




Routledge



MODERN  
SOUTH  
ASIA

**History, Culture, Political Economy**

SUGATA BOSE AND AYESHA JALAL

**Also available as a printed book  
see title verso for ISBN details**

## Modern South Asia

The South Asian subcontinent is home to nearly a billion people and has been the site of fierce historical contestation. It is a panoply of languages and religions with a rich and complex history and culture.

Drawing on the newest and most sophisticated historical research and scholarship in the field, *Modern South Asia* is written in an accessible style for all those with an intellectual curiosity about the region. After sketching the pre-modern history of the subcontinent, the book concentrates on the last three centuries from *c.* 1700 to the present. Jointly written by two leading Indian and Pakistani historians, it offers a rare depth of historical understanding of the politics, cultures and economies that shape the lives of more than a fifth of humanity.

In this comprehensive study, the authors debate and challenge the striking developments in contemporary South Asian history and historical writing. The book provides new insights into the structure and ideology of the British raj, the meaning of subaltern resistance, the refashioning of social relations along lines of caste, class, community and gender, the different strands of anti-colonial nationalism and the dynamics of decolonization.

This book is a work of synthesis and interpretation covering the entire spectrum of modern South Asian history — social, economic and political. The authors offer an understanding of the sophisticated historiography of this strategically and economically vital part of the world.

**Sugata Bose** is Professor of History and Diplomacy and Director of the Center of South Asian and Indian Ocean Studies, Tufts University, USA.  
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# MODERN SOUTH ASIA

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History, Culture, Political Economy

SUGATA BOSE  
and  
AYESHA JALAL



London and New York

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*For*  
*Sehr Jalal*  
*Naira Minto*  
*Asim Jalal*  
*Aidan Samya Bose Rosling (Tipu Sultan)*  
*Kieran Shaurya Bose Rosling (Tunku)*  
*and through their hands*  
*to the younger generation*



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## Preface

**T**imes of commemoration can occasion fresh ways of rethinking the past. And 1997 seemed as good a moment as any other to bring together the myriad threads of modern South Asian history, pause and reconsider, while taking account of the more important findings of recent historical research. The shifting parameters of scholarly debate on South Asian historiography, with the unfolding of the process of decolonization of the mind, need to be placed before a broader audience. In deciding to put together a general history of the South Asian subcontinent, the audience we had foremost in our minds was the younger generation of South Asians and students interested in South Asia. That is why we have chosen to dedicate this book to our nieces and nephews and through their hands to the next generation. We hope of course that our book will engage interested non-specialists, of whatever generation, curious about South Asian history.

Our deepest debt in writing this book is to our students at Columbia University and Tufts University who heard earlier versions of our arguments in the form of lectures. Their queries as well as occasional incomprehension have greatly helped to sharpen and clarify our interpretation of complex historical processes and events. Interactions with our doctoral students, Ritu Birla, Semanti Ghosh, Farina Mir, Mridu Rai, Shabnum Tejani and Chitralkha Zutshi, have militated against oversimplification. Farina Mir and Shabnum Tejani at Columbia and Semanti Ghosh and Chitralkha Zutshi at Tufts have served as our teaching assistants and contributed to the finer points of our text. Stephen Frug brought to our attention Auden's poem 'Partition'.

We are grateful to a number of our colleagues for reading the manuscript in whole or in part and making invaluable comments.



Kumkum Roy cast an eye over our chapter on ancient India while Muzaffar Alam and Mridu Rai scrutinized the three chapters dealing with the period from *c.* 700 to *c.* 1800. Christopher Bayly did a critical reading of the entire manuscript and made a number of apt suggestions. David Washbrook also read the manuscript through and toasted its success even before it was published. We benefited from the comments on our proposal by the four readers for Routledge. The two anonymous readers for Oxford University Press made perhaps the most astute comments on the pages of an earlier version of the manuscript. We would not have got our manuscript ready without the prodding encouragement of Rukun Advani of OUP Delhi — from which press has appeared some of the best recent research on modern South Asian history. The enthusiasm of Heather McCallum at Routledge was a source of confidence, while Bela Malik at OUP Delhi competently attended to the editorial task of getting the manuscript ready for the printers.

Once more we have to thank our families for their continued and warm support of our scholarly endeavours. We would like to thank each other for choosing the path of negotiation rather than war when it came to addressing disputes and disagreements in the course of writing this book. It is our hope that this work will encourage more dialogues across the great divide of 1947. Our contribution to the fiftieth anniversary of Independence and Partition will have been made if it enables the opening of an intellectual and cultural corridor stretching from Lahore to Calcutta.

AYESHA JALAL

SUGATA BOSE

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## Chapter 1

# South Asian History: An Introduction

**T**he very idea of India, and not just its wealth and wisdom, has been the site of fierce historical contestation. G.W.F. Hegel, the famous German philosopher, gave a not untypical nineteenth-century description of India as an object of desire:

From the most ancient times downwards, all nations have directed their wishes and longings to gaining access to the treasures of this land of marvels, the most costly which the Earth presents; treasures of Nature — pearls, diamonds, perfumes, rose-essences, elephants, lions, etc. — as also treasures of wisdom. The way by which these treasures have passed to the West, has at all times been a matter of World-historical importance, bound up with the fate of nations.

He added approvingly, ‘the English, or rather the East-India Company are the lords of the land; for it is the necessary fate of Asiatic Empires to be subjected to Europeans . . .’ In the early twentieth century Gandhi lamented in his tract *Hind Swaraj*: ‘the English have not taken India; we have given it to them. They are not in India because of their strength but because we keep them . . . Recall the Company Bahadur. Who made it Bahadur . . . it is truer to say that we gave India to the English than that India was lost.’

The battle to win India back was waged not only on the political plane but also in the realm of ideas. A turn-of-the-century Indian nationalist Bipin Chandra Pal, in a book called *The Soul of India*, delved back into ancient history in attempting to question the Western definition of India: ‘while the stranger called her India, or the land of the Indus, thereby emphasizing only her strange physical features, her own children, from of old, have known and loved her by another name . . . that name is Bharatavarsha’. This name, deriving from

the ancient king-of-kings Bharata, Pal claimed, was ‘not a physical name like India or the Transvaal, nor even a tribal and ethnic name like England or Aryavarta, but a distinct and unmistakable historic name like Rome.’ India may have been a name given by foreigners, but its emotive appeal came to be internalized by many inhabitants of this land. The ancient Persians and Arabs referred to the land beyond the river Sindhu or Indus as Al-Hind or Hindustan, and the people inhabiting that land as Hindu. The words India and Indian were simply Greek, Roman, and finally English versions of the old Persian terminology. It was only gradually that the term Hindu came to be associated with the followers of a particular religious faith as a matter of convenience since the ‘Hindus’ did not deploy a single term to define their religion. A leading twentieth-century Muslim poet writing in Urdu had no difficulty celebrating Hindustan as his own: Mohammad Iqbal in his ‘Tarana-i-Hindi’ (The Anthem of Hind) of 1904 extolled the virtues of his homeland:

*Sarey jahan sey achhaa, ye Hindustan hamara*  
*Hum bulbulen hain iske, ye gulsitan hamara*  
 (Better than the whole world is our Hindustan  
 We are its singing birds, it is our garden of delights)

Iqbal later became one of the foremost proponents of a homeland for India’s Muslims. On the eve of partition in 1947 Mohammad Ali Jinnah, widely acknowledged as the founder of this homeland, wrote indignantly about ‘the wholly unwarranted assumption that Pakistan would be an area seceding from the Indian state’, arguing that there could be no union of India without the Muslim-majority areas of the subcontinent. In the fifty years since independence and partition the political and ideational contests among its own people for proprietorship over the soul of the subcontinent have, if anything, greatly intensified.

It is not unusual for people burdened by history in their own contexts to be transformed into people without history in others. Given the tendency towards the ‘essentializing’ of India by western orientalisks over the past two centuries, it is no surprise that in the Western popular consciousness the Indian subcontinent tends to evoke two contrary images. On the one hand it is lauded as an ancient land of mystery and romance, extraordinary wealth and profound spirituality. On the other it is denounced for its irrationality

and inhumanity and derided for its destitution and squalor. Even after the maharaja of old had been reduced to a caricature in the advertisement of India's national airline, television audiences in both Britain and the United States were entranced during the 1980s by the nostalgia of India's final fling with the British raj. Yet one has only to switch from the channel showing soap opera to the one showing the news to find the coveted jewel in the crown portrayed as a veritable crucible of calamity, confusion and chaos. Stark poverty replaces the vision of India's grandeur, religious strife rudely disturbs the calm of otherworldly meditation, and fierce violence unleashed by both man and nature seem to make a mockery of the peaceful messages of a Buddha or a Gandhi. Both images, whether optimistically fanciful or pejoratively stereotypical, stem from an inability to understand or comprehend, far less explain, the enormous complexities of South Asia.

The subcontinent defies piecemeal approaches much the same way as the proverbial elephant confounded the blind men in the famous story by the Muslim sufi poet Jalaluddin Rumi. When made to touch different parts of the elephant's anatomy, each of the blind men described it according to the part of the body his hands had touched. So to one blind man the elephant appeared like a throne, to others like a fan, a water pipe and even a pillar. No one could imagine what the whole animal looked like. This book promises to present a view of India with the blindfolds off. A recourse to history is indispensable in order to broaden perspective and sharpen focus. A single volume on the complex history of the subcontinent can only offer a glimpse of its richness and nuance, but with a good angle of vision it could be a penetrating and insightful glimpse.

What then is this Indian subcontinent — or South Asia — as it has come to be known in more recent and neutral parlance — whose history will be interpreted in this book? Both South Asia and India are in origin geographical expressions. South Asia is a more recent construction — only about five decades old — which today encompasses seven diverse sovereign states of very different sizes: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives. Some would also include Myanmar, which as Burma was a province of British India until 1935. The term India, as we have seen, is of much older origin. What South Asia lacks in historical depth, it makes up for in political neutrality. The terms South Asia and India refer in the first instance to a vast geographical space

stretching from the Himalayan mountain ranges in the north to the Indian ocean in the south and from the valley of the Indus in the west to the plains of the Brahmaputra in the east. This huge geographical expanse has become home to a teeming population numbering nearly a billion people who account for over a fifth or, to be more precise, 23 per cent of humanity. The subcontinent carries the weight not only of its people but also of their ancient history, stretching back five millennia, and a modern history encompassing the experience of British colonialism compressed in tumultuous developments within the past couple of centuries.

It is a commonplace in any introduction to South Asian history to expound on the cliché about the region's unity in diversity. It may be more appropriate to characterize South Asia and its peoples as presenting a picture of diversity in unity, indeed of immense diversity within a very broad contour of unity. The geographical boundaries drawn by the highest mountain ranges in the world and encircling seas and oceans set the whole of the subcontinent apart from the rest of the world. Yet within these boundaries there is great diversity in natural attributes — imposing hills and mountains, lush green river plains, arid deserts and brown plateaus. People inhabiting such a clearly defined, yet diverse, region have evolved a shared cultural ambience, but at the same time are deeply attached to distinctive cultural beliefs and practices. The people of South Asia speak at least twenty major languages, and if one includes the more important dialects the count rises to over two hundred. Adherents to every major world religion are to be found in the subcontinent. The majority of the population of India are Hindu, but they are distinguished along lines of language and caste. Each of the three most populous countries in South Asia — India, Bangladesh and Pakistan — has well over a hundred million Muslims. India was also the birthplace of Buddhism, even though formal believers in this religious faith have dwindled in the land of its birth. The region also contains significant Christian, Sikh and other religious minorities. How do we begin to address the long and complex history of the people of this subcontinent?

### **The Scope of this Book**

Over the millennia South Asia developed rich and complex layers of culture which, during recent centuries, had a dramatic historical

encounter with the West. This is a book on modern history, concentrating on the problem of change in society, economy and politics from *circa* 1700 to the present in subcontinental South Asia — mainly present-day India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Three background chapters unravelling the more important features of India's pre-colonial history set the stage for a detailed treatment of British colonialism in India and its aftermath. A focus on the colonial period does not entail missing out on South Asia's pre-colonial heritage, since much of India's 'tradition' was recast, if not reinvented, during the colonial era, a process analysed in some detail in this book. But in order to grasp the issue of continuity and change under colonialism this book shifts the emphasis away from the concerns and imperatives of the imperial masters. Colonial initiatives in and of themselves cannot encapsulate the complex and at times largely autonomous and certainly contestatory dynamics which moulded relationships in Indian society, economy and polity. Colonialism as an agency of historical change is placed in its appropriate social context and studied in its interplay with the culture and politics of anti-colonial resistance.

### **The Themes of this Book**

The enormous difficulty in fashioning a balanced yet insightful approach to the study of modern South Asia is reflected in the yawning gap between a few general histories and the large number of research monographs and scholarly articles published over the last two decades. The general works that do exist are no more than one-dimensional sketches of the metaphorical Indian elephant, while the more in-depth and sophisticated research has dissected discrete parts of its complex anatomy. The challenge before us is to find a good perspective for a multi-dimensional, high-definition overview of modern South Asian history in the pages of a single book.

South Asian historiography has achieved a remarkable level of depth and sophistication in the past twenty years. This book is a work of synthesis and interpretation covering the entire spectrum of modern South Asian history — cultural, economic, political and social — that seeks to take full account of striking new developments in the field. A number of major themes have emerged in recent historical research which need to be placed within a general context.



Among these have been the role of intermediate social groups in the construction of the British raj and that of 'subaltern' social groups in anti-colonial resistance; the part played by the colonial state in the reinvention of communal and caste categories; the refashioning of social relations of class by the linking of Indian economic regions to wider capitalist systems; and the impact of the interplay between national, communal and regional levels of politics on the process of decolonization. Various works on these themes have differed in their relative emphasis on the affinities or contradictions of class and caste, religion and language, nation and region, community and gender, economics and politics, and so on. The 'subaltern studies' group, for instance, began with a political conception of class before going on to stress culture and consciousness over economics and politics as explanatory variables. The more insightful contributions of not only schools of historiography but individual scholars need to be weighed and placed into a broader and more meaningful framework for the study of modern South Asia history.

A meaningful framework for conceiving the history of modern South Asia on a subcontinental scale may be provided by the twin dialectics of centralism and regionalism, and of nationalism and communalism, so long as there is a keen awareness of the historically shifting definitions of and relationships between centre, region, nation and community. This is of the essence if we are to establish the contours of both the idea and the structure of India or South Asia on the basis of an analysis of the relationship of its constituent parts to the whole. Once this is done it becomes possible at the central and regional levels, and within the arenas of nation and community, to probe relations of power along lines of class and gender. As the different parts and the whole of South Asia became more organically linked to a wider capitalist world from the early nineteenth century, critical alterations took place in social relations within the subcontinent. These occurred not only along the axis of class but were refracted through a myriad of social and cultural relationships, including those of caste and community as well as gender and generation. These social and cultural relationships were not only inheritances from the past but were in the process of constant renegotiation and reformulation during the colonial era. Religious strife in contemporary India, for example, has little to do with any supposed ancient religious divide between Hindu and Muslim and cannot be explained without understanding the invention of

communally-defined political categories in the early twentieth century, or the historically dynamic dialectic between communal and provincial as well as religious and linguistic identities.

### **Post-Colonial, Post-Modern, Post-Orientalist and Post-Structural Historical Perspectives**

Among the latest concerns exercising the minds of historians in the academy these days is the challenge of writing histories unfettered by the construct of the modern nation-state. Historians of the South Asian subcontinent have been the most prominent knight-errants in the intellectual endeavour to rescue history from the fetters of the nation. In attempting to do so, some influential strands of South Asian historiography run the risk of chaining it to an unspecified and under-theorized, but over-deployed, category of the community. This retreat into the communitarian mode of historical writing is matched by decentering projects and anti-foundationalist critiques which, in the name of avoiding the snare of metanarratives, would have historians in effect take a vow of silence about global structures of domination. Our interpretative work is based on the premise that it is possible to write critical histories of capitalism and colonialism in South Asia and elucidate the nature of anti-colonial resistance in other than the purely fragmentary mode of historical writing.

The earlier moorings of South Asian historiography have been profoundly shaken by the swirling intellectual currents most commonly identified by the 'post' prefix. These post-modern, post-structural, post-orientalist and post-colonial perspectives have together subverted most of the modernist certitudes, structural rigidities, orientalist stereotypes and colonial vanities that had afflicted South Asian history. The philosophy underlying area studies as it evolved in the USA and to a lesser extent in Europe conspired to compartmentalize the study of areas, such as South Asia, South East Asia, East Asia and West Asia (still referred to as the Middle East in the Western academy), often infusing them with spurious, ahistorical 'religious' and 'cultural' essences, and denying people of these regions their agency in the making of history. The contribution made by post-Orientalist and post-colonial histories, by trespassing across disciplinary frontiers in restoring the subjecthood of subaltern and marginal actors, has been therefore an altogether welcome development. South Asian history had in some ways been

more insular than the rest, constraining its ability to invigorate broader historical arguments. Scholarship on other areas had occasionally managed to break free of the deadweight of modernization theory that burdened area studies to make fresh theoretical interventions on problems — such as the moral economy of the peasant in South East Asia, and science and the sociology of knowledge in East Asia. South Asia's day in the western sun came with the discovery of post-coloniality. Soon enough there emerged signs of hubris in the post-marked histories as well as increasing unease, tension and distance in their relationship with other, often older, radical challenges to historiographical orthodoxies. It had been possible for historians until the mid 1980s to write confidently and concernedly about peasants and labourers in colonial Asia as human beings who lived, worked and died in the context of a political economy of capitalist development that was not especially kind to them. That was before we learnt that rural labourers were produced by colonial discourse, and that to utter the phrase 'capitalist development' was to hopelessly succumb to its totalizing power.

The last decade has witnessed a significant shift in historiographical fashion from politics towards discourse, economies towards identities, materiality towards culture, class towards community. Accompanying this shift has been a tendency to celebrate the indigenous authenticity of South Asian religions and cultures in sharp opposition to the universalist claims of European reason, science, modernity and development. Not everyone, of course, chose to subscribe to the fashion of the decade. But their contributions have not always been duly acknowledged in the historiographical literature. In the field of South Asian history the subalternist collective led by Ranajit Guha undoubtedly made an immense impact in highlighting the role of subordinated social groups in anti-colonial resistance. Yet both before and after their intervention, many individual historians and social scientists wrote thoughtful and original works on Asian peasant and labour history and addressed the issue of subalternity along lines of class, caste, community and gender. Histories of the kind written by C.A. Bayly, focussing on intermediate social groups such as merchants and service gentry, transformed our understanding of the transition to colonialism and the part played by the colonial state in the reinvention of hierarchy and tradition. New insights were gained into the refashioning of social structures and relations by the linking of economic regions

within South Asia to wider capitalist systems. Our understanding of decolonization in South Asia was deepened by analyses of the interplay between the national, communal and regional levels, and arenas of politics based on an approach that did not divorce the study of communitarian narratives from processes of state formation.

Prior to the appearance of Edward Said's searing critique of 'orientalism' in 1978, the site of culture had been one of the happiest hunting grounds of anthropologists working on South Asian societies. Anxious not to be tarred by the orientalist brush, a good segment of cultural anthropology reinvented itself in the 1980s as a new historical anthropology with the professed intention of exposing the nexus between culture and power. Yet misinterpreting Said's attack on a spurious comparative method which enabled the occident to brand the orient as the realm of the irrational, the unscientific and the inferior, these historical anthropologists and anthropological historians ended up committing two grave fallacies. First, they failed to notice the dissonance and polyvalence within colonial discourse as it developed over time, and they imbued it with an ahistorical, monolithic quality. Second, they drew a sharp dichotomy based on a championing of otherness that posed the innocence of local culture against the cunning of universal reason. This also led to a privileging of particular kinds of textualized and oral sources of indigenous knowledge and the abandonment towards them of a critical stance which seemed reserved only for the colonial archives, even as the latter continued to be used as the main repository of the former. The works of historical anthropology that emerged from this re-education and re-orientation were more concerned with cultural representation than political practice and paved the way for the reified notion of irreconcilable cultural difference between Europe and Asia.

It was precisely when the post-structural and post-colonial historical scholarship of *Subaltern Studies* came to be championed by the post-modern and post-orientalist historical anthropology of North America that its radical edge seemed to get blunted. The problem did not stem, as is often asserted, from the invasion of history by the forces of literary and cultural criticism. The insights into post-orientalism and post-colonialism provided by Edward Said and Gayatri Spivak, when drawn with sensitivity to historical complexity and context, have invigorated South Asian historiography.

What has also emerged, however, in the name of post-coloniality is a sweeping critique of an ill-defined modernity and flowing from it a deep scepticism of the nation-state, of development as its legitimizing ideology, and of the justificatory values of science and reason. Since post-colonial nation-states in many instances inherited the centralized structure of colonial predecessors along with their unitary concept of sovereignty, intellectually honest historians are right in wanting to be free of their shackles. Yet arguments about cultural specificities and different modernities in South Asia come uncomfortably close to being deployed in favour of a form of socially conservative exclusivism which, in denying the encroachment of universalisms, ends up turning specificity into a value meriting uncritical acclaim. More important, the invitation to resist globalization on the part of some post-colonial intellectuals comes after the prospects of the political practice of resistance have been disabled by their deafening silence on economic and political structures that have a global reach, and their decision to operate in a purely communitarian or fragmentary mode. Exulting over the fragment not only erases the individual and leaves class and gender iniquities within the fragment unscathed, but presents little threat to the managers of global capital as well as of centralized post-colonial states. Capital and community, far from being antagonistic forces, have been more often than not deeply imbricated in modern history.

Surely it should be possible to maintain a critical, intellectual stance towards the homogenizing and hegemonizing tendencies of the centralized, colonial and post-colonial nation-states without sliding into mindless anti-statism. A sceptical attitude towards reductionist mega-science surely does not require negating the potential of harnessing science in reducing material deprivation. Questioning the arrogance of the votaries of universal reason need not be premised on a false binary between reason and religion. And taking a stand against the culturally insensitive blockbuster projects of development and the empty boasts of development discourse ought not blind us towards historicizing development as a site of contestation with possibilities of appropriation, resistance and reversal. The adoption of these sharp yet balanced perspectives would not have been so difficult if post-colonial scholarship had not compromised with post-modernism and refused to acknowledge that global capitalism and local communitarianism were locked not

in an adversarial but a dialectical relationship. Not just development regimes of nation-states, it must be remembered, but the top echelons of the regime of globalized capital, to borrow a phrase from David Ludden, 'hire historians to make themselves look good'. In addressing the problem of resistance the newest cultural and historical anthropology of South Asia has spoken of ethnographic refusal. What is really called for is unambiguous historiographical refusal, a stern refusal on the part of autonomous intellectuals to do the bidding of the economic structures of power that silently envelop them. The very definition of the intellectual as 'someone whose whole being is staked on a critical sense', as Edward Said puts it, is at issue.

How does our own location in what has been termed the post-modern era shape our perspectives on modern history? Despite a firm rejection of the weak thought and dubious politics inherent in a particular brand of post-modernism, we believe it is important to recognize that the march of history has left some of the certitudes of high modernism by the wayside. A modern history of modern South Asia would have confidently tracked the unilinear emergence of the nation-state in the political domain, the teleological path of capitalist (or socialist) development in the economic sphere, and the slow but sure triumph of modernity over anachronistic, traditional social bonds and values. The cracking and crumbling of the modern nation-state system, the disintegration of the socialist alternative, the disillusionment with the false promises of capitalism, and the resurgence of redefined social identities thought to have been obliterated by the steam-roller of modernization have all rendered interpretations of the modern era in South Asian and world history much more complex. Along with a greater sensitivity to difference and distinctiveness, the spotlight has been shifting towards the fragmentary parts rather than the monolithic whole of modern social, economic and political structures. Yet the intellectual breakaway from modernist dogma may have swung a little too far towards the fissures and away from the fusions which formed an equally important aspect of the historical process. A recourse to South Asian history where the dialectic between union and partition, centripetal and centrifugal tendencies, are dramatically played out may well enable a much-needed decentred balance in our current, disoriented, scholarly predicament.

## Chapter 2

# Modernity and Antiquity: Interpretations of Ancient India

Rabindranath Tagore, modern India's most celebrated poet, informed Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi in 1939 that he could identify only two 'modernists' among India's national leaders. Even these two rare embodiments of 'modernism' were deeply attached to their country's ancient heritage. In his book *The Discovery of India* Jawaharlal Nehru took solace in 'the continuity of a cultural tradition through five thousand years of history' which made the 180 years of British rule in India seem like 'just one of the unhappy interludes in her long story'. And on the opening page of *The Indian Struggle* Subhas Chandra Bose emphasized two features critical to an understanding of India: first, its history had to be 'reckoned not in decades or in centuries but in thousands of years'; and second, only under British rule India 'for the first time in her history had begun to feel that she had been conquered.' The mission of an independent India, therefore, should be to deliver to the world a rich 'heritage' that had been preserved from past ages.

A heritage five millennia old, containing multiple layers and strands of cultural influence and assimilation, was bound to be a very complex one and open to many interpretations. There were many individuals and social groups other than the 'modernist' national leaders ready and eager to offer their versions of India's lengthy and intricate past. Among them were British orientalists and Indian traditionalists and revivalists, Hindu as well as Muslim, each possessing an implicit if not explicit political agenda. Occasionally there were unlikely convergences, as was exemplified by the shared view of nineteenth-century European scholars and Gandhian utopians, of self-sufficient and happy village communities somewhere in the subcontinent's lost golden age. The plethora



1. *The Presence of the Past*. A Hindu Village in Punjab, Pakistan.  
(Courtesy Ayesha Jalal.)

of theories and fanciful evocations of tradition undoubtedly complicate the modern historian's task of interpreting South Asia's pre-modern history. The best that can be done is to carefully sift the extant evidence and be alert to the uses made of old evidence by earlier interpreters. What can be discarded straightaway is the undue and ahistorical privileging of religion in the periodization of Indian history adopted by historians of the colonial era. There are no grounds for branding the ancient, medieval and modern phases of the subcontinent's long and complex history as Hindu, Muslim and British periods.

It was in this century, in 1922 to be exact, that the age of Indian history was suddenly extended by a millennium and a half. Archaeological excavations unearthed the ruins of a quite stunning civilization in the Indus valley region, with two key urban centres at Harappa and Mohenjodaro. Its location in present-day Pakistan has



placed the onerous responsibility of preserving the remains of a heritage dated to *c.* 3000 BC on a state barely half a century old. Drawing subsistence from the rich agricultural tracts of the Indus river, the people of Harappa and Mohenjodaro had achieved a highly sophisticated level of urban culture. The immaculateness of their urban planning of streets and drainage might put some of the modern cities of South Asia to shame. Artefacts found at the excavation sites indicate the existence of long-distance trade with that other great ancient civilization — Mesopotamia. The Indus valley possessed a literate culture. But scholars are still struggling to decipher the script that was used. The images recovered suggest that the Indus people may have worshipped the mother goddess and venerated the bull — both powerful symbols of fertility. Although both these icons reappear in later phases of Indian civilization, no unbroken line of continuity with the Indus valley era can be traced. The prosperity of the region came to an apparently calamitous end well before the civilization of the Vedic age struck root in the plains of that other great Himalayan river — the Ganga.

Although there is substantial archaeological evidence on neolithic and chalcolithic cultures, especially in central India, relatively little scholarly attention has been given to the original inhabitants of India outside the Indus valley region until the age of the so-called Aryans, beginning around 1500 BC. The nineteenth-century ethnic definition of the Aryans has been effectively debunked by recent scholarship. They are now more accurately seen to be a linguistic rather than racial group whose speech adhered to the common core of Indo-European languages. Clues about the society, economy and politics of these Indo-Aryan settlers are to be found in the Vedas. The first and most important of the Vedas, the *Rig Veda*, was composed before 1000 BC. The great epics — the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata* — may contain some references to historical events that occurred between 1000 and 700 BC, but since the versions available to us are dated to the Gupta age (the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian era), they need to be cross-checked against other, especially archaeological evidence. It was during the Vedic period that the Indo-Aryans appear to have made the transition from nomadic pastoralism to settled agriculture in the Gangetic plain, even though settled agriculture was practised in different parts of the subcontinent even earlier. The political organization of the early Indo-Aryans appears to have had a strong democratic element,

with popular assemblies known as *sabha*, and more select gatherings known as *samiti*. Even after the Vedic age, republican forms of government seem to have been more pervasive than kingdoms. But with the expansion of political scale there was a noticeable drift towards monarchical forms. Kingdoms arose in the Gangetic heartland while republics proved to be more resilient along the outer rims of Indo-Aryan settlements.

Vedic society developed and elaborated upon an inherited Indo-European model of a tripartite social structure consisting of warriors, priests, and a third large group comprising agriculturists, traders and cattle-raisers. The first mention of the famous caste system which has mesmerized generations of Indologists is to be found in a single reference in the *Rig Veda* which lists four *varna*, literally meaning colour, but having an applied meaning closer to social orders. The four castes in order of hierarchy were the Brahmans (priests, or the sacerdotal elite), the Kshatriyas (warriors), the Vaishyas (originally encompassing both agricultural and merchant groups) and the Shudras (providers of menial labour). The Purusha Sukta verse in the *Rig Veda* describes the emergence of the Brahmans from the face of Purusha, the cosmic man, the Kshatriyas from his arms, the Vaishyas from his thighs, and the hapless Shudras from his feet. In time, only the traders and richer landowners could aspire to Vaishya status, while the bulk of the working peasantry fell into the Shudra rank. Caste by *varna* merely provided a theoretical scaffolding to peg different strata of social status. In reality caste by *jati*, literally birth, which included numerous subcastes originally classified by occupation, was far more relevant to social practice. Recent research has suggested that the origins of caste in south India did not quite fit into the *varna-jati* scheme elaborated in the north. Early mobility between occupational subcastes was soon restricted, however, and the *Upanishad*, the teachings appended to the end of the Vedic texts around the eighth and seventh centuries BC, provided an eschatological justification of the rigidity of caste status in the doctrine of karma. Caste in the present life was determined in this scheme of things by the quality of actions in a previous incarnation.

On the issue of gender, Indo-Aryan society tended to glorify womanhood in theory but cast women into all inferior role in social practice, generally excluding them from the public domain. There appears to have been a further deterioration of women's position

after the Vedic period. In the great epic the *Mahabharata* the main female character Draupadi is portrayed as a possession, if not a pawn, in the conflict between two male-dominated clans — the Pandavas and the Kauravas. Only a few passages, including a forceful speech delivered by Draupadi when she escapes humiliation through the divine intervention of Krishna, suggest that there was some consciousness as well of the iniquity and injustice to which women were subjected. In the *Ramayana*, too, the kingdom of Ayodhya is depicted as a patriarchy and Rama's wife, Sita, finally has to ask Mother Earth to take her back to save her from further humiliation by the king's subjects.

The Vedic religion was at one level a sophisticated version of animism. Its pantheon consisted of powerful natural forces — Indra, a thunderbolt-wielding warrior being the king among them — which were all personified and elevated to the status of gods to be placated by mere mortals. But the Vedic texts also had at the very end a mystical and metaphysical section — the *Upanishad*— which clearly enunciates the notion of a Supreme Being, referred to as Brahma. The Upanishadic theory of salvation or *moksha* expounds on the merging of the individual soul Atman with the oversoul Brahma, a merger which also signifies release from the cycle of rebirths. This philosophy was quite distinct from the much later mythology about the triumvirate — Brahma the creator, Vishnu the preserver, and Shiva the destroyer of this universe.

The teachings of the *Upanishad* passed into the realm of high philosophy and became divorced from day-to-day religious and social practices. The Indo-Aryan social order dominated by the Brahman caste came under serious and widespread challenge from the sixth century BC. The two most influential social and religious movements of this era were launched by Gautama Buddha and Mahavira (founder of the Jain faith). Both had belonged to the Kshatriya caste and came from republics on the periphery of the Gangetic plain. Buddhism and Jainism questioned caste, especially Brahmanical social orthodoxy, and shunned elaborate Vedic rituals. Buddhism, which later spread far and wide from India to other parts of Asia, called for a new ethical conception of human affairs. In the Buddha's view human life was full of suffering. The only means to escape this suffering was to follow the eight-fold path consisting of right views, resolves, speech, conduct, livelihood, effort, recollection and meditation, which together constituted the middle

way or a balanced and harmonious way of life. Perfection along this path would finally lead to release from the cycle of rebirths and the attainment of nirvana. The Buddhist concept of nirvana is subtly different from the Upanishadic concept of moksha. The Buddha made no mention in his teachings of God or a supreme being. So, while moksha represented union with Brahma or a supreme being, nirvana was simply a blissful transcendental state beyond human rebirths.

The Buddhist aversion to individual personality was later qualified when followers of the faith split into two major schools some six hundred years after Buddha had passed from the world. The Theravada, or old school, also referred to as Hinayana (the lesser vehicle), was more orthodox and true to the original teachings of the Buddha. The Mahayana (the greater vehicle) school of Buddhism began to venerate the individual personality of the Buddha, and also a number of Bodhisattvas who could be loosely defined as Buddhist saints. The Bodhisattvas were those who had so perfected their lives that they were eligible for nirvana but stopped short at its threshold to reach out a guiding hand to suffering humanity. With the establishment of the Mahayana school, images and statues of the Buddha and Bodhisattvas were made for the first time in the Gandhara region of north-western India. Theravada Buddhism eventually took hold in Sri Lanka, Burma and Thailand, while Mahayana Buddhism spread from Kashmir to China, Japan and northern Vietnam.

The political history of the centuries following the rise of Buddhism and Jainism saw the emergence and consolidation of powerful regional states in northern India. Among the strongest of these was the kingdom of Magadha with its capital at Pataliputra (near the modern city of Patna). The Magadhan kingdom expanded under the Maurya dynasty in the fourth and third centuries BC to become an empire which embraced almost the whole of the subcontinent. The dynasty was founded by Chandragupta Maurya in 322 BC just a few years after Alexander the Great's brief foray into north-western India. The Maurya empire reached its apogee under the reign of Ashoka (268–231 BC). Early in his reign Ashoka made far-flung military conquests. Legend has it that after a bloody war against Kalinga — present-day Orissa — Ashoka underwent a change of heart and, if Buddhist sources are to be believed, became an ardent Buddhist. He accepted the principle of non-violence,

denounced caste, and banned Brahmanical rituals. Kings of earlier times generally held an elaborate ceremony known as the Ashwamedha Yagna, involving the sacrifice of horses in a ritual advertisement of their power. Ashoka abolished animal sacrifice and instead chose his patronage of *dhamma*, an ethical way of life, to be the legitimating glory of his empire. A reading of *Arthashastra* by Kautilya, a leading courtier of Ashoka's grandfather Chandragupta, as well as contemporary Greek sources might suggest, on the face of it, that the Maurya empire developed a centralized bureaucracy and an intricate network of spies and informants. *Arthashastra* literally means 'science of wealth', but it reads more like a manual for kings in the same way as Machiavelli's *Prince*, in so far as it is an amoral analysis of the exercise of power. The *Arthashastra* is no longer regarded by historians of ancient India as a unitary text, and in any case was largely prescriptive and may never have been implemented. Moreover, it is clear that Ashoka was deeply concerned about morality and, more especially, the question of imperial legitimacy. His edicts were inscribed on pillars and rocks in all the different regions of his vast empire. While some of his edicts propagated the message of Buddhism, much of his *dhamma* was more universal, preaching the values of mutual respect and tolerance. Ashoka was clearly interested in commanding loyalty from the outlying parts of the empire through means other than coercive control from the centre, but he was not above threatening the forest tribes with the use of force if they proved recalcitrant. His was clearly an agrarian empire drawing revenues mainly from the land. But the degree and nature of state intervention appear to have been quite different in the Magadhan core and the provincial peripheries. Not long after Ashoka's death the great Maurya empire underwent a process of decentralization. After the passing of this far-flung empire, the fragmented character of Indian polities lasted about five centuries — from *c.* 200 BC to *c.* AD 300 — even though new settlers established quite strong and prosperous states such as the Shaka and Kushana kingdoms in western and northern India. The Satavahana dynasty, probably of indigenous tribal origin, consolidated its hold on the north-western part of the Deccan. During the second century BC a politically disparate India appears to have enjoyed a good deal of economic prosperity and cultural glory. The centuries prior to AD 300 witnessed a thriving coastal trade, long-distance trade with the Roman empire and South East

Asia, as well as the quiet and peaceful assertion of Indian cultural influence in places like modern-day Thailand and Kampuchea.

The process of empire building from the Magadhan base was renewed by the Gupta dynasty which lasted from AD 320 to the early decades of the sixth century. The early emperors, Chandragupta I and Samudragupta, undertook the conquests while the consolidation of the empire and the major cultural achievements took place during the reign of Chandragupta II. The structure of the Gupta empire was looser than that of their Maurya predecessors. The Guptas did not even attempt to impose centralized control over the distant parts of their domains. The legitimating glory at the centre-stage of the Gupta empire, which was the symbol of their power, was unquestionably Brahmanical in character. Vedic rituals were revived and the horse sacrifice again became an indispensable imperial spectacle. Caste hierarchies once more became rigid, and a number of social customs placed renewed emphasis on the inferior status of women. The *Bhagavad Gita*, which represented something of a departure from the Vedas, was quite influential by the Gupta age. Revolutionary and inspirational in its exposition of the way of love and personal devotion to reach the supreme being, in its philosophy of *niskama karma* (or disinterested action) and in its message of strength, the *Gita* was not, however, particularly egalitarian in matters to do with caste and gender. As Krishna says at one point in the *Gita*: 'If those who are of base origin, such as women, Vaishyas and Shudras, take refuge in me, even they attain the highest end.'

The revival of Brahmanical legitimation and dominance notwithstanding, the Gupta rulers were tolerant towards other religious and social beliefs and practices. Fa-xian, a Chinese Buddhist pilgrim who visited the Gupta domains early in the fifth century, found Buddhism to be in a very healthy state. The high Brahmanical tradition appears to have coexisted with a more diffuse and popular Shramanik tradition. Historic Hinduism, as we know it today, took recognizable form by about the fifth century. This Hindu religion was at one level a polymorphic monotheism with three major cults — of Shiva, Vishnu/Krishna, and the Mother Goddess (Durga or Kali). In the sophisticated Hindu view the supreme being was one but could be worshipped in any of these three major forms of manifestation, according to the devotee's preference. Yet in the coexisting Shramanik tradition there could be a much greater

multiplicity of deities and enormous variation in beliefs and practices. Hinduism as it evolved historically was, as Romila Thapar puts it, 'not a linear progression from a founder through an organizational system with sects branching off'; it was rather 'the mosaic of distinct cults, deities, sects and ideas and the adjusting, juxtaposing and distancing of these to existing ones, the placement drawing not only on beliefs and ideas but also on the socio-economic reality.'

The greatest strength of the Gupta age, often regarded as a 'classical' era, was a measure of political, social and religious flexibility, despite the resurgence of Brahmanical orthodoxy in certain spheres. The Gupta emperors, of course, could afford such a breadth of outlook. This was at least partly because of general economic prosperity based on an expanding and thriving agriculture, and a lucrative long-distance trade across the Arabian sea with Rome and the Mediterranean world as well as across the Bay of Bengal with South East Asia. A politically secure and economically prosperous Gupta centre presided over a great literary, scientific and cultural efflorescence. The greatest literary figure of this time was Kalidasa, whose works included the play *Shakuntala* and the poem *Meghaduta* (The Cloud Messenger), the latter renowned for its breathtaking evocation of the natural splendour of India. Aryabhatta, a great mathematician and philosopher, was noted for his scientific achievements, including remarkably accurate calculations of the value of 'pi' (3.141) and the length of the solar year. Of course, he suffered the same sorts of scepticism from the ranks of religious orthodoxy as Galileo and Copernicus were to face much later, during the European renaissance. In the fine arts an example of the brilliance of the Gupta era can still be seen in the cave paintings of Ajanta in western India.

The Gupta empire came under a number of stresses and strains from the early sixth century. Defence against a number of Hun invasions in north-western India drained the treasury. Evidence of an economic crisis can be noted in the debased coinage of the later Guptas. The trend towards imperial decentralization, if not disintegration, during the sixth century was briefly reversed in the first half of the seventh century under Harshavardhana, the founder of another short-lived empire in northern India between AD 606 and 647. A record of Harsha's reign is available in his biography *Harshacharita*, one of the finest expositions of Sanskrit prose, by his court historian Bana Bhatta. The seventh century has been

identified by some historians as the beginning of the early medieval era in India. Underlying the oscillation between the forces of centralization and decentralization, there was a noticeable drift, if not a clear long-term trend, in early medieval India from tribe to caste as the basis for the emergence of regional polities.

From the eighth century onwards many of the new developments in both the higher historic and popular forms of Hinduism, including commentaries, exegesis and fresh departures in the form of cults, occurred in southern India and the peripheral areas of the north. The best-known Hindu philosopher of this later period was Shankaracharya, who lived in the ninth century and propounded the doctrine of *maya* or the illusoriness of human life. The *bhakti* movement had already been launched in Tamil Nadu as early as the sixth century by sixty-three Shaivite saints known as the Nayanars and twelve Vaishnavite saints called the Alwars. The teachings of the eighth- and ninth-century leaders of the Shaivite devotional cults were compiled as the *Tirumurai*, hymns calling Brahmanism into question and celebrating the direct communion of devotee and God. A number of women saints came into prominence, notably Andal, who sang in praise of the god Vishnu.

Politically, too, it was the south which saw the rise of powerful new kingdoms in this period. The most famous of these was the Chola kingdom, which flourished from the tenth to the twelfth century. Based in peninsular India, the Cholas made military forays into the north and cast their political, economic and cultural influence over South East Asia. Rajaraja I conquered Sri Lanka near the end of the tenth century, while his son Rajendra I launched a great northern campaign during 1022–3 which fetched the temples and palaces of the southern kingdom a vast quantity of jewels and gold. Yet Rajendra, an aspirant to universal kingship, desired legitimacy as much as wealth. Having defeated the Pala king, he ordered the princes of Bengal to carry the holy water of the Ganga to his new capital called Gangaikondacholapuram at the mouth of the river Kaveri. In 1026 his navy defeated the forces of the great South East Asian empire Srivijaya. More important, the Cholas furthered economic and cultural exchange between southern India and South East Asia.

Indian society, economy and politics from ancient times until the twelfth century displayed a great deal of dynamism that does not accord well with stereotypical images of India's changeless tradition.



The very cultural assimilation of influences emanating from a succession of new arrivals — Aryans, Greeks, Scythians, Parthians, Shakas and Huns before the eighth century, as well as Arabs, Persians, Turks, Afghans and Mongols between the eighth and the twelfth centuries — was a vital and dynamic process. Indigenous tribal groups also played a creative role in processes of state formation. Politically, phases of imperial consolidation were followed by periods of decentralization. But even the empires, far from being centralized despotisms, were typically loosely structured suzerainties. Economically, instead of closed and static village communities, there was mobility and commercial exchange. For long stretches of time the subcontinent played a central role in a vast network of Indian Ocean trade and culture. Socially, there were unique institutions such as caste; but — contrary to the stereotypes of hierarchy propagated by scholars trapped in the rigid mould of caste — there was much in Indian society that emphasized equality as a value and in practice. Buddhism, and after the eighth century Islam, represented, at least in part, egalitarian challenges, but even within Hinduism the high Brahmanical tradition was more than counterbalanced by the popular Shramanik one. There were undoubtedly many instances of conflict and even internal colonization. But it was the ability to accommodate, if not assimilate, an immense diversity within a very broadly and loosely defined framework of unity which has given Indian cultural tradition its durability and appearance of unbroken continuity. It is to the greatest and most challenging of the many creative accommodations forged in the subcontinent's long history — the fashioning of an Indo-Islamic social and political universe — that we turn in the next chapter.

## Chapter 3

# Pre-Modern Accommodations of Difference: The Making of Indo-Islamic Cultures

**I**t was in the seventh century, AD 610 to be precise, that Muhammad, a Meccan merchant, given to austere tastes and solitary meditation had a grand vision which led to the founding of a new world religion in the Arabian peninsula. The first person to accept Muhammad's message as prophetic revelation was his wife, Khadija, giving her a position of pre-eminence in what was to soon become a very large community of the Faithful. The role of women in the construction of the community of Islam is quite crucial, but scholars are only now turning their attention to uncovering that veiled reality. The historical spotlight has remained on the spread of the Islamic doctrine through a dramatic expansion of Muslim political power. By the fifteenth century Muslims either ruled or lived in all known corners of the world, presenting one of the greatest challenges to earlier established religions and cultures. But contrary to stereotypical distortions of Islam as a religion of the sword and of Muslims as unbending fanatics thriving on hatred and violence against non-believers, the Prophet Muhammad's teachings allowed for tolerance and assimilation of regional and local cultures. One of the most spectacular of these processes of accommodation was the fashioning of an Indo-Islamic cultural tradition in the South Asian subcontinent. Both military conquest and religious conversion in the medieval period need to be understood in historical context.

The first wave of Arab political expansion reached the subcontinent when the Makran coast in north-western India was invaded in 644, towards the end of the caliphate of Umar. Although this and a second raid during the reign of Ali (656–61) were repulsed,

Makran was finally subjugated under the first Ummayid caliph Muawiya (661–80). The eastern frontier of early Islam was reached when Muhammad bin Qasim conquered Sind in 712. So the Islamic belief in one God and in Muhammad as the final prophet struck very early roots in at least one region of north-western India. From the eighth century onwards Arab traders also settled on the western coast of India, but they were primarily interested in profit and did not engage in attempts to bring about any large-scale conversions to Islam. There was no further expansion, political or economic, by peoples professing Islam until the Turkish and Afghan invasions from the turn of the eleventh century onwards. Between the seventh and eleventh centuries, in politically decentralized northern India, the high Brahmanic and more popular Shramanik traditions continued to coexist, with the latter being more pervasive. Far from being a dark age, this was another period in Indian history that saw the consolidation of regional kingdoms presiding over new economic initiatives and cultural achievements. The Tomaras, formerly feudatories of the Pratihara overlords, founded the city of Delhi in 736. The magnificent architecture and sculpture of the Khajuraho temples were executed under the patronage of the Chandellas in the tenth century.

The great Central Asian scholar Alberuni, who visited India in 1030, wrote: 'The Hindus believe with regard to God that He is One, Eternal . . . this is what educated people believe about God . . . if we now pass from the ideas of the educated people to those of the common people, we must say that they present a great variety. Some of them are simply abominable, but similar errors also occur in other religions.' In making this comment Alberuni was not simply giving a Muslim view but echoing the Hindu elite's position on monotheism and polytheism. There is little agreement among historians of medieval India about the extent to which the coming of Islam to the subcontinent fomented new processes of cultural accommodation and assimilation. At one extreme is the view that there was a clear distinguishing line between Islamic civilization and the pre-existing corpus of 'Hindu tradition'. This argument is dented not just by the sheer scale of the conversions to Islam among lower-caste Hindus, but also the contiguity of peoples belonging to different religious faiths — which meant that Islam in the subcontinent could not but develop local Indian roots. On the other hand, recent research on Islam in a variety of regional



2. *Islam in India.* The Qutb Minar, Delhi — a 13th century monument to the Sufi saint Qutbuddin Kaki started by Qutbuddin Aibak and completed by Iltutmish. (Source: Print from drawing by William Daniell exhibited at the Oriental Annual, 1834, in the private collection of Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal.)

settings has emphasized variants of an argument about 'syncretism' which tends to obscure the issue of religiously informed identity. For example, Richard Eaton's portrayal of Bengali peasants as a 'single undifferentiated mass' with a uniform 'folk culture' neatly erases the problem of difference. With the major historiographical challenge conveniently out of the way, a fanciful cultural argument can then be erected on quicksand-like material evidence from Bengal's agrarian frontier. Any historical interpretation of the spread of Islam in the subcontinent needs to be attentive to regional specificities in the domains of economy and culture as well as the great variety of Muslims — Turks, Mongols, Persians, Arabs, Afghan, and so on — who came from abroad. Taken together, these factors not only explode the myth of a monolithic Islamic community in India but call into question any general model of Muslim conversions based on a poor understanding of rather scanty evidence from one regional economy and culture. What the available sources do permit is a plausible argument to be advanced, to the effect that not only were creative Indo-Islamic accommodations of difference worked out at various levels of society and culture but that India, or al-Hind, became the metropolitan centre of an Indian ocean world with a distinctive historical identity that stretched from the Mediterranean to the Indonesian archipelago.

The emergence of India as the hub of an integrated Indian ocean economy and culture by the eleventh century preceded the fashioning of Indo-Islamic accommodations within the subcontinent's society and polity in the fourteenth century. Early conversions to Islam were more gradual than sudden, a process carried over a period of time but generally facilitated in regions where a weak Brahmanical superstructure overlaid a much stronger Buddhistic substratum, as was the case in Sind in the eighth century and in Bengal after the eleventh century. While military action undoubtedly took place in the conquest of these regions, capitulation and submission were the usual norm, followed by the laying down of terms of loyalty and dependence. This was in accordance with the overall theory and practice of conquests in India at the time, and explains why wars did not lead to significant political change. In the words of the ninth century merchant-traveller Sulaiman: 'The Indians sometimes go to war for conquest, but the occasions are rare. . . . When a king subdues a neighbouring state, he places over it a man

belonging to the family of the fallen prince, who carries on the government in the name of the conqueror. The inhabitants would not suffer it otherwise.'

Eighth-century Sind was a typical Indian polity in which sovereignty was shared by different layers of kingly authority. The *Chachnama*, the principal source of our information on the Muslim conquest of Sind, elaborates a royal code which demands sensitivity to the fluidity and shifting nature of the real world of politics. This is in contrast to Kautilya's 'classical' and largely theoretical text *Arthashastra*, which advises princes on ways to avoid the dilution of absolute and centralized power. The pardoning of a fallen enemy, described by the *Chachnama*, provided a quick route to legitimacy by renegotiating a balance between different hierarchically arranged layers of sovereignty. The Arab conquest of Sind, instead of representing a sharp disjuncture, can be seen as a form of adaptation to pre-existing political conditions in India.

Although there were no further military conquests in India from the north-west until the eleventh century, the India trade became vital to the Islamic world during the eighth and ninth centuries. India's export surplus attracted a steady flow of precious bullion and made it the centre of an Indian ocean world-economy, with West Asia and China as its two poles. It was the prosperity in India and the relative decline in West Asia which provided the context for the next wave of Ghaznavid invasions into the subcontinent, beginning in 997. The accumulated treasure in the palaces and temples of northern India was a prime target of a series of raids (997–1030) by Mahmud of Ghazni into north-western India, which, interestingly enough, were roughly coterminous with and not too dissimilar from Rajendra Chola's northern campaigns from his south Indian base. On one of his raids Mahmud of Ghazni looted and demolished the famous temple at Somnath in Gujarat. The looting raids of this period were motivated less by an iconoclastic zeal fired by religion than by more hard-headed economic and political motives. In Mahmud's case, it was a need to finance his imperial ambitions in Central Asia that led him to devastate well-endowed religious places of worship.

