to contradict several expectations of balance of power theory. First, if states are concerned with security and survival, as Waltz suggests, they should balance against those powers most likely to threaten their sovereignty, especially those that exercise authority over them and thereby diminish their autonomy in whole or part.²³ Yet, rather than exerting greater effort to assert their independence and balance against their dominant state, those countries subordinate to the United States reduce their defense efforts. Local threats may still lead states to spend more on defense, as suggested by the consistently positive and usually significant coefficients on MID involvement and the number of other allies in the various models reported in tables 5.1 and 5.2, but subordinate states clearly do not attempt to balance against the authority exerted by the United States. This fits with the general absence of balancing against the United States during the post-Cold War period.

Second, as collective action theory suggests, the states least likely to balance should be smaller, less-powerful states who can more easily free ride on the efforts of others, hoping that they can benefit from the general defense provided by those more willing and able to stand up to regional challengers or aspirants to hegemony.²⁴ This suggests that balance of power politics is a great power game played most intensively and vigorously by the larger and more powerful states who can make a difference in the global scales. Yet, the results

19. See Haas 1953.

20. Waltz 1979, 121.

21. Walt 1987.

22. Waltz 1979, 125.

23. *Ibid.*, 126.

24. Olson and Zeckhauser 1966; Hartley and Sandler 1999; Murdoch and Sandler 1982.

reported in table 5.2 indicate clearly that, once we control for levels of hierarchy, larger states that are more capable of wielding coercion typically do not exert any greater defense effort.

Critics of balance of power theory charge that its predictions fit the empirical record poorly.²⁵ In particular, they identify a variety of alternative strategies that states have adopted historically in response to rising power or threats, including hiding (retreating into isolation), bandwagoning (joining with the stronger power), transcending (building new institutions to escape from anarchy), co-opting (buying off a challenger), and buck-passing (doing nothing or free riding in the hopes that others will balance against the challenger). Overall, critics argue, bandwagoning and buck-passing are chosen more frequently than balance of power theory expects.²⁶ They especially point to the post-Cold War period in which other states, contrary to expectations, have failed to balance against the United States, by far the single strongest state in modern history.

Focusing on the effects of hierarchy on state behavior suggests the need to reformulate and revise how we think about the core alternatives to balancing behavior. Much of what is often described in the historical surveys as hiding or buck-passing may actually be subordinate states relying on the protection of their dominant powers—"cashing in" on the exchange that lies at the heart of authority relationships, if you will. Rather than trying to avoid their fair share of the costs of collective defense against imposing powers or threats, the results above suggest that subordinate states may actually be reaping the benefits for which they have surrendered part of their sovereignty. Instead of getting off more cheaply as the concept of free riding implies, subordinate states are paying a higher cost than their defense efforts alone might suggest. In turn, bandwagoning by subordinates with their dominant states may instead be acts of symbolic obeisance (see below).

The results do not show that balance of power theory is necessarily wrong. Rather, they make plain that its propositions are, at best, contingent on the absence or presence of hierarchy in relations between states. Since anarchy is not a universal trait shared equally by all states, not all countries should be equally concerned with balancing against stronger powers or threats. For wholly sovereign states, balance of power theory may apply. For subordinate states, however, the strictures of balancing are relaxed, increasingly so as countries increase

25. See Schroeder 1976. Levy and Thompson (2005) find that states are slow to balance, but eventually do so if the potentially hegemonic state acquires a third or more of the total military capabilities in the system.

26. On "bandwagoning," see Schweller 1994; Schweller 1997; Schroeder 1992; Schroeder 1994. On buck-passing, see Christensen and Snyder 1990; Rosecrance and Lo 1996.

in their degree of subordination. Subordinate states are not solely dependent upon self-help in crises and rely on their dominant states for at least a measure of security even in hostile environments. Balance of power politics should be strongest and most evident not among the great powers, as suggested by current theory, but among states that are not subordinate to some dominant state. Any test of balance of power theory must take the contingent nature of its propositions into account. None do so now.

Hierarchy and Economic Openness

The protection of individuals as they travel the globe in search of opportunities for exchange; goods as they await shipment, in transit, and upon arrival; and contracts governing the quality of those goods, payment, and other performance criteria is essential for international trade. The same holds for international factor flows, especially capital. Without a minimum level of political order, individuals will simply not invest in long-term assets nor seek out opportunities to exchange with one another. As Thomas Hobbes recognized, of course, in the state of nature "there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain . . . (and) no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea."²⁷ In the absence of international order, even when individuals are willing to bear the risks of unsecured commerce or investment, states may restrict exchange across national borders to limit dependence on potential enemies.²⁸ States may also restrict transactions to prevent their citizens from entering risky deals that may subsequently require official protection, such as travel to unsafe countries where they may require rescue, site-specific investments that may create demands for political and military intervention, or simply contractual disputes that, when adjudicated in national courts, may undermine diplomatic relations. Indeed, the possibility that states might be called upon to protect the "rights" of their citizens abroad creates a form of moral hazard in which individuals may be tempted to engage in riskier behavior than they otherwise would, thereby bringing about diplomatic or military crises that states would prefer to avoid. Thus, in addition to the assumptions discussed in the previous section, I assume further that the risks of political disorder inhibit exchange at both the individual and state levels.²⁹

To the extent that subordinates escape the state of nature through interna-

27. In Brown, Nardin, and Rengger 2002, 337.

28. Gowa 1994; Kastner 2009.

29. The assumption here does not require that individuals or states pursue "relative gains" or seek to maximize their welfare in a zero-sum world. On relative gains, see Grieco 1993.

tional hierarchy, enjoy a measure of political order, and expect their dominant states to protect them, their goods, and their contracts, it follows that they will be more willing to open themselves to international trade and investment and to risk becoming dependent on others. Where international rules governing exchange are secure, and especially when the dominant state itself has an interest in enforcing those rules, states will be more likely to engage in international commerce and seek the benefits of an international division of labor. This effect of hierarchy, moreover, is continuous. The greater the security and economic hierarchy exerted by the dominant state over a subordinate, the more secure that state and the more economically open it will be. This effect should be particularly evident when both parties to an exchange are subordinate to the same dominant state. In such cases, the dominant state not only protects both parties to a degree, but they also enjoy similar rules governing exchange, thereby reducing transactions costs, and can expect assistance from the dominant state in adjudicating disputes should they arise. Greater openness to international exchange, a deeper division of labor, and by inference greater economic welfare are immediate benefits for subordinate countries of the political order provided by a dominant state.

Subordinate states may also be more open economically because they are commanded or at least encouraged to be so by the United States. If the political order created under hierarchy encourages openness, so may the wishes and expectations of a particular dominant state. Not all dominant states are liberal, as evinced by Germany's proto-empire in Europe during World War II or the informal empire of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe during the Cold War. Dominance *per se* does not breed liberal economic values and policies.³⁰ Rather, democratic and liberal states that themselves have large spheres of private rights domestically or—to say the same thing—states that have only limited public authority can most easily solve the credibility problem that lies at the heart of all international hierarchies. Such states are more likely to become dominant and, in turn, to favor free trade for themselves and others. Although the relationship between domestic liberalism and international hierarchy is unlikely to rise to the level of an empirical law, there will be at least a correlation. Given its liberal orientation since at least 1945, if the United States exercises authority over other states, it follows that its subordinates should be more open to trade than nonsubordinates.

In the modern era, moreover, the United States is likely to exercise its authority through multilateral institutions or sets of rules that govern itself and its subordinates. By committing itself to abide by the same rules as others, the United States credibly signals its intent not to abuse the authority its subordi-

30. On domestic liberalism and hegemony, see Gilpin 1977.

nates have conferred upon it (see chapter 4). Equally important, with multiple subordinates there are real advantages to having a single set of rules governing exchange not only between the United States and its subordinates, but also between the subordinates themselves. Multilateralism, however, does not necessarily imply equality of outcomes. As discussed in the previous chapter, dominant states are likely to create a political order that is biased toward their interests and those of their citizens and corporations. Even though all states may share an interest in free trade as economic theory implies, there are strong distributional implications from alternative economic regimes. As part of the authority contract, complying with the United States's vision of a liberal international economy is a price that subordinates must pay to receive the larger benefits of political order. Subordinates may gain less than under some other, "ideal" order and will certainly gain less than in one in which they write the rules themselves. Nonetheless, in equilibrium subordinates gain from the political order produced by the United States relative to their next best alternative. Although any dominant state biases the rules in its favor, it can do so only as far as subordinates are willing to support. Subordinates then comply with those rules, even as they complain about having to do so. Given the important role of the United States in setting the agenda for the GATT/WTO and the potential gains from having multiple subordinates subject to the same set of rules, the authority exercised by the United States over its subordinates is likely to occur partly through the GATT/WTO. Indeed, writing a set of rules to bind subordinates may be the most visible manifestation of the authority of the United States in action.

In summary, as a function of both the benefits of political order and the need to comply with the rules of the dominant state, countries that are subordinate to the United States are more likely to be open to trade than similar countries that are not subordinate. This effect should be stronger in dyads where both parties are subordinate to the United States and transmitted, at least in part, through the GATT/WTO. As we shall see, it is not possible at present to discern whether subordinates are more open out of confidence in the political order they inhabit or whether they are complying with wishes of the United States, although some of the evidence suggests both factors are at play. Openness is overdetermined. But both motivations ultimately rest on the authority of the United States.

Evidence

As with defense effort above, there is significant anecdotal evidence that suggests subordinate states are more open economically than other states. Western Europe and Northeast Asia, where the United States has been dominant since

1945, have been dramatically more open than most other regions. Although much else varies between regions, especially the average size of states, total trade (imports plus exports) relative to GDP in Western Europe averaged approximately seven percentage points higher than the global mean over the period 1950–2000. Even Latin America, which followed the United States into protectionism after World War I and during the Great Depression, gradually liberalized after 1945; it enjoyed, for that region, a remarkable period of openness in the 1980s and 1990s under the aptly named “Washington consensus” on development. In turn, the advocates of today’s return to import-substituting industrialization and economic closure are the same political leaders who, like Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, reject U.S. authority over the region. Indeed, states that defy the authority of the United States are almost invariably economically closed, nationalist regimes.³¹ As revisionist historians of American foreign policy first argued, trade openness appears to be a central cleavage in world affairs.³²

Precisely because all else is not constant across such anecdotes, it is necessary to test this proposition more systematically. We can assess the effects of security and economic hierarchy on trade openness in two alternative ways. In the first approach, I examine trade openness defined as a country’s total trade with all partners (imports plus exports) as a share of GDP (trade/GDP). Trade/GDP is the most commonly used measure of trade openness. The two sets of security and economic hierarchy measures used throughout this book should be positively related to trade/GDP (see table 5.3). Building from the basic model of Helen Milner and Keiko Kubota, I include as relevant covariates (1) the log of national population, presuming that larger countries are more closed to trade and better able to secure their interests without yielding sovereignty to another state; (2) real GDP per capita, as richer countries both trade proportionately more and have lower opportunity costs for providing for their own security (GDP per capita squared is also included, as this effect declines with income); and (3) democracy, as regime type has been shown to be related to trade openness and democracies, as above, may be more likely to “flock together.”³³ To capture other omitted variables, and following Milner and Ku-

31. Solingen 1998.

32. Williams 1972; LaFeber 1985. For a recent variant of this argument, see Bacevich 2002.

33. Milner and Kubota 2005. Although I begin with their base model, I focus here on trade openness rather than tariff rates or barriers to trade, as in their article. Trade openness is, in my view, a better measure of actual liberalization than statutory rates or a simple dummy variable based on overall barriers. I also extend the sample beyond less-developed countries in the years 1970–1999 to all countries for which data is available for 1950–2000. I do not include many of the additional covariates, such as economic or balance of payments crises, which Milner and Kubota find consistently insignificant in their models and for which we do not have long-term data.

