

The Balancing Process in Pakistan's Foreign Policy

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There are two very different approaches to understanding Pakistan's foreign policy. Stressing its uniqueness, one can focus on how its foreign policy differs from that of all other states. This leads to identifying the peculiarities of its original geographical structure; the quite unparalleled influence during the early period of refugees whose former homes were within the territory of the country's larger neighbor; the unusual concentration of foreign policy authority in the hands of a few men, mainly drawn from only one part of the country—the Punjab; the weakness of civilian representative institutions; and the increasingly important role of "the military" in shaping the concepts and determining the size and nature of resources devoted to foreign policy problems. The real aficionados with inside information can, like King Lear, "talk of court news . . . who loses and who wins, who's in and who's out," and how these changes affect the pace, direction, and scope of shifts in foreign policy.

Alternatively, one can look at Pakistan as simply yet another state in a system of states, as a representative of a variegated but still distinguishable type of political community—a state. This state, like others, has territory, boundaries, a government usually capable of making decisions consequential to most who live within its frontiers, and

possessing during most of its history a monopoly or near-monopoly of the legitimate use of force. In this view, if there are generalizations about interstate relations, they should apply to Pakistan as well.

Since most of the chapters in this volume concentrate their attention on the uniqueness of Pakistan, this discussion climbs the abstraction ladder and looks at Pakistan as if it were one example within a largish category of political entities called states. It will argue that given one premise, there is little in Pakistan's foreign policy behavior since independence that could not be adequately understood from the perspective of the state-to-state model familiar to students of international politics.¹

The Balancing Process

From this intellectually rather conservative perspective, two major themes will be explored. The first concerns the process engaged in by the smaller, weaker state of balancing the power of its larger neighbor.² It is not so much "the balance of power" as a static equilibrium, but rather a balancing process, an endless effort of the weaker state to find ways of counterbalancing the greater power of its much larger neighbor, in this case India. To be sure, sometimes the notion of balance of power is used so loosely that it loses meaning. But in this instance the common usage is helpful and provides one key to understanding Pakistan's foreign policy behavior. The second theme concerns a different aspect of the balancing process, namely the effort of

1. For much of the chronological sequence, I am indebted to S. M. Burke's *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973).

2. For an essay that stimulated this approach, see Martin Wight, "The Balance of Power and International Order," in Alan James, ed., *The Bases of International Order, Essays in Honour of C. A. W. Manning* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 85-116.

a smaller, weaker state to improve its bargaining position vis-à-vis Major Powers. Again, it will be argued that Pakistan undertook rather typical policies in efforts to improve its bargaining position vis-à-vis a Major Power with which it became allied, the United States.

Pakistan's Central Preoccupation: *Fear and Ambition Toward India*

The single premise that has underlain Pakistan's foreign policy derives from India's centrality in nearly every calculation of Pakistan's foreign policy makers. A detailed explanation of why India played such a central, one might even say "obsessive," role in Pakistan's foreign policy would lead us into a fascinating, and complex, field of subcontinental political, constitutional, and religious history, which shall be left for the most part to the specialists. But another more general element in Indo-Pakistani relations derives from the simple fact of size and strategic and economic asymmetry.

Typically, smaller states next to larger ones are rendered anxious by that larger neighbor. Thucydides held that statesmen were driven by a number of motivations, of which fear was central.³ However unjustified Indian leaders may have thought it, Pakistan's overriding concern vis-à-vis India was fear, fear of India's sheer size, the size of its army (never less than two times larger than Pakistan's) and fear of the effects of the hard fact that a large, contiguous India with internal lines of communication separated Pakistan's comparatively small two parts by over a thousand miles. At certain points, West Pakistan, for instance, was scarcely 250 miles across,

3. In his *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Thucydides explains Athens' behavior toward its neighbors by pointing out that "acting as human nature always will, . . . [Athens' leaders were] . . . constrained by three all-powerful motives: ambition, fear, interest." F. R. B. Godolphin, ed., *The Greek Historians*, Vol. I (New York: Random House, 1942), 600.

while its major city, Lahore, lay less than ten miles from the Indian frontier in the flat and easily traversed Punjab plain. Fear, too, was compounded out of not infrequent public statements by prominent Indians regretting the tragedy of partition and reiterating the inherent unity of the subcontinent. These statements, sometimes said more in sorrow than in anger, seemed to intensify a conviction that India had never, as the saying went, "reconciled itself to the existence of Pakistan." As a small candle can throw a large shadow that may scare whoever sees it with a mind prepared by fear, every event in India of possible pertinence was read so as to increase the sense of Pakistan's vulnerability to its larger neighbor.⁴

European statesmen of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries would have understood Pakistan's security problem better than did most statesmen of the 1950s. In those days it was characteristic that a ruler's realm could be widely scattered. The art of statesmanship, among other things, was to evoke sufficient sinews of statehood to ensure that out of this fragmented realm a viable polity could be marshaled.⁵ Connections between the different parts were often tenuous, demands made upon the scattered provinces were often few and typically only periodic, when external dangers threatened or princely ambition required a special collective effort. In those centuries Pakistan's problems would have been familiar; in the mid-twentieth century such a state was unheard of, only intensifying the sense of Pakistan's vulnerability.

There were more specific vulnerabilities, too. Though the army's manpower had a high reputation for martial prowess,

4. For a detailed discussion from the Pakistan perspective, see G. W. Choudhury, *Pakistan's Relations with India—1947–1966* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968), intro. and chaps. 1, 2, and 3. For a thoughtful and more recent essay, see Anwar H. Syed, "Pakistan's Security Problem: A Bill of Constraints," *Orbis* (Winter 1973), pp. 952–74.

5. For a vivid discussion of such problems, see J. H. Elliott's *Imperial Spain, 1469–1716* (London: Arnold, 1963), esp. chap. 5.

the army was an ill-equipped structure with aging, obsolescent equipment clearly not comparable to India's larger and better-equipped force. The Sterling balances inherited at partition from wartime British India were briefly reinforced during the Korean War, but that boom soon collapsed. As prices for Pakistan's cotton and jute slipped badly on world markets, import requirements for simple maintenance and urgent development expenditures became more insistent. A severe drought in the early 1950s dramatized the need for concessional imports of foodgrains. Together these manifest vulnerabilities made the sense of anxiety and fear more palpable.

But it would make the analytical—and policy—task too simple if fear alone were to have illuminated Pakistan's policy. As Thucydides also noted, statesmen were moved by interest and ambition in addition to fear. With all these sources of weakness vis-à-vis India, Pakistan also had ambitions toward India. Its leaders had undertaken a commitment to ensure that the Muslims in Kashmir had an opportunity to express a choice about their future. Pakistan was unready to reconcile itself to the "Indian solution" to the Kashmir problem. Legally, the ruler had acceded to India, and the Indians had proceeded to occupy the best parts. But there had never been a plebiscite to which both parties had agreed at the United Nations; and each claimed the other had refused to fulfill the prerequisites for that reference to the people. In any event, since India held the most important areas of that lovely but poverty-stricken area, it was India's unwillingness to hold an internationally neutral plebiscite that remained decisive in Pakistan's eyes.