It was a similar combination of economic and political imperatives which led Muhammad Ghuri, a Turk, to invade India a century and a half later, in 1192. His defeat of Prithviraj Chauhan, a Rajput chieftain, in the strategic battle of Tarain in northern India paved

the way for the establishment of the first Muslim sultanate, with its capital in Delhi, by Qutubuddin Aibak. The Delhi Sultanate lasted from 1206 to 1526 under the leadership of four major dynasties — the Mamluks, Khaljis, Tughlaqs and Lodis. These Turkish and Afghan rulers exercised their sway primarily over northern India, but the more powerful sultans, like Alauddin Khalji (1296–1316) and Muhammad bin Tughlaq (1325–51), made incursions into the Deccan. Southern India in this period boasted two powerful kingdoms — the Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagara founded in 1336, and the Bahmani kingdom founded by a Muslim governor who revolted against the sultan in 1345.

The Turkish, Persian and Afghan invasions of northern India from the eleventh century onwards injected the Turko-Persian content into the formation of an Indo-Islamic culture. The roots of this variant of the emerging Indo-Islamic accommodations actually preceded the establishment of the Delhi Sultanate and can be traced to the occupation of the Punjab by the Ghaznavids between 1001 and 1186. Lahore was the first centre of the Persianized Indo-Islamic culture until Delhi rose to political preeminence and almost became a replica of the ancient Sassanid court of Persia. The symbols of sovereignty, which had been wholly absent in the far more austere Arab Islam of the preceding centuries, became much more ceremonial and ornate. Persian cultural influence was balanced by a strong Turkish slave element in the composition of the nobility and the ruling classes during the first century of the Sultanate. Slavery went into decline in India in the fourteenth century. From the beginning of the fourteenth century the Turkish Mamluks, or slave aristocracy, were steadily replaced by a new aristocracy of Indian Muslims and Hindus as well as foreign immigrant Muslims of high status. So it was in the fourteenth century that a true Indo-Muslim culture was forged, based on Hindu–Muslim alliance-building and reciprocity. While northern India witnessed accommodations with the Turkish–Persian variant of Islam, the Arab imprint continued to be indelible in the Malabar coast of western India as well as in coastal south India and Sri Lanka. So we find at least two different variants of the Indo-Islamic accommodations in the subcontinent, one straddling the overland belt from Turkey, Persia and northern India to the Deccan, and the other bridging the ocean from the


Arabian peninsula to coastal southern India and stretching across the Bay of Bengal to Java and Sumatra.

The state structure constructed by the Delhi sultans was based on experiments carried out in West Asia but also elaborated on pre-existing forms in India. While upholding the supremacy of the Islamic sharia, the rulers desisted from imposing it on a predominantly non-Muslim population, which was allowed to retain its customary and religious laws. A series of imperial edicts complementing the sharia underpinned the day-to-day administration of justice, especially in the domains of criminal and civil law. Modelled on Ummayyad and Abbasid rule, the intermeshing of religious and secular law was an intrinsic feature of the pact of dominance established by Muslim sovereigns in India. It had the merit of keeping the ulema (Muslim theologians) at bay without straining the legitimacy of Muslim rule among non-believers.

The Delhi Sultanate drew its revenues primarily from the land, and its many flourishing towns depended to a large extent on the agrarian surplus. Some of the land revenue was paid directly into the state coffers, but most of it was channelled through *iqtadars* or land-grant holders. The *iqta* was a non-hereditary prebendal assignment of revenue devised especially to suit the imperative of paying relatively stable state salaries in the highly monetized and fluctuating economic context of the Indian ocean world-economy. Generally, *iqtadars* and provincial governors, known as *muqtis*, enjoyed a fair amount of autonomy from the Delhi sultan. A few sultans attempted a greater degree of centralized control for brief spells. Alauddin Khalji, for instance, made drastic changes to existing *iqtas* with a view to reordering the bonds of loyalty between the centre and the provincial peripheries.

The southern kingdom of Vijayanagara drew revenues from land, but was also closely integrated with the broader economy and civilization of the Indian ocean. Merchants from the Vijayanagara domains engaged in profitable trade with both West Asia and South East Asia. The Vijayanagara centre was the repository of considerable wealth and glory, but, according to Burton Stein, the state structure was segmented to provide for a substantial division and devolution of powers. After going through a number of vicissitudes the Vijayanagara kingdom recovered its glory under the great ruler Krishnadeva Raya (1509–29), whose reign saw impressive achievements in temple architecture and Telegu literature. In addition to the broad-based sultanates and kingdoms of the





3. *The Feminine Dimension of Islam.* Tomb of Bibi Jiwandi in Uchh Sharif, Punjab, present-day Pakistan. (Courtesy Ayesha Jalal.)

north and south, independent sultanates had emerged by the fifteenth century at the extremities of northern India — Kashmir, Bengal and Gujarat — each forging wider contacts of its own. After Timur's attack on Delhi in 1398 even Jaunpur and Malwa emerged as independent sultanates. The fifteenth century ought to be seen as a period when there were several regional sultanates, since even Delhi was reduced to the status of one of the regional sultanates of north India.

During the era of the Delhi Sultanate — its expansion and attrition — northern India developed a distinctive Indo-Islamic culture. Society consisted of three broad classes: the nobility, artisans and peasants. The nobility was drawn substantially though not exclusively from Turkish, Afghan, Persian and Arab immigrants. The great majority of Muslim artisans and peasants were converts from lower-caste Hindus to whom Islam's egalitarian appeal had held an

attraction. Some recent works on early Islam in India have sought to underplay this dimension on grounds that Muslim conversions were more numerous where inequalities within the social structure were not as great as elsewhere. Yet this hardly invalidates the case for Islam's egalitarian appeal, since it is entirely logical that societies with a history of valuing equality would be more amenable to its attractions. The egalitarianism of Islam did not, however, extend equally to women. Both Muslim and Hindu women of the upper social strata were largely restricted in this period to the private domain and were expected to be in purdah or behind a veil. One early Delhi sultan of the Mamluk dynasty — Raziya Sultana — succeeded in becoming the first Muslim woman ruler in the subcontinent. Acknowledged to have been a capable ruler, she was assassinated by male rivals.

The Sunni and Shia sectarian division, which had occurred over differences of opinion on Muhammad's successor to the Khilafat, was reflected in Indian Muslim society. A great majority of Indian Muslims were Sunnis. In parts of Sind and southern Punjab, Multan in particular, Shias had become influential. But they seemed to be at a disadvantage in northern India during the period of the Sunni Delhi Sultanate. Yet in a sense the most influential of Muslims in India were the Sufis, who represented the mystical branch of Islam — which had achieved prominence in Persia since the tenth century. Indeed many of the conversions to Islam after 1290 were carried out by members of the Chishti and Suhrawardy orders. The Chishti order made its mark in the environs of Delhi and the Ganga–Yamuna Doab, while the Suhrawardy order developed a strong following in Sind. It was in the Islamic mystical tradition that women played a decisive role. One of the first mystics of Islam was a woman, the chaste and pure lover of God, Rabia, who lived in Basra during the eighth century and won the admiration of fellow male Sufis. The names of famous women Sufis are to be found throughout the Islamic world. In all the Muslim-majority regions of the subcontinent, especially Sind and the Punjab, there are shrines of women Sufi saints. So the feminine dimension in Islam, closely associated with spirituality, played a part in the peaceful spread of Muhammad's message. Evidence of the Sufi role in facilitating Islam's accommodation with its Indian environment can be seen in the very special mystical appreciation of the feminine in their poetry. While

in Persian, and also Arabic, the metaphor of mystical poetry is predominantly male, the imagery is altered in Indian Sufi tradition into a love of the divine in the form of a woman devotee. Drawing upon the Hindu traditions, the soul is described as that of a loving woman seeking union with God, the ultimate Beloved.

There was much in common between the *bhakti* strand in popular Hinduism and the Sufi strand of Islam. Both sought union with God through the way of love and revered pirs and gurus as spiritual leaders and mediators. The Sufi Islamic influence gave a powerful impetus to the *bhakti* movement in India, strengthening the Shramanik tradition and promoting a few syncretistic cults. Among the prominent leaders of the *bhakti* devotional movement were Kabir (1440–1518) in northern India, and Chaitanya (1486–1533) in Bengal, while the stream led by Guru Nanak (1469–1539) culminated in the foundation of the new Sikh religious faith in Punjab. Both Kabir and Nanak rejected the caste system and sought not so much to integrate Islam and Hinduism as to offer alternative views of the Creator. Kabir, when he did not deny the Hindu and Muslim conceptions of God, sought to equate them in eclectic fashion. He claimed himself to be the child of Allah and also of Ram. Nanak went much further in the direction of negating specifically Hindu and Muslim ideas of God while drawing on the mystical strands within both. The more resolute negation of the rituals of Hinduism and Islam by Nanak contributed to the emergence of Sikhism as a distinctive and separate religion after his death. Nanak's teachings were compiled in the *Adi Granth* and were disseminated by nine Gurus who came after him.

Most leaders of the *bhakti* movement preferred to communicate in regional languages, which established the importance of regional dialects and scripts such as Bengali, Assamese, Oriya, Maithili, Gujarati, Rajasthani, Awadhi and Braj (sometimes referred to as Hindavi). The devotional songs of the famous woman *bhakti* preacher Mirabai were composed in Rajasthani but she was influenced by other *bhakti* composers who developed Awadhi and Brai. Another great woman poet and saint of the fourteenth century was Lal Ded who did much to promote the Kashmiri language with her simple but powerful verses. The congruence between language and region was clearly drawn in India between the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, even though Persian remained the court language of the Sultanate. Urdu (literally the camp language), borrowing

liberally from Hindavi syntax and grammar, and Persian and Arabic vocabulary, developed into something of a lingua franca only in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The cultural fusion on which Indo-Islamic civilization was coming to be based was frowned upon by certain social groups. Muslim ulema, who often advised the sultans on issues pertaining to Islamic law, tended to be cultural exclusivists, especially in a scenario where the majority of the populace were non-believers. The Brahmanical tradition on the Hindu side could be equally exclusivist when it could not absorb and dominate and, consequently, was averse to accommodation. One Nrisinghacharya was reputed to have told a congregation of high-caste Hindus at a Kumbha Mela — a great religious fair held at the confluence of the Ganga and the Jamuna — to adopt *kamathabritti* or the habit of a tortoise, in other words withdraw into a shell in order to be impervious to Islamic influences. Indeed, if one reads the *Dharmashastra* or Hindu law books of this period, to the exclusion of other sources, one would not even begin to suspect that there were Muslims in India. Not all upper-caste Hindus, of course, could become tortoises. Some Rajput princes made alliances with the Sultanate and a few converted to Islam. These Rajput Muslims could not quite aspire to the *ashraf* (honourable, noble) status of the aristocracy of West Asian origin, but they still enjoyed much higher status than the large numbers of artisans and peasants who became *ajlaf* (commoner) Muslims. Islam, in adapting to the Indian environment, could not, despite its strong egalitarianism, avoid the social imprint of caste. According to one view, the Arab variant of Indo-Islamic culture in the coastal south was less of a hybrid than the fusion which took place in the hinterlands. While it is undeniable that the coastal towns of the Coromandal retained more of a purist Arab imprint than the Indo-Islamic culture of continental India, Hindus, Muslims and Christians of the south came to share, as Susan Bayly has demonstrated, some common religious and social idioms. Many southern mosques contained Hindu decorative features such as lotus columns, replicating the Indo-Islamic accommodations in architectural designs in northern India — where the Turkish-Persian variant of Islam was stronger.

The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries witnessed both a powerful current towards cultural accommodation as well as pockets of

stubborn resistance to it. By around 1500 Indo-Islamic cultures, with their creativity and ambiguity, accommodations and tensions, had struck deep in the subcontinent. It was at this juncture that a new empire was established in northern India by a ruler of Turkish-Mongol descent. The next chapter turns to this empire, and to further developments within an Indo-Islamic social and political universe under its aegis.

## Chapter 4

# The Mughal Empire: State, Economy and Society

While unravelling the complex weave of India's pre-modern history we could hardly not have noticed two recurring themes. First, the infusion of new peoples and ideas, sometimes in the form of an invasion from the northwest, and second, temporal cycles of imperial consolidation and decentralization. Invasions were not sharp disjunctures, and were most commonly followed by fresh processes of accommodation, assimilation and cultural fusions. The high points of great imperial epochs were often characterized by political cohesion, social vitality, economic prosperity and cultural glory. But it was also abundantly clear that periods of political decentralization were not necessarily accompanied by social and economic decay. These general observations drawn from a thematic survey of the long term in Indian history can be investigated more closely with reference to the Mughal empire which was established in 1526, enjoyed expansion and consolidation until about 1707, and survived, even if in drastically attenuated form, until 1857.

Empires in pre-modern India, we have seen, were not based on rigid centralized domination. This has been established by the most insightful of recent historical research, and runs counter to the misperceptions of many nineteenth-century historians and twentieth-century comparative sociologists. Few polities have been subjected to greater misinterpretation by Western comparativists than the Mughal empire, which has been seen as a prime example of 'oriental despotism'. Reading backwards from the twentieth-century experience of European totalitarianism, pre-modern Asian states were seen to be all-powerful revenue-extracting machines presiding over passive and pulverized societies lacking not only in dynamism but also processes of relatively autonomous social group formation.

The historiography of the Mughal era has been only recently freeing itself from the despotism of orientalist scholarship. While differences remain on the extent of centralization actually achieved, the Mughal empire is beginning to be viewed as a complex, nuanced and loose form of hegemony over a diverse, differentiated and dynamic economy and society.

The founder of the Mughal empire could not have been aware of the enduring legacy that he was to leave in India. Having set up a small kingdom in Farghana in Central Asia at the turn of the sixteenth century, Zahiruddin Babur was initially more interested in conquering Samarkand. After several futile attempts to expand in a northerly direction, Babur settled down to rule the environs of Kabul in modern-day Afghanistan. From there he made a raid into the Punjab, and then in 1526 defeated Ibrahim Lodi, the last of the Delhi sultans, in the first battle of Panipat. Babur's use of Turkish cannon in this battle led some historians to include the empire he founded in the category of 'gun-powder empires'. It is now clear that this sort of technological definition of empires is neither very accurate nor very appropriate. The Mughals in any case were more reliant on cavalry in making their conquests, although artillery was also used in an innovative way for selective purposes. Babur was descended from Timur (the great Turkish empire builder in Central Asia) on his father's side, and from Genghis Khan (the great Mongol war-leader) on his mother's side. Contemporaries referred to the empire he founded as the Timurid empire. The choice of the term Mughal, derived from Mongol, appears to have been a nineteenth-century preference. Babur was not particularly attracted to the heat and dust of the plains of northern India where he established his political power. In his introspective and evocative autobiography, the *Baburnama*, he expresses a longing to return to the cool valley of Kabul:

Hindustan is a country that has few pleasures to recommend it. The people are not handsome. They have no idea of the charms of friendly society, of frankly mixing together, or of familiar intercourse. They have no genius, no comprehension of mind, no politeness of manner, no kindness or fellow-feeling, no ingenuity or mechanical invention in planning or executing their handicraft works, no skill or knowledge in design or architecture; they have no horses, no good flesh, no grapes or musk melons, no good fruits, no ice or cold water, no good food or bread in their bazaars, no baths or colleges, no candles, no torches, not a candlestick.

But there are also passages in the *Baburnama* more appreciative of the charms of Hind:

The one nice aspect of Hindustan is that it is a large country with lots of gold and money. The weather turns very nice during the monsoon. Sometimes it rains ten, fifteen, or twenty times a day; torrents are formed in an instant, and water flows in places that normally have no water. . . . Another nice thing is the unlimited numbers of craftsmen and practitioners of every trade. For every labour and every product there is an established group who have been practising their craft or professing that trade for generations. . . . In Agra alone there were 680 Agra stonemasons at work on my building every day.

Before he could expand or consolidate his Indian domain Babur died suddenly in 1530. His short reign might have been remarkably uncontroversial were it not for an accusation that surfaced in the late nineteenth century and achieved political prominence in the late twentieth — that one of his generals, Mir Baqi, had destroyed a Ram temple to build a mosque in Ayodhya, the Babri Masjid, named after Babur. There is no sixteenth-century evidence that any temple had been destroyed to construct this particular mosque.

The newly founded Turkish dynasty's control over north India remained very shaky and tenuous under Babur's son, Humayun. An Afghan challenge from eastern India led by Sher Shah Suri forced Humayun to flee the country and take refuge in the court of Safavid Iran. Sher Shah (1530–45) brought about an imperial unification of much of northern India and set up an administrative framework which was to be further developed by Akbar later in the century. The weakening of the Suri dynasty (1530–55) after Sher Shah's death enabled Humayun to return in 1555 to reclaim his Indian patrimony, but he had not been back in Delhi for more than a few months before he took a fatal tumble down his library stairs. On his assumption of the imperial mantle his son Akbar (1556–1605) faced an immediate challenge from an Afghan and Rajput Hindu military coalition, which he defeated at the second battle of Panipat. Akbar, undoubtedly the greatest of the Mughal emperors, was an able leader of military campaigns, an astute administrator, and a patron of culture. In 1572 he launched a major campaign against Gujarat, and the following year made a triumphant entry into the Gujarati port city of Surat. In 1574 Akbar's army conquered Bengal, which had more often than not been independent of Delhi



during the period of the Sultanate. The conquests of Gujarat and Bengal gave the Mughals control over the agriculturally and commercially richest parts of the subcontinent. Among Akbar's other notable military successes were the conquests of Kabul in 1581, Kashmir in 1586, Orissa in 1592, and Baluchistan in 1595. The territorial expanse of the Mughal empire grew during the reigns of Akbar's successors, Jahangir (1605–27), Shah Jahan (1627–58), and Aurangzeb (1658–1707). Although Jahangir managed to lose Kandahar and Shah Jahan sent an abortive expedition to Balkh and Badakshan in Central Asia, all three of Akbar's successors made territorial gains in the Deccan and further south, eventually defeating the powerful kingdoms of Bijapur and Golkonda. The Mughal empire reached its territorial apogee under Aurangzeb in the 1690s. But Aurangzeb's Deccan adventures were fiercely resisted by the redoubtable Maratha leader Shivaji, who refused to be co-opted into the Mughal system. The economic costs of the Deccan wars made sure that Aurangzeb's final successes would turn out to be pyrrhic victories.

The expansion and consolidation of the Mughal empire was roughly coterminous with that of two other great Muslim empires — the Safavid empire in Iran and the Ottoman empire based in Turkey but controlling much of West Asia and North Africa. While there was much in common with these three formidable land-based empires, the Mughal empire was different in one important respect. In India the Mughals established an empire in which a majority of the subjects were non-Muslims. Akbar, who gave shape and form to the Mughal state, was acutely aware of this demographic fact and devised his policies accordingly. Although most of the nobility in Akbar's court consisted of Turks, Afghans and Persians, Akbar set about building a network of alliances with Hindus, especially through the regional Rajput rulers. The Mughals under Akbar drew the nobility into the tasks of defending and administering the empire through the *mansabdari* system. *Mansab* literally means rank, and a *mansabdar* was the holder of a rank of anything from 10 to 5000 and occasionally 10,000. Theoretically, mansabdars of various ranks were supposed to supply the specified number of cavalry to the imperial army when needed. A mansabdar of ten was, therefore, expected to have ten men under his command, and so on. In practice, not all mansabdars were expected to perform military duties. Civilian administrators were also given ranks or mansabs by the Mughal

emperor, and were paid salaries in cash equivalent to the amount that would be needed for the upkeep of a certain number of cavalry. Cash income from jagirs, literally land grants, was designated for various mansabdars. Mansabs were open to talent, and the jagirs from which mansabdars were paid were not meant to be heritable. It was only in a later period of crisis that some mansabdars could not be paid in cash and tended to hold on to hereditary jagirs. Although the mansabdari system was the main framework of the Mughal administration, the imperial domains had territorial divisions known as *subahs* or provinces, ruled by *subadars* or governors, who usually held high mansabs or ranks. Below the level of the subadars there would be jagirdars below the mansabdari rank, as well as zamindars, literally landlords, whose main task was to collect revenue from the locality.

Akbar included several Hindus in the ranks of the highest mansabdars. For instance, his top-ranking military general was Raja Mansingh of Amber, a Rajput, and his revenue minister




4. *The Rajput Arm of the Mughal Empire.* Gateway to the palace of Raja Mansingh of Amber. (Courtesy Sugata Bose.)

was Raja Todar Mal, a Khatri, who supervised a detailed cadastral survey of the far-flung Mughal territories. Akbar displayed impartiality towards his subjects, regardless of religious affiliation, by abolishing the *jizya* — a tax imposed on non-believers in Muslim states. He also showed a pragmatic streak and a determination to adapt to the Indian environment by replacing the Muslim lunar calendar with the solar calendar, which he thought made more sense in an agricultural country like India. Akbar's public tolerance and efforts to build a truly Indo-Islamic empire were matched by his flexibility in private beliefs and practices. In 1582 he announced his adherence to a new set of beliefs, drawing on elements from the mystical strains in both Islam and Hinduism and deeply influenced by Zoroastrianism, which he called Din-e-Ilahi or the Divine Faith. He did not, however, try to impose Din-e-Ilahi as a state religion. An amalgamation of diverse beliefs, it was in effect a cult centred on the emperor's personality and, even in its heyday, had only eighteen followers at the royal court. The Ibadatkhana or place of worship in Akbar's red sandstone capital at Fatehpur Sikri became the venue for free and lively theological and philosophical debates attended by Muslims, Hindus, Zoroastrians, Jains, Jesuit Christians and Jews. His policies of public tolerance and private eclecticism were continued by his son and grandson, Jahangir and Shah Jahan. Indeed the mother of Jahangir was a Hindu Rajput princess, Jodhabai.

The breadth of Akbar's outlook was frowned upon by some sections of the ulema. But during Akbar's reign the supremacy of temporal over religious authority was clearly maintained. Some ulema attempted to persecute Akbar's famous freethinking friend and courtier Abul Fazl and found themselves behind prison bars. The most prominent orthodox critic of Mughal religious accommodations in the early seventeenth century was Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi (1564–1624), who was the leading light of the Naqshbandi order and looked forward to a rejuvenation of the original purity of Islam at the turn of its second millennium. Sirhindi rejoiced at the death of Akbar, in whose reign 'the sun of guidance was hidden behind the veil of error', and was imprisoned by Akbar's son and successor Jahangir.

The followers of Sirhindi were fiercely opposed to the innovative mystical blendings of Upanishadic philosophy and Sufism of which Dara Shikoh, the eldest son of Shah Jahan, was a major proponent. Influenced initially by his eldest sister Jahanara, who had a deep understanding of Islamic mysticism, he was later drawn into the

Qadiriyya Sufi order. Better versed in mysticism than in worldly matters, Dara Shikoh lost out in a bitter succession struggle to his younger brother Aurangzeb in 1658. Aurangzeb's reign saw a partial reversal of the politics of alliance building and religious flexibility under a mounting set of economic and political pressures. The jizya was reimposed, not necessarily for religious reasons but as a means of taxing the commercial wealth of Hindus and Jains within the empire. The switch back from the solar to the lunar calendar owed perhaps more to Aurangzeb's ideological rigidity, even though he did not make this change until some twenty years into his reign. Yet even at the end of Aurangzeb's supposedly puritanical reign nearly a quarter of the mansabdars were Hindus. Aurangzeb's doctrinal rigidity does not appear to have pervaded the female quarters of the royal palace. One of his daughters thought better of the mystical dimensions of Islam and became a



5. *Mughal Memory*. Jahangir's Tomb, Lahore. (Courtesy Ayesha Jalal.)

patron of Sufic activities, gifting an entire complex of buildings in Delhi to the famous eighteenth-century mystical poet Mir Dard.

The early views of Mughal despotism emphasized material factors as much as ideological ones. The Mughal state was said to extract huge amounts of revenue from the agrarian sector. The proportion most commonly mentioned by generations of economic historians until very recently was forty per cent, or the entire moveable surplus. There can be little doubt that, as in other contemporary agrarian empires, the revenue demand on the peasantry was high, perhaps as much as a third of the product. But recent research suggests that the Mughals did not deploy a centralized bureaucratic administration as an engine to pump out revenues from villages. The Mughal state typically entered into accommodations with the clan power of zamindars in the countryside, not only in the peripheral regions but also in the environs of the capital. The agrarian surplus was distributed among various layers of appropriators, with the imperial household and the mansabdari nobility



6. *Mughal Piety.* The Badshahi Mosque, Lahore, built under the patronage of Aurangzeb. (Courtesy Ayesha Jalal.)

receiving only the final, albeit substantial, cut. Despite the elaborate details about revenue administration laid out in Abu Fazl's manual *Ain-e-Akbari* (compiled *circa* 1590s), many prosperous parts of the empire were never rigorously surveyed. There is a palpable lack of statistical data at the all-India level between the late sixteenth and nineteenth century, but recent studies of particular regions have shown that the seventeenth century was a period of vibrant agricultural growth which would hardly have been possible if a centralized state had been draining away most of the local resources. The picture of an emaciated and oppressed peasantry, mercilessly exploited by the emperor and his nobility, is being seriously altered in the light of new interpretations of the evidence. The agrarian revolts that began to undermine the power of the Mughal empire from the later years of Aurangzeb's reign were not typically prompted by absolute poverty, but paradoxically occurred in regions which had enjoyed relative prosperity under Mughal auspices and were now minded to preserve their gains.

Primarily an agrarian empire, the Mughal state was also linked to long-distance overland and oceanic trade. From the mid seventeenth century onwards the empire became more heavily engaged with the international economy and may have turned more mercantilist in character, relying for its economic viability as much on textile exports as on land revenues. The Mughals, however, unlike the Ottomans, did not possess a navy which enabled European powers to command the sea-lanes of the Indian ocean. Even before the establishment of the Mughal empire the Portuguese, led by Vasco da Gama, had landed on the south-western coast of India in 1498 and, by 1510, had set up a major settlement in Goa. But the Portuguese never came close to achieving their professed aim of establishing a monopoly over sea trade in the Indian ocean. Arab and Gujarati merchants in particular were resourceful enough to meet the Portuguese economic challenge. In the latter half of the sixteenth century, hailed by some Western writers as the Portuguese century, the trading outpost of Goa was economically less important than the Mughal port city of Surat. The Ottoman navy made certain that the Portuguese, even at the height of their power, were never able to close the Red Sea to Turkish, Persian, Arab and Indian trade. The Portuguese presence and influence was limited to a few Indian coastal enclaves. As Ashin Dasgupta has argued, 'after the

first violent overture' the Portuguese in the sixteenth century 'settled within the structure and were, in a way, swallowed by it.' The English, who succeeded the Portuguese as the leading European traders in India in the seventeenth century, were also supplicants of the Mughals and simply sought permission from the emperor to carry on quiet trade. The English East India Company, founded in 1600, first obtained permission to trade in India from Jahangir in 1619. But their political and military power remained limited to a few factory forts in coastal areas. The English and also the Dutch in the seventeenth century worked, according to Dasgupta, 'within the indigenous structure' and were 'one more strand in the weave of the [Indian] ocean's trade'. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries have been characterized by Blair B. Kling and M.N. Pearson as 'an age of partnership' between Europeans and Asians, while Sanjay Subrahmanyam, in his work on southern India, has dubbed it 'an age of contained conflict'.

To Indian merchants the Mughal state allowed a certain measure of autonomy in important trading towns and cities. At the same time, the Mughals were not directly dependent for their state finances on the services of these merchant groups. The empire could simply accrue benefits from the credit and insurance facilities provided by bankers and traders which linked processes of inland trade and urbanization to wider networks of the Indian ocean economy. Bankers and merchants helped achieve a degree of economic integration which matched the political integration sought by the Mughal empire. Since European traders were primarily interested in Asian goods, especially Indian textiles, to sell in European markets, the Mughal domains received large inflows of precious metals, particularly silver. Mughal India was, therefore, a great metropolitan magnet of wealth in the context of sixteenth-and seventeenth-century international trade. Mughal power, far from having despotic roots, rested on arrangements based on a large measure of political and economic flexibility.

In their administration of justice the Mughals followed the pattern established by the Delhi sultans. Given the limited scope of the sharia, especially in providing for effective and speedy public justice, Muslim sovereigns everywhere had set up mechanisms to strengthen the judicial administration. Anxious to preserve law and order, the Mughals created a parallel system of courts alongside the specifically

Islamic ones. Imperial edicts, or *qanun-e-shahi*, supplementing the Islamic sharia, allowed the Mughal rulers and officials considerable room for administrative innovation. Muslim law officers, such as qazis and muftis, enforced the Islamic sharia, less as a rigid legal code and more as a set of moral injunctions to be invoked in the light of circumstances. The goal was to assure the result of equity and justice rather than strictly apply the letter of the law. While brought under the purview of the Mughal system of criminal law in certain parts of India, non-Muslims had recourse to their own customary and religious law in matters to do with marriage and inheritance.

Although the Mughal empire on the whole made no distinctive contribution to improving gender relations, it is important to note the very considerable influence which the women of the *zenana* could exercise upon the royal throne. The close interplay between the private and the public domain became particularly pronounced once Akbar began contracting marriages with Hindu Rajput princesses. Jahangir's religious tolerance can be traced to his rearing under the direction of his Hindu mother, Jodhabai, while his highly refined artistic tastes are at least partly attributable to his wife, Nur Jahan, who established herself as a formidable member of the royal household, enjoying strong political influence over the emperor. Mumtaz Mahal, sadly, was not a historical agent in Nur Jahan's league. She had to die trying to bear Shah Jahan's fifteenth child and her death became the inspiration behind the emperor's patronage of the Taj Mahal, one of the finest architectural forms ever constructed in the world. Shah Jahan's eldest daughter Jahanara established herself as a scholar of Islamic mysticism, winning accolades from her Sufi mentor Molla Shah. The women of the Mughal household were of course hardly representative of the typical Indian woman, Hindu or Muslim. But there can be no denying their role in the making of the majesty that was the Mughal empire.

Both the grandeur and the syncretism of the Mughal empire were reflected in the very considerable cultural achievements over which they presided. Persian was the court language of this Turkish dynasty. But at a more popular level Urdu became the language of Indo-Islamic culture in northern India, especially in the seventeenth century. Regional vernaculars continued to flourish in the provinces outside the Mughal heartland. Some of the finest literary and artistic



achievements of the Mughals were their illustrated manuscripts. The autobiographies and chronicles of the Mughal emperors were written in flowing Persian, and were brilliant examples of calligraphy and visual illustration. Among the more famous of these manuscripts is Abul Fazl's history of Akbar's reign, the *Akbarnama*, and Abdul Hamid Lahori's *Padshahnama*. Mughal scribes and artists not only chose Islamic subjects but also illustrated the famous Hindu epics, the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata*. Humayun had brought back with him from Persia two leading painters of the Safavid court, Mir Sayyid Ali and Abdus Samad. They were joined in Akbar's royal studio by talented Hindus. Together they created a new Indo-Persian style of painting, lighter and more colourful than the formal ornamentation of the pure Persian. In music the basic grammar of north Indian classical music with its thirty-six *raga* and *ragini* was composed under Mughal patronage. The most famous of music composers of this era was Tan Sen, one of the 'nine gems' at Akbar's court. Legend has it that Tan Sen could bring on torrential monsoon rains by his rendition of Raga Meghamalhar. A distinctive style of vocal music, *dhrupad*, was developed during Shah Jahan's reign. The most famous treatise on the ragas, the *Raga Darpana*, was written in 1666 by Faqir Allah during the reign of Aurangzeb — the emperor being, ironically, a man not particularly fond of music.

Yet the greatest and most lasting cultural achievements of the Mughals were made in the field of architecture. The buildings in Akbar's capital Fatehpur Sikri were based on a fusion of classical Islamic and Rajput styles. The *buland darwaza*, or great gateway, with its imposing arch had a strong West Asian influence, while the balconies were adorned with Rajput decorative arts. The greatest of the Mughal builders, of course, was Shah Jahan, justly famous for having built the exquisite marble monument in memory of his wife, Mumtaz Mahal, in Agra. But he would have been remembered as a great builder even if he had not built the Taj Mahal. In Delhi, Shah Jahan constructed a magnificent capital. The towering mosque called the Jama Masjid in old Delhi commanded the inhabitants of the capital and continues to be a focal point of Muslim religion and culture in India. The centrepiece of the new capital, Shahjahanabad, was the famous Lal Qila or the Red Fort, which came to be recognized as the most important symbol of sovereignty in India.

Mughal sovereignty was not wholly undermined until the British tried the last of the Mughal emperors, Bahadur Shah Zafar, in the Red Fort after the 1857 mutiny-rebellion. Bahadur Shah was sentenced to deportation for life and died in exile in Burma, while a British military officer exterminated the Mughal imperial line. It would be clear to the populace that British sovereignty in India had been undermined when, after another trial at the Red Fort in 1945, the British were unable to carry out their life sentence on three Hindu, Muslim and Sikh rebels in the face of intense public pressure. To this day Indian prime ministers make a ritual of addressing the nation on independence day from the ramparts of the Red Fort, even if by now they are no more than mere shadows of even the lesser Mughals.

## Chapter 5

# India Between Empires: Decline or Decentralization?

In the introduction to his *History of the Punjab* published in 1891, Syad Muhammad Latif contrasted the ‘corruption, degradation and treachery’ that ‘stalked openly through the land’ prior to the British conquest with the peace and tranquillity which followed in its wake. Under the ‘fostering care of the English’, he gloated, ‘the same bands of fanatics, marauders and highway robbers who were once a terror to the people’ had been ‘turned into peaceful cultivators and useful citizens’.

This predominant nineteenth-century view of the eighteenth century as a period of anarchy between the age of Mughal hegemony and the imposition of pax Britannica persisted until very recently. Research during the past decade has broken new ground and signalled fresh departures in late-Mughal and early-colonial historiography. From a balanced angle of vision the eighteenth century does not appear any more as a dark valley in the shadow of towering empires. What emerges is a mixed scenario of shadow and light, with high points and low points. It is important in any study of India between empires not to confuse the erosion of power of the Mughal court and army with a more general political, economic and societal decline.

The death of Aurangzeb in 1707 is generally seen to separate the era of the great Mughals from that of the lesser Mughals. Even as Aurangzeb projected Mughal power to its farthest territorial extent, the costs of military campaigns sorely undermined the financial basis of his empire. Agrarian-based revolts by Marathas, Sikhs, Jats and others, as well as the assertion of autonomy if not independence by provincial governors, did not bode well for the Mughal centre. While a process of fission, separation and renegotiation of the terms of suzerainty may have been built into



India in 1765

the logic of the empire, dissent from the turn of the eighteenth century reached unprecedented levels of intensity. Influential historians of the early twentieth century, notably Jadunath Sarkar, had read into Maratha, Sikh and Jat resistance a strong element of 'Hindu reaction' against Aurangzeb's religious bigotry. But resistance to Mughal hegemony was not primarily Hindu in composition. Irfan Habib in his classic *The Agrarian System of Mughal India* depicted the revolts as peasant uprisings owing primarily to economic oppression. According to this view, to the high Mughal revenue demand had been added the rapacity of the proliferating mansabdars bent on squeezing the resources of their fast diminishing jagirs. But revolts against the Mughals appear to have occurred in the relatively prosperous regions and were usually led by locally wealthy zamindars, which casts some doubt on the validity of the exploitation-poverty-resistance causal chain. Other historians have stressed factional conflict among the nobility at the Mughal court, a process related to the mansabdari crisis, and offered more nuanced explanations of the problem of jagirs. Another view pointed to the withdrawal of financial support to the empire in crisis by the great banking firms.

The latest research, especially the work of Muzaffar Alam, emphasizes the regional aspect of the motivation and articulation of revolt. Control of the peripheries by the Mughal centre was sought to be replaced by the manipulation of central authority by regionally-based powers. In this process the later Mughals may well have been the victims of the stability and prosperity over which their predecessors had presided. Regions and local elites which dominated at that level were minded to protect their wealth and resist paying for the empire's expensive wars. Inter-regional imbalances of wealth and intra-regional disparities between classes combined in complex ways to weaken the leverage of the Mughal centre *vis-à-vis* the regions in the early eighteenth century.

In addition to internal contradictions, a couple of major trends outside the subcontinent exerted serious pressures on the Mughal empire. First, a general South and West Asian crisis found expression in the eighteenth century in the form of tribal incursions from Central Asia, Eurasia and Afghanistan into the heartlands of the great Muslim empires — the Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal. The raids of Suvorov and Potemkin into the Ottoman domains were matched by those of

Nadir Shah and Ahmad Shah Abdali into Iran and India. In addition to the more dramatic invasions that left cities devastated, there was a more steady flow of Afghan cavalymen into many regions of the subcontinent. These incursions were initially sparked off as a reaction against imperial attempts to extract additional revenues from previously lightly taxed frontier zones lying athwart lucrative overland routes of trade. Second, in addition to the inter-regional crisis, disruptions to bullion flows from Europe, which the Mughal financial system had come to rely on, became more frequent in the early eighteenth century even as a surge in European production and trade began to alter the framework of Europe–Asia economic relations.

These multiple internal and external forces resulted in the steady attenuation of Mughal imperial power during the eighteenth century. In the 1730s vast tracts of central India passed from Mughal into Maratha hands. In 1739 Nadir Shah, who had earlier conquered Iran from his Afghan base, razed Delhi in a devastating looting raid and took back enough wealth to resolve for a generation Iran's balance-of-payments problem, stemming from a decline in the silk economy. He also took with him the Peacock Throne from the Red Fort. This throne of the great Mughals was later carried away from Iran to England. The emperor Muhammad Shah was more devoted to music than statecraft and, on being warned of Nadir Shah's impending invasion, reportedly said: '*Dehli door ast*' ('Delhi is far away'). In the 1740s the subadars (provincial governors) of Bengal, Awadh and the Deccan turned themselves into nawabs or independent kings. The Mughal emperor was not even a direct participant at the third battle of Panipat in 1761 in which the Afghan leader, Ahmad Shah Abdali, inflicted a crushing defeat on a Maratha army led by Sadasiv Rao Bhao. The defeat in 1761 was a major setback for the Marathas, potential inheritors of India's imperial mantle, just at a time when the English were beginning to shift from trade to political dominion. In 1757, after defeating Nawab Siraj-ud-daula at the battle of Plassey, the English East India Company took effective political control of Bengal. The Mughal emperor, a refugee at the Lucknow court of the nawab of Awadh, put up an army alongside the Nawabs of Awadh and Bengal in the battle of Buxar in Bihar in 1764, a battle in which the company's army prevailed. The emperor was forced to concede the *diwani* (the

right to the revenues) of Bengal to the company in 1765. Maratha power had a brief revival under their great leader Mahadaji Scindia in the 1770s and 1780s. In 1784 Scindia won acknowledgment as protector of the Mughal emperor. It was only after overcoming fierce Maratha resistance that the British occupied Delhi in 1803.

The weakening of the Mughal emperor and nobility enabled the strengthening of other groups who were the products of dynamic processes of social mobility and change. Among the more important social groups which rose to prominence were Hindu and Muslim revenue farmers, mostly Hindu and Jain merchants and bankers, and mostly Muslim service gentry. The merchants and bankers, in particular, provided critical financial sustenance to the regional states of the eighteenth century which paved the way for a process of commercialization of political power and social relations. The layered dispersion of commercialized power occurred within the context of the authority if not the actual strength of the Mughal empire. The Mughal *shah-en-shah* or king of kings continued to be, as C.A. Bayly puts it, 'the highest manifestation of sovereignty'. Below the imperial level were regional rulers, small potentates and even rajas or little kings of villages. The eighteenth century saw an increasing devolution of real power to the lower levels of sovereignty. Mughal legitimacy proved to be longer lasting than Mughal power. Not only Muslim nawabs but Maratha and Sikh leaders took part in ceremonial acknowledgments of the Mughal emperor as the ultimate repository of sovereignty. The eighteenth-century regionally-based state system retained important elements of Mughal administrative practice in addition to respecting Mughal authority. Muslim service gentry and Hindu scribes well-versed in Persian continued to be the mainstay of eighteenth-century administrative structures.

A typology of Mughal successor states would reveal at least three distinctive forms. First, there were the independent kingdoms where subadars or provincial governors had amalgamated offices kept separate by the Mughals and then asserted independence. Nawab Alivardi Khan of Bengal, Nawab Saadat Khan of Awadh, Nizam Asaf Jah of Hyderabad and the Nawabs of the Carnatic (Arcot) enjoyed *de facto* independence by the 1740s. These regional states were dependent on merchant-bankers such as the Jagat Seths of Bengal. The transition from prebendal to patrimonial land holdings, already set in motion in the late seventeenth century, was further

expedited during the eighteenth century under the nawabs. Punjab represents the most striking example of a subadar's failure to accommodate regional aspirations by asserting autonomy and the consequent claims of a warrior aristocracy to independent statehood. Warrior states established by Sikhs, Jats and, most important, the Marathas, were the second major form of the eighteenth-century state system. Although Sikh and Maratha rulers used non-Muslim religious symbolism and claimed to protect sacred places and cattle, their distinctiveness did not owe primarily to religion but to policies of military fiscalism which they adopted. Mahadaji Scindia's army, for instance, contained as many Muslims as Hindus in the 1780s. The Marathas had resisted Mughal power, but they achieved the Mughal aim of a profitable symbiosis of military power and revenue resources better than the Mughals themselves. The third major form of Mughal successor states were compact local kingdoms whose sovereignty acquired more substance in the eighteenth century. Such were the Rajput petty states of the north and the polities of Telegu-speaking warrior clans in the south. Besides, free-riding Afghan cavalry led a process of state formation which included the Rohilla sultanates nestling against the Jat states in the environs of Delhi, but also small kingdoms in central India, the Deccan and even in the deep south. These states resorted to military fiscalism within the compact domains, achieving varying degrees of success in extracting revenues from trade and production. Mysore under Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan combined elements of a warrior state and a territorially compact kingdom, and was probably most successful in gathering resources and maintaining the viability of the state without being utterly dependent on merchant-bankers.

If the politics of the eighteenth century was marked more by decentralization than decline, economy and society were characterized by general buoyancy and creativity despite some key weaknesses and contradictions. The economy did well in the spheres of agriculture, inland trade and urbanization. Pockets of agricultural decline — often because of inter-state warfare, as in the Punjab and parts of north India — were more than counterbalanced by wider expanses of growth. The Maratha territories under Poona were noted for their low revenue rates and agricultural prosperity in the latter half of the eighteenth century. Mysore under Haidar Ali was described as a garden from end to end. The dynamism that



had characterized many agrarian regions since 1600 had not abated in the eighteenth century. States exacted tribute from systems of agricultural commodity production that tied villages to expansive networks of commercial mobility and exchange. It was this vibrant 'tributary commercialism', as David Ludden calls it, which made India look attractive to European companies.

It is noteworthy that, except for a major subsistence crisis in south India between 1702 and 1704, the first seven decades of the eighteenth century in India were remarkably free of famine. The great Bengal famine of 1770, in which an estimated one-third of the population perished, occurred soon after the colonial conquest. This was followed by another disastrous famine in northern India in 1783. It is difficult in the period immediately preceding colonial conquest to generalize about the condition of rural elites and subaltern classes and the relations between them. Overall, a favourable land-labour ratio had enabled highly mobile peasant and tribal labour to negotiate reasonable terms with controllers of land. While some village notables managed to transform revenue farms into hereditary estates, others felt the squeeze from powerful regional states such as Tipu's Mysore. Population, production, prices and wages tended, generally speaking, to be on a gentle upward incline during the eighteenth century.

Fragmented polities did not of themselves hamper the development of a thriving inland trade in grain, cloth and cattle. Corporate merchant institutions transcended political boundaries in overseeing the transportation of goods and the provision of credit and insurance services. This is not to say that interterritorial strife posed no threats of dislocation. The concentration in the best recent research on intermediate social groups rather than on labour makes any comment on the status of artisans tentative. It would seem, however, that in the immediate pre-colonial era artisanal labour, especially weavers, had ample scope for successfully resisting extravagant demands by intermediate social groups and the state. Even an intrusive state like late-eighteenth-century Mysore appeared to attack intermediaries rather than labour. Evidence from Bengal and Madras suggests that urban labour was worse off in relation to the state and the market in the early colonial than in the immediate pre-colonial period. While inland trade did well, there is little question that Indian shippers and merchants involved in export trade declined in the face of European advances. The great Gujarati port city of Surat

lost its importance around 1720. There was a resurgence of demand for Indian goods in both West and South East Asia late in the eighteenth century in addition to European demand, but by now British merchants and shippers had achieved dominance at the expense of Indians and took the bulk of the profits.

As the old commercial centres of Surat, Maslipamam and Dhaka degenerated, colonial port-cities like Bombay, Madras and Calcutta took their pride of place. But the decline of the Mughal capitals Delhi and Agra was offset by the rise of regional capitals, including Lucknow, Hyderabad, the various Maratha cities, and Seringapatam. The level of urbanization was clearly higher in 1800 than a century before. What had changed in the urban centres was the relative balance of power between rulers and merchants. In some instances, commercial and financial magnates were arrogating to themselves the powers of the state. But merchants faced a political backlash in some states, notably Tipu Sultan's Mysore.

Even with the passing of Mughal grandeur, India in the eighteenth century retained its cultural vitality. The tendency, according to C.A. Bayly, was 'towards greater complexity and richness of religious and cultural tradition rather than towards homogeneity.' Devotional cults remained popular among Hindus and Muslims and were patronized by regional rulers. The Marathas, for instance, supported the old shrine of the Sufi saint Sheikh Muinuddin Chishti at Ajmer. Vaishnavite bhakti flourished in Nadia under the nawabs of Bengal. Important innovations took place within the high traditions of Islam and Hinduism as well. The *usuli* or rationalistic branch of Shia jurisprudence achieved a high level of sophistication in Awadh. The mobility characteristic of the eighteenth century brought even more southern Brahmins than before to Banaras, who infused new life into the Hindu philosophy of the north. South Indian classical music took shape in the courts of the Carnatic in the eighteenth century. Devotional themes were depicted with great skill and passion in the Kangra, Bundi and various Rajasthani schools of painting which represented a fresh departure from Mughal miniature painting. The scramble for resources during the coming apart of a great empire did lead to some sectarian, communitarian and ideological conflicts between Shia and Sunni, Sikh and Muslim, and Hindu and Muslim. But the eighteenth century was distinguished more by amity than animosity.

India in the eighteenth century held out many attractions to Europeans, particularly the British, who set about to appropriate a relatively buoyant economy by harnessing the dynamic social and political changes taking place to their own advantage. In what was an early revisionist piece on the eighteenth century Aurobindo Ghose argued just after the end of World War I that ‘a new life’ which ‘seemed about to rise in the regional peoples’ was ‘cut short by the intrusion of European nations’.

The next chapter will analyse the logic behind the early phase of British colonialism and the ways in which it was moulded by Indian collaboration and resistance.

## Chapter 6

# The Transition to Colonialism: Resistance and Collaboration

**I**n the mid-eighteenth century there began a steady dismantling of the Mughal successor state system and its replacement by British domination. Beginning with the British conquest of Bengal in the 1750s and 1760s, this was a long and arduous process not completed until the conquest of Punjab and the final annexation of Awadh in the 1840s and 1850s. The strongest organized resistance to British expansion came from the great warrior states of Mysore, the Marathas, and the Sikhs. But there was also a strong strand of collaboration by Indian social groups, especially merchant capitalists, who helped undermine the regional states which they had bankrolled in the past. Any interpretation of the transition to colonialism in India must address a set of related issues: the impetus behind European expansion; the reasons for colonial conquest in an era of decolonization and informal empire in other parts of the world; the basis of collaboration between the English East India company and Indian intermediate social groups and, finally, the critical factors which brought the British success.

The great spurt in European production and trade from the beginning of the eighteenth century provides the very general backdrop to the British move from trade to political dominion in India. Indian textiles were the most profitable item in the company's trade at this time. The goods had to be paid for in large quantities of silver imported from Europe. During the early eighteenth century the mercantilist critique of the drain of silver from Europe to Asia grew increasingly strident. Access to, if not control over, Indian revenues would be one way in which this problem could be solved. Yet the European desire to stop the flow of precious metals alone cannot explain the transition to colonialism. The opportunities for

political intervention by the company were provided by internal contradictions in the economy and politics of India in the late eighteenth century. The withdrawal of support by commercial and financial magnates to the successor states was of critical importance. No less important was the growing involvement of the company's servants in India's internal trade. Some regional states were determined in the late eighteenth century to reduce their dependence on merchants and bankers by extracting additional resources from them, and to delimit the spheres within which Europeans could trade. It was the attempt by relatively powerful regional states to vigorously pursue the policy of military fiscalism which brought about a congruence of interests between the English East India company and Indian merchant capitalists. To facilitate the transition to colonial rule, foreign capital promised initially to shore up indigenous merchant capitalists against the common threat posed by the so-called 'neo-Sultanist' states. European dominance over external trade and shipping, and hence over long-distance cash flows, as well as their slight edge in military technology, contributed to the wrecking of the eighteenth-century Indian regional state system.

In the process of subduing the independent Indian states, the English disposed of a challenge presented by the French East India company. European traders had been attracted by the buoyancy and profitability of Indian internal trade and politics. Paradoxically, the ultimate losers — the French — took an early lead in intervening in the affairs of Indian states. François Dupleix, the flamboyant governor of the French East India company, was the original grandmaster of the game of nabobism. In return for offering military services in succession disputes and inter-territorial strifes, the French received substantial economic benefits. Lack of effective support from the metropolis and the superiority of the English at sea ensured that the French were eventually checkmated. The game had been fought with furious intensity in southern India during the war of the Austrian succession between 1740 and 1748, and erupted again during the seven years' war between 1756 and 1763. During the 1740s, for instance, the English based in Madras and the French in Pondicherry supported rival nawabs of Arcot. In the end it was the English client, Mohammad Ali, who prevailed, albeit less as a king than a pawn.

The decisive breakthrough for the English came in Bengal in 1757. The young nawab Siraj-ud-daula had succeeded his grandfather, the experienced and circumspect ruler Alivardi Khan, who had presided over a delicate balance of interests between the English and French companies (in Calcutta and Chandernagore respectively), the great merchant bankers (including the Jagat Seths and Omichand), and agrarian notables (zamindars) in the districts. Determined to consolidate state power, Siraj-ud-daula called for an end to the building of English fortifications in Calcutta, demanded more money from the merchant bankers to finance his armed forces, and levied higher taxes on the rural elite. Siraj may have opened up too many fronts at the same time, but there can be little question that all these forces had been undermining the effective exercise of state power by the nawab of Bengal. When the English continued with their fortifications — intended to ward off the French — the nawab led his army down from his capital in Murshidabad to Calcutta and inflicted a decisive defeat on the English company's forces in 1756. The death by suffocation of a number of English prisoners held overnight in a prison cell gave rise to the gory legend of the black hole of Calcutta. More level-headed research in recent decades has suggested that the black hole story was hugely exaggerated and that it was more an accident than a deliberate act of cruelty.

