



University for Peace
Université pour la Paix



A GLOSSARY
of
TERMS
and Concepts
in Peace and Conflict Studies


Second Edition



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A GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND CONCEPTS IN PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES

SECOND EDITION





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AFRICA PROGRAMME

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The mission of the University for Peace is to provide humanity with an international institution of higher education for peace with the aim of promoting among all human beings a spirit of understanding, tolerance, and peaceful coexistence, to stimulate cooperation among peoples, and to help lessen obstacles and threats to world peace and progress in keeping with the noble aspirations proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations.

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
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
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A Note to Readers

The idea for this glossary originated with the positive response to the lecture 'Definitions, Conceptions, and Debates in Peace and Security Studies in Africa'. Delivered by Dr Ebrima Sall at the Africa Programme Advisory Meeting in Maputo, Mozambique, 23–25 October 2003, it was jointly written by Sall, then at the Nordic Africa Institute, and Dr Mary E. King, professor of peace and conflict studies at the University for Peace.



GLOSSARY

Accompaniment

The physical presence of civilians, sometimes foreign volunteers, with the aim of protecting activists from violent attacks or intimidation and encouraging their continued activities. The use of accompaniment, a method of non-violent struggle, carries with it the possibility that politically motivated violence perpetrated against activists will result in undesirable consequences, usually in the form of international sanctions, against the sponsors of such violence. This act of ‘witness’, as it is sometimes termed, is highly contextualised given that the parties and circumstances are different in every case. Accompaniment ultimately aims not only to protect, but also to create space and opportunities for activists to continue diverse political and social work, such as voter registration and voting, demonstrations and vigils, or news reporting and documentation. As persons willing to endanger their own lives for the protection of others, accompaniment volunteers are often viewed as occupying a relatively moral high ground.

The concept of accompaniment has a long and varied history although valid examples are not framed as such. Historical incidents can be traced back to the Roman Empire, but the more modern notion of international, non-governmental protective presence dates to the formation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1863. Accompaniment has since been utilised in various movements, from the anti-colonial and independence drives in India to the civil rights movement in the United States, and is the primary impetus behind organisations such as Amnesty International and a host of other human rights–monitoring groups.

As an act conducted in the hope of stopping an anticipated act of aggression, accompaniment represents a form of deterrence. Its effectiveness, however, is difficult to discern. How does one measure the value of a threatening, intimidating, or violent act that does not occur? In addition, the circumstances in which volunteers conduct accompaniment are not always straightforward, and the perpetrators of political violence and intimidation may elude easy identification, which may result in false accusations or a tendency to scapegoat.

Nonetheless, the act of accompaniment remains highly commendable in situations that allow individuals essentially to act as unarmed bodyguards, often spending extended, continuous periods alongside activists under harsh political and often life-threatening conditions. Some of the broadly defined motivations for accompaniment include a general humanitarian concern, a personal connection with the activists who are in need of protection or assistance, some form of shared perspective with such activists, and a desire to offer professional services. Not bound by national or international mandates, borders, or processes, accompaniment adds a complex dimension to the global struggle for justice and human rights.

“”

Witness for Peace [a faith-based U.S. organisation] . . . announced that they would camp out in the war zones until the fighting stopped . . . [and eventually] their actions spread to all corners of Nicaragua. . . . Witnesses courted the prospect that their own blood might be shed as they travelled and lived in ever more remote villages. At the end of the 1980s, when the shooting war receded from our headlines and public attention shifted elsewhere, Witness continued to accompany the Nicaraguan people, to be present in the seesaw process of reconciliation and reconstruction. . . . Witnesses lived with and shared the dangers of ordinary people. . . . They worked and prayed with the Nicaraguan people in the midst of a profound and risky social transformation and tried to be an echo of their hopes for justice and aspirations for progress. They heard the victims' cries and tried to convert their own sorrow and outrage into a human blockade. . . . Witness for Peace tried to use a bit of the safety and privilege given them by accident of birth to shield their Central American brothers and sisters

Griffin-Nolan 1991: 18–19

For further reading, see Liam Mahony and Luis Enrique Eguren, *Unarmed Bodyguards: International Accompaniment for the Protection of Human Rights* (Hartford, Kumarian Press, 1997).

Agency (human)

The ability to act and effect change and the subsequent occurrence of an act by a person or group. In the fields of international relations and politics, an ongoing debate surrounds the role of human agency, especially in relation to social change. Fundamental to the concept is the conviction that individuals can directly influence their environment and act as agents of social and political change. The concept of human agency thus involves issues related to intention, causation, and responsibility and is commonly linked to norms and values as well. In contrast, structuralists view external conditions—institutions, economic forces, linguistics, and culture—as the precipitators and causes of social and political change. The question of human agency often arises in the context of leadership: How much does a leader affect the course of affairs? Are leaders shaped by the constituencies and movements that they lead?

More recently the concept of agency has been discussed and analysed in relation to women, illustrating that the attainment of such attributes and skills as literacy and

specialised education contributes to the development of sound agency, particularly regarding development and social well-being. In this sense, the social, educational, and professional advancements of women have too often been minimised or completely overlooked.

Nonetheless, although various factors may influence or limit agency, they cannot be construed as determinants. For example, one's cultural setting and milieu affect one's worldview. The ability of a person to hold multiple viewpoints on the same issue and the subsequent ability to shift perspectives, however, creates the space where individuals' choices of action are formed. Furthermore, the majority of actions may only be considered tactical, as opposed to strategic, thereby eliminating any causal relationship between action and result. Therefore, agency cannot be evaluated by establishing a concrete link between means and ends.

“”

[W]omen are increasingly seen, by men as well as women, as active agents of change: the dynamic promoters of social transformations that can alter the lives of both women and men. . . . Understanding the agency role is thus central to recognizing people as responsible persons: not only are we well or ill, but also we act or refuse to act, and can choose to act one way rather than another. And thus we—women and men—must take responsibility for doing things or not doing them.

Sen 1999: 189–90

For further reading, see Roland Bleiker, *Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000).

Aggression

An unprovoked, offensive act of hostility, attack, or violence on the individual, communal, regional, or governmental level. In the legal sense, aggression refers to military attacks by one nation-state against another or its armed forces. In such cases, the aggressor is commonly identified as a result of violation of a cease-fire, treaty, or other mutually recognised, binding agreement. The United Nations defines aggression as the 'use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations' (UN General Assembly Consensus Resolution 3314 of 14 December 1974).

Ahimsa

From the Sanskrit for ‘non-harm’, the principled, often religious, renunciation of physical or mental violence against the self, others, animals, and nature. This ideal originates within Jainism, a reforming sect of Hinduism and a faith prominent in the region of India where Mohandas K. Gandhi grew to adulthood. Ahimsa is commonly translated into English as ‘nonviolence’, but in the original Sanskrit it conveys a more strict and comprehensive meaning that encompasses non-injury to all aspects and forms of life.

See also **nonviolence** and *satyagraha*.

Alliance

A coalition of individuals, groups, or nation-states based on formal or informal agreement, open or secret, formed to assist one another to secure identified objectives according to specified and mutually accepted criteria. In international relations and politics, alliances are long-standing historical phenomena, usually formed to address security issues, especially the potential outbreak of war or some crisis projected to be equally debilitating. Although several approaches explain the formation of alliances, the principle arguments involve either a balance of power theory—where alliances are formed as counterpoints to the anticipated or real strength of another bloc or party—or ‘jumping on the band-wagon’—where those joining a dispute ally with the strongest perceived party. Whether officially embodied by treaty or tacitly adopted, alliances often lead to difficulty or confusion in relation to one or some combination of the following:

- extent of cooperation or specific responsibilities borne by the different parties;
- accuracy of assessments of capabilities to be contributed;
- mandates and leadership or command structure;
- measurement of objectives, particularly in relation to defensive or deterrent alliances;
- triggers that will provoke forms of cooperation;
- geographic scope;
- political or ideological contradictions among members;
- commitment of members; and
- termination of responsibilities.

Alliances vary in form, including in duration, numbers, commitment, and relative strength of members. Although frequently justified as providing coherence to the

international system, no international structure is capable of enforcing or sanctioning alliances. Alliances are thus often fluid, and today's ally could be tomorrow's adversary, or vice versa. Such an understanding attributes the formation of alliances to political expediency as opposed to shared perspectives or values, which are thought to strengthen and maintain alliances.

With the end of the cold war, the concept of alliances in international relations came to suggest a broader range of co-operative endeavours, including purposes of development, humanitarian aid, and conflict resolution.

“”

Alliances have traditionally been regarded as an instrument of policy by means of which a nation may augment its own capabilities. Among the benefits that should accrue from alliance membership are enhanced security from external threat, reduced defence expenditures, and possible side benefits such as economic aid and prestige. For a regime with shaky popular support, a strong ally may be a necessary condition for survival. But benefits rarely come without attendant costs. Alliances may be a net drain on national resources; they may distort calculations of national interest if allies become wedded to 'inherent good faith' models of each other; and they may lead to a loss of decision-making independence. And, if alliances merely trigger off counter-alliances, they may leave everyone poorer and less secure.

Holsti 2004: 1024

For further reading, see Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1987).

Alternative dispute resolution (ADR)

A wide range of procedures and approaches other than litigation that aim to identify resolutions to conflicts that will be mutually accepted by the constituent parties. Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) has evolved and been adapted to address conflicts in political and international affairs, civil and human rights, corporate and commercial interests, and community and family issues. In these areas, it is used in the processes of arbitration, conciliation, mediation, mini-trials, negotiation, peer review, and rejuvenated or reformulated endogenous means of attending to disputes.

Alternative dispute resolution arose in the United States during the 1970s. The court system had experienced a dramatic increase in litigation arising from tens of thousands of people in communities large and small contesting laws upholding racial segregation during the civil rights movement; civil disobedience led to thousands of such cases flooding the courts at the municipal, state, and federal levels. The growing backlog was often met by increasing the numbers of sitting judges. The combination of the limited resources of the judiciary and the unpredictability of rulings from many of the new judges generated a desire to find recourse outside established legal venues among those seeking justice in civil as well as business-related matters. Several other factors additionally contributed to the advancement of alternative methods for resolving disputes, including the costs associated with litigation; the complexity of judicial procedures and terminology; the limited contribution to a just outcome of the underlying issue that needed resolution; and the reliance upon ‘experts’ (lawyers) who were external to the conflict and possessed limited knowledge of the grievance, culture, or individuals involved. In general, ADR tends to involve greater participation on the part of disputants than does traditional litigation, takes much less time and money, and seeks consensual formulae and outcomes. Although the binding of settlements remains contestable, the internationalisation of many ADR processes has accelerated their legitimacy. Given the increased mainstreaming of alternative dispute resolution, some commentators and advocates suggest that the use of the term ‘alternative’ is no longer appropriate and favour simply ‘dispute resolution’.

For further reading, see Catherine Bell and David Kahane (eds.), *Intercultural Dispute Resolution in Aboriginal Contexts* (Vancouver, UBC Press, 2004).

Appeasement

A policy of granting concessions in response to aggressive or hostile demands with the intent of gaining some greater good or asset. Appeasement is usually portrayed as a willingness to accede to an immoral actor or entity. In extreme cases, practitioners may even be accused of cowardice.

Prior to World War II, a policy of appeasement was fashionable and widely pursued, particularly on the part of Great Britain and France towards Germany and Italy. Derogatory connotations of appeasement became widespread after it came to be epitomised by the 1938 Munich Agreement that ceded part of Czechoslovakia to Nazi Germany. Since then, ‘No more Munichs’ has served as the rallying cry against excessive cooperation or appeasement in various international conflicts, including the 1950–53 Korean War, the 1956 Suez crisis, and the 1990–91 Persian Gulf crisis and war. Although some people view appeasement predominantly as capitulation, others perceive it as a necessary process or tool of international relations.

Arbitration

A mechanism for resolving conflicts whereby the disputants identify their grievances and demands, fix a procedural process, and willingly submit the decision of outcomes, which are to be final and binding, to an external entity. The contending parties often select the majority of the members of the third party, which normally takes the form of a tribunal. The third party is usually presented with arguments and evidence from both sides, but the process can vary according to the pre-established procedures. Although similar to adjudication, arbitration is informal, private, economical, and relatively quick.

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As long as all international conflicts are not subject to international arbitration and the enforcement of decisions arrived at by arbitration is not guaranteed, and as long as war production is not prohibited, we may be sure that war will follow upon war. Unless our civilization achieves the moral strength to overcome this evil, it is bound to share the fate of former civilizations: decline and decay.

Albert Einstein, in Nathan and Norden 1960: 203

For further reading, see Richard B. Bilder, 'Adjudication: international arbitral tribunals and courts' in I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen (eds.), *Peacemaking in International Conflicts: Methods and Techniques* (Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997).

See also **conciliation**, **mediation**, and **negotiation**.

Arms control

Bilateral or multilateral measures, usually facilitated through international organisations, to mutually reduce military capacities—armaments, armed forces, deployment zones, and general usage—particularly aimed at reducing conventional and nuclear war, but also intended to alleviate tensions that could escalate into military confrontations. Often negotiated in the midst of conflict, arms control does not attempt to resolve (or even address) the grievances or demands of the contending parties. Generally undertaken between antagonistic parties for whom the likelihood of military confrontation is perceived to be high, arms control can contribute to

building mutual confidence and ease the tensions associated with conflict situations. Most arms control agreements are specific in enumerating acceptable levels of production, possession, and deployment of arms. Such intricate arrangements are also meant to prevent arms races. Other forms of such agreements attempt to limit the potential effects of war and avoid accidental or surprise attacks. Brought to prominence by academicians in the 1950s, the term ‘arms control’ has often been used interchangeably with disarmament, but it can be used to denote a much more comprehensive concept.

“”

The most important measures of arms control are undoubtedly those that limit, contain, and terminate military engagements. Limiting war is at least as important as restraining the arms race, and limiting or terminating a major war is probably more important in determining the extent of destruction than limiting the weapon inventories with which it is waged.

Schelling 1966: 263

See also **disarmament**.

Asylum

Temporary sanctuary granted to a foreigner within a country or embassy or other office with diplomatic immunity. Such protection is granted because it is believed that the foreigner in question would otherwise be in danger.

See also **displaced person** and **refugee**.

Authority. See **legitimacy**.

Bargaining

Concessions, incentives, and threats issued by parties engaged in a process of negotiation. Bargaining should not overshadow the process of negotiation, yet it offers insight into one aspect of how negotiations are conducted. Such exchanges may occur over a single concern or multiple issues, but the parties often tend to offer initially what they view as less valuable in order to obtain what they consider to be more valuable, an approach known as Homans’ Theorem. Bargaining, however,

is not a straightforward exercise of mutual exchanges. In sophisticated applications, comparisons are drawn between the respective parties' manoeuvres, which are monitored in order to identify patterns that may be exploited as the bargaining continues. Such practices, derived from social psychology, attempt to recognise and understand the behaviours of others.

“”

A bargainer's concession strategy is one of several influences on the other's concessions; it interacts with such variables as time pressures, the initial offer, perceived relative defensibility of positions, perceived similarity between bargaining opponents, and the pressures of being a representative. But, responding to another's moves is unlikely to be automatic, as in tit-for-tat. It is a more complex process involving expectations, evaluations, and adjustments.

Druckman 1993: 30

See also **concession** and **negotiation**.

Capitulation

A conditional surrender or yielding of rights by a party engaged in a conflict. Capitulation is usually in the form of an official document.