While the details of the Kashmir dispute are unique to the subcontinent, and a major uniqueness was the attachment of each to contradictory principles of statehood leading to opposite positions on the future of Kashmir, there was nevertheless nothing startlingly unusual about the fact that two neighboring states had ambitions to control the same terri-

tory. Western European, Middle Eastern, and Asian history are full of territorially based quarrels.

Nor is it unique to Pakistan that the weaker neighbor persists in attempts to change the local situation in its favor at the cost of its more powerful neighbor. A quite typical consequence is a persisting gap between foreign policy goals and insufficient foreign policy means. The effort to fill that gap by the weaker party requires a ceaseless experimentation and adroit maneuvering. The difficulty of this task goes far to explain much of Pakistan's foreign policy behavior.

The Search for Outside Backing

The United Nations and Middle Eastern States

Shortly after partition, as already noted, the smaller and larger subcontinental neighbors fought a small war over the disputed valley. The advantage of surprise gained by tribes and auxiliaries from the smaller country was counterbalanced by the indiscipline of the infiltrators and by better materiel, less inhibited generalship, and larger numbers on the Indian side. It was the larger power that originally called in the United Nations because the area it conceived of as its own had been the "victim of international aggression." Now well-established in the more advanced military positions, India soon considered the United Nations as an interloper, for the United Nations showed itself progressively more interested in organizing a plebiscite to record public sentiment in the valley than in directly repudiating the steps that forces from Pakistan had taken. In consequence, understandably enough, India became less and less cooperative.

In contrast, the weaker country, Pakistan, increasingly sought to strengthen its position by efforts to enlist the United Nations, particularly the larger countries in the

Security Council, on its behalf in an effort to redress the local balance that was then working to its disadvantage. Again, it is quite characteristic policy for smaller states in contention with a more powerful neighbor to seek outside support to counterbalance their own weakness.⁶

A certain success was registered at the United Nations and among a number of countries outside, which expressed their support for a plebiscite. In the end, however, the effective position of an India determined to avoid an internationally supervised plebiscite blocked that avenue for change.

Parallel efforts by Pakistan to enlist support from fellow-Muslim countries in the Middle East bore little fruit. Each state was beset by acute internal problems, or, as in the case of Egypt, was dealing with the remnants of the European presence. Most were stressing secular, not religious, values, and few found Pakistan's effort to establish an Islamic state relevant to their problems. President Nasser may have seen in Pakistan's talk of "Islamic unity" competition with his own conception of Arab unity under his leadership.

Support from the Commonwealth relationship, particularly Pakistan's expected backing from Great Britain, did not materialize as Karachi had hoped, since Great Britain was as determined to maintain relationships with India as with Pakistan, and undue partisanship on behalf of one side in the subcontinent would mean hostility from the other. Indeed, it was the outsiders' unwillingness to side with Pakistan against its larger neighbor that bedeviled Pakistan's foreign policy from the start.

6. For useful discussions, see George Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962); David Vital, *The Survival of Small States* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971); Robert Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968). Throughout, we designate Pakistan as a "Small Power," not because of its actual size, but by virtue of its relative size and power compared with India. It also fits Rothstein's definition: "A small power is a state which recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes or developments to do so" (p. 29).

A Major Power as an Ally?

Given, then, a substantial amount of fear, a goodly dose of ambition to "redress the injustice in Kashmir," and a failure of efforts to provide either security or satisfaction through the international community broadly conceived, through Islamic solidarity, or through the Commonwealth link, Pakistan not surprisingly sought an alliance with an outside Major Power.

The following account will suggest that much that has happened is not entirely atypical of state system behavior. The main Major Power candidate to act as an ally (the United States) was at the time building a system of alliances designed to block the expansion of its major opponent (the Soviet Union). Pakistan responded favorably to American soundings regarding a possible close association.

One finds striking parallels in the actions, say, of Czechoslovakia and Poland in the 1920s, perceiving themselves weak in relation to both Weimar Germany and Bolshevik Russia, readily accepting alliance arrangements with victorious France; or at the turn of the century, when Austria's leaders calculated that their country's position vis-à-vis Italy and Tsarist Russia would be improved by alliance with the larger Germany.

The American Connection: Advantages and Liabilities

By 1951-52, like Barkis, the United States was certainly willin' to develop a close working relationship with Pakistan. It had but recently found dealing with a limited war in Korea a good deal more demanding than it had anticipated; its leadership, particularly Secretary of State Dulles, feared a repetition in South Asia of what it conceived of in Korea as a Soviet-inspired initiative. Washington recalled what had been revealed in the Nazi-Soviet documents and considered these reflected a long-run Russian interest "in the area of the Persian Gulf." And it was at the time seeking, with British assistance, to find a way of developing mutual defense.

arrangements with Middle Eastern countries. President Nasser had rejected the concept of a Middle East Defense Organization requiring Arab cooperation with Western Europe and America, but there was then emerging a concept of the "northern tier," involving Turkey and Iran.⁷

From the American point of view, if Pakistan's manpower could be added to the combination, Pakistan's interest in defending itself against Soviet encroachment through Afghanistan would strengthen Middle East defenses and block a historic route from central Russia into South Asia. The Americans were impressed by Pathan and Punjabi reputations as "martial races." The fact that Pakistan was an Islamic country and had made consistent efforts to reach out to the Islamic Middle East made it all the more attractive to the Americans.⁸

For a number of responsible figures in the Pakistan government, the United States appeared to be the logical—indeed, the only plausible—Major Power for Pakistan to turn to. Moscow was still not yet free from the thrall of Stalin's harsh rule, and it had no military equipment or economic resources to spare. China's new regime had hardly yet mastered its dissident areas. By the early 1950s the United States was actively pursuing in Asia a policy, begun in Europe and in Greece and Turkey, of developing alliances and supporting aid relationships. Washington was already releasing badly needed agricultural "surpluses" to Pakistan. It seemed ready to commit large economic resources to assist its friends in Asia. Above all, it appeared ready to provide up-to-date military equipment and training.

Moreover, the United States filled another requisite of prudent statesmanship—it was far away. Machiavelli warned his Prince against the risk of associating too closely with a

7. For accounts, see *The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony Eden: Full Circle* (London: Cassell, 1960), *passim*; Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years, Waging Peace: 1956-61* (London: Heineman, 1965), pp. 133, 145; and Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973).

8. See, e.g., editorials in *New York Times*, Jan. 24, 1953; Nov. 5, 1953.

bigger power close to one's borders, for there have been many examples, Machiavelli argued, when a large neighboring ally had come to help and remained to rule. America, some 12,000 miles away, could hardly pose such a threat.