TABLE 5.3.
U.S. hierarchy and trade openness, 1950–2000

	Model 1 β /pcse	Model 2 β /pcse
Index of security hierarchy $_{t-1}$	3.7825**	
Index of military personnel $_{t-1}$	1.2586	0.7901
Index of independent alliances $_{t-1}$		0.5646
		3.7103*
Index of economic hierarchy $_{t-1}$	0.7076	1.5423
Index of exchange rate regimes $_{t-1}$	0.7288	
		0.1856
Index of relative trade dependence $_{t-1}$		0.5539
		7.2252*
		3.3204
Trade openness $_{t-1}$ (lagged DV)	0.7978***	0.7910***
Democracy $_{t-1}$	0.0276	0.0279
	-0.0554	-0.0610
GDP per capita (1995) $_{t-1}$	0.0457	0.0459
	0.0006*	0.0006*
GDP per capita (1995) squared $_{t-1}$	0.0003	0.0003
	-1.98e-08*	-1.95e-08*
Log of population $_{t-1}$	9.14e-09	9.31e-09
	-1.9234	-1.8549
Year	2.3436	2.3150
	0.1768*	0.1777**
Constant	0.0699	0.0689
	-315.6925*	.
	124.8635	.
Observations	4141	4141
Countries	114	114
R-squared	0.95	0.95

Dependent variable: Total trade/GDP

Panel Corrected Standard Errors, Country Fixed Effects (coefficients not reported).

AR(1) correction

* $p < 0.05$

** $p < 0.01$

*** $p < 0.001$

bota, I include country fixed effects in all models (coefficients not reported) and a time trend (year). The time variable also addresses possible spurious correlation from hierarchy and openness trending together over time. As in the regressions on defense effort above, I employ panel-corrected standard errors to mitigate possible heteroskedasticity and a lagged dependent variable and an AR(1) correction to address problems of serial autocorrelation.

As expected, security hierarchy is positively and significantly related to trade openness. For the period 1950–2000, the average level of trade relative to GDP for all countries is 64.07 percent (standard deviation = 43.34 percent). All else equal, a one-unit increase in the aggregate security hierarchy index, equiva-

lent to moving from no hierarchy to the level of Panama in 1995, produces a 3.8 percentage point increase in a country's trade relative to GDP (model 1), or about 6 percent of the mean level. A maximal increase in security hierarchy, equivalent to South Vietnam in 1968, would increase trade as a proportion of GDP by nearly 20 percentage points (or nearly one-third of the mean value). As model 2 indicates, this effect is largely driven by the index of independent alliances. All else constant, including the index of military personnel, having an alliance with the United States but no other country that is not also allied with Washington increases trade openness by 3.7 percentage points.

The aggregate economic hierarchy index is not related to trade openness (model 1), but the index of relative trade dependence is (model 2); *ceteris paribus*, increasing relative trade dependence by one unit, equivalent to Canada in 1995, increases trade openness by 7.2 percentage points. A maximal increase in relative trade dependence, to the level of St. Kitts and Nevis in 1987, would increase trade as a proportion of GDP by roughly 20 percentage points. Although intuition might suggest otherwise, trade openness and relative trade dependence are analytically and empirically distinct. Relative trade dependence measures a country's trade with the United States divided by GDP, minus similar ratios for the United Kingdom, France, Russia (Soviet Union before 1991), and China. It captures not how open the economy is, but the country's reliance on trade with the United States relative to the other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. The correlation between trade openness and relative trade dependence is only 0.16. Yet, controlling for other factors, the more dependent a country is on trade with the United States relative to trade with other great powers, the more open it is to trade in general.

Surprisingly, of the covariates, only GDP per capita and its square are statistically significant in any specification. Richer countries are likely to be more open, but at a declining rate. The effects of population and democracy typically found in other studies, including Milner and Kubota, are likely absorbed in the country fixed effects and lagged dependent variable.

In the second approach, I examine trade flows between pairs of countries (dyads), controlling for economic determinants through the now conventional gravity model of international trade (see table 5.4). I use the basic model presented by Andrew Rose and corrected and supplemented by Michael Tomz, Judith Goldstein, and Douglas Rivers for GATT/WTO participation.³⁴ Grav-

34. Rose 2004; Tomz, Goldstein, and Rivers 2007. Specifically, I use models 3 and 4, in table 2, from Tomz, Goldstein, and Rivers, but constrain all membership variables to have the same coefficient, as in their models 5 and 6. Unfortunately, data on security and economic hierarchy is missing on some country pairs, especially for the index of exchange rate regimes. I also elimi-

ity models are the workhorses of empirical studies of international trade and explain trade patterns between countries by a vector of economic, geographic, political, and cultural variables. These variables are listed in table 5.4 and described further in the appendix. Although all of the gravity model variables perform in the expected ways, they are not of substantive interest here except to note that they include proxies for other political institutions that might influence trade flows, including regional trade agreements and currency unions.

Security and economic hierarchy are measured through the same sets of indicators as above. Because trade flows are measured as the log of total trade between country dyads, however, I use the product of each pair of country's hierarchy scores. The higher the value of the hierarchy indicators in table 5.4, the greater their joint subordination to the United States. This allows us to test whether being subordinate to the same dominant state affects a dyad's level of trade flows. Since by construction the United States cannot be subordinate to itself, this excludes all dyads of which the United States is a member. This has the added benefit, in this case, of avoiding bias in the estimates of the effects of relative trade dependence due to potentially higher levels of trade with the United States. Thus, the several models assess the effects of joint hierarchy on trade flows between pairs of countries not including the United States.

The results in table 5.4 indicate that joint security and economic hierarchy have strong, positive, and typically significant effects on trade flows. Pairs of countries that are both subordinate to the United States trade substantially more with one another. Without country fixed effects, the impact appears to be driven largely by the indices of military personnel and relative trade dependence (model 2); with country fixed effects, a way of capturing potentially omitted variables, the results suggest that the effect originates in the indices of independent alliances and relative trade dependence (model 4), the same pattern we find in the previous test on country-level trade openness (see model 2, table 5.3).³⁵ A change from a dyad in which neither country is subordinate

nate the years 1948 and 1949 for lack of data on hierarchy, as well as all dyads that include the United States as one of its members. This reduces the number of observations in Rose and Tomz, Goldstein, and Rivers by about 38 percent, or from 234,597 to 144,489. Despite the somewhat smaller sample in the models reported here, Rose's variables on GATT/WTO membership are often negative and insignificant while Tomz, Goldstein, and River's corrected participation variables, used here, are positive and highly significant. These results replicate those in their respective articles.

35. Rose (2004) and Tomz, Goldstein, and Rivers (2007) also test models with dyad fixed effects. Because the indicators of security and economic hierarchy are quite stable between country pairs, including dyad fixed effects in models similar to those here "washes out" the effects of hierarchy and produces statistically insignificant coefficients. One way to interpret this is not that security and economic hierarchy do not matter controlling for dyad effects, but that the dyad fixed effects are actually capturing the omitted variables of security and economic hierarchy.

TABLE 5.4.
U.S. hierarchy and dyadic trade flows, 1950–1999

	Model 1 β /se	Model 2 β /se	Model 3 β /se	Model 4 β /se	Model 5 β /se
Index of security hierarchy (Dyad interaction)	0.3347*** 0.0895		0.3157*** 0.0922		0.3191*** 0.0921
Index of military personnel (Dyad interaction)		0.2579*** 0.0599		0.0743 0.0454	
Index of independent alliances (Dyad interaction)		-0.0447 0.0471		0.2650*** 0.0579	
Index of economic hierarchy (Dyad interaction)	0.3104** 0.0956		0.2777*** 0.0770		-0.2083 0.1457
Index of exchange rate regimes (Dyad interaction)		0.0739 0.0656		0.0500 0.0532	
Index of relative trade dependence (Dyad interaction)		3.4508*** 0.5706		2.5926*** 0.5572	
Index of economic hierarchy x Both participate in GATT					0.6670*** 0.1888
Index of economic hierarchy x Only one participates in GATT					0.5717** 0.1794
Both participate in GATT	0.3720*** 0.0793	0.3534*** 0.0796	0.5237*** 0.0725	0.4932*** 0.0724	0.4306*** 0.0773
Only one participates in GATT	0.1631* 0.0777	0.1516 0.0780	0.2453*** 0.0674	0.2278*** 0.0673	0.1505* 0.0737
GSP	0.7843*** 0.0406	0.7758*** 0.0405	0.6133*** 0.0403	0.6043*** 0.0403	0.6146*** 0.0403
Log product of real GDP	0.9210*** 0.0123	0.9185*** 0.0123	0.1459* 0.0664	0.1621* 0.0662	0.1202 0.0667
Log product of real GDP per capita	0.3625*** 0.0184	0.3720*** 0.0184	0.4868*** 0.0623	0.4670*** 0.0621	0.5132*** 0.0627

Regional FTA	1.0652*** 0.1429	1.1254*** 0.1415	0.8972*** 0.1817	0.9056*** 0.1838	0.8851*** 0.1812
Currency union	1.1678*** 0.1610	1.1869*** 0.1611	1.5323*** 0.1556	1.5547*** 0.1556	1.5226*** 0.1557
Log distance	-1.1138*** 0.0270	-1.1132*** 0.0270	-1.2156*** 0.0284	-1.1918*** 0.0286	-1.2155*** 0.0284
Common language	0.2294*** 0.0494	0.2266*** 0.0498	0.2556*** 0.0538	0.2466*** 0.0539	0.2592*** 0.0539
Shared border	0.6322*** 0.1337	0.6467*** 0.1344	0.5143*** 0.1323	0.5312*** 0.1321	0.5150*** 0.1324
Number landlocked	-0.2436*** 0.0364	-0.2511*** 0.0368	0.0441 0.3541	0.0386 0.3529	0.0005 0.3520
Number of islands	-0.0708 0.0453	-0.0559 0.0450	0.8333** 0.2549	0.7591** 0.2548	0.7916** 0.2545
Log product of land area	-0.1155*** 0.0102	-0.1141*** 0.0102	0.4991*** 0.0464	0.4935*** 0.0462	0.5169*** 0.0466
Common colonizer	0.6622*** 0.0874	0.6449*** 0.0876	0.6605*** 0.0838	0.6535*** 0.0839	0.6556*** 0.0838
Ever in a colonial relationship	0.4943* 0.2219	0.5609* 0.2247	0.5668** 0.1988	0.5772** 0.2034	0.5628** 0.1988
Constant	-28.6197*** 0.4556	-28.6489*** 0.4579	-11.0323*** 1.4113	-11.4545*** 1.4080	-10.5871*** 1.4140
Country fixed effects?	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	144489	144489	144489	144489	144489
R ²	0.63	0.63	0.69	0.69	0.69

Dependent variable: Log of total annual trade between country pairs.

Robust standard errors, clustered on dyads. Year fixed effects and country fixed effects (coefficients not reported).

* p < 0.05

** p < 0.01

*** p < 0.001

to the United States in security affairs to one in which both are subordinate at the level of Panama in 1995 produces an increase in trade roughly similar to the effect of both states participating in the GATT/WTO (without country fixed effects; see models 1 and 2).³⁶ A maximal increase in joint security hierarchy (Germany-Iceland in 1957 = 7.55) has nearly seven times the substantive effect of both countries participating in the GATT/WTO. A similar change in economic hierarchy from neither country being subordinate to the United States to a dyad where both reach the level of Canada in 1995 produces an increase in trade slightly less than when both states participate in the GATT/WTO. A maximal increase in joint economic hierarchy (Grenada-St. Kitts in 1987 = 2.14) has almost double the effect of both participating in the GATT/WTO.

In the postwar era, efforts by the United States to open other states to trade have largely been conducted through the GATT/WTO, which carries positive and significant coefficients in all models. While the effects of security hierarchy are largely independent, in turn, the effects of economic hierarchy on trade flows appears to operate through participation in the GATT/WTO (see model 5).³⁷ By itself, economic hierarchy may exert a negative effect on trade, but dyads that are jointly subordinate to the United States economically and in which one or both countries are also members of the GATT/WTO are likely to trade at significantly higher levels than otherwise. In fact, the interaction between joint economic subordination and GATT/WTO participation is sufficiently large to more than offset whatever negative effect economic hierarchy might have by itself and substantively larger than any of the estimated effects of GATT/WTO participation alone.