Cease-fire

A bilateral or multilateral halt in all or select offensive military actions among parties engaged in official war, guerrilla warfare, or violent exchanges with one another. Cease-fires sometimes lead to more stable or permanent military or political agreements, but they minimally aim to reduce immediate tensions and extreme losses while providing opportunities for the initiation of other forms of conflict resolution or management efforts.

Civil disobedience

The conscious, individual or collective violation of a law, regulation, or edict. The order violated is usually deemed to be immoral or unjust by those undertaking the

action. Civil disobedience also includes disobeying neutral orders, which serve as symbols of more general opposition. Henry David Thoreau, well known for his writing on ‘civil disobedience’, did not use the term so far as anyone knows. He did, however, present a lecture that was published in 1849 as a collection entitled *Resistance to Civil Government* and has since become known as *On the Duty of Civil Disobedience*. For Thoreau, the intentional breaking of immoral laws represented a form of remaining true to one’s beliefs. Some scholars assert that he was influenced by the ideas of Granville Sharp, who in the 1770s resigned from the London War Office rather than authorise arms to put down the colonial rebellion in North America.

“”

The Programme of Action adopted [by the African National Congress] in 1949 stressed new methods. Representations were done with. Demonstrations on a countrywide scale, strike action, and civil disobedience were to replace words. Influenced by the combined action of the Indian community after the passing of the Ghetto Act, we agreed to concentrate mainly on non-violent disobedience. This disobedience was not directed against law. It was directed against all those particular discriminatory laws, from the Act of Union onwards, which were not informed by morality.

Luthuli 1962: 109

For further reading, see Henry David Thoreau, *Civil Disobedience* (New York, Washington Square Press, 1968).

Civil society

A sphere of society distinct and independent from the state system, the means of economic production, and the household. This collective realm, or ‘public space’, includes networks of institutions through which citizens voluntarily represent themselves in cultural, ideological, and political senses. The term ‘civil society’ is often employed in the context of mutual rights and responsibilities. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, distinctions between civil society and the state became more pronounced, reflecting the view that independent sectors (within civil society) can defend themselves from a state. More recently, the notion of capitalist endeavours being at the heart of civil society has been replaced with a central concept of a sphere in which social activity protects the substance of democracy.

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are often considered the backbone of

civil society, yet informal social institutions, professional associations, and interest groups constitute further examples. Although the degree of institutionalisation among civil societies may vary widely, the strength of civil society is generally considered critical in providing protection and institutional hedges for individuals and groups against potential authoritarianism or intrusive government. Under such circumstances, governments and civil society groups commonly find themselves at odds with one another.

The ineffectiveness or failure of some developing nation-states to provide their citizens with basic services has sometimes resulted in suggestions that entities outside the government might better perform such tasks. Civil society has proven effective in some instances at performing such responsibilities, with environmental groups working to clean and maintain public spaces, some organisations providing social services, and others playing roles in governance, such as the community-based groups in Thailand that assisted in drafting the constitution. More often than not, however, civil society has been cherished in theory, rather than in actuality. A proliferation of NGOs is not necessarily an indicator of the strengthening of civil society. For example, some of the NGOs and other groupings that have emerged in developing countries cannot truly be considered part of civil society, as they were not formed independently or do not operate autonomously from state structures or governments.

“”

Civil society has helped set standards for politicians preparing for public service in order to help them provide competent, honest leadership: accept defeat graciously; and become a more effective opposition. Open, disciplined, and democratic civil society organizations can provide alternative models for public life. Groups within civil society must thus be careful not to allow their individual political aspirations to subvert the freedom of speech and association that have been painfully clawed back from governments in the past decade. They must not convert the hard-won civic space into just another arena for the party politicking.

Jusu-Sheriff 2004: 284

For further reading, see Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument* (Oxford, James Curry, 1999).



Civilian-based defence

A policy designed to accomplish a full range of defensive objectives, including deterrence as well as preparations to defend against internal and external acts of aggression. The term is quite literal, indicating planned defence by citizens (as opposed to military personnel). Various methods of non-violent resistance are employed in place of military or paramilitary operations. Successful non-military civilian defence requires that general populations be provided with appropriate training, equipment, and funding to enact the policy. Such civilian defence has only been adopted in limited cases and degrees. It works as follows: in the face of an attack, invasion, or military occupation, civilian defenders work to deny their opponent's objectives. Through non-cooperation measures, political defiance, and control of key social and political institutions, they make it difficult or impossible for their home country or territory to be ruled by the aggressor. Civilian-based defence has also been variously referred to as 'civil resistance', 'non-military defence', 'non-violent defence', and 'social defence'.

For further reading, see Adam Roberts, *Civilian Resistance as a National Defence: Non-violent Action against Aggression* (Middlesex, England, Pelican Books, 1969).

Compromise

An outcome to a conflict in which the parties involved concede in order to obtain only a portion of their objectives. Such results often occur when the contending parties lack the strength or ability to achieve a complete victory, seek to avoid escalation because of mutual interdependence, or value a future relationship with one another. Compromises may be internally or externally proposed, with external propositions more likely to be received favourably when the third party is seen as neutral or trusted by both sides.

See also **negotiation**.

Concession

The voluntary granting of a right, privilege, or advantage by one side to another during negotiations. Concessions indicate a willingness to continue talks and thus serve as a practical step towards facilitating a negotiation process. Debate surrounds the timing, extent, and logic of concessions. Unilateral concessions can

provide opportunities to overcome impasses. Exceedingly minor concessions may be ineffectual, while extensive ones can be seen as revealing weakness. Bilateral or multilateral concessions can help to build mutual confidence.

See also **bargaining** and **negotiation**.

Conciliation

The voluntary referral of a conflict to a neutral external party (in the form of an unofficial commission) that either suggests a non-binding settlement or conducts explorations to facilitate more structured techniques of conflict resolution. The latter can include confidential discussions with the disputants or assistance during a pre-negotiation phase. Conciliation can also contribute to maintaining agreements and preventing future conflicts over other issues. The impartiality of the third party is central to the conciliation process as is that party's non-intervention in the conflict.

Conflict

From the Latin for 'to clash or engage in a fight', a confrontation between one or more parties aspiring towards incompatible or competitive means or ends. Conflict may be either manifest, recognisable through actions or behaviours, or latent, in which case it remains dormant for some time, as incompatibilities are unarticulated or are built into systems or such institutional arrangements as governments, corporations, or even civil society.

Within the field of international relations, Peter Wallensteen (2002) identifies three general forms of conflict: interstate, internal, and state-formation conflicts. Interstate conflicts are disputes between nation-states or violations of the state system of alliances. The international community, however, has become increasingly concerned with the rise in frequency and intensity of internal conflicts, which are contributing to the expanding nature, sophistication, and, at times, legitimisation of interventionist policies. Examples of internal and state-formation conflicts include civil and ethnic wars, anti-colonial struggles, secessionist and autonomous movements, territorial conflicts, and battles over control of government. Today, attention has also focused on 'global conflicts', where non-state groups combat international and regional organisations.

For further reading, see Peter Wallensteen, *Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System* (London, Sage Publications, 2002).

Conflict management

Interventionist efforts towards preventing the escalation and negative effects, especially violent ones, of ongoing conflicts. Rarely are conflicts completely resolved. More often, they are reduced, downgraded, or contained. Such developments can be followed by a reorientation of the issue, reconstitution of the divisions among conflicting parties, or even by a re-emergence of past issues or grievances. Conflict management when actively conducted is, therefore, a constant process.

A variety of techniques have been identified and employed in conflict management efforts. The following are the most prominent: First, conflicting parties are brought together to establish a mutual agreement. Second, governments or third parties to the strife may directly intervene to introduce or impose a decision. Third, new initiatives, programmes, or institutional structures (for example, elections) are implemented to address the conflict in question. Fourth, contending parties are compelled or coerced to utilise previously established means of resolution or containment. Fifth, government or another third party may use coercion to eliminate or instill fear among one or all those engaged in a given conflict, leading to subsidence.

Conflict management should not be viewed as a simple, linear or structured process. Those assuming or charged with such a task must usually overcome an intensely chaotic situation. Conflicts are frequently managed directly by the society in which they occur. When not possible or when conflicts become national in scope, government normally assumes the task, provided it is not a party to the conflict. In cases where a government is unable or unwilling to intervene, international organisations increasingly assume the role of conflict manager.

“ ”

Conflict is an inevitable aspect of human interaction, an unavoidable concomitant of choices and decisions. . . . The problem, then, is not to court the frustrations of seeking to remove inevitability but rather of trying to keep conflicts in bounds.

Zartman 1997: 197

For further reading, see I. William Zartman (ed.), *Governance as Conflict Management: Politics and Violence in West Africa* (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 1997).

Conflict prevention

The anticipation of conflict that seeks to redress causal grievances to avoid the escalation of violent forms of conflict engagement or to curtail the re-occurrence of violent exchanges or some combination of these elements. The term ‘conflict prevention’ can be misleading, because theoretically none of the aforementioned aspects aspire to ‘prevent’ conflict as such. Instead, the aim is often to resolve a conflict at hand or more typically to prevent escalation or violent manifestations. Although at times referred to as ‘preventive diplomacy’ and ‘crisis prevention’, such activities usually involve maintaining the status quo due to potential threats associated with crises or the anticipated outcomes from engaging in a dispute. Conflict prevention, however, recognises that in order to avoid the catastrophes associated with strife, particularly violent upheaval, change is usually necessary, for example, through new institutions, revitalised processes, or the sharing of power.

In any case, conflict prevention as an approach relies heavily on accurate analysis of any latent or minor disputes in the hopes of identifying appropriate strategies for resolution or intervention. Such efforts are collectively categorised as ‘early warning systems’, which vary in complexity and approach. They may include fact-finding missions, consultations, inspections, report mechanisms, and monitoring. The predictive nature of conflict prevention raises several issues, particularly regarding the timing of intervention and the possibility of precipitating pre-emptive action by parties beyond the conflict.

Humanitarian and moral concerns are often insufficient for initiating effective conflict prevention efforts, even in the face of egregiously violent circumstances. As a result, numerous arguments are put forth on behalf of conflict prevention, for example, geo-strategic concerns, security interests, cost-benefit analyses, and refugee issues. Despite the increasing technical capacity and human ability to identify deadly conflicts before they erupt, as well as the likelihood of extreme costs in life, social cohesion, and regional instability, conflict prevention remains in the realm of theory more than practice.

Conflict prevention has predominantly been viewed as the task, if not the responsibility, of international organisations or nation-states neutral to the given conflict. It, however, does not necessarily rely nor should it depend solely on external parties. The most effective method of conflict prevention, although not described as such, is accountable governance, whereby citizens and groups have access to effective avenues and mechanisms for resolving the range of disputes and conflicts that ordinarily arise within societies. Such access not only involves governmental structures, but also requires the cooperation of civil societies and business communities. This is particularly true in settings where violent conflict has already occurred and conflict prevention focuses on inhibiting recurrences, for example through some form of reconciliation.

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The Somalia case demonstrates the high cost of waiting too long The international community was certainly aware of the growing crisis and the need for outside intervention. By mid-1990 the United States was making contingency plans for an intervention in Somalia, and the West knew well in advance that a costly internal conflict and humanitarian crisis were imminent.

Despite forewarnings, the international efforts undertaken were insufficient to stop the crisis before it became acute. As the crisis worsened, the economic costs of intervention mounted, as did the humanitarian costs. The lateness of international intervention is most often blamed on domestic political concerns. Few elected governments commit troops to an area where no compelling vital interest is at stake. However, governments need to recognize that risking a small yet decisive military intervention early in a crisis could produce domestic political success. Since it was clear to the West early in the crisis that some deployment would eventually be necessary, waiting only increased the costs that would eventually be incurred.

Blakley 1999: 89

See also **conflict management**, **conflict resolution**, and **conflict transformation**.

Conflict resolution

A variety of approaches aimed at resolving conflicts through the constructive solving of problems distinct from the management or transformation of conflict. Conflict resolution is multifaceted in that it refers to a process, a result, and an identified field of academic study as well as an activity in which persons and communities engage every day without ever using the term. The antagonisms in question may involve interpersonal relationships, labour-management issues, business decisions, intergroup disputes, disagreements between nation-states, or international quarrels.

Not all conflicts are harmful. Some may ultimately result in positive social change. As noted by Nigerian sociologists Onigu Otite and Isaac Olawale Albert (1999: 17), ‘although conflicts have negative connotations . . . [many] constitute an essential creative element for changing societies and achieving the goals and aspirations of

individuals and groups’.

Conflict resolution involves recognition by the clashing parties of one another’s interests, needs, perspectives, and continued existence. The most effective forms identify the underlying causes of the conflict and address them through solutions that are mutually satisfactory, self-perpetuating, and sustaining. Conflict resolution can also be practised with a variety of emphases, including but not limited to cooperation, non-confrontation, non-competition, and positive-sum orientation. Serious challenges are found when parties at times favour, for various reasons, continuation of conflict over its resolution. In such cases, the role of external parties can be critical in creating a balance of power, enacting sanctions or incentives, or acting as neutral mediators or invested facilitators. Not all conflicts lend themselves to conflict resolution techniques.

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[C]onflicts arise from both systemic and individual perceptions. Therefore, a lasting resolution for any conflict requires both systemic and individual analysis and intervention. Conflict resolution and peace building thus call for a collaborative approach that addresses both of these levels. The parties to the conflict are the experts in defining their needs and how to satisfy them. The role of a third party is to assist parties in identifying and understanding those needs and values when negotiations have deadlocked. Imposing outside resolution may provide temporary relief, but a lasting arrangement can only be designed and implemented by the parties themselves.

Abu-Nimer 2003: 9

For further reading, see Ben K. Fred-Mensah, ‘Bases of traditional conflict management among the Buems of the Ghana-Togo border’ in I. William Zartman (ed.), *Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts: African Conflict ‘Medicine’* (Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).

Conflict transformation

Changes in all, any, or some combination of the following matters regarding a conflict: the general context or framing of the situation, the contending parties, the issues at stake, the processes or procedures governing the predicament, or the structures affecting any of the aforementioned. Conflict transformation may occur through the unintended consequences of actions taken by parties internal or external to the



conflict, yet deliberate attempts at transformation may also be made. The latter aims to generate opportunities for conflict resolution or conflict management and ultimately more equitable outcomes, particularly where a given conflict is considered intractable or where it has encountered a seemingly insurmountable impasse. Conflict transformation requires that the parties involved alter their previous strategies of handling or avoiding the discord in order to implement new approaches towards ameliorating the situation. The non-violent transformation of conflict and the weaponry of non-violent struggle are desirable for those who seek non-lethal means of conflict engagement, which can improve the odds for reconciliation.

Containment

A general policy that aims to prevent or at least limit the expansion of an adversary's geographic or ideological influence. The means of containment may involve a range of efforts and initiatives, overt or covert, including diplomatic pressures, sanctions, or military actions or presence.

Containment is most commonly associated with the foreign policy espoused and pursued by the United States in the aftermath of World War II to curtail the threat of expansion by the Soviet Union. The essence of the idea was that the United States should stop the global spread of communism by diplomacy, politics, and covert action—that is, by any means short of war. U.S. diplomat George F. Kennan coined the term in policy circles in an anonymously written article in 1947 for a popular journal that outlined his conception of containment and proposed measures for its pursuit. In the 1940s, Kennan became the Department of State's first policy-planning chief, serving under Secretary of State George Marshall. He was an intellectual architect of the Marshall Plan, the U.S.-sponsored programme designed to rehabilitate the economies of seventeen Western and Southern European countries with the goal of stabilising conditions to sustain democratic institutions.