One liability of a major associate so far away was the probability that it would have many other preoccupations apart from those of its small ally halfway around the world. In distance also lay the risk that when an issue arose of Pakistan security, the major ally's attention might be diverted by developments elsewhere. There were also risks in too much intimacy with such a power. Given the asymmetry between the Major Power and the Small Ally, no matter how far away he might be, would involvement with him unduly inhibit one's freedom of foreign policy maneuver? How often would one have to publicly side with the Major Power Ally on issues of little direct interest to oneself but in ways that might cost one the friendship of potentially important third parties? Would his weight become unduly influential in one's own internal affairs? These typical questions were explored within segments of the Pakistan government and, on balance, the alliance relationship seemed to be worth the risk.

The main framework for the alliance arrangement was a network of multilateral treaties (SEATO and CENTO) in each of which the *casus belli* was specifically defined as "Communist aggression." This was not Pakistan's main worry, but the substance of the "special relationship" with the Major Power was built on bilateral military and economic assistance agreements that brought resources badly needed by the military and civilian segments of government. This too was quite characteristic, and finds close parallels with the British coalition system during the Napoleonic wars and with inter-war alliances between France and members of the Little Entente.⁹

9. For a discussion of the latter, see Rothstein, *op. cit.*, chap. 10.

At the core of the arrangement, however, was a fundamental difference between the two countries in focus and sense of priority. For the Major Power, the main concern was the Soviet problem and its ally China, and a possible thrust southward by one or both, analogous to the invasion of South Korea by North Korea several years earlier. To the Smaller Ally, by contrast, the main problem was its much larger subcontinental neighbor, India.¹⁰ To be sure, Afghanistan posed a problem among Pakistan's tribal peoples, and its relations with the Soviet Union were periodically troublesome. But by comparison, Afghanistan was small worry; India was the overriding concern. The ambiguity in the relationship came early, for soon the United States sought working relations with both its Small Ally, Pakistan, and the latter's source of principal anxiety, India, at the same time.

There is nothing remarkable in such differences. Rarely do two states, separated by such distances, experience of statehood, and of such unequal power see eye to eye. As Rothstein put it,

An alliance between a Great Power and a Small Power may also involve an inherent difficulty arising from the extent of their interests. The Great Power tends to ally in terms of a threat to the balance of the whole system; the Small Power in terms of a threat to its local balance. Inevitably conflicts of perspective emerge.¹¹

But what the two states did share was clear. They agreed that if Pakistan's military capability could be improved by injections of military equipment and training, and its political capabilities consolidated by substantial economic assistance, the leaders of Pakistan would be better able to cope should an external threat materialize.

10. For an illuminating discussion of this ambiguity as it affected Pakistan's approach to SEATO, see George Modelski, *SEATO—Six Studies* (Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, 1962), pp. 137-138, 155, *passim*.

11. Rothstein, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

Quite typically, the alliance brought a sharp increase in military equipment and in economic resources devoted to bolstering local military expenditures of the Smaller Ally. Over \$900 million worth of military equipment was transferred to Pakistan, although the exact figure is not known. Transport, mobile equipment, and tanks were delivered in substantial numbers, as were B-57 bombers and more sophisticated aircraft including numerous F-86s and, in the early 1960s, twelve jet fighter F-104s. The latter could out-fly anything in the Indian armory, though the latter had many more if less sophisticated aircraft. Large economic assistance transfers were also made, and foodgrain shipments tided over bad seasons. Indeed, economic assistance trebled after 1954 in comparison with the years preceding the alliance, grants coming to nearly \$900 million and concessional loans and PL 480 foodgrains together totaling another \$1.5 billion.¹²

Moreover, also typical of many alliance arrangements, the mutual interchanges became so close and detailed between the Major Power and its Small Ally that at least within the Washington government a substantial group of international security officials emerged who were deeply committed to protecting the alliance arrangement with their Smaller Ally.

There also developed a potential bargaining asset that proved useful later on—the electronic installations at Peshawar.¹³ Originally these had not been planned when the alliance was first bruited, but it turned out that the electronic characteristics of the Peshawar valley were ideally suited to tuning in on the Soviet Union's major missile-testing range. Peshawar also proved to be a useful jump-off point from which, on occasion, the Major Power Ally

12. Shaheen Irshad Khan, *Rejection Alliance? A Case Study of U.S.-Pakistan Relations (1947-1967)* (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1972), p. 186.

13. For a discussion, see Selig Harrison, "America, India and Pakistan—A Chance for a Fresh Start," *Harper's*, CCXXXIII (July 1966), 56-68.

sent reconnaissance planes at some 80,000 feet across Russia to the territory of another ally, Norway.

In addition to providing the location for electronic surveillance, which became in itself a source of policy leverage to the Pakistan government, the Small Ally supported its Major Power Ally's position at the United Nations on many (though not all) issues.¹⁴ At meetings of the "non-aligned" statesmen, such as at Bandung and Colombo, it argued on behalf of the legitimacy of alliance relationships undertaken in self-defense and criticized the Soviet Union's form of "colonialism in Asia" and "neo-colonialism." Such statements were all the more acceptable to the Pakistan authorities since they were not only highly regarded by representatives of the Major Power Ally, but they also ran counter to the arguments made by Pakistan's large neighbor, India.

Though subsequently these arrangements and policy lines came to be seen as very mixed blessings, and some stressed their net liability all along, it could be argued that for five or six years the Small Ally prospered within the alliance. Particularly in relation to its larger neighbor, Pakistan's defense and diplomatic position had markedly improved by comparison with 1954. As Wayne Wilcox put it,

The alliance with America offset India's military preponderance and changed the diplomatic weightings of the Indian and Pakistani cases on Kashmir. The army's own "tools" were not only expanded, but much enhanced in quality and sophistication. U.S. military advisers brought new techniques of command and communication to what was, in fact, an obsolete light infantry formation.¹⁵

To be sure, Pakistan did not gain enough diplomatic clout to solve the Kashmir problem its own way. But its sense of anxiety about the ability of its larger neighbor to overrun

14. It differed on China policy, for example, from 1959 onward.

15. "Political Role of Army in Pakistan: Some Reflections," *South Asian Studies* (Jaipur), VII, No. 1 (Jan. 1972), 30-44, quoted on 36.

it sharply diminished; the original sense of acute fragility was markedly reduced. On the economic side, its irrigation infrastructure, transport, and industrial facilities improved sharply, and urban food prices were held down, allowing city payrolls to remain stable and the cost of exports to be competitive.

At the same time, however, the substantial improvement in Pakistan's position had its effects on developments in India. It was not an intended by-product of the military assistance program, but that did induce the Indians to increase their defense budget. The competition hardly became an "arms race" as the super-powers experience them, but in terms of local resources it came close to that as each party increased defense expenditures in rather close relation to the other.

The Alliance Loses Its Charm

The alliance arrangement, however, was far from perfect, and it came to be seen by prominent Pakistanis as less and less satisfactory.