Taken together, these results imply that subordinates benefit from political order and become more willing to open their economies to other subordinates, largely through the avenue of increased security as in the discussion of defense effort above. They also imply that subordinates are more willing to comply with the rules laid down by the United States in the GATT/WTO, especially when they are both economically subordinate. Finally, the positive effects of security hierarchy and the interaction of economic hierarchy and GATT/WTO participation suggests that the effect of hierarchy on trade is not

36. Since the dependent variable is the natural log of trade, the magnitude of the substantive effects of hierarchy relative to other variables is hard to interpret. For ease of comparison, I calibrate the effects relative to joint participation in the GATT/WTO.

37. There is no significant interaction effect with any of the security hierarchy indicators. A model similar to model 4, with the indices of exchange rate regime and relative trade dependence, four interaction terms between these variables, and the categories of GATT/WTO membership (similar to model 5), is not inconsistent with model 5's result, but cannot be easily interpreted due to the large number of interaction terms.

entirely through general GATT/WTO rules such as unconditional most-favored-nation status: security hierarchy has an independent effect on trade flows, and economic hierarchy has an interactive effect with GATT/WTO participation, indicating that it is the combination of joint subordination and shared rules that really matters. Thus, the results in tables 5.3 and 5.4 strongly support the hypothesis that hierarchy is associated with more open trade and that this effect is increasing in the level of subordination to the United States. This suggests that hierarchy is important not only in minimizing insecurities about international economic exchange, but also in inducing compliance by subordinates with the economically liberal policies preferred by the United States.

Implications

International anarchy, according to Waltz, “entails relations of coordination among a system’s units, and this implies their sameness.” As a result, he argues, international systems are, almost by definition, functionally undifferentiated.³⁸ International hierarchy, as we have seen, produces economic openness that, in turn, necessarily implies some degree of specialization, a division of labor, and functional differentiation in pursuit of the gains from trade. Just as Hobbes saw the creation of a Leviathan as necessary for investment and the division of labor, the formation of international hierarchy lifts countries out of the state of nature and encourages them to specialize and trade with one another—especially when both are subordinate to the same dominant state.

The finding that states subordinate to the United States are more open to trade does not imply that hierarchy leads to complete functional differentiation. First, in no hierarchically organized human society do individuals specialize completely. Unlike, say, ant or bee colonies, all humans work for food, all reproduce, and so forth—albeit with differential success. That functional differentiation is always incomplete in human societies, including international societies, does not imply that some differentiation has not occurred. Second, in the contemporary era, at least, international hierarchies remain partial. Perhaps nineteenth-century European empires approximated the degree of hierarchy found in some nation-states of that same era, but none of the hierarchies dominated by the United States rise to this level.³⁹ If international hierarchies

38. Waltz 1979, 93.

39. Note, however, that some “failed states” in the contemporary era, where the center of ten cannot project power very far beyond the capital city, may be less hierarchical than some relationships dominated by the United States, such as Guam, Puerto Rico, or even the Federated States of Micronesia, a formally sovereign state.

are attenuated compared to domestic hierarchies, functional differentiation will be stunted as well, producing a question not of kind, as for Waltz, but of degree. Finally, states subordinate to the United States remain in relations of anarchy with other states, possibly impeding further specialization. Nonetheless, being subordinate to the United States leads states to be more open to trade than otherwise, implying a degree of specialization and differentiation.

The effects of hierarchy on openness are similar though not identical to those predicted by the theory of hegemonic stability, which flourished in the 1980s.⁴⁰ The theory of hegemonic stability posited that a single, politically powerful hegemonic state produces systemwide economic openness in one or both of two ways: (1) by forming a privileged group and unilaterally providing essential public goods that enable others to liberalize their economies and (2) by coercing others with different policy preferences to open their economies to trade and investment. Both versions of the theory lacked clear microfoundations that linked assumptions about the interests of political and economic actors to predicted outcomes. The first variant failed to explain why small sets of states could not also form privileged groups and effectively provide public goods.⁴¹ The second explored several alternatives, but never successfully explained why hegemonic states had stronger interests in free trade than nonhegemonic countries and why or how they were able to coerce others into adopting openness. Tests of the theory and its variants were hampered by poor research designs and a small number of observations, limited primarily to Great Britain in the nineteenth and the United States in the twentieth centuries.⁴²

The effects of international hierarchy identified here are similar to the first variant in spirit, but do not assume that political order is a global public good. Indeed, the results in table 5.4 suggest that the effects of order are at least partly private and largest for states that are both subordinate to the United States. The approach here also does not posit that order must be provided by a single hegemonic state, but can in principle be produced by any dominant state for its subordinates.⁴³ Finally, whereas hegemons were understood to provide public goods unilaterally because they received sufficiently large absolute returns to make the effort worthwhile, economic openness here follows from the authority contract between both dominant and subordinate states in which each

40. On hegemonic stability theory, see Kindleberger 1973; Gilpin 1975; Gilpin 1977; Krasner 1976. For a rigorous empirical treatment that estimates the effect of hegemony on trade flows, see Mansfield 1994.

41. Snidal 1985; Lake 1988.

42. See Lake 1993.

43. Given data limitations, however, I can only test for the effects of the United States as a dominant state.

has negotiated rights and duties. Although some hegemonic stability theorists flirted with notions of authority in international politics, they did not develop fully the implications of this concept and the obligations it implied.⁴⁴ In terms of an authority contract, providing political order is the governance cost that dominant states pay to gain the compliance of their subordinates and to legitimate their rule. Even though dominant states usually benefit from the political order they create, both absolutely and from the bias they write into the rules, dominant states might lose on net from providing order, yet recoup their costs by gaining the compliance of subordinates on other issues they care more about. When placed into the larger context of the authority contract, simple notions of the costs and benefits of free trade that stymied the theory of hegemonic stability become less relevant.

Despite other similarities, the implications of international hierarchy also differ from the second variant of hegemonic stability theory. In this variant, hegemons were expected to have stronger interests in freer trade and to be willing to take costly actions to coerce others to open their economies. An important critique was that few examples of coercion could be identified in the histories of either Britain or the United States.⁴⁵ A focus on hierarchy suggests that the dominant state's expectation of compliance rests on the authority earned by providing valuable political orders. In the bargain between ruler and ruled, order and compliance are two sides of the same Janus-faced coin. Thus, it should not be surprising that there are few visible episodes of dominant states coercing subordinate states to adopt free trade. Indeed, overt and directly coercive attempts to open another state's economy to trade might well be counterproductive, revealing the dominant state as a tyrant rather than a legitimate ruler. Rather, we would expect dominant states to attach conditions to the political order they provide—for instance, by requiring membership in organizations such as the GATT/WTO that specify rules to be followed and sanctions to be imposed in cases of violation—and occasionally discipline states that cheat on those conditions. The importance of such institutions is illustrated by the role of GATT/WTO participation in increasing dyadic levels of trade, both absolutely and in conjunction with joint economic subordination to the United States. Governing by authority rather than coercion looks very different.

Finally, perhaps the most decisive problem with hegemonic stability theory was that it predicted a grim future of economic closure and beggar-thy-neighbor policies that never arrived. Focusing on material indicators of coercive

44. Gilpin 1981, esp. 30.

45. McKeown 1989. But also see James and Lake 1989.

capabilities, the traditional measures of international "power," analysts were perplexed by liberalism's long afterglow in the face of obviously waning hegemony.⁴⁶ Yet, as stressed repeatedly here, authority is not the same as coercive power and—in the American experience at least, the only one for which we have data—the two can have very different trajectories. Even though its coercive capabilities continued to recede over the 1970s and 1980s, turning around only with the fall of the Soviet Union, the international hierarchies of the United States remained on average surprisingly robust through this same period (see figures 3.1 and 3.2). With interests vested in these American-led orders both in the United States and its subordinates, continuity in policy is exactly what a focus on hierarchy would predict, even in Western Europe, where economic (but not security) hierarchy had clearly declined by the mid-1980s. Seen through the lens of contemporary international hierarchy, liberalism's afterglow is not such a mysterious phenomenon.

Legitimizing Coalitions

In return for political order, subordinates legitimate dominant states by accepting their authority and usually (but not always) complying with their commands. Living within a particular order and respecting the authority of another state implies that subordinates alter their behavior from what they would otherwise choose in the state of nature. We saw above how subordinate states benefit from political order by spending less on defense and opening more to trade than do nonsubordinate states. Demonstrating that subordinates comply with the wishes of a dominant state, however, remains difficult. Rather, we can best see the role of authority in promoting compliance through the costly actions by which subordinate states signal their assent to the authority of the dominant state.

As discussed in chapter 3, compliance with authority is observationally equivalent to compliance under the shadow of coercion. Given a political order provided by the dominant state, compliance is often in the self-interest of the subordinate state. In international relations, the so-called compliance debate has been quite important, but irresolvable. Some analysts are struck by the extraordinarily high rates of compliance by states with international law, while others argue that states only enter agreements to which they are willing to be bound.⁴⁷ Introducing authority into this debate does not break the conun-

46. On afterglow, see Krasner 1976 and Brawley 1999.

47. On the tendency to comply, see Chayes and Chayes 1993; Chayes and Chayes 1995. On selection, see Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996.

drum and may, in fact, only complicate the issue by adding another reason to comply. In equilibrium, rulers will typically command only what they know their subjects will accept, and the ruled will usually do that which they are asked. Without knowing the reasons why specific states comply with particular rules, it is difficult and perhaps impossible to know whether they complied out of obligation, fear of sanctions, or some internal motivation. And since reasons—especially publicly articulated reasons—are always strategic, even detailed discourse analyses may be misleading. Although compliance with commands is important, and in complying, subordinates alter their actions from what they would otherwise do, it is analytically difficult to demonstrate the role of authority in shaping behavior simply by showing that the actions of subordinate states do indeed conform with the presumed desires of a dominant state.

Subordinates also demonstrate respect for authority, however, by engaging in what might be called *symbolic obeisance*, which I define as costly acts that do not involve direct compliance with commands but are nonetheless public, often collective displays of submission that acknowledge and affirm the authority of the ruler.⁴⁸ Symbolic obeisance, in fact, legitimates and strengthens a ruler by reinforcing the beliefs of other subordinates that the performer also respects the authority of the ruler.⁴⁹ In this way, symbolic obeisance is the inverse of civil disobedience. Civil disobedience gains its power by challenging convention and demonstrating that at least some fraction of the population denies or at least challenges the legitimacy of the ruler, thereby making it safer for others to contest that legitimacy as well. Symbolic obeisance deters challenges to authority by demonstrating to subordinates that other subordinates support the ruler. Importantly, to the extent that states engage in symbolic obeisance, we can infer that at least some portion of their broader pattern of compliance is a product of their respect for authority.

Within countries, symbolic obeisance takes many forms, including parades and patriotic celebrations on holidays, respect for the flag or other national symbols (monuments, ancient battlegrounds), and deference to political leaders (including the use of titles or grants of special privileges). In the United States, two of the most visible rituals are reciting the Pledge of Allegiance in schools and singing the national anthem before sporting and other public events. Many of these actions are not very costly to any single individual; if

48. Symbolic obeisance, then, is a performative, that refers to actions that are not true or false but are themselves actions and carry meaning only through what they signify. See Laitin 2006; citing Austin 1961, 66–67; Pitkin 1972, 280.

49. Symbolic obeisance is thus more than simple reputation for authority, but is part of the equilibrium between the ruler and each subordinate that creates authority. See chapter 4 on discipline.

they were, more individuals would opt out and the actions would lose their collective, affirming purpose. But summed over all individuals and events, the costs are not inconsequential. Some acts, however, are more costly at the personal level. Volunteering for the military, even in the burst of patriotism that often occurs in the rally-round-the-flag phase of any new war, can mean sacrificing one's life for one's country. As more costly signals, such acts reveal more deeply an individual's commitment to the community and especially his or her respect for its authority.

In international relations, where the authority of one state over another is not formally recognized and, in fact, is denied under juridical sovereignty, symbolic obeisance is less overt but nonetheless important. Despite the often visible trappings of formal equality between states, newly elected presidents and prime ministers of subordinate states nearly always visit the United States president at the White House first, rather than the president visiting their national capitals. Following the ancient pattern of imperial supplicants, for instance, postwar British prime ministers have on average visited the president within six months of assuming office, and all have visited within the first year. Israeli prime ministers have on average called at the White House to pay their respects in less than two and one-half months, and some have appeared in Washington within days of their elections.⁵⁰ The United Nations, IMF, World Bank, and the Organization of American States, to name but a few international organizations, are headquartered in the United States not because of its neutral status but because Washington or New York form the "imperial" centers of its international political orders. If we but peel back the surface of formal equality, we can see many symbols of obeisance in the everyday practice of world politics.