The term was popularised by President Harry S Truman in what was later referred to as the Truman Doctrine. In a speech delivered to the U.S. Congress on 12 March 1947, Truman proposed a general scheme for containment of communist expansionism spearheaded by the Soviet Union. This policy provided the general contours for successive U.S. presidents and their foreign policies throughout the cold war. Although the link between Kennan's article and Truman's doctrine was evident, it should be noted that Kennan's interpretation, analysis, and anticipated outcomes of containment were more sophisticated than the eventually implemented Truman Doctrine. Kennan, while serving briefly as chargé d'affaires at the U.S. embassy in Moscow, became aware of the possibilities of exploiting the internal contradictions and weaknesses of the Soviet system. In general, his perspective focused on the

political sphere, and he suggested strategies and methods within that milieu. Meanwhile, Truman and his successors became increasingly preoccupied by the militarisation of the conflict, which has been attributed to geo-political developments from the late 1940s onwards and the individual personalities of leaders.

The militarisation of containment relaxed during the 1970s in accordance with the U.S.-Soviet détente—a simple reduction in tension without attempting to resolve the underlying conflict—but re-emerged under President Ronald Reagan. In the aftermath of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the concept of containment has barely surfaced or attracted serious consideration or discussion, with the notable exception of U.S. president Bill Clinton’s policy of containment towards Iran and Iraq. Some analysts argue that Kennan’s original conception holds relevant lessons for the ‘war on terror’.

Coup d’état

The illegal overthrow and seizure of a government apparatus through threatened or actual violence by individuals of the respective government. Often led by military, political, or governmental figures, successful coups d’état are normally conducted in less than seventy-two hours. Members of the armed forces typically guide the resulting governmental junta (council or bureau) that assumes direct or indirect control of the state apparatus. The new group in control of the government may cede power to democratically elected leaders, but more often its members retain control through some form of military rule.

Although decreasing in frequency, coups d’état remain a common form of political transition, particularly in developing nation-states where governments can be weak or political procedures have not been effectively institutionalised. Within the various contexts in which coups have occurred, numerous justifications and explanations have been offered. Most rationalisations fall within two general categories: 1) social or economic upheavals presumably necessitating military intervention to provide security or stability; or 2) internal politics of the military forces precipitate their undertaking overt and drastic political manoeuvres. In either case, the politicisation of the military seldom leads to resolution of the underlying social or economic crises.

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Since the sixties, Africa has had more than 150 different heads of state and government. By 1999, 93 military coups had taken place on the continent (only 4 in North Africa) and at least 26 African presidents and prime ministers had been killed. . . . If you include cabinet members and other high-ranking government officials

as well as military officers staging counter-coups, the number of leaders killed during Africa's first generation of independence is much higher. . . .

Now add those who lost their lives in failed coup attempts across the continent, and the number of ordinary soldiers, who simply obey orders, and innocent civilians, killed in all those coups and coup attempts. The number of casualties is in the thousands.

Mwakikagile 2001: 1

For further reading, see D. J. Goodspeed, *The Conspirators: A Study of the Coup d'État* (New York, Viking Press, 1962).

See also **insurgency**.

Decommissioning of arms

The handover of conventional weapons or armaments during or directly following an armed conflict or war. As an operational process, the decommissioning of arms is closely related to demobilisation of combatants. Decommissioned officers or soldiers are typically provided some type of incentive, in money or in kind, but in certain cases problems arise. Where the trade-in value of decommissioned arms exceeds market prices, individuals at times exploit the situation for profit. Also, the incentives at times fail to entice decommissioning from both the losing and winning sides of an armed conflict, leaving those who remain armed as threats for renewed or protracted engagement. Although increasingly gaining attention, the decommissioning of arms has rarely been an issue in the conclusion or de-escalation of a conflict.

See also **demobilisation of combatants**.

De-escalation

An identifiable lessening (in quantity or severity) of violent exchanges among parties. De-escalation often follows intense exchanges among military or paramilitary forces and is initiated through the facilitation of a third party. Conflicts can simultaneously de-escalate in one sense and escalate in another. The ultimate intent of de-escalation is to limit extremely destructive exchanges and create space for more intensive efforts to resolve or manage the conflict. In some cases, however, de-escalation may be pursued merely to buy time to regroup one's forces in order to launch more extensive efforts.

See also **escalation**.

Demilitarisation

The removal of military or paramilitary forces from a determined area or the concession of particular weaponry by one or all parties engaged in conflict. Demilitarisation normally occurs in the aftermath of a debilitating civil war. The intended immediate reduction of threat can be stabilising or volatile, depending on the timing of demilitarisation and its role within a wider post-conflict strategy. More successful efforts are commonly accompanied by endeavours to professionalise armed forces and reallocate military spending in an attempt to bridle the armed forces under legitimate civilian control. The political gains achieved in conflict or through the actual demilitarisation process must appear to outweigh the risks associated with demilitarisation. It, therefore, is inherently linked to civil-military relations.

Demobilisation of combatants

The deliberate process of transferring individuals from military or paramilitary forces to other, sustaining and productive roles in society. As an operational aspect of conflict resolution, demobilisation aims to reduce the number of people engaging in armed conflict and to provide the requirements for such individuals to reintegrate themselves into their society. The initial stage involves disarming soldiers or fighters, followed by comprehensive programmes—such as that of the UN-sponsored Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) Programme—offering skills training, job creation, housing, social reintegration, psychological assistance, and re-socialisation. Beyond the pitfalls of implementation, successful demobilisation requires careful monitoring and evaluation.

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To end the violence and ensure that stable peace is achieved after wars have taken place, all combatants must be demobilized and given effective means to alter their lifestyles and reintegrate into a peacetime society. This includes child soldiers who were recruited into violent conflicts, of which the African continent has suffered so many in recent years. Rehabilitation programming for former child soldiers and youthful combatants often presents a combination approach that typically includes social reorientation, psychosocial counseling, basic health care services, skills training (technical, vocational, micro-enterprise), a modest loan or grant, career counseling, and often a resettlement package or financial support to encourage social and economic reintegration into the local community.

Lakeberg Dridi 2004: 125

For further reading, see Rachel Brett and Irma Specht, *Young Soldiers: Why They Choose to Fight* (Geneva, International Labour Organisation, and Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004).

See also **decommission of arms**.

Détente

Originally from the French verb for ‘to slacken’, modern usage refers to a reduction in acute tension between conflicting parties, thereby reducing the risk of war but without attempting to settle the ongoing conflict or dispute. Despite a long tradition pre-dating the twentieth century, détente is primarily identified with the thaw during the cold war that eased tensions in U.S.-Soviet relations during the 1970s.

Deterrence

Deriving from the French for ‘to frighten from’, the dissuasive means of preventing an impending or projected action of others through instilling fear of repercussions or by an understanding that the negative consequences of such actions will outweigh the benefits. The actions in question, as well as the threatened repercussions, are usually anticipated (direct or indirect) military attacks, but they may also include political or economic actions. Deterrence differs from other forms of persuasion in that it aims

to prevent future actions of others, as opposed to halting those that are ongoing. Measures taken against those in progress are referred to as compellance.

Successful deterrence depends on a credible capacity and willingness to follow through on one's threats and on convincing the targeted party of the likelihood of the projected negative outcome they will suffer. Determining success, however, is much more difficult in that it requires identifying or measuring actions not taken by others, which involves understanding others' intentions. Deterrence, therefore, is more a theoretical construction (as the basis for a doctrine of strategic defence) than a program of concrete actions.

Given the unique significance of nuclear weapons, deterrence does not speak to how much is enough to deter an adversary's 'first strike'. If an opponent is willing to undertake self-annihilation along with extermination of the adversary, then it cannot be deterred. The manufacture of new generations of nuclear weaponry creates a perpetual desire and system for continuing production of nuclear weaponry. Moreover, a strategic doctrine of deterrence overlooks human psychology and assumes rationality on the part of all players. It presupposes that leaders possess absolute control over their emotions, as well as their nuclear forces, and that nuclear weaponry is sufficiently secured.

Diplomacy

From the Greek word *diploun*, in reference to an official, folded document, the official means by which sovereign nations conduct affairs with one another and develop agreement on their respective positions. Issues faced include war and peace, alliances, boundaries, and trade, among many others. Somewhat of an art and a science, diplomacy is a tool of foreign policy that involves representation, bargaining, negotiation, and other peaceful means. Such arrangements may be conducted publicly or out of view, but once mutual interests and consensus are recognised, official policy formulation proceeds. Extreme flexibility and tact are commonly attributed to successful diplomatic efforts, which are regulated by law and custom. Accredited agents are assigned the task of conducting diplomacy, and tremendous emphasis is placed on individual capacities and talents in addition to the actual official stances offered or defended.

In more recent times, use has been made of unofficial, non-traditional diplomatic agents, including business executives, religious figures, non-governmental organisations, academicians, and citizens. Such efforts are referred to as Track II diplomacy or multi-track diplomacy. UN secretary-general Dag Hammarskjöld coined the term 'preventive diplomacy' in the 1950s to refer to the resolution of disputes before they escalate or the persuasion of parties to desist from allowing such escalation to occur.

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Diplomacy, the fundamental means by which foreign relations are conducted and a foreign policy implemented, far from being an invention of capitalism or of the modern nation state, or of classical antiquity either, is found in some of the most primitive communities and seems to have been evolved independently by peoples in all parts of the world.

Smith 1989: 7

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Disarmament

The near elimination of military arsenals and forces, usually by a nation-state, through bilateral or multilateral agreements or unilaterally. Although complete disarmament is deemed idealistic, the concept is often considered interchangeable with arms control, which is viewed as more practical and refers to restraints on specific weapons or forces. More of a process than an event, disarmament theoretically speaking contributes to a reduction in tensions, de-legitimises the reflexive turn to military force in conflict, and redirects military expenditures and resources towards other endeavours. The first attempts towards international disarmament were discussed at conferences in The Hague in 1899 and 1907, but neither produced positive results. The most significant instances are associated with compulsory disarmament policies proposed for societies after defeat in war.

See also **arms control**.

Displaced person

An individual forced to leave his or her home province, district, region, or nation in search of sanctuary from life-threatening circumstances. A displaced person remaining within his or her home nation is usually referred to as an internally displaced person (IDP).

See also **asylum** and **refugee**.

Escalation

An increase in quantity, intensity, or scope of violent exchanges among parties. Commonly referred to as a ‘downward spiral’, escalation typically occurs in cycles of attack or counterattack. A strategy of escalation is typically adopted based on one of two conditions: First, although losses are expected for all the parties engaged in a conflict, the party pursuing escalation projects that its losses will be tolerably less than the losses of others. Second, a party commits to previously stated intentions, regardless of any risks associated with escalation. Although the latter can suggest inflexibility, commitment in such cases is important to generating credibility. It is expected that eventually an opponent will be coerced through fear of continued escalation. In either case, such a strategy can become double-edged, especially if pursued by multiple parties.

See also **de-escalation**.

Failed state

The inability of a nation-state to provide its citizens basic necessities because of the effects of war or other destabilising crises. A failed state is a nondescript and imprecise term that can refer not only to a nation-state’s inability to provide services and security, but also to its unwillingness to meet such responsibilities. In either instance, state failure can be attributable to numerous factors, including corruption, mismanagement of institutions, weak political processes, overwhelming security or criminal threats beyond the capacities of a government, and external interventions aimed at destabilisation. As the effects of such factors become widespread, popular participation in public or civic affairs decreases. As risks become associated with public action, the government of a failed state gradually loses legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens, and non-state groups may attempt to fill the void, usually without legitimacy, mandate, or skills. A failed state is different from a ‘collapsed state’, though the two are commonly confused. The latter refers to a situation where national structures or institutions that are meant to implement its responsibilities have disappeared, dissolved, or lost their ability to act.

The concept of a failed state is analytical as well as normative. Nation-states can be evaluated in relation to their ability to ensure the protection of human rights and delivery of basic services. The delineation and acceptable provision of such responsibilities, however, are far from universal, and values and norms often play a decisive role in determining and judging such tasks.

State failure is generally associated with degenerative anarchy that requires some

type of external intervention to restore a semblance of order and security and to ensure conditions for building a stable, safe, and functioning nation-state. Efforts to resuscitate failed states, however, have been criticised in that historically not all such political entities have succeeded or proved to be sustainable. Perhaps the failure of a given nation-state is a necessary process because of its artificial nature. The example most often cited is Somalia.

For further reading, see Roger Kobasomba, 'A failing state: the Democratic Republic of Congo' in Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham (eds.), *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies* (London, Zed Books, 2003).

Force

The application or threat of coercion within the context of international relations. In physical terms, the use of force is usually associated with military weapons and personnel. Considerable debate surrounds the legitimacy of the use of force in various situations. At a minimum, force should only be exerted if it is properly sanctioned through internationally recognised vehicles. Even the sanctioned use of force is not, however, universally accepted. To appropriate the term 'force' solely for military purposes represents a serious distortion, as it assumes that non-violent means are incapable of force.

Game theory

A formal modelling system used to analyse competitive situations in which at least two parties (or players) make decisions, the outcomes of which are interdependent. Originating from a branch of mathematics, game theory assumes that all players act rationally—i.e., can determine, evaluate, and select better rather than worse options—and are governed by constraints or rules that are contextually defined. The theory centres on each player attempting to anticipate the choices of other players to determine his or her best strategic course. Complexity arises from the interdependency and multiplicity of player choices plus the improbability of settling on the best player strategy. Game theory offers a structured system of decision making and problem solving.

Gender

Social, historical, and cultural constructions and conditioning indicating acceptable and preferable forms of behaviour and attitudes for men and women. ‘Gender’ as a term originates with the Old French *gendre* and until the contemporary period pertained mainly to the linguistic and grammatical ‘kinds’ of words in three classes (or, in some languages, two categories) denoting masculine, feminine, or neuter.

Validity in the field of gender studies requires that focus be given to feminist analyses as well as to the emerging field of masculinities, both of which are sub-fields of gender studies. ‘Sex’ refers strictly to biological determinations and chromosomes. ‘Feminism’ refers to the emancipatory project for women and pertains to the pursuit of equity between men and women. The study of masculinities concerns itself with social constructions of what it means to be a man, with the understanding that there is no single form of masculinity.

Gender and the building of peace is a rapidly growing interdisciplinary subject that straddles gender studies and peace and conflict studies. The linkage is important because the social institutionalisation of gender is central to politics and, therefore, to peace. In the field of peace and conflict studies, gender is explored as an obstacle to peace or as a positive and influential asset. An indisputable body of evidence proves that the uplift and empowerment of women beneficially affect all aspects of society.

The UN Charter, signed in San Francisco in 1945, includes the phrase ‘equal rights of men and women’. When the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted and proclaimed by the General Assembly in 1948, the word ‘everyone’ rather than the male personal pronoun was used in most articles. Coterminous with gender studies gaining credence, a number of multilateral evolutions sought gender parity, starting with the rights of women. Two agreements of major multilateral significance coaxed governments into examining issues that would otherwise have been ignored: the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 1979, and the 1985 Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies. CEDAW covers civil, political, economic, and social rights, and in 1980, with ratification obtained, it became known as the international women’s human rights treaty. A series of UN-sponsored World Conferences on Women began in 1975 in Mexico City. It continued in 1980 in Copenhagen and in 1985 in Nairobi, giving legitimacy to the work of women’s organisations around the world. In Vienna at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, the previously unmentionable issue of violence against women came to the fore. The 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, held in Cairo, stressed gender equality.