In the first place, the rate of military deliveries leveled off after a rapid surge during the first years of the alliance. The military services were naturally disappointed that the early pace was not maintained. Second, the Small Ally found that its Major Power Ally did not wholeheartedly support its case against India on the disputed territory, but sought to maintain working diplomatic and economic relations with both countries. Third, because of the United States' desire to block Soviet expansion and the very size and possible consequential character of India in the future Asian balance, the Major Power sought to strengthen the Small Ally's opponent by a substantial economic assistance program. To be sure, on a per capita basis, economic aid to India never reached more than half as much, but since the country was four times as large, the non-ally often received nearly twice

16. For a discussion, see Rothstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 251-59.

as much in real terms as the Small Ally. "What kind of a 'special relationship' was this?" it could be and was argued in Pakistan.

Fourth, a new element in the state system became increasingly obvious, promoted in part by the energetic activities of the large neighbor—namely, the mystique of non-alignment and the effort to undermine the reputation of statesmen who sought to solve their diplomatic and security problem by allying with a "neo-colonialist" Major Power.¹⁶ It may have been coincidence, but apart from Yugoslavia, whose position was unique, and Ghana in Africa, the principal proponents of nonalignment just happened to be by far the largest countries in their respective areas and were not experiencing the sense of local threat from larger neighbors that troubled Pakistanis. But diplomatic costs became associated with the alliance relationship at the United Nations, at "Third World" conferences, and in other multilateral forums where diplomats confabulated and reputations were upheld or undermined.¹⁷

Moreover, the relationships developed as part of the alliance affected the domestic balance of political forces within the Smaller Ally. The army was receiving large flows of military supplies and the central bureaucracy was receiving and allocating substantial economic assistance transfers. Accordingly, these elements in the political system were gaining in preeminence at the expense of civilian political forces and institutions and domestic regional interests. Bengali opposition against Ayub Khan, the leader of Pakistan who had earlier been welcomed as the architect of the alliance, became focused on the alliance as the source of domestic political distortions. Growing domestic resentment against both the army and the bureaucracy built up hostility

17. Godfrey Jansen, *Non-Alignment and Afro-Asian States* (New York: Praeger, 1966); Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Non-aligned World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

against those alliance arrangements that were seen to be consolidating the latter's position at home.

In 1960 the downing of the U-2 dramatized the Major Power's activities on Pakistan's soil directed against the Soviet Union. The Russian threat to retaliate against Peshawar by releasing nuclear missiles sharply inflated the apparent cost of the alliance arrangement. It raised widespread questions about the advantages of the alliance that had not been raised before.¹⁸

In 1962 the Small Ally's principal opponent became embroiled in military conflict with China, Asia's largest country. Instead of standing by, as Pakistan would have preferred, Pakistan's Major Power Ally promptly came to India's assistance. United States' military assistance was never "massive" as alleged. Nevertheless, the Major Power's military aid to the Small Ally's major opponent came as a shock. It underlined the hard fact that the so-called special relationship had not been nearly as special as had been touted. This proved particularly vivid when the Major Power was not prepared to make its limited military assistance to India contingent on a settlement of the disputed territory in a way favorable to its Smaller Ally, as the latter insisted.

Such developments are not unusual in alliances. As Modelski points out, when a Great Power provides a security guarantee, it "has the right to expect that such support will not be called for except in defense of the most vital interests. [Nevertheless,] the small countries have a propensity for using the Great Power for their own . . . interests and . . . local preoccupations."¹⁹ Pakistan, he argued, consistently sought to draw SEATO into its quarrel with India over Kashmir, an endeavor that distracted the countries of South-east Asia from what had presumably brought them together in the first place, i.e., the perceived threat from China.

18. For a brief discussion, see Burke, *op. cit.*, p. 266. See also Z. A. Bhutto, *The Myth of Independence* (Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1969).

19. Modelski, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

More Varied Options in Asia

It is characteristic of alliance relationships in a highly dynamic area and period that they do not last. Two elements contributed to changing Pakistani views of the utility of the American alliance. As pointed out, at the core of the arrangement were the very different weights Washington and Karachi/Islamabad attached to the Russian and Indian threats. Whenever this difference became apparent, the alliance was brought into question in both capitals. Second, China's rise from the ashes of civil war and revolution meant that a new and major element in the Asian state system, just on India's northern border, might also play a useful role in balancing the power of India.

As early as 1959 Pakistan had begun to broaden its relationships with its Asian neighbors to the north in a search for additional ways of dealing with its Indian problem. Negotiations with Russia led to oil-exploration agreements—on the assumption that such arrangements might induce Russia to be less wholehearted in its support of India's case at the United Nations, quite in addition to the intrinsic value of having additional explorations for oil under way. In 1959 President Ayub offered "joint defense" to India and spoke of the "danger from the north," meaning China, a ploy that pleased Washington and put New Delhi in a bad light. When it rejected Ayub's initiative in late 1959–60, however, Pakistan approached China regarding a possible frontier delimitation in the area of the Karakoram. Nothing came of this latter step until after the Sino-Indian border war had begun, but these initiatives showed Pakistan's interest in broadening its Asian relationships. Its Major Power Ally did not welcome these initiatives, since both Russia and China were then considered by Washington as its foremost opponents. But the Small Ally persisted all the same.

In 1962 the success of China in ignominiously defeating India opened a major alternative for Pakistan in its effort to

balance the power of India. Machiavelli had urged his Prince to develop friendly relations with the neighbors of his larger neighbor. Kautiliya, Chandragupta's adviser, had elaborated this principle as early as 300 B.C. He had sketched a typical checkerboard pattern, where one's immediate neighbor was an enemy and the country on the other side of one's neighboring enemy was one's natural ally. The simplified apothegm for this theorem is the familiar, "The enemy of my enemy is my friend."²⁰ Following 1962, China, for Pakistan, fitted this recommendation perfectly; it was clearly India's enemy and it had now demonstrated its proven capacity to preoccupy India and to distract it from ambitions it might harbor toward Pakistan. Pakistan's Major Power Ally, acting on the same principle, saw India as its principal "friend" on the subcontinent, since it was directly opposing Washington's enemy, China. Accordingly, it was not prepared to press India hard on behalf of a "Pakistan solution" in Kashmir. Perhaps, some Pakistani officials argued, India's enemy—China—might be persuaded to oblige on Kashmir, since the Americans clearly would not.

This new opening posed a diplomatic conundrum, however, since the Major Power with whom Pakistan was allied was acutely hostile to Pakistan's Kautilyan "friend." Following 1962, therefore, Pakistan developed further a more complex policy. President Ayub called it the "triangular tightrope." It sought to retain whatever advantages the alliance with its Major Power Ally might still provide, while simultaneously reaching specific agreements with one of the Ally's major Asian opponents. The trick was to find issues of such manifestly reasonable substance that its Ally's objections could not be too sharp. Yet the issues had to be of sufficient import to dramatize to Pakistan's subcontinental opponent—India—its new flexibility and its potential for

20. For a discussion, see George Modelski, "Kautiliya's Foreign Policy and International System in the Ancient Hindu World," *American Political Science Review* LVIII, No. 33 (Sept. 1964), 549-60, quoted on 555.

bringing new sources of pressure to bear. Within most alliances at one time or another, particularly when important shifts are taking place, such conundrums present themselves and often take some years to solve.