Symbolic obeisance is manifested most clearly in the strong tendency of subordinates to follow dominant states into war, analogous to individuals joining the military as an act of patriotism. Much of this follow-the-leader behavior is purely symbolic, as the subordinates contribute few and often no resources to the effort and have little prewar trade or investment at stake. Nonetheless, declaring war on another state is always a costly act. Where the forms of symbolic supplication just described might be dismissed by skeptics, declarations of war lay at the heart of a state's sovereignty and security. Even if active hostilities are not engaged, war places a country at risk of retaliation, as the terror attack on Spain for its participation in the war on Iraq visibly attests. Joining a conflict is particularly costly for small and distant states that could otherwise hide and safely avoid becoming embroiled in wars fought by oth-

50. For listings of visits by foreign leaders, see <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/c1792.htm>. Accessed December 7, 2007.

ers over issues in which they do not have a direct stake. Following a leader into such wars is, then, a bit of a mystery for conventional theories of international relations, but it can be readily interpreted here as an act of symbolic obeisance that affirms and legitimates the authority of a dominant state.

Evidence

There has been a clear pattern of subordinates following the United States into war over the last century. The participation of Latin American states in World War I is particularly telling, as few had any significant interests in the distant conflagration. Although we lack systematic data on security or economic hierarchy in the pre-World War I era, there is little doubt that the United States possessed at least a measure of authority over most countries in its hemisphere after 1900. Prior to the entry of the United States into the largely European war on April 6, 1917, no Central or South American country had declared war or broken relations with Germany or Austria-Hungary. In the succeeding months, however, twelve Latin American states joined the hostilities not as combatants but by severing their relations and, in some cases, officially declaring war against the Central powers.⁵¹ A similar trend arose in World War II. Despite strong fascist sympathies in some countries, with Paraguay even contemplating joining the Axis in the opening months of the war, no Latin American state had severed relations or declared war on Germany, Italy, or Japan before the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. In the Dominican Republic, then dictator Rafael Trujillo openly admired the fascists in Europe and gave concrete support to Germany between 1939 and 1941. Yet, nearly all of the Central American countries immediately joined the United States in declaring war on Japan and then, typically within a few days, Germany. Indeed, despite his evident sympathies, Trujillo declared war on Japan the day after the Pearl Harbor attack and on Germany and Italy four days later.⁵² By the end of the conflict, most Latin American states had joined the Allies, although some did so rather late in February 1945 only when victory was imminent.⁵³ Almost no resources were provided by these countries to the war effort; only Brazil contributed troops. Although it froze the assets of Axis

51. Only two nonsubordinate countries (Greece and Thailand) joined the war after the United States. Source: www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1112.html, accessed on May 9, 2005. Interestingly, the Dominican Republic, then under American occupation and martial law (see the introduction), did not declare war on Germany or Austria-Hungary.

52. Atkins and Wilson 1998, 82; Hartlyn 1991, 187.

53. Some nineteen Latin American states eventually joined World War II either by severing relations with or, more commonly, declaring war on the Axis powers. For a concise description of the actions taken by various countries in World War II, see http://www.kommersant.com/p576136/r_1/All_Participants_of_World_War_II/.

countries within its territory and allowed an expanded military mission from the United States to bolster its defenses in the Caribbean, for instance, the Dominican Republic provided no practical assistance to the Allies—and indeed enjoyed spectacular economic growth as the demand for sugar cane exploded during the war. For all of these Latin American states, declaring war was largely a symbolic gesture aimed not at the Axis powers but at the United States.

The effects of U.S. hierarchy on participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 are particularly striking, perhaps forming the proverbial exception that proves the rule. While few countries actively supported the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the preventive war undertaken by the United States, as we have seen, was widely opposed internationally. Indeed, in the days preceding the outbreak of hostilities, the United States withdrew a draft resolution authorizing the war from the United Nations Security Council once it faced inevitable defeat. In response, the United States pressed other countries to support the war and thereby legitimate its actions, finally putting together a coalition announced with great fanfare at the White House.⁵⁴ This was one of the more heavy-handed and thereby exceptional cases of symbolic obeisance, more a “command performance” than a strictly voluntary act of subordination. Nonetheless, it is revealing to consider which countries complied with Washington’s call for support. While some traditional subordinates refused to join, notably Germany, other European subordinates such as the United Kingdom quickly signed up as members of the coalition of the willing. Similarly, traditional subordinates in East Asia joined, including Japan and South Korea. Not surprisingly, all the states in Central America joined, as well as the Dominican Republic. The butt of late-night humor, many of the small island states that form the informal empire of the United States in the Eastern Pacific, including the Marshall Islands and Micronesia, also pledged to the coalition in symbolic solidarity. Although unexpected, many former communist countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union eagerly joined as well. Few of these countries were subordinate to the United States at the time and might be considered anomalies. Yet, most were currying favor with the United States and offering themselves as future subordinates to elicit American aid in balancing the still threatening and dominant role of Russia. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s distinction between “Old Europe” and “New Europe” had a real basis in the pattern of support for the United States.

More systematically, Atsushi Tago has compiled a comprehensive list of all

54. White House Press release on Operation Iraqi Freedom of March 27, 2003 (<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/print/20030327-10.html>, accessed April 6, 2003). See Chap. 4, fn. 12.

U.S.-led military coalitions between 1950 and 2000.⁵⁵ Including all countries in the international system at the time of each crisis for whom data are available, he examines the determinants of why some countries join U.S.-led coalitions and others do not. Table 5.5, models 1 and 2, presents Tago's basic model with my indicators of hierarchy added to his analysis.⁵⁶ Models 1 and 2 assume random effects, which Tago uses to test between competing hypotheses. His indicators, drawn from different theories, function here as a battery of control variables. Theory suggests that military expenditures (reflecting an ability to participate, but also the product of security hierarchy [see table 5.1]), joint language, joint regime (especially democracy), involvement in enduring rivalry (similar to the presence of an external threat), and United Nations legitimation (reflecting multilateral approval) may be related to both hierarchy and coalition joining and should be included in the model. The other covariates are discretionary and are reproduced here only for comparison with Tago's results. The covariates perform as expected, with the exception that major power status and interventions in domestic affairs are no longer significant. To test my hypothesis fully, to ensure against the confounding effects of unmodeled attributes of different conflicts, and as a robustness check, models 3 and 4 use a fixed effects specification by conflict. These models necessarily drop all of the conflict invariant indicators. The fixed effects specification has only a marginal impact on the relevant coefficients.

As expected, U.S. security and economic hierarchy are strongly related to the probability of joining a U.S.-led military coalition (models 1 and 3). Mod-

55. A qualified coalition is a military operation in which (a) at least one state deploys its armed forces to a war zone by accepting the request of the United States, (b) the United States provides the largest portion of the coalition's forces, and (c) a U.S. military officer serves as commander of the multinational forces or the U.S. military command designates what friendly forces do in the theater through coordination. Partner states must deploy armed forces with at least twenty combatants or provide frontline bases or logistics without which the United States could not have conducted operations. Partners exclude those states who provide only economic assistance. The coalitions are the Korean War (1950), Middle East Multinational Force (MNF) (1959), Panama Naval Patrol (1959), Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), Thai Border Protection (1962), Inter-American Peace Force in Dominica (1965), Vietnam War (1965), Lebanon MNF (1982), Suez International Force (1983), Grenada Intervention (1983), Persian Gulf War (1990), No-Fly Zone over Iraq (1991), Somalia Intervention (1993), Haiti Intervention (1994), and Kosovo (1999). This method selects against uses of military force, such as the invasion of Panama in 1989, in which no other states participate. But given the participation of at least one other country in the U.S.-led coalition, we can nonetheless seek to explain which countries choose to join. Tago (2007, 188–190).

56. I exclude Tago's dummy variable for whether a country is allied with the United States, since it correlates near perfectly with my index of independent alliances and, in turn, correlates strongly with the index of security hierarchy. I also drop his variable for whether a country is involved in a war; after listwise deletion of observations with missing data, this variable is perfectly collinear with coalition membership.

TABLE 5.5.
U.S. hierarchy and U.S.-led military coalitions, 1950–2000

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Index of security hierarchy	0.823*		0.878**	
	0.357		0.300	
Index of military personnel		−0.439		−0.404
		0.609		0.506
Index of independent alliances		0.901**		0.931***
		0.284		0.243
Index of economic hierarchy	1.315***		0.936**	
	0.410		0.345	
Index of exchange rate regimes		0.998**		0.905**
		0.351		0.329
Index of relative trade dependence		0.326		−0.179
		0.866		0.735
Major power status	0.033	0.026	−0.015	−0.028
	1.082	1.040	0.911	0.915
Military expenditures (natural log)	0.210***	0.208***	0.214***	0.215***
	0.043	0.044	0.041	0.043
Operation within the same region	1.893***	1.885***	1.658***	1.645***
	0.247	0.245	0.226	0.230
Joint primary language	1.092***	1.068***	1.051***	1.083***
	0.325	0.310	0.240	0.244

Joint regime (democratic) with the U.S.	0.455	0.379	0.484*	0.407
	0.279	0.276	0.234	0.242
Involvement in enduring rivalry	-0.352	-0.255	-0.243	-0.185
	0.401	0.389	0.338	0.343
Government crises	0.304	0.287	0.244	0.221
	0.180	0.177	0.169	0.168
Coalition war operation	0.364	0.391		
	0.351	0.351		
Coalition intervention in domestic affairs	-0.524	-0.507		
	0.408	0.406		
UN legitimation	1.889***	1.879***		
	0.423	0.421		
Regional legitimation	0.085	0.048		
	0.370	0.372		
Constant	-7.592***	-7.618***		
	0.708	0.712		
Conflict fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	1525	1525	1458	1458
Wald chi ² (models 1 & 2) pseudo R ² (3 & 4)	120.62	124.53	0.18	0.19

Dependent variable: join U.S.-led military coalition (no = 0, join = 1)

Models 1 and 2 are times series logit; models 3 and 4 are conditional fixed effects logit

* p < 0.05

** p < 0.01

*** p < 0.001

els 2 and 4 indicate that hierarchy operates, in this case, largely through the indices of independent alliances and exchange rate regimes. The fixed effects models, which are the most rigorous tests of the proposition in this section, suggest that the substantive effects of hierarchy on the propensity to join coalitions are quite large. States that are subordinate in security at the level of Panama (1995) or in economics at the level of Canada (1995) are approximately 2.5 times more likely to join a U.S. coalition than are nonsubordinates.⁵⁷ These results strongly confirm that security and economic hierarchy are positively related to a state's propensity to join U.S.-led coalitions of the willing across a wide variety of types of conflicts.

Implications

Symbolic obeisance is hard to explain in traditional theories of international relations. Under anarchy, why would formally equal states take costly actions, especially declaring war, in a purely symbolic gesture to affirm their respect for the authority of another state? Following a dominant state into war contradicts balance of power theory. Latin American states were not threatened by the Central powers in World War I. Indeed, by the time they joined that great conflagration, the major powers on both sides had locked themselves into a fruitless struggle that would have prevented them from interfering in hemispheric affairs for many years to come. The United States remained more powerful relative to the states of Latin America than did Germany or Japan at the time of World War II. Many states actively sympathized with the fascists, yet they joined the war immediately after the United States. In the Iraq War, the United States dwarfed its antagonist. Rather than joining the United States, balance of power theory would predict that other states would ally with Iraq to help protect its sovereignty.