The English resolved to avenge their humiliation in Calcutta and a military force set sail from Madras under the command of Colonel Robert Clive, who had already won his spurs in battles against the French. On his arrival Clive entered into a conspiracy with the merchant bankers Jagat Seth and Omichand, who in turn intrigued with Siraj's disaffected general, Mir Jaffar. At the battle of Plassey, within an expansive mango grove in the district of Murshidabad, the bulk of the nawab's army under Mir Jaffar's command looked the other way while the English defeated the small detachment led by Mohan Lal and Mir Madan which did fight. The name Mir Jaffar in time came to mean 'traitor' and remains even today one of the worst terms of political abuse in modern South Asia. Siraj-ud-daula was killed and Mir Jaffar installed as the puppet nawab. Clive collected Rs 28 million or £ 3 million sterling as payment for the company's service and as personal presents. Half of the amount was immediately paid by Jagat Seth and the rest pledged to be paid off in instalments by the nawab. Mir Jaffar ceded the revenues of

the 24-Parganas, south of Calcutta, to the company. Clive had told his superiors that Bengal, an 'inexhaustible fund of riches', would provide all the money needed for the company's trade and army. But in order to do so the company would progressively demand more territories and ever larger shares of Bengal's revenues.

Another Bengal nawab, Mir Kassim, tried in the early 1760s to cut the state's losses by confining the English East India company's activities to western Bengal and by building a base for himself in Bihar. Here he attempted to organize a tightly-knit administration, capable of extracting revenues from the zamindars and keeping the merchant bankers in their place. The Jagat Seths met their nemesis when they were forced to pay up what they owed to the English, and then to move bag and baggage from their mansion in Murshidabad in order to be kept in virtual detention in Monghyr, Bihar. The consolidation of Mir Kassim's power was viewed as a potential threat by the English to their possessions around Calcutta. In 1764 the battle lines were drawn between the nawabs of Bengal and Awadh and the Mughal emperor on the one side, and the English East India company on the other. The battle at Buxar in 1764 saw the company breaking the back of the last organized armed resistance to their control over eastern India. In 1765 the British obtained from the Mughal emperor the diwani, or the right to collect all the revenues, from Bengal. It was an apt conclusion to the colonial transition in Bengal since it was the streamlined flow of revenues from the great zamindars, organized in the days of the Mughal subadar Murshid Quli Khan, which had made Bengal such an attractive proposition for the English in the first place. The availability of land revenue conveniently obviated the need to bring in silver from Europe.

Bengal's revenues were not only used to purchase Bengal's goods, which were sold at a profit in markets abroad, but also to finance the colonial conquest of other parts of India. As was rapidly becoming the norm, the company used their military force only after securing the collaboration of certain Indian intermediate social groups. The company's assumption of political dominion on the Coromandal coast in the south-east and the Malabar coast in the south-west was built on configurations of alliance between English traders and Indian men of commerce and finance. In the river basin of the Krishna and Godavari, north of Madras, a region later known

as the northern Circars, the company's officials worked hand-in-glove with Hindu entrepreneurs in revenue and Gujarati banking houses to prise away territories from the control of the Nizam of Hyderabad. Further south, the company's servants operated in their private capacity as creditors alongside Indian revenue farmers and Hindu businessmen known as *dubash* (literally, 'those who speak two languages') to hold the nawab of Arcot in a hopeless debt trap. At first the company sought to control a state such as Arcot through a mechanism known as a 'subsidiary alliance', by which, in return for a subsidy or tribute, the English would 'protect' the nawab from external threats. The subsidiary alliance system was, however, inherently unstable, since the search for revenues to fund the subsidy alienated the puppet nawabs from key groups in society. The arrangement was also inadequate in warding off the more powerful independent regional states of the late eighteenth century. The Maratha threat to the northern Circars and Mysore's poaching on Arcot's territory led the company to dispense with the façade of subsidiary alliances and to directly take over the administration in these regions by the end of the eighteenth century. Resurgent Mysore challenged the company's intrusions from the 1760s, both on the south-east and south-west coasts. It was a combination of the company's alliance with Hindu merchants and the imperative to keep Mysore at bay which led to the English take-over of the Malabar region. Further north, on the west coast, the collaboration of Hindu and Parsi financiers of cotton production and trade, and the need for security from the Maratha threat, led to the assumption of political dominion by the English in Gujarat by 1803.

Nineteenth-century historiography had distinguished periods of intervention and non-intervention in the story of British expansion in India. The periods of intervention were often simplistically related to the aggressive personalities of governors and governor-generals like Clive, Wellesley (1798–1805) and Dalhousie (1848–56). There can be little doubt that the pressures on the subsidiary alliance system, and military campaigns against the great warrior states of Mysore and the Marathas, came to a head during the governor-generalship of Wellesley at the turn of the nineteenth century, and that Dalhousie hammered the last nail into the coffin of subsidiary alliances. The recent work of C.A. Bayly has shown that, in the period of the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars in Europe, the Wellesley



generation was imbued with a new sense of British nationalism, the projection of the power and dignity of the British state overseas and the morality of conquest by the racially superior British. There was no real contradiction between the ideology of free trade, as propounded by the critics of the company's monopoly of trade with Asia, and the ideology of nationalistic imperialism since it was the deployment of state power which could open up vast colonial markets. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the Wellesley era the company state engaged in a squeeze play on its subsidiary allies and adopted a bellicose posture towards India's remaining independent states.

The best example of the erosion of the subsidiary alliance system was Awadh. The Nawab of Awadh had agreed in 1765 to pay large annual tributes for the 'protection' given by the company's troops. The pressure to produce this subsidy led the nawab to alienate zamindars, peasants and even his own soldiers — who could not be paid on time. It also led him into the debt trap which was usually the fate of subsidiary allies. In Awadh in the north and Arcot in the south, as Bayly has explained, 'the financial demands of the alliance merely served to erode the basis of the state, and ultimately to provide the conditions for British annexation.' Private English creditors of these nawabs had been quite prepared to keep their clients nominally independent and in perpetual debt. Wellesley's government, however, was determined to consolidate the corporate authority of the company state. Despite the divergence between the company and the private financial interests of its servants, the Nawab of Awadh was forced to cede all his western territories to the company in 1800. The migration of peasants and weavers from Arcot to Mysore and the military strength of the Mysore sultans produced a confluence of interest between the company and its servants working in their private capacity. The state of Arcot was also swallowed up by the company in 1800. Among the more important subsidiary allies, only Hyderabad escaped outright annexation, probably because the company did not wish to bear the costs of administering this large and sparsely populated territory. But the terms of the subsidiary alliance were made more stringent in 1798, and powerful British residents wielded enormous influence in alliance with the diwan's faction, consisting of Shia Muslims and north Indian Hindus, in the Nizam's court. In time a saying came to

be coined that a whisper in the residency could cause thunder in the palace.

The state of Mysore and the Maratha confederacy presented the most formidable obstacle to British colonial expansionism in India. Haidar Ali and his son Tipu Sultan constructed a powerful state characterized by efficient revenue management and the elimination of the special privileges of intermediate social groups. Haidar Ali is generally acknowledged to have ruled over a prosperous peasantry and a thriving but not overweening merchant community. Tipu Sultan has been accused by some historians of resorting to coercion to extract revenues for the state. Yet it is clear that Tipu's surplus was drawn more from *poligar* warrior overlords and intermediate revenue farmers than from the working peasantry. He increased taxes on mercantile wealth but promoted trading facilities with Arabia and Iran. As late as the 1790s Mysore had a growing economy both in the rural and urban sectors. Mysore was also closing the gap in military technology between Europeans and Indians. In addition to traditional light cavalry and white Deccan cattle, Mysore developed the capability to deploy infantry and artillery with telling effect. Tipu understood the gravity of the threat posed by the company and sent diplomatic missions to the Marathas, the Nizam of Hyderabad, and the French. In the early 1780s he was in friendly correspondence with the Maratha leader Mahadaji Scindia. In the wars of 1781 to 1784, Mysore fought the English East India company's army to a military stalemate. A setback in 1791 resulted in the cession of territories on the peripheries of the state. But it was not until 1799 that the faster expanding economic resources of the British, who controlled the more productive coastal areas and had the use of fractions of indigenous capital, tilted the balance decisively against a defiant Mysore. Tipu Sultan died fighting gallantly at the gates of his capital, Seringapatam, preferring to live a day like a lion than a lifetime as a lamb cowering before the British.

The Maratha confederacy did not rule over a state as compact as Mysore, but attempted some of the same methods of taxation and revenue management. Having arisen as a warrior state in western India out of a society marked by low social stratification and relative equality between the genders (women flaunted their independence by riding on horseback in military camps), it had been transformed under the leadership of Mahadaji Scindia in the 1780s

into a far-flung empire which had begun to resemble the Mughal hegemony. Although Poona became the ceremonial capital, much in the manner of Delhi, the expanded Maratha polity and society were plagued by dissensions and divisions that had become so characteristic of the later Mughals. The Maratha military consolidation, which included the setting up of ordnance factories in northern India, alarmed the British. Rivalries among the constituent units of the confederacy offered opportunities for British intrigue and intervention. Wellesley's armies forced the Marathas to submit to the status of subsidiary allies through the treaty of Vasai (Bassein) in 1802, which triggered a fierce Anglo-Maratha war. In 1803 the English East India company's capture of Delhi marked the high point in British imperialist expansion. In 1817 the British carried out military campaigns against Pindari horsemen of Afghan and Rajput origin in central India. This made the Marathas suspicious of ultimate British designs and led them to take a desperate stand which ended in their final defeat in 1818.

Among the great eighteenth-century warrior states only the Sikh kingdom of Punjab, established by Ranjit Singh in 1790, still remained outside the British grasp. Punjab, as also the neighbouring emirate of Sind, was too distant from British centres of power in the eighteenth century to be viewed as a direct threat. Ranjit Singh built up a strong army and an economically powerful government deriving revenues from agriculture and commerce. The Talpur mirs of Sind also established state granaries and profited from taxes imposed on Indus valley trade. British concerns with the north-western frontier of their Indian empire eventually brought them into conflict with Sind and the Punjab from the late 1830s. Charles Napier, upon conquering Sind in 1842, proudly reported back in Latin: *'Peccavi'* ('I have sinned'). The Hotchands who, like the Jagat Seths of Bengal nearly a century earlier, helped bankroll the British possession of Sind paid for their sins by rapidly losing out in the area of shipping and seaborne trade, even though they managed to survive as landlords and bureaucrats. Between the taking of Sind and the conquest of Punjab, the British launched a catastrophic expedition to Afghanistan. The Company's army lost nearly 16,000 men in the siege of Kabul and, during a disastrous retreat from the Afghan capital in January 1842, only one man returned to tell the story of the debacle.

The British were able to take advantage of splits in Punjabi society and polity following the death of Ranjit Singh in 1839. With the collaboration of some local Sikh magnates in eastern Punjab the British, after two Anglo-Sikh wars, succeeded in subduing the Sikh state in 1849. One of the courtiers of the Lahore-based kingdom who aided the British was Gulab Singh, the Dogra ruler of Jammu. The British rewarded him through the Treaty of Amritsar of 1846, which handed over the valley of Kashmir 'for ever' to 'Maharaja Gulab Singh and the heirs male of his body' for a good sum of money. Gulab Singh acknowledged 'the supremacy of the British Government' and also agreed to remit annually a token tribute of 'one horse, twelve pairs of shawl goats of approved breed (six male and six female), and three pairs of Kashmir shawls.'

The wars against Punjab, Sind and Afghanistan had naturally drained the treasury. Dalhousie sought to recoup some of the costs of these expensive military adventures by annexing the more attractive subsidiary states. Utilizing the 'doctrine of lapse', by which subsidiary states without a natural male heir conveniently fell into the hands of the company, Dalhousie took over Satara in 1848, Jhansi in 1853, and Nagpur in 1854 — these brought some five million pounds in revenue. Finally, it was the lure of another five million pounds which led to the formal annexation of Awadh in 1856. With the annexation of Awadh the roar of the British lion could be heard through the length and breadth of the Indian subcontinent. In a small corner of it could be heard the Nawab of Awadh's plaintive song lamenting his departure from the magical city of Lucknow.

A close analysis of the transition to colonialism in India reveals the resistance offered by many of the regional successor states of the Mughal empire, as well as the interlocking relations between the English East India company and indigenous merchant capitalists. But it also brings into focus the pressures exerted by British capital and the company state on Indian polities which, more than anything else, undermined the eighteenth-century state system. The company state moved firmly to cut the cord between Indian commerce and political power which had contributed to the undoing of the indigenous states and had the potential to threaten the colonialists. Once the British achieved state power, Indian intermediary capital was quickly reduced to inferior status in most parts of India, although it was to be allowed some opportunities in other regions of British

supremacy in South East and West Asia, and later East and South Africa. Having risen to a position of dominance by riding the wave of a relatively vibrant eighteenth-century economy, the British resorted to a form of conquistador imperialism which contributed in no uncertain way to the economic stagnation of the early nineteenth century.

The following chapter explores the nature of the British colonial state and the colonial economy.

## Chapter 7

# The First Century of British Rule, 1757 to 1857: State and Economy

In the decades following 1757 the English East India company, which had begun its career with a charter to trade in Asia, established an elaborate state apparatus to govern its Indian territories. An organization originally created to accumulate profits from oceanic trade now drew its basic sustenance from land revenues. The century of company raj in India has been a subject of lively historical debate. Revisionist interpretations of the eighteenth century tended to imply that the disjunction between the pre-colonial and early-colonial eras was not as great as had been assumed. The bulk of the most recent research has emphasized the continuity between these eras. The early colonial edifice was undoubtedly built on the foundation of existing indigenous arrangements, institutions and identities which had not lost their vitality during the phase of political decentralization prior to the colonial advance. But it is important not to lose sight of the colonial state as a key actor in bringing about major changes within economy and society. While resilient indigenous entities moulded the colonial impact, fundamental alterations took place in the structures of state and in the character of political economy. An overemphasis on the processes of adaptation to pre-existing networks and patterns must not obscure the crucial elements of qualitative change.

The essence of the company state as it developed in the late eighteenth century was military despotism. The European core of the company's army was supplemented by increasing numbers of Indian 'sepoys', a corruption of the Urdu word *sipahi* or soldier. After 1757 the company recruited soldiers into its Bengal army from among the upper-caste peasantry of northern India and Bihar.

The number of sepoy rose from 25,000 in 1768 to 65,000 in 1814, divided into 54 infantry and 8 cavalry regiments. By 1814 the jurisdiction of the Bengal army extended all over northern India. It was essentially a mercenary army whose loyalty would be strained if the soldiers were not paid properly and promptly. There were instances of disaffection, if not mutiny, among European officers and Indian ranks in 1764, 1766, 1791, 1795–6 and 1824. But on the whole the Bengal army proved to be an effective fighting force, not only in the subcontinent but also in Ceylon, Java and the Red Sea area in the early nineteenth century. In addition to the Bengal army, the company had a numerically weaker outfit known as the Madras army drawn from Eurasians, Telegu warrior clans, Muslims who had been unable to find employment in the Mysore army, and also a detachment known as the Bombay Marines. The total strength of the company's armed forces increased dramatically during the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, from 115,000 in 1790 to 155,000 in 1805. This made it one of the largest European-style standing armies in the world. A standing army of this sort was a novelty in the history of institutions of state in India.

Alongside a mercenary standing army the company state fashioned a hitherto unknown centralized civilian bureaucracy between the 1760s and the 1780s. Formal authority over the company's Indian affairs was exercised by the court of directors in London. Lord North's regulating act of 1773 and Pitt's India act of 1784 attempted to bring the company's administration under the supervision of parliament through a board of control. Ideologues in parliament, such as Edmund Burke, could generate a good deal of controversy about the despotic and corrupt practices of the company's servants. The most dramatic manifestation of this was the impeachment of Warren Hastings, the first governor-general of the company in the 1770s. But India being six months' sailing distance away from the metropolis, the governor-general and his bureaucrats generally had substantial practical autonomy in the day-to-day running of the administration. After 1773 the governor-general and his council ruled with the assistance of a cadre of about 400 covenanted civil servants. The colonial bureaucracy became more racially exclusive and distant from the lower levels of Indian clerkdom during the era of nationalistic imperialism represented by Wellesley at the turn of the nineteenth century. As Peter Marshall

has noted, 'Indian agency at lower levels was still essential for the running of the government', but 'the ethos of the higher ranks of the service had become firmly British.' A clear chain of command descended from the governor-general based in Calcutta to the governors of Bombay and Madras presidencies, and down to the administrators overseeing the collection of taxes and dispensation of justice in the districts. While a few naive British district magistrates and collectors may well have been unsuspecting victims of crafty Indian manipulators, it is preposterous to suggest, as one or two historians have done, that the company's empire was more Indian than British. The structure and logic of the bureaucracy assured the dominance of higher-level British administrators.

Outside the directly administered territories the company entered into a series of treaty arrangements with a range of Indian rulers, big and small, who acknowledged British overlordship in return for a measure of autonomy in their respective domains. A system of British paramountcy was gradually elaborated from the second decade of the nineteenth century which brought nominally independent Indian rulers under tighter control. The subservience of these rulers was underlined by the restrictions on their defence and foreign policies and the refusal to allow them to enter into bilateral relations with each other. British residents in these states — which came to be known as the Indian princely states in contradistinction to what eventually became the directly administered provinces of British India — managed to gain considerable leverage in the field of internal administration as well by influencing the diwans or finance ministers who were generally under their thumb. The colonial construct of indirect rule was an ingenious device that complemented and did not contradict the efficacy of direct British colonial rule in other parts of the subcontinent. Power may have been exercised through indirect means, but it was not in any more than a formal sense limited in its potential to stamp out resistance.

Military and bureaucratic institutions of the company state in the directly ruled areas were instruments designed to bolster selective but deep administrative interventions in Indian economy and society. The early colonial state's chief concern was the security and stability of land revenue — the principal source of its income. A variety of mechanisms were created in different parts of India to achieve this end. The earliest and most controversial arrangement was the



'permanent settlement' of 1793, by which a private property right in revenue collection was assigned to the zamindars of Bengal. The revenue demand from these zamindars was settled in perpetuity; they were expected to collect rent from the raiyats and remit a part of it as revenue to the state. Cornwallis, the author of the permanent settlement with the zamindars, also hoped that they would become improving landlords modelled after the estate-holders of England. But the disjunction between property and production meant that these hopes were misplaced. The zamindars held some land as part of their personal demesne, but did not have actual possessory dominion over lands occupied and cultivated by various strata and categories of raiyats. Consequently, it was not always easy for the zamindars to collect rent and remit the assigned revenue to the colonial state. The revenue demand was in any case initially pitched very high. Many zamindars defaulted and sold their property rights to other zamindars, to their employees, to service people and commercial groups in towns. In the early nineteenth century the colonial state armed the zamindars with formidable powers of extra-economic coercion, including distraint and eviction, to enable them to extract rent from the peasantry and regularly remit revenue to the government. In parts of Madras presidency, which were taken from Mysore, agrarian notables had already been squeezed out by Tipu Sultan's policies. This facilitated a revenue settlement between the colonial state and the raiyats, even though many of them were not actual tillers of the soil. Eventually about two-thirds of Madras presidency had a 'ryotwari' arrangement, and the remaining one-third a settlement with large landlords or zamindars. Besides choosing varying strata or segments of rural society and investing them with the property right in revenue collection, the colonial state desisted in later settlements from signing away its right to periodically enhance the revenue demand. This was usually done in the temporarily settled areas at thirty-year intervals. The entire period from the late eighteenth to the mid nineteenth century was characterized by a revenue and rent offensive by the colonial state and its zamindari intermediaries.

Yet the broader economic context of the company state's operations changed about halfway through the first century of colonial rule. The period from 1757 to the 1810s represented a straightforward plunder of India's revenues. These were 'invested'

in the purchase of Indian manufactured products, especially textiles, for sale in the world's markets. In 1765 the grant of diwani had given the company Bengal's revenues, amounting to about three million pounds. By the time the Marathas were finally defeated in 1818 the company's Indian revenues had soared to £ 22 million. But already from the turn of the century the company's monopoly in Asian trade had come under a barrage of criticism from the newly emergent industrial capitalist class in Britain, which espoused the doctrine of free trade in order to sell their products in eastern markets. During the 1810s India's artisanal economy lost its ability to compete with cheaply manufactured British textiles and to sell its products in foreign markets. The charter act of 1813 ended the East India company's monopoly of trade with India. The sales of British cotton twist and yarn in India increased tenfold during the two decades following 1813, but the increase was not all that dramatic compared to the giant strides taken by British textiles in other markets. India, the homeland of cotton, was inundated with British cotton only from the 1850s.

China tea had now replaced Indian textiles as the most profitable item of the company's trade. Without control over Indian territories the company would not have been able to survive for half a century after the loss of its Indian trading monopoly. The company met its requirement of remittances to the metropolis through the forced cultivation of indigo and financed their China tea trade by establishing a government monopoly over opium cultivation in India. Massive illegal sales of Indian opium in China made it unnecessary for the company to bring in silver to finance their purchase of tea. The opium monopoly provided about fifteen per cent of the income of the company state, and accounted for nearly thirty per cent of the value of India's foreign trade until the mid-1850s.

The colonial state's role in consolidating indigo production for export was equally significant, though not as direct as in the case of opium. Indigo planters were predominantly private European entrepreneurs who received some advances from the government until 1802, but who later financed indigo production and trade with capital borrowed from trading and financial institutions known as agency houses. The early-nineteenth century was a blue phase in dressing for European war and fashion. The demand was strong, and about half a dozen giant European houses dominated the

production and trade in indigo. Apart from outright coercion, the only reason why small peasants cultivated indigo prior to 1830 was the monetary advance which came with it. The indigo economy was acutely vulnerable to fluctuations in the capitalist world economy. The economic depression in Britain from the late 1820s was transmitted to India and led to the collapse of all the leading agency houses between 1830 and 1833. There is no question that between 1830 and 1860 indigo cultivation by peasants was entirely unremunerative, and that the planters, like the zamindars, had to be assisted by the state with various coercive powers. Finances for indigo production and trade again became available between 1835 and 1840, but were adversely affected by the economic downturn in London's markets in the 1840s, crashing during the depression of 1847–8. With the rising demand as well as prices for rice and jute from the mid-1850s, peasants came to resent the imposition of indigo as never before. The indigo system was overthrown in Bengal by the so-called 'Blue Mutiny' of 1859–60, but a less favourable configuration of class forces ensured it continued its stranglehold over neighbouring Bihar until 1917.

An analysis of the structure and capacity of the early colonial state, particularly the ways in which it marshalled military force and the extraction of resources from peasants and weavers, suggests it was qualitatively different from the pre-colonial states it had subdued. Having appropriated all that was vital and buoyant in India's pre-colonial economy, the company state did little to contribute to either economic growth or equity in the early nineteenth century. Weavers were squeezed by bringing production more directly under state control, even before they felt the full brunt of the impact of the industrial revolution in Britain — though they proved resilient enough not to be eliminated. Peasants found their earlier mobility restricted and were emaciated as a direct consequence of the state's revenue and rent policy. In southern India, where rights to resources had been expressed as shares in community institutions such as temples, the colonial state replaced this form of risk-sharing by capital with the risks of the marketplace — which were now put squarely on the shoulders of the workforce that produced. In other words, whereas earlier there were some restraints on the exploitation of labour by wealthier social groups such as landlords and merchants, the Company's obsession with the doctrine of private property,

together with direct state control over production and distribution, removed the safeguards that had shielded peasants and weavers. And in northern India, where proto-proprietary forms had a prior existence, small-holding peasant families and artisans came under relentless pressure from the newly empowered class of property owners, aided by the state's legal enactments. Intermediary capitalists may have prospered to begin with, so long as company state power was not firmly established. But the shortsightedness of these intermediate social groups, which had extended a helping hand to the company, became clear when they were in many instances reduced to the status of usurers (except in some pockets on the west coast, such as Bombay, and in other British colonies outside the subcontinent). As C.A. Bayly acknowledges in his major work, *Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars*, 'earlier despotisms were tempered by a political culture which insisted that rulers should offer service and great expenditures in return for high revenue demand', but 'the British acknowledged few such restraints'. The crisis of legitimacy of the early colonial state was, therefore, 'a moral as much as an economic one'.

It was to mask their essentially amoral political behaviour that the British retained some of the ceremonial trappings of pre-colonial state ideology. Even the racially arrogant Wellesley directed the company's servants to treat the person of the puppet Mughal emperor with reverence and respect, and struck coins bearing the emperor's profile. Persian was retained as the official language of government until 1835. This ensured a continued livelihood for the Muslim and Hindu service gentry, certainly in northern India. While gradually introducing English judicial procedures in the domains of civil and criminal law, substantive aspects of the Mughal legal system were retained. The company's officials not only consulted Mughal law officers — qazis, muftis and pandits — but also upheld their decisions as long as these conformed with the dictum of justice, equity and good conscience. A pragmatic policy for a newly colonizing power, this was explicitly aimed at minimizing the threat of social reaction. In keeping with this policy, special care was taken not to offend the sensibilities of colonial subjects by overtly tampering with Muslim and Hindu personal law. Here again the period of Bentinck in the 1820s and 1830s was something of an exception. The abolition of *sati* — the burning of Hindu widows on the funeral

pyres of their husbands — in 1829 was, on the face of it, a departure from the policy of non-interference in the religious practices of Indians. Yet since the colonial state could establish a semblance of cultural legitimacy only by appropriating symbols and meanings that commanded authority in indigenous society, the distinction between public and private law was never an easy one to maintain. To galvanize Hindu commercial and clerical support in the south, the company state sponsored a somewhat spurious neo-Brahmanical ruling ideology based on the rigid varna-defined caste system. Similarly, the company's orientalist scholars gave far greater importance to doctrinal Islam or the sharia as propagated by the ulema than the eclectic religion shot through with local customary practices, which was followed by the vast majority of Indian Muslims.

But even cultural bribery had its limitations in winning legitimacy for the early colonial state. The influential South Indian mystical singer and poet Tyagaraja by and large ignored the company and its Indian clients. He sang:

They chatter and blabber  
pretending they're topnotch experts  
in melody and cadence, but  
they don't have a clue in their brains  
about the distinctions  
of *raga* notes and *murchhana* trills.

And the leader of the Chishti Sufi shrine in Delhi simply turned his back on Charles Metcalfe, the chief commissioner of the city, deriding him as 'an infidel stinking of alcohol'.

During the last decade of company raj tentative attempts were made to reform the state and soften the harsher edges of political economy. But nothing could bring about the Company's moral regeneration. In the newly conquered territories of the Punjab and Sind relatively low revenue rates were introduced and public investments made in agriculture. Revenue rates were also sought to be moderated during revisional settlements in Bombay, Gujarat, and parts of Madras. Even in Bengal, officials of the company toyed with the idea of introducing legislation providing raiyats with security of tenure and moderation of rent, even though the Rent Act was

not actually passed until 1859. With the beginnings of European capital investment in the railways, from 1854, a gentle upward trend in prices and wages began. This was the prologue to the period of classical colonialism of the late nineteenth century which was to be characterized by Indian exports of agricultural raw materials and imports of British manufactured products. Yet even a modernizing governor-general like Dalhousie, who was introducing railways, telegraphs, and a postal system, and rationalizing the revenue administration, could not resist the temptation of looting revenues of states which had hitherto been quasi-independent. This was adding insult to the already grievous injury inflicted on the Mughal successor state system. Reforms in the domain of political economy were too inadequate and uneven, particularly in the north Indian heartland, to stem the gathering tide of resentment against colonial rule. Detachments of the Bengal army were being despatched to fight for Britain in China and South East Asia in the 1840s and 1850s, even as tension and disaffection intensified in their home villages in northern India. Sporadic zamindari, peasant and tribal insurrection in different parts of India had dotted the entire history of colonial expansion and consolidation. These movements of resistance and their merging with a military mutiny in 1857, which brought the company raj to an end, will command our attention in the next chapters.

## Chapter 8

# Company Raj and Indian Society, 1757 to 1857: Reinvention and Reform of ‘Tradition’

Indian society’s negotiation of western influences and pressures under company raj is a matter of wide disagreement between nineteenth-century writers and contemporary scholars, and also among modern historians of the subcontinent. The old model of studying the European impact and Indian response is gradually being replaced by approaches more attentive to Indian initiative and agency. The nineteenth-century expectation that powerful forces of westernization would remould Indian social institutions and thought permeated earlier historical writing on the subject. From the early nineteenth century, in particular, three potent forces of change were thought to have been unleashed on Indian society. First, the heady doctrine of free trade was supposed to jerk Indian society and economy out of their insularity and immobility. Second, the ideology of utilitarianism through the enactment of good laws was expected to do away with backward, if not evil, Indian social customs. Third, the impulse of evangelism was to have struck a powerful blow to established Indian religions, Hinduism and Islam alike, and Christianize and uplift hapless colonial subjects.

Revisionist historians have recently pointed out that these expectations not only remained largely unfulfilled and misplaced but dramatic social changes such as these may never have been attempted in the first place. In other words, there was a gulf between ideological currents in the west and colonial social policy in India during the first half of the nineteenth century. The brief governor-generalship of the utilitarian Bentinck between 1828 and 1835 may have been the only exception to this trend. On the revisionist view,

far from westernizing or modernizing India, the British in the nineteenth century invented and consolidated the traditional India of peasant and Brahman. Uncomfortable with, and threatened by, the mobility of eighteenth-century rural society, Pax Britannica and the British revenue collecting machine sought to sedentarize and peasantize Indian society. The settled Indian village community was largely fashioned under colonialism during the nineteenth century in an attempt to tie it more closely to the wider world economy. As part of their search for social stability, the British gave substance to caste hierarchy and rigidity dominated by the Brahmans, which had been available in theory but been often ignored in social practice in the immediate pre-colonial era. Similarly, by injecting English procedural practices, such as precedence, into their rulings based on the sharia, the company's judicial officials transformed what Muslim law officers generally treated as a flexible set of moral injunctions into a strictly laid down legal code.

The debate between the old and the new historiographies is generally portrayed as one between the votaries of arguments emphasizing change or continuity under colonial rule. It would be more accurate to say that the disagreements are really about the *kind* of social change brought about under the aegis of company raj in the nineteenth century. If indeed the Indian caste system, as we know it today, was largely a nineteenth-century colonial invention, then it must be regarded as one of the more important changes brought about by colonial social engineering. But there is already a sense of unease about the possible excesses of the revisionist school. One line of qualification suggests that in consolidating the Indian peasantry and the status of the Brahman, the colonial state was reinventing rather than inventing tradition and speeding up processes already in motion since the eighteenth century. Yet even the argument about the minimal impact of western ideas and institutions is probably overdrawn. A regime presiding over qualitative changes in state and economy was not entirely non-interventionist when it came to importing social initiatives from abroad. The existence of multiple and occasionally contradictory social currents and cross-currents calls for a finely tuned historical perspective as well as balance in attempts to assess the nature and direction of social change.

The injection of an element of periodization is essential in order to be clear about temporal trends. The late eighteenth century must,



in important ways, be distinguished from the nineteenth. The early phase may have been a period of military aggression and economic plunder but it was not one of heavy-handed social intervention by conquerors imbued with a sense of racial superiority. Early British orientalist scholarship of the sort being carried out, for instance, by the Royal Asiatic Society under William Jones did not regard Indian culture and civilization as inferior. There was, however, a bias towards studying the more exclusivist high traditions of both Hinduism and Islam rather than the more flexible and pervasive religious and cultural practices of the majority of the people. This may have been partly dictated by the need to formulate a neo-Brahmanical and, to a lesser extent, pseudo-Mughal ruling ideology for the colonial state. But the bookish nature of early orientalist learning also made certain that the influence of Brahmans and ulema would be much greater on the colonial mind than uncodified cultural traditions.

The waves of free trade, utilitarianism and evangelism reached the shores of India only in the early nineteenth century. Of these three currents evangelical Christianity was the least successful. The 1813 charter act, which ended the company's monopoly of trade in India, also provided freer access to Christian missionaries. One Scottish preacher, Alexander Duff, arrived in 1820 with high hopes of converting the entire city of Calcutta to Christianity. He was sorely disappointed. The utilitarian stream was a more direct product of Western confidence in the superiority of the forces of science and reason. Colonial legal initiatives inspired by utilitarianism had a deeper social impact than is being acknowledged by the revisionist historiography. Changes in the prevailing system of civil and criminal law, intended to bolster the administration of public justice, could hardly fail to have far-reaching affects. Non-interference in personal law also proved to be more of a convenience than a moral stance on the part of conquerors anxious to avoid imposing their norms on a subject people. The efficacy of colonial social legislation in any case, depended on the nature of the interaction with various strands of Indian reform and reaction. The economic changes being shaped by the tussle between free traders and monopolists also had important knock-on effects on Indian society. This is not to argue a case of economic determinism, but to note the complex interconnectedness of developments in economy and society.

It is useful for the convenience of exposition to distinguish



7. *Colonial Conquest.* A tiger hunt by colonial officials mounted on elephants. (Source: Print from drawing by William Daniell in the private collection of Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal.)

between social change in the rural interior and in urban centres. During the first half of the nineteenth century the physical environment of India's rural areas experienced devastating alteration. Pre-colonial states had been less interested in extracting resources from forest and pastoral land than from agriculture, nor did they demarcate a clear conceptual frontier between the two domains. The company raj redefined Indian forests as separate from the agricultural plains before launching a major onslaught on forests and forest peoples. Large-scale deforestation not only produced climatic change but also led to the disruption of tribal lands and the rude intrusion of money into tribal economies. The company, with the assistance of Indian moneylenders and traders, subdued India's newly redefined, internal tribal frontiers. For instance, the Bhils of western India were 'pacified' during military expeditions in the 1820s. The attack on forests was accompanied by an invasion of the


nomadic and pastoral economy. In northern and central India groups engaged in cattle-raising and horse-breeding, such as Gujars, Bhattis, Rangar Rajputs and Mewatis, were subjected to the stern discipline and immobility of agricultural commodity production. The biggest villains in the colonial demonology of wandering groups were the so-called 'Thugs' of central India, who were brought to heel by a British military officer, William Sleeman, at great cost. 'Thuggee', it is now emerging from historical research, was a colonial stereotype which afforded great scope for self-congratulation on the part of those claiming to have established Pax Britannica by crushing a supposedly organized cult of Kali-worshipping highway robbers who were alleged to have taken a million lives in the early decades of the nineteenth century. It is a story that is increasingly being viewed with searing scepticism in history books, but has now found its rightful place in Hollywood films such as *Indiana Jones*. The subjugation of tribes and nomads generally paved the way for the consolidation of commodity production in agriculture where the settled peasant family was the most common work unit. But there were some enclaves, especially in the hills, where the British established plantations — for example, the coffee plantations in the Nilgiris in south India and the tea plantations in Darjeeling and Assam in the 1830s.

The settling of the countryside was sought to be consolidated by lending support to principles of hierarchy and ritual distinction. British scholars and officials aided by Brahmanical interpretations of Indian society set about the task of rank-ordering Indian social groups in various localities. One of the better known products of this enterprise is James Tod's *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, compiled between 1829 and 1832. It is probable that Indian social practice was more hierarchically defined in the first half of the nineteenth century than it had been during the eighteenth century. However, some popular devotional cults continued to retain their vitality. Social movements, such as the one of the Satya Narayanis of Gujarat, coexisted and competed with priestly hierarchies and even developed a coherent ideological rejection of Brahmanism. Reform movements within Islam, as well, called for a purification of the faith in order to effectively survive the colonial impact, but stopped short of overwhelming popular social practice in much of the countryside.

If colonial social engineering was largely limited to providing selective support to aspects of Indian tradition in the countryside, it

allowed more scope for rationalism to have an impact and provoke a response in urban centres. The ideological currents of science and reason reached the city of Calcutta at least a decade or so before the arrival of the socially interventionary governor-general Bentinck. It was largely at Indian initiative that Hindu College, the first English-language higher educational institution, was established in 1818. At least three strands are identifiable in Calcutta society's response to western education and culture. The Young Bengal group, based in Hindu College and led by a dynamic teacher, Henry Derozio, was most enthusiastic about the new ideas from the West. This group flaunted its westernization even in dress and eating habits and derided 'irrational' Indian social customs. Conservative reaction against the Young Bengal group was orchestrated by the Dharma Sabha. This society even petitioned against Bentinck's abolition of sati. The leaders of this society did not defend sati as such but stoutly opposed colonial legal interference in Indian social customs. Interestingly, the most prominent spokesman of the Dharma Sabha, Radha Kanta Deb, supported Western education and was a patron of Hindu College. The most creative strand, however, was led by Rammohun Roy, who attempted to adapt elements from all that he considered best in Indian and Western learning. Well-versed in Sanskrit, Bengali, Arabic, Persian and English, Rammohun Roy aimed at a regeneration of Indian society and culture through a process of thoroughgoing reform which would weed out the evils and anachronisms. He set up a society called the Brahmo Samaj which rejected caste and idolatry and sought a return to the original monotheistic purity of the *Upanishads*. He derided the evangelists but generally supported the utilitarians. He had campaigned against sati since 1818 and his defence of Bentinck's 1829 abolition of sati, which he called a 'barbarous and inhuman practice', helped ensure that the measure was not overturned by the privy council, the ultimate court of appeal in London.

Ironically enough, Rammohun's spirited attacks against sati relied less on rational arguments than on his interpretations of the same scriptural sources, especially the Vedas, on which the conservative opposition also rested its case. In his earlier writings on the subject, Rammohun had argued that the ritual was more often than not a plot by male members of families to circumvent the provision allowing widows to inherit the property of their deceased husbands.



8. *The First Steps of Western Education.* The main staircase of Presidency College, formerly Hindu College, Calcutta. (Courtesy Sugata Bose.)

His subsequent celebration of ascetic widowhood instead of sati was to seriously embarrass latter-day social reformers angling for legislation permitting widow remarriage. Despite his enlightened views on women, Rammohun at the time saw better sense in facilitating the colonial state's centralizing project of controlling the lives of its subjects by imposing restrictions on their right to suicide in the name of protecting Hindu 'tradition' from offensive customary practices like sati.

Bentinck's administration also borrowed heavily from Rammohun Roy's proposals to use public funds to promote western education. Rammohun had written to Bentinck's predecessor in 1823:

Neither can much improvement arise from such speculations as the following, which are the themes suggested by the Vedant: In what manner is the soul absorbed in the Deity? . . . Nor will youths be fitted to be better members of society by the Vedantic doctrines which teach them



9. *Colonial Calcutta*. Facade of the Marble Palace, a nineteenth-century Calcutta mansion. (Courtesy Sugata Bose.)

to believe that all visible things have no real existence. . . . Again, no essential benefit can be derived by the student of the Mimamsa from knowing what it is that makes the killer of a goat sinless by pronouncing certain passages of the Veds and what is the real nature and operative influence of passages of the Ved, etc.

He therefore called upon the British nation, which had abandoned the system of Schoolmen and embraced Baconian philosophy, to promote in India 'a more liberal and enlightened system of instruction, embracing mathematics, natural philosophy, chemistry and anatomy, with other useful sciences.' The 1820s and 1830s have been often referred to as the period of the Bengal renaissance, albeit hampered by colonial constraints, which saw major achievements in the fields of literature, the arts, as well as social and religious reform. Social stirrings similar to those in Calcutta but not yet of the same intensity were also discernible in Bombay and Madras. Later in the century key intellectual figures such as Mahadev Govind Ranade in western India, Veereselingam in the south, and Saiyid Ahmed Khan in the north played similar roles in the fields of education and social reform to those pioneered by Rammohun Roy in Bengal.

The promotion of Western education through the medium of the English language by Indian urban elites and British colonial officials stemmed from very different motives. For educated Indians it was seen as part of a process of self-strengthening and became almost proto-nationalist in character. The colonial attitude was made explicit by Thomas B. Macaulay, law member in Bentinck's council, in his famous minute on education in 1835. All learning in Indian languages, according to Macaulay (who did not read or understand any), was useless. The aim of Western education was to 'form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons Indian in blood and colour but English in taste, in opinions, in morals and in intellect.' Urged on by Macaulay, Bentinck replaced Persian with English as the official language of the government and the higher courts in 1835. Later generations of English-educated Indians would refuse to allow the educational institutions to simply be a production line of Indian clerks. In any event, Bengali and Urdu continued to be important at the lower levels of the administrative and judicial structures in eastern and northern India. It was in Punjab that British officials, tired of adapting to yet another regional language, imported English and Urdu as the languages of government.

The immediate response to the change in the official language by Hindu literate castes was to switch from Persian to English in order to find continued service in government. Although a few Muslims educated at Delhi College and Calcutta Madrasah also took to English and entered the colonial service, the vast majority of Muslims remained aloof from the new Western educational institutions. Smarting from the loss of sovereignty and state power Muslims, especially in urban centres, resented the imposition of English and responded with much greater enthusiasm to reformist movements seeking an internal regeneration of Islam. Some of the more important Muslim reformist movements were directed by the Naqshbandiya Sufi order in Delhi, led by Shah Waliullah, his son Shah Abdul Aziz, and his disciple Saiyid Ahmed of Rai Bareilly; by the Faranghi Mahal seminary in Lucknow and the Chishti sufi order in the Punjab. The Naqshbandiya order had some links with the Wahabis of the Arabian peninsula and was quite influential among Muslim artisans in the major towns of northern India. The Chishti order in the Punjab was able to penetrate the countryside by making the necessary compromises with the mediational and saintly forms of regionally variegated Islam. Movements to purify Islam were hardly ever frontal assaults on popular religion, which stressed the importance of saints, vernacular languages and time-honoured rituals. The Faraizi movement of Haji Shariatullah and his son Dudu Mian in Bengal called for a return to the Quran but did no more than replace the *pir–murid* (saint–follower) model, which smacked of servitude with an *ustad–shagird* (teacher–student) relationship. The spectre of Wahabi conspiracies which haunted the colonial mind was largely a function of British insecurity. Muslim reformist movements were ambivalent in their attitude towards colonial rule since they believed that internal strengthening had to precede any reassertion of Islamic power.

Yet social resistance was a key feature throughout the first century of colonial rule. The company's attempt to draw revenues and commodities from settled agriculture was resisted by zamindars and peasants alike. The project to colonize the forests provoked elemental uprisings by tribal peoples. And the intrusion of free-trader industrialists caused unease and unrest among artisans in towns. For long, early revolts against colonial rule were treated by historians as irrational and pre-political. The primary and early secondary sources were loaded in the characterization of insurgency as deviant,



if not criminal, behaviour. In the prose of counterinsurgency, as Ranajit Guha has shown, peasants were equated with insurgents, Muslims with fanatics, and entire social groups were branded criminal tribes. Generations of historians, relying heavily on colonial official resources, tended to ignore rebel consciousness, even if they lauded rebel heroism. More recently a concerted attempt is being made to restore to peasants, tribals and artisans their subjecthood in the making of their own history. Resistance carried too many risks to be resorted to in a fit of absentmindedness; it was carefully planned and executed only after all alternatives had been exhausted. Underlying the violent outbreaks of major revolts there was also a more continuous process of everyday resistance to oppression and injustice.

It would be a mistake to concentrate exclusively on either the landed magnates or the subaltern classes in any study of resistance during the first half of the nineteenth century. Rural magnates opposed not only the higher land-revenue demand of the colonial state, but also the erosion of their kingly authority. In South India the poligars (warrior lords) believed that they were inheritors of the shares in sovereignty of the erstwhile Vijayanagara rulers. They put up ferocious resistance against the company during the Sivaganga revolt at the turn of the nineteenth century. Zamindari revolts flared up in other regions and at various times, but were most widespread during the economic downturn of the 1830s. Peasants resisted the demands both of the colonial state and its zamindari intermediaries. Some of the movements of peasant resistance articulated a religious ideology. The Faraizis of East Bengal, led by Dudu Mian, refused to pay rent and revenue, acknowledging only Allah's sovereignty over land. They also attacked Hindu traders and moneylenders and burnt down the houses and factories of the notorious indigo planters during the 1830s and 1840s. The Mapilla rebellions on the Malabar coast in 1802, the late 1830s, and from 1849 to 1852, similarly combined religious reform of their society with social protest against Hindu landlords and British officials. Most of the resistance movements in agrarian society before 1860 were communitarian struggles which must not be confused with the 'communalism' of the twentieth century. The first major exception to the communitarian character of resistance was the indigo revolt in Bengal in the late 1850s, which displayed a strong class dimension, not only in composition but also in ideology.

Some of the most stubborn resistance to company raj came from tribal people. An overemphasis in some of the historical literature on the paternalistic colonial discourse about tribes tends to gloss over the political practice of repression and resistance. The Bhils in western India fought against the company's army in the 1820s and the Kols rose up in rebellion in Bihar between 1829 and 1833. The most famous instance of tribal revolt was the Santhal *hool* (uprising) of 1855–6 on the Bengal–Bihar border. The Santhals, led by Sido and Kanhu, violently resisted the incursion of the *diku* (foreigners), among whom they included both the British who were tearing down their forests and the Indian moneylenders who were grabbing their best lands. These tribal uprisings were severely repressed. But in their aftermath legislation was passed restricting the alienation of tribal lands to non-tribals.

Urban resistance centred on dispossessed artisanal groups. Weavers rioted in north Indian towns in the 1810s and the 1830s. Occasionally, the protest of Muslim artisans would target centres of Hindu wealth and prestige, especially of merchant groups. More often, such uprisings took the form of grain riots, as in Delhi and north Indian towns between 1833 and 1838, and in Madras in 1806, 1833 and 1854. The newly introduced colonial systems of civil and criminal law had little legitimacy among urban groups, which often called for the restitution of Mughal law officers such as kotwals, qazis and muftis.


So Indian society was astir throughout the period of colonial consolidation under the company state. Resistance was widespread, affecting all regions of the subcontinent and a variety of social groups, including rural magnates, peasants, tribals and urban artisans. The logic of the company state and political economy was quite as important as overt colonial social policy in creating turmoil among the subject people. What the movements of resistance lacked were first, supra-local organization and, second, convergence in time — though the 1830s must be regarded as a decade of more than usual unrest. The great civilian uprisings which accompanied the military mutiny of 1857 aimed at supplying these missing ingredients. Hugely expanded in scale and focused in time, the 1857 mutiny-revolt would turn out to be a watershed in India's colonial history.

## Chapter 9

# Eighteen Fifty-seven: Rebellion, Collaboration and the Transition to Crown Raj

**E**ighteen fifty-seven, however one interprets the events of that fateful year, is a date to conjure with in modern South Asian history. The year witnessed a serious military mutiny and very large-scale civilian uprisings which, for a fleeting moment, threatened to bring British rule to an end exactly one hundred years after the first colonial conquest in Bengal. Colonial officials-turned-historians usually referred to the uprising of 1857 as the sepoy mutiny. Early-twentieth-century nationalist commentators proudly described it as the first war of Indian independence. There is no agreement among historians whether the revolt was a forward-looking freedom movement or a backward-looking restorationist struggle, a feudal reaction led by landed magnates or a peasant rebellion of the wretched of the earth; a 'secular' movement cutting across communal affiliations or a religiously inspired jihad (holy war); an anti-colonial revolt or a civil war pitting resisters against collaborators. There was probably a bit of all of these in the complex events of 1857, which has made its historiography somewhat confusing and confused. Yet this watershed year has also been the subject of some fine scholarship. Our aim is to assess the importance of the various strands and identify some points of emphasis.

Neither military mutiny nor civil revolt was uncommon in early colonial India. But they had in the past been rather disparate and unco-ordinated. What gave the 1857 revolt its unique character was the convergence of various strands of resistance, the expansion of scale, and a new level of intensity. The company's army was mercenary in nature and its different branches had shown signs of disaffection at various points in the first half of



India in 1857

the nineteenth century. The Madras army had mutinied in Vellore in 1806 and the Bengal army in Java in 1815, Gwalior in 1834, Afghanistan during 1839 to 1842, and Burma in 1824 and 1852. During the 1850s the British carelessly added a number of new provocations. The refusal of units to fight in Burma led to the passage of the general service enlistment act of 1856 which required recruits to undertake to serve abroad or, as the soldiers saw it, across the *kala pani* (dark waters). The Afghan debacle had also led the British to widen the circle of caste and regional groups from which they recruited the Bengal army. The Rajputs and Bhumihaar Brahmans of Banaras and Awadh who had so far formed the backbone of the Bengal army thoroughly disliked the new recruitment policy. After the conquest of Punjab and Sind these soldiers lost their *bhatta* (pay bonuses) for service abroad, and with the annexation of Awadh in 1856 they lost prestige. At the same time their families were being subjected to a high land-revenue demand.

The sepoys in the company's army were already suffering from a deep sense of social and economic unease when certain greased cartridges for the new Lee Enfield rifle supplied the immediate fuel to spark off revolt. These cartridges were rumoured to have been smeared with cow and pig fat, repugnant to Hindus and Muslims alike, and were widely seen as an insidious plot by the infidels to pollute Indians before forcing their conversion to Christianity. As soldiers refused to load the new rifle in the early summer of 1857, they were sentenced to imprisonment and sent off to jail in fetters. It was the sight of their compatriots humiliated in this fashion that led the XI Native Cavalry, based in Meerut, to mutiny on the night of 10–11 May 1857. The mutineers then marched to Delhi where the reluctant and ageing Mughal emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar, was installed as the symbolic head of the revolt. Discontented landed magnates and peasants in the environs of Delhi lent support to the mutinous soldiers, as did artisans, labourers and rebellious policemen in the city of Delhi. The revolt spread to the north and west of Delhi, enveloping garrison towns as well as the countryside. During June and July of 1857 the British military forces in the east were cut off from those located in Punjab. Yet the rebels' concentration on Delhi, while providing a great boost to morale, proved to be a grave tactical error. Not only were they not quick enough to attack British forces coming from Punjab, they failed to consolidate their

grip over a liberated zone in which to establish their own legitimate administration.

The second, almost autonomous, focus of revolt lay to the east, in Awadh. Political and economic resentments ran deep in this region, only lately annexed by the British. The revolt here soon acquired a broad popular base in both rural and urban areas. Taluqdars, peasants and artisans joined the revolt in large numbers, bringing about the collapse of the newly installed British administration, and imprisoning a British garrison in the same residency in Lucknow from where the British had manipulated the downfall of the nawab. There was panic in the British camp that their rule would come to a catastrophic end on the hundredth anniversary of Plassey. British troops had to win back control of Awadh, fighting village by village and meeting fierce resistance spearheaded by local leaders, until the summer of 1858. The collaboration of the Bhumihar magnates of Banaras, rivals of the Rajput brotherhoods up in revolt, was a critical element in the success of the British counterattack.