Another question typical of alliances is the matter of how domestic politics affect alliance relationships. To go very far in this direction takes us away from the state-to-state model we are working with, but a few words would be in order. We have already seen the alliance's effect on strengthening the hand of the army and the bureaucracy and noted that criticism of the regime was in part taking the form of criticism of the alliance. Now the flow of influence ran the other way, as criticism of the alliance began to cost the regime further domestic support. Younger political leaders with an eye to the future began to dramatize their own differences with the regime by stressing the constraints imposed on their country by the alliance. They publicly urged the merits of closer relationships with their large Asian neighbors to the north.²¹ Elements of the professional military establishment and the foreign policy community, frustrated by the declining rate of military aid transfers and anxious to make the most of their larger neighbor's embarrassment, pressed for a closer Chinese connection. Any improvement in relations with Russia might loosen the Delhi-Moscow connection and would tend thereby to further weaken external backing for the larger neighbor.

Accordingly, despite criticism from the Major Power Ally, a border settlement was finally worked out with China in 1962. Some military assistance arrangements were also defined and a series of state visits arranged. These steps signaled to the larger neighbor that Pakistan had additional ways of countervailing against the latter's dominant position; to its domestic critics it showed that it was not bound

21. See e.g., Bhutto, *op. cit.*, where he develops the arguments he and others began to use a good many years before the publication in 1969, even when he was still in the government.

hand and foot by the alliance with the Major Power, as the critics alleged.

It was noted earlier that within the alliance arrangements the Smaller Ally sought to improve its own bargaining position in relation to the Major Power. These symbolic steps served also to dramatize to the Major Power Ally that Pakistan ought not to be taken for granted, and that although Pakistan had stood out in support of its Major Power Ally's positions on many occasions in the past, there were limits to its acquiescing to everything the Major Power might want to do. Indeed, some observers believed the Government of Pakistan welcomed, and may even have encouraged, sharp public criticism of American policy. The public protests demonstrated that domestic pressures on the Pakistan government were so severe, it might have to withdraw from the alliance if American policy did not change. This may have strengthened Pakistan's hand in dealing with the United States, though it might as likely provoke equally compelling impatience on the part of the Major Power Ally.²² These steps did not answer Pakistan's aspirations for the disputed territory, nor did they slow down the growth of India's military strength.

Just as its larger neighbor (India) had protested loudly against any transfers of military equipment from the Major Power (the United States) to its Smaller Ally (Pakistan) in 1954, now the Smaller Ally reacted vigorously to any military transfers to its larger neighbor. The sharp objections against the limited American transfers to India in 1962 have been mentioned. These so aroused the anxieties of the Smaller Ally that its representatives appeared to be, as someone said, "almost out of their minds with worry."²³ Gradually, the close personal collaboration between the military services of Pakistan and the United States was restricted;

22. See, e.g., *New York Times*, April 29, 1963, from Karachi.

23. Personal interviews.

the training role and mobility of the American mission were pared down. American officials were often put on the defensive in what seemed to be well-orchestrated personal encounters.

In an effort to reassure the Small Ally, in the spring of 1963 a number of high-level envoys from Washington visited the subcontinent, including Secretary of State Rusk and President Kennedy's personal military adviser, General Maxwell Taylor. About this time, it is reported that the American Embassy in Rawalpindi indicated to the Government of Pakistan, in a letter from President Kennedy, that the "United States commitment to Pakistan was not limited to Communist countries, but specifically includes India" as well.²⁴

Moreover, in 1963¹ the Indian government sought a major modernization program from the United States. An impressive military mission went to Washington and sought military assistance reported to be valued at between \$500 million and \$1.5 billion over a three- to five-year period. If the latter figure was nearer the mark, the contemplated transfers would have been well beyond those already made to the Smaller Ally.²⁵ Debate within the American foreign policy community was intense and protracted. In the end, the Major Power proposed to provide much of what was asked for, with the exception of the supersonic, high-performance aircraft similar to what had already been transferred to Pakistan. From the Indian point of view, this downgrading of the assistance package was so serious that they rejected most of it

²⁴ Unpublished memorandum by B. H. Oehlert, Jr., "How to Lose Allies," dated May 19, 1970, reported by G. W. Choudhury, "The Emergence of Bangladesh and the South Asian Triangle," *The Yearbook of World Affairs* 1973 (London: Institute of World Affairs, 1973), p. 81.

²⁵ The lower figure is from Chester Bowles, *Promises to Keep* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 475; the higher from the *New York Times*, May 21, 1963. The actual value of military assistance at that time, of course, varied greatly, depending upon the pricing policies of the supplier and the opportunity costs actually attributed to financing loans at different interest rates, "grace periods," and years to repay.

except for some radar defense installations to be located across the northern frontier and a used munitions plant to be moved from St. Louis.²⁶ There is little doubt that the leading officials of the Smaller Ally were greatly relieved.

It can be fairly argued that an important implicit consideration in Washington's deliberations was the likely effects such a program as proposed by India would have on relations between the United States and its Smaller Ally. The Pakistanis were at pains to make clear their acute anxiety. And by now the Smaller Ally had some bargaining power in dealing with its Major Ally. The professional proponents of the Pakistan connection in the United States, particularly within the military establishment, argued strongly on behalf of the interests of the Smaller Ally. Its growing Chinese relationship strengthened their hand, as they could argue the importance of not "driving Pakistan into the arms of the Chinese," a point the Pakistani officials were actively pressing as well. To what extent the electronic installations at Peshawar were a bargaining chip thrown into the scale is not known, but they probably played a part.²⁷ The prospective transfer of supersonic aircraft was particularly disturbing to the Pakistani authorities, for at a stroke their only technical military advantage would have been checkmated. It seemed likely that there was a hard bargain on that specific issue—which proved to be decisive in leading the Indians to turn down the package offered.

In the end, of course, Pakistan's large neighbor found the Russians more willing than the Americans, as Ambassador Bowles had warned all along, and a large build-up, begun before 1962, accelerated after the lukewarm Washington offer in 1963. Just as China had seen Pakistan as a useful counter-

26. For contemporary published reports, see *New York Times*, March 25, May 21, May 31, June 20, and June 30, 1963.

27. Certainly Grand Harbor's naval facilities played a crucial part in the hard bargaining Malta engaged in vis-à-vis Great Britain in 1971. For this fascinating encounter, see my "Up for Auction: Malta Bargains with Great Britain" in I. William Zartman's *The 50% Solution* (New York: Anchor Books, 1976), pp. 208-34.

weight to India on the latter's western flank, so the Soviet Union must have seen India as a convenient counterweight to China on the latter's southern flank.