Similarly, symbolic obeisance is hard to reconcile with collective action theory. Many of the coalition partners in these various conflicts were states that could easily have avoided contributing to the war under other circumstances. Most states on the Caribbean littoral, for instance, contributed nothing to the

57. Neither panel times series logit (xtlogit, used by Tago and models 1 and 2 here) nor conditional fixed effects logit (clogit) produce results that are easy to interpret. Instead of the relative risk reported for logit analyses in tables 4.1 and 4.3, I base the substantive interpretations here on the odds ratio, which in rare events (such as coalition joining) is a good approximation of the risk ratio. See Tomz 2007b, 124 n. 29. The odds ratio for a one-unit change in the index of security hierarchy is 2.41, the index of economic hierarchy is 2.55, the index of independent alliances is 2.50, and the index of exchange rate regimes is 2.47. The joint effect of security and economic hierarchy is substantially larger: were any country subordinate at the level of Panama (security) and Canada (economics) in 1995, the probability of joining a U.S.-led coalition would be more than six times as high as nonsubordinates.

war effort in 1917, and would never have been expected to contribute, but they immediately followed the United States by declaring war on the Central powers. Given the visible opposition against the Iraq War in 2003, countries easily could have remained aloof from the conflict. Nonetheless, both large and important countries such as the United Kingdom and small and peripheral states such as the Dominican Republic and the Federated States of Micronesia rallied to support the United States in an otherwise unpopular war.

Nor did subordinates appear to bandwagon with the United States to feed upon the corpses of Germany and Austria-Hungary, the Axis powers, or Iraq.⁵⁸ In none of these conflicts did the subordinate states gain significantly from the peace. Indeed, since the 2003 war, Operation Iraqi Freedom members have faced growing domestic opposition and increasing calls to withdraw. National leaders who brought their countries into the coalition have been denied reelection. Rather, it appears that states participated in the war as a costly signal of support for the United States and an acknowledgement of its authority, just as the statistical results indicate they have done in other coalitions.

States do genuflect toward authority, even in international relations. This implies that subordinates may comply more generally with commands not only out of shared interests or threatened punishments but also because they respect and comply with the authority of the dominant state. But importantly, neither symbolic obeisance nor compliance with authority more generally, however, can be explained in standard theories of international relations.

States subordinate to the United States—and by extension, subordinate states more generally—behave differently from nonsubordinate states. Subordinates spend proportionately less on defense, trade more and more with each other, and follow their dominant states into war. These behaviors are all consistent with and predicted by a relational approach to authority and, in turn, international hierarchy.

Surveying the pattern of results presented in this chapter, it is evident that the indicators of economic hierarchy are less robust and sometimes less accurate predictors of subordinate state behavior than the indicators of security hierarchy. Economic hierarchy matters most in predicting trade openness and trade flows between countries and coalition formation, but appears to be largely unrelated to defense effort. This requires further study and investigation. One possibility, of course, is that economic hierarchy simply does not have the predicted effects and that the mixed results should count as strikes against the theory. A second possibility is that economic hierarchy is measured poorly. Despite face and convergent and discriminant validity, the economic hierar-

58. Schweller 1994.

chy indicators may lack predictive validity. One likely problem, discussed in chapter 3, is that the index of exchange rate regimes fails to capture states that are indirectly fixed to the dollar through some other currency that is fixed to the dollar. If the problem is largely one of measurement error, it would be inappropriate to reject the theory on these grounds alone.⁵⁹ The robust relationship between economic hierarchy and the likelihood that the United States would join a crisis involving a subordinate, as discussed in chapter 4, as well as the positive results in all tests except those for defense effort, however, raise doubts about the seriousness of measurement error in the tests reported here.

A final possibility is that the results are telling us something real and important about the world. Economic hierarchy alone may not create a sufficient level of political order or produce a commitment by the United States sufficiently credible to allow subordinates to relax their own defense efforts. Indeed, the main effect of economic hierarchy revealed in this chapter has more to do with compliance with United States policy as embedded in the GATT/WTO and coalition participation than it does with the general security issues that underlie defense effort and, in turn, political order. Different dimensions of hierarchy may be related to different behaviors in more subtle ways than the theory as developed here currently predicts. Further theoretical and methodological refinements are necessary before concluding that any of these three possibilities are correct. Nonetheless, the majority of the evidence compiled so far supports the theory and suggests an important effect of hierarchy on world politics.

Hierarchy between states challenges received understandings of international relations. It remains a truism that the system as a whole is anarchic. Despite the very substantial number of its hierarchies in all regions of the globe, the United States today is still very far from ruling the world. But hierarchy between states tempers the widely accepted consequences of systemic anarchy for world politics. Subordinate states are not solely dependent upon self-help, but depend upon protection from others in exchange for legitimacy and compliance. Subordinate states do not balance against dominant others. Instead, they benefit from political order by reducing their defense efforts and opening their economies to trade and lend their "moral," if not material, support to legitimate efforts by the dominant state to produce order. International relations is not a Hobbesian state of nature, but rather is a mixed society with pockets of relative anarchy in which self-help remains the rule and pockets of relative hierarchy in which a measure of authority, peace, and free trade prevail.

59. Lakatos 1978 cautions against "naïve methodological falsification."

Conclusion

International relations are near universally conceived as an anarchic state of nature in which states are dependent upon self-help. Built on a formal-legal conception of authority and the assumption that sovereignty is indivisible, international relations theory assumes that states are formal equals with none beholden to any other. Although accepting that states differ in their ability to coerce one another, extant theory does not recognize that some states exercise more or less authority over other states.

Sovereignty is, in practice, a negotiated relationship that states hold in different degrees in different issue areas at different times. Through a relational conception of authority, world politics is properly seen as a realm of variegated hierarchy. Some states do interact with one another under anarchy, but many have ceded at least partial authority over their security and economic policies to the United States or other states. International relations are not a uniform piece of cloth, but a rich tapestry of varying shades, hues, and patterns.

International hierarchy not only exists, it matters. Hierarchy influences the policy choices and behaviors of subordinate and dominant states alike. Perhaps most striking, as it cuts to the core of the supposedly self-help nature of international relations, subordinate states spend significantly less on defense as a proportion of GDP than nonsubordinate states; in turn, dominant states are more likely to come to the assistance of their subordinates should they become involved in an international crisis. Due perhaps in equal measure to the security they enjoy and the commands they receive, subordinate states are also more likely to be open to international trade, especially so in relations with others subordinate to the same dominant state. Subordinates are also more likely to follow their dominant states into war. Although they may bias the rules to their advantage, to create and sustain the authority they enjoy over others dominant

states must produce political order, discipline subordinates, and restrain their own freedom of action. Dominant states are not unaffected by the authority they wield.

That hierarchy matters suggests important tenets of international relations need to be rethought. The world is not a wholly Hobbesian state of nature in which might trumps right. Just as within states, a measure of international authority mitigates the struggle for security and power and transforms relations between states. As a result, not all states are dependent upon self-help. For many analysts, a primary implication of anarchy is that states must depend upon their own efforts and strategies. In a world without authority, states can ultimately depend on no one but themselves. In an international system of variegated hierarchy, however, subordinates will turn to dominant states for protection, to facilitate cooperation, and to resolve disagreements with third parties. States can prosper internationally under authoritative orders.

States do not always balance against the power or threats of others, but sometimes accept the leadership of dominant powers. Balancing is often taken to be one of the operative laws of international politics. Under anarchy, states are compelled to rally together or mobilize their internal resources to counter the most powerful or threatening state. Under varying hierarchy, on the other hand, there will be less balancing than otherwise expected. As argued in chapter 5, this is neither bandwagoning in hopes of reaping a share of the dominant state's spoils of war nor free riding, but an exchange of protection for compliance that is in the interests of both dominant and subordinate states. Instead of allying against a dominant state, subordinates will shelter under its wings for protection. This more benign form of bandwagoning helps explain the absence of balancing against the United States in the post-Cold War era, one of the enduring puzzles of contemporary international politics. Rather than feeling threatened by American power, a large enough number of states remain sufficiently subordinate to the United States and accept its role as legitimate that a countervailing coalition has failed to arise.

Compliance is not simply a function of coercion. Compliance by one state with the wishes of another is normally expected in asymmetric power relations and follows from threats or actual uses of force. Subordinate states, however, accept the authority of their dominant state and comply with its commands in the belief that its rules are legitimate. One sign of this compliance is symbolic obeisance, especially the tendency to support dominant states in their wars. More generally, we observe compliance by subordinates even in the absence of any overt threats or uses of coercive pressure, as in the move to free trade. Nonetheless, discipline by the dominant state is important to sustaining compliance and the authority relationship itself.

Dominant states provide order not just in their narrow self-interest, but as

a means of creating authority. Protection from threats, secure property, and the expectation that promises made will be kept are important to dominant as well as subordinate states. Yet, in much of the international relations literature, order has been treated as a public good that larger states provide only when they are altruistic or form a privileged group. In a world of variegated hierarchy, on the other hand, dominant states have important incentives to provide order for their subordinates regardless of their size. It is through the provision of order that dominant states earn their authority and, in turn, acquire the ability to issue legitimate commands and enforce their preferred rules.

Dominant states have more power than their coercive capabilities alone suggest. Authority is not just material capabilities or even the "soft power" that comes from the attractiveness of American culture and society, though this is important.¹ Rather, authority is the ability to command that follows from the legitimacy conferred by others. It may also give dominant states the ability to call upon the resources of their subordinates in times of need, as suggested by the pattern of following the leader into war. As we have seen, authority is not a tangible, material asset and is not captured well by the standard measures of "power" used in international relations, such as GDP or military spending. But it is no less real.

Dominant states seek legitimacy and do not attempt to reap all the fruits of their coercive abilities. Under anarchy, the powerful are expected to exploit the weak. As Thucydides observed, international politics is not conditioned on rights or justice, but "the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept."² In actuality, however, dominant states forsake self-aggrandizing policies and seek to build up others in order to expand or preserve their own legitimacy. To acquire authority, it is essential that self-interest be tempered by actions in the general interest. And to credibly commit not to abuse the authority they have been granted, dominant states will tie their own hands or, in John Ikenberry's phrase, "self-limit" their power.³

At the deepest level, states do not seek survival or security as a primordial goal.⁴ The voluntary ceding of sovereignty by states is generally regarded as anomalous.⁵ Yet, in forming hierarchies, states regularly transfer portions of their sovereignty to other states. If hierarchy is a general feature of international relations, this implies that states are pursuing something other than sur-

1. On soft power, see Nye 2002.

2. Thucydides 1972, 402.

3. Ikenberry 2001.

4. Realists are clear that states seek survival, but exactly what this means is not always obvious. Waltz (1979, 92) cites amalgamation into larger units as a goal on which states might place a higher value than survival itself, suggesting that by survival he means persistence as a sovereign unit. See also Mearsheimer 2001, 18–22.

5. Grieco 1997, 184–186.

vival defined as sovereignty and that exceptions to this principle cannot be regarded simply as oddities or historical curiosities but as part of a larger political calculus.

Hierarchy is not an objective or natural fact, like the possession of nuclear weapons. Rather, it is produced and reproduced by the interactions of states themselves. To be authoritative instead of simply coercive, the power of a dominant state must be legitimate. Legitimacy, in turn, is conferred through practice only by subordinates. That support, finally, rests on the benefits to subordinates of the political order provided by the dominant state and credible reassurances that they will not be abused by the authority they have ceded. Produced by the actions of states, authority can also be destroyed by their actions, especially by how they respond to exogenous threats and strategic miscalculations.

International hierarchy is likely to be less robust than domestic hierarchies. Dominant states typically exercise less authority over subordinate states, at least today, than states themselves do over their citizens. Internationally, dominant states provide political orders, but they are usually less extensive than domestic orders, at least in the developed world. Knowing that international order is less secure or extensive, actors invest in fewer assets specific to that order and in turn are less willing to defend it in the face of change or challenge. With fewer vested interests, international hierarchy is more fragile. Often because they possess their own domestic or autonomous resources that are not contingent on support from their subordinates, dominant states are also more likely to overreach by asserting powers that are not deemed legitimate by others. With fewer actors committed to the existing order, there are fewer pressures on each side of the authority contract to correct mistakes and a greater chance that errors will lead to a breakdown in legitimacy and, hence, authority. Ironically, the collective failure of diplomats and scholars alike to recognize the important role of hierarchy in world politics may contribute to the frequency of these strategic mistakes and to the relative fragility of international authority.