Gender mainstreaming emerged as a global strategy for promoting gender equality in the Platform for Action at the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women

in Beijing in 1995. In March 2001, Secretary-General Kofi Annan told a University for Peace meeting in New York City that he hoped that within ten years UPEACE would have succeeded in mainstreaming gender studies worldwide.

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[Gender mainstreaming is] the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.

ECOSOC Agreed Conclusions 1997

For further reading, see Swanee Hunt and Cristina Posa, 'Women waging peace', *Foreign Policy*, May–June (2001), 38–47.

Genocide

Acts aiming to significantly reduce or eliminate entirely a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group through murder, physical or mental harm, unfit living conditions, birth prevention, or forcible population transfer. The crime of genocide was fortified and defined by the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948 and further elaborated in Statute Article 2(2) of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Although the specific actions defining genocide are well articulated, murkiness surrounds what constitutes a recognised 'group'. Genocide excludes groups that individuals join voluntarily; membership must be by birth into a stable, permanent group. Thus, mass killings or violence perpetrated against groups not recognised by the Genocide Convention have sprouted terms such as 'politicide', 'democide', and 'gendercide'. Those suspected of the crime of genocide are bound by international law to face trial.

See also **war crimes**.

Grand strategy

A formulation of how best to achieve an overall objective in a conflict. Grand strategy outlines a general course of action and co-ordinates all one's inventoried resources. The term is most commonly used in reference to military conflicts, while the quasi-equivalent term 'policy' is preferred for non-violent action and other forms of conflict engagement.

See also **strategy** and **tactics**.

Guerrilla warfare

Irregular, often protracted, warfare predominantly targeted against an incumbent government and conducted by paramilitary or voluntary forces operating outside of conventional military organisations. From the Spanish for 'small war', the term was first used in English to depict Spanish opposition to Napoleon in the Peninsular War of 1808 to 1814. 'Guerrilla' refers to the individual fighter in guerrilla warfare.

Guerrilla techniques require maintaining clandestinity and avoiding direct confrontations. Among classical guerrilla techniques are hit-and-run operations, sabotage, ambushes, and partisan warfare behind enemy lines. Aside from undertaking overt offensive and defensive operations, guerrilla fighters must master the ability to blend into the general population of the region in which they conduct their activities. This is done most successfully when the population condones (or supports and assists) the guerrillas' objectives. The guerrillas' unique and at times sophisticated tactics have spawned opponents to develop an array of responses generally referred to as counter-insurgency tactics.

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The guerrilla is the combat vanguard of the people, situated in a specified place in a certain region, armed and willing to carry out a series of warlike actions for the one possible strategic end—the seizure of power. The guerrilla is supported by the peasant and worker masses of the region and of the whole territory in which it acts. Without these prerequisites, guerrilla warfare is not possible.

Guevara 1985: 183

Human rights

The universal, indivisible, equitable, and indispensable claims and entitlements that are endowed to all persons simply by the sake of being human. In its contemporary sense, the term ‘human rights’ was first used by U.S. president Franklin Delano Roosevelt in a 1941 speech delivered to Congress in what was then seen as a secular expansion of what had historically been referred to as ‘natural rights’. Natural rights had been advocated in the treatises of the British philosopher John Locke (1632–1704), perhaps the most influential natural law theorist of modern times, and the works of eighteenth-century philosophers working in Paris, including Montesquieu, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Voltaire. Such philosophers and others sought to discern universally defensible principles governing nature, humanity, and society, including certain inalienable rights. Human rights derive from these philosophical traditions as well as from the deeply rooted concepts of several non-Western traditions. Legally recognised internationally as applying to individuals and collectivities, human rights were enshrined by the United Nations General Assembly in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) on 10 December 1948. Yet, the principles enunciated in the declaration are not enforceable; rather, they offer guidance that is now universally admired and increasingly accepted.

Although the legal interpretations and developments associated with human rights are largely derivative of practices descending from Greco-Roman theories of law, basic standards of human behaviour and concepts of entitlements are found in cultures across the globe. Several attempts have been made to additionally incorporate the protection of human rights in post-colonial contexts. For example, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, also known as the Banjul Charter, was adopted in June 1981 by the Organization of African Unity (later the African Union) and enacted in October 1986. In July 2003, the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments of the African Union adopted the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa. The protocol addresses the gender dimension of human rights and entitlements. It offers thus far the most comprehensive protection to African women of any international or regional human rights instrument. It calls for an end to all forms of violence against women in the public and private spheres. In addition to addressing equality in marriage before the law and the right to participate in political and decision-making processes, the protocol goes so far as to express the right to peace, including the entitlement of women to participate in the promotion and maintenance of it. The protocol notes the limits to legislative prescriptions alone and takes a holistic approach to women’s rights. It calls for states to ‘commit themselves to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of women and men, with a view to achieving the elimination of harmful cultural and traditional practices . . . [that are] based on the idea of the

inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes, or on stereotyped roles for women and men’.

Although no clear divisions exist among the categories, or generations, of rights, the following distinctions are generally recognized:

- **First generation:** civil and political rights defining predominantly negative obligations. For example, the right to life imposes the duty not to kill persons indiscriminately. Other civil and political rights include freedom of movement, thought, religion, opinion, and expression; freedom of peaceful assembly and association; freedom from slavery, torture, inhumane treatment, political persecution, and arbitrary interference in personal life.
- **Second generation:** socioeconomic rights establishing positive obligations. Such rights include equal access before the law to legal institutions, public services, and cultural life; choice of employment, quality work conditions, unemployment safety nets, equal pay for equal work; adequate living standards, social security, free education through designated stages, and protection of private and intellectual production and one’s good name.
- **Third generation:** rights generally conferred upon collectivities. These include the right to development, peace, and self-determination.

Several state systems have incorporated aspects of the UDHR into their constitutions, providing legal provisions in their respective justice systems, and private individuals and corporations are increasingly being recognised as bearing responsibility for ensuring human rights.

Idealism (philosophical and metaphysical)

An approach to politics based on the possible and essential application of particular principles and values, such as justice, peace, and international law. Idealism holds a view of human nature as amenable to change and subject to individual will and contains within it a viewpoint that organisations and societies can alter their circumstances, primarily with regard to international relations. The school of philosophical, or political, idealism asks whether it is possible to build a better world. Peace studies stands on the grounds of philosophical idealism.

Idealism can be approached in philosophical or metaphysical terms, advancing the belief that only ideas exist. Reality and perception in this view can only be understood in reference to consciousness and categories of thought that are then imposed on the

external world.

Proponents of philosophical idealism (and the field of peace studies) have proposed various strategies that call on international law and multilateral organisations to address or even eradicate the tragedies resulting from a militaristic international system. Idealism is thus reformist in seeking to strengthen international organisations, multilateral diplomacy, and international tribunals of law in order to ensure a global peace.

Metaphysical idealism has left impressions upon its political counterpart, including the ebbing of the importance and relevance of strictly empirical investigation and analysis. With the decline of behavioralism—the belief that societies and individuals can only be understood and analysed in terms of their behaviours—the influence of idealism on political philosophy is experiencing a resurgence. Nonetheless, political idealism has been criticised on the grounds that as a school of thought it suggests or encourages the pursuit of unrealistic or impossible goals. Also, values and norms are not universally defined or accepted and are in fact contested. Moreover, the most caustic critiques emanate from the school of realism, suggesting that philosophical idealism ignores national interests, security dilemmas, and the weight of history.

By far the most well known advocate of idealism is the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, who was born in 1724 in Prussia (what is now Kaliningrad, Russia). Kant's work on theories of knowledge, ethics, and in aesthetics profoundly influenced philosophical studies. He believed that the increasingly destructive nature of war would eventually lead to the realisation of the need for peace through international cooperation, institutions, and law. Closely associated with the liberal tradition of the nineteenth century, idealism peaked in the 1920s in the wake of World War I, culminating with the formation of the League of Nations. After the war, debate raged (primarily between idealists and realists) over whether international cooperation was even possible. Throughout the cold war and thereafter, the school of philosophical idealism remained a counterpoint to the dominance of realism. It is perhaps most visible in the rapid growth of peace studies as an interdisciplinary field and in such contemporary movements as environmentalism, anti-globalisation, and various non-violent mobilizations worldwide.

See also **liberalism** and **realism**.

Ideology

A comprehensive perspective or worldview that provides a general framework for action, interpretation, and conceptualisation. Ideology has been utilised to interpret the past, analyse events, and provide criteria for future and present action. In



philosophical argumentation, it also acts as a logical construction to filter validity and truth, often relying, however, on some all-encompassing beliefs or assumptions. Ideology is most commonly associated with the general orientation of a group that upholds specific, identifiable ideas. Although usually viewed as concrete and discrete, ideologies often contain internal contradictions and multiple interpretations.

Coined by the eighteenth-century French philosopher Destutt de Tracy, the term ‘ideology’ was intended to form and promote a new academic discipline of scrutinising ideas and sensations. Envisioned as a scientific and systematic form of analysis, the meaning of ideology, or the science of ideas, underwent a political transformation in the nineteenth century. The general study of various sets of ideas as a way of promoting a better understanding of human beings and their social interaction began to connote the classifications of the ideas themselves, which then became the targets of condemnation and attack. Likely the most well known (although theoretically ambiguous) promotion of ideology is attributed to Karl Marx, although his conceptualisation is distinct and numerous interpretations have been offered. Marx used the term only sparingly in his own writings, but his imprint on politics, economics, and literature is undeniable.

Although some view ideology as discrete and neutral sets of ideas, often categorised as ‘isms’ —for example, realism or contractarianism (the belief in the social contract) — understandings of ideology generally, and even of particular ideologies, fluctuate over time, context, and culture. Despite or regardless of such analytical variegations, others argue on more pragmatic grounds that the very concept of ideology cannot be neutral. Given its inherent political nature, ideology attempts simultaneously to explain and make sense of the world around us and to advocate actions or policies to be adopted by groups or societies, usually in face of some competing options. In prescribing behaviours and extolling supporting interpretations, such measures as logic, rhetoric, emotions, and even coercion may be invoked. More rigid and dogmatic ideologues, or promoters of specific ideologies, may additionally lead to one or some combination of the following: criticism of proponents of other ideologies; the promotion of illusions or falsehoods as a result of a monopolisation of truth; or an intended or initially manipulated means of domination. This need not necessarily be the case, as ideologies may also be flexible or empowering. In either instance, although individual dispositions may affect interpretations of aspects or components differently, ideology is essentially a group manifestation.

‘Ideologies compete over the control of political language as well as competing over plans for public policy’, according to Michael Freeden, and ‘indeed, their competition over plans for public policy is primarily conducted through their competition over the control of political language’ (Freeden 2003: 55).

Although by the middle of the twentieth century relative credence was granted to the ‘end of ideology’, the concept shows no indications of disappearing from

the political landscape. In fact, since the 1970s, ideologies have experienced a resurgence, as demonstrated by environmentalism and globalism. Within the social sciences, various emphases differ on the role and importance of ideology, but underlying assumptions, beliefs, norms, and values are widely acknowledged as affecting political action in some manner.

For further reading, see Michael Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996).

See also **idealism**, **liberalism**, and **realism**.

Insurgency

Paramilitary, guerrilla, or non-violent uprisings directed against a nation-state or apparatus from within in order to achieve political objectives. Insurgencies vary in organisation, spontaneity, and threat, but all rely on mass participation in some form.

See also **coup d'état**.

Intervention

Requested or imposed unilateral or multilateral actions by external parties conducted in relation to an ongoing process between parties. Intervention assumes one of three forms: actions by external nation-states in pursuit of policy objectives or favourable conditions to achieve those objectives; actions taken to uphold internationally accepted values or laws; or efforts to alter the dynamics or outcomes of a process under way.

The first type of intervention is widely understood as the unprovoked interference by one nation-state in the internal affairs of another. Such intervention is normally unilateral and coercive and includes an array of examples, such as military force, covert operations, dissemination of propaganda, or cultural domination. The principle of non-intervention that has historically helped to define international relations generally deems such actions to be illegitimate. Recent developments in humanitarian intervention have, however, had the effect of condoning and in some cases encouraging external parties to become involved in the alleviation of suffering of peoples within a nation-state, geographic area, or region. In such cases, moral or legal concerns (such as protection of human rights) may overshadow other factors.

The second type of intervention — humanitarian intervention — is a tool available to

the international community and is particularly encouraged where human suffering occurs at the hands of a host government or where the state system is unwilling to address such conditions. In cases where a nation-state is simply unable to relieve trauma and suffering, humanitarian intervention is often requested by the authorities in power. Successful intervention requires a secure geographical area within the region in question and, therefore, in instances of warfare, necessitates a military component to ensure a degree of security. Given increasing assumptions about the validity of humanitarian intervention and the growing establishment of standards for implementation, non-interference in cases of severe human suffering or atrocities is now widely deemed unjustifiable.

The third form of intervention is typically referred to as third-party intervention, in which the external party attempts to either influence a party (or parties) involved in conflict engagement, conflict management, or conflict resolution or seeks to manipulate any such processes already under way.

For further reading, see Nicholas Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000).

Just war, theory of

A doctrine derivative from the work of Bishop Augustine of Hippo after the collapse of the Roman Empire that provides criteria for the decision to go to war (*jus ad bellum*) and guidelines for conducting war (*jus in bello*). The study of just war over the centuries has led to the development of several principles that have greatly influenced Western political thought and international law particularly. These include (1) that the war be a last resort—not to be entered into until all other means of resolution have been explored and found wanting; (2) that the decision to engage in war be made by a legitimate, duly constituted authority—not by aggrieved individuals; (3) that there be right intention and just cause—neither aggression nor revenge being acceptable—and that the detrimental results of war be unlikely to outweigh the intended injustices targeted for amelioration; (4) that success be reasonably attainable; and (5) that the result of the envisioned peace be preferable to the situation that would pertain if the war were not fought. Conditions three through five are often referred to as the proportionality principles. Once a war is under way, the *jus in bello* principles ask that military means and the cost of war be proportional to a moral goal and the presumed benefits.

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One problem is that it is easy to say ‘Amen!’ to each of the . . . conditions whilst in practice reducing them to one—a just war is one fought by my side and an unjust war is one fought by yours.

Kaunda 1980: 94

For further reading, see Kenneth Kaunda, *The Riddle of Violence* (San Francisco, Harper and Row, 1980).

***Kanye ndu bowi* (ingredients of harmony)**

A philosophical worldview and a normative perspective on maintaining social order that pertains to societal norms and conflict management, which are enforced through a complex system of positive and negative sanctions. For the Buem people who reside along the central part of the Ghana-Togo border, socialisation through myths, beliefs, and values is critical for individuals to become respected members of their society and to sustain continuity within the community. The *kanye ndu bowi* ideology is central to such development. An implicit understanding also exists to abide by decisions of accepted forms of conflict resolution mechanisms. All violations are tantamount to threats or disruptions within the community as a whole.

For the Buem, the individual is central to conflict prevention. They encapsulate this perspective in the expression 'It is the crooked leg that draws mud and smears it unto the straight one'. Where conflicts emerge, the most common form of resolution in Buem society is *benyaogba ukpikator*, which literally translated means 'to say no to a case between adversaries'. In practice, this institution is similar to mediation. The process involves a downplaying of contending parties' incompatibilities as well as the outcome. The emphasis is instead placed on flexibility and adaptability to ensure social order among peoples who are highly interdependent. *Benyaogba ukpikator* is a preferential form of settling conflicts among the Buems because it does not entail adversarial approaches or zero-sum outcomes commonly associated with other forms of dispute resolution, such as arbitration and adjudication, or *kate* and *adzina*, respectively.