A third focus of revolt was in central India, where the rulers and peasants of the Maratha territories seized the opportunity to be rid of the British. The Rani of Jhansi, whose kingdom was annexed by Dahousie in 1853 utilizing the doctrine of lapse, led her people from the front in a fierce struggle and died fighting against the British on horseback. Another Maratha leader, Nana Sahib, led his troops up to Kanpur and inflicted a severe defeat on the British garrison stationed there.

The 1857 revolt was by and large confined to the northern Indian Gangetic plain and central India. In July 1857 Rohilla Afghan soldiers joined urban groups in a revolt in Hyderabad, but the Nizam and some of his chiefs kept this southern kingdom away from a movement which was perceived by them to be led by their erstwhile rivals, the Marathas. Mutinies broke out in garrison towns of Punjab, and Muslim pastoralist groups revolted in the western part of the province. But the loyalty of Sikh magnates in the east of the province, which the British had assiduously cultivated of late, enabled them to contain trouble in Punjab. The strong British military presence in Bengal, boosted by reinforcements from an expeditionary force diverted on its way to China in November 1857, was a deterrent to potential rebels. The uneven spread of colonial rule ensured that the new Bengali intelligentsia was not particularly enamoured of what they regarded as a movement of feudal oligarchs. So the British

were really threatened in the north and in the central Indian heartland. June and July 1857 were the most dangerous months for them, though sporadic guerilla warfare raged even after Governor-General Canning formally declared the war to be over in July 1858.

It is simpler, certainly far less controversial, to catalogue the course and extent of the rebellion than to analyse its character. The 1857 revolt was infused with an inchoate sense of patriotism, if not nationalism, to the extent that it had a shared objective of putting an end to colonial rule. But this aspiration for freedom was in the context of a legitimist reaction among the rulers and aristocrats at the indigenous courts. These kings and nobles were deeply aggrieved by British perfidy in tearing up established treaties whenever they proved inconvenient. This was like changing the rules in an unfair bid to win a chess game. The queen mother of Awadh gave voice to this sense of grievance when she referred to British deception in the cases of Awadh, Jhansi, Satara, Nagpur and even tiny Bharatpur, whose ruler 'on the one hand they salaamed and by the other hand they hanged'. These aristocratic leaders were offering those prepared to follow them into rebellion the legitimacy of a resurrected eighteenth-century stare system under the highest sovereignty of the Mughal emperor. A powerful legitimizing ideology, it was nevertheless a source of weakness. The inter-state rivalries of the eighteenth century were mirrored in 1857 when, for instance, Hyderabad refused to throw its full weight behind a revolt that could re-establish Maratha power in their neighbourhood. The Mughal sovereign himself may have been a symbol of fading glory, as he himself acknowledged:

*Na kisi ki ankh ka noor hoon*  
*Na kisi ke dil ka karar hoon*  
*Jo kisi ke kam na aa sake*  
*Mein wo ek mooshtai gobar hoon*

(I am neither the light of anyone's eye  
 Nor the solace of anyone's heart  
 Unable to serve anyone's needs  
 I am no more than a mere speck of dust)

Religious millenarianism was doubtless a theme which informed the revolt of 1857. In the immediate aftermath of the revolt British

officials exaggerated the religious factor when they singled out Muslims as the main rebels and explained the rebellion as an insidious plot by Muslim fanatics. So it is important to be clear about the precise role played by religion. Prior to the outbreak many in Delhi interpreted the confrontation between Persian forces and the company in 1856 as a prelude to a general Muslim mobilization against the British. In Lucknow, Muslim millenarian preachers had been foretelling the end of the company raj. During the height of the revolt thousands of *ghazis* (warriors of the faith), drawn from among the Pindaris and the Naqshbandi Sufi order, fought fearlessly against the British. In certain districts like Muzaffarnagar and Saharanpur, where the declining Muslim service gentry had congregated, the revolt took on a distinctly millenarian flavour. In some of the towns and *qasbahs* (small country towns) of northern India, Muslim weavers were inspired by local calls for jihad given by men like Maulvi Ahmedullah Shah of Faizabad, Maulvi Liaquat Ali of Allahabad, and Maulvi Fazl Huq Khairabadi of Delhi. Yet the invocation of religion produced some complications. Certain Sunni religious leaders were not particularly excited by the prospect of a resurgence of Shia power in Awadh, others made pragmatism a virtue and refused to proclaim a jihad since success was hardly assured. Care had to be taken to build and preserve Hindu–Muslim unity which, according to some historians, blunted the millenarian edge of the movement. Even the Maulvi of Faizabad’s proclamation of jihad stressed the common threat posed by the *farangis* (foreigners) to Hindus and Muslims:

These accursed English had written to the impure Victoria . . . “if your Majesty will permit us to kill fifteen maulvis out of every hundred in India and the same number out of every hundred pandits as well as five hundred thousand of Hindu and Mahomedan sepoy and ryots we will in a short time make all the people of India Christian.” Then that ill-starred polluted bitch gave her consent to the spilling of this innocent blood.

Other proclamations were more polite but displayed a similar concern about Hindu–Muslim unity. The famous proclamation of Azimgarh of 25 August 1857 pointed out that ‘both Hindus and Muslims [were] being ruined under the tyranny and oppression of the infidel and treacherous English.’ Hindu religious millenarianism did not figure in the revolt, but rebel leaders like the Rani of Jhansi



and Tantia Topi have become part of the folklore and festivals of more recent times.

Agrarian protest was the other important strand of the revolt. Peasant recruits supplied the link between the military mutiny and the rural uprising. As with other aspects of the events of 1857, there is a lively debate among historians about the motivation, composition, and leadership of the agrarian dimensions of the revolt. The standard works on 1857 prior to the 1970s had argued that the loss of landed rights to urban traders and moneylenders was the main cause of discontent in the countryside. While the inroads of the *bania* (trader–moneylender) into the countryside undeniably took place, transfers of landed rights to them did not generally form the lion's share of such transfers. Careful district-level research in the 1970s also showed that revolt was often most intense in those regions where the moneylenders had been least successful in taking over landed rights. Eric Stokes pointed out that in some instances the moneylender was no more than 'the fly on the wheel'. Another round of research in the 1980s tended to resurrect the hated *bania* as one of the main culprits in the north Indian countryside. The chief villain, it is now agreed, was the British tax collector. The British revenue demand was arbitrary and high, and was especially insensitive to the subsistence needs of the drier districts. Yet economic factors on their own, in terms of either the moneylenders' or the revenue collectors' depredations, are not sufficient in explaining the motivation to revolt. Equally important was a sense of relative political deprivation. It was the decline of political clout and honour in relation to other neighbouring clans and communities which ferreted out the rebels from the collaborators of 1857. For instance, the Jat farmers of the south-west part of Saharanpur district were aggrieved because a high land-revenue demand was lowering their status relative to their social peers and marriage partners in other parts of the district.

It is more or less clear that the agrarian revolts were multi-class in character. Taluqdar magnates, village zamindars, tenant farmers, peasant proprietors and tribal communities, all participated in one region or another. In some regions agrarian dependants followed the lead of their landed chiefs, elsewhere they took the initiative and persuaded the elites to revolt. In other instances village brotherhoods displaying the *bhaiachara* (literally, 'brotherhood') tenure collectively decided to take up arms against the forces of

the colonial state. What emerges from the myriad complexities of a countryside in revolt is that 1857 witnessed much more than simply a feudal reaction. The participation and initiative of the subordinate classes reveals a collage of multifaceted revolt. Leadership at the local levels was drawn not only from the 'traditional elites' but also from rather ordinary people from lower social classes and castes who came to the forefront during the throes of rebellion. Nawab Walidad Khan, a landed magnate, directed the agrarian revolt in Bulandshahr district until he vanished mysteriously in 1858. Shah Mal, a Jat farmer, emerged from relative oblivion to lead the rebellion in Baraut locality in north-western India until he was killed in combat. Devi Singh, a village-level raja in Tappa Raya in Mathura, set up a parallel government until he was caught and hanged. Gonoo, an ordinary Kol tribesman, led the rebellion in the Chhotanagpur region. There were clearly many other such local rebel leaders who galvanized their communities to resist the British and their collaborators.

The revolt of 1857 in its aristocratic, religious and agrarian aspects was also a reaction against British racial arrogance — a key feature of the mid-Victorian era. The rebellion itself only served to harden the lines of racial animosity. There was brutality on both sides. Once the tide of war had turned in favour of the British, even relatively temperate officers, outraged by stories of rebel atrocities against English women and children, found the punishment of death by hanging too lenient. Although most were hanged, thousands of captured rebels were strapped to cannons and blown to shreds. Hundreds of villages were torched simply because of their proximity to rebel centres. Long after the war had ended the mental and psychological wounds continued to fester.

It had cost an astronomical sum of £ 50 million (Rs 500 million) to quell the mutiny-revolt of 1857. The abolition of the company in the aftermath of 1857 meant that this sum was included as part of the India debt which the newly created crown raj had to pay back to London. In order to restore the finances of the Indian administration, the taxation system was revamped. Land revenues were moderated but an income tax was imposed for the first time on wealthier urban groups. The most important restructuring under the crown was undertaken, however, in the domain of the armed forces. Upper-caste recruits from Gangetic north India were no longer deemed trustworthy. By 1875 nearly half of the British Indian

army was drawn from Punjab, a fitting reward for loyalty during the crisis, and Gurkhas from Nepal now became the new shock troops of the infantry brigades. When the mutiny broke out a mere 40,000 British soldiers had counterbalanced nearly 240,000 Indian sepoys. After 1857 it was decided that the ratio of Indian to European troops was never to be more than 2 : 1. British officers were placed in exclusive charge of the artillery. Communication networks, particularly railways, were streamlined to defend strategically important parts of the Indian empire.

Queen Victoria, in her proclamation of August 1858 taking India under the crown, made a few conciliatory gestures. Treaties with Indian princes, she assured, would be duly respected in future. Colonial subjects in general were promised a relatively benevolent government. Yet even by the time Victoria was proclaimed Empress of India at a glittering durbar in Delhi the mood in northern and central India remained sullen and sombre. Mirza Asadullah Khan Ghalib, one of the greatest-ever Urdu poets who lived through the cataclysm of 1857, captured the spirit of his times when he wrote in his couplets:

*Agehe ati thi hal-e-dil pe hansī*  
*Ab kisi baat pe nahin ati*

(Previously one laughed at the state of one's heart  
 now nothing at all elicits joy or laughter)

Or, in another wry reflection on the atmosphere of pessimistic gloom following the passing away of sovereignty:

*Kahte hain jeetay hain umeed pai log*  
*Hum ko jeenay ki bhi umeed nahin*

(It's said that people live on hope  
 I have no hope even of living)

## Chapter 10

# High Noon of Colonialism, 1858 to 1914: State and Political Economy

In the aftermath of the great mutiny-rebellion of 1857 the British crown decided to put an end to the company's by now well-advertised mismanagement of Indian affairs and extended its direct sway over the conquered territories. It is in the period from 1858 to 1914 that Britain is generally seen to have been able to extract solid strategic and economic advantages from its prize colonial possession. India was being fashioned into a colony not only to play a critical role in the international system of payments of the capitalist world economy for the sustenance of its hegemonic core, but was also indispensable in the strategic defence of that hegemony. The strategic imperative of using Indian troops for the defence of Britain's worldwide empire was achieved by amending the structure and composition of the army that had erupted in such serious revolt in 1857. India's economy was twisted to fit a classical colonial pattern of importing manufactured goods from the metropolis and exporting a variety of agricultural raw materials. Britain enjoyed a trade surplus with India. But it had a growing deficit in its overall international trade which was offset in this period by India's substantial export surplus with the rest of the world.

The switch from company to crown raj meant that instead of a governor-general India would now be ruled by the crown's viceroy. Instead of the company's court of directors in London, control over Indian affairs was now exercised by a secretary of state for India who was a member of Britain's cabinet. The most urgent task faced by the secretary of state and viceroy was the reorganization of the British Indian army and the civil bureaucracy so that the colony could once again play its crucial role in substantiating Britain's

imperial dominance. So the state in India, during the high noon of colonialism, developed some novel institutional features.

The British Indian army, as pointed out earlier, was organized on the principle of maintaining a high European ratio; this was never to fall short of 1 : 2 until the outbreak of World War I. Next to what was seen as a grand counterpoise of a sufficient British force, there was to be the more insidious 'counterpoise of natives against natives'. The British now not only recruited from among new social groups, especially Sikhs, Gurkhas, Punjabi Muslims and Pathans, but they also mixed the regiments in such a way that, as the secretary of state put it in 1862, 'Sikh might fire into Hindu, Gurkha into either, without any scruple in case of need.' As justification for the new recruitment patterns the colonial masters concocted a new-fangled, anthropological theory of martial races and castes. Punjabis and Gurkhas, for instance, in the British view possessed martial characteristics, but Bengalis and Tamils did not. The need to favour the chief recruiting grounds in economic policy contributed to disparities in wealth and the uneven pattern of colonial economic development. Punjab, for example, was favoured when decisions were made regarding public investment in irrigation. The discrepancies and distortions stemming from late-nineteenth-century alterations in the structure and composition of the army have constituted one of the more lasting legacies of colonial rule in the subcontinent.

A domestic rod of order and an international fire brigade, the British Indian army protected Britain's far-flung imperial interests from North Africa to East Asia. It helped put out the burning fires lit by the Mahdi uprisings of 1885–6 and 1896 in Sudan, the Boxer rebellion of 1900 in China, and the Boer war in South Africa during 1899–1902. Britain used Indian troops in its intervention in Egypt in 1882, which set the ball rolling for the partition of Africa. Closer to the subcontinent the British Indian army was deployed in Afghanistan in the late 1870s and the early 1880s, for the final conquest of Burma in the late 1880s, to impose British dominance in Tibet in 1902–3, and to bolster British influence in the Persian Gulf, especially southern Iran, Bahrain, Kuwait, Muscat and Aden in the first decade of the twentieth century. During the World War Indian troops were to play a critical role in the British campaigns in what was then called Mesopotamia, present-day Iraq. As many as 60,000 Indian soldiers died fighting for Britain during 1914–18. The costs of all

these military adventures were, needless to say, borne principally by Indian taxpayers.

As for the colonial bureaucracy — the ‘steel frame’ holding up the raj — Indians within it were discriminated against along racial lines. The upper echelons of the bureaucracy were exclusively British in composition. These senior British officials were recruited into the Indian civil service through competitive examinations held in London. Indian nationalists demanded that simultaneous civil service exams be held in Britain and India. Despite the passage of a resolution supporting simultaneous examinations by the house of commons in 1893, this administrative reform was not implemented until after the end of the World War I. Indians were needed at the lower levels of the administration, but even here many educated Indians faced racial discrimination. Some of them, notably Surendranath Banerji, turned to the nationalist cause in the wake of their disenchantment with the British colonial service.

Reordering political economy of colonial India was as important as restructuring institutions of state. From the early decades of the nineteenth century the free traders’ lobby in Britain had been gradually prising open the Indian market for their manufactured goods, especially cotton textiles. But it was only from the early 1850s that India was systematically cast into the role of exporter of agricultural raw materials, such as cotton, jute, tea, coffee, wheat, and oil seeds. The colonial system required the annual transfer of funds from the colony to the metropolis to meet an array of home charges. These were funnelled through India’s rising export surplus. Home charges included the cost of the secretary of state’s India office in London, costs of wars at home and abroad, purchase of military stores, pensions for British military and civilian officials and a guaranteed 6 per cent annual interest on railways. At the turn of the century visible home charges annually amounted to between seventeen and eighteen million pounds sterling. The chief items on the bill in order of magnitude were the guaranteed railway interest, military expenses, interest on the India debt, purchases of government stores and pensions. In addition to this, private remittances were made by British officials serving in India, and there were further transfers of profit by British merchants and ‘invisible’ charges for services, including shipping, banking, and insurance. The silver-based Indian rupee worth 2 shillings in 1872 had depreciated against the

pound sterling by 1893, when it was shifted on to a gold-exchange standard, by nearly half — to 1 shilling and 2 pence. The depreciating value of India's currency during the two decades from the early 1870s to the early 1890s increased the real burden of India's payments to Britain.

This 'drain', estimated at 5 per cent to 6 per cent of the total resources of India, took place through the notorious council bill system. British buyers of Indian exports paid sterling for council bills obtained from the secretary of state in London. The council bills were then presented by British trading firms in India to exchange banks where they were exchanged for rupees from the government of India's revenues. The rupees were then advanced to finance the production and trade in export commodities, e.g. jute. The rupee profits could subsequently be used to buy sterling bills at local branches of British-owned exchange banks and London paid sterling against these bills. The sterling could then once again be used to buy council bills, and so the annual cycle repeated itself.

Between 1870 to 1914 India's export surplus was critical for Britain's balance of payments. Growing protectionism in continental Europe and America made it difficult for Britain to sell its manufactured goods while being dependent on importing a broad range of their agricultural commodities. It was in this context that Indian raw-material exports to America and continental Europe proved vital for financing Britain's deficits with the USA and Europe. This was possible because Britain had a surplus with India and a huge deficit with the rest of the world, while India had a deficit with Britain and a huge surplus with the rest of the world.

The drain of wealth theory, first articulated by early Indian nationalists like Dadabhai Naoroji and Romesh Chunder Dutt, has been a topic of lively debate ever since the late nineteenth century. The British denied that the unilateral transfer of funds from India to Britain constituted anything more than returns on capital and payments for services rendered. While it is hard to construe military campaigns abroad as services rendered to India's colonial subjects, it is true that finance capital could be raised and certain stores purchased more cheaply in London than in India of the late nineteenth century. However, the crux of the nationalist critique was that the wealth drained away represented a potential investible surplus which would have contributed to economic development if it had remained

within the country. It was this which lent credence to charges of exploitation during the era of high colonialism.

Such charges of exploitation called for tempering the rules of governance in India. The colonial state's law of property served as an instrument of compromise, mainly through tenancy legislation, albeit one which was now more orientated than before to free-trader capitalism, or more aptly to a one-sided free-trader capitalism. In regions of zamindari revenue settlements, such as Bengal, the British legislated through the rent act of 1859 and the Bengal tenancy act of 1885 to give occupancy tenants moderation of rent and security of tenure. Elsewhere, as in Punjab, peasant proprietors were bolstered by passing laws such as the Punjab land alienation act of 1900 which limited the possibility of land transferring from agriculturist to non-agriculturist hands. These measures were taken because the development of colonial India as a vast market for British goods could only rest on an expansion of the broadly-based purchasing power of India's predominantly agrarian populace. The cultivation of new cash crops, such as cotton and jute, could also be promoted by lightening the revenue and rent burden. Colonial capitalists now preferred the credit mechanism rather than the revenue and rent structure of the state as the main channel of appropriating the agrarian surplus. The same merchants who bought council bills in London advanced money through a network of traders and moneylenders to the peasants who were actually engaged in primary production. Many peasants, in time, fell into an annual cycle of debt, while purchasing companies and their intermediaries obtained products cheaply and siphoned off sizeable interest payments.

The growing commercialization of Indian agriculture based on commodity production for the world market did create some brief periods of boom, for example in the cotton tracts during the years of the American civil war. But peasants were now exposed to the vagaries of the world market as never before. The downward fluctuations of the 1870s and the 1890s hit primary producers hard, particularly since many small peasants had turned to high-value and labour-intensive cash crops to ensure their subsistence. Fits of optimism in the third quarter of the nineteenth century were followed by disappointments and, finally, in the late 1890s these were swept away in a spate of devastating famines, especially in the cotton-growing regions of India. Between 1906 and 1913 the jute-growing



regions in eastern India enjoyed a boom which eventually collapsed during the World War.

If new ways were being devised to extract resources from the agrarian economy, the colonial state was coming under increasing pressure from the metropolis to institute fiscal policies designed to maintain India as the most important outlet for British manufactured goods. Despite facing a financial crisis during the Afghan war of the later 1870s, the government of India was prevented from raising customs duties by the Lancashire lobby in Britain. These duties were altogether abolished in 1882. When dire financial need compelled the colonial state to reintroduce customs duties on British textiles in the 1890s, London made sure that a countervailing excise duty was slapped on Indian manufactured textiles. This meant that the infant textile industry centring around Bombay and Ahmedabad, the only region where indigenous capital had moved from petty commerce to industry, was deprived of protective tariffs. This stunted the industrialization process in India and prevented the rise of a factory-based textile industry at a time when the artisanal industry had suffered serious setbacks.

The theme of deindustrialization in late-nineteenth-century India has been a matter of some disagreement. Nationalist critics generally pointed to the dwindling proportion of artisanal goods on India's export list. A few historians have tried to suggest that this is not sufficient evidence to sustain the argument of deindustrialization, and that India's domestic market may have been large enough to absorb both imported manufactures and domestic artisanal products. The poverty of the colony — the most optimistic estimate of per capita national income suggested a figure of under Rs 40, or about £ 2.5, compared to Britain's £ 52 at the turn of the century — casts some doubt over the buoyancy of Indian demand. It has also been suggested that Indian weavers benefitted from the supply of cheaper imported yarn. But this knocked out Indian spinners and also prevented the Indian weaving industry competing in costs with the factory-based manufacturing industry in Britain. Even if the older arguments about deindustrialization need some refinement, the disadvantaged status of the Indian colonial economy can hardly be in question.

Metropolitan imperatives invariably took precedence over the financial and political needs of the colonial state. The famous Indian

railways, often cited as the great modernizing achievement of colonialism, were planned and constructed to serve the strategic and economic needs of the metropolis. Nearly five thousand miles of railway lines were laid by the close of the nineteenth century. But they generally facilitated the movement of troops, the dispersal of British manufactured goods, and the extraction of raw materials from hinterlands to port cities. Since most of the equipment was imported from Britain, the building of the railways did not stimulate the growth of other ancillary industries. The deployment of British capital in this sector was a striking example of private investment at public risk, with investors receiving guaranteed interest payments whether the railways made profits or not. In the 1870s the outflow of interest actually exceeded the inflow of fresh capital into India.

British monopoly over the upper echelons of the institutions of state and over the reordering of political economy to their advantage did not mean that colonial rule was sought to be sustained without the support of Indian collaborators. The search for reliable collaborators began soon after the end of the mutiny-revolt of 1857. The rebellion had been the last gasp of resistance by disaffected Indian princes. The crown raj took calculated steps to make sure that the preservation of ceremonial trappings and a measure of internal autonomy transformed the princely states into solid bulwarks of empire. The colonial state juxtaposed to its own conception of monolithic, unitary sovereignty at the centre a shallow, if not fake, version of sovereignty reposed in the persons of 'traditional' rulers. This kind of sovereignty, which was merely the other side of the coin on which the supremacy of British sovereign power was clearly engraved, was later extended from the subcontinent to the coastal polities of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. The colonial reinvention of 'traditional' authority as part of its ideology of state had large consequences, helping transform princely India into a reliable base of support for the empire and freeing rulers legitimized by colonial 'tradition' from the trouble of seeking popular sanction. Having imported the notion of unitary sovereignty from post-Enlightenment Europe into colonial India to replace pre-colonial India's view of layered and shared sovereignty, the crown raj made certain it stymied any move towards the acquisition of substantive citizenship rights. In colonial India there were to be no citizens, only subjects of the empire and 'traditional' princes.

The British search for collaborators did not stop with the princes. Those taluqdars of north India who had remained loyal in 1857 were extended economic protection. Elsewhere, nurturing the landlord class as potential friends of the raj was balanced by an effort to promote export-oriented agriculture and preserve peace in the countryside by affording a measure of protection to peasants. The deepening financial troubles of the government of India and the increasing pressures brought to bear upon it by the metropolis led the colonial state to make institutional innovations that sought to widen the network of collaborators. One way to try and soften the blows dealt by the metropolis on Indian society was to push for the introduction of local self-government. This brand of representative government was not quite substantive democracy, but rather its obverse.

Beginning with the Indian councils act of 1861, provincial councils were created in Bengal, Madras and Bombay. In these councils British officials had a majority but a few nominated non-official Indians were consulted on legislative matters. In 1882 the viceroy, Ripon, extended the principle of granting Indians a measured say in local affairs; municipal and local boards were formed in most provinces. The costs of running these local government bodies and financing local development works were met by raising new taxes in the localities and provinces. This, it was hoped, would insulate the central state from the charge of imposing new taxes. It was also a convenient way of lowering administrative costs. And while most of the members of such boards were to be nominated, the British partly accepted the notion of elected representatives by agreeing to seriously consider the recommendations of certain Indian organizations. The proportion of non-official Indians in the councils was increased by another Indian councils act of 1892. But it was only in 1909 that the Morley–Minto reforms extended the links between the higher and lower councils, thus building bridges which local men with power and pelf could hope to cross to reach the provincial and, in exceptional cases, even the governor-general's legislative council at the centre. More importantly, British social engineering through censuses helped create supra-local caste and religious categories through which the colonial state could distribute differential patronage. The 'depressed classes' and the 'Indian Muslims' were such constructs. They were respectively accorded reservation of seats and separate electorates for election to local

and other representative bodies set up by the Morley–Minto reforms of 1909. This principle not only survived but was extended under the 1919 Montagu–Chelmsford reforms, and later incorporated into the government of India act of 1935. While dividing and categorizing their subjects according to new principles of social enumeration, the raj also had, in the words of Rajat Kanta Ray, ‘the overriding character of an imperial power which set apart its subjects in a block with interests fundamentally antagonistic to those of the rulers.’

If at the turn of the nineteenth century the Wellesley generation had brought to bear a new British national pride on their attitudes towards Indian society, the Curzon generation at the turn of the twentieth century exhibited a fully developed form of racial superiority and arrogance which had gathered momentum in the middle and late Victorian era. The British had hoped that the diamond jubilee of Victoria’s reign in 1897 would be an occasion for the



10. *British Majesty.* The Victoria Memorial in Calcutta started under the patronage of Lord Curzon. (Courtesy Sugata Bose.)

display of imperial pomp based on a sense of quiet confidence. But there were too many strands of insecurity flowing from the intense competition with European rivals for supremacy in relatively new and semi-colonies in Africa as well as South East and East Asia. Adding to feelings of insecurity was the new assertiveness of nationalist opponents, some of whom were talking back to the colonial masters in their own language. The general condition of the colonial subjects was dismal in 1897. 'The shadows darkened and deepened in their horrors as the year advanced,' Mahadev Govind Ranade recorded grimly, 'and it almost seemed as if the seven plagues which afflicted the land of the Pharaohs in old time were let loose upon us, for there is not a single province which had not its ghastly record of death and ruin to mark this period as the most calamitous year of the century within the memory of many generations past.' As famine and pestilence stalked the land, the radical critique of moderate nationalism grew more strident. By the time Curzon was building a marble monument in Victoria's memory on the sprawling green of Calcutta, Indian nationalists were already discussing swaraj (self-rule) and planning to turn the raj itself into a bad memory.

## Chapter 11

# A Nation in the Making? 'Rational' Reform, 'Religious' Revival and Swadeshi Nationalism, 1858–1914

Historians who focused on the politics of western-educated elites had little hesitation in identifying the beginnings of modern nationalism, narrowly defined, as the most important historical theme of late-nineteenth-century India. The foundation of the Indian National Congress in 1885 provided a convenient starting point for those with a penchant for chronological precision. The recent reorientation of modern Indian historiography towards subordinate social groups has dramatically altered perspectives and added confusion, complexity, subtlety, and sophistication to the understanding of Indian society in the high noon of colonialism. Anti-colonialism can be seen now to have been a much more variegated phenomenon than simply the articulate dissent of educated urban groups imbued with western concepts of liberalism and nationalism. The currents and cross-currents of social reform informed by 'reason', and its apparent rejection in movements of religious revival, are being weighed and analysed more carefully. The overlapping nature of the periodization of resistance is being recognized. The *ulgulan* or great tumult of 1899–1900 of the Munda tribe on the Bengal–Bihar border was, after all, roughly coterminous with the first major attempt by the educated urban elite to mobilize mass support for the swadeshi movement of 1905–8. What was novel, however, about the late nineteenth century was the interconnectedness, though not necessarily the convergence, of social and political developments across regions on an unprecedented scale. In that general sense it was during this period that the idioms, and even the irascible idiosyncrasies, of communitarian identities

and national ideologies were sought to be given a semblance of coherence and structure. What needs emphasizing is that there were multiple and competing narratives informed by religious and linguistic cultural identities seeking to contribute to the emerging discourse on the Indian nation.

Some of the impetus to the redefinition of social identities and the quest for social mobility was provided by the initiatives of the colonial state. The decennial censuses began a process of enumeration and rank-ordering of castes which spurred a great competition among many sub-castes by jati for high varna status. Upwardly mobile social groups rewrote their caste histories and changed their caste names as they climbed the ladder of respectability. For example, in north Tamil Nadu the Pallis claimed high varna status in 1872 and started calling themselves Vanniyas; in south Tamil Nadu the Shanans did the same in 1901 and referred to themselves as Nadars. Between 1872 and 1911 the Kaibartas of west Bengal became Mahishyas, the Chandals of east Bengal Namasudras, and the Koches of north Bengal Rajbansi Kshatriyas. The desire for higher social status through census manipulation was discernible among Muslims as well: butchers started calling themselves Quraishi and weavers Mumin. Many Muslims claimed foreign descent in order to gain recognition as members of the ashraf classes in northern India and Bengal.

Although in 1858 the colonial power had announced its intention not to interfere in the private realm of 'religion' and 'custom', its policies in the late nineteenth century ensured that precisely these concerns had to be bandied about in the 'public' arenas of the press and politics. A plethora of communitarian narratives written in 'modernized' vernacular languages, therefore, filled the pages churned out by a burgeoning press and publications market. In order to gain the attention of a colonial state minded to disburse differential patronage, publicists needed to dip their pens in the ink of community. A direct public statement of anti-colonial politics ran the risk of running foul of the laws of sedition enshrined in a battery of vernacular press acts. The fictive separation of religion and politics in the colonial stance was breached the moment the British took the momentous decision to deploy religious enumeration to define 'majority' and 'minority' communities. Colonial constitutional initiatives lent religiously-based communitarian affiliations a greater

supra-local significance than regional, linguistic, class and sectarian divergences might otherwise have warranted. The most important step in this regard was the construction of the political category of 'Indian Muslim'. Whatever the internal differences among India's Muslims, this encouraged them to lay emphasis on their religious identity in putting forward political claims. Not all of the social stirrings, of course, are reducible to colonial stimulus even if they occurred within a broad colonial context of British rule. Brahman social dominance, bolstered by a British-sponsored neo-Brahmanical ruling ideology, provoked a strong anti-Brahman or non-Brahman backlash in parts of western and southern India. A prominent example of such a lower-caste movement is Jyotirao Phule's Satyashodhak Samaj (Society for the Quest of Truth), established in 1873 in Maharashtra. The debates between rival schools of Islam in the Punjab and Bengal also had a measure of autonomy from colonial manipulations. The redefinition of a more religiously informed cultural identity among Muslims in the late nineteenth century should not be mistaken, however, for a kind of 'communalism' that has been read back into this period in retrospectively constructed 'nationalist' pasts.

Social reform and religious revival were once seen by historians of the nineteenth century as starkly contradictory processes. Hindu revival in the late nineteenth century was reckoned to be gaining the upper hand over reformist activities set in motion in the 1820s and 1830s. Educated Muslim society was deemed to be experiencing a tussle between pro-West reformers and conservative revivalists. Social trends among Hindus and Muslims alike were much too nuanced to be captured by the reform–revival, modernity–tradition or indeed our (Indian) modernity–their (Western) modernity dichotomies. It is true that Brahmo reform was limited to a small circle and Iswarchandra Vidyasagar's support for widow remarriage in the 1850s was the final episode in which reformers prevailed within the public debate in Bengal. The atmosphere was markedly more conservative during the controversy over the age of consent act of 1891, which raised the legal age of marriage for girls from ten to twelve. The intrusiveness of the colonial state, which was seeking to impose western medicine during the plague epidemics of the late 1890s, elicited an even more virulent protest all over India. This did not amount to a wholesale rejection of the potential benefits of western science, but represented an attitude of resistance to the



intrusiveness of an authoritarian colonial state. The conflation of the colonial state with western/modern medicine has led some historians to view modern science primarily in terms of a grave assault on the body of the colonized, and to greatly exaggerate the anti-modern, religious overtones of resistance against epidemic measures. A more powerful critique of the colonial state would concentrate on its inaction, if not complete dereliction of responsibility in the arena of public health, and a more historically fine-tuned analysis of the attitudes of colonial subjects would reveal strands of resistance to, as well as the selective appropriation of, new scientific knowledge.

Religious sensibility could in the late nineteenth century be perfectly compatible with a rational frame of mind, just as rational reform almost invariably sought divine sanction of some kind. Speaking at the eleventh social conference in Amraoti in 1897, Ranade scored a debating point against his 'revivalist' critics:

When my revivalist friend presses his argument upon me, he has to seek recourse in some subterfuge which really furnishes no reply to the question — what shall we revive? Shall we revive the old habits of our people when the most sacred of our caste indulged in all the abominations as we now understand them of animal food and drink which exhausted every section of our country's Zoology and Botany? The men and the Gods of those old days ate and drank forbidden things to excess in a way no revivalist will now venture to recommend.

What lay at 'the root of our helplessness', Ranade declared, was the sense that we are always intended to remain children, to be subject to outside control, and never to rise to the dignity of self-control by making our conscience and our reason the supreme, if not the sole, guide to our conduct. . . . We are children, no doubt, but the children of God, and not of man, and the voice of God is the only voice [to] which we are bound to listen. . . . With too many of us, a thing is true or false, righteous or sinful, simply because somebody in the past has said that it is so. . . . Now the new idea which should take up the place of this helplessness and dependence is not the idea of a rebellious overthrow of all authority, but that of freedom responsible to the voice of God in us.

Seven years later, in 1904, in an article entitled 'Reform or Revival', Lala Lajpat Rai sought to argue that while the reformers

wanted reform on 'rational' lines the revivalists wanted reform on 'national' lines. Attempting to turn Ranade's argument on its head, Lajpat Rai wrote:

Cannot a revivalist, arguing in the same strain, ask the reformers into what they wish to reform us? Whether they want us to be reformed on the pattern of the English or the French? Whether they want us to accept the divorce laws of Christian society or the temporary marriages that are now so much in favour in France or America? Whether they want to make men of our women by putting them into those avocations for which nature never meant them? . . . Whether they want to reform us into Sunday drinkers of brandy and promiscuous eaters of beef? In short, whether they want to revolutionize our society by an outlandish imitation of European customs and manners and an undiminished adoption of European vice?

By this time Ranade was dead and he could not reply that there need be no necessary contradiction between the rational and the national.

In late-nineteenth-century Maharashtra, Hindu revival centred on Poona, and it had a clear, strong Brahmanical content. Yet it was also from its Maharashtra base that Ranade's Social Conference sought to make a case for reform rather than revival. Lajpat Rai was a legator of the Arya Samaj (Aryan Society) led by Dayanand Saraswati which had, in late-nineteenth-century Punjab and western U.P., sought to include reformist postures on issues such as child marriage, widow remarriage, idolatry, travel overseas, and caste — within a framework of the assertion of Hindu supremacy over other religious faiths. If Hindu regeneration in Maharashtra had a Brahmanical flavour and the variant in Punjab had supremacist overtones, Hindu revival in Bengal certainly had its ambiguities. Ramakrishna Paramhansa, a priest in a Kali temple north of Calcutta, who cast an almost hypnotic spell over the Calcutta intelligentsia (including staunch 'rationalists'), clearly posed an antithesis to the western concept of rationality. But his disciple Swami Vivekananda, who gained international fame at this time, preached the twin messages of self-strengthening and social service. He told young men that it was more important to play football than to pray and predicted a millennium in which the poor, the downtrodden, and the Shudra would come into their own. Vivekananda seemed to have little difficulty in combining reason with his vision of nation and religion. He derided conservative opponents of the age of consent

bill and commented on northern Indian protectors of the sacred mother cow — ‘like mother, like son’. Vivekananda was also generally respectful towards other religious faiths, including Islam, and took a clear stand against what he called religiously inspired ‘fanaticism’. So there was in the late nineteenth century a great deal of interplay and overlap between the strands of reform and revival, whose meanings varied by region.

A sharply defined fault-line between tradition and modernity as well as Indian and European modernity makes it impossible to take full account of the contestations that animated the creative efforts to fashion a vibrant culture and politics of anti-colonial modernity. These efforts were not just staked on claims of cultural exclusivity or difference but also on imaginative cultural borrowings and intellectual adaptations that consciously transgressed the frontier between ‘us’ and ‘them’. A difference-seeking distortion has crept into studies, such as those of Partha Chatterjee, which privilege a particular strand of ‘our’ modernity as *the* tradition of social and historical thinking on modernism and nationalism. Bankim Chattopadhyay, the Bengali Hindu novelist of the late nineteenth century, has been seen as an exemplar on this view of modernist, nationalist thought at its ‘moment of departure’. Yet even within the charmed circle of the Bengali Hindu middle-class intelligentsia there were many different responses to the challenge of western modernity. Rationalism and humanism were drawn upon by men like Rabindranath Tagore from both India’s pre-colonial and Europe’s post-Enlightenment intellectual traditions in projects of internal, social regeneration and reform which, on the whole, strengthened the ability to contest Western colonial power in the arenas of politics and the state. In its attitude to European modernity the first radical intellectual challenge to moderate nationalism was remarkably discriminating, judicious, and balanced. Aurobindo Ghose’s remarks on this point in his sixth essay, ‘New Lamps for Old’, published on 4 December 1893, bear quoting at some length:

No one will deny, — no one at least in that considerable class to whose address my present remarks are directed, — that for us, and even for those of us who have a strong affection for original oriental things and believe that there is in them a great deal that is beautiful, a great deal that is serviceable, a great deal that is worth keeping, the most important objective

is and must inevitably be the admission into India of Occidental ideas, methods and culture: even if we are ambitious to conserve what is sound and beneficial in our indigenous civilization, we can only do so by assisting very largely the influx of Occidentalism. But at the same time we have a perfect right to insist, and every sagacious man will take pains to insist, that the process of introduction shall not be as hitherto rash and ignorant, that it shall be judicious, discriminating. We are to have what the West can give us, because what the West can give us is just the thing and the only thing that will rescue us from our present appalling condition of intellectual and moral decay, but we are not to take it haphazard and in a lump; rather we shall find it expedient to select the very best that is thought and known in Europe, and to import even that with the changes and reservations which our diverse conditions may be found to dictate. Otherwise instead of a simple ameliorating influence, we shall have chaos annexed to chaos, the vices and calamities of the West superimposed on the vices and calamities of the East.

To put it in another way, colonized intellectuals were clearly seeking alternative routes of escape from the oppressive present, not all of which lay through creating illusions about *our* past and denouncing *their* modernity.

An extension of the scope of enquiry to Muslim ashraf classes of northern India immediately reveals more intellectual variations on the theme of colonial and anti-colonial modernity. The variety of the Muslim elite's responses to British colonialism and western modernity cannot be captured within the facile distinctions between 'liberals' and 'traditionalists' or 'modernists' and 'anti-modernists'. A reform-oriented current within Indian Islam was led by Saiyid Ahmed Khan, who sought to alter British conceptions about inherent Muslim disloyalty and urged his co-religionists to accept Western education but not necessarily all its ideals. It was religious narrow-mindedness which, according to him, had prevented Muslims from taking advantage of the new education. In 1875 he established the Aligarh Anglo-Muhammadan Oriental College which attracted the sons of Muslim landlords of northern India and drew British patronage. Yet, while making some compromises with the British, the Aligarh movement initiated by Saiyid Ahmed still jealously guarded against intrusions into what was termed custom as well as personal law. Many affluent Muslims in north India and Bengal challenged the British attempt to draw a distinction between legal

public *waqfs* (charitable institutions), and illegal private ones established for the benefit of family members. Since charity begins at home, they saw no reason why they should be debarred from preventing the fragmentation of property through recourse to the time-honoured loophole in Islamic inheritance laws. After all, in Punjab it was customary law rather than the Islamic sharia which decided matters related to inheritance. Saiyid Ahmed's rational approach to Islamic theology and law nevertheless earned him the hostility of the ulema bunched in the theological seminaries at Deoband and, less vociferously, Faranghi Mahal in Lucknow.

The ulema were not alone in opposing Saiyid Ahmed's newfangled views. His ardent promotion of western knowledge and culture as well as loyalty to the raj drew acerbic comments from Muslims attached to their moorings and the ideal of a universal Muslim *ummah*. The anti-Aligarh school was given a fillip by the great preacher of Islamic universalism Jamaluddin al-Afghani, who lived in Hyderabad and Calcutta between 1879 and 1882. In India al-Afghani tempered his adherence to the political principles of Islamic universalism with calls for Hindu–Muslim unity against British colonialism. The poet Akbar Allahabadi, in his satirical verses, mercilessly ridiculed Saiyid Ahmad Khan and his associates for their shallow imitation of Western culture:

The venerable leaders of the nation had determined  
Not to keep scholars and worshippers at a disadvantage  
Religion will progress day by day  
Aligarh College is London's mosque

But Akbar Allahabadi was equally derisive towards obscurantist maulvis. Maulana Shibli Numani, an associate of Saiyid Ahmed Khan, endorsed the Aligarh line that Indian Muslims were British subjects and not bound by religion or Islamic history to submit to the dictates of the Ottoman Khilafat. Yet on matters closer home, Shibli's Islamic sentiments led him to take political paths different from those charted by Saiyid Ahmed Khan. By 1895 he was publicly opposing Saiyid Ahmed Khan's policy of Muslim non-participation in the Indian National Congress. So, in the 1890s, although there were serious instances of Hindu–Muslim conflict — for instance over the cow protection issue, the question of Hindi versus Urdu, and the nature of electoral representation in much of the northern India and beyond

— intra-communitarian debates, tensions and contradictions were almost quite as important as inter-communitarian ones.

Deepening and widening the historical perspective to include subalternity along lines of gender and class makes the cognitive map of colonial and anti-colonial modernity even richer and more complex. Rokeya Sakhawat Hossain's early-twentieth-century tract *Sultana's Dream*, in which all the men were put in purdah, is perhaps an extreme but revealing example of male dominance without hegemony. In any case, an overemphasis on the discourses of elite men and the 'modern' political associations formed by them would provide a very incomplete picture of the multifaceted contestations of the hubris of colonial modernity. Anti-colonial resistance in the late nineteenth century certainly took many forms. Civilian insurrections of the sort noted in the early nineteenth century were less frequent but not uncommon. A multi-class rural revolt took place in Maharashtra in 1879. Tenants' protests against landlords took on a religious flavour among the Mappillas of Malabar. The new context of colonial tenancy law appeared to rob peasant resistance in Bengal of its communitarian character and injected a legalistic and quasi-class dimension, as in the anti-rent Pabna agrarian movements of the 1870s. The collapse of the cotton boom created the conditions for the Deccan riots of the mid-1870s, in which Marwari moneylenders from the north were prime targets. No-revenue campaigns were launched in Assam and Maharashtra in the 1890s. Where forests met the plains in Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Central India, Bengal and Bihar, tribes revolted against the incursions of foreigners, white and brown. The most serious millenarian tribal uprising occurred in eastern India, led by Birsa Munda in 1899–1900. Subaltern anti-colonialism pre-dated attempts by an urban elite to engage in the politics of 'mass mobilization' against British rule.

In the cities at this time, the intelligentsia were articulating their disaffection in organized fashion and the small class of industrial labour made its early protests in a combination of class and communitarian modes brought from the rural areas. Educated Indians had been forming political associations at the regional level since the 1870s. The more prominent among these were the Poona Sarvajanic Sabha (1870), the Indian Association (in Bengal, 1876), the Madras Mahajana Sabha (1884), and the Bombay Presidency Association (1885). After coming together at a couple of national



11. 'The Face of Subaltern Resistance'. Birsa Munda, leader of the Munda 'ulgulan' of 1899-1900. Courtesy the archives of the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.

conferences, these city-based professionals were able to set up a permanent organization — the Indian National Congress — in 1885. The first annual session of the Congress was attended by seventy-three self-appointed delegates. The political character and role of the early spokesmen of Indian nationalism varied according to region. In Bengal the professionals who formed the Indian Association had broken ranks with rentier landlords who had their own British Indian Association since 1851. The fact of European dominance of commerce and industry in eastern India also facilitated a certain autonomy and radical disposition among the Bengali intelligentsia. Elsewhere, *vakils* (lawyers) who played such a dominant role in early nationalist organizations were no more than publicists tied to the interests of *shetias* (commercial men) in Bombay, or *raises* (local notables) in Allahabad.

The early leadership of the Indian National Congress was moderate in its methods and aims. Its preferred method was the constitutional way of prayer and petition. The chief political aims were expansion of the elective principle in legislative councils, and greater Indianization of the administration. On the economic front, nationalist writers and spokesmen developed a powerful critique of the whole gamut of colonial policies — the high land-revenue demand contributing to famines, the drain of wealth leading to general impoverishment, and the use of indentured labour on plantations in India and abroad resulting in degradation and oppression. There were persistent calls for cutbacks in military expenditure and greater opportunities for elected Indians to discuss the government budget. The successes of the moderate Congress in extracting concessions from the British were modest, at best. From the mid-1890s a new generation of nationalists began to criticize the mendicancy of moderate leaders and called for a bolder approach. The intellectual critique of moderation gathered momentum in Bengal from 1893, took concrete form in Tilak's Ganapati festivals from 1894, no-revenue campaigns and protest against the countervailing excise duty on Indian cotton in 1896, and then dramatically announced itself with the first terrorist assassination of two British officials — including Walter Rand, the hated plague commissioner in Poona — by the Chapekar brothers in 1897. But it was Curzon's aggressive imperialism between 1899 and 1905 which provided fuel to the 'extremist' strands of Indian resistance in the first decade of the twentieth century.

Curzon tried to roll back some of the concessions granted to educated Indians by his predecessors in the fields of education and local government. He passed laws restricting the autonomy of universities from officialdom and reducing non-official Indian representation on municipalities. By far his most controversial decision was to partition the province of Bengal in 1905. Although sought to be justified on grounds of administrative efficiency, the partition was clearly a political move. As Curzon's home secretary put it, 'Bengal united is a power; Bengal divided would pull in different ways . . . one of our main objects is to split up and thereby weaken a solid body of opponents to our rule.' More insidious was the attempt to pit Muslim against Hindu by claiming that the creation of a separate Muslim-majority province in eastern Bengal with



Dhaka as its capital would almost resurrect the lost glories of the Mughal empire. Curzon received support from some Muslim landlords, particularly Nawab Salimullah of Dhaka, on whose estate the Muslim League was eventually born in December 1906. Two months before that, in October 1906, a deputation of Muslim landlords from northern India had called on Curzon's successor Minto and, with some prompting, requested separate electorates for Muslims and representation in proportion to their social and political importance rather than numbers alone. The partition was an affront to most educated Bengali students and professionals, Hindu and Muslim alike, who were proud of their common language and culture. Even the moderate Surendranath Banerji vowed to 'unsettle' what Curzon claimed to be the 'settled fact' of partition. Rabindranath Tagore gave poetic expression to Bengali determination:

*Bidhir bandhan katbe tumi?*

*Emni shaktiman, tumi emni shaktiman!*

(You will cut the bond decreed by Providence?

you are so powerful, are you!)

Resistance to partition signalled the beginning of the swadeshi movement. Although Bengal was the main centre of agitation, the reverberations were felt in other parts of India. The Indian National Congress took up the cause and the sophisticated moderate leader from Bombay, Gopal Krishna Gokhale, stated in flattery of the Bengalis: 'What Bengal thinks today, India thinks tomorrow.' The swadeshi movement of 1905–8 has often been seen as the initial coming together and the subsequent parting of ways of moderate and extremist nationalists. It would be more accurate to identify, as Sumit Sarkar has done, at least four strands within the nationalist movement in this period. First, the old moderates who believed in constitutional methods but were deeply offended by Curzon's aggressive measures (men such as Surendranath Banerji and Gopal Krishna Gokhale). Second, leaders of society who until 1905 had called for a process of self-strengthening or *atmashakti* before engaging in a head-on collision with the British raj. Rabindranath Tagore is a good example of this legion. Third, a new generation of assertive leaders who propounded the doctrine of passive resistance, which was to include relentless boycott of British goods and institutions but also violence if repression became intolerable.



12. 'Lal, Bal and Pal'. Lala Lajpat Rai of the Punjab, Balwantrao Gangadhar Tilak of Maharashtra and Bipin Chandra Pal of Bengal, leaders from three different regions of India's nationalist movement at the turn of the century, c. 1906. Courtesy the archives of the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.

Among the main votaries of this form of political extremism were Aurobindo Ghose, Lala Lajpat Rai, Balwantrao Gangadhar Tilak and Bipin Chandra Pal, the last three forming a popular troika of Lal, Bal and Pal. Finally, there were small bands of angry and impatient young men, and some women too, who took to the cult of the bomb, believing revolutionary terror to be the only language that their colonial masters would understand.

In the early stages of the swadeshi movement, political extremists and believers in *atmashakti* came to the forefront with their programme of boycott and national education. Moderate constitutionalists were stampeded into accepting not only new methods of struggle but also a redefined goal of *swaraj*, which passive resisters interpreted as something close to full independence. During

1905–6 the boycott of British cotton textiles and other consumer goods was quite effective. There was nearly a twenty-five per cent fall in the quantity of cotton piece-goods imported in the first year of the agitation. Bonfires of cotton cloth and the shunning of official courts and educational institutions foreshadowed some of the methods of mass agitation used more widely later, in the Gandhian era. The cry ‘Bande Mataram’ was used as the main nationalist slogan. As Aurobindo Ghose argued in 1907, it was only when ‘the Mother had revealed herself’ that ‘the patriotism that work[ed] miracles and save[d] a doomed nation [wa]s born.’ He credited Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay with having caught the first modern glimpse of this grand spectacle: ‘It was thirty-two years ago that Bankim wrote his great song and few listened; but in a sudden moment of awakening from long delusions the people of Bengal looked round for the truth and in a fated moment somebody sang *Bande Mataram*. The mantra had been given . . .’

Bankim’s hymn to the Mother, originally written and printed in 1875 as a filler for a blank page in his journal *Bangadarshan* (Vision/Philosophy of Bengal), had a chequered and controversial career in the service of the nationalist movement:

*Bande mataram,  
sujalaang suphalaang, malayaja sheetalang,  
shasya shyamalaang mataram . . .  
saptakotikantha-kalakala-ninada-karale,  
dwisaptakotibhujaidhritakharakarabale,  
abala keno ma eto bale!  
Bahubaladhaarineeng, namami taarineeng,  
ripudalabaarineeng mataram.*

(I bow to you, Mother,  
well-watered, well-fruited,  
breeze cool, crop green,  
the Mother!  
Seven crore voices in your clamorous chant,  
twice seven crore hands holding aloft mighty scimitars,  
Who says, Mother, you are weak?  
Repository of many strengths,  
scourge of the enemy’s army, the Mother!)