Future Research

When seen through the lens of international hierarchy, international relations look different. Like a Gestalt shift picture, to return to the metaphor that closed the introduction, refocusing on hierarchy reveals an alternative reality that has always been with us if we would but choose to see it. Seeing international hierarchy will, I hope, generate new theories and testable hypotheses in addition to those examined in chapters 4 and 5. Beyond the refinement of the measures

of hierarchy and the elaboration and testing of additional propositions, which I heartily encourage, three larger research directions suggest themselves that will help sharpen further the lens of international hierarchy so that we may eventually see world politics more clearly.

First, paralleling the dyadic continuum of security and economic hierarchy developed here are “federal” forms of supranational hierarchy in which two or more formerly or potentially sovereign constituent units form a third party to govern them equally. As with security and economic hierarchy, such federal forms may vary in the extent of authority they possess, forming a continuum that runs from anarchy, to international organizations with delegated authority, to confederal governments with authority limited to foreign affairs, to federal states with greater authority, and finally to amalgamated states with all authority located at the center.⁶ Chad Rector finds that a relational contracting model similar to that used here explains cases of successful and unsuccessful federation.⁷ The evolution of the European Union and even more limited forms of supranational authority are a clear avenue for additional research on the forms and causes of international hierarchy. The analytic challenge is to develop an integrated theory of all forms of international hierarchy.

Second, hierarchy is but one alternative to anarchy. The principal contribution of this volume has been to open up and seek to understand continua of hierarchical relationships between states. But as other observers have noted, networks can also be effective forms of governance, both within and between states.⁸ Like federal hierarchies, networked forms of governance appear to be expanding in the contemporary world—or at least receiving new attention.⁹ Ultimately, we will want to explain the choice between anarchy, hierarchy, and networks as ways of governing political interactions and, especially, international relations.¹⁰

Third, the theory in this book has been developed in dyadic terms with a dominant state and a set of individuals who compose the subordinate state as the units of analysis. The set of subordinate individuals, however, has been treated as an undifferentiated mass, akin to a median voter model in studies of domestic politics.¹¹ A key but untheorized part of the authority contract be-

6. See Lake 2003.

7. Rector 2009.

8. Powell 1990.

9. See Keck and Sikkink 1998; Slaughter 2004; and Kahler 2009.

10. For some early steps in this direction, see Kahler and Lake 2009 and Jung and Lake 2008.

11. In light of the collective nature of authority, it may be appropriate to think of the set of subordinate individuals as a necessary supermajority. Nonetheless, even in such models, there is still a median voter who is decisive in forming the supermajority and whose preferences will determine policy.

tween dominant states and their subordinates is the role of intermediaries, or individuals in the subordinate unit who act as brokers between the dominant state and the rest of the population.¹²

Not all intermediaries are alike. Some govern near the position of their median voter and receive broad-based support. Konrad Adenauer, the first chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (1949–1963), was favored by the United States for his pro-Western political views and compliant but effective leadership, but he was also elected and reelected by strong majorities in the newly democratic political system. Others use the hierarchical relationship and its benefits to further their own autocratic rule. Indeed, some portion of the time, dominant states appear to prefer dictators who lack popular support and are more dependent on their backing precisely because they are more obliging agents. Unpopular at home, as explained in the introduction, Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo was nonetheless able to use his role as intermediary with the United States to stay in power for over 30 years while brutally repressing political rivals and doing relatively little to develop his country. He was removed by the Americans only when he began courting support from other states. More broadly, international hierarchy may have distributional implications not only between dominant and subordinate states, as emphasized throughout this text, but also within the subordinate population. If so, intermediaries may be entire classes rather than specific individuals.

Unfortunately, but perhaps not surprisingly given the lack of attention to hierarchy in the existing literature, we do not have a good theory of intermediation. Unpacking the authority contract and theorizing the role of intermediaries is an important next step in the research program. This will, I believe, shed additional light on how authority and legitimacy are created and sustained both within and between states. I suspect it will also modify the proposition advanced in the theory that hierarchy must leave subordinates at least as well off as the next best governance alternative. Although this must hold for subordinates on average or the median subordinate in each state, it is certainly not the case that all subordinates benefit equally from international hierarchy. Introducing domestic politics into the theory of international hierarchy is likely to lead to additional insights into hierarchy and its effects.

No one study can do everything. Simply showing that hierarchy exists and matters is a necessary first step. This book is the beginning, I hope, rather than the end of a progressive research program.

12. On collaborators within international hierarchies, see Hollander 2006.

The Future of American Hierarchy

If international relations look different when viewed through the lens of international hierarchy, so does the proper course of American foreign policy in the years and decades ahead. Just as scholars need to see differently, American citizens and their elected leaders must also recognize that international hierarchy matters but, at the same time, is quite fragile. Only by careful nurturing will the United States rebuild the international authority it has lost since 2003 and prevent a slide back into the state of nature.

There are currently no viable alternatives to U.S. hierarchy. Although some European states maintain residual hierarchies over some former colonies, and Russia dominates states within its near abroad, no other state possesses the extensive set of international hierarchies that the United States does today. Outside of Europe, in turn, there is little movement toward federal forms of hierarchy, not least because the United States benefits from its existing authority relationships and would likely oppose efforts to create any alternatives that would diminish its advantages. To the extent that its authority has created zones of relative peace and prosperity that benefit its subordinates, continued hierarchy led by United States is preferable to the alternative of a fully anarchic state of nature. The practical policy question then becomes how the United States can best preserve its international authority while meeting its national and global responsibilities. I do not attempt a comprehensive survey here, but illustrate the differences in the debates over how to respond to a rising China and move forward after the Iraq War.

The Rise of China

If international politics were simply a function of coercive power, the future would be simple to predict: the medium-term forecast for the United States would be bright, and the long-term forecast would be dark. What Charles Krauthammer first dubbed the “unipolar moment” looks set to become the unipolar era.¹³ Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not faced a peer competitor and is unlikely to do so for the next twenty-five years or so. Although various state and non-state actors will continue to challenge the interests of the United States around the globe, and possibly carry out attacks on American citizens at home and abroad, no state appears capable of posing a major threat within the next generation.

Over the longer term, however, it is almost certain that China will emerge

13. Krauthammer 1990/91.

as a superpower equal to the United States. With its vast population, large territory, and rapidly growing economy, China's aggregate economy will likely surpass that of the United States sometime in the second quarter of the twenty-first century.¹⁴ Although it will still be a "poor" superpower with an average per capita income far below that in developed countries, its sheer economic size will permit it to be a major player on the world scene and to deploy a global military reach equal to that of the United States if it chooses to do so. Given its imperial history, still autocratic rule, and relative poverty, its interests are expected by many to clash with those of the United States. Thus, over the long term, a new bipolar international system appears possible and perhaps even likely.

This scenario, of course, is premised on coercive capabilities being the sole form of international power. Seen through the lens of international authority and American hierarchy, however, the short to medium term looks more fragile, and the long term contains seeds that, if cultivated carefully, may grow into a more promising or benign future.¹⁵

Take the long term first. As argued throughout this book, authority is a substitute for coercive capabilities. Investing in and using authority rather than coercion creates the possibility of integrating potential competitors, including China, into an American-led international order. The analogy here is to the Western system created by the United States after World War II. By providing a political order that benefited both itself and its subordinates in Western Europe and Northeast Asia, the United States earned substantial authority and legitimacy to lead that community of states, including major powers such as Britain and Germany and rising economic powerhouses such as Japan and South Korea. This system created both security against the Soviet Union and tremendous economic prosperity for America's subordinates.¹⁶ The "buy-in" of these states to the American-led order masks the alternative possibilities that might have evolved for a more multipolar world with a tier of antagonistic rather than compliant middle powers or a united Europe that challenged rather than supported the United States in world affairs. Even after the European states recovered from the war and Japan and South Korea industrialized and joined the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)—the rich nation's club—the vested interests that benefited from their American-led orders helped preserve the hierarchical relations formed

14. See Tammen et al. 2000, 153–157; and Mearsheimer 2001, 396–400.

15. On the future Asian security order, see Friedberg 2005; Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2003; Kang 2003a; Kang 2003b; Kang 2003/04; Mastanduno 2002; Mastanduno 2005.

16. On the American system, see Calleo and Rowland 1973; Gilpin 1981; Gilpin 2001; and Ikenberry 2001. On diversity within what he calls the American imperium, see Katzenstein 2005.

earlier. The pluralistic security community that emerged locked these states into a set of American hierarchies that promoted peace and economic growth for all.

Even though China's position today is quite different from the war-torn economies of Europe and Northeast Asia that facilitated the construction of American hierarchies out of the ashes of World War II, a similar outcome is possible in the future. Following the path of Japan, South Korea, and the other Asian "tigers," China is pursuing a strategy of export-led growth that depends on the continued openness and health of the open world economy dominated by the United States and its subordinates and governed by rules agreed upon by those same countries. Although China is not a "small country" in absolute terms, it is both a "price taker" in world markets and a "policy taker" in international institutions. To date, it is largely conforming to the existing system as it develops.¹⁷ In turn, it is also accumulating important domestic interests that are vested in the current international order and who may, in the years ahead, become an important political force that backs living within rather than challenging the American order.¹⁸ This is the analytic foundation of the strategy of cooperation rather than confrontation with China, often left implicit and seldom linked to issues of authority by its proponents. The more deeply China is integrated into the current world order, the less likely it will be to challenge America's authority in the future, even as its coercive capabilities grow. The hope is that China can be like France in the Western system: a difficult but ultimately loyal ally.

If a strategy of integrating China proves impossible, investing in and enhancing its international authority over others will still allow the United States to confront an antagonistic rival with a phalanx of loyal subordinates who remain vested in their American-led orders. Even though the economies of the United States and China and their coercive capabilities may become more equal, the American-dominated block may remain larger and, in the aggregate, more powerful than China. The analogy again is to the Western bloc during the Cold War. In 1985, for instance, the GDP of the United States alone outdistanced the Soviet Union's by a ratio of 1.8:1. But the combined GDP of NATO members was even larger than that of Warsaw Pact states by a ratio of 2.9:1, and the combined total of all "Western" states relative to the Eastern bloc was a startling 3.3:1.¹⁹ The network of subordinates constructed by the United States significantly augmented its power relative to the Soviet Union. If the

17. Johnston 2003. On efforts by the Bush administration, late in its second term, to integrate China as a stakeholder in the international economy, see Drezner 2007, 41.

18. Moore and Yang 2001, but see also Shirk 2007.

19. All ratios calculated from Walt 1987, 289–291.

United States maintains its authority over its current subordinates in Europe, Northeast Asia, and Latin America, and perhaps extends this authority over new subordinates in South and Southeast Asia, the combined resources of its hierarchies will continue to be larger than China's far into the future. Examined on this scale, China—like the Soviet Union during the Cold War—may well turn out to be simply another failed challenger to the United States and the political orders it leads.

As China continues to grow, however, it is likely to bid for its own subordinates to counter America's current hierarchies. We already see the seeds of this in China's effort to position itself as an Asian leader in regional forums that exclude the United States and its efforts to court oil producers, such as Sudan, that are being shunned by Western countries for their human rights and other political practices. China may also try to outbid the United States by offering a better deal to some subordinates now safely lodged in an American hierarchy. The United States will continue to have real advantages in this competition as the benefits of American-led orders are well known, there are substantial interests within subordinates vested in those orders, and its democratic political system and past practice of relatively "lite" hierarchies make credible its commitments not to abuse the authority it enjoys. Because of the legitimacy attached to these existing hierarchies, China will have to offer an even better package to potential subordinates to woo them away from the United States, reducing its own benefits from the hierarchies it succeeds in forming, or develop a reputation as a reliable leader, which will be difficult given its autocratic institutions and the continuing hold of its imperial past on the current political imaginations of its leaders. Nonetheless, the United States must be prepared to respond to China's bids for subordinates and may be forced to compete by either offering more order in return for less hierarchy than in the past or rewriting the rules of that order in ways less favorable to itself. Regardless of the form of the new contracts with its subordinates, the net impact on the United States will be hierarchies that are less profitable for it in the future than in the past. This may make the United States less interested in staying engaged in international affairs and more likely to go it alone by letting its authority dissipate and ignoring its subordinates.

The key issue, however, is whether America's hierarchies can be sustained over the short to medium term. Here, the future is more tenuous than commonly believed. The authority of the United States is far more fragile than the material resources that give it the capability to coerce others. It has already been severely weakened by strategic miscalculations; the question is whether it can earn back what it has lost.