For further reading, see Ben K. Fred-Mensah, 'Bases of traditional conflict management among the Buems of the Ghana-Togo border' in I. William Zartman (ed.), *Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts: African Conflict 'Medicine'* (Boulder, Colorado, and London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).



Legitimacy

A quality that signifies voluntary acceptance of procedures that inherently necessitates obedience, cooperation, or acquiescence. Such procedures may be explicitly or implicitly formulated by individuals or institutions and may include laws, orders, decrees, decisions, and judgements. Legitimacy is crucial to the maintenance and exertion of political power, but it is extremely fragile, as it depends upon voluntarism and cooperation from the governed. In political terms, legitimacy simplifies the ability to rule and removes recourse to physical or other forms of coercion. ‘Legitimacy’ derives from the Latin *legitimus* and was originally bestowed by a document conveyed by a king. Legitimacy and legality may appear indistinguishable in practice and conception, but legitimacy is an intangible property bestowed by a people or group, and without it governance is difficult if not impossible.

See also **sources of power**.

Liberalism

A philosophical approach and theory of international relations premised on the promotion and maintenance of rights, freedoms, and equality in the pursuit of individual interest. In defending freedom, liberalism has been concerned with differentiating private and public space and placing limits on the latter to allow citizenry to attain specific ideals based on rational thought and action. Thus, liberalism is inherently linked to defining the limits of politics, economics, and social and civic life in relation to

- political power, authority, consent, and the rule of law;
- market capitalism, private property, investment, and trade; and
- justice, tolerance, and human agency.

Although a belief in natural rights independent of government or political authority remains central, the pursuit of liberal ideals has assumed various historical manifestations. Classical liberalism is generally associated with limited government intervention into all spheres of life due to the ability and self-reliance of individuals to define and fulfil their own interests. The desire to ensure individual welfare, however, became increasingly perceived as the responsibility of governments, based on the concept of the ‘common good’, later spurring the ‘welfare state’. This shift is apparent in relation to social provisions as well as economic activity. In other words, a nation-state that reflects the goals of a community as a whole can use its influence

to remove obstacles to the common good and provide opportunities to all of its members. Modern liberals have extended the philosophical underpinnings to the international system, whereby international law can act as the guarantor of liberties, justice, and pursuit of the good. John Stuart Mill, based on his 1859 essay *On Liberty*, is viewed as an important source for modern liberal ideas. His 1869 essay *On the Subjection of Women* is often cited as the origin of gender studies' liberal school of thought which espouses that the protections and guarantees of the law afforded for men merely need to be extended to women.

Liberalism has developed politically in concurrence with democratic ideals and forms of governance and economically with capitalism; these parallel evolutions are cited by advocates and critics alike. Liberalism clearly was an extremely influential force in the formulation and evolution of Western political traditions. Political liberalism advocates personal equality as a goal and endorses a 'rational' democratic state. Some argue that the primacy of the West in international relations has led to an artificial and politically motivated push for liberalism and its ideals in societies and regions that not only lack the historical roots for the tradition to flourish, but whose peoples are also unwilling participants in the process.

See also **idealism**, **ideology**, and **realism**.

Liberation theology

A movement in Christian theology, primarily in the Church of Rome, that stresses the participation (and in some interpretations obligation) of Church officials and members in pursuing social justice at the communal level, particularly on behalf of those suffering from oppression or poverty. Advocates of liberation theology maintain that the Bible mandates and supports striving to alleviate social ills and that such endeavours are the responsibility of all Christians. Debate on creating and perpetuating equitable social conditions and practices has focused on four general themes:

- the involvement of and extent of engagement of Church officials in political life, especially given the resistance by some secularists to such activities;
- the means available to advocates of liberation theology, particularly the issue of whether such means may include sabotage, demolition, destruction of property, directly violent actions, and so on;
- the influence that movements outside the Christian tradition may have had on the development of liberation theology; and
- the particular spiritual and theoretical interpretations of the Bible and their resulting practical lessons.



The emergence of liberation theology is firmly rooted in Latin America and is traceable to the Second Vatican Council held from 1962 to 1965. Aiming to modernise the Roman Catholic Church, the meetings resulted in opening the Church to various political and academic influences of the time. In Latin America, the most notable trend among politicians, activists, and social scientists was Marxism. In 1968, a group of Latin American bishops of the Church of Rome met in Colombia for the Conferencia Episcopal Latinoamericana (CELAM). Combining spirituality with socioeconomic analysis, the participants unanimously voted in support of the central tenets of liberation theology.

Gustavo Gutiérrez, widely cited as the academic progenitor of the movement, utilised this formal recognition to promote in Latin America the need for social revolution, which, he argued, might necessitate the use of violence. His vision, encapsulated in *A Theology of Liberation* published in 1971, advocated class struggle, justified on the grounds that underdevelopment and the resulting poverty of so many Latin Americans was directly due to ‘dependent capitalism’ and domination by the advanced industrialised countries. Through the organisation of ‘Christian-based communities’, the poor would become their own liberators. This approach gained credence and widespread support within and without Christian circles across Latin America throughout the 1970s.

As liberation theology began to garner worldwide attention, the Vatican of Pope John Paul II began to voice serious concern and criticism, particularly about armed rebellion under the banner of Christian theology. The pope’s attacks on liberation theology during the 1980s were motivated by the fact that Marxism suffused the so-called option for the poor. The justifications of violence worried John Paul, because they led some Roman Catholic parish priests to support armed struggle by peasants against repressive landowners and feudal dictatorships. Given the wave of insurrections sweeping across Latin America at the time, advocates of liberation theology were accused of acting as a partisan political force as much as striving to achieve social justice. Consistent criticisms from the Vatican and the waning of revolutionary fervour in the region contributed not so much to a lessening of liberation theology’s impact as to a mellowing of radical interpretations and practices. The concept of persons pursuing their own liberation through community-based networks remains a central component of liberation theology, and it continues to be promoted throughout Latin America and other developing regions, most notably in southern Africa in response to the struggle there against apartheid.

See also **just war, theory of.**

Mechanisms of change

The four processes by which non-violent struggles succeed: conversion, accommodation, non-violent coercion, and disintegration. Conversion, the most desirable yet rare mechanism of change, occurs when an opponent accepts the justification of the objectives of those employing non-violent action and in turn concedes based upon this shift in perspective. Accommodation involves mutual compromise over select objectives between an adversary and non-violent protagonists. This mechanism—the most common in practice—is possible when the contending parties have not developed extensive objectives, hope to avoid an escalation of conflict, or can identify and accept mutually beneficial concessions. The mechanism of non-violent coercion occurs when an opponent is compelled to concede because of the threatened or actual methods of the non-violent protagonists. The opponent realizes that any direction taken will be either ineffectual or produce a negative return. The most unlikely and elusive mechanism, disintegration, occurs when non-cooperation and defiance are so extensive that an opponent is simply unable to respond because its system of decision making or implementation crumbles and dissolves.

Mediation

A voluntary, informal, non-binding process undertaken with an external party that fosters the settlement of differences or demands between directly invested parties. Mediators often have a general interest in the resolution of a given conflict or dispute, but theoretically they are able to operate neutrally and objectively. Lacking the authority to coerce or impose judgements, conditions, or resolutions, such facilitators aim to transform the dynamics of the conflict situation by introducing new relevant knowledge or information, especially regarding the negotiation process between the disputants, and by revealing common interests and suggesting possible directions towards settlement. In acute situations, mediation acts as a means of facilitating communication, commonly termed ‘good offices’, through the consent of the vested parties that are unable to formulate mutually satisfactory resolutions on their own.

The process is usually initiated by the intended external mediator—such as an international organisation, government, or non-governmental organisation—or by the relatively weaker party of the conflict. Mediators often spend time with each party to the conflict through what has come to be known as ‘shuttle diplomacy’, or ‘caucusing’, especially when the parties are unwilling to meet each other or joint meetings are not leading to progress. The contending parties nonetheless maintain considerable control over the process and the outcome.

Two theories explain how mediation can be successful. The first focuses on the



personal skills and characteristics of the mediator(s), and the other emphasises the environmental and contextual factors relevant to the conflict in question. In either case, assessing the process or agent of mediation can be difficult in that protracted conflicts often involve extended mediation efforts, which in turn entail multiple third parties and an ever-changing environment.

Meditation has a long, if informal, history. Examples can be cited from ancient Greece and the Bible and during early Chinese dynasties and the Persian Empire. In modern international relations, mediation first received explicit recognition during a conference held in The Hague in 1899. Although disarmament—the primary aim of the meeting—basically failed, the secondary goal sought ideas for settling international disputes. The latter resulted in a series of declarations focusing on resolving conflicts without resort to military weapons or exchanges. The statements argued for the use of adjudication, arbitration, and mediation.

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In traditional African mediation, the agent is a neutral and powerless third party, armed with personal characteristics such as wisdom and integrity but without the means for providing inducements and sanctions—a moral mediator rather than a mediator with muscle, or in more standard terms, a mediator as formulator but not as manipulator. The mediator functions much as an ombudsman, intervening between authority and citizen, tempering justice with mercy and sentences with reintegration.

Zartman 2000: 222

For further reading, see Hizkias Assefa, *Mediation of Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies. The Sudan Conflict* (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1987).

See also **arbitration**, **conciliation**, and **negotiation**.

Military-industrial complex

The informal structures resulting from relations between the military services and industrial corporations involved in the military defence industry. The military-industrial complex is unique to industrialised nation-states. Each party pressures the other and their respective government to maintain or expand the national defence budget. The government agencies and procurers dedicated to defence-related issues and decisions serve as the critical link and conduit between the military services on the one hand and the corporations on the other and are, therefore, identified at times

as forming a third component of the military-industrial complex.

U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower coined the term ‘military-industrial complex’ in his 1961 Farewell Address, and the actual entity has since tended to suffer depiction in a negative light. The involved parties are viewed as considering their interests paramount, even above the security needs of the given nation-state, and siphoning off appropriations for other basic government services. Unwarranted continuation or expansion of defence spending may also contribute to the likelihood of an arms race. In addition, the limited number of entities involved in the lucrative industry of defence contracting is open to considerable waste, fraud, and abuse. Military-industrial complexes have been most extensively examined within the United States, because of the huge proportion of the national budget allocated to military defence, but in recent times they have emerged in other nation-states—most notably Brazil, China, Israel, France, Russia, South Africa, and the United Kingdom—the main actors in the international arms trade.

Negative-sum outcome

A situation in which the losses of one party equal the losses of another party. In other words, negative-sum, or ‘lose-lose’, outcomes involve the pursuit of objectives by one or more parties that produce mutually detrimental effects on all the parties in question, limiting the possibility of any of them achieving their objectives.

See also **game theory**, **positive-sum outcome**, and **zero-sum outcome**.

Negotiation

Communication, usually governed by pre-established procedures, between representatives of parties involved in a conflict or dispute. As a technique in the management and resolution of conflict, negotiation is conducted on various grounds: to identify common interests and develop unilateral or multilateral initiatives in pursuit of objectives, to de-escalate a conflict situation, or to formulate mutually satisfactory solutions towards resolution of a given conflict.

The voluntary nature of negotiation grants the parties direct control over the process and outcome, both of which can vary widely. The process involves numerous skills and tactics, including bargaining, compromise, and concessions, among others. Outcomes may range from authorized documents to informal agreements to new or adjusted procedures to institutional arrangements. Negotiation may also be employed as a stalling technique, although unstated, where concrete results are not expected by a participating party. Certain conflicts—e.g., those where the



parties possess an interdependent relationship or value their future relationship with one another—lend themselves more readily to negotiation. Such conditions do not automatically eliminate or reduce adversarial or confrontational attitudes, even during a negotiation process, but reductions in tension and mutual confidence provide considerable advantages over more hostile encounters.

For further reading, see Daniel Druckman, ‘Turning points in international negotiation’, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45:4 (2001), 519–44.

See also **arbitration**, **conciliation**, **mediation**, and **pre-negotiation**.

Non-cooperation

A conscious and deliberate, partial or total, non-engagement in activities that can impede the objectives or interests of a particular person, group, institution, bureaucracy, or state system. Encompassing a large class of methods in the repertoire of non-violent direct action, non-cooperation may assume social forms (boycotts and stay-at-homes), economic forms (strikes and lockouts), and political forms (civil disobedience and mutiny). Non-cooperation rests at the core of non-violent action and is based on all systems of government relying on cooperation from their respective populations, whether through consent, acquiescence, or duress. Individuals may refuse to provide such cooperation and withdraw their support.

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If nothing be given [tyrants], if they are not obeyed, without fighting, without striking a blow, they remain naked and undone, and do nothing further, just as the root, having no soil or food, the branch withers and dies.

de la Boétie 1577: 11

For further reading, see Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, Vol. 2, *Methods of Nonviolent Action*, vol. 2, Boston, Porter Sargent Publishers, 1973.

See also **mechanisms of change** and **non-violent action**.

Nonproliferation

See **arms control** and **disarmament**.

Nonviolence

A holistic belief in and practice of abstaining from violent acts. Such belief systems may stem from various religions and ethical codes, with the range of understandings varying equally. These may include degrees of rejection of mental harm or physical damage to the environment, the self, or others. In some instances, a conviction in nonviolence rejects the notion of adversaries. Normative nonviolence—religious, ethical, or principled—may be a creed, matter of spirituality, or system of morality. It can also be an article of faith.

Non-violent action

A technique of conflict engagement or prosecution that aims to achieve political objectives through the imposition of sanctions and various supporting methods excluding physical, violent acts. Non-violent action constitutes a vast array of political, economic, social, and psychological methods that can be categorised into three main classes: protest and persuasion, non-cooperation, and intervention. Non-violent action involves two fundamental forms of activities: omission and commission. It operates on the precept that all political symbiotic relationships require varying degrees of obedience, cooperation, or acquiescence, which are manifested through identifiable sources. The supply of these sources is not guaranteed, and it can be purposefully withdrawn. As a result, shifts can occur in the power relations among the parties involved in the conflict. Non-violent action is also termed ‘non-violent struggle’, ‘non-violent resistance’, ‘direct action’, ‘civil resistance’, and ‘political defiance’. In the past, scholars sometimes differentiated between ‘principled’ and ‘practical’ nonviolence. This is a false dichotomy no longer in use, as ample historical evidence shows that non-violent direct action is principled as well as practical.

See also **mechanisms of change** and **sources of power**.

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Pacifism

A doctrine and historical school of thought that rejects war as the means of resolving conflict. Pacifism reflects several perspectives, all of which consider that conflicts should be settled through peaceful means. The term ‘pacifism’ is but a century old—having first been used in 1902 at the tenth Universal Peace Conference at Glasgow, Scotland—but the concept has existed for centuries. Persons choose pacifism for any number of reasons, including religious faith, non-spiritual conviction on the sanctity of human life, or practical belief that war is ineffective and obsolete. To some, pacifism includes action to promote justice and human rights in addition to opposition to war. Pacifism is often confused with non-violent resistance, but it is not a pre-condition for the practice of non-violent struggle as a form of engagement in conflicts.

A differentiation must be made between the morality of pacifism as practiced by an individual and the application of such morality to the behaviour of a society. Failure to appreciate this difference can lead to problems in discussing pacifism.

An absolute pacifist may believe that it is never right to take part in war, even in self-defence, and that human life is so valuable that nothing justifies killing another person intentionally. Conditional pacifists oppose war and violence in principle, yet recognise that there may be circumstances when war is the least bad option. Selective pacifists believe that pacifism is a matter of degree and may oppose wars involving weapons of mass destruction—atomic, nuclear, chemical, and biological—because of the significance of such devastating weapons or because a war utilizing such weaponry is not ‘winnable’.