The magic number of seven crores refers, of course, to Bengalis, and the Mother whom Bankim had in mind in 1875, even though

there is no specific mention, is Bangamata or Mother Bengal. It might have been less controversial and more universally acceptable if the last verse had not gone on to equate the mother country with the mother goddess, and if the song had not been inserted in 1882 into Bankim Chattopadhyay's novel *Ananda Math* which dripped with anti-Muslim prejudice.

In rendering homage to the mother country, political extremists decided in 1905 to avoid violence. The decision was tactical, not ideological. With the Indian populace totally disarmed, Aurobindo pointed out that the use of violence would be unwise because it carried the battle on to ground where Indians were comparatively weak from ground where they were strong. Yet there were points of weakness even in the strategy of boycott. Educated professionals, students and small sections of the working class in Calcutta and Bombay were the main supporters of swadeshi. Boycott of foreign goods also enabled something of a revival of artisanal crafts and industries, but indigenous mill-owners in Bombay and Ahmedabad took the opportunity to hike up prices and make unconscionable profits. Swadeshi soon proved an expensive indulgence for the common Bengali peasant. There were some outbreaks of violence in east Bengal in which Muslim peasants attacked Hindu landlords, moneylenders and traders. Rabindranath Tagore captured the changing mood. In 1905 he had composed songs celebrating the unity of Bengalis responding to the mother's call. His novel *Ghare Baire* (Home and the World) reflected the sombre spirit of 1908, by which time the coercive methods of swadeshi agitators had alienated the Muslim poor. When the masses refused to rise in rebellion the young swadeshi nationalists fell back on individual terror.

Outside Bengal political extremism took root in Punjab, Maharashtra, and parts of Madras presidency. In Punjab, the British decision to put up canal-water rates provoked much peasant discontent in 1906–7. In Maharashtra, extremists under Tilak's leadership used religious symbolism and Maratha folklore to enthuse the richer peasantry in the interior and workers in the textile mills. In Madras, there was much sympathy for the Bengali cause and a spurt in swadeshi industry in the extreme south of the province. But by and large the rest of India remained quiescent. In 1907 the extremists found themselves on the defensive at the annual session of Congress at Surat, and left the meeting after hurling shoes at the

moderates. The latter had by now reneged on the resolutions on boycott and swaraj, declaring 'steady reform of the existing system of administration' to be their goal. They had correctly anticipated that constitutional concessions were on the anvil. In fact the Morley–Minto reforms had the avowed objective of rallying the moderates. As the extremist leadership was cast into prison, or sent into exile, the liberal secretary of state, Morley, could only ruefully confess that he was becoming 'an accomplice in Cossack rule'. Tilak was sent off to spend six years in a Burmese prison. But the extremists won a pyrrhic victory. The British went back on promises made to their Muslim allies and annulled the partition of Bengal in 1911. This embarrassed the loyalist Muslims and cleared the way for the capture of the Muslim League by nationalist professionals in 1912–13. The British also decided to remove their capital from the troublesome province of Bengal. As viceroy Hardinge made a ceremonial entry on an elephant into New Delhi in 1912, he was greeted with a Bengali revolutionary's bomb.

The swadeshi era was distinguished by a bold redefinition of nationalist aims and strategies as well as an accompanying cultural awakening. Making a distinction between the 'problematic' and the 'thematic' of nationalist thought, Partha Chatterjee in his book *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World* has suggested that it constituted a 'different' but 'dominated' or derivative discourse. In a more recent work, *The Nation and its Fragments*, he draws a dichotomy between the inner, spiritual on the one hand, and the outer, material domain on the other. Arguing that anti-colonial nationalism 'creates its own domain of sovereignty' in the former, he asserts that the history of nationalism as a political movement, by focussing on 'the material domain of the state', has 'no option but to choose its forms from the gallery of "models" offered by European and American nation-states: "difference" is not a viable criterion in the domain of the material.' If we are to unravel the contextual and contestatory dimensions of modernity and of one of its key signs — nationalism — we need to disturb both binaries: the one separating the inner, spiritual, from the outer, material, domain; and the other relating to the 'two intellectual arenas of modernity' — 'the Western claiming to be the universal and the national aspiring to be different'. Despite a measure of derivation in nationalist thought at the founding moment of modernity in the so-called material

domain of the state, there was a powerful critique as well of modular forms supplied by the West. More important, the national or anti-colonial definitions of modernity aspired to be both different and universal. The claim to difference in the realm of the state was, for instance, articulated by Aurobindo Ghose, when he wrote that political ‘unification . . . ought not to be secured at the expense of the free life of the regional peoples or of the communal liberties and not therefore by . . . a rigidly unitarian imperial state.’ The ‘lifeless attempt’ to ‘reproduce with a servile fidelity the ideals and forms of the West’ was, in his view, ‘no true indication of the political mind and genius of the Indian people.’ The claim to universality was perhaps most eloquently stated in the works of Rabindranath Tagore. Tagore’s writings on nationalism and modernity disdainfully rejected European forms of the nation-state without surrendering an anti-colonial intellectual position, while at the same time advocating and accepting universalist ideals of reason and humanism. A claim to difference and universality had been explicitly articulated by Bipin Chandra Pal in the inaugural issue of the English weekly *New India* on 12 August 1901:

New India can, therefore, no more ignore the ancient spiritual treasures of the Hindus, than the higher elements of Muhammadan culture, or the intellectual and moral ideals of modern European civilization. Its standpoint is intensely national in spirit, breathing the deepest veneration for the spiritual, moral and intellectual achievements of *Indian civilisation*, and distinctly universal, in aspiration, reaching out to all that is noblest and loveliest in *Western culture*.

Steering a creative path between an unthinking eulogy of European ‘enlightenment’ and an indiscriminating assault on the ‘modern’, the more imaginative strands of anti-colonial modernity fashioned a cultural and political space where there was no necessary contradiction between nationality and human community.

On the key questions of relations between the overarching Indian nation on the one hand and religious communities and linguistic regions on the other, anti-colonial thought and politics of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries left contradictory legacies. The anti-colonialism of both Hindus and Muslims was influenced in this period by their religious sensibilities. But since the colonial state’s scheme of enumeration had transformed one into the ‘majority’

and the other into the 'minority' community, it became easier for Hindu religious symbolisms and communitarian interests to be subsumed within the emerging discourse on the Indian nation. Even a Saiyid Ahmed Khan, his loyalism notwithstanding, was more opposed to majoritarianism of the Congress variety than the idea of an Indian nation. Others more inclined to making common cause with the Congress and seeking location within the construct of the Indian nation found it increasingly difficult to be accepted as both Muslim communitarians and Indian nationalists. The granting of 'communal' electorates compounded the problem even further. As Maulana Mohamed Ali complained to his Congress colleagues in 1912, the educated Hindu 'communal patriot' had turned Hinduism into an effective symbol of mass mobilization and Indian 'nationality', but 'refuse[d] to give quarter to the Muslim unless the latter quietly shuffles off his individuality and becomes completely Hinduized.'

If religiously based notions of majority and minority were already beginning to pose problems for a unified Indian nationalism, as yet there appeared to be little contradiction between Bengali or Tamil linguistic communities or 'nations' on the one hand and a broader diffuse Indian 'nation' on the other. The poetry of Rabindranath Tagore and Subrahmanian Bharati could be equally harnessed in the service of regional and all-India nationalisms. Abanindranath Tagore's painting 'Bharatamata' was originally conceived as Mother Bengal and then ungrudgingly offered in the service of a wider Indian nation. Few, if any, of the nationalist ideologues were thinking at this stage of the acquisition of power in a centralized nation-state. The swadeshi nationalist Bipin Chandra Pal pointed out that the legendary king Bharata had been described in ancient texts as *rajchakravarti*. Pal took some pains to explain that the 'literal meaning of the term is not emperor, but only a king "established at the centre of a circle of kings."' King Bharata was a great prince of this order.' His position was 'not that of the administrative head of any large and centralized government, but only that of the recognized and respected centre', which was the 'general character' of all great princes in ancient times. Under Muslim rule, according to Pal, Indian unity, 'always more or less of a federal type', became 'still more pronouncedly so'. He left his readers in little doubt about the type of state he would prefer once swaraj was won. India's two most celebrated poet-philosophers, Rabindranath Tagore and

Muhammad Iqbal, writing in Bengali and Urdu respectively, had produced in 1904 and 1905 patriotic narrations of linguistic and territorial nations of effervescent literary quality. But what they saw of the swadeshi movement in Bengal — communitarian bigotry in Punjab as well as the European rivalries of a murderous sort — turned both into powerful critics of the western model of the territorial nation-state.

At the height of the swadeshi movement, Aurobindo Ghose had written warmly about national ego, but he also saw nationalist India preserving itself in a kind of cosmopolitanism, somewhat as the individual preserves itself in the family, the family in the class, the class in the nation, not destroying itself needlessly but recognizing the larger interest. The relatively comfortable coexistence of a multiplicity of identities — linguistic, regional, religious, national and international — would not be left undisturbed in subsequent decades.



## Chapter 12

# Colonialism Under Siege: State and Political Economy after World War I

**S**evere dislocations wrought by World War I in India's economy and society set the stage for mass nationalist movements in the early 1920s. Some of the old axioms underlying the organization of the colonial state and political economy since 1857 had to be abandoned on account of wartime exigencies. It is important, therefore, to be clear about the impact of the First War on the structure of the colonial state and the economic relationship between metropolis and colony. While addressing this theme, the present chapter also draws a broad analytical framework which takes into account continuities and changes in the state and political economy, enabling us to correctly place the mass politics of the 1920s, the economic and political crises of the Depression decade, and upheavals around and during the Second War.

The first administrative change with the outbreak of war in 1914 was in the strict 1 : 2 ratio of British and Indian army troops. The British now adopted a policy of large-scale local recruitment. By the time war ended in 1918 the strength of the Indian army stood at 1.2 million soldiers. As many as 355,000 of these were recruited from Punjab alone. In August 1918 the governor of Punjab reported proudly that in one district, Gujranwala, the ratio of soldiers to the adult male population had risen from 1 : 150 to 1 : 44 over the course of just one year. Large quantities of food and fodder were also exported to war zones in the Middle East, while some regions in India faced famine conditions. In certain military campaigns, such as in Mesopotamia in 1915, Indian troops were used as cannon

fodder. All told, nearly 60,000 Indian soldiers were killed fighting for Britain in the European and Middle Eastern theatres during the First War. 'I am very glad', Hira Singh wrote home to Punjab from Kitchener's Indian Hospital in Brighton on 9 July 1915, 'that you are in India. For the people of India [*sic*] are very unlikely to see India again. The black pepper [Indian troops] has all been used up, and there is only a little of the red pepper [British troops] left. I have nothing more to say, for I cannot write more plainly.'

Back in India it was the financing of the British war effort which had the most detrimental effects on large sections of Indian society. India's defence expenditure increased by some 300 per cent during the war. The colonial government had to increase income tax and customs duties and aggressively raise subscriptions to war loans. The land-revenue demand was not increased but continued to remain a heavy burden. The colonial government's rapid expansion of public expenditure fuelled inflationary pressures in the economy. In order to secure its war supplies, the colonial state resorted to the printing of money against credit building up in the Bank of England. The currency circulation in India increased from Rs 660 million in 1914 to Rs 1530 million in 1919. This increased money supply was now chasing fewer goods available in the economy, since imports had fallen drastically. Shortages and high prices of essential commodities became the order of the day. The worst effects of the government's inflationary policy were seen in the countryside, where grain prices rocketed and articles of daily use, such as cloth, kerosene oil and medicines, were scarce and expensive. What was more, the prices of coarse grains — the staple food of the poor — rose higher and faster than prices of better-quality rice or wheat. Prices of primary products such as raw jute and raw cotton remained low. By contrast, European manufacturers of jute sandbags and Indian manufacturers of cotton textiles reaped a windfall. Although large sections of India's rural populace suffered serious hardship during the war, Indian industrial capitalism — especially in the cotton sector of Bombay and Ahmedabad — achieved a major breakthrough. Dislocations in transport had resulted in a sharp decline in the import of cotton piece goods from Britain, and an increased import duty from 3.5 per cent to 7.5 per cent to meet the government's financial needs in 1917 gave the Indian textile industry its first taste of protection. During 1917 and 1918 Indian mill production of cotton cloth surpassed

the volume of Lancashire imports. Indian gains, however, were limited to this one sector. After a short-lived post-war boom in 1919–20, India's trade was caught in the web of the worldwide slump of 1920–2. The value of the rupee had been held down until 1917. It was raised that year and reached a peak of 2 shillings and 4 pence in December 1919, and fell drastically during the slump, hitting a low of 1 shilling in early 1921. Given the violent fluctuations in the rupee exchange rate over this period, the Indian economy was not able to recover wartime credits.

To what extent were the British able to use India's human and economic resources for the war without provoking serious nationalist resistance? Sporadic food riots, isolated armed insurrections, and measured or moderate demands never came close to unsettling British rule during the course of the war. In fact the British were able to reduce the number of British troops in India and send them across to places where the state decided they were more urgently needed. Even Gandhi, who returned to India from South Africa in 1915, saw no contradiction between his non-violent creed and his efforts to recruit soldiers for the British Indian army. There were, at the same time, radical nationalist elements who were minded to take advantage of the international war crisis and moderate western-educated nationalists who wanted something in return for valuable services rendered during the war. By procuring small quantities of German and Turkish arms, revolutionaries in India were able to raise their level of activity from the assassination of individual British officials to small-scale armed insurrections in localities. Attempts were also made to instigate mutinies among Indian soldiers in 1915, but these met with very limited success. Several Muslim theologians and religious leaders, including Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, carried on propaganda against the use of Indian men and materials for the prosecution of Britain's war, especially in the Middle East. The mid-point of the First World War saw the coming together of moderates and erstwhile extremists who had parted ways in 1907, as well as increasing co-operation between the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League. Tilak, who returned to India after a long six-year spell in Burmese prisons, was welcomed back by the Congress in 1915. The Muslim League had been captured by a younger generation of nationalists drawn from urban professional classes in 1913. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, a staunch

Congressman since the turn of the century, had joined the Muslim League at the invitation of Wazir Hassan that year. Jinnah played an important role in co-ordinating the political programmes of the Congress and the League. The crowning achievement of their dialogue was the Lucknow Pact of 1916, by which Congress accepted the principle of separate electorates for Muslims in the larger interest of forging a united Hindu-Muslim front against colonial rule. Some British officials saw this unity as paving the way for *vakil raj* — rule by Indian lawyers. At about the same time Tilak and Annie Besant, inspired by the Irish model, set up a number of Home Rule Leagues in parts of the country.

All this persuaded the British that some initiative had to be taken to assuage Indian public opinion. While continuing to take repressive measures against groups wedded to revolutionary violence, the British offered something to moderate nationalists. In 1917 the secretary of state for India, Edwin Montagu, declared that ‘the progressive realization of responsible government’ would be the goal of British rule in India. A largely discredited Whiggish or Liberal view interpreted this announcement as the starting point of a unilinear movement towards the grant of Indian independence. The expression of British good intentions, on this view, implied that the mass nationalist movements of the post-1920 period were somewhat redundant. But the path of British decolonization in India was scarcely paved with good intentions. Even the moderates were disappointed with the measure of responsible government conceded by the Montagu–Chelmsford reforms of 1919. While broadening the basis of Indian political activity, the British retained the earlier policy of 1909, of balancing interests by creating separate categories for Muslims, landlords, and the Depressed Classes. The 1919 reforms did however go a step further than the 1909 reforms in granting the principle of ‘dyarchy’. This placed responsibility for certain less sensitive subjects, such as local self-government, in the hands of non-official Indian ministers. Not that this was a first step towards responsible government at the centre: all that the 1919 reforms intended was to divert Indian attention away from the centre and into provincial arenas. The new franchise, based on property and educational qualifications, was tilted in favour of the raj’s friends, not its critics.

Throughout the remaining years of the raj in India, the centre was kept firmly in British hands. The 1935 act which accepted the principle of an all-India federation widened the franchise to thirty-five million and gave the provinces a large measure of autonomy. Dyarchy was scrapped and Indians were associated with decision-making in all departments of provincial government. But full responsibility at the centre was something for the future; the executive was not responsible to the legislature; Indians had no say over defence; the act gave the viceroy vast discretionary powers, and defence and foreign affairs — the vital aspects of sovereignty — were kept firmly within his grasp. Despite much song and dance about provincial autonomy, the centre was equipped with all the authority necessary to curb powers in the provinces. Moreover, there was a clear disjunction between provincial autonomy and the creation of an all-India federation. While the provinces were to become autonomous after the first general elections under the act, the initial steps towards federation were to be taken only after one-half of the Indian princely states had voluntarily agreed to accede. With both the viceroy and the provincial governors enjoying special powers in the executive and legislative spheres, the 1935 act aimed at preserving British rule in India by taking into account an altered political environment.

In the early twentieth century the colonial state was almost forced to devolve authority in certain parts of India — Bengal for example — while its constitutional reforms acted as a spur to political activity in others — Madras for instance — which had remained more quiescent during the first two decades of the twentieth century. What the institutional structures of the colonial state did was to bring relatively isolated localities into greater contact with one another, allowing for the creation of alliances transcending local boundaries in the formal political arenas. So the constitutional reforms were both concessionary and pre-emptive in nature. Their overall aim was to direct Indian political attention away from the all-India centre, which the British were determined to keep in their own hands in order to promote and perpetuate their imperial interests — both strategic and economic — and direct it towards safe local and provincial pastures where the policy of pitting Indian against Indian could ensure the stability of the colonial state. The challenge faced by Indian nationalism was not to be wholly limited to or co-

opted by the inadequate representative institutions in the locality and the provinces set up by British constitutional reforms.

In addition to adaptations in the institutional structures of the colonial state in the changed circumstances of World War I and its aftermath, the political economy of late colonialism was different in many respects from the 'classical patterns' established during its high noon. After the end of the First War the colonial state in New Delhi found it increasingly difficult to service the needs of the metropolis while holding on to vital attributes of Britain's political and economic dominance in India. Already, the dislocations of the war had provided effective, though not formal, protection to India's cotton textile industry, an opportunity this industry was quick to seize to the relative detriment of Lancashire. In 1922 London was forced to concede fiscal autonomy to the colonial government of India. This meant New Delhi could now impose taxes, including import duties, without having to seek permission from the metropolis. But if the fiscal authority and industrial dominance of Britain were being sapped during the 1920s, the shock of the Great Depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s overturned most of the equations of the metropolis-colony relationship. Import-substitution gathered momentum in India, displacing many of the traditional privileges enjoyed by British manufactured products. Lancashire decisively lost out to Bombay and Ahmedabad, whose cotton production outstripped British imports. In 1929 nearly twelve hundred million yards of British cloth had been imported into India; ten years later less than a hundred and fifty million yards of cloth came in. It was not that the British did nothing to stem the rot. The Ottawa agreement of 1932 produced a system of imperial preference by which British imports enjoyed preferential tariffs compared to duties imposed on goods from non-empire countries. This staved off a serious invasion of the Indian market by Japanese and, to a lesser extent, German manufactured goods. While the British were able to use the colonial connection to withstand Japanese competition, they were forced to yield ground to indigenous Indian industry.

If the Depression damaged British industry's access to the Indian market, it completely wiped out India's export surplus with the rest of the world through which colonial India's payments to metropolitan Britain had been channelled. In 1929-30 the value of Indian commodity exports, which stood at Rs 3.1 billion, was well in excess

of the value of imports, which was approximately Rs 2.4 billion. By 1932–3, the value of exports and imports had both fallen to about Rs 1.3 billion. How then did the colony manage to maintain its payments, including home charges to Britain, in the dramatically altered economic scenario? In September 1931 the British pound sterling was taken off the gold standard and the rupee tied to it at a fixed exchange rate of 1 shilling and 6 pence. With the pound and the rupee effectively devalued against gold, and the rupee artificially pegged to the pound at a high exchange rate, a dramatic outflow of gold — up to a conservative estimate of Rs 3.4 billion in value between 1931 and 1934 — took place from India. Short-term profits made on sales of gold masked a long-term disinvestment by India, especially its agrarian sector. Hoards of gold ornaments came out of the Indian countryside and much of it was eventually melted down in British warehouses. Distress sales of gold enabled Britain to continue the process of transferring wealth from colony to metropolis, even after India's export surplus had evaporated. Incidentally, Britain was not able to keep all the gold it acquired during the Depression era. Some of it flowed across the Atlantic into the hoards of the Federal Reserve of the United States of America.

The advanced industrialized countries of the West, including Britain, had responded to the crisis of the Depression with policies of deflation, erection of protective tariff barriers, and huge cutbacks in foreign lending. The deflationary policies and the tariff walls accentuated the collapse of agrarian prices which had already been on the downslide because of slackening demand in western markets. Stoppage of foreign funds from Britain to India, once Indian export prospects looked bleak, resulted in a massive credit crunch. The annual inflow of these funds had been critical to the financing of agrarian production and trade, and the annual addition of a key portion of the money supply. From the perspective of India's regional economies the dishoarding of gold from 1931 onwards represented a desperate attempt to maintain liquidity.

While Britain's commercial dominance of India was dented during the Depression, the metropolitan power managed to retain control of finance. It was British financial wizardry which deflected Indian attempts to win a real measure of autonomy in this sphere. Britain was forced to set up a central bank, known as the Reserve Bank of

India, in 1934. But it was to be under London's and not New Delhi's ultimate jurisdiction. Although denied financial autonomy (relating to currency and credit), colonial India did of course have fiscal autonomy (relating to taxes), which it used to set up protective tariffs for certain kinds of Indian industry. The mid 1930s saw the establishment of subsidiaries of British multinational firms inside colonial India's tariff walls. Some of the more important firms were Dunlop, Unilever, Metal Box, and Imperial Chemicals. So financial finesse and multinational manoeuvring enabled Britain to continue to derive economic benefits from its Indian possession.

Throughout the inter-War period India remained the lynchpin in the strategic defence of the British empire, especially of the new, lucrative oil-producing areas of South West Asia. But the nature of India's economic importance to Britain had been undergoing fundamental change. It had required the most ingenious of financial manipulation and solid rearguard action by the British to continue to derive economic benefits from India. Agrarian distress provided a major impetus to the Gandhian mass movements of the 1920s and 1930s, but it also gave rise to other forms of communitarian and class conflicts in some regions. While making tactical concessions to a rising nationalist movement, the British were able to retain the vital attributes of sovereignty and centralized power in their own hands. A measure of Britain's success in fending off nationalist challenges can be detected in Viceroy Linlithgow's lament in 1939: 'Hitler has rather upset our Indian plans.' Yet the outbreak of the Second War also strengthened Britain's will to hold on to empire. Churchill grandly declared, on becoming prime minister in 1940, that he had not become the king's first minister to preside over the liquidation of the British empire. In India the colonial government prepared contingency plans to ban the Congress organization as a whole in the event of another campaign of civil disobedience. The British were determined at the outset of World War II to put their professed aim of progressive realization of responsible government in India into cold storage for the duration of the war.

An analysis of the structures of the late colonial state and political economy provides us with a general picture of what Indian society and nationalist political organizations had to contend with. In the subsequent chapters we will shift our focus from structures — more static than changing — to the dynamics of Indian social change and



political protest. These social and political processes included not only the high drama of Gandhian non-cooperation and civil disobedience movements but also the dissenting politics of the All-India Muslim League and Muslim-majority provinces, the radical left-wing challenges to Gandhian leadership of the Congress, and various popular upsurges working inexorably and decidedly outside the pale of Congress organization.

## Chapter 13

# Gandhian Nationalism and Mass Politics in the 1920s

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Indians had opposed the British raj through constitutional methods of prayer and petition, by extra-constitutional methods of individual revolutionary violence, and via futile attempts at armed insurrection during World War I. By 1919 constitutionalism had proved ineffective in winning major concessions, and the sporadic, isolated instances of armed resistance had been crushed. It was at this juncture that Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi appeared on the all-India political stage with his strategy of non-violent non-cooperation. He was to stride the arena of Indian nationalist politics like a colossus until the Second War.

Gandhi was born in 1869, into a Gujarati bania family. He studied law in England but was unable to establish a successful practice in either Bombay or Ahmedabad. From 1893 to 1915 he lived in Natal, South Africa. It was his successful organization of non-violent protest against the racist policies of South Africa's white government towards the large expatriate Indian community which brought him into political prominence. In 1908 Gandhi wrote a short book entitled *Hind Swaraj* (the Freedom of India) which provides some of the best insights into his political beliefs and philosophy. *Hind Swaraj* contains a powerful critique not only of British rule in India but of modern industrial civilization and the Western concept of civil society as a whole. 'When I read Mr Dutt's economic history of India', Gandhi wrote, 'I wept; and as I think of it again my heart sickens. It is machinery that has impoverished India.' Gandhi believed it was not sufficient simply to win political swaraj, for this would result in 'English rule without the Englishmen'. 'India's salvation', he declared, 'consists in unlearning what she has learnt during the past

fifty years or so. The railways, telegraphs, hospitals, lawyers, doctors and such like have all to go, and the so-called upper class have to learn to live consciously and religiously and deliberately the simple life of a peasant.' Endorsing Napoleon's pejorative description of the English as a nation of shopkeepers, Gandhi denounced Britain's greed for commercial profit achieved through economic imperialism. He opposed British political autocracy but saw no virtue in Western representative institutions. Gandhi likened parliament, for instance, to 'a sterile woman and a prostitute': the first because it could never enact a law according to its own judgement and the second because it continuously shifted its allegiance from one set of ministers to another, depending on which happened to be more powerful. He called instead for a state of enlightened anarchy in which national life would be so self-controlled that representatives would become unnecessary. His utopia was the Ram Rajya (the kingdom of Rama) of the great Hindu epic *Ramayana*. Ram Rajya was a patriarchy in which the ruler, the embodiment of moral virtue, always gave voice to the collective will. It is no coincidence that Gandhi's model for Indian women was Sita, the wife of Rama, whom he interpreted as a chaste, submissive woman. Passive resistance and the nationalist ritual of spinning the *charkha*, he was to argue later, were especially suited to the 'nature' of women. Gandhi's musings in *Hind Swaraj* may have sounded a trifle obscurantist to most urban educated groups, but his critical evaluation of western industrialism and political institutions struck a chord among large sections of Indians ruined as much by factories as by law courts.

Upon returning to India in 1915 Gandhi spent more than a year travelling across the subcontinent, surveying the social and political scene. During 1917–18 he felt confident enough to try out his political strategy of non-violent non-cooperation in three local agitations. Two of these were conducted in his home province of Gujarat: the first in Kheda district against the colonial state's high revenue demand at a time of economic distress; the second in Ahmedabad, where he successfully mediated a conflict between Indian workers and industrialists within the city's textile mills. The third agitation took place in Champaran district of Bihar, where Gandhi took up the cause of peasants forced to grow indigo by European planters. These movements, albeit local and specific in character, had a much wider demonstration effect and established Gandhi's reputation as an effective leader of mass agitations.

The disappointments and fears of 1919 afforded Gandhi the opportunity to launch his first major all-India agitation. Not only had the Montagu–Chelmsford reforms not gone far enough, the Rowlatt act which perpetuated wartime ordinances into peace-time legislations — permitting the British to hold Indians without trial — contradicted the spirit of the reforms. Indian public opinion was outraged. Gandhi described the Rowlatt law as a ‘black act’ passed by a ‘satanic’ government. He seized the moment to call for an all-India mass protest movement, relying on political networks like the Home Rule Leagues, an array of groups inspired by Islamic universalism and anxious about the fate of the Khilafat in the aftermath of the defeat of Ottoman Turkey, as well as his own creature — the Satyagraha Sabha. The Congress was conspicuously absent; it had no organizational machinery for agitational politics of the sort Gandhi had in mind. This needs some emphasizing, because the 1919 agitation was the largest and most violent anti-imperialist movement India had witnessed since 1857.

The swadeshi movement against the partition of Bengal in 1905 had foreshadowed some of the Gandhian techniques of non-cooperation, but it paled in comparison with the sheer ferocity of the 1919 agitation. Reeling under the social and economic consequences of the First War, the people of India were ready to storm the gates of the British raj. The Muslims of India had felt a deep sense of unease about British intentions ever since the Balkan wars of 1912–13, the Kanpur mosque incident of 1913 (in which many Muslims were killed), and the implications of the outcome of the 1914–18 war for the Islamic ummah. It was these misgivings that persuaded pro-Khilafat Muslims, led by the charismatic Mohamed Ali and his elder brother Shaukat, to join forces with Gandhi at war’s end in the hope of more effectively challenging the colonial state. As the anti-Rowlatt satyagraha merged with the Khilafat movement, attacks on the symbols of British authority — banks, post offices, railway stations and town halls — as well as assaults on British civilians, were followed by brutal repression.

The 1919 agitation had many remarkable features, among which was a courageous display of unity among Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. Punjab, generally considered the least nationalist-orientated of the British Indian provinces, had to be placed under martial law, and at least one of its towns was the target of aerial bombardment. It was also Punjab which gave the satyagraha its best-known

martyrs. On 13 April 1919 a peaceful and unarmed crowd of villagers who had come to Jallianwallah Bagh in Amritsar, looking for a fair and oblivious of the martial law regulation prohibiting meetings, were fired upon by General Dyer's men; 379 innocents were felled by British bullets and more than 1200 injured. Gandhi had called upon all those opposed to the Rowlatt legislation to respond to his programme of non-violent protest. The violence which erupted during the course of the movement was described by him as 'a rapier run through my body'. The tally of fatalities was hugely uneven on the British and Indian sides, but the killing of even a few British officials was an indication that Gandhi had not yet fine-tuned his agitational techniques and was not fully in control.

In 1920 Gandhi wove together more explicitly the negative value of ahimsa (non-violence) with the positive value of satyagraha (a quest for truth through mass political activity). He emphasized the importance of discipline and loyalty to the leader in campaigns of satyagraha by using a military metaphor: 'a soldier of an army does not know the whole of the military science, so also does a satyagrahi not know the whole science of satyagraha. It is enough if he trusts his commander and honestly follows his instructions and is ready to suffer unto death without bearing malice against the so-called enemy . . . [the satyagrahis] must render heart discipline to their commander.' In order to enlarge his political base, however, Gandhi offered his method of non-violence to the Congress party and his country as a political weapon, not as a moral philosophy. He even told a group of revolutionaries in Bengal that if India had the sword he would have asked her to draw it. But since India did not, he asked the revolutionaries to try his programme at least for a year. 'I do believe,' Gandhi wrote, 'that where there is only a choice between cowardice and violence I would advise violence. . . . Hence also do I advocate training in arms for those who believe in the method of violence. I would rather have India resort to arms in order to defend her honour than that she should in a cowardly manner become or remain a helpless witness to her own dishonour.' However, he held non-violence to be 'infinitely superior' to violence. Gandhi made it amply clear in a later speech to the Congress in 1942: 'ahimsa with me is a creed. But it is never as a creed that I placed it before India . . . I placed it before the Congress as a political weapon to be employed for the solution of practical problems.' The restraining value of non-violence, the leadership principle, and the Congress party organization

which Gandhi was able to fashion to his needs made it possible for him to launch powerful, yet controlled, mass movements.

Gandhi's techniques paved the way for his capture of the leadership of Congress at Nagpur in 1920. This he was able to achieve with the help of pro-Khilafat Muslims. Gandhi succeeded in out-manoeuvring the moderate elements. A man like Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who had tried forging Hindu-Muslim unity on a different basis, deplored Gandhi's mix of religion and politics. Jinnah was shouted down at the Nagpur Congress and left the session in disgust. But the Ali brothers and other Muslim leaders stuck to their programme of using the Khilafat agitation to bring their community firmly into the mainstream of Indian nationalism. Contrary to the fears of their detractors, the Khilafatists hoped that by juxtaposing Gandhi's chosen symbols — the charkha (the spinning wheel) and khadi (hand-woven cloth) — with the Islamic crescent and the Turkish fez they could reconcile, not aggravate, Hindu-Muslim differences.

There were other elements of the Gandhian programme which came in for some criticism. The great Bengali poet Rabindranath Tagore did not support the idea of boycotting educational institutions, remembering the inadequacies of national education in the Swadeshi period. Tagore wrote disapprovingly in 1921:

To one and all he simply says: Spin and weave, spin and weave. Is this the call: "Let all seekers after truth come from all sides?" Is this the call of the New Age to new creation? When nature called to the bee to take refuge in the narrow life of the hive, millions of bees responded to it for the sake of efficiency, and accepted the loss of sex in consequence. But this sacrifice by way of self-atrophy led to the opposite of freedom. Any country, the people of which can agree to become neuters for the sake of some temptation, or command, carries within itself its own prison-house.

But the All-India Congress Committee, the AICC, including sceptics like C.R. Das and Motilal Nehru, endorsed Gandhi's programme to boycott the reformed councils and launch a non-cooperation movement. Gandhi was in the driver's seat, albeit temporarily. The Congress constitution was modified; its goal was to attain swaraj through legitimate and peaceful means. Provincial Congresses were reorganized along linguistic lines: Gandhi knew well that the emotive power of anti-colonial sentiment often sprang

from linguistic nationalisms. At his insistence steps were taken to transform Congress into a truly mass political party. But the adoption of a mass programme by the Congress was more in the way of a symbolic gesture, an effort by Gandhi — a brilliant politician — to make political capital out of the populist ferment sweeping India at the time.

The years from 1919 to 1922 were marked by widespread labour unrest and *kisan* (peasant) movements owing little or nothing to the Congress. So Gandhi's programme had an immediate psychological impact. His somewhat rash promise of swaraj within a year aroused millenarian hopes in the remotest villages of India, and his call for village reconstruction based on an economic revival through the charkha and khadi was greeted enthusiastically. But it would not be too far-fetched to assert that the national leadership was being pushed, by pressures which the colonial state's economic policies were generating below, into taking positions they might otherwise have wanted to resist. Indeed, at each crucial twist of the non-cooperation movement of the early twenties, we find the Gandhian Congress ready to press the brakes, fearful of people running ahead of the leadership and redefining the organization's cherished goal of swaraj.

This is why Gandhi laid special emphasis on issues cutting across India's manifold class, caste, and religious divisions. For example, the Congress under the Mahatma considered adopting the non-payment of rent and revenue as part of its official programme. Kisan movements in various parts of the country were already urging peasants not to pay rents and revenue. So, although the Congress did accept non-payment of revenue after much hesitation, it refused to extend the programme to the non-payment of rent. After agrarian conflicts in U.P., Gandhi 'deprecated all attempts to sow discord between landlords and tenants and advised the tenants to suffer rather than fight'; they had to 'join forces [with their landlords, however oppressive] for fighting against the most powerful zamindar, namely the [British] Government'. Gandhi adopted much the same line with labour lest his business and industrialist supporters be put off by Congress radicalism.

Despite the Mahatma's willingness, even eagerness, to keep populist forces on leash, his prestige among the populace was undeniable. The images of Gandhi as Mahatma were, as Shahid Amin has shown, crafted by the spread of popular rumour. The

message of Gandhi maharaj — the great king Gandhi — could be interpreted in their own way by peasants who may have seen the leader only once from a distance, or perhaps not seen him at all. If local and regional variations bring out the contradictions in the non-cooperation movement, the perception of Gandhi as a veritable messiah explains why, in spite of the ‘disparate aspirations and grievances’, the main ingredients of Indian nationalism became, as Rajat Ray has claimed, ‘somehow generalized into unities stronger than their own contradictions’.

The boycott of British goods and institutions was much more effective in 1921 than it had been in 1905. The sense of alienation from the raj also expressed itself in the successful boycott of the visit by the Prince of Wales in late 1921. In most towns and cities the prince only saw dosed shutters. By early 1922 the phase of boycott appeared to have reached a peak. Although most leaders and activists other than Gandhi had been cast into prison, there were many more ready and eager to escalate the movement into a no-revenue campaign which Gandhi had declared would begin in Bardoli district of Gujarat in late February 1922. So it is hardly possible to underestimate the wave of disappointment when Gandhi abruptly called off the non-cooperation movement after receiving news that twenty-two policemen had been killed in a police station set alight by angry peasants at Chauri Chaura in Gorakhpur district of U.P. on 5 February 1922. Chauri Chaura, in time, came to signify an aberration in the official story of Indian nationalism.

Gandhi’s compromise, and there were to be many more, brought the divisions within Congress out into the open. Men like C.R. Das and Motilal Nehru, who had wanted to extract substantial political concessions from the British while the Congress movement had the upper hand in late 1921, now favoured entry into the Montagu–Chelmsford councils on the grounds that since non-cooperation had been called off it made sense to try and wreck the structure of the raj from within. Unable to persuade Gandhi — so often given to obduracy — Das and Nehru with their followers broke with the Congress to form a Swaraj party. So the end of the non-cooperation movement of 1920–2 left the Congress split down the middle between no-changers and pro-changers of the policy of boycott. But it was worse than that. The heyday of Hindu–Muslim unity during the Khilafat fervour was followed by tension, conflict and violence between these religious communities on an unprecedented



scale. The worst affected provinces were U.P. and Punjab, where the anti-imperialist struggle was replaced with Hindu social movements of *shuddhi* (purity) and *sangathan* (organization), and Muslim counterparts named *tabligh* (religious preaching) and *tanzeem* (organization). As Congress president at Cocanada in December 1923 Mohamed Ali called for an accommodation of religious differences through the creation of a 'federation of faiths' rather than just a 'unity of opposition'. In Bengal the farsighted Deshbandhu C.R. Das reached a generous agreement with Muslim leaders known as the Bengal act, based on a 50 : 50 principle in the allocation of future government posts and jobs, but the all-India Congress refused to follow his bold example. So, while the formal arenas of politics in Punjab had been successfully provincialized by the British and were dominated by the loyalist Unionist party headed by Fazl-i-Husain, the informal arenas were coming to be influenced by a noxious brand of religious bigotry. The absence of generosity on the part of Congress augured poorly for the future of a Hindu-Muslim compromise and, by extension, for the anti-colonial struggle. It may be tempting to see this as the logical conclusion to the dangerous blending of religion and politics by Gandhi and his Khilafat allies. But then religious differences between the communities had generally been less of a barrier to forming a common front against the British than a politics of nationalism devoid of the spirit of accommodation.

It was the British who inadvertently created the prospects of Indian unity with the announcement of an all-white commission, led by John Simon, in November 1927. The Simon Commission was to enquire into the future of constitutional reforms in India. This intensified pressure on the Congress to chalk out its future course of action. Having resolved to boycott the Simon Commission, Congress set up its own committee under Motilal Nehru to formulate the elements of a future constitution. The Muslim League, led by Mohammed Ali Jinnah, offered to co-operate on the basis of a reasonable charter of safeguards for the Muslim minority. He was rebuffed by the Congress under pressure from a fringe group known as the Hindu Mahasabha. Interestingly, it was at about this time that the term 'communal' acquired its pejorative connotation as the lesser 'other' of nationalism. Any individual or organization outside the Congress fold claiming to speak for Muslim interests now ran the risk of being labelled 'communist'. This represented a departure

from the acknowledgement and accommodation of religious difference that was seen, until the early 1920s, as a basis for forging Hindu–Muslim unity in the anti-colonial cause. In November 1930 Mohamed Ali made an impassioned plea for Indian freedom while strongly advocating the ‘Muslim case’ for separate electorates, safeguards and majority provinces:

I have a culture, a polity, an outlook on life — a complete synthesis which is Islam. Where God commands I am a Muslim first, a Muslim second, and a Muslim last, and nothing but a Muslim. . . . But where India is concerned, where India’s freedom is concerned, where the welfare of India is concerned, I am an Indian first, an Indian second, an Indian last, and nothing but an Indian.

A perfectly legitimate ‘nationalist’ position in 1920, such an expression of the multiple identities of India’s Muslims in 1930 by a former Congress President now entailed his being nailed a ‘communalist’.

In the late 1920s the Indian National Congress continued to dither over the all-important question of complete independence — this despite the efforts of its more radical wing, led by Subhas Chandra Bose and Jawaharlal Nehru, to force the Mahatma’s hand on the matter. The Motilal Nehru Report had recommended a demand for dominion status. A resolution moved by Subhas Chandra Bose at the Calcutta session of the Congress in December 1928, calling for complete independence, was narrowly defeated after Gandhi intervened in the debate. The reason for Gandhi’s hesitation is not difficult to identify: he had always insisted on leading a controlled movement against the raj and was afraid of giving the forces of popular radicalism their head. But the forces of radicalism were not about to wait for Gandhi to switch on the green signal. The year 1928 saw India, and Bombay in particular, rocked by a spate of labour strikes and radical protest by urban youth and students. At the Maharashtra Provincial Conference of 1928 Subhas Chandra Bose called for ‘a coalition between labour and nationalism’ and the transformation of India into ‘an independent Federal Republic’. He warned Indian nationalists not to become ‘a queer mixture of political democrats and social conservatives’, arguing:

If we want to make India really great we must build up a political democracy on the pedestal of a democratic society. Privileges based on birth, caste or

creed should go, and equal opportunities should be thrown open to all irrespective of caste, creed or religion. The status of women should also be raised and women should be trained to take a larger and more intelligent interest in public affairs.

Bengal meanwhile was once again in the grips of a systematic revolutionary campaign. By the time Gandhi came around to accepting *purna swaraj* or full independence as the goal at the Lahore session of the Congress in 1929, labour militancy and urban youth radicalism had been to a large extent repressed. The British had charged thirty-one labour leaders of alleged Communist leanings for conspiring to overthrow the government. The trial came to be known as the Meerut Conspiracy Case of 1929. Significantly, it was only very reluctantly that Congress accepted the release of the Meerut prisoners as one of its demands during the civil disobedience movement of the early 1930s.

The British design of provincializing Indian politics was successfully circumvented, if not subverted, by the forces of Indian nationalism through the use of new techniques of struggle in the early 1920s. Congress was certainly altered from being a club of the educated elite to a more broad-based mass political party. Yet the Congress under Gandhi, espousing an ideology of class conciliation, more often than not represented the class interests of the middle to richer peasantry and industrial capitalists in the urban sector. Urban professionals not impressed by Gandhi's political ideology nevertheless accepted his leadership as a matter of expediency. For the poor, suffering from economic oppression and social discrimination in rural and urban areas alike, Gandhi simply offered the palliative remedy of trusteeship. According to this concept, the wealthy and relatively powerful would hold not only property but also the interests of the subordinate classes in trust. Once the mass movement had been called off, Gandhi and the Gandhians fell back on constructive work in villages. The Swaraj party's attempts to wreck the reforms from within were relatively successful in some provinces, such as Bengal and the Central Provinces, but a complete failure in others, notably Punjab. Gandhi's suspension of the mass campaign and Congress's refusal to support C.R. Das's strategy to assure Hindu-Muslim unity opened the way for the politics of loyalism on the one hand and bigotry on the other. By the late 1920s urban-educated students and youth as well as

industrial workers were showing an inclination to identify with more radical organizations and ideologies within and outside Congress. The British for their part sought to rest their regime on the support of princes, rural elites in regions where politics had been successfully provincialized, and sections of religious minorities which had never felt at home in the Gandhian Congress. With the passage of the purna swaraj resolution in December 1929, Gandhi and the Congress faced the challenge of undermining colonial structures of domination and collaboration while harnessing the various and competing strands of opposition to the British raj without being overwhelmed by them. In the early 1920s Gandhi had been instrumental in transforming India's political landscape. Would the Mahatma's magic work a second time?

## Chapter 14

# The Depression Decade: Society, Economics and Politics

**T**he economically decisive decade of the 1930s witnessed significant changes in social relations and a quickening of the political pace. The huge impact of the Depression showed how closely the Indian economy was tied to the capitalist world economy, how vulnerable Indian society was to its dramatic downturns. The acute economic crisis of the early 1930s provided the context for a revival of the mass nationalist agitations held in suspended animation since 1922 but also unleashed a whole range of other types of conflicts along lines of class, caste and religious community. The colonial state responded to the political challenges initially with repressive measures, and by mid-decade with a new round of political engineering which made concessions at the provincial level but gave away little at the centre. In the late 1930s some part of the social discontent was channelled into the provincial electoral arenas defined by the 1935 Government of India act. At the same time the Gandhian old guard of Congress came under fire from radical and socialist elements within and outside the party. The Muslim League, which offered co-operation against the British until 1937, was rebuffed by Congress after the elections and began its search for an alternative political strategy.

Indian economy and society experienced the Great Depression in two major ways — a collapse of prices and a rupture in the circuits of monetary credit. Prices had been weakening since 1926 with the slowing down in the rate of growth of demand in Western markets. A crash in the prices of agricultural commodities was postponed by the efforts of various governments to withhold stocks from the market. In 1929 a glut was reached and prices tumbled. The crisis in agrarian production and prices coincided with major disorder in the industrial economies of the West. The



India in 1937

protective tariffs and deflationary policies resorted to by Western governments intensified the trade slump and accentuated the fall in prices. Between 1929 and 1932 the prices of India's major cash crops more than halved. Once India's export prospects looked bleak in 1930, the flow of foreign funds into India's agrarian sector was suddenly withdrawn. This resulted in a generalized liquidity crisis affecting the prices of all commodities, a trend exacerbated by the government's manipulation of the financial instruments of currency and credit. As the financial superstructure stopped pouring vast amounts of liquid capital down the trading and credit networks, small trader-moneylenders in the rural areas were left high and dry. Small landlord-usurers were unable to recover any interest from peasant-debtors and had nothing to lend. The bigger creditors simply pulled out of the unprofitable business of rural moneylending. Peasants suddenly discovered that the trader would not appear at their doorsteps, and at the village mart no one was prepared to pay a remunerative price for their produce. Unable to service their debts, they would be refused new loans in cash. Where landlord-moneylenders held large personal demesnes, grain loans were continued in return for labour and ties of dependence were strengthened. But in many other instances the rupture in credit relations had the effect of snapping social bonds and undermining the unequal symbiosis which had characterized relations between peasant-debtors and trader/landlord creditors. The slump brought economic hardship to peasants and rural labourers but also damaged the principal mode of social dominance available to sections of the rural elite. Since food prices fell almost as much as cash-crop prices, the rural poor, though they were able to struggle through the Depression decade, suffered a much reduced standard of living and greatly straitened circumstances. The long-term damage to credit relations meant, however, that when prices rose with the outbreak of the World War II, the prospect of starvation stared them in the face.

The experience of the Depression in the urban areas was much more mixed. Unemployment and low wages were the norm in many industrial sectors, e.g. the European and Marwari-dominated jute mills in eastern India, and the indigenous cotton-textile industry in western India. Industrial capitalists were generally able to shift losses to the workforce and the agrarian sector by resort to measures such as short-time working. The flow of capital from rural to urban

sectors and a measure of protection for certain commodities gave a boost to some sectors of urban industry. The cement industry, for instance, did well, as new residential areas came up in the metropolitan cities of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, and as the process of urbanization gathered pace in the smaller towns. Tariffs against imports of Javanese sugar provided an opening for the Indian sugar industry. Low prices brought comfort to the urban salaried classes and workers fortunate enough to retain employment. So the urban classes and the rural masses were affected rather differently by the Great Depression. But it is important to note that the 1930s were good times for urban consumption and not necessarily for urban industrial investment. Between 1930 and 1938 some 155 million rupees worth of alcohol was imported into India, a figure close to the total amount invested during this period in cotton-textile machinery.

It was in the context of a dramatically altered economic scenario that the Gandhian civil disobedience campaigns of the early 1930s were launched. Gandhi's specific demands and programme, unveiled in early 1930, were something of a disappointment compared to the *purna swaraj* or complete independence resolution of December 1929. Five of Gandhi's eleven demands, listed in an ultimatum to Viceroy Irwin, related to economic issues. His call for the abolition of the salt tax and a reduction of the land-revenue demand by half were designed for India's peasant masses. On behalf of India's industrial bourgeoisie Gandhi demanded protection for the indigenous textile industry, reservation of coastal shipping for Indians (since international shipping was almost entirely British owned), and a reduction of the rupee–pound exchange rate from 1 shilling 6 pence to 1 shilling 4 pence in order to stimulate Indian exports. The British did not budge, other than in making a concession to the textile interest. So in March 1930 Gandhi chose the salt issue to kick off the civil disobedience movement. Even Nehru was forced to admit that the Mahatma's choice of salt as the central issue was a trifle too eccentric for his liking. But, as ever, Gandhi had his way, and what was more, he had a point. His march to the coast in western India to make salt in violation of an unjust law had an electrifying effect across the subcontinent. The civil disobedience movement got off to a good start with no-tax and no-revenue campaigns and a boycott of British goods and institutions. This was not altogether difficult, since all the Congress had to do was rubber-stamp the multifarious



discontents seething in the Indian countryside and, to a limited extent, in towns as well.

As the year drew on, however, the movement showed signs of flagging in some regions and a tendency towards increased radicalism in others. Peasant movements began to display a no-rent mentality which directly affected Indian rentier landlords. In certain regions, such as east Bengal, mostly Muslim peasant debtors rose against mostly Hindu moneylenders, giving what was at this stage a primarily economic struggle a potentially communal complexion. Revolutionary violence, which had reared its head during the militant student, youth and workers' movements of 1928–9, showed few signs of abating. Bhagat Singh, who had assassinated a British police officer in Punjab in 1928 and hurled a bomb inside the central legislative assembly in 1929, was widely regarded as a folk-hero in 1930–1. Among the more daring revolutionary acts were the Chittagong armoury raid in April 1930 and the assault on Writers' Building, the seat of government in Calcutta, by three young men — Benoy, Badal and Dinesh — in December 1930. Gandhi's peasant followers often had to rely on these types of revolutionaries in the face of British repression. In Midnapur district of Bengal, where Gandhian civil disobedience was especially strong, the British district magistrate wrote in 1930: 'We have not got the force to deal with these mobs with lathis and the effect of lathis is insufficient. The best thing that could happen would be to have a few more shootings . . . unless this is done collection of taxes will I am certain be extremely difficult.' A few more shootings did take place in this district. The district magistrate and two of his successors were among those who were killed. Sometimes individual terrorism impeded mass movements in India, but on other occasions the two were closely connected and complemented and strengthened each other.

Unbridled revolutionary or radical fervour was not something which the Mahatma was inclined to encourage. So he opened talks with Viceroy Irwin. Winston Churchill, a diehard imperialist temporarily in the political wilderness, may have found it 'nauseating' to see 'a half-naked fakir' striding up the steps of the viceregal palace to 'parley on equal terms' with the representative of the king-emperor. But most nationalists, and people who had responded to the call of civil disobedience with alacrity, were dismayed that Gandhi was again abandoning their struggle at the wrong moment

and giving away too much for too little. The Gandhi–Irwin pact of March 1931 — based on three vague principles of federation, Indian responsibility, and safeguards for minorities — signalled the suspension of civil disobedience. There was an emotional outcry at Gandhi's refusal to press for a commutation of the death sentence passed on Bhagat Singh and his associates. But Gandhi had won a ticket to attend the second round table conference (the Congress had boycotted the first) in London, where the future shape of India's constitution was under discussion. On his arrival in London a reporter asked Gandhi what he thought of Western civilization. 'I think it would be a good idea', the Mahatma replied. But for all his wit and charm Gandhi returned politically empty-handed from London at the end of the year and called for a resumption of civil disobedience in January 1932. The British had been steeling themselves to crush the second stage of the civil disobedience movement. The numbers arrested between January 1932 and March 1933 rose to 120,000, compared to 90,000 between March 1930 and March 1931. This was more an index of the success of British repression than the strength of the civil disobedience movement. By 1934 both the non-violent resisters and the violent revolutionaries had been subdued.