The Iraq War

The Bush administration's eventual decision to go to war against Iraq without the approval of other states did more to undermine America's international authority than perhaps any other event in the last century. In building its first hierarchies over Latin America in the opening years of the twentieth century, the expansion of these hierarchies to Western Europe and Northeast Asia after 1945, and further attempts to extend hierarchies over the rest of the globe after the Cold War, the United States carefully cultivated its international authority. As outlined in chapter 4, it worked hard to assure others that it would not abuse the authority they granted it. It hid its iron fist in the velvet glove of legitimacy. But in calling for the forcible removal of Saddam Hussein, the United States claimed new authority that others refused to countenance. The right of preventive regime change, which lies at the heart of the principle of sovereignty, had never been sanctioned before. In the case of Afghanistan in 2001, the U.S.-led overthrow of the Taliban occurred in the wake of an unprecedented terrorist attack on American soil by an organization closely affiliated with the regime. But preventive regime change was something entirely new and, in the eyes of other states, a move that, if approved, might set a dangerous precedent. In going to war against Iraq in the face of international opposition, and especially without the support of some of its most important subordinates, the United States demonstrated clearly that it would not be bound by commitments of its own making nor by the need for the concurrence of others. It revealed the fist.

Even though American-Iraqi relations did not directly affect their own authority contracts with the United States, the universal terms in which the war was justified and the stubborn persistence of the Bush administration in the face of international opposition led subordinates and nonsubordinates alike to reassess the country's commitment to its historic policy of restraint. Following on the heels of its rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, its pullout from efforts to create an effective inspections mechanism in the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention, its declaration of opposition to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, its withdrawal from the anti-ballistic missile treaty, and its symbolic "unsigned" of the treaty creating the International Criminal Court, the United States sent a clear signal of its unwillingness to be bound by others.²⁰ Faced with their resistance to its policies on Iraq, in turn, the primary response by Bush administration officials was to hector its traditional subordinates, ex-

20. Soderberg 2005, 124–127. For a perceptive account of how these events undermined United States legitimacy, see Tucker and Hendrickson 2004.

emplified by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's denigration of "Old Europe" and his effort to split the continent in the run-up to the Iraq War in 2003. And rather than listening to subordinates and attempting to gain their assent, the administration repeatedly plunged ahead in the belief that they would eventually come around once they witnessed America's awesome coercive power.²¹ In the process, not only did it demonstrate that it could break the restraints it had previously imposed upon itself, it showed that it was willing—indeed, eager—to do so.²² Even though they may have agreed on the odious character of Saddam Hussein's regime, this particular act of overreaching cut to the core of America's hierarchies and gravely weakened the legitimacy of the United States in the eyes of others.

The Iraq war has turned out to be a key strategic miscalculation. Not only did the United States foment civil war in Iraq through a lack of planning and inadequate resources,²³ demonstrating that it was not competent to deliver the political orders promised to others, but it needlessly antagonized the subordinates necessary to sustain its authority over the long term. The damage was compounded when President Bush was reelected by a popular majority in 2004, indicating to foreign observers that average Americans supported or at least did not oppose this new stance toward the world.²⁴

Those who continue to doubt that authority and hierarchy matter in international relations need look no further than the difficulties the United States has faced since 2003 in assembling coalitions to rebuild Iraq, oppose proliferation in North Korea and Iran, or stop genocide in Darfur. Its calls to concerted action are now suspect and ignored, and to the extent that cooperation has occurred, it has been largely on terms other than those preferred by Washington. It is also facing a wave of democratically elected, left-leaning governments in Latin America opposed to the Washington consensus and the historic role of the United States in the region—and there is very little it can do directly to counteract this trend. The United States is now confronting the difficulties and costs of trying to pursue its interests and secure compliance in a world in which its authority has significantly eroded.

Toward a New Social Contract

Although some subordinates have drawn the conclusion that the United States has become an imperialist power rather than a legitimate leader, there are

21. Mann 2004, 237.

22. Prestowitz 2003.

23. Gordon and Trainor 2006; Packer 2005.

24. Sweig 2006, 86.

strong self-equilibrating forces at work that may yet serve to correct recent overreaching. There are many interests strongly vested in international orders both within the United States and abroad pushing for a return to a more restrained policy of American leadership. The core of this constituency is internationally oriented business, which has grown and prospered under the political orders created by the United States in Latin American and Europe. Ironically, these masters of globalization, vilified by the left, appear to be the major interests pushing the United States back toward a multilateral approach of restrained leadership. Their success, limited though it was against one of the most ideological governments in recent decades, is reflected perhaps in the return of the Bush administration to a more conciliatory approach to foreign relations during its second term and, specifically, a resurgent multilateralism in its response to the North Korean and Iranian nuclear weapons programs.²⁵ These same interests, in turn, defected from the Republican party in the 2008 election to support the more centrist candidate, Barack Obama.

These vested interests are opposed, in turn, on both the left and the right. On the left, critics of liberal internationalism favor a more inclusive multilateralism that strengthens the role of international institutions, integrates global civil society into the hallways of power, and favors a rights-oriented system of rules.²⁶ There remains considerable debate about how institutions should be reformed and which rights should be enshrined at the international level. The failed constitution of the European Union is a case in point. But the current system of American hierarchy and international orders that favor globalization are widely seen as inadequate for the challenges of the twenty-first century.

On the right, neoconservatives who prefer the use of unilateral American power and isolationists who desire to withdraw from the responsibilities of leadership are joined in opposition to any restraints on America's freedom of action on the global stage. Although differing in obvious ways on their preferred degree of American involvement in world affairs, neoconservatives and isolationists agree on a principled unilateralism, reflected in their reverence for the sovereignty of the United States, if not necessarily for that of others.²⁷

These challengers to a policy of restrained hierarchy through multilateral leadership have been growing since the end of the Cold War, with the neoconservatives briefly triumphing in the first administration of President George W. Bush.²⁸ Ironically, given its importance for the future of its hierar-

25. Sanger 2006.

26. Among others, see Florini 2003; Slaughter 2004.

27. Rabkin 2004; Rabkin 2005.

28. On neoconservatism, see Mann 2004; Mann 2003. For amore extreme view, see Norton 2004. For an "insider's critique" of neoconservatism, see Fukuyama 2006.

chies around the globe and for the daily lives of its subordinates, the direction of American foreign policy will hinge almost entirely on which approach wins the narcissistic political struggle at home.

The age of American hierarchy is not yet over. Gravely weakened by its decision to go to war over Iraq, the authority of the United States is still a potent force in world politics. But it will be impossible to return to the status quo ante. As stressed in the chapters above, once damaged, legitimacy cannot be easily repaired.

The United States has been a significant force for political order over the last century. For its subordinates and the world more generally, it has provided a measure of peace and stability as well as rules governing conduct within and between states that created unprecedented levels of global integration and prosperity. Building and maintaining order is the foundation on which its authority rests. If the United States is to continue to lead, it must bolster and enforce that order—and this requires a policy of continued engagement. Having overreached, the solution is not to retreat into isolationism, but it must actually deliver the order it has provided in the past and promised for the future. This task may become even more important in the years and decades ahead. As globalization expands and transnational externalities create greater demands for global governance, calls for some form of international authority will become louder and more salient. The United States can, through its existing and possibly new hierarchies, play an important role in meeting this demand.

If the United States is to succeed in rebuilding its authority, however, it will have to become once again—as George W. Bush promised in the 2000 election campaign—a “humble” nation. Within countries, legitimate governments are not above the law. The same is true internationally. Dominance does not exempt the United States from the rules it expects others to follow. The attacks of 9/11 did not create new and unique rights for the United States alone. By adhering to the rules it has written for others, the United States can demonstrate a renewed commitment to restraining its enormous coercive power. The United States must also return to a strategy of multilateralism. Although derided as an unnecessary and costly constraint on American power by neoconservatives, multilateralism has unrecognized virtues. By tying its hands, now as in the past, multilateralism helps legitimate America’s authority over others. The fetters imposed on the United States are costs, but it is precisely these costs that make credible American restraint and legitimate its policies. In a way not appreciated by its critics, multilateralism transforms raw coercive power into authority by creating legitimacy.

Much as some might wish otherwise, legitimacy originates in the opinions of subordinates. Authority is conferred upon the ruler by the ruled. Rulers—

dominant states included—are not free to define for themselves what actions are or are not legitimate. Regardless of its extraordinary coercive capabilities, which seduced many into thinking the country could and should shape its destiny and the world's single-handedly, the United States must again learn to listen and then act within the bounds of what is acceptable to its subordinates. Otherwise, even though it may have forsaken empire for lesser forms of hierarchy, it will nonetheless be defined by others as an imperialist power, and its authority, so carefully nurtured over the last century, will be rejected by those over whom it would rule. Yet, if the United States and its subordinates return to the state of nature, we may face a future in which, as Hobbes described it, life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”²⁹

29. In Brown, Nardin, and Rengger 2002, 337.

Data Appendix

This appendix provides formal definitions, sources, and descriptive statistics for each of the variables used in the chapters. The first section presents definitions and sources for the indicators of security and economic hierarchy. These indicators are used in all of the other data sets. The remaining variables are organized by type of data, starting first with country-year data, crisis level data, dyadic level data, and then coalition data. Full replication data sets and Stata do files to use to reproduce all results reported in this book are available at <http://dss.ucsd.edu/~dlake/data.html>.

Hierarchy Indices

Index of military personnel: Total active duty military personnel stationed abroad in each country is divided by each country's total population and normalized to one for the highest country value in 1995. Military personnel data are from the Department of Defense. Available at [www.heritage.org/Research/National Security/troopsdb.cfm](http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/troopsdb.cfm). Population is defined below. The index was constructed by author.

Index of independent alliances: The EUGene data-generating software reproduces each square of the matrix used to compute the S or similarity of alliance portfolios.¹ The independent alliances scores were computed using `gportu41`, which ranges from 0 to 50 and calculates the number of countries that are allied with country *i* but not the United States. The index was then calculated as $1/\text{number of independent alliances}$ if country *i* was allied with the United

1. Bennett and Stam 2000.

States. If the country is not allied with United States, the value is coded as 0. Variable naturally ranges from 0 to 1. The index was constructed by author.

Index of security hierarchy: This is the sum of the indices of military personnel and independent alliances, normalized to one for the highest country value in 1995. The index was constructed by author.

Index of exchange rate regimes: De facto exchange rate regime is as classified by Reinhart and Rogoff.² Anchor currency is from Meissner and Oomes.³ For countries anchored to the U.S. dollar, the Reinhart and Rogoff index is rescaled as 9–15 = 0, 5–8 = 1, 3–4 = 2, 1–2 = 3. All others are coded as 0. Normalized to one for the highest country value in 1995. Data on anchor currencies was kindly provided by Christopher Meissner. The index was constructed by author.

Index of relative trade dependence: Defined as B's trade with the United States/B's GDP—(B's trade with the Soviet Union(Russia)/B's GDP + B's trade with China/B's GDP + B's trade with the United Kingdom/B's GDP + B's trade with France/B's GDP). It is normalized to one for the highest country value in 1995. Trade data is from Gleditsch.⁴ The index was constructed by author.

Index of economic hierarchy: This is the sum of the indices of exchange rate regimes and bilateral trade dependence, normalized to one for the highest country value in 1995. The index was constructed by author.

Country-Year Variables (see Tables 3.1, 3.2, 5.1–5.3)

All variables in this data set were originally generated via the EUGene data-generating software unless otherwise noted.⁵

Capability score: The Correlates of War (COW) National Material Capabilities data set calculates a capability score that combines six annual indicators of material capabilities: military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, urban population, and total population.

Civil war: Binary variable is equal to 1 if country involved in a civil war, from the COW Intra-State War Data, 1816–1997, v.3.0.

Cold war: Binary variable is equal to 1 for all country-years from 1950 to 1991. It was constructed by author.