Pacifists are often deeply involved in political efforts to promote peace and argue against particular wars. Some pacifists refuse to fight. Others will take part in non-combat activities that seek to reduce the harm of war, such as attending the wounded, bearing stretcher, or driving ambulances. Still others refuse to take part in any activity that might support a war. Some pacifists have chosen punishment, even execution, rather than go to war. Many democratic countries accept the principle that citizens have the right of conscientious objection to military service, but they usually expect the objector to undertake public service as an alternative.

Pacifism is as much a factor in Western thinking as the theory of just war, yet pacifism as national policy is rare. The ideals of pacifism, however, have played an important part in twentieth-century international politics and inform the work of the United Nations. Pacifism surged in reaction to the horrors of World War I and universal male conscription, and it gained renewed support after the advent of nuclear weapons. The Holocaust of World War II, however, and other gross abuses of human rights, have caused many to reconsider whether war is not sometimes the least objectionable course of action. Two major pacifist organisations that emerged from World War I are still at work: the International Fellowship of Reconciliation and

the War Resisters League.

Some religions, including Buddhism, promote pacifism. Others, for example Christianity, have strong pacifist roots but have accepted the possibility of war and seek to provide moral guidance in decision making concerning war and in its conduct. The ‘historic peace churches’ have long propounded pacifism and are sometimes known as ‘prophetic minorities’. These include the Society of Friends (Quakers), Anabaptists of the sixteenth century, the Mennonites, and the Brethren. Judaism is historically opposed to violence and has traditionally considered that where force is necessary, the minimum should be used.

Paradigm

A model or pattern that cannot be proved in a scientific sense, but which may reflect shifts in thinking. Paradigms are often used to describe concepts of peace, because of the ephemeral nature of describing such a state. In another example, the German theologian Hans Küng describes the era after World War II as embodying a number of ‘epoch-making’ paradigm shifts, characterised by him as follows:

- post-Eurocentric
- post-colonial (nations more inclined to cooperate)
- post-capitalist, post-socialist
- post-patriarchal
- post-ideological
- interreligious, post-confessional, multiconfessional, and ecumenical, concerned with world society

For further reading, see Hans Küng, *Global Responsibility* (New York, Crossroad, 1991).

Peace

A political condition that ensures justice and social stability through formal and informal institutions, practices, and norms. Several conditions must be met for peace to be reached and maintained:

- balance of political power among the various groups within a society, region, or, most ambitiously, the world
- legitimacy for decision makers and implementers of decisions in the eyes of their respective group, as well as those of external parties, duly supported through

transparency and accountability

- recognised and valued interdependent relationships among groups fostering long-term cooperation during periods of agreement, disagreement, normality, and crisis
- reliable and trusted institutions for resolving conflicts
- sense of equality and respect, in sentiment and in practice, within and without groups and in accordance with international standards
- mutual understanding of rights, interests, intents, and flexibility despite incompatibilities

Notoriously elusive, peace connotes more than a mere absence of war or hostilities; an absence of conflict is impossible. In addition, the state of peace should be distinguished from techniques that simply avoid conflicts or employ violent or coercive approaches to engage in, manage, or resolve them.

Deriving from the Latin *pax*, peace in the Western world is generally considered a contractual relationship that implies mutual recognition and agreement. Understandings of peace throughout the world often disclose a much deeper comprehension of peace in relation to the human condition, which also includes inner peace. The comprehensive understanding of peace outlined above extends beyond what are referred to as positive conceptions of peace but acts in accordance with them as well. This contrasts with negative conceptions of peace, which are described most commonly as the mere absence of war or violent conflict.

For further reading, see Johan Galtung, 'Cultural violence', *Journal of Peace Research*, 27:3 (1990), 291–305.

Peace building

Policies, programs, and associated efforts to restore stability and the effectiveness of social, political, and economic institutions and structures in the wake of a war or some other debilitating or catastrophic event. Peace building generally aims to create and ensure the conditions for 'negative peace', the mere absence of violent conflict engagement, and for 'positive peace', a more comprehensive understanding related to the institutionalisation of justice and freedom.

The UN peace building operations in Namibia in 1978 were then understood primarily as a form of post-conflict reconstruction. The conceptualisation of peace building, however, has since expanded, as can be seen in the 1992 and 1995 editions of former UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace*. Although speaking in relation to post-conflict situations, Boutros-Ghali (1995:15) identified a range of peace-building programmes, including 'co-operative projects

... that not only contribute to economic and social development but also enhance the confidence that is so fundamental to peace'. More specifically, he mentions activities focusing on agriculture, transportation, resource management, cultural exchanges, educational projects, and simplification of visa regimes.

That there exists a connexion between security and development is an accepted tenet in peace building, and the implications of this mutually reinforcing relationship are extensive. The United Nations has launched several initiatives that involve elements of peace building, including the Peacebuilding Support Offices under the Department of Political Affairs, first operative in Liberia in the late 1990s and later in Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic. Yet, peace building involves a wide range of international donors, aid agencies, and international, regional, community, and grassroots civil society organisations. Such initiatives have revolved around several foci. The following represents a small selection of them:

- assisting an end to military or violent exchanges through the decommissioning of arms, the demobilisation of combatants, and rehabilitation and reintegration programmes
- providing humanitarian relief to victims
- protecting human rights
- ensuring security and related services
- generating an environment of trust in order for social relations to function properly
- establishing non-violent modes of resolving present and future conflicts
- fostering reconciliation among the various parties to a conflict
- providing psycho-social or trauma healing services to victims of severe atrocities
- repatriating refugees and resettling internally displaced persons
- aiding in economic reconstruction
- building and maintaining the operation of institutions to provide such services, and
- co-ordinating the roles of numerous internal and external parties involved in such interrelated efforts

Although isolated or partial elements of such a conception of peace building have been implemented to alleviate the consequences of past wars and acute conflicts, the integration of this complex model of processes is a relatively new phenomenon. The changing nature of war, and the increasing frequency of wars within nation-states as opposed to between them, has also complicated peace-building initiatives. To date, no comprehensive formula for peace building exists. Such efforts have been developed and implemented mostly on an ad hoc basis, and they vary widely from case to case in accordance with local and temporal circumstances.

As an extremely broad concept—encompassing democracy, development, gender, human rights, and justice—peace building can be thought of as a bridge from conflict resolution to ‘positive peace’. Peace building aims to create and foster stability and adequate functioning of a region or society. Attempts to refine and implement peace building have encountered several difficulties, including the following:

- failures to address the underlying or root causes of the conflict
- lack of legitimacy in the eyes of recipients and target groups, particularly in relation to newly formed institutions
- lack of agreement over the acceptance of roles and implementation of responsibilities by all parties to the conflict
- limits on leadership in times of political transition or extreme crisis
- over-reliance on external parties
- aspirations to build a society that functions generally better than it did prior to the conflict

In addition to noting such complications, practitioners and commentators have raised theoretical criticisms and questions as well. First, the activities of relief and development have usually been conducted and studied separately, and their intersections are not well defined. Peace building bridges this traditional divide, but a reformulation is needed for integrating the theory and practice of these interconnected disciplines. Second, peace building seems to suggest long-term, extensive effort and commitment by parties to the conflict and external partners. Conceptualising a timeframe for such efforts has generated considerable debate. Third, peace building is often understood as the final phase of a conflict, yet some argue that such processes can begin in the midst of a violent conflict. Fourth, the importance of gender in relation to conflict and peace building continues to be overlooked, often completely. The sufferings resulting from conflict affect men and women differently and their subsequent roles in peace building differ as well.

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In today’s conflicts, 85% of victims are civilians of which the majority are women. Women in unstable, disruptive conflict and post-conflict situations are at risk from multiple forms of violence and share a set of common vulnerabilities. . . . In conflicts world-wide, rape, sexual assault, military sexual slavery, enforced prostitution and forced pregnancy are being used as deliberate military tactics. Studies of forced migration confirm that 80% of refugees and IDPs are women and children and the indefinite and long term nature of forced migration creates unique problems for women who are

forced to beg for food, live in refugee camps or to earn a living in unfamiliar environments. . . . Women suffer economic dislocation, an intense sense of insecurity, the unravelling of traditional social and cultural structures of support and an increased risk of domestic violence, particularly in post-conflict situations. However, despite these overwhelming difficulties women are not just victims. . . . Their participation in fighting, their importance as caretakers and providers for the community and the often extraordinary role they play in peacebuilding, peacemaking and reconstruction needs to be recognized.

Galama and van Tongeren 2002: 220–21

For further reading, see Taisier M. Ali and Robert O. Matthews (eds.), *Durable Peace: Challenges for Peacebuilding in Africa* (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2004).

See also **peace**, **peace enforcement**, and **peacekeeping**.

Peace enforcement

Operations undertaken to end military or violent exchanges or acts of aggression, with or without the consent of one or more parties to the conflict, to create a permanent and viable environment and guarantees for such conditions. Peace enforcement is typically associated with the employment of military forces in order minimally to generate ‘negative peace’, or the absence of violent conflict engagement. Such activities are usually considered as a phase in more extensive operations, including peacekeeping and peace building, but attempts to distinguish and define the interplay among such initiatives remain controversial.

Although peace enforcement is predominantly understood in terms of military interventions, a broader interpretation includes the use of a wide range of collectively enacted sanctions by any party to a given conflict in order to end the violent hostilities. A general set of objectives for such an operation may include the following:

- forcible compliance of cease fires
- separation of belligerents
- isolation of a particular party or parties to the conflict
- establishment of buffer zones or safe havens
- decommissioning of arms and demobilisation of combatants
- protection of human rights
- assistance with humanitarian aid

The difficulty of conceptualising ‘peace enforcement’ is exacerbated by the legal interpretations that define the mandates, means, and evaluations of operations. Chapter VII of the UN Charter is commonly cited as providing the legal provisos of peace enforcement operations. Arguments have been put forward, however, on behalf of Articles 42, 43, and 47. Until recently, peace enforcement operations have typically been led and commanded by specified members of the United Nations, although the forces themselves are normally multinational and rotational. Efforts have been increased to ensure the neutrality of forces so as not to precipitate or encourage the pursuit of strategic or other interests on the part of those intervening or their respective governments.

During the cold war, the stipulations for peace enforcement primarily lay dormant, with some limited exceptions, including in Korea (1950–52) and in the Congo (1960–63). The 1990s saw a considerable expansion of peace enforcement operations and a concurrent growth of interest in refinement of its theory and practice. Recent examples include northern Iraq (1991), Angola (1991–94), Liberia (1992–93), Bosnia (1992–95), Somalia (1992–95), Haiti (1993–94), Rwanda (1994–96), Zaire (1995–96), and Kosovo (the southernmost province of the former Yugoslavia) (1999). As a result, confusion and deficiencies emerged in this expanded interpretation as well as perplexity over peacekeeping operations and peace building. Nonetheless, the protection of civilians has remained the essential element of all peace enforcement operations, and failures to accomplish this most basic provision have generated extensive criticism, particularly regarding Rwanda and Bosnia.

For further reading, see Mohamed Awad Osman, *The United Nations and Peace Enforcement* (Hampshire, England, Ashgate Publishing, 2002).

See also **peace building** and **peacekeeping**.

Peace studies

An interdisciplinary field of study with varying themes and foci, including but not limited to analysis of conflict, management of conflict, and resolution of conflict; non-violent sanctions; peace paradigms, peace building, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement; social and economic justice; war’s causes and conduct; and a variety of conceptions of international and domestic security. The field of peace studies is one of the fastest growing disciplines within the social sciences.

Carolyn Stephenson identifies three ‘waves’ of peace studies. The first began in the 1930s, with quantitative studies of industrial conflict and war, and was largely academically driven. The second occurred in the 1960s. It broadened the field to include the study of the impact of forms of violence and injustice. At this time

peace research moved assuredly into classrooms in certain parts of the world. The third wave emerged in the 1980s and was influenced more by movements and organizations than by academia and pedagogues (Klare and Thomas 1989). The field has its richest history in Scandinavia, where universities have had peace studies since the nineteenth century.

Peace research is a constituent element of peace studies. As in peace studies, persons involved in peace research rarely desire to produce knowledge for its own sake. They usually aim to bring about or consolidate peace. Moreover, those involved in peace research need not necessarily be academicians, as innumerable successes and insights are attributable to the work of non-governmental organizations. Particularly in Africa, some of the most useful work is a by-product of collaboration between scholars and community organizations. Action research is an approach within peace research in which the researcher abandons a detached stance and becomes part of the programme team. He or she is therefore able to give rapid feedback, often solving problems in the course of conducting research.

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Indeed, while numerous examples have been cited over the centuries about how language has been used to provoke violent actions, very little has been written about and hardly any courses exist that deal exclusively with the relationship between language and peace. . . . Thus, the study of language within the field of international peace and conflict resolution is imperative because it can be demonstrated that language is the subject of policy decisions as well as a possession that confers advantages. Moreover, language is a major variable that pushes open or closes the door to power, prestige, and wealth within societies and contributes to war and peace within and between societies.

Bangura 2003: 3

For further reading, see Carolyn Stephenson, ‘Evolution of peace studies’ in Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas (eds.), *Peace and World Order Studies: A Curriculum Guide*, 5th edn (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1989).

Peacekeeping

The maintenance of public security, civil services, and cease-fire agreements in war and conflict zones by UN or regional military, police, and civilian forces with the consent of the nation-state on whose territory these forces are deployed.

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Peacekeeping involves co-ordinated efforts to ensure stability and relative normalcy in the aftermath of otherwise extremely volatile and chaotic situations. Chapter VI of the UN Charter outlines the objectives of peacekeeping and serves as the international mandate. The extended goal is to create conditions conducive to establishing lasting political settlements. The scope of peacekeeping activities has gradually broadened over the years, leading to what some observers call 'mission creep'. Such commentaries particularly point to the civilian and humanitarian activities conducted by peacekeepers, such as food distribution, transportation and other basic services, and establishing safe havens. At a minimum, peacekeeping operations are to be conducted by troops and led by countries neutral to the conflict, and they are dependent upon some degree of consent by contingent parties.

The activities of peacekeepers usually fall within four partially distinct spheres, or what are referred to as 'types'. The first, or type I, involves observance where a cease-fire has been brokered. Such symbolic missions are often sent to act as deterrents against renewed violent conflict, as troops are lightly armed and not mandated to retaliate in the event of attack against them or civilians. Type II operations are conducted to aid or ensure political transitions. Such missions are most successful when the troops are deemed legitimate by the citizens of the society in which they are deployed and when they are provided adequate resources and scope of action. Where some form of military intervention is considered necessary, Type III peacekeeping operations are performed; these are more commonly categorised as 'peace enforcement'. Type IV operations are generally associated with 'peace building', or 'post-conflict reconstruction'. Extensive debate and confusion surround the legal and practical distinctions among these missions, as well as the increasing tendency of regional organisations to assume peacekeeping roles. Several key issues remain controversial: formulating mandates, defining the rules of engagement, establishing command structures, and designating responsibility for initial action.