The British resorted not simply to outright repression but also to a new round of political engineering to divide and deflect the nationalist challenge. British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald announced the communal award in August 1932, specifying representation in elected bodies for various communities, which gave separate electorates to the 'depressed classes' (lower-caste Hindus). Gandhi, seeing this as a sinister British plot to divide the Hindus after successfully creating a separate electoral arena for Muslims, threatened a fast to death in his prison cell. Talks with the 'depressed classes' leader B.R. Ambedkar, who was sharply critical of Gandhi's patronizing attitude towards the lower castes, resulted in the Poona Pact of 1932 by which, in return for a larger number of reserved seats, the lower castes gave up the idea of separate electorates.

A new set of constitutional reforms was eventually passed collectively by the British parliament as the Government of India act of 1935. The act had two main parts — provincial and federal. At the provincial level dyarchy was abolished and all government departments brought under the control of elected Indian ministers. But the British kept sufficient emergency and reserved powers

enabling them to dismiss ministries and bring the provincial administration under the direct sway of the governor and his civil servants whenever they deemed it necessary. In any case the British were going to hold on to all the vital attributes of sovereignty as well as to key powers in the areas of finance and defence at the centre. The federal part of the 1935 act projected a future 'federation' in which representatives of the princely states would be a counterpoise to elected representatives of the British Indian provinces. The rules of representation were laid down in a way which negated the possibility of a nationalist majority in the projected federal legislature.

Jawaharlal Nehru denounced the 1935 act as 'a new charter of slavery'. In the words of Subhas Chandra Bose it was a scheme 'not for self-government, but for maintaining British rule in the new political conditions, through the help of the Indian princes and sectarian, reactionary and pro-British organizations.' Jinnah,



13. 'The Nationalist Leadership'. Mahatma Gandhi, Subhas Chandra Bose, Vallabhbhai Patel and Jawaharlal Nehru (standing) at the Haripura session of the Indian National Congress, February 1938. (Courtesy the archives of the Netaji Research Bureau, Calcutta.)

leader of the recently revived Muslim League who had kept open lines of communication with the Congress, found the federal provisions of the 1935 act 'most reactionary, retrograde, injurious and fatal to the vital interest of British India *vis-à-vis* the Indian states.' By directing Indian political attention towards the provinces and bringing autocratic and subservient princes to redress the balance against the democratic and nationalist challenge in British India, the 1935 act sought to safeguard British rule in India, not weaken it.

After some soul-searching and hard-headed calculating, Congress decided to take the pragmatic course of contesting the provincial elections scheduled for 1937. The franchise, still based on a property qualification, had been expanded to include nearly 35 million voters, including women. The restricted nature of the franchise ensured that the social base of the Gandhian Congress, limited to the middle and richer peasantry in the countryside, would be an asset, not a handicap. The civil disobedience campaigns of the early 1930s paid handsome dividends at the ballot boxes in 1937. Congress won a major electoral triumph and, after some dithering over office acceptance, formed ministries in seven, and by 1938 in eight, provinces of British India.

The late 1930s witnessed growing competition and conflict between the radical left-wing within and at the edges of Congress on the one hand, and the cautious, conservative and compromising Gandhian right-wing on the other. The broad left-wing tendency within the Congress was represented by Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose. A more closely organized pressure group within the organization, the Congress Socialist Party, had been active since 1934. Two smaller groups — the Communist Party of India, active since the early 1920s but using the National Front label in the late 1930s, and the Radical Humanists led by M.N. Roy — were also part of the leftist camp. Gandhi tried initially to co-opt the radical elements by conferring the presidency of the Indian National Congress on Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose in 1936–7 and 1938 respectively. Nehru believed that the solution to the problems of the world lay in 'socialism', both as a scientific economic doctrine and as a philosophy of life. He saw as Congress President in 1936 the 'great and fascinating unfolding of a new order and a new civilization' in the Soviet Union as 'the most promising feature

of our dismal age.’ But he added: ‘Much as I wish for the advancement of socialism in this country, I have no desire to force the issue on the Congress and thereby create difficulties in the way of our struggle for independence.’

Subhas Chandra Bose not only stood for a more radical social and economic programme based on a form of socialism adapted to Indian conditions but also a more militant nationalism which would brook no compromise on issues such as federation. In 1938 Bose set up a national planning committee with Nehru as chairman to draw up a blueprint of the socialist reconstruction of India once freedom had been won. Bose managed to defeat Gandhi’s candidate in a fiercely contested election for the Congress presidency in 1939. But the Gandhian old guard refused to accept the democratic verdict, intriguing and manoeuvring successfully to get Bose to resign. Bose then formed a Forward Bloc within Congress and tried to consolidate leftist forces on a radical, socialist and democratic platform. The Gandhian leadership saw this as indiscipline and barred him and his elder brother Sarat from holding elective office within the Congress organization for six years.

On the eve of the Second War the Indian National Congress was split into conservative and radical segments. More ominously, the nationalist movement’s unifying appeal was being blunted by concerted Muslim opposition under the leadership of Jinnah and the Muslim League (a theme we elucidate more fully in Chapter 16). Jinnah had long deplored the leadership style of the Gandhian Congress and its compromises with the more bigoted representatives of Hindu interests in some of the provinces. He had nevertheless extended co-operation to the Congress against British collaborators until he was spurned, following Congress’s strong showing in the 1937 provincial elections. Between 1937 and 1939 the League denounced the Congress’ provincial ministries even as it searched for a new basis to safeguard Muslim interests.

With the outbreak of war the winds of inflation began blowing and the Indian economy emerged from a long Depression. But the stage was about to be set for the stark contradictions between the economic requirements of Britain’s war and the subsistence needs of a subject people. Viceroy Linlithgow’s declaration of India as a belligerent in the war against Germany, which he made without bothering to consult Congress or the provincial ministries, left

Congress leaders deeply embarrassed. Upon failing to extract a satisfactory definition of war aims from the British, Congress resigned office in the provinces. The Muslim League declared it a day of deliverance. As Gandhi inched his way towards the face-saving device of an individual satyagraha campaign, the more militant among Indian nationalists prepared to take full advantage of the international war crisis to strike for Indian independence.

## Chapter 15

# Nationalism and Colonialism during World War II and its Aftermath: Economic Crisis and Political Confrontation

**W**hen war broke out in Europe in September 1939 the British political will to hold on to its Indian empire was as strong as it ever had been, despite qualitative changes in the economic relations between metropolis and colony. The forces of Indian nationalism were more radicalized but were also more divided than they had been in the past. The Congress leadership, having just fended off a left-wing challenge, asked the British to define their war aims before they agreed to any support for the British cause. Congress leaders had been deeply offended and embarrassed by Viceroy Linlithgow's decision to declare India a belligerent in the war against Germany without bothering to consult the Congress high command or the provincial ministries. Once it became clear that the British were not of a mind to make any immediate concessions to Indian nationalist aspirations, Congress had little choice but to resign from holding office in the provinces as a mark of protest.

From the Indian nationalist point of view the world war was a conflict between old and new imperialist powers. That Britain was fighting for freedom and democracy was simply not credible to its colonial subjects unless they too were given a taste of these values. In 1940 Gandhi, not yet prepared to signal the beginning of a mass movement, called upon his followers to offer individual satyagraha. So satyagrahis made anti-war speeches and courted arrest in large numbers. While non-violent protestors were herded into detention camps the British moved decisively to imprison radical leaders and

workers, including Subhas Chandra Bose and his followers, in 1940. Japan's entry into the war in December 1941 and its military sweep across South East Asia in early 1942 provided the occasion for one futile round of negotiations but ultimately served to strengthen Britain's resolve to use its coercive powers to their fullest extent when necessary in order to keep nationalists at bay.

Political denial was matched by economic intervention on an unprecedented scale. Indian resources were marshalled to finance Britain's war effort as never before. While the Depression decade had seen a steep decline in prices, the war economy came to be characterized by galloping inflation. The inflationary pressure emanated largely from a massive expansion in public expenditure. Between 1939 and 1945 nearly Rs 3.5 billion was spent on defence purposes in India. While Indian revenues were to be used for the defence of the colony, the metropolitan government agreed, in a major departure of policy, to foot the bill for the use of Indian forces in the defence of the empire. But the treasury in London was short of cash. So, in a typical example of British financial jugglery, a mechanism was devised by which India would pay here and now and be reimbursed after the end of the war. Part of the total war expenditure would be recoverable as sterling credits for India accumulated in the Bank of England. For now, the government of India would finance the war by making the mints work harder. The money supply in India rose from about Rs 3 billion in 1939 to Rs 22 billion in 1945. Since imports had dropped drastically due to the dislocations of war and government purchases of war-related material diverted some goods from Indian consumption, serious shortages developed and prices soared for essential commodities — for cloth, kerosene oil, and most important of all, food.

The majority of India's rural poor, as well as workers and salaried groups in urban areas, were hit harder by the inflation of the war period than they had been by the Depression of the past decade. The phenomenon of daily necessities going beyond the purchasing reach of large sections of the populace caused privation in most parts of India. The most dramatic manifestation of this was in Bengal, where a devastating famine in 1943–4 killed between 3.5 and 3.8 million people. Recent researches have made it clear that there had been no aggregate food-availability decline in the province of Bengal in 1943. Famine mortality stemmed from a drastic decline in exchange entitlements of vulnerable social groups. To begin with,





14. 'Famine'. A starving woman during the Bengal famine of 1943. (Courtesy Sugata Bose from his film *Rebels against the Raj: India during World War II* — original footage in the archives of the Netaji Research Bureau, Calcutta.)

military construction work took place on a bigger scale in Bengal, which was on the front line against Japan. British colonial policy shielded its own troops and urban industrial classes deemed to be critical for war production against higher inflation. Agricultural labourers and small-holding peasants lost entitlement to food in their millions. Rural wages and employment declined as prices rocketed. The relative price of jute, Bengal's premier cash crop, remained low in relation to rice, Bengal's staple food crop, and rural credit relations continued to be in a state of disrepair, forcing exclusive dependence on a volatile product market where food had to be paid for in cash. The colonial state's fabled famine code of the late nineteenth century was not even invoked. The deliberate absence of relief measures contributed to one of the more catastrophic, though least publicized, holocausts of the Second War.

Wartime exigencies and the experience of the Bengal famine, however, brought about a reversal of the debt relationship between metropolis and colony, as well as the nature of the links between the colonial state and the economy. Throughout the colonial era India had owed a debt to Britain, but at the end of the war it was Britain which owed a large debt of £ 1.3 billion to the colonial government of India. In order to provision troops and key urban classes, the colonial state had intruded into the food market, procuring grains from the countryside and selling them through ration shops in the towns and cities. Social groups such as the rich farmers of Punjab, who might have been expected to make large profits from rising grain prices, were prevented from doing so by the colonial state's procurement and price-control policies. The poor in one region of India, Bengal, perished on account of the state's lack of action; the better off in another region, Punjab, complained bitterly about the state's heavy-handed interventions which they deemed detrimental to their own interests.

It was in the context of a deepening economic crisis that the major political confrontations between nationalists and the British colonial state occurred. Radicals and socialists had always wanted to take advantage of the international war situation to advance the cause of Indian independence. It was in pursuit of this strategy that Subhas Bose had escaped from India in January 1941, having determined to subvert the loyalty of the Indian element within the British Indian army. The German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 not only upset his plans of an armed invasion from the north-west, but led Indian communists to redefine what had been an 'imperialist war' to a 'people's war' — in which they went to the extent of lending support to the British against the nationalists. This decision of the Indian communists led to a serious rift between them and the socialists within the anti-colonial movement; the latter saw Britain's difficulty as India's opportunity. Communists, as well as the followers of M.N. Roy, were subsequently to find it extremely difficult to live down what came to be widely viewed as their betrayal of the anti-colonial nationalist movement at a critical moment during World War II. Japan's defeat of Britain in South East Asia in early 1942, especially the fall of Singapore in February that year, emboldened even the Gandhian Congress to make more strident demands. It was to prevent the Indian nationalists from allying with the enemies of Britain that Churchill reluctantly agreed to send an

emissary to hold talks with Indian political leaders. It is now clear from British documents of this period that both Churchill and Linlithgow, acting under pressure from Labour Party constituents of the National Government and President Roosevelt of the United States, wanted to see the Cripps Mission fail. And it did fail because Stafford Cripps was unable to meet the minimum Congress demand for immediate control of the defence portfolio at the centre. Gandhi reportedly dubbed the Cripps offer a post-dated cheque on a crashing bank. The Cripps offer as it related to provinces and communities, particularly Muslims, is also of great interest (it is discussed in the following chapter). Gandhi drafted a resolution in April 1942 calling upon the British to quit India. He indicated in interviews that he would be 'prepared to take the risk of violence' to end 'the great calamity of slavery'. The 'ordered anarchy' that he saw around him, he felt, was 'worse than real anarchy'. Gandhi believed in his own ability to negotiate with the Japanese, who would have no reason to invade India if the British left. In any event, he was prepared to tell the British to leave India to anarchy or to God. A somewhat watered-down version of Gandhi's 'quit India' resolution was eventually moved by Jawaharlal Nehru and adopted by Congress on 8 August 1942.


Inspired by Gandhi's slogan 'do or die', the Quit India movement turned out to be the biggest civilian uprising in India since the great rebellion of 1857. It was led and orchestrated by lower-ranking Congress leaders since the top leadership had been swiftly clapped into jail as soon as the 'Quit India' resolution was passed. It began as an urban movement, spearheaded by students and workers, which was quickly repressed within a month. In late September 1942 the disturbances spread to the countryside, where large crowds of peasants attacked symbols of British authority, including revenue offices, police stations, railway lines, post offices, and so on. In some instances, arms were looted from captured police stations. British administration collapsed in many districts of Bihar, eastern U.P., western Bengal (especially Midnapur district), Orissa, and parts of Bombay province (especially Satara district). Much like the great revolt of 1857, the agrarian dimension of the 1942 movement was multi-class in character even though the small-holding peasantry provided the backbone of resistance in most of the regions that took part in the revolt. Bihar, which was the storm-centre of the rebellion, saw strong participation from the caste peasantry as well

as tribal people. Parallel governments were set up in the name of the Congress in liberated localities, but overwhelming British military might ultimately prevailed by the spring of 1943, even though some of the underground leaders — such as Jai Prakash Narain, Ram Manohar Lohia and Aruna Asaf Ali — were not apprehended until later. The key Muslim-majority provinces of the north-west took little part in the Quit India movement. Right-wing fringe groups like M.S. Golwalkar's Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh maintained a studied aloofness, as did right-wing Congress politicians like C. Rajagopalachari. Industrial capitalists, having initially flirted with the Congress, quickly settled down to work in harmony with the colonial state by 1944. The Bombay Plan, propounded by leading Indian industrialists, resonated with projects of the government's planning and development department, set up that year. For communists, despite the opportunity to do some famine relief work and set up progressive cultural organizations like the Indian Progressive Theatre Association, their wartime political posture turned out a strategic blunder. The weakening of British power in the eyes of Quit India rebels had in a sense been an optical illusion. The war had brought about a brief revival of the British empire, certainly the biggest deployment of British military forces on Indian soil. Largely unarmed or poorly armed resistance wilted in the face of the ruthless British onslaught. Yet the martyrs of the Quit India uprising had forced the British raj in India to fall back on its coercive foundations and given Congress an emotive issue around which to rejuvenate its electoral fortunes at war's end.

An organized armed struggle under the leadership of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose was launched against the British from across India's north-eastern frontiers. Bose had travelled by submarine from Europe to Asia in early 1943 to lead the Azad Hind Fauj (Indian National Army). Some 40,000 of the 45,000 Indian soldiers of the British Indian Army who had surrendered at Singapore had volunteered to join an army of liberation. To the professional core of the ex-prisoners of war were added civilian recruits from among Indian plantation labourers in Malaya, petty traders in Burma, and shopkeepers in Thailand. Punjabi Muslim, Sikh and Pathan professional soldiers mingled with Tamil and Malayali workers in a national army led by a Bengali. An overwhelming majority of nearly two million Indian expatriates in South East Asia responded with

great emotional fervour to Bose's call for 'total mobilization', his battle-cry 'Chalo Delhi', and his national greeting 'Jai Hind'.

A few significant features of this movement of resistance deserve emphasis. First, it attacked the kernel of British imperial power, namely the British Indian army, which was the ultimate instrument of colonial control, and sought to replace the loyalty of Indian soldiers to the crown with loyalty to the nationalist cause. Second, unlike the Quit India movement in which Muslim participation was minimal, the Azad Hind movement was not only characterized by harmony and unity among various religious and linguistic communities but had a very large, and indeed disproportionate, representation of Muslims and Sikhs within its leadership and ranks. Third, this movement saw widespread participation by women and included a small but significant women's regiment named after the Rani of Jhansi, the legendary leader of the 1857 rebellion.



15. 'An Army of Liberation'. Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose and the Indian National Army in Burma, 1944. (Courtesy the archives of the Netaji Research Bureau, Calcutta.)

The promised march to Delhi was halted at Imphal in 1944. Although the Indian National Army was militarily defeated in the battles in north-eastern India and Burma, it underwent a dramatic political resurrection in the winter of 1945–6. The Congress, Muslim League and other political groups lauded the heroism of the INA and its leader, who had said: ‘We shall not repent even if the advance of our revolutionary army to attain independence of our homeland is completely defeated . . . Even if the whole army becomes only spirit we will not stop advancing towards our homeland.’ ‘The roads to Delhi are many,’ he had told his followers, ‘and Delhi still remains our goal.’ When the British made the grave error of putting on public trial at the Red Fort of Old Delhi three officers of the INA — a Hindu, a Muslim, and a Sikh — for waging war against the King-Emperor, the Congress put together a high-powered legal team for their defence, led by Bhulabhai Desai and including Jawaharlal Nehru. Having shrewdly assessed the public mood, Congress made the release of INA prisoners the main issue in their election campaigns. Although the court martial sentenced the Red Fort three to deportation for life, the commander-in-chief, Claude Auchinleck, was compelled under tremendous pressure to release them forthwith.

The final mass movement on an all-India scale took place on the issue of the INA trials in late 1945 and early 1946. Apart from large-scale public protests and Congress’s championing of the cause, there was a new dimension to this agitation: it included mutinies, uprisings and dissent within the British Indian armed forces. ‘[T]he whole country has been roused,’ Mahatma Gandhi observed, ‘and even the regular forces have been stirred into a new political consciousness and have begun to think in terms of independence.’ There were large-scale street protests in Bombay and Calcutta between November 1945 and February 1946. The most serious of the mutinies took place among the ratings of the Royal Indian Navy led by M.S. Khan in Bombay and other ports of western India in February 1946. In street demonstrations the green flag of the Muslim League and the red flag of the communists were occasionally flown together with the Congress tricolour. The communists proved less successful through these tactics to rehabilitate themselves with the anti-colonial nationalist movement than the Congress, which turned the INA issue to electoral advantage. The ‘decisive shift’ in the British policy on decolonization, Sumit Sarkar has correctly noted, ‘came about under mass pressure in the autumn and winter of 1945–

6'. Faced with problems at home and unable to muster sufficient forces of coercion or collaboration to put down another Indian movement, the British decided in the spring of 1946 to send out a cabinet mission to discuss the terms and shape of Indian independence.

The remarkable political unity of early 1946 quickly degenerated into serious division and conflict by late 1946 over the all-important question of how power was to be shared among Indians once the British quit. The next two chapters examine in detail the forces that led to the partition of India at the moment of decolonization, the colossal human tragedy that this occasioned, and the poisoned legacy of that fateful decision.

## Chapter 16

# The Partition of India and the Creation of Pakistan

The partition of India and the creation of Pakistan has been the subject of fierce but lively historical debate. Various theories have been invoked to explain why, in the process of dismantling their raj, the British partitioned India along ostensibly religious lines. Official histories of Pakistan have in the main subscribed to the ‘two nation’ theory, according to which Indian Muslims were always a distinctive and separate community that had resisted assimilation into their Indian environment. A recurring refrain among historians of mainstream Indian nationalism, on the other hand, has been to blame imperialism for tearing asunder two communities which history and tradition had joined — this is the classical theory of British ‘divide and rule’. Both theories, often propounded as part and parcel of the ideology of post-colonial nation-states, have had wide popular currency. Yet they raise more questions than they answer. Apart from limiting the terrain of historical study, they have only compounded problems which stem from a lack of scholarly dialogue across the great divide of 1947. There is now overwhelming evidence to suggest that regardless of whether Muslims were in fact a ‘nation’, let alone one created by British policies of divide and rule, it was the contradictions and structural peculiarities of Indian society and politics in late colonial India which eventually led to the creation of Pakistan. So it is important to be sensitive to the social and political context in which uses were made of the ‘two nation’ theory by the All-India Muslim League, especially by its leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah. The primary focus of this chapter is on the final decade of the British raj in India. But there can be no understanding of the larger context of Muslim history in colonial India, of which Jinnah and the League admittedly formed an important part, without accounting





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for a multitude of other trends that had helped fashion the discourse, and eventually also the politics, of the 'two nation' ideal.

This ideal would have been unimaginable without some of the dominant assumptions underlying the fact of British colonial rule in India. A powerful revisionist school of modern South Asian historiography has been suggesting lately that Indian social tradition, as we know it today, was largely a nineteenth-century British colonial invention. British social enumerators of the later nineteenth century invested the great religions of the subcontinent, Hinduism and Islam, with a degree of supra-local significance and cohesion never achieved before. While serving the purpose of subverting the mythology of millennia old tradition — for instance the 'two nation' theory and its obverse the 'composite nationality' theory — arguments about the British construction of social identity in South Asia are much in need of analytical disaggregation. For one thing, colonial initiatives may have been more successful in creating political categories out of local religious affiliations than in moulding the mental world of their subject peoples. For another, identities were redefined not simply as a function of skilful social engineering by the colonial masters but also as part of a process of the multifaceted resistance against colonial rule.

So were the Muslims of India after the late nineteenth century an artifact of British colonial imagination? To be sure, the definition of Indian Muslim as an all-India political category for purposes of limited electoral politics triggered all manner of contradictions between Hindu and Muslim as well as Muslim and Muslim, and influenced the course of Muslim politics in the first half of the twentieth century. Yet Muslim social identities in different parts of the subcontinent were being formed by patterns of social and economic relations linked to the fact of British colonial rule without being wholly shaped by it.

During the nineteenth century Muslim reformist movements with some ideological links with West Asia gave a measure of coherence and articulation to a variety of social and economic discontentments. Some scholars have argued that these movements facilitated the construction of a coherent Indian Muslim identity. Yet Muslim social identities in late-nineteenth-century India remained fractured by class, region and the rural–urban divide. The innumerable divisions — doctrinal, sectarian as well as heterodox — of Islam in South Asia even today suggest that the construction of an Indian Muslim

identity, much less a coherent one, in the late nineteenth century has occurred more in the mind of latter-day scholars than in the actual unfolding of social rules and relations. A religiously informed cultural identity as a component of a set of multiple identities certainly did not translate automatically into what came to be understood by the 1920s as communalism and separatism.

It is against the background of changing social identities falling short of effecting grand resolutions on a subcontinental level that the role of British construction, specifically the foisting of the all-India political category of Indian Muslim, acquires special relevance. By the closing decades of the nineteenth century, especially after the great mutiny-rebellion of 1857, British statesmen and officials began perceiving Muslims as a significant and separate political community. Seeing the Muslim lower classes as naturally prone to religious revivalism, and needing a counter to the increasingly assertive Hindu educated classes, the British looked upon the Muslim landed elite as a natural ally. Sections of the Muslim elite were only too eager to encourage this perception. During the 1880s Saiyid Ahmad Khan, founder of Aligarh University and the most strident proponent of the merits of a Muslim *via media* with the colonial power, used the argument that there were 'two nations' in India. This he did in order to exhort Muslims to shun the predominantly Hindu Indian National Congress, and to impress upon the British the need to view their importance in political rather than numerical terms. Anxieties about possible Muslim discontent saw the British adopting the principle of maintaining a balance between communities on nominated local-government boards. With the extension of the elective principle under Ripon's reforms of 1882–3, the British granted separate electorates to Muslims in local-government bodies. Separate electorates were incorporated in the 1909 Morley–Minto reforms, which extended links between the higher and lower councils.

Separate electorates not only survived the constitutional reforms of 1919 but were actually extended despite the expressed reservations of its authors. A concession which articulate segments of the Muslim ashraf classes looked upon as a birthright was now difficult to withdraw. If pitting Muslim communitarianism against Indian nationalism had the potential to misfire, playing the region against the centre could secure British imperial interests. The main purpose of the reforms was to confine Indian politics to the provinces, so that the unitary centre could be kept under the exclusive

purview of the British. Politics in provincial and local arenas meshed awkwardly with communally compartmentalized electorates. This structural contradiction was to haunt Muslim politics for the remainder of the colonial period. Instead of lending substance to an all-India Muslim identity or giving rise to a distinctive politics, Muslims were reduced to the status of a perpetual minority in any constitutional arrangement. Not needing to compete with other Indians, Muslim politicians seeking election in religiously demarcated constituencies could focus wholly on doing down their own co-religionists. Those in the electoral fray — landed notables for the most part — used their local influence and did not need assistance from organized political parties at the centre or in the provinces. This stood in some contrast to the politics of many non-Muslims who, during the first three decades of the twentieth century, saw increasing advantages in allying with the Indian National Congress. Despite the existence of an All-India Muslim League since 1906, Muslim politicians in their different regional locales preferred to go it alone.

There is scarcely any evidence to suggest that, in their local and provincial politics, Muslims ever followed the lead of an all-India Muslim political organization until the last decade of British rule. Only when constitutional reforms were on the anvil did Muslims have an incentive to try and cobble together a common front. Working within a restrictive colonial representative system, Muslim politicians at the local and provincial levels often had to make terms with members of other communities. Supra-communal alliances at these levels frequently militated against too close an association with a Muslim League primarily concerned with promoting the interests of a community defined by religion alone. This became amply evident under the Montagu–Chelmsford reforms of the 1920s. An exclusively Muslim politics held out few attractions in the formal arenas of politics. Separate representation did not guarantee Muslim solidarity, the more so since constitutional arrangements were tailored to prevent the dominance of the reformed councils by any single community. So alliances with other communities were forged not only in the United Provinces where Muslims were in a minority, but also in Punjab and Bengal where they had bare majorities. With the provincialization of electoral politics in the twenties, it was Muslim anxieties about the Turkish Khilafat that served to revive interest at the all-India stage. Yet there lay the rub. Instead of cutting themselves

adrift from Indian nationalist politics the Khilafatists rallied to the support of Gandhi, hardly the best proof of Muslim predilection for an exclusively religiously informed politics. After the disintegration of the movement, pro-Khilafat Muslim nationalists like the Ali brothers were rebels without a cause. The Congress was divided down the middle on whether or not to contest elections to the reformed provincial councils. Overshadowed by the alliance between Congress and Khilafatists, the Muslim League had become moribund in the twenties.

During the next round of constitutional negotiations in the early thirties there was no single all-India Muslim political party which could put forth a plausible claim to speak for all Indian Muslims. Muslim politicians were at sixes and sevens on the issue of separate electorates. There was also considerable heartburning on the implications of the Congress–League agreement of 1916 in Lucknow which, in return for weighted representation for minorities, denied Muslims in Punjab and Bengal representation based on population proportions. Muslim interests in the majority provinces were to clash in louder discord with those of their co-religionists in the predominantly Hindu provinces, especially once the prospect of full provincial autonomy shifted the pendulum in favour of the majority provinces, Punjab in particular. Indeed, it was the Punjab Unionists, a supra-communal alliance of Muslim, Hindu and Sikh agriculturalist interests, that exercised most weight in the constitutional dialogue of this period. The Punjabi view of ‘Muslim interest’, spearheaded by Mian Fazl-i-Husain through the All-India Muslim Conference, found expression in the Communal Award of 1932 and the Government of India act of 1935 but failed to enthuse Muslims in provinces where they were in a minority. Under the award, Muslims in Punjab and Bengal were not only allowed to retain their separate electorates but granted more seats than any other community in the provincial assemblies. Though far from perfect from their point of view, Muslim politicians in these two provinces, as well as their counterparts in the newly-created province of Sind and the North West Frontier Province (which was elevated to the status of a governor’s province), could maximize the gains from provincial autonomy conceded by the 1935 act. But full autonomy for the provinces dealt a hammer blow to Muslims in the minority provinces. It entailed the elimination of British officials from the provincial

councils which had come to be seen as a safeguard for minority interests.

This was the backdrop against which some Muslim politicians from the minority provinces turned to Mohammad Ali Jinnah. A leading constitutional lawyer who masterminded the Lucknow Pact of 1916, Jinnah had appeared to bid farewell to politics in India after being disenchanted by his Congress colleagues during the controversies surrounding the Nehru Report of 1928. By 1934 Jinnah had assumed the mantle of a newly revived All-India Muslim League. The 1935 act was seen as a possible prelude to the British finally agreeing to concede power to Indians at the centre, based on electoral showings in the provinces. If they could somehow counter the adverse effects of the provincialization of politics in the twenties, Jinnah and his League might win the support of Muslims in the majority provinces. Aided and abetted by their numerically preponderant co-religionists in the north-west and north-east of India, minority province Muslims could try and extract more at the all-India centre in order to redress their provincial disadvantages. But with the British in no haste to dilute their power at the centre, Muslims in the majority provinces had no reason to jump onto the All-India Muslim League's bandwagon.

Before the 1936-7 elections, Jinnah and his associates in the League angled for support in the Muslim-majority provinces and also tried striking a deal with Congress at the all-India level. They were thwarted on both scores. Preoccupied with their own concerns on the eve of full provincial autonomy, politicians in the Muslim provinces had no need for a party which existed nowhere but on paper. Unable to prove its following in the Muslim-majority provinces, the League was spurned by Congress at the centre. The League won an ignominious 4.4 per cent of the total Muslim vote cast. Separate electorates, it was painfully clear, were not prohibitive of variety in the internal politics of a community differentiated by religion. If not for an electoral understanding with a band of influential Muslims in Bengal who won thirty-nine seats in the provincial assembly, the All-India Muslim League came very close to extinction. Even in Bengal the Krishak Praja Party leader Fazlul Huq became the leader of the KPP-Muslim League coalition government. Despite a measure of support among urban Muslim Punjabis, the League was categorically rejected by all the Muslim provinces in the north-west. This was ominous. It was in Punjab that the stirrings of a

Muslim revolt against a Congress-led Hindu raj were especially marked. If Jinnah and the League were to have any say in the making of India's future constitution, the provincializing trends influencing the articulation of separate identities in Punjab had to be contained.

So it was some consolation that the Muslim League survived oblivion in provinces where Muslims were wholly outnumbered by those categorized as Hindus. It should not have required much political foresight to predict a decent showing for Congress in the Hindu-majority provinces. But the margins gained by the political mobilization of the early twenties and thirties were much wider than could have been predicted. Unexpected even by its own standards, the Congress victory in the 1937 elections went beyond all expectations. Evidence of the final countdown in the clash between British colonialism and the forces of Indian nationalism, it was based on rather rusty foundations when it came to the nexus between communitarian identities and the 'nation'. Having done so well in its electoral bid, the Congress leadership saw no reason to seek help from outside quarters. There was no space here for Jinnah and the League. And so the party which claimed to represent the elusive political category of Indian Muslim was out of play both at the centre and in the provinces.

But the Congress too had failed miserably at the hustings in most of the Muslim-majority provinces. A poor comment on the effectiveness of pro-Congress Muslims, this was the straw in the wind Jinnah had to clutch when re-entering all-India politics during the decisive final decade of British rule. No ordinary constitutional strategist, he knew full well that Congress would have a none-too-easy ride trying to rope in the Muslim-majority provinces. The North West Frontier Province was the solitary bastion of Congress support in these provinces. What Congress needed, to assert its claim to the British Indian centre, was a hook into Punjab and Bengal, two provinces which had consistently given it grief but which now would play a key part in charting the route to an independent India. Fiercely attached to their provincial interests, the Muslim electorate in these provinces opted for regional parties, Unionist in Punjab and Krishak Praja in Bengal. Not an unexpected result of the 1919 reforms, it was countered by the emergence of the Congress as India's premier nationalist party. On Jinnah's reading this signposted the eventual success of the centre over the provinces. If the League could for

once emerge from the political woodwork it might yet provide a formidable challenge to the Congress.

Even though the electoral arithmetic had produced a disastrous result for the League, there was no disputing the fact that Indian Muslims, however divided and disorganized, remained a separate political category within the existing constitutional set-up. By adopting causes dear to all Indian Muslims, the All-India Muslim League could continue to pose as the most representative organization of Muslims in majority and minority provinces alike. This required striking just the right sort of balance with the majority provinces — making concessions to be sure, but taking care to stamp its own authority over them. Backed by the Muslim provinces, the League would not be ignored by the British or the Congress. This may in turn induce the Congress to come to terms with Jinnah and the League.

It was fortuitous that the twenties and thirties had seen a distinct hardening of Muslim opposition to a Congress-dominated all-India centre, particularly in Punjab and Bengal. With the Congress in office in eight of British India's eleven provinces, the premiers of Punjab and Bengal, Sikander Hayat Khan of the Unionist party and Fazlul Haq of the Krishak Praja Party, thought better to lend support to an all-India Muslim party. Congress rule in the provinces ignited fears of Hindu raj and brought charges of 'atrocities' against Muslim minorities. Seizing his moment with measured grace, Jinnah agreed to represent Punjab and Bengal at the centre, leaving the premiers to manage provincial affairs. Perceiving the Congress as near to grabbing the whole cake, Muslims could no longer postpone reckoning with the prospect of an independent India. The federation outlined in the 1935 act made Muslims uneasy. Both Sikander and Haq could see that a Congress-dominated centre could ride roughshod over the provinces so long as the unitary structure of the colonial state remained intact. Preferring strong provinces and a weak centre, the Muslim-majority provinces disliked the proposed federal arrangement or, at any rate, wanted better assurances of autonomy. An all-India federation offered no consolation to Muslims in provinces where they were in a minority. Separate electorates, even with weighted representation, were simply inadequate. Even if there was a miraculous convergence of their identity and politics, Muslim numbers in the federal assembly would be insufficient to override the Congress vote. So long as they remained a minority,



Muslims could not expect anything more than a marginal role in settling how power was to be shared in an independent India.

A possible way out of the quandary was to invoke aspects of Saiyid Ahmad Khan's thinking and asserting that Indian Muslims were a nation entitled to equal treatment with the Hindu nation in the distribution of power and patronage. In December 1930 Muhammad Iqbal, the renowned poet and philosopher, had asked the All-India Muslim League's council to endorse the call for the creation of a Muslim state in the north-west of India, including Punjab, Sind, the NWFP, and Baluchistan. His ideas were ignored by most Muslim politicians but gained some momentum in the informal arenas of politics through the medium of the popular press. In 1933 they inspired Chaudhri Rahmat Ali, a student at Cambridge, to invent the word 'Pakistan' — etymologically, the 'land of the pure'. 'P' stood for Punjab, 'A' for Afghan (North West Frontier) Province, 'K' for Kashmir, 'S' for Sind, and 'tan' for Baluchistan. Unlike Iqbal's scheme, which was placed strictly within the context of India, Rahmat Ali's envisaged a confederation of Muslim states in the subcontinent linked to the 'original Pakistan', including all the Muslim countries in West and Central Asia up to the Bosphorus. Inciting charges of an Islamic conspiracy among sections of the Hindu press, the proposal's irredentist flavour and the hint of a massive transfer of Muslim populations from other parts of India made it equally unpalatable to most seasoned Muslim politicians. By the late nineteen thirties Iqbal and Rahmat Ali's ideas had been supplemented by a plethora of Muslim schemes, each looking in its own ingenious way to a solution of a minority community's political dilemma.

Despite differences in emphasis, most of the schemes were predicated on Muslims being a nation and not a minority. A veritable revolt against Hindu majoritarian rule under the Congress banner, Muslim assertions of nationhood were put to the test by the outbreak of war in Europe. Once Congress had stated its conditions for supporting the war effort, namely immediate independence, the viceroy needed some excuse to postpone all constitutional advance for the duration of the war. The League's insistence that it represented all Muslims provided the pretext with which to contest Congress's claim to speak for the whole of India. But in order for the League to press home the advantage, Jinnah had to formulate a demand out of the contradictory requirements of Muslims in the majority and minority provinces.

So in March 1940, without specifying the exact geographical boundaries, the All-India Muslim League at its annual session in Lahore formally demanded independent Muslim states in the north-west and the north-east of India on the grounds that Indian Muslims were a nation. As Jinnah noted in his address, the term nationalist had become a 'the play of conjurers' in politics. The time had come for Muslims to reject the derogatory label of communalism, once and for all, and advance a vision of nationalism which was no less valid than that of Congress. Rising from the ashes of the 1937 electoral debacle, this was Jinnah and the League's attempt to formally register their claim to speak for all Indian Muslims. An astonishingly bold stance for a vanquished party to take, it drew strength from the rising tide of Muslim antipathy to the prospect of Congress rule at the all-India centre.

Yet nothing could quite detract from the jarring contradictions inherent in the League's posture. The very party claiming to represent all Indian Muslims had staked an apparently separatist demand for independent Muslim states. There was no reference at all in the resolution to a centre, weak or strong, Muslim or Indian. Moreover, there was no mention of either partition or 'Pakistan'. The nub of the League's resolution was that all future constitutional arrangements be 'reconsidered de novo' since Indian Muslims were a 'nation' and not a minority, as had been presumed in the past. In the League's 'considered view', Muslim-majority provinces in the north-west and the north-east of India should be 'grouped to constitute Independent States in which the constituent units . . . [would] be autonomous and sovereign'. This seemed to suggest an even greater degree of provincial autonomy than already granted under the 1935 act. Intended as a bait for the Muslim provinces, it was counteracted with the proviso that the 'sovereignty' of these 'Independent States' and also of the constituent units within them would be settled at a later stage. In other words, while there was no going back on the assertion of Muslim nationhood, the demand for separate statehood could be achieved only after protracted negotiations on the quantum of sovereignty and autonomy to be conferred.

This imprecision, together with the lack of clear reference to a centre, gave Jinnah some breathing space. He had taken care to draft the resolution in such a way that textual ambiguities would not foreclose alternative outcomes. According to the resolution, the

frontiers of the 'Independent States' were to be based on the existing boundaries of the Muslim provinces. This would leave Muslims in the minority provinces outside the Muslim 'autonomous and sovereign' areas, which would include large non-Muslim minorities in them. Significantly enough, the League envisaged a reciprocal arrangement to protect the interests of both sets of minorities, Muslim and non-Muslim. The fourth paragraph of the resolution refers specifically to 'the constitution' to decide safeguards for minorities inside as well as outside the Muslim states. A constitutional arrangement covering the whole of India had not been ruled out categorically.

H.V. Hodson, the British reforms commissioner, discovered in 1941 that 'every Muslim Leaguer . . . interpreted Pakistan as consistent with a confederation of India for common purposes like defence, provided the Hindu and Muslim element therein stood on equal terms'. The Lahore Resolution represented a revolt against minority status which relegated Muslims to being 'a Cinderella with trade-union rights with a radio in the kitchen but still below-stairs'. Muslims had responded positively to the 'new terminology' invoking nationhood, which 'recognizes that the problem is one of sharing power rather [than of] qualifying the terms on which power is exercised by a majority'. I.I. Chundrigar, a prominent Leaguer from Bombay, explained to his followers that the object of the Lahore Resolution was not to create 'Ulsters', but to achieve 'two nations . . . welded into united India on the basis of equality'. And Jinnah himself admitted to Nawab Ismail on 25 November 1941: 'I think Mr Hodson finally understands as to what our demand is.'

After 1940 Jinnah argued that as there were at least two identifiable nations in India, a transfer of power would have to involve dissolution of the unitary centre which was an artefact of British colonialism. Any reconstitution of that centre would require the agreement of Muslim-majority provinces as well as princely states. Once the principle of Muslim provinces being grouped to form a separate state had been conceded, Jinnah was prepared to negotiate whether that state would seek a confederation with the non-Muslim provinces, namely Hindustan, on the basis of equality at the all-India level, or whether, as a sovereign state, it would make treaty arrangements with the rest of India. In either case, the League's demand for a 'Pakistan', the territorial expression of the Muslim

claim to nationhood, had to be conceded prior to negotiations determining the shape and powers of the all-India centre.

Since the League claimed to speak for all Indian Muslims, and political geography ensured that the Muslim nation would have citizens straddling the frontiers, Jinnah always maintained that the two main Muslim-majority provinces, Punjab and Bengal, would keep their existing boundaries (and thus their large non-Muslim minorities). The calculation was that a Muslim state built around these two provinces would remain part of a larger all-India whole in which minority Muslims outside the Muslim territory would be protected by the similar position that non-Muslims would have inside it. Jinnah's demand for Pakistan aimed at negotiating a new constitutional arrangement in which Muslims would have an equitable share of power at a centre reconstituted on the basis of a partnership between two essentially sovereign states, Pakistan (representing the Muslim-majority provinces) and Hindustan (representing the Hindu-majority provinces).

This was the strategy of a leader adept at constitutional law but directing a party whose main bases of support were in the Hindu-majority provinces. If they were to have a say in the making of India's constitutional future, Jinnah and the League had to prove their support in the Muslim-majority provinces. Such support could not be won by too precise a political programme since the interests of Muslims in one part of India were different from those of Muslims in others. A socio-economic programme aimed at rousing the Muslim populace was bound to be resisted by landed oligarchs who dominated local politics and, given the limitations of the franchise, prove utterly impracticable. With no organizational machinery in the Muslim provinces, Jinnah and the League could not afford to incur the wrath of the landed notables in control of local politics. The best tactic was to build bridges with as many local bigwigs as possible and reserve energies for negotiations at the all-India level.

It was the fact of a glowing prospectus and gnawing organizational weaknesses that led Jinnah to make a belated recourse to religion. Hailed by Sarojini Naidu as the 'ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity', he had often poured scorn on the maulanas, maulvis and mullahs who touted Islam in the bazaars and mohallas of Muslim India. Looking for a way to gather together a hopelessly scattered flock, Jinnah's resort to religion had nothing to do with his ideological

convictions. This was the most practical way of mobilizing a community divided by politics but defined by religion. By keeping the League's demand for a 'Pakistan' vague and undefined, Jinnah could try and muster up as much Muslim support as possible to block Congress ambitions at the centre.

It is well known that the remaining years of the war witnessed a spectacular jump in the popularity graph of a 'Pakistan' among most Muslims, whether in the majority or minority provinces. Mushirul Hasan has documented the role of Aligarh students in popularizing the League's creed in the remote villages of British India. Yet popular sentiments for an undefined demand for a 'Pakistan' did not translate into a matching political organization working for its attainment. Despite Jinnah's undeniable stature, he and the League's high command fell well short of effecting control over Muslim-majority-province politicians, both inside and outside the provincial legislatures, as well as over the populace at the base. The provincial Leagues in the majority provinces were riven with divisions and Jinnah had to rest content on gaining the allegiance of whichever combination was temporarily in the ascendance. Letting his wayward followers make of 'Pakistan' what they pleased, the Quaid-i-Azam kept his sights on negotiations at the centre. But while this specifically Muslim demand attracted many Muslims, it further soured relations between the communities in Punjab and Bengal. Without the tacit agreement of non-Muslims in these two provinces, Jinnah could not palpably claim their undivided territories for 'Pakistan'.

The Cripps Mission of 1942, offering provinces and not communities the right to opt out of the Indian union, nearly succeeded in bringing out the basic contradiction in Jinnah's demands. Some Muslim politicians in Punjab and Bengal could see that the provincial option was incompatible with following the lead of the Muslim League at the all-India level. But the Cripps Mission failed and many Muslim politicians, for various reasons, chose to alienate non-Muslims rather than break with the League. A 'Pakistan' that might mean the division of Punjab and Bengal remained distant thunder. In 1944 C.R. Rajagopalachari, the veteran Congress politician from Madras, offered Jinnah a 'Pakistan' carved out of the Muslim-majority districts of Punjab and Bengal. Such a 'Pakistan' had still to seek common arrangements with the rest of India on matters to do with defence, communications, and commerce. But without the non-

Muslim-majority districts of these two provinces, the League could not expect to bargain for parity between 'Pakistan' and 'Hindustan'. So although Pakistan's geographical boundaries in 1947 had been visualized precisely by Rajagopalachari, Jinnah dismissed the scheme as 'offering a shadow and a husk — a maimed, mutilated and moth-eaten Pakistan, and thus trying to pass off having met our Pakistan scheme and Muslim demand.'

Cripps and Rajagopalachari had in their different ways put their finger on a festering sore. 'Pakistan' was anathema for most non-Muslims in the Muslim-majority provinces. There were repeated warnings from the governors of Punjab and Bengal, and also Assam. But neither New Delhi nor London cared to expose the flaw in Jinnah and the League's strategy, namely that 'Pakistan' could entail partitioning Punjab and Bengal. This allowed Jinnah to concentrate upon building the League's strength in the Muslim-majority-province legislatures. By the time of the first Simla conference in the summer of 1945, the League was out of office in all the Muslim-majority provinces save Sind. Jinnah nevertheless had his moment of glory at Simla. The conference failed because Congress refused to concede his point that the League be allowed to select all the Muslim members to the viceroy's executive council.

Without Congress's consent, the British could not satisfy Jinnah's demands. This became even more evident once the war was over. New Delhi continued to ignore gubernatorial exhortations from Punjab and Bengal. For a government based on executive fiat, not a word was issued to dispel the popular perception among Muslims that 'Pakistan' would include most, if not all, of Punjab and Bengal. Congress for its part merely reiterated the old line that a solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem would have to await the winning of independence. While neither the British nor the Congress were willing to take the 'Pakistan' demand too seriously, many Muslims thought their best security lay in backing a party strongly advocating the Muslim case in negotiations to settle the all-important question of how power was to be shared after the British quit India.

In the 1945–6 elections Jinnah and the League won all the Muslim seats to the central assembly, and polled seventy-five per cent of the total Muslim vote cast in the provincial assembly elections. A remarkable recovery considering their performance in the 1937 elections, it was not nearly as foolproof a step to achieving the

substance of the League's demand as might appear at first sight. Electrified by the slogan for a 'Pakistan', Muslims had not voted for a specific agenda because no agenda had been detailed. No one had a clear idea about the exact meaning of 'Pakistan', let alone its precise geographic boundaries. The elections had been won by local leaders with whom the provincial Leagues had struck alliances of convenience. These could very well crumble under the pressure of events over which Jinnah and the League had no control. In Punjab the Unionist Party paid the price for having been in office during the war to administer policies inimical to many agriculturalists. With events appearing to move fast at the centre, many local landed notables as well as *pirs* thought it prudent to switch to the League. In Bengal, radical posturing by the Abul Hashim faction of the Muslim League organization and its role in famine relief — at a time when many Muslim peasants were victims of profiteering by Hindu traders and landlords — had ensured a steady stream of defection from Krishak Praja leaders and activists as well as a groundswell of support for the League. Ignoring such local and regional causes underlying the League's spectacular performance, it was all very well for Jinnah to depict his party's resounding electoral victory as a mandate for a 'Pakistan' built around an undivided Punjab and Bengal. But with Sikhs in Punjab preparing for a holy war against Muslims, and many Hindus doing much the same both there and in Bengal, the claim was not an irrefutable one. Without solid organizational support in these provinces, there was also nothing the League high command could do to stop Congress from hobnobbing separately with politicians in Muslim-majority provinces. Indeed, after the 1946 elections, apart from Bengal which had a League ministry, Sind was the only province in the north-west where Leaguers were in office. The North West Frontier Province was under a Congress ministry and Punjab, the 'cornerstone' of Pakistan, was under a coalition ministry of Unionists, Congressmen and Panthic Sikhs.

The Cabinet Mission plan of 1946 for a three-tiered all-India federation offered Jinnah something worthy of consideration. Compulsory grouping of provinces at the second-tier handed the League a potential centre capable of disciplining the Muslim provinces and deploying their weight at an all-India centre confined to dealing only with defence, foreign affairs and communications. But Congress

imperatives called for the extension of the centre's powers so that real authority was vested at the all-India level, not with group legislatures, as the League demanded. So the Mission could only give Jinnah the choice between on the one hand an undivided India with a weak federal centre and compulsory grouping of Muslim and Hindu provinces but without a guarantee of the Muslim share at the centre, or on the other a sovereign Pakistan stripped of eastern Punjab and western Bengal (including Calcutta).

On 6 June 1946 Jinnah rejected such a sovereign 'Pakistan', paving the way for the All-India Muslim League's acceptance of the Mission's plan for a three-tiered federal arrangement. With Congress fanning opposition to provincial grouping among the




16. 'Prime Minister in Waiting'. Jawaharlal Nehru as head of the interim government, 1946 (seated on his left are Sarat Chandra Bose and Rajendra Prasad. (Courtesy the archives of the Netaji Research Bureau, Calcutta.)



Frontier Pathans and elsewhere, Jinnah soon realized that the Mission's proposals would not stick for long after the British withdrawal. Jawaharlal Nehru's statement of 11 July 1946, after taking over from Maulana Azad as Congress President, that grouping might not last, alarmed the Muslim League. A 'Pakistan' with its own sovereign centre would alone be capable of controlling the Muslim provinces. But a sovereign Pakistan had to include undivided Punjab and Bengal if it was to receive a large share of the centre's assets (particularly the Indian army). Without some such bargaining weight Jinnah could not hope to negotiate the broader all-India arrangements which he had always assumed would have to be made.

In a desperate bid to achieve Pakistan, the Muslim League called for a 'Direct Action' day to be observed on 16 August 1946. The 'great Calcutta killing' which began that day and continued until 20 August left a few thousand Hindus and Muslims dead. In early September the Congress joined an interim government at the centre, while the Muslim League stayed out. After the League joined the interim government in October, the two sets of ministers remained at odds with one another. Meanwhile, relations between religious communities deteriorated sharply in various regions of India. In October, Muslim peasants led by demobilized soldiers attacked Hindu landlords and traders in the Noakhali and Tippera districts of east Bengal. Far worse violence was perpetrated against the Muslim minority in neighbouring Bihar in its immediate aftermath. Violence careering out of control at the social base narrowed the options of those negotiating at the centre even further.