The 1965 Gamble

Direct Challenge to the Large Neighbor

There are times in a state's history when the tide of events appears to be turning against it, when a formerly precariously held but just tolerable position is visibly eroding. The difficulties may be domestic, they may be foreign, or a combination of both. At such times, statesmen are tempted to stake a good deal on a bold initiative. Once even a minor resort to violence is accepted, a gage is thrown down to *fortuna*; the outcome must in some measure depend on chance. In 1965 Pakistan's leaders gambled heavily—and lost.

By then, Pakistani officials could not help but notice that the military strength of their larger neighbor was improving, thanks to Soviet equipment transfers and a growing arms industry that Pakistan could not hope to match. Politically, India was progressively drawing the disputed territory of Kashmir into India's constitutional system. In contrast, the Small Ally was receiving fewer military supplies than it had before, for its Major Power Ally's strategic orientation was downgrading South Asia generally as a result of ICBM technology, some measure of detente with Russia, and a growing concern with Southeast Asia. In 1962 and the early spring of 1963, many Pakistanis came to believe that the United States had not been a reliable ally, for it had refused to make arms shipments to India contingent on Indian concessions on Kashmir. Having let that opportunity pass, Pakistan officials must have reasoned, Washington was not likely to press Pakistan's larger neighbor further. The United Nations was moribund on the issue of Kashmir. Domestic

opposition in West Pakistan was increasingly critical of the regime for its inaction. In East Pakistan, however, critics of Islamabad focused more on lack of economic growth and insufficient political representation of Bengali interests, for they cared little for the Kashmir issue that so exercised opinion in the west.

In retrospect, one can see that the Pakistan initiative of 1965 was a turning point. Again, details would take us too far into the particularities of India's, Pakistan's, and subcontinental history, but certain key points can be quickly made.²⁸

There developed a growing conviction among a number of key Pakistani leaders that a policy of doing nothing would mean that the disputed territory of Kashmir would be irrevocably surrendered to India. Such an approach was not only seen as dishonorable desertion of Muslim brethren left under Hindu rule, but would be politically risky at home, particularly in the Punjab where sentiment in regard to Kashmir was most exercised.

Portents of short-run Indian weakness could be seen in the succession to Nehru's mantle of the unprepossessing and reputedly Gandhist Shastri and the unimpressive performance of Indian troops in the Rann of Kutch combat in the spring of 1965.

Already in late 1963 discontent in Kashmir was dramatized when the theft of a hair from the Prophet's beard held as a sacred relic in the principal mosque of Srinagar precipitated severe rioting and police shootings. A situation ripe for rebellion might be at hand, some thought, if only Pakistan could show determined support for its Muslim brothers in the valley.

Part of the effort may have been designed to forcefully drag the attention of the international community back to Kashmir. It is credible, though admittedly speculative, that there was

²⁸. For a critical, analytical discussion, see Herbert Feldman, *From Crisis to Crisis, Pakistan from 1962-1969* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), chap. 9.

a belief among a number of Pakistani officials that only if there was an outbreak of violent (though limited) international conflict would the international community, including the Major Powers, bring sufficient weight to bear on Pakistan's larger neighbor to force a mutually acceptable settlement. Nasser, perhaps, had tried such a maneuver in 1967 and failed, but Sadat had been bolder in 1973 and had gained a measure of success. In 1965 some Pakistani policy-makers may have calculated in a similar vein.²⁹

It may be that they believed others shared their view regarding the sharp distinction they saw between the "line of demarcation" in Kashmir separating the two parts of the disputed territory and the "international boundary" separating Pakistan and India in the Punjab. Seen from this perspective, an intrusion of "irregulars" into the valley from Azad Kashmir could remain quite distinct from any action India might take elsewhere in retaliation. If India did move across the international frontier, some may have argued, this would represent Indian aggression and the specific American assurances mentioned earlier, reportedly given in 1962-63, might bring Pakistan's Major Power Ally to the support of Pakistan.

There may have been a further expectation. If the adventure did go so far as to bring war between the two South Asian countries, the Kautilian formula would prove correct and Pakistan's friend China, the enemy of its enemy, would again drive southward—or at least threaten to do so—to confound Pakistan's larger neighbor.

In the early months of 1965, India took further steps to integrate Kashmir into the Indian political and administrative system. Local political groups desirous of cooperating

29. On Nasser's presumed calculations, see Miles Copeland, *The Game of Nations* (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1969), pp. 144-46, 253-58; Yair Evron, *The Middle East: Nations, Super-Powers and Wars* (London: Elek, 1973), p. 185, citing article by Heikal; and Insight Team, *The Middle East War* (London: Sunday Times and Andre Deutsch, 1974), pp. 42 and 228.

with India were made parts of the Indian National Congress party; titles of key officials were made identical with similar officials in India; provisions of the Indian constitution relating to the application of emergency powers were, for the first time, made operational in Kashmir. The worst suspicions of Pakistanis seemed to be about to be fulfilled in such a Fabian way that outsiders were scarcely aware of what was happening; or if they were aware, they did not seem to care.

A classic example of reciprocal escalation got under way. Activity across the Kashmir cease-fire line intensified. Claiming that Pakistani armed men were trying to interrupt traffic on the precarious road from Srinagar to Leh, in mid-May the Indian government ordered its troops to cross the cease-fire line where they occupied three posts in the Kargil area. Pakistan protested to the United Nations, and the Indian troops were withdrawn on the guarantee that the United Nations supervisory corps would occupy the evacuated posts and ensure that there were no repetitions of the alleged actions by Pakistani troops. Incidents (border crossings, firings, etc.) became more frequent all along the line; the United Nations reported over two thousand during the first six months of 1965. Unrest in Kashmir was said in Pakistan to be rising sharply with the political changes; Indian officials claimed that all was calm and peaceful as usual. Officials in Azad Kashmir reportedly organized guerrilla training units, the Indians arguing these were really elements of the regular Pakistan army training under leadership based in Murree. In early August substantial numbers of infiltrators penetrated the Indian-held parts of Kashmir.³⁰

30. For a long time Pakistan officially denied the fact of infiltrators from its side of the line. Perhaps the most objective and informed testimony comes from General Nimmo, chief of the United Nations Military Observer Group, who reported "that the series of violations that began on 5 August were to a considerable extent in subsequent days in the form of armed men, generally not in uniform, crossing the cease-fire line from the Pakistan side for the purpose of armed action on the Indian side." United Nations, *Report of the Secretary General on the Current Situation in Kashmir* (Doc S/6651), Sept. 3, 1965.

They appear to have hoped to evoke a popular uprising or to give heart to those Kashmiris who wanted to oppose the valley's integration with India.

In response to the infiltration, the Indian army again crossed the cease-fire line "to eliminate the source of the infiltrators." The Pakistan army retaliated on September 1 by sending a regular force against the Indian army units defending the road from Jammu to Srinagar near Akhnur. A week later, the Indians eventually replied, as they had always said they would, by attacking Pakistan across the international frontier in the Punjab and pressed toward Sialkot and Lahore. Two days later, Washington announced a stop to all military assistance to both India and Pakistan. After some seventeen days of combat between regular army units of both sides, the indecisive war ground to a stop.