2. Reinhart and Rogoff 2004.

3. Meissner and Oomes 2004.

4. Gleditsch 2002.

5. Bennett and Stam 2000.

TABLE A.1.
Country-year level variables, 1950–2000

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min.	Max.
Index of security hierarchy	7111	0.211	0.420	0	5.913
Index of military personnel	7465	0.107	0.608	0	10.826
Index of independent alliances	7138	0.309	0.458	0	1
Index of economic hierarchy	5179	0.208	0.320	0	2.781
Index of exchange rate regimes	6090	0.208	0.364	0	1
Index of relative trade dependence	7210	0.062	0.300	0	8.980
Capability score	7138	0.007	0.023	0	0.320
Civil war	7138	0.075	0.264	0	1
Cold war	9737	0.823	0.382	0	1
Defense effort	6714	0.026	0.047	0	1.402
Democracy	6532	-0.462	7.532	-10	10
GDP per capita	7465	5992.402	6444.167	281.26	46064.72
GDP per capita squared	7465	7.74e+07	1.74e+08	79107.2	2.12e+09
Log of population	7465	8.504	2.055	1.946	14.046
Major power	7138	0.038	0.192	0	1
Member of Warsaw Pact	9737	0.028	0.164	0	1
Mid involvement	7138	0.349	0.477	0	1
Middle Eastern member of OPEC	9737	0.032	0.176	0	1
Military personnel	7075	171.850	496.051	0	5800
Number of other allies	7138	9.295	10.883	0	53
Population	7465	27964.26	98134.12	7	1258821
Real GDP (1996 dollars)	7465	140334.4	503006.3	7.191	9169655
Trade openness	5754	64.069	43.342	3.148	473.857

Defense effort: Defense expenditures/GDP. Military expenditures from the COW National Material Capabilities data set. GDP is from Gleditsch.⁶ Calculated by author

Democracy: Polity2 variable is from the PolityIV data set.⁷

GDP per capita: GDP/population is given in constant 1996 dollars. The GDP and population data come from Gleditsch.⁸

GDP per capita squared: See GDP per capita. Calculated by author.

Log of population: Natural log of population. See Population.

Major power: Binary variable is equal to 1 if country is a major power, based on COW membership list.

Member of Warsaw Pact: Binary variable is equal to 1 if country was a member of the Warsaw Pact alliance and was coded by author.

6. Gleditsch 2002.

7. Marshall and Jaggers 2002.

8. Gleditsch 2002.

MID involvement: Binary variable is equal to 1 if a country experienced a militarized interstate dispute, as defined and reported in the COW Militarized Interstate Dispute data set.

Middle Eastern member of OPEC: Binary variable equal to 1 if a country was in the Middle East region (COW country codes 600–699) and a formal member of OPEC. It was coded by author.

Military personnel: Personnel is given in thousands and is from COW, National Material Capabilities data set v3.02.

Number of other allies: EUGene reproduces each square of the matrix used to compute the S or similarity of alliance portfolios.⁹ The number of other allies variable is the sum of *gprortu11*, *gportu12*, *gportu13*, *gportu14* minus one (each state is assumed to be allied with itself) and represents the total number of defense alliances of a country.

Population: Population is in thousands and is from Gleditsch.¹⁰

Real GDP (1996 dollars): GDP is in millions of 1996 constant dollars and computed from Gleditsch.¹¹

Trade openness: Total trade is calculated as a percentage of GDP; exports plus imports and GDP are from the Penn World Tables v.6.1.

Crisis Level Variables (see Tables 4.1–4.3)

All hierarchy variables are extracted as appropriate from the country-year variables described above. See the text on construction of the highest observed levels of hierarchy in crises/disputes joined and not joined.

Duration of crisis: Length of the crisis is in days, from the international crisis behavior (ICB) data set.¹² ICB variable BREXIT.

Duration of dispute: Length of the dispute is in days and is from COW v3.02.¹³ COW variable MAXDUR.

Geopolitical salience of crisis: Ordinal variable has five categories describing the significance of an international crisis in terms of the number and importance of regions involved, from ICB.¹⁴ 1 = One minor region (i.e., South America), 2 = two minor regions, 3 = one major region (i.e., Europe) and one minor region, 4 = two major regions, 5 = the world. See Brecher and Wilkenfeld for examples.¹⁵ ICB variable GEOSTR.

9. Signorino and Ritter 1999.

10. Gleditsch 2002.

11. Ibid.

12. Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997.

13. Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004.

14. Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997.

15. Ibid.

TABLE A.2.
Crisis-level variables

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min.	Max.
MID data					
Index of security hierarchy	1172	0.249	0.450	0	5.913
Index of military personnel	1173	0.160	0.725	0	10.826
Index of independent alliances	1172	0.345	0.465	0	1
Index of economic hierarchy	844	0.252	0.321	0	1.742
Index of exchange rate regimes	938	0.285	0.389	0	1
Index of relative trade dependence	1058	0.080	0.239	0	4.706
Duration of dispute	1218	144.991	365.624	0	4764
Level of violence in dispute	1079	0.486	1.173	0	6
U.S. joins an ongoing MID	1218	0.025	0.155	0	1
ICB data					
Index of security hierarchy	300	0.228	0.582	0	5.144
Index of military personnel	300	0.235	0.407	0	1
Index of independent alliances	300	0.225	1.061	0	10.288
Index of economic hierarchy	243	0.282	0.385	0	1.742
Index of exchange rate regimes	255	0.273	0.396	0	1
Index of relative trade dependence	293	0.120	0.323	0	2.323
Duration of crisis	300	151.403	221.058	1	1461
Geopolitical salience of crisis	300	1.533	1.013	1	5
Level of violence in crisis	300	2.377	1.012	1	4
U.S. joins an ongoing crisis	300	2.003	0.791	1	3

Level of violence in crisis: Ordinal variable describing the extent of violence in an international crisis as a whole from the ICB.¹⁶ 1 = No violence, 2 = Minor clashes, 3 = Serious clashes, 4 = Full-scale war. ICB variable VIOL.

Level of violence in dispute: The number of military fatalities in the dispute among all parties and is from COW v3.02.¹⁷ COW variable FATALPRE.

United States joins an on-going MID: Binary variable is coded as 1 if the United States joined an on-going conflict by becoming a crisis participant, excluding all cases in which the United States is coded as an original participant. It is coded from the COW Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) data set v3.02.¹⁸

United States joins an ongoing crisis: Categorical variable from ICB v5.0.¹⁹ It excludes all cases in which the United States is coded as an actor in the crisis. ICB variable USINV.

16. Ibid.

17. Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004.

18. Ibid.

19. Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997.

TABLE A.3.
Dyad-year level variables

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min.	Max.
Index of security hierarchy (dyad interaction)	206998	0.061	0.189	0	7.546
Index of military personnel (dyad interaction)	208928	0.009	0.198	0	17.798
Index of independent alliances (dyad interaction)	207662	0.161	0.362	0	1
Index of economic hierarchy (dyad interaction)	145036	0.049	0.148	0	2.136
Index of exchange rate regimes (dyad interaction)	162606	0.056	0.195	0	1
Index of relative trade dependence (dyad interaction)	193236	0.007	0.108	0	13.951
Both participate in GATT	234597	0.652	0.476	0	1
Common colonizer	234597	0.100	0.300	0	1
Common language	234597	0.222	0.416	0	1
Currency union	234597	0.014	0.118	0	1
Ever in a colonial relationship	234597	0.021	0.142	0	1
GSP	234597	0.231	0.422	0	1
Log distance	234597	8.165	0.809	3.783	9.421
Log of total annual trade between countrypairs	234597	10.062	3.336	-16.090	20.811
Log product of real GDP	234597	47.881	2.676	35.388	59.090
Log product of real GDP per capita	234597	16.034	1.504	9.716	21.598
Log product of land area	234597	24.206	3.280	9.639	32.769
Number landlocked	234597	0.246	0.466	0	2
Number of Islands	234597	0.341	0.539	0	2
Only one participates in GATT	234597	0.306	0.461	0	1
Regional FTA	234597	0.015	0.120	0	1
Shared border	234597	0.031	0.172	0	1

Dyadic Variables (see Table 5.4)

All hierarchy variables are calculated as dyadic interaction terms between country pairs for each year for each variable. All other variables are from Rose unless otherwise noted.²⁰

Both participate in GATT: The binary variable is equal to 1 if both states in a dyad were participants in GATT/WTO.²¹

Common colonizer: The binary variable is equal to 1 if each state in a dyad had the same colonizer after 1945.

Common language: The binary variable is equal to 1 if each state in a dyad has the same language.

20. Rose 2004.

21. Tornz, Goldstein, and Rivers 2007.

Currency union: The binary variable is equal to 1 if both states in a dyad use the same currency at time t .

Ever in a colonial relationship: The binary variable is equal to 1 if one state in a dyad was ever a colony of the other.

GSP: The binary variable is equal to 1 if one state in a dyad extended trade concessions to the other through the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).

Log distance: The log of distance is given in miles between each state in a dyad.

Log of total annual trade between country pairs: Given as the log of the average value of real bilateral trade between each state in a dyad.

Log product of real GDP: Calculated as the log of the product of the real GDP (in constant dollars) of each state in a dyad.

Log product of real GDP per capita: Given as the log of the product of the real GDP per capita of each state in a dyad.

Log product of land area: The log of the product of the land area is given in square kilometers of each state in a dyad.

Number landlocked: Given as the number of landlocked countries in a dyad (0, 1, or 2).

Number of islands: Calculated as the number of island countries in a dyad (0, 1, or 2).

Only one participates in GATT: The binary variable is equal to 1 if only one state in a dyad was a participant in GATT/WTO.²²

Regional FTA: The binary variable is equal to 1 if both countries in a dyad belonged to the same regional trade agreement.

Shared border: The binary variable is equal to 1 if the states in a dyad share a border.

Coalition Variables (see Table 5.5)

All hierarchy variables are extracted as appropriate from the country-year level data described above. All other variables are from Tago.²³

Coalition intervention in domestic affairs: The dichotomous variable is coded 1 if a coalition is created for action inside another country's territory without the consent of that government.

Coalition war operation: The dichotomous variable is coded 1 if a coalition created for military action against at least one sovereign state resulted in more than 1,000 battle deaths.

22. Ibid.

23. Tago 2007.

TABLE A.4.
Coalition-level variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
Index of security hierarchy	2095	0.192	0.363	0	5.362
Index of military personnel	2095	0.082	0.490	0	9.724
Index of independent alliances	2103	0.301	0.454	0	1
Index of economic hierarchy	1537	0.199	0.310	0	1.224
Index of exchange rate regimes	1585	0.212	0.362	0	1
Index of relative trade dependence	2035	0.058	0.237	0	6.065
Coalition intervention in domestic affairs	2103	0.336	0.472	0	1
Coalition war operation	2103	0.260	0.439	0	1
Government crises	2103	0.162	0.475	0	6
Involvement in enduring rivalry	2103	0.166	0.372	0	1
Joint primary language	2103	0.191	0.393	0	1
Joint regime (Democratic) with the U.S.	2103	0.332	0.471	0	1
Major power status	2103	0.023	0.149	0	1
Military expenditures (natural log)	2103	10.497	4.610	0	19.337
Operation with the same region	2103	0.183	0.387	0	1
Regional legitimation	2103	0.377	0.485	0	1
U.N. legitimation	2103	0.371	0.483	0	1
U.S.-led military coalition	2080	0.081	0.273	0	1

Government crises: Crises are the aggregated number of situations that threatened the downfall of a regime.

Involvement in enduring rivalry: The dichotomous variable is coded 1 if a state was involved in at least one enduring rivalry.

Joint primary language: The dichotomous variable is coded 1 if a country shares a principal language with the United States.

Joint regime (democratic) with the United States: The dichotomous variable is coded 1 if a country possessed a Polity IV democracy score of greater than 7.

Major power status: The dichotomous variable is coded 1 if the country was a major power as defined by the COW.

Military expenditures (natural log): Military expenditures are from COW.

Operation within the same region: The dichotomous variable is coded 1 if a country is in the same region as the target of the coalition, with the region defined by COW country codes.

Regional legitimation: The dichotomous variable is coded 1 if a coalition is authorized by a regional intergovernmental organization.

U.N. legitimation: The dichotomous variable is coded 1 if a coalition is authorized by a United Nations Security Council resolution.

U.S.-led military coalition: The dichotomous variable is coded 1 if a country participated in a U.S.-led coalition.

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