By early 1947 London's main priority was to get out of India as quickly as possible before anti-colonial politics became more radicalized than they already were, and before communal violence reached even more dangerous levels. Throughout the country there were reports of peasant, labour and youth unrest. In certain regions like Telengana and north Bengal, poor peasants and sharecroppers rose up in rebellion. After the rioting in Bengal and Bihar in late 1946, the communal situation was steadily deteriorating in the Punjab from January 1947. These myriad conflicts along lines of class and community laid the basis for an understanding between the Congress high command and London. On 20 February 1947 the British prime minister, Clement Attlee, announced that the



17. 'Walking for Peace'. Mahatma Gandhi in Noakhali. (Courtesy the archives of the Netaji Research Bureau, Calcutta.)

British would depart from India by 30 June 1948. The Hindu Mahasabha immediately demanded the partition of Punjab and Bengal. The Mahasabha's demand was echoed by the Congress high command in Nehru's statement of 8 March 1947 which called for the partition of Punjab and suggested that the principle of partition might have to be extended to Bengal as well. Mountbatten's arrival as the last viceroy in March hastened the process of British disengagement even further. Mountbatten was minded to withdraw as quickly as possible with the least possible harm to British interests. Congress, led by Jawaharlal Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel, was ready and eager to take power at the British centre at the price of partitioning Bengal and Punjab. 'Beset by Curzon's ghost', the Bengali newsmagazine *Millat* wrote on 11 April 1947, the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha were performing the role of the matricidal Parashuram of Hindu mythology as they 'together raised a sharpened axe to slice "Mother" into two'.

During April and May 1947 Bengali nationalist leaders Sarat Chandra Bose and Kiran Shankar Roy were able to reach an understanding with Muslim League leaders Husain Shahid Suhrawardy and Abul Hashim on a united and independent Bengal. The scheme received the endorsement of both Gandhi and Jinnah. In fact, as late as 28 May 1947 Mountbatten recorded two alternative broadcast statements in London. Broadcast 'A' was to be used if it appeared probable that Bengal was to be partitioned, and Broadcast 'B' if Bengal was to remain unified, leaving Punjab alone as the candidate for partition. The implacable opposition of Nehru and Patel ensured that broadcast 'B' was discarded on Mountbatten's return to India on 30 May 1947.

On 2 June 1947 Mountbatten unveiled his partition plan to leaders of the Congress and the League. Late that night Jinnah met Mountbatten in an attempt to persuade him not to make the plan public since the League's council might not accept it. The viceroy retorted: 'you [Jinnah] will lose Pakistan, probably for good'. Jinnah simply shrugged his shoulders, and said: '[w]hat must be, must be'. 'Mr Jinnah!' came Mountbatten's threat, 'I do not intend to let you wreck all the work that has gone into this settlement. Since you will not accept for the Muslim League, I will speak for them myself.' At the leaders' meeting the next morning the Quaid-e-Azam was ordered to 'nod [his] head in acquiescence'. The 3 June plan formally presented to the Congress and League leaders and broadcast by

Mountbatten later that day virtually decreed partition, leaving a few hollow phrases to keep up the pretence of awaiting 'the decision of the Indian people'. The legislators of the Muslim-majority districts and the remaining districts of both Punjab and Bengal sitting separately were empowered to vote on whether or not their provinces should be partitioned. If a simple majority of either part decided in favour of partition, the division would take place. The provinces, partitioned or not, would have to choose between joining the existing constituent assembly or a new, i.e. 'Pakistan' constituent assembly.

The charade of ascertaining 'the will of the people' in late June 1947 has left historians with a small advantage. It has put on record that the majority of legislators in both provinces rejected partition; the decisive votes in favour of partition were cast by east Punjab and west Bengal legislators acting under Congress



18. 'A Tired Vote for Partition'. Jawaharlal Nehru raises his hand to vote for partition, June 1947. (Courtesy the archives of the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.)

whip. It now only remained for the British Parliament to pass the necessary legislation to transfer power to two new dominions, which was duly done in July. In a final show of defiance that month Jinnah expressed his desire to convene the Pakistan Constituent Assembly in New Delhi! The Congress leaders would not hear of it. By accepting partition they hoped to have banished the Muslim 'nation' to the north-western and eastern extremities of the subcontinent, while riveting central control over the Hindu-majority provinces.

The choice with which Jinnah was presented in the end by Congress and the British was either an undivided India without any guarantee of the Muslim share in power at the all-India centre, or a sovereign Pakistan carved out of the Muslim-majority districts of Punjab and Bengal. Had Jinnah been more sure of his following in the Muslim provinces he might conceivably have decided to



19. 'Announcing a Birth'. M.A. Jinnah about to make a radio broadcast, June 1947. (Courtesy the Information Division, Embassy of Pakistan, Washington, D.C.)

work the Mission's plan for an all-India federal structure. In this way he could have prevented the partition of Punjab and Bengal and used the weight of the Muslim provinces to secure safeguards for Indian Muslims in both majority and minority provinces. Jinnah's fears of his own followers, his deep mistrust of the Congress high command, and Mountbatten's decision to move up the date for the final transfer of power from June 1948 to August 1947 left him with little alternative but to acquiesce in the creation of a Pakistan shorn of eastern Punjab and western Bengal (including Calcutta) — the 'maimed, mutilated and moth-eaten' state which he had rejected out of hand in 1944 and then again in 1946.

A Pakistan without its large non-Muslim minorities in Punjab and Bengal was hardly well placed to demand safeguards for Muslim minorities in the rest of India. Congress agreed to the principle of partition on the condition that Jinnah and the League



20. 'The Pity of Partition'. Mahatma Gandhi in a pensive mood just outside Calcutta, June 1947 (walking with him is Sarat Chandra Bose).  
(Courtesy the archives of the Netaji Research Bureau, Calcutta.)

accepted it as a final settlement and would not make any further claims on behalf of Muslims in the minority provinces. Moreover, according to Congress, partition did not entail a division of India into Pakistan and Hindustan, as Jinnah had always maintained, but would merely mean that some areas with Muslim majorities had 'opted out' from the 'Union of India' which already existed. Congress's insistence and British acceptance of the notion that the 'Union of India' would continue to exist without the Muslim-majority areas destroyed the entire basis of the 'two nation' theory as propagated by Jinnah. So the creation of Pakistan, far from being the logical culmination of the theory that there were two nations in India, Hindu and Muslim, was in fact its most decisive political abortion. It was only in an all-India context that the concept of the two nations could have survived the creation of a separate Muslim homeland. Congress's interpretation of partition cast Pakistan in the role of a 'seceding' state with the added implication that if it failed to survive, the Muslim areas would have to return to the 'Union of India' severally, not help to re-create it on the basis of two sovereign states.

It was precisely because religion had not been sufficient to bring the Muslim provinces solidly behind an all-India strategy aimed at safeguarding the interests of all Indian Muslims that Jinnah had to abandon his larger political purposes and settle for a truncated Pakistan. This is not to deny that the slogan 'Islam in danger' was a useful rallying cry against the prospect of a Hindu-dominated centre. But the contradictory logic of British constructions — namely the emphasis on provincial and local arenas of politics on the one hand and communally compartmentalized electorates on the other — meant that in the end it was the particularisms of the Muslim provinces rather than a supra-local Islamic sentiment which provided the more important driving force in the making of Pakistan. The Congress leadership's aversion to substantial provincial autonomy as well as the prospect of having to concede a substantial share of power at the centre suggests that exclusion, not separatism, might better explain the outcome of 1947.

The dismemberment of the union of India on 14–15 August 1947 was accompanied by the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of innocent Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs as millions stumbled fearfully across the 'shadow lines' separating two post-colonial nation-states. Lord Mountbatten, who never missed an opportunity for self-

congratulation, patted himself on the back for having carried out one of 'the greatest administrative operations in history'. As New Delhi took on a festive air before being plunged into a communal carnage, Mahatma Gandhi — the 'father' of the Indian nation — mourned quietly by himself in Calcutta. And, of course, only a British judge could tell for certain where exactly the partitioners' axe was to fall. Radcliffe's award of the precise territorial extent of the two dominions was not made known until at least two days after India and Pakistan had come into being. W.H. Auden did not miss this final irony in the story of Britain's withdrawal from the subcontinent in his poem 'Partition':

Unbiased at least he was when he arrived on his mission,  
Having never set eyes on this land he was called to partition  
Between two peoples fanatically at odds,  
With their different diets and incompatible gods.  
'Time,' they had briefed him in London, 'is short. It's too late  
For mutual reconciliation or rational debate:  
The only solution now lies in separation.  
The Viceroy thinks, as you will see from his letter,  
That the less you are seen in his company the better,  
So we've arranged to provide you with other accommodation.  
We can give you four judges, two Moslem and two Hindu,  
To consult with, but the final decision must rest with you.'  
Shut up in a lonely mansion, with police night and day  
Patrolling the gardens to keep assassins away,  
He got down to work, to the task of settling the fate  
Of millions. The maps at his disposal were out of date  
And the Census Returns almost certainly incorrect,  
But there was no time to check them, no time to inspect  
Contested areas. The weather was frightfully hot,  
And a bout of dysentery kept him constantly on the trot,  
But in seven weeks it was done, the frontiers decided,  
A continent for better or worse divided.  
The next day he sailed for England, where he quickly forgot  
The case, as a good lawyer must. Return he would not,  
Afraid, as he told his Club, that he might get shot.



## Chapter 17

# Nineteen Forty-seven: Memories and Meanings

**D**uring the closing days of the British raj officials in the imposing secretariat buildings designed by Lutyens resembled apprentice sorcerers who had let loose forces they could barely understand, much less fully control. Fifty years ago the raj came to its end amidst political and social convulsions in which Hindu and Muslim as well as Muslim and Sikh engaged in an orgy of murder, rape and plunder on an unprecedented scale. Some seventeen million people were shunted across frontiers of a subcontinent ostensibly divided along religious lines for the first time in its history. In the half century that has elapsed India and Pakistan have been to war over the north Indian princely state of Kashmir on two separate occasions. A third war in 1971, preceded by the slaughter of Muslims by Muslims, marked the breakaway of Bangladesh. This bloody baptism of the states which replaced the British raj has wreaked havoc on inter-state relations in the subcontinent. The 1990s have witnessed the rise of Hindu majoritarian nationalism in India, the resurgence of Hindu–Muslim violence in the north and west of the country, the recurrence of centre–region problems in nearly all of South Asia, the repression of a popularly backed armed insurgency in Kashmir, and the ravages of an array of violent social and political conflicts in Pakistan involving, in particular, Urdu-speaking migrants from India. Today the legacy of 1947 is looming larger than ever before, both at the domestic and regional levels. The scars of partition have proven to be deeper than the healing touch of independence from colonial rule.

The sheer magnitude of the events of 1947 has elicited varied interpretations. When clashing emotions have not rendered

discussion impossible, the marshalling of contradictory facts has generated bitter controversies. The meanings and memories of 1947 have been suffused by charge and counter-charge of polemicists, whether apologists of empire or the embattled propagandists of official nationalism, Indian and Pakistani alike. Until recently the main explanations of why India was partitioned were based on the theory of British divide and rule and arguments about Indian Muslims being a separate and identifiable nation. Neither theory, as we have seen in the last chapter, provided an adequate explanation of the central event in modern South Asian history. Left to statist historians or 'communal' ideologues, debates on the partition and independence of India have drawn upon tortured recollections of displacement, unmitigated terror, and the brutal killing and rape of kith and kin — in order to harden the lines of hostility rather than on thoughtful recollection and reappraisal of the memories and meanings of 1947, as well as of the history and mythology surrounding partition, so as to promote informed dialogue and understanding.

When India was partitioned there were nearly a hundred million Muslims in the subcontinent, or more than one person in five. Of these about sixty million were to live in Pakistan, both east and west, making it the largest Muslim state in the world, but a state cut in two by over a thousand miles of Indian territory. Nearly forty million Muslims were left inside India, the largest group of Muslims in a non-Muslim state. These bare facts suggest that if Indian Muslims had a common faith and a shared, religiously informed cultural identity, they were in no sense a homogeneous community, especially in their politics. Muslims differed from Muslims on the bases of their regional and local loyalties, language, occupation, and economic standing. Ever since the early centuries of Islam in India, Muslims had coexisted and often worked in harmony with followers of other religions. When the British came to power in India, it was certainly not in the face of the organized resistance of Islam; while the British remained in Government House, it was hardly with the organized support of an united Muslim community. Yet when they transferred power in 1947, they did so to two states, in one of which we are invited to believe that an Islamic ideology had become the most important impulse.

There is more than a little that is curious about the claim. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man widely credited with the creation of Pakistan, made his mark on Indian politics as an unequivocal

protagonist of Hindu–Muslim unity, and from 1913 to 1937 stood for a common Congress–League political programme. The triumphant hero of Pakistani hagiography, the monster in the demonology of the less perceptive among Indian and British historians, not to mention the ‘lunatic’, the ‘evil genius’ and the ‘megalomaniac’ in the breathtakingly egotistical utterances of the last viceroy, Jinnah has been until recently acclaimed and denounced in unison for tearing apart the historic unity of the Indian subcontinent. But the result of the end game of the raj was not what Jinnah had been after all along. For a man who liked to describe himself as a ‘cold blooded logician’, Jinnah avoided any discussion on the logistics of his demand. Indeed at no point during the final decade of the British raj did anyone in the All-India Muslim League give a precise definition to the demand for a ‘Pakistan’. While the leaders remained tight-lipped about what Pakistan actually entailed, the followers were allowed to make of it what they wished. Naturally, a host of conflicting shapes and forms, most of them vague, some utopian, others simply fatuous, were given to what was little more than an undefined slogan. Yet if Jinnah did not reveal his real aim or give concrete shape to his notion of Pakistan, he did so with a deliberate purpose. Historians have no excuse to accept the slogan at face value. Jinnah’s appeal to religion was not characteristic of his earlier politics, nor indeed of his personal convictions. His use of religion was a political tactic, not an ideology to which he was ever committed.

Was Jinnah’s and indeed the League’s use of religion sufficient to commit the early managers of Pakistan to constructing an Islamic state? Religion as culture has always been an important element in the identity of Muslims in their varied regional settings. But there has never been any agreement on religion as political ideology. In a context where the local and regional politics of Muslims had never developed within the framework of an all-India Muslim political party, the League could rustle up the semblance of mass support only by bringing the Muslim provincial bosses into line. Such support could not be won by a precise political programme, since what was good for Muslims in one part of India was not good for Muslims in others. A social programme which might have mobilized the rank and file held no attractions for the provincial oligarchs who dominated Muslim politics. This is where religion came to Jinnah’s rescue, less as a device to be deployed against rival communities, and more as

a way of papering over the cracks in the splintered ranks of Muslim India.

In the event, Jinnah's strategy misfired. It had been grounded upon a number of assumptions, many of which proved unsound when it came to the crunch. This shrewd politician underestimated Britain's anxiety to hand over power. He thought he still enjoyed the luxury of a leisurely British timetable. Since a partition of India would clearly damage British interests in some ways, Jinnah assumed that London would delay a transfer of power rather than accept it in a hurry. Since Gandhi was implacably opposed to partition, Jinnah assumed Congress would go to great lengths — perhaps even as far as conceding parity — rather than permit it. But Jinnah exaggerated the Mahatma's influence over his erstwhile lieutenants in the Congress high command, particularly once office at the centre was at stake. Jinnah of all people should have understood why the hard men in the Congress, especially Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and Jawaharlal Nehru, needed a strong unitary centre for India, and realized the high price they would pay to achieve it. Yet the fundamental flaw in Jinnah's strategy was his lack of effective control over his followers in the Muslim-majority provinces. In playing the communal card Jinnah had helped arouse religious passions because, lacking a strong and unified party organization, this was his only trump card against the British, the Congress, and even his own recalcitrant allies in the Muslim provinces. Fired by millennial hopes of various sorts, depending on the regional and class contexts, the enthusiasts for Pakistan destroyed Jinnah's calculations at the top — which had a very narrow margin for error.

For Jinnah, Pakistan was the means with which to win an equitable share of power for Muslims at the all-India centre. It was not a strategy designed for the benefit of Muslim-majority provinces alone; nor was it in the interests simply of Muslims in the minority provinces. Rather it was the line of a seasoned politician who, throughout his long career, had set his sights on the all-India stage. Paradoxically, his nationalist sentiments had more in common with those of the Congress high command, an organization in which he had served his political apprenticeship, than with the narrower perspectives of most of his own supporters. Playing for high stakes with an indifferent hand, he could hardly reveal his cards. The appeal to religion proved to be the joker in the pack. This solitary man, who lacked the common touch, had to pretend to be a man of the people;

this modern politician with secular leanings had to give the men of religion their due; this dedicated constitutionalist had in the end to threaten his opponents with religiously inspired agitation; and this nationalist, who had dedicated so much of his life to winning for India that strong centre from the colonial masters, ended up by being held responsible for the partition of India. This then was the man held responsible for the creation of a 'maimed, mutilated and moth-eaten' Pakistan, a country whose Islamic unity has proved to be fragile — a truth that Jinnah, who had for so long and so painstakingly tried to combat the provincial particularisms of the Muslim-majority provinces, must secretly have known. Corroborating evidence that the Quaid-i-Azam never envisaged Islam as ideology to dominate the state of Pakistan can be seen in his address to the first ever meeting of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly on 11 August 1947:

You are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this state of Pakistan. . . . You may belong to any religion or caste or creed — that has nothing to do with the business of the State. . . . We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State.

Sadly for the man who is still revered by the people of Pakistan as the father of the nation, his ideas that have seemed inconvenient have been suppressed by ideologues of the post-colonial state. The brazen use of state-controlled education and media since 1947 has helped to ensure that Jinnah is remembered as the man who gave concrete expression to the vision of an Islamic state. Devoid of historical fact, the partition of India is celebrated as the ultimate victory of Islam in the subcontinent. Few Pakistanis visiting Jinnah's mausoleum have wondered how this great defender of minority rights could have left so many Muslims unprotected in a predominantly Hindu India. The time when ignorance was bliss, however, seems to be running out, and more and more Pakistanis are reassessing the memories and meanings of partition as they look agitatedly, if helplessly, at the fate of their co-religionists in India today.

The gap between the meanings and memories of partition has been quite as wide in India. Having successfully appropriated the mantle of the British raj, it was not too difficult for Congress to lay exclusive claim on the appellation of 'Indian nationalist'. Partha

Chatterjee has shown how nationalist thought at its 'moment of arrival', exemplified by Jawaharlal Nehru, became a 'discourse of order' conducted not only in 'a single, consistent, unambiguous voice' but also 'glossing over all earlier contradictions, divergences and differences'. Yet Chatterjee's methodological decision to 'give to nationalist thought its ideological unity by relating it to a form of the post-colonial state' leaves insufficient space for the recovery of contested visions of nationhood and alternative frameworks of the free Indian state. As late as 1945, Gandhi was holding fast to 'the system of Government envisaged in Hind Swaraj' and refusing 'to draw a large scale picture in detail'. If Gandhi's predilection for the small-scale village community led him to refuse to elaborate on the nature of a state on a subcontinental scale, there were plenty of other nationalist models of the state that offered variations on the theme of decentred democracy with room for an interplay between fission and fusion as well as centrifugal and centripetal tendencies. A unitary, post-colonial state was in the end prepared to grant legitimacy to only one strand of singular nationalism. But it is imperative for historians not to accept the easy conflation between nation and state when no such hyphenated relationship existed until the climactic moment of the post-colonial transition.

In the retrospectively reconstructed narrative of the nationalist past only those Muslims who supported the Congress qualified as 'nationalist Muslims', with little regard to their historically shifting role in colonial and anti-colonial politics. More important, the spectre of a great communal divide, 'finally settled' or 'solved' through the partition of 1947, could conveniently obscure the centre-region contradictions in the rest of India. The lever of a subcontinent-wide conflict between a religious majority and minority not only enabled the Congress in 1947 to cut the Muslim League's contradictory demands to size but also to deploy the powers of the centralized state apparatus it had inherited to assert its authority over the Hindu-majority regions. In the immediate aftermath of independence the proponents of a linguistic reorganization of states, as well as communists fighting for poor peasants' rights in Telengana, could be tarred by the sweeping Nehruvian brush of anti-state terrorism. There were other benefits that came with the negotiated transfer of power. Through the newly won control of the official channels of communication the new regime could proudly propagate the myth of how independence was won purely through Gandhian methods

of non-violence, even if it paid little heed to Gandhian values and visions of the future. The revolutionaries who took to the path of armed struggle won much popular veneration but were for decades after independence virtual untouchables so far as official histories and media reportage were concerned. Outside a select company of scholars and intellectuals, the communal holocaust accompanying partition has been rarely permitted to challenge the hollowness of the claim of India's non-violent coming to freedom. Among the elite, many Indian Muslims accuse Jinnah and his Pakistan of undermining their socio-economic and political standing in independent India, while the non-Muslim 'majority' hold Pakistan and its principal architect responsible for destroying the sacred unity of Bharatmata — 'mother India'. The situation surrounding Ayodhya, where Hindu majoritarian nationalists are seeking to build a temple at the alleged birthplace of Ram after razing the sixteenth-century Babri Masjid to the ground, suggests that the real meaning of partition has been lost on Indians quite as much as on Pakistanis. There is, of course, a major difference. In India the prevalent memory of partition is an acutely negative one, even if the Hindu Mahasabha and the Congress called for it in 1947. Partition seems to be the demon that Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led Hindus are trying to exorcise by felling a mosque and erecting Ram's temple in its place.

The resurgence of 'communalism' in self-professedly secular India evokes many but not all the memories of 1947. A communal holocaust notwithstanding, 1947 was the year British rule was finally terminated and Indians given full responsible government. But, as in the case of partition, there is a disjunction between the meanings and the memories attached to the winning of independence on 15 August 1947. For most Indians, independence was won on that day, albeit at the painful but ultimately affordable price of partition. Very few realize, much less question, why their nationalist heroes accepted dominion status rather than the full independence to which they had been committed since the adoption of the Purna Swaraj resolution at Lahore in 1929. More have criticized the decision to accept Pakistan, entailing as it did a total reversal of the Congress policy of acquiring power over a united India. Gandhi's categorical rejection of an independence based on the partition of India lends added weight to this sentiment. A close analysis of the end game reveals that, by going along with partition, the Congress leadership was able to lay claim to the British unitary centre at New Delhi, pull

in the princely states, and ensure its triumphant march over three-quarters of India. No mean achievement — especially the integration of the princely states achieved by that man of iron, Vallabhbhai Patel — it was made possible only by compromising on the two main principles of the Indian nationalist creed since the late 1920s — unity and full independence.

If unity and even independence could be compromised, it was easy to dilute Congress's commitment to the socio-economic betterment of the people of India. The assumption of the centralized power of the raj by a Congress professing an ideology of reformist class conciliation, but in fact representing the interests of more specific privileged groups, has kept the scales firmly tilted against India's poor. India's 'tryst with destiny' at the midnight hour on 15 August 1947, while it represented in the popular consciousness an achievement second to none in the subcontinent's history, has not eradicated the poverty, discrimination and exploitation of which colonialists were accused by nationalists. Neither the Gandhian dreams of self-sustained village reconstruction, nor the radical objective of rapid socialist development through the instruments of a centralized state, have been fulfilled by the configurations that have ruled India since 1947. If anything, Congress's inheritance of the colonial state's unitary centre — the glistening prize in the quest of which its leadership took the momentous step of conceding partition and Pakistan — has accentuated centre-state tensions and complicated the task of redressing the socio-economic deprivations of India's teeming multitudes. India's federal dilemma, the threats to its secular ideology, the class, caste and communal conflicts and, above all, military disputes with Pakistan, are all directly related to the decisions of expediency taken in 1947.

The memories and meanings of 1947 proved least traumatic for the erstwhile colonial rulers, despite some early manifestations of withdrawal symptoms. Raj nostalgia burst forth on media screens with aplomb in the 1980s. Britain's romance with India grew stronger in the aftermath of empire precisely because memories can be selective to the point of distorting reality. The most acclaimed figure of Britain's grand moment in India at the time of the transfer of power in 1947 is Lord Louis Mountbatten, the last viceroy, who delighted in Hollywood theatrics quite as much as in his royal lineage. Mountbatten's decision to transfer power in August 1947 rather than in June 1948 is attributed to his political acumen, not to his self-



-serving interest in striking a deal with a Congress leadership that was more anxious to acquire power than uphold the nationalist ideals for which so many freedom fighters in the past had sacrificed their lives. This prince-charming turned viceroy never lost an opportunity for self-congratulation. He even claimed laurels for presiding over the agonizing dismemberment of Punjab and Bengal. In the memory of those Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims who perished in their hundreds of thousands, the refugees who in their millions stumbled fearfully across the frontiers of the two states and, above all, the women and children who bore the full brunt of the violence, Mountbatten's contention that he carried out in a matter of months one of 'the greatest administrative operations in history' needs to be signposted instead in the historical archive as the clearest admission of the former colonial masters' dereliction of duty at the moment of India's gravest crisis.

The dawn of independence came littered with the severed limbs and blood-drenched bodies of innocent men, women and children: this is the nightmare from which the subcontinent has never fully recovered. The colossal human tragedy of the partition and its continuing aftermath has been better conveyed by sensitive creative writers and artists — for example in Saadat Hasan Manto's short stories and Ritwik Ghatak's films — than by historians. There have been recent, belated attempts by a few historians and anthropologists to capture the experience of pain during the partition. When coming from those imbued with a communitarian or fragmentalist perspective, these attempts miss more than a historical nuance or two in their dogged anti-statism. Veena Das has suggested how the Indian state may have impinged on the exercise of choice by raped and abducted women by creating a legal category of 'abducted women' for the purposes of its repatriation programme. While taking a strong and entirely laudable position against the many instances of violence by the post-colonial state, she is curiously silent about the negation of consent and choice at the traumatic, violent moment of abduction and rape. By dramatizing, if not romanticizing, examples of murderers and rapists turned into besotted husbands of their former victims (such as a big, bearded Sikh weeping copiously at the border checkpoint), she presents a more benign picture of the acceptance of raped women by families, and of the kinship communities of victims and perpetrators alike, than is warranted by the historical evidence or the cultural context.

In a slightly different vein Gyanendra Pandey, in his effort to write about the experience of partition and challenge colonial as well as nationalist stereotypes of communal conflict, has treated all violence that was not violence by the state as an undifferentiated category. This has rather disconcerting implications for the recovery of the consciousnesses of women who were the worst victims of violence at the time of partition. The historians' critique of over-centralized state monoliths of the colonial and post-colonial era needs to avoid the trap of simply and rather uncritically celebrating the community and the fragment. The structures and ideologies of communities deserve to be subjected to the same critical scrutiny as the structures and ideologies of states. The best way forward in partition historiography may be to investigate the relationship between the social and cultural formation of communities in their interaction with political and state-making processes at the local, regional, and all-India levels. That would enable some restoration of their subjecthood to subaltern social groups, including women, in the making of history, while noting that even their active agency could not always prevent them becoming tragic, though not passive, victims of the games of power played by claimants, makers, and managers of colonial and post-colonial states.

There are moments, however, when even the most sensitively crafted history of communities and states pales in comparison to the poetic licence of a Faiz Ahmed Faiz, who captured the mood of the times when he wrote the poem 'Freedom's Dawn (August 1947)'

*Ye dagh dagh ujala, ye shab-gazida sahar  
 Vo intizar tha jis-ka, ye vo sahar to nahin,  
 Ye vo sahar to nahin jis-ki arzu lekar  
 Chale the yar ke mil-jaegi kahin na kahin  
 Falak ke dasht men taron ki akhiri manzil,  
 Kahin to hoga shab-e sust mauk ka sahil,  
 Kahin to jake rukega safina-e-gham-e-dil.  
 Jawan lahu ki pur-asrar shahrahon se  
 Chale jo yar to daman pe itne hath pare;  
 Diyar-e-husn ki be-sabr khwabgahori se  
 Pukarti-rahin bahen, badan bulate-rahe;  
 Bahut aziz thi lekin rukh-e-sahar ki lagan,  
 Subuk subuk thi tamanna, dabi dabi thi thakan.  
 Suna hai ho bhi chuka hai firaq-e-zulmat-o-nur*

*Suna hai ho bhi chuka hai visal-e-manzil-o-gam;  
 Badal-chuka hai bahut ahl-e-dard ka dastur,  
 Nishat-e-vasl halal o azab-e-hijr haram.  
 Jijar ki ag, nazar ki umang, dil ji jalan,  
 Kisi pe chara-e-hijran ka kuchh asar ni nahin.  
 Kahan se ai nigar-e-saba, kidhar kho gai?  
 Abhi charagh-e-sar-e-rah ko kuchh khabar hi nahin;  
 Abhi girani-e-shab men kami nahin ai,  
 Najat-e-dida-o-dil ki ghari nahin ai;  
 Chale-chalo ke vo manzil abhi nahin ai.*

(This leprous daybreak, dawn night's fangs have mangled —  
 This is not that long-looked-for break of day.  
 Not that clear dawn in quest of which those comrades  
 Set out, believing that in heaven's wide void  
 Somewhere must be the stars' last halting place,  
 Somewhere the verge of night's slow-washing tide,  
 Somewhere an anchorage for the ship of heartache.  
 When we set out, we friends, taking youth's secret  
 Pathways, how many hands plucked at our sleeves!  
 From beauty's dwellings and their panting casements  
 Soft arms invoked us, flesh cried out to us;  
 But dearer was the lure of dawn's bright cheek,  
 Closer her shimmering robe of fairy rays;  
 Light-winged that longing, feather-light that toil.  
 But now, word goes, the birth of day from darkness  
 Is finished, wandering feet stand at their goal;  
 Our leaders' ways are altering, festive looks  
 Are all the fashion, discontent reprov'd; —  
 And yet this physic still on unslaked eye  
 Or heart fevered by severance works no cure.  
 Where did that fine breeze, that the wayside lamp  
 Has not once felt, blow from — where has it fled?  
 Night's heaviness is unlesened still, the hour  
 Of mind and spirit's ransom has not struck;  
 Let us go on, our goal is not reached yet.)

## Chapter 18

# Post-Colonial South Asia: State and Economy, Society and Politics, 1947–1971

**N**ow is the moment when the historical clock ticks past the famous midnight hour of 14–15 August 1947. This chapter aims at breaching the spatial and temporal divide which that moment has come to represent in the domain of scholarship. Despite a much longer shared history, marked by as many commonalities as differences, post-colonial India and Pakistan have for the most part been treated as two starkly antithetical entities. Only a few comparative analysts have risked trespassing across the arbitrary frontiers demarcated at the time of partition, most preferring to operate within the contours of independent statehood even when these fly in the face of overlapping developments rooted in the distant as well as the recent colonial past. Such scholarly deference to the boundaries of post-colonial nation-states in the subcontinent is matched by the attitude of Indian and Pakistani border patrols, who, despite firing shots at one another, seem perfectly resigned to the two-way flow of illicit trade in luxury wares, arms and drugs. If a twelve-hundred-mile-long frontier has served to thwart policing efforts, a five-millennia-old past persists in unsettling the rigid compartmentalization of historical memory and narration enforced during five decades of state-orchestrated national imaginings. Neither end nor beginning, 1947 has to be seen as intrinsic to the ongoing processes of decolonization while addressing the theme of continuity and change between the colonial and post-colonial eras.

The overlapping dialectics of centralism and regionalism as well as nationalism and religious assertion (both of the communitarian

and sectarian varieties) continued to mould the historical experiences of India and Pakistan after independence, albeit with significant variations and modifications. Independence from colonial rule was claimed by Congress as the triumph of centralism and nationalism. Yet the creation of a Pakistan had underlined the partial success of regionalism and religious communitarianism. In the initial decades of independence, the Congress-dominated Indian centre wedded to an ideology of secular nationalism did better than Islamic Pakistan in containing the forces of regionalism. Not only did the dialectic of centralism and regionalism in India prove more amenable to the setting up of a democratic system but, unlike Pakistan, which came under the dominance of the military and the civil bureaucracy very early on in the day, Congress's inclusionary nationalism appeared to have taken the sting out of the more rebarbative forms of exclusionary communitarianism. It might be tempting to attribute Congress's achievements in establishing a relatively stable democratic system in India to its ideology of secular nationalism and commitment to centralism. After all, the deployment of Islam as the central tenet of Pakistani nationalism managed to neither curb the forces of regionalism nor piece together the most rudimentary form of a democratic political system.

Yet such a conclusion seems a trifle premature in view of developments in the subsequent decades of independence. Since the mid-seventies, the trappings of democracy and secular nationalism in India have been unable to prevent the centre from coming under increasing pressure from a welter of regional and communitarian groups. If anything, secular and democratic India has displayed many of the same stresses and strains during the eighties and nineties which made military authoritarian and Islamic Pakistan particularly susceptible to regional challenges. Could it be that post-colonial India and Pakistan are grappling with the age-old problem of constant shifts and fluctuations in the balance of power between centre and region?

While the centre has held up in India without the ignominy of a region breaking away from its control, Pakistan in 1971 saw the majority of its population in the eastern wing successfully striking for independence and ushering in the creation of a sovereign state, Bangladesh. A dramatic instance of Pakistan's chronic regional problems, the breakaway of Bangladesh was brought to fruition by India's military intervention. Ever since 1947, regional dissent against

central authority has spilled across national boundaries, keeping inter-state relations in perpetual disrepair. In more recent times, the Indian state's discomfiture in Punjab and Assam, not to mention the perennial problem of Kashmir, the dilemmas presented by Pakistan's southern most province of Sind, and the restiveness among Chakma Buddhists in Bangladesh, all in their different ways have been demonstrating the extreme permeability of the borders defining nation-states in the subcontinent.

Why has democratic and secular India done only marginally better than authoritarian and Islamic Pakistan in preventing the recurrence of regional dissidence? The question requires probing not only the structural basis of the two states, but also stripping them of their ideational self-projections. Such a clearing of the decks has multiple advantages. Historically, democracy and its obverse, authoritarianism, secularism and its presumed antithesis, religion, have coexisted if not been thoroughly imbricated. By disturbing the sanguine assumptions underlying conceptions of democracy, authoritarianism, secularism and religion, students of history might gain much by way of nuance and in the process deepen their understanding of these complex but overused terms. Instead of tracing the linear development of democracy and secularism in India and authoritarianism and Islam in Pakistan, the spotlight is best focused on the historical dynamics of the transition from colonialism. This should allow for a better appreciation of the interplay between state consolidation and political processes as it was fashioned and refashioned by the relationship between the two sovereign centres and the various regions.

The modalities of partitioning India effectively precluded its division into two 'successor states'. It was Congress which inherited the unitary central apparatus and international personality of British India. Ignoring Jinnah's vocal protests against Congress seizing the appellation 'India', Mountbatten admitted that he was doing no more than setting up a tent for the government of the newly created Muslim state. The Muslim-majority areas in the north-western and eastern extremities of the subcontinent constituting Pakistan were deemed to be merely 'contracting out' of the 'Union of India'. Forced into the role of a state 'seceding' from a continuing sovereign entity, and with Muslim regionalisms showing no signs of receding before an all-powerful Islamic impulse, Pakistan had to somehow register its independent existence. A formidable undertaking, it

required building a centre from scratch and controlling territories separated by over a thousand miles of Indian territory that had, throughout their history, resisted the imposition of outside authority. The different inheritances in the area of institutions of state, especially at the centre, were of critical importance in influencing the nature and direction of historical continuity and change in post-colonial India and Pakistan.

Explanations of India's success in establishing a system of parliamentary democracy have privileged the Congress organization at the expense of other institutions of the post-colonial state. While Congress as the premier political party was undoubtedly the main player in the new dispensation, its ability to frame a constitution and enforce central authority over diverse provinces and hitherto nominally independent princely states owed much to the civil bureaucracy, the military and the police. Without these institutional legacies of colonialism, even an organization like the Congress might have balked at the tasks confronting India in the initial years of independence. By keeping the focus exclusively on Congress, several Western political scientists have inadvertently helped perpetuate colonial definitions of 'democracy' as mere representation, overlooking the tendencies of bureaucratic authoritarianism that remained embedded in the non-elected institutions of the Indian state. Working in close concert with Congress, these institutions engaged in a process of state consolidation where legitimacy, gained from the formalization of regular elections, had frequently to be supplemented with authoritarian methods in the name of preserving law and order in the different regions.

The partnership between Congress and non-elected institutions, the civil bureaucracy and the police in particular, facilitated the establishment of a formal democracy within the barely modified structures of British India's unitary state system. With a spread of support in the regions and the confidence that comes from having successfully dislodged colonial rulers, Congress was ready and able to work a Westminster style of parliamentary democracy. The holding of regular elections lent legitimacy to a multi-party system dominated by Congress. General elections at five-yearly intervals gave Indian voters the inestimable power to freely choose and depose governments. With a widening of the electoral base, this is a power which a discerning Indian electorate has exercised effectively to oust discredited governments, both at the centre and in the states,

in defiance of formidable party organizations enjoying the support of the administrative machinery. Yet electoral verdicts in themselves have not sufficiently empowered the Indian voter when it has come to shaping the state's social or economic development policies. Political privilege has been far too entrenched at various levels of the polity to permit the elimination of caste, class, and gender-based discrimination. In this sense political processes in India have fallen well short of the democratic ideal and may even have served to disguise the authoritarianism inherent within the Indian political economy and state structure. Ruling configurations at the centre have been content with securing support from regional elites who are inclined to further entrench their own political and economic interests, not advance the process of democratization. With only inadequate implementation of the fundamental rights provisions of the Indian constitution, the removal of widespread social inequalities and injustices has remained an unrealized ideal.

Yet there can be no question that India's success in working a system of parliamentary democracy has over time greatly assisted the mobilization of ever larger segments of the populace. The more recent assertion of their political muscle by the backward and scheduled castes in several states has spelt important changes on the Indian political scene. The ruling configurations that had dominated Congress have been vigorously challenged by the newly empowered middle and lower castes and classes, with serious consequences for its continued dominance at the centre. This democratic result has not been registered at the base without provoking authoritarian responses from the state, usually in conjunction with the social groups ensconced in executive and legislative institutions. Resistance to this nexus of democratic authoritarianism has given the meaning of democracy a new twist. The possibility of mobilizing electoral support around generalizable symbols, such as the neat confluence of the Muslim invasion signified by the Babri Masjid and the birthplace of the great Hindu god Ram, has been put to effective test by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) since the late 1980s. Equally forcefully, it has provoked one of the stiffest resistances ever by Indian political parties of varying hues and colours to the BJP's perceived intention to dilute the secular credentials of the Indian union. One of the central questions raised by the emergence of a national alternative in a party touting the ideology of Hindutva is whether electoral processes, however



democratic, can be allowed to weaken the secular pillars of the Indian state.

A few rules of thumb might help in tracing the historical threads through the different phases of India's post-independence history. Changes in the centre-state dialectic, whether manifested in relations within party organizations or between them and non-elected institutions, have had a direct bearing on the balance between democratic and authoritarian tendencies within the state structure as well as the larger political system. A distinction between formal democracy — reflected in the phenomenon of regular elections — and substantive democracy — defined as the provision of social opportunities through equitable economic development — is also a useful way to measure the achievements of post-independence India. By the same token, differentiating authoritarianism in its overt and covert manifestations can help in assessing the concrete effects of the close interaction between elected and non-elected institutions at the centre as well as the regions.

The roots of the centre–region tensions in South Asia have less to do with its inherent cultural diversities than with the historical circumstances of the immediate post-colonial period. The trauma of partition in 1947 meant that the first priority of state managers in both India and Pakistan was to set up strong central governments. Such concessions as were made to federalism, whether real or on paper, were handed down from above. With at least fourteen major linguistic groups and some 1652 mother tongues, India's need for a federal system was an imperative rather than simply a matter of political choice. But instead of creating a genuinely federal system, India's early state managers were more anxious to build a state structure capable of ensuring unity. Fears of survival were even greater in Pakistan, where military-bureaucratic dominance combined with an all-pervasive, if ill-defined, Islamic ideology was used to chip away at provincial rights very early on in post-partition era.

States and provinces in both India and Pakistan have been subject to constitutional arrangements borrowed to a great extent from the Government of India act of 1935. A centrally appointed governor and a cabinet headed by the chief minister might seem to replicate the president and the prime ministerial equation at the centre. But in actual fact the state governor has been for all practical purposes, like the centrally appointed members of the IAS, an active agent of

the centre at the state or provincial level. If the Indian centre feels that a state is not being administered according to the constitution, the elected government headed by the chief minister can be dismissed and the state brought under what is euphemistically known as president's rule. The central governments in India and Pakistan have constitutional sanction to poach on both the legislative and executive domains of the state. So although federal in form, the Indian and Pakistani state structures have been unitary in substance. Borrowing heavily from their colonial masters in the initial stages, the two state structures have over time become increasingly more centralized.

It has almost become a cliché to ascribe the success of formal democracy in India to the uniqueness of its premier nationalist organization, the Indian National Congress. But India's inheritance of the British raj's unitary centre and its success in warding off international pressures in the first decade of independence were equally, if not more, important in the unravelling of its immediate post-independence experience. Making a virtue out of pragmatism, the Congress leadership egged on by Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel moved quickly to appropriate the same Indian civil service which, as Pranab Bardhan has wryly commented, was neither very civil nor service-oriented and had been a consistent target of their attack under colonialism. Renamed the Indian Administrative Service, the old ICS, as well as the Indian police service, an assortment of paramilitary forces and on occasion even the Indian army were deployed to underwrite the centre's authority in areas where Congress machinery was either weak or riven with factionalism and corruption. Disarray within the Congress was only a few degrees less than dissension within the Muslim League, especially at the state and district levels of the organization. There were remarkable similarities and weaknesses in the dominant political parties of India and Pakistan. What accounted for the success of democracy in one and of authoritarianism in the other was the nature of the links forged by these political parties with the non-elected institutions of state.

Even under Jawaharlal Nehru (prime minister, 1947–64), the dynamics of centre–state relations had begun shifting the locus of power away from parliament towards executive authority residing in the hands of the prime minister. Centralization of state authority by Nehru was offset to an extent by the accommodations he made

with provincial party bosses. But this prevented the genuine democratization of the state and the premier political party. Although it had an overall organizational advantage over the Muslim League, state and district Congress committees, were no less infected by the personality cult of local leaders and no more immune from internal rivalries than in Pakistan. Each successive election saw a broadening of the political base, placing the organizational machinery under greater pressure from newly mobilized social groups. This suggests that the deinstitutionalization of the Congress was already well under way before the setback registered in the fourth general elections in 1967. The changing balance of power within the elected institutions was to be reflected in their relationship with the non-elected institutions of state, the civil bureaucracy in particular. Needing to balance the conflicting interests and demands emanating from various levels of the party organization with the imperatives of state consolidation under Congress auspices, Nehru had no qualms about relying on the civil bureaucracy, the police, and the military when necessary, to buttress central state authority. The spurt in public-sector enterprises during the period of the first three development plans (1950–65) created new sources of patronage and greatly aided the cementing of the partnership between Congress' leader and non-elected officials of the state. And while Nehru succeeded in stamping his personal imprimatur on the rhetoric behind policy formulation, the Indian state's increasing administrative capacities and deepening interventions into economy and society gave civil bureaucrats considerable discretionary powers *vis-à-vis* elected representatives at various levels of policy implementation.

A new generation of scholars is questioning earlier conclusions about Nehru's achievement in placing India firmly on the track to democracy. Having been instrumental in Congress's acceptance of power at the British unitary centre, Nehru at the helm of a post-colonial state was not inclined to undermine the exercise of his own authority if this clashed with democratic practice. As early as the 1920s, Congress had promised a federalism based on the linguistic reorganization of existing state boundaries which were correctly seen to be arbitrary creations for the convenience of colonial administrators. Yet no sooner had independence been won that the Congress under Nehru tried to block vociferous demands for a reorganization of state boundaries along linguistic lines. On 20 October 1952, Potti Sriramalu — a Gandhian — began a fast unto

death unless the centre agreed to the principle of creating a separate state of Andhra based on the eleven Telegu-speaking districts of Madras. Nehru remained unmoved and on 15 December 1952 Sriramalu died of starvation. This was ironically enough on the same day that Nehru presented the preamble of his First Five Year Plan for India's development to parliament, describing it as the 'first attempt to create national awareness of the unity of the country'. News of the Telegu leader's death sparked off riots in all eleven Telegu districts of Madras. On 18 December 1952 the central cabinet decided that the state of Andhra would be created. In 1953 the states' reorganization committee was set up and in 1956 its report's implementation began in earnest. The report provided for fourteen states and six union territories. But the report rejected the demand for the reorganization of Bombay and Punjab along linguistic lines. The commission's refusal to accept the demand to divide Bombay province into Marathi and Gujarati-speaking states was due to the fact that Congress's Gujarati supporters dominated Bombay business while the Marathi-speakers were in a majority. The problem snowballed in the late fifties. In 1960 there were violent language riots in Bombay. Marathi speakers finally succeeded in forcing the centre's hand and Gujarat was separated from Maharashtra, which included the city of Bombay. In Punjab there was a long-standing demand for a Punjabi-speaking subah. Even the premier Sikh party, the Akali Dal, was really demanding a state on linguistic rather than religious grounds. But it was not until 1966 that the demand for a Punjabi subah was conceded by the government of Indira Gandhi. Yet, as we shall see shortly, the problem of Punjab was far from resolved.

The most serious secessionist challenge in the early decades came from the southern state of Tamil Nadu. C.N. Annadurai, founder of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, sought to counterbalance the dominance of the Hindi-speaking north by first promoting a Dravidian nationality and culture and then espousing a strident Tamil nationalism. It was in response to the southern challenge that Nehru proposed his three-language formula. According to this formula, Hindi would be the official language of India, English the link language, and regional languages of each state would be compulsory in the school curricula. The completion of the linguistic reorganization of state boundaries in the fifties and sixties proved insufficient in

alleviating centre–state tensions, which resurfaced during the eighties with unprecedented intensity as well as simultaneity.

The roots of the problem in Kashmir can also be traced to the early years of Nehru's prime ministership. A princely state with a Hindu ruler and a Muslim-majority populace at the moment of the British transfer of power in 1947, Kashmir has been the most divisive issue in the subcontinent. India and Pakistan have been to war over it in 1948 and 1965 and Kashmir remains the main bone of contention between the two neighbours. The recurring denial of genuine democracy as well as substantive federal autonomy promised soon after independence contributed to acute Kashmiri disenchantment with their status in the Indian union. Threatened by a tribal incursion from Pakistan's North West Frontier Province, Maharaja Hari Singh had signed an Instrument of Accession to India in October 1947. When the first Indo-Pakistan war ended with a United Nations ceasefire resolution in January 1949, some two-thirds of the former princely state was under Indian control and the remaining one-third under Pakistani control. Between 1947 and 1953 the administration of Jammu and Kashmir was in the hands of the popular premier Sheikh Abdullah, who was the leader of the National Conference. The Delhi Agreement reached between Nehru and Abdullah broke down with the latter's arrest in 1953. The terms of autonomy agreed in Delhi had been incorporated into Article 370 of the Indian constitution. During the next two decades these terms were steadily whittled down as Jammu and Kashmir was brought more firmly under the centre's writ and administered by ruling groups willing to do New Delhi's bidding.

Using the carrot-and-stick approach in dealings with his own party leaders, Nehru showed considerable ingenuity and skill in leading the Congress to victory in three successive general elections. Even though each election underscored the limitations of the party's bases of support, Nehru neglected to initiate the kind of reforms that might have offset the processes of organizational disintegration within Congress. Relying on his personal stature in the main, he projected a brand of socialism and commitment to social justice that could appeal to the populace while taking care to cultivate the support of state officials as well as the fat cats of Indian capitalism. It is noteworthy that India's early development plans borrowed more from the work of the colonial state's development and planning

department set up in 1944 than that of the national planning committee of 1938–40. From the mid-1950s India pursued a strategy of capital-goods-led import-substituting industrialization. While it was able to build the heavy industrial base that the planners had envisioned, little progress was made in the direction of combating poverty, illiteracy and disease. Indian development planners had become engrossed in the task of improving instrumental variables, such as the savings rate, but had quite forgotten the idioms and the intrinsic values that had initially inspired the project of national development. In Amartya Sen's view the Indian obsession with 'means enhancement' and neglect of 'means use' explain to a large extent India's failure to remove chronic malnutrition and hunger, and to provide entitlements to basic health and education.

Nehru's death in 1964 plunged the Congress into state-party bossism and an oligarchical form of politics. The new prime minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri (1964–6), died prematurely trying to live down the legacy of his illustrious predecessor. But the problems attending Congress after Nehru's departure from the Indian political scene were not of Shastri's making. Without the necessary organizational reforms, its limited social support base was turning into a liability, not the asset it had been in the 1937 and 1945–6 elections. To make matters worse still, there were serious divisions in party organization at the lower levels which helped fuel a slow but steady downward leakage of power and initiative. Under increasing pressure from members of the Congress state bosses, known as the syndicate, Shastri sought refuge among the notables of the higher civil services. This at least promised to delay if not forestall the attempt by an unrepresentative coterie of regional bosses to turn the Congress party into a vehicle of self-promotion and, in the process, weaken the centre's capacity to secure the interests of its main beneficiaries both within and outside the state structure.

Rule by Congress state bosses came to an abrupt end with their failure to deliver vote banks in the 1967 general elections. While scraping through at the centre, the Congress was ousted from power in several states. The challenge of regionalism was now plainly coming from political forces outside the pale of Congress. A simple partnership with the civil bureaucracy was no longer sufficient to maintain Congress hegemony or central authority. Upon being chosen to lead the Congress following Shastri's death in 1966, Indira Gandhi

(prime minister, 1966–77, 1980–4) consulted with a kitchen cabinet consisting of skilled bureaucrats. On the electoral front, she decided to up the ante for the Congress by pronouncing in 1969 a populist socio-economic programme. Intermediate castes and classes, especially big farmers and middle to richer peasants, had been providing the principal power-base of the opposition to Congress at the state level in most regions. But there were more radical challenges in the states of West Bengal and Kerala, where left-wing coalitions came to power. The late 1960s also witnessed the Maoist Naxalite movement involving poor peasants and militant students in West Bengal as well as parts of Andhra Pradesh and Bihar. Faced with a variety of challenges, Indira Gandhi set about trying to link the top and bottom layers of agrarian society through renewed efforts to woo the high-caste, old landed elites, and by advocating the interests of subordinate castes and classes as well as Muslims cutting across local and regional arenas. Her populist anti-poverty programme was designed to get the Congress substantial electoral support from scheduled castes and tribes, who also happened to form the bulk of the rural poor. This split the Congress in 1969 but did not rupture its old associations with the civil bureaucracy and sizeable fractions of the industrial capitalist class. Indira Gandhi's socio-economic programme captured by the ringing slogan '*garibi hatao*' (eliminate poverty) and tactical alliances with populist leaders in the states proved a resounding success in the general elections of March 1971 and also in the 1972 elections to the state assemblies.