Each side claimed military victory, since each had gained some territory at the expense of the other. The net assessment concludes that the Pakistan army was effectively brought to a halt, while the Indians had many uncommitted troops and much more materiel than their opponent when the cease-fire came, though these forces were scattered and would have required some time to be brought to bear. It is probable that President Ayub and his immediate military advisers knew the position, but the newspaper reporting had been so exaggerated that the populace was bewildered. They could not understand how such a series of "victories" would end with such a miserable, indecisive peace. The terms of the peace were confirmed at Tashkent, when the Russians mediated the settlement, with the inconspicuous involvement of the American President, Lyndon Johnson.³¹

We now know that this adventure was a disaster for Pakistan and for its regime. China did threaten, but it did not move. Politically, the gambit did not succeed because the

31. W. W. Rostow, *The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History* (New York: Macmillan, 1972), p. 410.

inhabitants of the disputed territory did not rise, and most of the infiltrators were turned in and killed or imprisoned. Militarily, it showed an early success, but Indian numbers and the inherent vulnerability of Lahore left Pakistan with no alternative but to accept a cease-fire once it became clear that replenishments from the United States were not forthcoming.

These actions dramatically underlined the outer limits of the alliance with the Major Power. Not only did the Major Power Ally refuse to come to the rescue of its Smaller Ally; in an effort to bring the conflict to a prompt halt it stopped all arms shipments to both belligerents. This policy hurt its Ally more than its Ally's opponent, since the latter had its own armaments industry and the flow of supplies from the Soviet Union was hardly affected. In its own defense, the Major Power Ally argued, not without logic, that it had never offered to guarantee Pakistan against the consequences of any high-risk initiative it might be tempted to take, particularly against other than the assumed Communist threat. Even the specific bilateral commitment made in 1962 in the aftermath of military aid to India did not apply when Pakistan itself had by its infiltration gambit in effect pulled the main trigger first.

Understandably enough, the Pakistanis looked on this as near treachery on the part of Washington, since India had been the first to cross the international boundary. In any event, as the Pakistanis saw it, India had precipitated the situation by its political moves in changing the constitutional status of Kashmir. As Washington saw it, however, the sending of irregulars into the valley was the real precipitant of the conflict and that initiative absolved the United States of the obligation to fulfill its guarantee in this instance. That Pakistan's tactics were precisely the ones the Americans were grappling with in Vietnam only served to further weaken sympathy for Pakistan in Washington.

As a result of this conflict, the predominant mood in the

capital of Pakistan's Major Power Ally became "a plague on both your houses." In Pakistan, this change of attitude called for an urgent search for alternatives to the now virtually inoperative American connection.

The Chinese Option Becomes All the More Important

Problems within the alliance intensified. Efforts of Pakistani spokesmen to improve relations with China and the Soviet Union by criticizing the Major Power Ally's policy in Asia made collaboration within the alliance all the more difficult. Eventually, the American President became so annoyed by these differences, vigorously aired in public, that on indecently short notice he abruptly postponed visits of both the Pakistan President and the Indian Prime Minister; a critical meeting of the international consortium on aid to Pakistan was not held on time because, it was said, the American representative was not given clear instructions, certain "political problems" having to be clarified first. It is reported that the foreign minister, a strong critic of American policy, was fired at American insistence. To placate the supporters of the first and to protect the regime from being criticized for being too pro-American, the finance minister, a strong proponent of the alliance, was also dropped.

In short, instead of eliciting a response that furthered the interest of the Smaller Ally, as had occurred in 1962 when Pakistani officials made clear their acute anxiety over American aid to India, the public criticisms and risky military initiative had only weakened Pakistan's supporters in the capital of the Major Power Ally. Such protests might have been good domestic politics, however, for the Pakistani public was understandably as bitter against Washington as were the officials who had advised on the decisions leading to the outbreak of war. But from the foreign policy point of

view, they were, as the saying goes, counterproductive.

On the other hand, Pakistan's relationships with its Kautiliyan friend China were improving. Arms flows increased, some MIG fighters were delivered, and the ever-present possibility of renewed Chinese activity on India's northern border was thought to inhibit Indian activities.

The Government of Pakistan also sought to affect the balance between itself and India by seeking constructive relationships with the Soviet Union. While differences with the United States were intensifying, Pakistan began to receive limited military assistance from the Soviet Union. Moscow reportedly also urged India to try to stabilize relationships with Pakistan by moderating its position on Kashmir. As part of its bargain with the Soviet Union, Pakistan finally closed the American listening post in Peshawar at the expiration of the original agreement.³² Satellite technology had apparently rendered it less crucial to the United States by then. But as it had served Pakistan well in bargaining with the United States in 1962, so it was useful as a chip in bargaining with the Soviet Union in 1968. But it was a one-shot asset then, for once it had been closed in exchange for some Soviet military equipment, Pakistan could no longer use it in dealing with either Major Power.

So long as the Johnson Administration grappled with the North Vietnamese in Vietnam, these Pakistan relationships with the Asian Communist giants complicated Pakistan's relationship with Washington. But once the Nixon Administration sought to bring an end to American participation in the Vietnam war by improving relations with both China and Russia, Pakistan's position became more acceptable in Washington. The "triangular tightrope," of which President

32. International Institute of Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1968* (London: IISS, 1969), pp. 33-34.

Ayub spoke in explaining his efforts to have simultaneous relationships with the United States, China, and the Soviet Union, was developed further by his successor. It was through Islamabad that the Americans and Chinese arranged their first steps toward direct discussions between the American and Chinese heads of state.

By now it was clear that instead of coping with its major problem—India—through its close association with a Major Power Ally, as between 1954 and, say, 1965, Pakistan had broadened its options and was dealing directly with its two larger Asian neighbors to the north, with a much looser relationship with the United States. It had not been successful in isolating India from its Soviet backer, but since the Tashkent settlement following the 1965 war the Soviet Union had been steering a less one-sided course in South Asia than it had before—or than it resumed following the treaty arrangement with India in 1971.

The 1971 Debacle

The next major shift in the subcontinent's balance of power came as a result of the follow-on events after President Yahya had opened Pakistan's domestic political system to the freest elections the country had ever had. This led to a geographical polarization of political support for two civilian leaders who were unable to bury their differences in common effort to ensure a continuation of civilian rule encompassing both wings. Acute linguistic, economic, and political grievances, a total misreading by Pakistani officials at the center of the intensity of resentment in the Bengal region, and a misplaced confidence in the efficacy of large-scale military action to suppress agitational regional politics led the Islamabad authorities to concentrate nearly a third of their forces in the eastern province. A savage repressive

effort backfired hideously and intensified the determination of Bengali political leaders to accomplish the separation that the army's action had been intended to prevent.