Efforts resembling peacekeeping missions were launched by the United Nations prior to 1950, including the UN Special Mission on the Balkans (UNSCOB), the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTO) to oversee the truce in the Middle East, and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) sent to Jammu and Kashmir. Not until 1956, however, did the term 'peacekeeping' first come into usage; it was coined in reference to the UN Emergency Force (UNEF₁) sent to the Suez Canal. The conceptualisation was due largely to Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld. From 1949 to 1988, the United Nations launched an additional seven peacekeeping missions, and in 1990 it had eight peacekeeping operations underway involving approximately 10,000 troops. At the end of 2000, the United Nations oversaw fifteen deployments involving nearly 38,000 troops. The number of peacekeeping operations undertaken between 1988 and 2000 totalled forty when combining UN deployments with those of the several regional organisations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

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The presence of impartial multi-national troops and civilians under UN authority serves as a confidence-building measure, providing psychological and physical space for the parties to pursue the process of peacemaking. As in Mozambique and Namibia, the ‘blue helmets’ can assist in monitoring adherence to a cease-fire, overseeing elections, repatriating refugees and demobilising combatants.

Nathan 1997

See also **peace building** and **peace enforcement**.

Pillars of support

The institutions and organisations that supply the necessary sources of power to a party in a politically symbiotic relationship, thereby allowing that party to maintain and exert its political power capacity. Pillars of support are most recognisable within a nation-state or society. Examples of such pillars include authority figures, the business community, labour organisations, the media, military forces, police, prisons, and universities, among many possible others.

See also **sources of power**.

Political *jiu-jitsu*

Deriving from the Japanese martial art, a process by which participants in a non-violent struggle refuse to reciprocate violent actions of their opponent, which can result in a disruption of the opponent’s political equilibrium. In turn, the non-violent resisters can be strengthened by new or altered third-party or constituent allegiances and support. Requiring steadfast discipline by non-violent resisters, political *jiu-jitsu*, a rarity in practice, shows how non-violent protagonists, despite an asymmetrical position, can employ techniques that will throw off balance their adversary.

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Briefly stated, by deliberately refusing to meet violence with violence, and by sustaining nonviolent behavior despite repression, a protagonist throws an opponent off balance. As the participants in a nonviolent campaign refuse to reciprocate their adversary’s

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violence, the attacker becomes shaken by the sight of the suffering that has been caused and the refusal of the protagonists to respond with violence. The adversary becomes unsure of how to respond. The sympathies of the police or troops often begin to flow toward the nonviolent protagonists.

King 2002: xv

Political power

The summation of means, influences, and pressures available to a government, institution, group, or individual that are exploited to achieve respective objectives or to change targeted conditions. Political power may be exerted positively, in the form of incentives, or negatively, as in various types of sanctions. Domestic and international relations are influenced and at times dictated by the relative political power among parties. The attainment of political power is often a source of conflict in itself. Differentials in political power can be a crucial factor in determining the outcomes of disputes, but in such situations the underlying causes of the conflict in question are often purposefully ignored. Groups are often unaware of their full power capacity, creating distorted assumptions of the balance of power among contending parties. Shifts in power relationships can occur through a full realisation of political power or structural changes within or among societies.

Positive-sum outcome

A situation in which the gains of parties can be mutually satisfied. Positive-sum, or 'win-win', outcomes encourage cooperation in joint problem solving where the parties seek to minimize or eliminate the negative impact of their respective actions on other parties and the likelihood of the interdependence of their actions in the future.

See also **game theory**, **negative-sum outcome**, and **zero-sum outcome**.

Pre-negotiation

The exploration by parties to determine if negotiations might act as a successful technique of conflict resolution between them and, if so, the subsequent joint process of developing procedures for such negotiations.

Realism

A school of thought and theory of international relations that is also known as *realpolitik* and is distinguished by the following three general characteristics or assumptions:

- international politics are dictated through a disorganised system of self-reliance;
- nation-states are the primary and dominant agents acting within the international system; and
- politics inherently revolve around the quest for power.

Proponents of realism acknowledge that relations among nation-states are generally guided by accepted norms. In their opinion, however, the international system lacks the supranational authority to impose or enforce such relations, which means that nation-states must ensure and maintain their own interests. While various agents and groups may affect international relations, such entities remain subordinate to nation-states. Realists view political power on the international level as a zero-sum game; that is, the gain of one or several nation-states will result in the proportional loss by one or more others. Thus, the world is understood as inherently conflictual. Also, central to realist thought, however, is the concept of balance of power, whereby an equal distribution of power is maintained among opposing nation-states or coalitions, particularly ensuring that any one nation-state or alliance does not gain overwhelming strength. Such an allocation is usually defended in terms of polarity. Yet, proponents of realism disagree about whether the balance of power is intrinsic to the international system of nation-states or consciously sought by representative agents.

Classical realism contains a philosophical aspect as well. Human nature is viewed as unchanging, and pessimism overshadows the inevitable battles over power played out through international relations. Neo-realists, or structural realists, attribute innate power struggles to the anarchic system of international relations rather than to the actions of individuals. In their view, the preparation by nation-states for self-reliance (particularly regarding security) endangers the stability of other nation-states, creating a cycle of real or perceived threat.

See also **idealism** and **liberalism**.

Reconciliation

A process that attempts to transform intense or lingering malevolence among parties previously engaged in a conflict or dispute into feelings of acceptance and even forgiveness of past animosities or detrimental acts. Reconciliation may involve recourse to justice, particularly where one party has suffered egregiously relative to or at the hands of the other party. In such cases, compensation for victims might be offered as an emollient. If proffered sensitively, compensation has tremendous healing capacity for the injured party as well as for the perpetrators of harmful acts. Although reconciliation is far from being standardised or even fully understood, the process usually involves the oppressors' acknowledgement of their actions; their sincere expression of regret and remorse; and elements of forgiveness on the part of the victims for such acts. Therefore, it involves much more than telling, or a simple realisation, of truthful facts.

Reconciliation is often considered essential to creating conditions for durable resolutions and stability, especially since the trauma of extensive violence is often passed on to future generations, contributing to perpetual cycles of retributory violence. In this sense, reconciliation is needed not only for psychological or social healing, important as they may be, but also for political stabilisation or renewal in the pursuit of much broader goals or ideals. John Paul Lederach (2002) has outlined a model that proved useful in negotiations between the government and a resistance movement in Nicaragua. Its elements consisted of truth, mercy, justice, and peace. The place where these meet, says Lederach, is reconciliation.

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Reconciliation as a concept and a praxis endeavours to reframe the conflict so that the parties are no longer preoccupied with focusing on the issues in a direct, cognitive manner. Its primary goal and key contribution is to seek innovative ways to create a time and a place, within various levels of the affected population, to address, integrate, and embrace the painful past and the necessary shared future as a means of dealing with the present.

Lederach 2002: 35

See also **truth (and reconciliation) commission**.

Refugee

A person seeking asylum based on the likelihood of persecution or imminent harm in his or her home country due to race, religion, nationality, ethnicity, social membership, political opinion, or knowledge. Refugees commonly flee from war and its subsequent conditions and are unable to receive protection from their home nation-state. Considerable debate surrounds whether refugee status must involve one or both of the following conditions: impending persecution of select individuals or groups and the inability of a state system to provide protection to such persons or groups. What constitutes 'protection' is contested as well. Does it involve, for instance, the provision of public order and subsistence or mere survival? The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) offers protective auspice for refugees.

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Under the international regime, those individuals who flee across a border from the generalized threats posed by war or civil disturbance are outside the ambit of refugee law. These people are not considered to have a sufficiently individualized fear of persecution. Member states of the Organization of African Unity have adopted a broader refugee definition, which includes war and civil disorder. Governmental and expert discussions in Asia and Latin America have also recognized the advantages of a broader definition.

Helton 1994: 118

See also **asylum** and **displaced person**.

Rwanda International Criminal Tribunal

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On 1 July 1994 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 935, which requested the establishment of a commission of experts to investigate the possibility of serious violations of humanitarian law, including genocide, by Hutus against Tutsis in Rwanda. The commission reported findings to the Security Council, which prompted the secretary-general to issue a statute on the formulation of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. The tribunal was established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and under the pretence of the tribunal formed in 1993 for the former Yugoslavia. It consisted of six trial judges (in Arusha, Tanzania), five appeals judges (in The Hague), and a deputy chief prosecutor.

The statute of the tribunal limited jurisdiction to events in 1994 and granted power to prosecute responsible persons for violations of humanitarian law committed in Rwanda and by Rwandan citizens in neighbouring countries. This constituted an expansion of juridical power beyond the territorial and into a personal domain. Although Rwanda conceded partial jurisdiction, given its request for the tribunal, neighbouring nation-states were forced to comply. Although state systems may try Rwandans on counts of violations of international law in conventional court systems, the tribunal retains primacy over national courts and may thus request deference of particular cases. The tribunal's statutes outline penalties for any nation-state refusing to comply.

After investigations by the tribunal found flagrant violations of international law, the task remained to develop grounds for the case of genocide. As stipulated in the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, an early responsibility of the tribunal was to determine if the Tutsis constituted a stable and permanent group. With further evidence and investigation, the justices concluded that the Tutsis should be considered an ethnic group in accordance with the mandatory identity cards distributed by the Rwandan government. This decision has tremendous ramifications for future cases involving the crime of genocide, as the nature of the Tutsis' inclusion among groups identified as 'stable and permanent and determined by birth' significantly expands the peoples protected under the genocide convention. In the Tutsis' case, 'ethnic group' was defined in relation to the subjective understanding and culture of Rwandan peoples and respective government procedures.

The lengthy procedural requirements of the international tribunal and conventional courts led to restoration and modification of a traditional mechanism for addressing disputes over land and other communal issues. In pre-colonial times, elders sat on a *gacaca*—green grassy knoll in the Kirwanda language—to mete justice. The *gacaca* system has been upgraded to meet international human rights standards, and the requirements of a fair trial, and has been adapted for use in dealing with the huge number of genocide detainees. More than 250,000 judges, including a large number of women, were elected, hired, and trained to preside over the trials of the *genocidaire*, or perpetrators.

For further reading, see Paul J. Magnarella, *Justice in Africa: Rwanda's Genocide, Its Courts, and the UN Criminal Tribunal* (Hants, England, Ashgate Publishing, 2000).

Sanctions

Penalties threatened or imposed by a government, institution, organisation, or group on a targeted party for actual or anticipated failure to act in accordance with standards, obligations, or expectations. As countenance or encouragement, forms of sanctions may range from the political to the economic to the cultural. Punitive sanctions similarly have great variety. Economic sanctions include embargoes and prohibition of foreign aid. Political sanctions may target diplomatic links or international organisational participation. Cultural sanctions may limit educational exchanges and involvement in sporting events. Implementation may be unilateral or multilateral, comprehensive or selective, and initiated by official authorities or civil society organisations, although in common usage the term ‘sanctions’ is often used to describe penalties imposed among nation-states. In all cases, sanctions are enacted to coerce the party in question and influence its behaviour.

The latent effects of punitive sanctions are widely debated, particularly concerning the detriment to civilians affected in undemocratic societies, because they are often unable to influence policy in their own country or may have been weakened by opposing the targeted regime. Selective sanctions are increasingly used to target specific personnel and élites, thereby limiting the effects on the general population.

See also **sources of power**.

Satyagraha

A Gandhian conception to denote active non-violent resistance to injustice, oppression, and exploitation. Deriving from two Sanskrit roots, *satya* means truth but also implies love and firmness, while *agraha*, often translated as ‘insistence on’, or ‘pursuit of’, serves as a synonym for force.

Mohandas K. Gandhi believed the term ‘passive resistance’ to be inadequate as an equivalent of non-violent struggle. He thought that it was incomplete and conveyed the wrong impression, because non-violent struggle is anything but passive. He preferred a term from Sanskrit or Urdu, rather than a translation from English. Therefore, through the journal *Indian Opinion*, Gandhi offered a small prize for the best suggestion of a single word to describe the principles of Truth and Love as the forces of power and change. The winning entry— *sadagraha*—meaning ‘firmness in a good cause’, needed some modification, and the result was *satyagraha*, or ‘firmness in Truth’, or a ‘relentless search for Truth’, to describes Gandhi’s broad philosophical conception of non-violent action. During the Indian campaigns against British rule, satyagraha became associated with nearly all such activities, and Gandhi frequently

used the word to designate the independence movement.

For Gandhi, satyagraha could be understood in moral and in political terms. He personally upheld both perspectives and encouraged others to do the same, but he recognised that not all persons who put satyagraha into practice would share his deep moral convictions as well. Gandhi sought a broad meaning of satyagraha, as a force born of Truth and Love, or non-violence, to **embody a lifelong pursuit**. In this sense, the term transcends the more limited definition of non-violent action.

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There is a law of nature that a thing can be retained by the same means by which it has been acquired. A thing acquired by violence can be retained by violence alone, while one acquired by truth can be retained only by truth. The Indians in South Africa, therefore, can ensure their safety today if they can wield the weapons of Satyagraha.

Gandhi 1928: 306

For further reading, see Mary King, *Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr.: The Power of Nonviolent Action* (New Delhi, Indian Council on Cultural Relations and Mehta Publishers, 2002).

Security

A subjective state in which an individual or collectivity feels free from threats, anxiety, or danger. Such insecurities have typically been defined in relation to nation-states, for example regarding borders or institutions responsible for governance. Security stands along a continuum and, therefore, cannot be understood in absolute terms. Given relative perceptions, reaching or maintaining security is almost always a contentious matter, subject to shifting perceptions. To ensure security at the national level, governments must trust their ability to deter attacks or to defend against them. Such capacity has centred historically on the uses of military power among nation-states. Given the subjective nature of defining security, obvious difficulties arise. A range of activities have consequently resulted in the name of security, including expansionist policies, wars of conquest, armaments races, acts of intervention, pre-emptive military action, and the formation of alliances.

Governments have traditionally been solely responsible for providing their own security, commonly called strategic security. More recently, a reconceptualisation of security has been put forward under the rubric of collective security. This reformulation rests upon an understanding that security threats are not necessarily political in

nature, although the repercussions of such threats eventually may call for political solutions. For instance, environmental problems have not usually been incorporated in definitions of security, yet the political repercussions from environmental degradation are increasingly being realised. This evolution is linked to the increasing tendency of threats in societies to arise from internal rather than external factors. In turn, the responsibility of formulating and implementing security strategy and policy has expanded to include proponents outside government organs and bodies, and the nation-state is no longer the sole unit to be protected. Societies and individuals have become the primary concern. This expanding doctrine includes the coinage of new terminology, such as ‘human security’, ‘common security’, ‘co-operative security’, ‘democratic security’, ‘environmental security’, and ‘preventive security’.

Social contract

The notion that individuals and nation-states tacitly agree to a set of mutually binding stipulations and obligations. The social contract has long served as a philosophical foundation for understanding modern conceptions of citizenship and constitutionalism, whereby individuals willingly submit some of their personal freedoms to political authority in return for the general benefit of all members of a given society.

So-called contractarians—theorists and commentators of the social contract—are ultimately concerned with the following three elements: the circumstances under which the contract came into force; the constraints associated with the situation when the contract was accepted; and a theory of rational choice to understand why parties agree to the specific elements of the contract. Although more a theoretical construction than an historical occurrence, the social contract has served to explain fundamental aspects of modern societies, the protection of human rights, the distribution of particular goods and services, and the formulation and institutionalisation of social and political relationships. The failure of a party to the social contract to uphold its responsibilities may not only lead to a breakdown of any of the aforementioned assurances, but also to a complete undermining of the entire contract itself and thereby of fundamental demarcations. In such cases, the original parties may seek to reformulate the contract or completely opt out, and the role and responsibility of third parties, although contentious, can be influential as well.