The fifth nationwide reference to the people in India's electoral democracy roughly coincided with the first general election in Pakistan in December 1970 and the military crackdown in March 1971, leading to the secession of its eastern wing by December 1971. This end result of an unhappy union between its two wings shattered the myth about Islam being the sole basis of Pakistan. In the intervening years since independence, the leaders of the new state had concentrated their attention on constructing a new central government apparatus capable of asserting authority over disparate regions through a brazen manipulation of the political process. At the height of Cold War era in the late forties and fifties, when the state structure was still in the process of formation, a combination of domestic, regional and international factors worked to undermine

the role of parties and politicians and enhance that of the civil bureaucracy and the military. Pakistan's failure to evolve a democratic political system has been blamed on the organizational weaknesses of the Muslim League. Jinnah's death so soon after its creation has also been a much favoured explanation. But the death of an individual leader, however great, cannot be sufficient explanation for why Pakistan slipped off the democratic course. A close scrutiny of the historical evidence in any case suggests that, in the immediate aftermath of partition, neither elected nor non-elected institutions had a decisive edge. Quite as much as the Muslim League, the civil bureaucracy and the military were a shadow of their counterparts in India. Not only did they lack the necessary pool of skilled manpower, they also suffered from grave infrastructural inadequacies. It was the imperative of building a new centre together with the outbreak of war with India over Kashmir within months of Pakistan's emergence which created the conditions for the dominance of the bureaucracy and the army.

With the division of the military assets of undivided India still incomplete, the Pakistan army was in no position to embark upon a holy war to liberate Jammu and Kashmir. In setting their sights on wresting this predominantly Muslim princely state from Indian control, the central leadership inadvertently assisted in skewing the relationship between the elected and non-elected institutions of state. In dire financial straits, the Pakistan central government had to dig more deeply into provincial resources to pay for a defence procurement effort whose costs equalled that of undivided India. The ensuing tussle between the centre and the provinces augured poorly for the political process. With revenue extraction as the primary objective, those at the centre devoted most of their energies to administrative consolidation and expansion rather than building a party-based political system capable of reflecting Pakistan's linguistic and cultural diversities.

As politicians were marginalized or edged out of decision-making, civil servants trained in the colonial tradition of bureaucratic authoritarianism took charge of administering the affairs of state. The tilt in the balance of power from political to administrative arms bent relations between the centre and the provinces out of shape and also provided a pretext for incessant bickering between Punjabis and non-Punjabis. Greater centralization of the administrative



machinery aimed at generating resources for the defence effort entailed poaching on provincial rights. Manned by a team of civil bureaucrats, Punjabis and Urdu speakers from northern India in the main, the personalized touch given to administrative interventions often worked to the disadvantage of provincial politicians. When they could not be bought or threatened into submission, politicians working in the provincial electoral arenas presented problems for the administration. The decolonization process in Pakistan has resulted in one of the more improbable combinations of personalized elements of rule with impersonalized ones. A product of the adjustments between the post-colonial centre and the regions, it has in defining the balance between the political and administrative arms of the state shaped the course of Pakistan's overt military as well as covert democratic authoritarianism, which has been generally more noxious than the Indian brew.

It was in October 1958 that the Pakistani military high command moved in conjunction with the president and the higher echelons of the civil bureaucracy to directly take over the levers of power. The *coup d'état* had been preceded by a phase of military-bureaucratic dominance that can be traced to as early as 1951 when the first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, was assassinated. A refugee politician from a Muslim-minority province of India, Liaquat's exercise of executive authority came to be resented by the predominantly Punjabi federal bureaucracy and army. Moreover, since Bengalis in the eastern wing had an overall majority in the country, any system of representative democracy promised to give them a far greater share of state power than the non-elected institutions and their allies in the political arenas of West Pakistan were ready to countenance. It was only by delaying the drafting of the constitution for nine long years and postponing general elections that the civil-military axis, in conjunction with segments of dominant social classes in the western wing, managed to forestall Bengali dominance. Primarily concerned with raising an effective shield of defence against India which a resource-crippled state was in no position to guarantee, civil and military officials preferred to bolster their international connections. In doing so they hoped to streamline the administrative machinery and pursue development strategies aimed at creating a political economy of defence rather than one geared to the expansion of social opportunities.

But the very fact of a military takeover suggests that the internal structures of the state were still too fluid and uncertain to ensure the dominance of the civil bureaucracy and the army. The aversion of state functionaries to electoral exercises in the initial decade of Pakistan's independence was linked to fears of a coalition of political forces led by Bengalis drastically modifying the agendas of the state. This internal battle for supremacy combined with the regional threat from India and pressures from the international capitalist system during the Cold War era to put the autonomy of the political process at a serious discount in Pakistan. It was only by curbing and distorting the political process that the early managers of the state were able to exert central authority in a manner consistent with their preferred notions of Pakistan's national interest. So it is necessary to challenge the assumption that the failure of the 'parliamentary system' in Pakistan was the result of the 'power vacuum' created by wayward and venal politicians in command of parties with no effective bases of popular support. By distinguishing between the phases of dominance and actual intervention by the military, it is possible to see why the fragility of political parties in and of itself cannot account for the army high command's decision in 1958 to directly wield state power.

Tinkering with the political process was easier than twisting it to fit the purposes of a state structure where civil and military officials, not politicians, called the shots. As long as Pakistan maintained the façade of a parliamentary system of government, nothing could prevent any number of political configurations from pressing concerns diametrically opposed to those of non-elected institutions. It was only by dismantling a political system which was never really given a chance to function in the first place that the military and civil bureaucracy could assert themselves decisively. Taking advantage of tensions with India and their carefully nurtured nexus with the centres of the international capitalist system in London — and after 1954 in Washington — senior military leaders and the civil bureaucracy opted to consolidate state authority by dispensing with the political process altogether. This might avoid some of the difficulties of electoral mobilization surfacing in India, while outright authoritarianism could release the state from constraints which acted as an impediment to rapid economic growth — essential if Pakistan was to find the means to sustain a respectable level of security

arrangements. The decision to depoliticize Pakistani society was a momentous one. The institutional shift from elected to non-elected institutions in the first decade, which the military intervention of 1958 sought to confirm, has so far endured all manner of experiments: controlled politics, 'populism', outright authoritarianism, and even the much vaunted party-based system of parliamentary democracy since 1988.


Pakistan remained under a military-cum-bureaucratic dispensation until its disintegration in 1971. During this period state consolidation proceeded apace with a heavy accent on externally driven development planning. Drawing support from a mainly Punjabi army and civil bureaucracy, the military regime of General Mohammed Ayub Khan pursued a strategy of controlled politics aimed at extending differential patronage to carefully vetted segments of society. This form of selective as opposed to mass mobilization was intended to ensure the stability of Ayub's regime against challenges from politicians and parties with provincial bases of support. Ironically enough, the very groups which were virtually disenfranchised from the late 1950s helped engineer Ayub's downfall, while his successor, General Yahya Khan, reaped the whirlwind of regional dissent in eastern Pakistan — which the strategy of partial mobilization had been designed to forestall. The Pakistani centre's attempts to assert its unqualified dominance over the provinces had backfired badly. Bengalis in the eastern wing had resented the imposition of Urdu as the official language since the early fifties. Ayub's 1962 constitution conceded official status for the Bengali language. But even belated concessions in the domain of cultural autonomy could not offset the damage which the dialectic of state construction and political processes had inflicted on relations between the Pakistan centre and the provinces. So it is important to be clear how the decade of Ayub Khan's rule informed an already structurally very estranged relationship between the regions and a newly sovereign centre. The developments that came to a head under the two regimes underlined the limitations of state consolidation under the supervision of the military and the bureaucracy in societies subjected to systematic depoliticization.

Ayub's basic democracies order of 1959 was a transparent attempt at stretching the scope of bureaucratic control into the political arena. Taking its cues from the colonial rulers, Ayub's regime made sure to marginalize the voluble and active groups in urban

society — industrial labour and the intelligentsia in particular. Ayub sought to strengthen the state's grip over society by giving the civil bureaucracy a bigger hand in dishing out political and economic patronage. By calling the rural localities directly into the service of the centralizing state, Ayub hoped to exercise his presidential authority without any interference from parties and politicians with provincial bases of support. Dependent on aid and advice from Washington, Ayub and his advisors quickly imbibed the logic of functional inequality and adopted measures to promote growth, not redistribution. Widening regional and class disparities gave fresh impetus to demands for provincial autonomy, especially in East Pakistan, and also in the non-Punjabi provinces in the west, where the one-unit system had given a fillip to Punjabi supremacy over the state apparatus.

The entrenched institutional dominance by a mainly Punjabi army and federal bureaucracy has on repeated occasions frustrated attempts to restore democratic processes in Pakistan. After the urban popular upsurge in 1968–9 against an Ayub regime trumpeting its achievements as the 'golden decade' of development, the commander in chief General Yahya Khan was in a conciliatory mood. He agreed to hold the first ever national election on the basis of universal adult franchise. But there was no question of letting future representatives of the people put to the torch interests which the bureaucratic and military nexus had come to acquire through long years of dominating the state structure. As the president and commander in chief, Yahya retained the power to veto any constitutional draft emerging from the national assembly which was unacceptable to the higher echelons of the state. The power to veto a constitution adopted by a sovereign parliament gave the military high command the authority to override parties and politicians. A decade of authoritarianism had made sure that, unlike the late forties and early fifties when state formation was in its incipient phase, the sharing of power between the two wings was not a matter the main political party or parties could settle on their own. The assertion by the military and the bureaucracy of their corporate interests was by far the bigger obstacle to a negotiated settlement between Mujibur Rahman's Awami League and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party than the fragmented nature of their social bases of support.

Bengalis formed just over fifty per cent of the population of undivided Pakistan, but were poorly represented in the two main non-elected institutions of the state — the military and civil bureaucracy. Since these institutions rose to dominance within the state structure and democratic political processes were aborted in the 1950s, it is possible to see why regional dissidence in Pakistan cannot be understood without reference to the nature of the state. There was of course a cultural dimension to the alienation of the Bengalis. They deeply resented the early attempt to impose Urdu as the national language and the 1952 language movement had given the Bengali cause its first martyrs. The strategies of economic development pursued by the military regime of Ayub Khan in the sixties widened regional disparities. The politics of exclusion and the economics of inequality gave impetus to the Awami League's campaign for provincial autonomy. The



21. 'Jai Bangla'. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman  
addressing a rally in Dhaka, March 1971.  
(Courtesy the archives of the Ananda Bazaar Patrika, Calcutta.)

clash between the imperatives of the military-bureaucratic state and Bengali politics proved irreconcilable.


In the 1970 elections the Awami League derived tremendous political mileage from the growing economic disparity between the two wings and the inadequate representation of Bengalis in the two main non-elected institutions of state. Denied their rightful share of power, Bengalis fared badly when it came to developmental allocations and other forms of state patronage. A more equitable apportioning of power and resources required the acquiescence of the military and the civil bureaucracy as well as their allies in West Pakistan. But with the Awami League's strong electoral support confined wholly to the eastern wing, espousing the amorphous interests of West Pakistan was one way the ruling configuration at the centre could stonewall a negotiated settlement that might have prevented the tragic dismemberment of the country. By ordering a brutal military crackdown in March 1971, the central leadership in Pakistan exposed their colonial colours amidst hollow-sounding appeals to Islam and national integrity. A common religious bond, abused and distorted to serve the interests of authoritarian rulers, snapped all too easily as the Mukti Bahini (Liberation Army) fought a war of resistance and the army of the Indian state crossed the lines of 1947 to liberate one Muslim-majority region from its tormentors in another.

## Chapter 19

# Post-Colonial South Asia: State and Economy, Society and Politics, 1971–1997

The early 1970s have been described as an era of populism in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Indira Gandhi's success in restoring the Congress party's sagging electoral fortunes with her brand of populism came to be seen as a threat not only by dominant rural groups but also, paradoxically, by the bearers of central state authority. As Nehru seemed to have realized, extending the Congress's social bases of support and the corresponding broadening and deepening of democracy in India could constrain the exercise of authority by the centralized state. But this was a price Indira Gandhi had to pay to keep the Congress slotted in power at the centre. It was not long before she had to face the consequences. Her alliances with populist leaders in the states had only delivered the votes. They had not succeeded in vanquishing the old rural power structures dominated by syndicate bosses with whom she had parted company. Although they lost the elections, the erstwhile Congress bosses could rely on their middle to richer peasant supporters — many of whom were strategically located in the state police and civil services — to foil a centrally orchestrated populist challenge. As the experience of the Congress ministries in Bihar and Gujarat showed, it was easier to trump the dominant castes and classes at the hustings than to implement populist initiatives on behalf of newly empowered subordinate castes and classes. Stiff resistance by the deposed ruling configurations at the state level not only thwarted the Congress's populist initiatives but threw up fresh challenges for the party high command from its own rank and file.

The juxtaposition of formal democracy and covert authoritarianism in the heyday of Indira Gandhi's populism reflected a



South Asia in 1972

(Source: Ayesha Jalal, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia*)



markedly different relationship between centre and region than the one over which Nehru had presided. Opting for more democracy entailed reorganizing the Congress party to consolidate the gains of the new and broader-based electoral alliances. But this meant strengthening popular regional leaders at the expense of the centre, a reversal of fortunes that was untenable without substantially modifying both the party and state structure. If the Congress party under Nehru had partially mitigated the unitarian strands inherent in the post-colonial Indian state, institutionalizing the shifts in the balance between the high command and populist state leaders meant conceding more to regional forces than was consistent with the logic of an inclusionary nationalism. So even where her populist venture had registered the best results, for instance in the electorally crucial state of U.P. between 1972 and 1975, Indira Gandhi at the helm of the central executive chose to keep populist leaders at arm's length. Success at the regional level based on populist mobilization could give Congress politicians like H.N. Bahuguna and Chandrashekhar in U.P., and Devraj Urs in Karnataka, the means to extract greater concessions for their constituents and, more dangerously, provide them with ammunition to blast their way into power at the centre. This was anathema to Indira Gandhi, who reacted by scrapping any semblance of inner-party democracy within Congress. Instead, she preferred to appoint her own loyalists as state and local leaders. Attributed to her insatiable desire for self-aggrandizement in the main, the personalization of power by Indira Gandhi cannot be adequately understood without accounting for the structural contradiction between the exercise of executive power from the centre and the resilience of dominant castes as well as the potential problems which populist power could pose at the level of regional politics and political economies.

Imposing the 'Emergency' of 1975–7 was Indira Gandhi's attempt to ward off both sorts of regional challenges by making the centre the sole repository of supra-local and supra-regional populist programmes. Aided by non-elected institutions of state, the resort to overt authoritarianism was aimed at augmenting central powers against the regions. A workable enough strategy in the short-run, it lacked legitimacy and could not for long withstand concerted opposition from an array of political forces. Even state officials found it difficult to go against the grain of popular opinion, deftly articulated by sections of the press defying censorship, and the



22. 'Aristocratic Populists'.

Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto at Simla, 1972.

(Courtesy archives of the Ananda Bazaar Patrika, Calcutta.)

burgeoning ranks of Mrs Gandhi's political opponents. With members of the civil bureaucracy, the police, and the judiciary all unwilling to do the bidding of an unpopular government — to say nothing of mounting grievances among subordinate castes and classes in northern India which had helped fuel Congress's populism since 1969 — the brief moment of overt authoritarianism was categorically rejected in the 1977 elections.

The Janata Party — a loose conglomeration of regional, left- and right-wing forces united only in their opposition to Mrs Gandhi — emerged as the main beneficiary of the polls. Once in power, the Janata with its regional base confined to the north Indian Hindi heartland fell prey to its own internal contradictions. Disagreements within its constituent units made certain that the first non-Congress government in India would be tossed to the winds quite as quickly as it had been embraced. After her own electoral defeat in U.P., Indira Gandhi came back into play after winning a by-election victory in Karnataka, which was then the stronghold of the Congress populist Devraj Urs. But regional patronage was not something a populist seeking power at the apex of the Indian state wanted to encourage. Indira Gandhi's political about-turn a mere three years after she had been rejected by the electorate was based on a careful manipulation of the political scene. Urs was dropped as soon as the subordinate castes, classes and religious minorities in the north began tiring of both the pro-agrarian plank of Janata's predominantly middle to richer caste and class supporters, and the bigotry of traders and merchants in the urban areas who had long been supporters of the Jana Sangh component of the Janata Party. With the democratic wheel poised to turn in her favour, Indira Gandhi took to the 1980 elections with alacrity. Not only did she give her opponents a drubbing in key regions, but was back in the saddle at the centre more determined than ever to fight regional dissidence to the bitter end. The problems in Punjab, Assam and to an extent also Kashmir were all creations of policies pursued by a Congress-dominated centre. The declining strength of Congress's claim to power at an effectively unitary all-India centre in the 1980s was sought to be offset by substituting populism with implicit, if not explicit, majoritarian communalism.

Pitting communalism against regionalism was a well tried formula of the colonial state. In 1947 the Congress high command had used it to partition Punjab and Bengal and cut Jinnah and the Muslim

League out of any share of power at the all-India centre. In the 1980s the majoritarian card was deployed against regional forces that had emerged to challenge the political centre. The Telugu Desam party, for example, shot to victory in state elections in Andhra Pradesh in 1983. In Punjab the Akali Dal, which until 1966 had been in the vanguard of an agitation for a Punjabi-speaking linguistic state, claimed in the 1970s and the 1980s sovereign national status (though not necessarily a separate state) for the Sikh religious community. The more extreme elements among them acquired sophisticated weapons and launched a violent campaign for the attainment of a separate Sikh homeland — Khalistan. Negotiations between the Indian state and Sikh representatives were fitful; agreements were not implemented and Punjab became convulsed in waves of terror and counter-terror. A deep psychological alienation was caused by the Indian army's assault on the Golden Temple in June 1984, the assassination of Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards in October 1984, and the anti-Sikh riots in New Delhi of November 1984.

Riding a sympathy wave following his mother's assassination, Rajiv Gandhi (prime minister, 1985–9) swept the 1984 elections with the help of the Hindu card at a time of widespread regional dissent in Punjab. Viewing Indian society through the colonial lens that revealed a majority and a minority community based on the religious distinction, the young pilot, who had visions of flying India into the twenty-first century, took a couple of decisions that might have done nineteenth-century viceroys proud. On the one hand Rajiv Gandhi's government opened the doors of the Ayodhya mosque to Hindu worshippers. On the other, in a curious and ill-advised attempt to placate 'Muslim' opinion after India's judicial system had awarded alimony to Shah Bano (a Muslim widow), he railroaded through parliament a deeply conservative Muslim women's bill. Apart from giving a new meaning to the dialectic of communalism and regionalism, an appeal couched in the idioms of Hindu majoritarianism — only ineffectively balanced by recognition of a particular construct of Muslim 'minority' interest — appeared to give a new lease to the continued exercise of central authority by Congress. Sabre-rattling against neighbours was another convenient distraction. The 1980s saw another instance of Indian intervention in a neighbouring country's federal dilemma at a time when New Delhi itself was grappling uncertainly with its multifarious domestic

discontents. The opportunity for India's regional projection of its formidable military machine came as the clamour for sovereign nationhood gathered momentum among the Tamil minority of Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka's post-colonial state structure was heavily centralized and the centre came to be dominated by the Sinhalese majority. The problem became particularly acute when Tamils were targeted during riots in the capital city of Colombo in 1983. The Tamils who formed a majority in the northern province of Jaffna took up arms under the leadership of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), who have been demanding a sovereign Tamil state in the northern and the eastern parts of the island. The Indian government initially aided and abetted the Tamil rebels. But the military contingent it sent, ostensibly to enforce an agreement between the Sri Lankan government and the rebels to keep the peace, quickly got embroiled in a war with Tamil guerillas who refused to be pliable clients.

Meanwhile, the Rajiv Gandhi-led Congress lost one state election after another in the late 1980s, got embroiled in corruption scandals and missed historic opportunities for negotiated settlements of the problems in Punjab, Assam and other north-eastern states. The seeds of the post-1989 uprising in Kashmir were also sown in this period. The release of Sheikh Abdullah from prison in 1975 and an agreement with Indira Gandhi had opened the way for two reasonably fair elections in the state, won by the National Conference led by Sheikh Abdullah in 1977, and by his son Farooq Abdullah in 1983. The removal of Farooq Abdullah's elected government in 1984, his political deal with Rajiv Gandhi's Congress in order to return to power in 1986, and the royally rigged elections of 1987 led Kashmiris to embark upon a full-fledged campaign aimed at severance of the Indian connection. In 1989 and the early 1990s a popularly backed armed insurgency was orchestrated by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, which called for a secular and sovereign Kashmir. Kashmiri cultural and linguistic identity appeared to be more potent than Islamic aspirations or pro-Pakistan sentiment in the Vale of Kashmir. In time, however, the balance of firepower among the rebels shifted to the Hizbul Mujahideen, which received more support from Pakistan. The Indian state deployed more than 550,000 armed personnel in the early 1990s to severely repress the Kashmiri movement.

By the time the national elections of 1989 came along, it was not the Congress but the Bharatiya Janata Party which was poised to do best on the issue of a Hindu Rashtra while the newly formed Janata Dal stole the populist thunder. With support from both the BJP and the communists, the Dal was able to form a minority government at the centre under the leadership of V.P. Singh (prime minister, 1989–90). The 1989 electoral verdict spelt the beginning of the end of the Nehru–Gandhi dynasty and represented the most decisive success of certain groups influential at the regional level in exercising state power directly from the centre. As in 1977, this was a victory for those dominant in north India’s regionally based political economies, but now reaching out to the lower castes and subordinate classes. Regional parties outside the Hindi belt whose electoral gains and agitations had plagued the centre during the eighties were routed by the Congress in the southern states. On the face of it, the new configuration of political forces at the centre seemed to have a better chance of reordering priorities, if not the direction, of India’s political economy of development. But any economic reorientation privileging the agrarian sector and the big farmers and the middle to richer peasants within it had to contend with the non-elected institutions of the Indian state, the bureaucracy in particular, and the counterweight of powerful industrial capitalist interests. Indeed the Janata Dal had little option but to abandon the fire and fury of its agrarianism and settle down to working within the established parameters of compromise between formal democracy and covert authoritarianism.

The rise of a Hindu majoritarian politics since the 1980s in India must be placed squarely in the context of the many powerful regional challenges to central authority. As ideologies of secularism and socialism lost credibility, the Congress regimes at the centre turned to an implicit, if not explicit, religiously based majoritarianism to parry regional threats. By so doing they paved the way for the more ideologically committed and organizationally cohesive forces of *Hindutva* — the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) — to emerge as major forces on the Indian political scene. Deployed initially *vis-à-vis* a Sikh ‘other’ in the early 1980s, Hindu majoritarianism increasingly took on anti-Muslim overtones. The symbolic issue that came to the fore was the temple–mosque controversy in Ayodhya, a small town in north India.

Ayodhya was the site of a sixteenth-century mosque named after Babur, the first Mughal emperor. Some extremist Hindu groups, notably the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, began demanding that the Babri Masjid be pulled down and a mandir to Ram built in its place. The demand was based on the claim that Ram, the mythical hero of the great Hindu epic *Ramayana*, was born exactly on the spot where the mosque stood. On the eve of the 1989 elections the BJP took part in the transportation of 'holy bricks' to Ayodhya, and a foundation-laying ceremony for a temple to Ram near the mosque. The Congress government, afraid of losing Hindu votes, did not stop the ceremony from taking place. Less than a year after the elections, V.P. Singh's decision to implement the recommendations of the Mandal commission to reserve jobs at the centre for backward castes seemed designed to divide the Hindu community by caste and thereby undermine the BJP's electoral project of mobilizing support by playing the communal card. Its leader, L.K. Advani, responded by undertaking a *ratha yatra* (a chariot journey) which critics have called a riot yatra. After traversing large parts of northern India, Advani threatened to arrive in Ayodhya and start building the temple. The BJP had taken on not only its political rivals but had challenged one of the main foundations of the Indian state. The BJP's attempt to storm the mosque was foiled on that occasion. But two years later, with a BJP government in office in UP, a large crowd of Hindu 'volunteers' tore down the mosque in the presence of the leaders of the BJP, the RSS, and the VHP on 6 December 1992, setting off some of the worst attacks on the Muslim minority in many parts of India.

Although the incident severely damaged the secular façade of the Indian state, it would be a mistake to view religious communalism of the BJP variety as the binary opposite of secular nationalism. Both ideologies have been adduced by votaries of the centralized post-colonial nation-state. The promise of Hindutva to shore up central state authority, however, is illusory. Despite the long strides made by the forces of Hindutva, the heterogeneity of Indian and 'Hindu' society has continued to be a formidable obstacle in the way of the triumph of religiously based majoritarianism. A renegotiation of the powers of the centre with its varied constituent units would seem to be the most sensible way forward towards the resolution of South Asia's centre–region conflicts. The equation

between religion and nation in an intransigent majoritarian vein might only hasten a process of regional fragmentation.

In the domain of political economy the return of the Congress party to power with a working majority in 1991 provided an opportunity for the new government led by P.V. Narasimha Rao (prime minister, 1991–6) to dismantle some of the pillars of what had come to be called the permits, licences, and subsidy raj. The initial impetus for the economic reforms came as a result of an acute balance-of-payments crisis in mid 1991, making it necessary to seek an IMF loan and accept certain terms of a stabilization and structural-adjustment programme. However, the Indian state was to an extent able to make a virtue out of necessity by removing the many barriers to the entry of firms in the industrial sector. An elaborate system of licensing the use of industrial capacity was virtually abolished, and many of the bureaucratic logjams in the path of economic development removed. The economic reforms pursued by the Congress government from June 1991 to May 1996 addressed, however, only the first part of a two-pronged problem facing Indian economic development. The reformers concentrated on redressing the negative effects of over-intervention by the state in certain sectors and removing the more stifling bureaucratic controls on industry. They moved tardily, if at all, to rectify state negligence of critical social sectors, notably health and education. Neither the economic free-marketeters' attack nor the cultural fragmentalist onslaught on development has been sensitive to the potential role state and public action can play in these areas. The political costs of pursuing a lop-sided reform process, which contributed to the defeat of the Congress in the 1996 elections, appear to be enabling the long-forgotten intrinsic values of development to re-enter the discourse. Amartya Sen and Jean Drèze have made a powerful case for taking the Indian development debate 'well beyond liberalization' to focus on 'expanding social opportunities'. But the failed institutions of state have yet to be imaginatively refashioned. On the one hand the privileged but besieged defenders of the centralized monolith have resorted to the dangerous course of a bigoted religious majoritarianism propagated by the Bharatiya Janata Party and its allies and followers. On the other, the new populism of the first 1996 United Front government in New Delhi led by H.D. Deve Gowda and then by I.K. Gujral, of which several regional and left-wing parties are members, has



displayed deep taints of localism and agrarianism with a rich-farmer bias while proclaiming solidarity with the poor and disadvantaged majority. The successful realization of the idioms of equitable development require the appropriate instruments, both economic and political, which are yet to be carefully crafted.

India's formally democratic spoils system coupled with bureaucratic corruption and inefficiency may have hampered the prospects of economic development. But its effects have been nowhere as devastating as the legacies of military rule in Pakistan — a parallel arms and drugs economy, administrative paralysis, and violent social conflict. Nearly forty years of military authoritarianism in Pakistan have little to show by way of substantive economic development, despite registering on average higher rates of growth than in India. An overemphasis on the consumer goods sector, textiles in particular, drew Pakistan more tightly into the net of the international capitalist system than its better endowed neighbour. Heavy dependence on external finances was matched by a concentration of wealth in the hands of those with privileged access to state power. While income disparities widened, social sectors suffered unconscionable neglect by successive authoritarian regimes. It is true that India's social indicators are not appreciably better than Pakistan's. But this has less to do with the formally democratic or overtly authoritarian character of the regimes that have governed the two countries than with the state-society nexus as a whole. If there is a lesson to be learnt from India's post-colonial experience, it is that the paraphernalia of democracy is a necessary but by no means sufficient condition for achieving the goal of development with social justice.

After 1971 both Pakistan and the newly created state of Bangladesh experienced brief phases of parliamentary democracy and populism, followed by lengthy spells of direct or quasi-military rule. In what was left of Pakistan, the institutional imbalances within the state structure survived the traumas of dismemberment. With the military and the civil bureaucracy discredited, Pakistan with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as its elected prime minister (1971-7) seemed well poised to start a fresh chapter in its history. But for someone who had served his political apprenticeship in Ayub's government, Bhutto was not about to let the populist appeal of his Pakistan People's Party circumscribe his own exercise of state power. His reforms of the military and civil bureaucracy aimed at enhancing his personal authority, not that of elected institutions such as

parliament, which had for long languished on the margins of the Pakistani political system. Bhutto had promised redistributive reforms for the underprivileged by professing a left-leaning ideology. But once in power he preferred to wield state authority to punish recalcitrant segments of dominant social groups and rewarding those prepared to join the PPP. By packing the party executive with the very landed notables which his agrarian reforms were purportedly targeting, Bhutto considerably watered down his populist platform. The scant respect he showed for civil liberties, indeed for any kind of dissent, earned him the eternal animosity of influential sections of society.

On the issue of provincial rights versus the centre, Bhutto was found badly wanting. In ordering a military crackdown to quell a tribal uprising in Baluchistan, he gave the army high command an opportunity to claw back the influence it had momentarily appeared to lose in the wake of military defeat at the hands of the country's premier enemy. Not only were the provincial autonomy provisions of the 1973 constitution ignored, but no headway was made in redefining centre–province relations to better accommodate social changes in the various regions. Preferring to press the non-elected institutions into his service, and confident of his personal appeal with the floating vote, Bhutto desisted from placing the PPP's organizational machinery on a more effective footing. In 1977 he called elections in the face of mounting resentments against his arbitrary rule. Bhutto's PPP won the elections. But the extent of the sweep gave some credence to the nine-party opposition coalition's charges that the elections had been rigged. Without an effective PPP organization at his disposal, Bhutto was fair game for the military-bureaucratic combine acting in collusion with a cross-section of industrial and commercial groups to oust him from power.

On 5 July 1977 a polarized and fragmented polity sat back and watched Bhutto's hand-picked chief of army staff, General Zia-ul-Haq (military ruler, 1977–88), assuming control of the state apparatus. It soon became clear that the regime had the tacit support of fractions of dominant social classes, landed as well as industrial, who thoroughly disliked Bhutto and his style of governance. Assured of support from the army and a substantial proportion of the bureaucracy, federal as well as provincial, Zia was only too eager to expand his support among these anti-Bhutto elements. While promising elections within ninety days, a promise consistently broken

over a period of nine years, the general concentrated on winning quick legitimacy by lashing out against the moral turpitude and corruption of Bhutto's government. Appropriating the platform of religious parties like the Jamat-i-Islami and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan, the new military ruler vowed to establish an Islamic social order where virtue and piety would reign supreme. Women became the focal point of Zia-ul-Haq's Islamization programme. In 1979 he passed a series of purportedly Islamic ordinances wildly discriminatory towards women. These blurred the distinction between adultery and rape and called for the evidence of two women to be deemed equivalent to that of one man. Women's groups, notably the Women Action Forum (WAF) showed great courage in opposing these inequitable laws. As Saeeda Gazdar wrote in her poem 'Twelfth of February 1983':

*Matami jhandian phar phara rahi thein  
Kaneezain baghi ho ghi thein  
Do saaw auratain  
Charon taraf say ghiri hui thein  
Musala police kai nargai main thein  
Ansoo gas, rifle aur bandooqain  
Wireless vainavar jeepain  
Haar rastai ki nakabandi thi  
Kui panha na thi  
Ye larai khudi larni thi . . .  
Tum do khatay ho  
Hum doo crore auratain  
Is zulam aur jabar ke khilaf  
Guwahi dein ghien  
Jo qanun-e-shahadat ke naam par  
Tum ney hamarai saroon pai mara hai  
Hum nahin tum  
Wajab al-qatal ho  
Kai roshni aur sachai hai dushman  
Muhabat kai qatal ho.*

(The flags of mourning were flapping  
the hand-maidens had rebelled  
Those two hundred women who came out on the streets  
were surrounded on all sides  
besieged by armed police.)

Tear gas, rifles and guns  
 wireless vans and jeeps  
 every path was blockaded  
 there was no protection  
 they had to fight themselves . . .  
 You ask for two  
 We two crores of women  
 shall testify  
 against this tyranny and cruelty  
 hurled at our heads  
 in the name of the law of evidence  
 Not us, but you  
 deserve to be murdered  
 for being the enemies of light and truth  
 for being the murderers of love.

The eloquent defiance of women failed to deter a military ruler anxious to make women — those symbols of Muslim social consciousness — the focal point of a state-sponsored Islamization.

However it was not the regime's religious credentials but the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 that enabled Zia to use an external threat to Pakistan's survival to consolidate his hold on power. The first step in this direction was to strengthen support within the defence services by drawing them more closely into the day-to-day running of the state and political economy. Unlike Ayub who relied more on the civil bureaucracy, Zia's only recourse to liberality lay in grafting favoured military officials into key positions within the civilian administration as well as in semi-government and autonomous organizations. This was a way of giving those loyal to the regime privileged access to a variety of lucrative business enterprises, a certain entry point for the more venal into the upper strata of the economy. Together with an emergent nouveau riche belonging to the trading classes, the beneficiaries of Zia's patronage in the military have since played a key role in Pakistani politics, certainly in the urban areas.

The disbursement of rewards and privileges by the Zia regime created an even bigger stake for the military in the existing structures of state and political economy. But this carefully nurtured constituency was still too limited in extent to resolve the regime's dilemma of legitimacy and corresponding search for sufficient social bases of support. Co-opting segments of the dominant socio-

economic strata, landlords and nascent commercial and industrial groups, through differential patronage and selective mobilization, offered a way out. Using the Islamic notion of the *shoora* (advisory council), Zia readily applied the colonial state's method of conflating representation with selection. It was only after many broken promises that the general agreed to hold non-party-based elections in 1985 to the national and provincial assemblies. By then the regime had garnered enough of a support base through its control over channels of patronage to feel confident about facing the electorate. But if there was any doubt in anyone's mind of the military high command's game plan, the passage of the Eighth Amendment by Zia's parliament in exchange for the lifting of martial law should have laid them to rest.

The Eighth Amendment helped to make 1985 a watershed year in the politics of post-1971 Pakistan. A deterrent to martial rule, it had been incorporated in the constitution to allow for the continuance of Zia's authoritarian rule with all the democratic paraphernalia. Article 58(b) of this amendment empowered the president to dismiss an elected prime minister and parliament without any obligation to consult with the senate or the supreme court. Given the nature of the Pakistani state, the exercise of presidential powers conferred by the clause was inconceivable without the approval of the military high command. With the military as the ultimate overseer, presidents elected by both houses of parliament had no scruples dismissing national assemblies. Since 1985 the Eighth Amendment was used five times to oust prime ministers and dissolve assemblies until it was repealed in 1997. While elections were held within the ninety days prescribed in the constitution, the significance of repeated references to the people was rendered meaningless when elected parliaments and prime ministers could be arbitrarily dismissed by the president acting in league with the military high command. All except one of the petitions challenging the presidential order were turned down by the judiciary. Against a backdrop of rampant corruption, widespread violence and administrative decay, the presidential office served as a convenient decoy for a military command ever ready to exert its will but loath to assume responsibility for a bankrupt economy and a strife-ridden society.

When Zia vanished into fire and ash in August 1988 the fiscal crisis of the state was visible to all. Not only were revenues failing to keep pace with mounting expenditure, the trends for the future

promised to send the entire country into a tailspin. Zia left other legacies as well. During his military rule Sind had become the main venue of provincial dissidence. Most inadequately represented in the non-elected institutions of state, Sindhis began to take powerful stand against Punjabi domination. Rural Sind was transformed during the 1980s into a cauldron of discontent. In urban Sind, where Sindhi speakers were heavily outnumbered by Urdu-speaking muhajirs (refugees) and other linguistic groups, the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) made a meteoric entry into Pakistan's political landscape. During the latter half of the 1980s the urban centres of Sind, particularly Karachi and Hyderabad, became battle zones for ferocious conflicts between well-armed rival linguistic communities. Unbridled violence in the informal arenas of politics and the manipulation of *biraderi* or patrilineal kinship ties in the formal arenas of electoral representation were to be key features in the post-Zia era of Pakistani politics.

The removal of the biggest obstacle in their way permitted the judiciary to give a ruling in favour of party-based elections. Held in November 1988, they brought success to Benazir Bhutto (prime minister, 1988–90, 1993–7) who, ever since her father's controversial hanging by Zia-ul Haq in 1979, had led the PPP in the movement for the restoration of democracy. With only a third of the popular vote cast, the PPP's emergence as the largest single party in parliament was less than categorical. The beneficiaries of the Zia era represented by the Pakistan Muslim League led by Nawaz Sharif (prime minister, 1990–3, 1997–) and packaged by the intelligence services into a coalition of parties called the Islamic Democratic Alliance made a good showing in Punjab. With Nawaz Sharif as chief minister of Punjab, Benazir's federal government found its options far more limited than its promises to the electorate demanded.

The fiscal bankruptcy of the state in any case made it extremely difficult for Benazir, with her support base in Sind, to risk being anything other than a loyal opposition to the pre-existing state structure. Any attempt to enforce changes was likely to meet stringent opposition from a mainly Punjabi military and civil bureaucracy. A state structure geared to high defence expenditure and dominated by the non-elected institutions — namely the military and the civil bureaucracy — cannot easily concede the ascendancy of the elected institutions — parliament in particular. Despite holding

four general elections in 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997, the recurrent dismissals of prime ministers and dissolutions of the national assembly have shown that institutional imbalances within Pakistan's state structure have proven resilient. The army high command's decision to rest content with dominance rather than direct intervention has been based on a careful calculation of the pros and cons of playing umpire in a highly polarized and violently pulverized political arena.

Populism in Bangladesh had an even briefer span than in Pakistan. In January 1972 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (prime minister and president, 1972–5) was released from a prison in Pakistan. Upon returning to Bangladesh he became prime minister in the first Awami League government in the newly independent state of Bangladesh. His populist economic measures included land reforms and nationalization of the handful of industries in the country. But the ravages of war and splits in the armed forces, as reflected by the heroes of the liberation war and repatriates from Pakistan, defeated Mujib and the Awami League. Unable to restore a war-torn economy, the government was jolted in 1974 by the woes of hunger from a countryside gripped by famine. Like his counterparts in India and Pakistan, Mujib too began tinkering with authoritarian methods. In early 1975 he announced the setting up of a one-party socialist state. This lost him the support of many of his former backers among the middle classes and intelligentsia. In August 1975 Mujib and his family were assassinated in a military coup believed by many to be linked with the American CIA.

The brutal murder of the country's founding father initiated a brief spell of overt authoritarianism. It was not long before the need for legitimacy became compelling for the new military ruler, General Ziaur Rahman (1975–82). Giving proof that military regimes do have a patterned response to the twin challenges of administering a civilian population and enjoying legitimacy, Rahman engaged in a form of socio-political engineering reminiscent of Ayub Khan and foreshadowing the tactics of Zia-ul Haq in Pakistan. Elections were first held at the local level, followed by the launching of a state-sponsored political party called the Bangladesh National Party. This created the conditions for Rahman's election as president and the inauguration of a subservient parliament. Tensions within the military once again reared their head. In 1981 Ziaur Rahman was assassinated. The advent of another military dictator, General Ershad

(1981–90), gave added impetus to the politics of localization and the economics of privatization. Tarrred with the brush of corruption, Ershad was unable to withstand pressure from a powerful pro-democracy movement. During the 1990s Bangladesh has witnessed two general elections, leading to the formation of a government in 1996 by the Awami League under Mujib's daughter, Sheikh Hasina Wajid (prime minister, 1996–), preceded by one led by Zia's widow, Khaleda (1991–6).

The recent history of Pakistan, and to a lesser extent of Bangladesh, demonstrates just how puerile it would be to presume that military authoritarianism can be brought to an end by the mere holding of elections. During the Cold War era an interplay of domestic, regional and international factors confirmed military dominance in Pakistan. In the late 1970s these same factors reinforced the asymmetry between elected and non-elected institutions in Pakistan and gave rise to similar imbalances within the Bangladeshi state structure. The military-bureaucratic state in both countries has extended its patronage to win over significant segments of the dominant socio-economic elite and to localize political horizons in much the same fashion as the colonial state. Elections have been held in both countries in recent years, but the casting of ballots cannot be confused with the full restoration of democracy. Democratic forces in these countries have to overcome a formidable wall of structural obstacles before they can aspire to the boons of even the formal democracy of India.

Despite differences in the nature of their states and regimes, not to mention the great disparity in size, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh continue to face a common set of social and economic problems. In all three countries nearly half the population continues illiterate. India has an elaborate infrastructure for higher education but has invested little in primary education. Even though the average life expectancy has increased from a mere 32 in 1947 to nearly 60 fifty years later, it is significantly lower in all three countries than in neighbouring countries like Sri Lanka, Burma and China. The ratio of women to men in the population is dismally low in all three countries — some 93 women to 100 men — evidence of acute discrimination along lines of gender. India shows great regional variation in all these social indicators — the state of Kerala being a shining exception — suggesting perhaps that social opportunities can be expanded and



capabilities enhanced given the necessary political will. Each of the countries has witnessed increasingly powerful social and cultural movements seeking to rectify deep-seated imbalances along lines of region, community, class and gender. Yet so long as managers of post-colonial states remain trapped in the colonial mould, valuable resources get frittered away in high defence expenditure occasioned by inter-state hostilities, the potential benefits of a common South Asian market remain unrealized, and the promise of social and economic freedom that was supposed to follow on the heels of political independence in 1947 remains a mirage for the majority of the subcontinent's poor and obscure.



23. 'A Secret Ballot'. A woman votes in the Indian general elections of 1991 in Madhubani, Bihar. (Courtesy Sugata Bose from his film *Mandir, Masjid, Mandal and Marx: Democracy in India.*)

## Chapter 20

# Decolonizing South Asian History: Fiftieth Anniversary Reflections

**T**ransfers of power, however momentous or revolutionary, tend to have an air of anti-climax about them. ‘Like the complex electrical system in any large mansion when the owner has fled’, Benedict Anderson has written in *Imagined Communities*, ‘the state awaits the new owner’s hand at the switch to be very much its old brilliant self again.’ Where the inheritance is disputed, it might be added, the festival of lights may have a dark side to it. The capture of state power at the triumphal moment of formal decolonization by forces representing singular nationalism generally brought with it problems of its own in socially and culturally heterogeneous ex-colonies, perhaps nowhere more complex than in South Asia. The new owners of the stately mansions built during the colonial era may have at last laid their hands on the switchboards of the electrical mains; but they soon discovered the short circuits in many of the rooms of the mansion that could easily blow most of the worn fuses. In the absence of effective circuit breakers, whole mansions could easily be plunged into darkness.

To push this metaphor even further, these mansions were not just edifices of brick and mortar, but contained libraries with weighty books. The extent to which anti-colonial nationalist thought was derivative of colonial knowledge is currently a matter of scholarly debate. We have sought to argue in this book that there were many contested visions of nationhood and alternative models of decolonized states in South Asian anti-colonial discourse which have gained heightened relevance today. The historical specificities of the post-colonial, political transition generally witnessed the smothering of diversity and the inheritance of colonial structures of

state and ideologies of sovereignty by mainstream nationalist elites. But there was a promised difference. Colonial subjects, so long denied and divided along lines of religion, language, tribe or ethnicity, were to be treated to the full-blown rights of equal citizens.

The new occupants of the stately mansions and secretariat buildings busily set about their plans to modernize and streamline 'traditional' and stubbornly intricate societies, deliver a measure of redistributive justice to the inhabitants of huts and shacks, and, in the process, iron out the problem of minorities within political systems which upheld the rule of healthy, democratically-elected majorities. Where that failed, modernizing, 'neutral,' post-colonial militaries could always take matters into their iron hand. Meanwhile, the older legacy of the red sandstone and marble palaces of pre-colonial empires and their regional successor states lay in the desolate isolation of irrelevance, their libraries looted of their treasures and now enriching Orientalist collections of Western museums of learning. In any case, how could the politics and states of those branded 'oriental despots' hold any edifying lessons for post-colonial 'democrats'?

It is now emerging from scholarly research that pre-colonial empires, far from being centralized, bureaucratic autocracies, were flexible, nuanced, and overarching suzerainties. Although obviously bereft of modern democratic ideals, these empires and their regional successor states had well-developed political concepts of both individual and communitarian rights as well as political theories of good governance. The emperor merely laid claim to the highest manifestation of sovereignty, leaving the balance to be negotiated with regional sultans and local rajas, merchant institutions, and port-cities. The amount of power actually vested in the different levels of sovereignty was subject to historical shifts with downward flows and seepages in periods of decentralization and fragmentation. What was non-existent, even in the heyday of pre-colonial empires, was any notion of absolute sovereignty and its concomitant demand of singular allegiance.

The idea of unitary, indivisible sovereignty was a foreign import into Asia and Africa from post-Enlightenment Europe. But there was an embargo on the export of rights of citizens of sovereign states to Europe's colonies. This distortion in the international trade in ideas of sovereignty and citizenship had large implications for the

quest to achieve freedom and democracy without riding roughshod over legitimate communitarian rights. The colonial state in India claimed to occupy 'neutral' ground above indigenous society which, in its view, could do no better than squabble over the sectional interests of its component parts. Through rigid classificatory schemes employed in colonial censuses and maps, the state made it harder to maintain the peaceful coexistence of multiple social identities, even though colonial constructs never wholly succeeded in shrinking the mental horizons of colonized peoples. Once colonial modernity had redefined 'traditional' social affiliations, the way was open for the construction of divisive political categories that might deflect unified challenges of anti-colonial nationalists. These were not just the larger oppositions, such as the one between Hindu and Muslim in India. Colonial powers often preferred to recruit minorities, such as Sikhs in India, in disproportionate numbers into key state institutions such as the military. The problem of assuring minority rights among the subject population became a convenient excuse for the perpetuation of minority, colonial rule.

Late colonialism in India also took to constitutional manoeuvres aimed at directing political attention towards local and provincial arenas to keep central state authority insulated from nationalist challenge. Anti-colonial nationalists thus became increasingly suspicious of schemes that threatened 'balkanization' at the moment of decolonization. Minorities came to be seen as only pawns in the end game of colonial empire. A grievous flaw was embedded in this perception. Aspirations for unity among different linguistic and religious communities in anti-colonial politics now came to be replaced by assertions of a singular, 'secular' or 'composite' nationalism. The more far-sighted anti-colonial activists and thinkers had always recognized the imperative of assuring rights of religious, linguistic and other communities, and conceding autonomy to diverse regions. 'Particularist' identities, however much they may have been re-invented in the mould of colonial modernity, could not just be wished away but needed to be accommodated within any enlightened view of anti-colonial nationalism. Muhammad Iqbal gave voice to his sense of a distinctive identity when he asserted: 'The light of foreign wisdom does not dazzle me; the kohl lining my eyelids is the dust of Mecca and Najaf'. Couching his anti-colonialism in an autonomy derived from 'adherence to faith', Iqbal maintained that:

‘In slavery, neither swords nor ideas are of any use; but when belief takes its hold, chains are cut loose’.

From another part of the subcontinent, Rabindranath Tagore had tried putting the issue into perspective: ‘Where there is genuine difference, it is only by expressing and restraining that difference in its proper place that it is possible to fashion unity. Unity cannot be achieved by issuing legal fiats that everybody is one.’ By contrast, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote in 1938 that he looked ‘through a telescope’ to locate a Muslim minority problem in India and could not spot it. As late as the 1920s it had been common to forge a common anti-colonial nationalist position through negotiation among diverse religious and linguistic communities. Those who set their sights on the acquisition of power at the helm of a unitary nation-state displayed increasing impatience with articulations of cultural difference and diversity.

In socially heterogeneous colonies there was always the potential for the emergence of multiple contenders for nationhood. As the discourse of mainstream Indian nationalism turned more strident in its insistence on singularity, a sense of unease led some dissenting minorities to couch their own demands in the language of nationalism. Among the proponents of the Indian Muslims’ claim to nationhood in the early 1940s there was little enthusiasm for a partitionist solution. Minority claims to nationhood should not necessarily be equated with calls for secession, which may be an option of last resort when all attempts at negotiating power-sharing arrangements fail. The quest to be recognized as a ‘nation’ must be distinguished from its territorial expression in the form of a completely separate ‘state’.

Post-colonial South Asian history and historiography have shown an inability to discard colonial definitions of majority and minority based on a system of enumeration privileging the religious distinction, despite being overtaken by events. In military-ruled Pakistan, the denial of democracy led East Pakistan’s Bengali majority to claim itself a distinct nation. It is arguable that as in the 1940s, here too, the initial aim was all equitable share of power, failing which the die was cast in favour of a separate, sovereign state of Bangladesh in 1971. The successful secession of Bangladesh was for quite some time an exceptional occurrence in the history of the post-World War II interstate system. The legitimacy of any given political unit

or juridical state has increasingly become a key issue in interlinked campaigns for democratic rights, both in its individual and communitarian aspects and for national sovereignty. A social group denied a voice in decision-making within a particular democratic polity may either criticize the quality of such a democracy and seek reforms, or question the founding credentials of the state and seek autonomy or secession.

The failure of post-colonial states to assure equal citizenship rights and to deliver on the promise of redistributive justice has brought these entities into some disrepute. As the general concept of the modern, centralized nation-state has been drawn deeper into a crisis of legitimacy, a raging battle has begun between state-sponsored and anti-state nationalisms. As secularism and socialism have increasingly sounded like hollow slogans, centralized states under siege have resorted to majoritarian ideologies, religiously or ethnically defined, in attempts to prevent their own structures from being undermined. The systematic denial of substantive rights of democracy and autonomy by existing states, as the experience of East Pakistan showed, can contribute to the birth of new nations. The rise of Hindu 'nationalism' in India is tied to the defence of centralized state authority against a variety of regional challenges, even though it has not succeeded in dislodging the formal secular ideology of the Indian state.

The clash between majoritarian principles and substantive democracy is taking an increasingly bloody toll as part of the conflict between incipient nations and juridical states. Instead of the unbending insistence on the singular loyalty of the citizen to the state, the time is overdue to rethink the relevance of multiple and shifting social identities for the cause of democracy. Such identities by their very nature defy capture within unambiguous, permanent or even durable constructs of majority and minority. If the function of democracy is to unsettle permanent or entrenched majorities and democratic processes are meant to ensure that majority support is earned, then the multiplicity of social identities rooted in South Asia's history can only be a boon and not a threat to democratic values and practice. These identities can only flourish within a political and state system based on layered and shared sovereignties. Sovereignty need not be the monolith from the peak of which one flaunts authority and under the weight of which 'the Other' is

crushed. Disenchanted social groups who have, of late, conceived of themselves as nations are unlikely to give up this expression of their new consciousness. But they may yet be invited to form a part of multinational states, of union forged from below, through negotiation of terms of sovereignty among constituent peoples and nations. That in turn may heal inter-state relations fifty years after the tragedy of Partition, and improve the prospects of a better South Asia based on mutual understanding and co-operation at the dawn of the next century.