The origins of the concept of the social contract are rooted in the Scottish Enlightenment, with indebtedness to the Protestant Reformation. The term ‘civil society’ has been employed from then until the contemporary era in the context of mutual rights and responsibilities defined by a social contract. Writing in the eighteenth century, John Locke considered the most significant rights to be the protection of property rights and the right of individuals (by which he meant men,

but not women) to withdraw from any contract that does not protect life, liberty, and property. Left to nature, asserted Locke and Thomas Hobbes, writing fifty years earlier, human beings would sink into war, because conflicting natural rights would produce scarcity, unless each person were to give up some natural rights or transfer them to an external authority through a social contract. Thus, the social contract is in essence the foundation of civil society, ratifying the associations of individuals as a system of restraint. Today, the concept of the social contract knows no regional boundaries, as its basic ideas have transcended virtually all political demarcations.

From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, the distinction between civil society and the state became more tactically applied, with a view towards political justification by oppositional social movements. The path-finding conception that independent sectors within a civil society can defend themselves against a state, as provided in a social contract, took form in the French and American revolutionary controversies.

Sources of power

The origins or loci of political power: legitimacy, human resources, skills and knowledge, material resources, intangible factors, and sanctions. Sources of power can be identified in any politically symbiotic relationship, as can their manifestations through institutions and organisations. The supply of these sources by one or various parties is directly related to the political power of the party that receives them.

See also **legitimacy**, **non-violent action**, **pillars of support**, and **sanctions**.

Strategy

The activity, process, or plan to attain desired objectives or goals as efficiently as possible, usually in the face of or in competition with others who are developing and implementing similar activities. Strategy is essentially the application of means to attain desired ends. Here, means are expressed widely, suggesting available or retrievable political, economic, social, and psychological resources.

The term 'strategy' derives indirectly from the Greek *strategos*, or general. In modern usage a comparable equivalent is *strategike episteme*, or generals' knowledge. Although the use of strategy is most frequent in connection with warfare, the concept permeates politics and other fields, where the logic remains the same. Strategy focuses on questions of how, when, and where and determines how the subsequent answers are interdependently formulated. Strictly speaking, it is understood as direct or indirect competition with others. Three broad forms can be identified: offensive, defensive, and deterrent. Offensive strategies pertain to seeking objectives actively

through initiative. Defensive strategies involve denying the accomplishment of the objectives of an opponent. Deterrent strategies aim to persuade an adversary to abandon pursuit of objectives in light of the estimated or perceived cost of such pursuit. Successful strategies may be informed by the politics, ethics, and culture of the context and the party responsible for development and implementation.

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Whenever strategy is less than fully realized it does not assess, continuously and comprehensively . . . all the factors that are likely to bear on the outcome of a conflict, and adjust the group's behavior to them in real time to achieve the best effect. To the extent that strategic assessment is present at all, so long as it remains unarticulated and inchoate it is unlikely to produce good guidance and optimal decisions.

Kruegler 1997: 515

See also **grand strategy** and **tactics**.

Structural violence

Embedded social and political hierarchies—enacted most often by societies and their institutions—that impose conditions which place people at high risk for negative consequences, such as unemployment, malnutrition, mental illness, suicide, crime, disease, and ill health. The sources of structural violence may be difficult to identify, but its results are normally visible.

During twelve years spent in South Africa after 1902, Mohandas K. Gandhi witnessed the impact that structural forms of violence could have on society: hunger, poverty, the oppression of women, the privilege of the few, and the powerlessness of the many. Observing pathological violence ingrained in societal structures—a structural exploitation more than intentional harm inflicted upon innocent victims by evil people—would fuel Gandhi's campaigns and underlie his insistence on the technique of non-violent resistance. For Gandhi, what he saw in South Africa highlighted the depths of institutionalised violence and persuaded him of the need for a procedure that could undermine such violence from within.

The concept of structural violence also hints at transactional relationships with other types of violence, such as domestic violence, sexual exploitation of children, and drug trafficking. These silent types of violence have a mutual effect on one another and often a disproportionate impact on marginalised populations.

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If sustained peace is the goal, conflict resolution in Africa must move beyond military response, and focus on addressing the root causes of conflict. At the most fundamental level, the absence of justice is frequently the principal reason for the absence of peace. Ethnic discrimination, denial of basic rights, extreme economic inequality and other manifestations of injustice are forms of ‘structural’ violence, [which] plants the seeds of physical violence and, in many cases, deadly conflict.

Cheru 2002: 204

Tactics

Limited and particular actions decided on short-term bases. In conflict situations, tactics refer to such actions during encounters with contending parties. If conducted efficiently, the choice of tactics will be informed by a strategy.

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Thus, it may be a strategic choice to use mass demonstrations and strikes to force a violent regime to recognize human rights standards, but it is a tactical choice to conduct certain demonstrations in a silent and dignified manner, as opposed to a boisterous or provocative one.

Kruegler 1997: 514

See also **grand strategy** and **strategy**.

Terrorism

Violent actions inflicted upon secondary targets that may be conducted by an individual, group, or government with the wider purpose of attracting attention, gaining support, or forcing concessions from the primary target on personal or political issues. Perpetrators of terrorism normally select, either purposefully or indiscriminately, illegitimate secondary targets—that is, non-combatants and civilians—and target them with bombings, hijackings, and other violently coercive methods. These targets are ‘intermediaries’ used by terrorists to manipulate the primary target and subsequently to achieve an objective. A dominant theory regarding terrorism holds that such actions are employed in expectation that a harsher reaction by the primary target will in turn generate support for the issues espoused by the terrorists.

Deriving from the Latin *terrere*, meaning ‘to frighten’, in a political sense terror was first used to describe the methods of the French revolutionary government against its adversaries. From September 1793 to July 1794, while embroiled in civil and foreign wars, the revolutionary government in France decided by decree to make ‘terror’ the order of the day and to use harsh reprisals against the aristocracy, priests, and other suspected enemies of the revolution. A wave of executions known as the Reign of Terror followed. Although states continue to employ terrorism, the concept of state terrorism is generally understood as a nation-state that supports or condones activities as described above, not one that conducts such operations.

Revolutionaries in czarist Russia first developed terrorism as a technique of waging war in the 1870s. The term ‘international terrorism’ denotes actions conducted by groups outside the country of their origin, residence, or the location from which their activities are co-ordinated. Terrorism primarily involves semi-clandestine groups opposed to their home government or an external one.

Terrorists have adopted numerous organisational structures, from single- or two-person operations to durable, identifiable groups or clandestine, solvent cells. Al-Qai‘da, or The Base, has developed a modern structure often described as a ‘network’, with the dispersion of affiliated but autonomous individuals over vast expanses of territory organised as ‘ sleeper cells’. Operating with minimal communications, the well-trained members of these cells are afforded the opportunity to rehearse, and then they disperse after completing their missions. Such factors necessitate greater time and effort in planning, but also make possible larger operations with higher mortalities.

Some groups that employ acts of terrorism reject the stigma attached to this method of conflict engagement that is widely considered illegitimate and egregious. This is especially true in cases where terrorism is one of several techniques employed and the overall objectives are widely believed to be legitimate and worthwhile. Nonetheless, the method usually overshadows the issues.

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Historically,] there were three principal objectives [of terrorism]. One was self-advertisement—what was called ‘Propaganda of the Deed’—to show the world that the group existed and was ruthless in its determination to achieve its ends. The second was to demoralise the government and its supporters. And the third was to provoke the government into such savage acts of suppression that it forfeited public support and awoke popular and international sympathy for the revolutionary cause. This was known as a ‘strategy of provocation’.

Howard 2001

For further reading, see John Richard Thackrah, *Dictionary of Terrorism*, 2nd edn, London, Routledge, 2004.

Treaty

A legally binding written agreement of mutual relations that is ratified by two or more nation-states or other internationally recognised subjects. Treaties are developed by co-operative production of drafts by authorized agents, adoption of a final text, authentication through designated signatories, ratification through respective constitutional procedures, and enactment as a binding force. International treaties today are legally founded on the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* (pacts made in good faith shall be observed). Outside international jurisprudence, treaties, particularly in Africa, once were enforced by the swearing of oaths.

Truth (and reconciliation) commission

A temporary fact-finding body that aims to elucidate past human rights violations and war crimes and address issues of reparation and rehabilitation. The ultimate objective of truth commissions is to create conditions that lead to healing from suffered losses or injuries and which foster stability and reconstruction. Such commissions are normally empowered to grant partial amnesty in exchange for full testimony by witnesses and suspects. To date, nineteen truth commissions have been established worldwide.

See also **reconciliation**.

Ubuntu

An endogenous philosophical perspective of South African peoples that connotes a collective responsibility among human beings to distribute naturally and spiritually the life force for common benefit. The term stems from *ntu*, ‘the life force that causes things to happen’, in the Bantu family of languages. Literally translated, *ubuntu* means ‘collective personhood’. Its meaning is captured by the Nguni proverb ‘umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu’ (I am because we are). In other words, human nature can only be realised through relationships with others. The ubuntu spirit is also based on a union of opposites that while maintaining their inherent contradictions are not exclusive, creating a unified and interconnected conception of human existence.

A sense of collective solidarity characterizes ubuntu through love, caring, tolerance, respect, empathy, accountability, and responsibility. Transgressions against this customary law are rarely enforced, but breaches have resulted in isolation, fines, and at times death. Ubuntu did not traditionally extend in practice to situations external to a given community. The past century, however, has evidenced an expansive application of the concept in South Africa, for example regarding debates on the death penalty and the 1995 Labour Relations Act. The term is making its way into juridical rulings, and its use is spreading northwards to other parts of the continent.

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Ubuntu is thus a celebration of being in its trinity of manifestation: the human, natural, and spiritual. Ubuntu is a life force that helps to maintain the equilibrium of forces natural, spiritual, and human in the community. Ubuntu is something that is internalised and should manifest itself in activities and attitudes such as respect, love, care, sharing, accountability, and responsibility. Due to the centrality of the other person in my own existence, it does not discriminate on the basis of race, gender, ability, or handicap. It accepts all persons as belonging to the community of the living.

Seleti n.d.

Values and norms

Values: characteristics of a person, object, behaviour, experience, or concept that imply intrinsic excellence, esteem, worth, or desirability. They are essentially preferences governed by individual choice, which, admittedly, is influenced by external factors. Personal values are constantly changing and adapting, and values that withstand fluctuations can become institutionalised by custom, tradition, or convention. Values might not be consciously articulated, but may strongly guide behaviours and conformity.

The social sciences have shown considerable interest in identifying and understanding values in two ways. First, theoretically speaking, knowing a group's values can offer insights for systematically documenting behaviours and patterns. Second, understanding why certain groups act or do not act in certain ways can be improved by the study of values, which can supply rational illumination for behaviours.

Norms: explicit prescriptions, or rules, for human (inter)actions or a recognised implicit pattern of behaviours that are 'normatively' driven. In either case, norms can develop spontaneously or through purposeful construction. Regardless, violations are usually subject to formal or informal sanctions. Most norms become accepted when adherence to them brings individuals some benefit, and subsequent imitation can eventually lead to institutionalisation. Whether the norm is formulated spontaneously or purposefully can be crucial. The former tends to benefit the society as a whole, while the latter tends to centralise enforcement. Rules can evolve into behavioural patterns, whereby the rule itself is forgotten, but such patterns need not be deliberately constructed.

Values and norms are important in the field of normative ethics – the study, exploration, and search for morally superior ways to act or live one's life. Values and norms should be distinguished from attitudes and beliefs, which do not necessarily carry normative valuations. Attitudes refer to emotions or sentiments that are generated based on experience or information. Beliefs are opinions or rationalised reflections filtered through facts, thoughts, or feelings. While individuals may act on the basis of specific attitudes or beliefs, they do not guide behaviour towards some ideal, proper, ethical, or appropriate manner. The field of normative research encompasses studies, investigations, and inquires concerning the nature and formation of values, norms, attitudes, and beliefs.

War

A mutually recognised, hostile exchange of actions among two or more parties (such as between or within nation-states) conducted by conventional military forces, paramilitary forces, or guerrillas to achieve respective policy objectives. Warfare assumes a degree of continuity until such objectives are accomplished or a party concedes or is defeated.

A state of war normally carries legal parameters governed by internationally recognised rules of engagement and conduct. For example, the initiation of war customarily requires some form of official or unofficial declaration, and conclusions to war are usually facilitated by formal agreements among the belligerents. Such declarations enable war to be 'officially' under way even when no military manoeuvres have been undertaken. In an effort to afford some minimum principles of humanity in relation to war, the Geneva Conventions, adopted in 1949 and augmented by the Geneva Protocol in 1977, outline conditions on the treatment of combatants, prisoners of war, and civilians; protection of medical and religious facilities and practitioners; and restrictions of certain types of weapons.

Encounters in war may assume a range of forms and employ various types of weapons, depending on the capacities of the parties to the hostilities. Examples include the use of nuclear, chemical, and conventional arsenals, among many others. Explanations and justifications for war have led to numerous categorisations and terms, for example 'total war', 'civil war', 'ethnic war', 'proxy war', and 'wars of self-determination'.

Historical trends in warfare are changing: human, environmental, and economic costs are rising along with the number of civilian casualties. The geographic areas involved in actual battles are widening, and the number of battles per year is increasing. On average, however, wars are becoming shorter. The absolute size of armies is increasing, as well as their size relative to their respective general populations. Lower proportions of combatants are injured, with a concurrent rise in the casualties of civilians. Also, wars now spread to additional belligerents more swiftly than in the past. Since World War II, the frequency of 'low-intensity' conflicts, revolutions, counter-revolutions, and proxy wars has risen.



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It is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire. . . . If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after-effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war.

Liddell Hart 1991: 353

See also **war crimes**.

War crimes

Violations of the laws of war or recognised customs and conventions for the engagement or conclusion of them. Most war crimes are perpetrated against non-combatant and civilian populations and include murder, torture, deportation, rape, the taking of hostages, and forced labour. Such acts are also considered war crimes when perpetrated upon prisoners of war and refugees. In addition, war crimes include plundering, unjustified destruction of public or private property, the use of certain weapons, and improper usage of symbols of truce.

Although trials for war crimes date back at least to the fifteen century under the Holy Roman Empire, the most comprehensive (though incomplete) modern definition of war crimes is outlined in Article 6 of the 1945 Charter of the International Military Tribunal. It sets forth two categories: crimes against humanity and crimes against peace. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, held during 1945 and 1946 to prosecute Germans for their role in World War II, refined the definition of such acts and illustrated their criminality. Conducted on an ad hoc basis, this tribunal was dissolved immediately following the announcement of its conclusions, having found several men guilty and imposing the death penalty on them. Since then, capital punishment has been replaced in favour of imprisonment. Accused war criminals must be granted a fair trial under supranational or national juridical pronouncements. In this sense, the Nuremberg Tribunal set the stage for the intensive efforts to create an international criminal court with jurisdiction over all war crimes. Nonetheless, indictment on the supranational level does not preclude proceedings before national justice systems.

See also **genocide**.

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

Any weapon capable of horrific human or material destruction. Weapons of mass destruction may be nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological. The acronym abc is sometimes used to refer specifically to atomic, biological, and chemical weapons. The term 'weapons of mass destruction' is literally translated from Russian. Since its inception into the English language, it has remained vague, imprecise, and ambiguous.

Zero-sum game

A situation where the gains of one party are inversely related to the losses of another party. In other words, as one side benefits, the other side proportionally suffers. At the extreme, zero-sum, or 'win-lose', outcomes produce a completely victorious party and an utterly defeated party. The pursuit of zero-sum strategies places parties in direct competition with one another, encourages egoistic behaviour, and limits the prospects for cooperation.

See also **game theory**, **negative-sum outcome**, and **positive-sum outcome**.

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
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
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