From India's point of view, the opportunity to "finally" deal with its Pakistan problem, the flood of millions of refugees, and the disorders likely to move across the frontier into its own most disturbed state of West Bengal led it to receive, train, and equip guerrillas to fight the army-imposed regime in East Pakistan. Its own military preparations, begun in April and May 1971, and its Treaty of Mutual Friendship, concluded in the summer of 1971 with the Soviet Union, were contingent preparations for a highly skillful and well-executed Indian military penetration of East Pakistan in December.

The repressive action of the Pakistan army had lost Pakistan most of its friends abroad, quite as much as within East Pakistan. Although China stood at the ready on the frontiers, any initiative it might have been tempted to take was inhibited by Soviet power, now committed to India's defense by Article (9) of the new Treaty of Mutual Friendship.³³ The United States attempted to mediate a political settlement between authorities in East and West Pakistan, but the timing of Indian moves preempted whatever slight chances of success that diplomatic initiative might have had. The Americans made gestures of support for Pakistan when the Indian armies crossed East Pakistan frontiers, and it sent units of the Seventh Fleet to the Bay of Bengal, though they were not in the area until the conflict was virtually over. Once again, the Major Power Ally appears to have been inhibited by the steps the Pakistan authorities had taken to precipitate the new conflict and by the Ally's unwillingness

33. For a detailed discussion of the military planning, actual preparations, and course of the Indian campaign, see the excellent study by Pran Chopra, *India's Second Liberation* (Delhi: Vikas Publishing, 1973); also International Institute of Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1971* (London: IISS, 1972), pp. 46-54.

to involve itself in a direct military engagement against Pakistan's larger subcontinental neighbor.

In the end, Pakistan saw over half the country's population splitting off to form the new state of Bangladesh, over one-third of its army taken prisoner, and its larger subcontinental neighbor virtually in command over its former eastern province. As the International Institute of Strategic Studies put it, Pakistan now had only one-tenth the size of India, with "about an equivalent proportion of its diplomatic and political leverage."³⁴ The refugees returned, and within five months the Indian army had gone home in a neatly managed military victory, brief occupation, and prompt withdrawal. Pakistan's prisoners of war were taken in tow to India, to remain in camps for over a year and a half.

Indian preponderance on the subcontinent could not now be doubted. Whether this state of affairs would persist depended more on India's domestic capacity for coping with intractable economic and political difficulties at home than on India's unambiguous numerical superiority in military strength, population, and economic potential.

Prime Minister Bhutto's Predicament

Since taking over his shattered country, much that Prime Minister Bhutto has done can be seen as concerned with this persisting foreign policy problem. His early fast-paced travels to the Middle East, to Peking, Moscow, and Washington can be understood as continuing episodes in the search for economic and military resources from abroad and foreign political support.

Quiet special relationships with and the assignment of technicians to the Gulf sheikdoms provide badly needed

34. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

foreign exchange and may have been designed to assure adequate representation of Pakistani interests in the councils of the OAPEC. But undue preference for Saudi Arabia and the neighboring sheikdoms could run counter to Iran's conception of its future role in the area and complicate relations with Iran. Even though both may have shared concerns regarding Afghanistan, Pakistan's policy toward Baluchistan can have a direct effect on Iran's conception of Pakistan's intentions. A loan of some \$500 million from Teheran in the summer of 1974 suggests that the Shah, however, sees a considerable parallel interest with Pakistan's.

The Simla accord in July 1972 opened the way for a process of accommodation between India and Pakistan on such problems as the return of the prisoners of war, trade relations, collaboration on river valley development, etc. If success could be achieved on specific issues, the level of mutual suspicion might decline and a number of cooperative enterprises of mutual benefit be begun. But India's nuclear explosion could only intensify Pakistan's anxieties once more and would require substantial Indian diplomatic art to assuage.

The Islamic Summit in the winter of 1974 sought to dramatize the breadth of Pakistan's support among Muslim states stretching all the way from Morocco to Indonesia. It permitted subtle political steps toward recognizing Bangladesh, a prelude to renewing ties with the former east wing. And since the conference followed the Yom Kippur War and the quadrupling of oil prices in November and December 1973, it may have been designed to gain for Pakistan assured oil supplies at preferential prices from the Muslim Middle East.

Looked at from another angle, Mr. Bhutto's foreign policy predicament was severe. On the one hand, he could not expect major military assistance from the United States. What equipment Pakistan required had to be purchased, on whatever lending terms could be obtained, in the open arms

market, further enlarging Pakistan's already very substantial foreign indebtedness. Some degree of detente with the Soviet Union was desirable to minimize the risk of Soviet pressure on the Northwest Frontier. And an easing of tension with India could reduce military expenditures and turn more attention in both countries to domestic development. But in the absence of a solid civilian political party structure and established political institutions, any regime had to depend on either popular enthusiasm or the sustained goodwill of the military. Since popular enthusiasm was likely to be fickle and the military tended to be both conservative and still committed on Kashmir, they were not likely, separately or together, to provide the domestic base for such unpopular but probably prudent policies.

Conclusion

In sum, we can see four major periods, each marked by a different Pakistani approach to balancing the power of its larger neighbor. During the first period, from independence to roughly 1954, Pakistan sought to accomplish this end by turning to the international community in the form of the United Nations to bolster its position and by seeking support of countries in the Arab Muslim Middle East.

By 1952 this course seemed inadequate, and Pakistan turned toward developing close relations with a distant Major Power, the United States. By 1954 this relationship was institutionalized in a series of alliances and military and economic assistance arrangements. This second effort to alter in Pakistan's favor the balance of power between Pakistan and its larger neighbor brought a considerable improvement. However, it fell short of Pakistan's highest aspiration since the disputed territory of Kashmir was not successfully obtained.

The state system is always in flux, however. Arrangements

useful in one period may become inadequate in another. The relative position of Pakistan *via-à-vis* India began to slip in 1960–61. In part, this is attributable to the Indian response to Pakistan's improved arms position in the mid-1950s as a result of the American alliance. But India's concern with China had an independent dynamic influence on India's military position. The two together, however, and Indian interests in a general improvement in her own defense position, particularly after the 1962 debacle, led to a rapid step-up in India's defense after 1962.

As a result of these changes and Pakistan's changing perception of the utility of the American connection, Pakistan sought to correct its weakening position by developing broader options within Asia itself. China's success in humiliating Pakistan's rival and its readiness to play a direct role in balancing India improved Pakistan's position after 1962. But the gain was limited and proved only temporary. Soviet military assistance to India increased following the war with China. The politico-military debacle of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war and its side-effects on America's commitment to Pakistan, changes in American perceptions of the politico-strategic importance of the subcontinent, and the somewhat dramatic style of political spokesmen in demonstrating their independence from the Major Power Ally, all weakened the utility of the American connection. Growing contention within China resulting in the Cultural Revolution made the China connection temporarily less useful. Nevertheless, while there was a net loss in the military balance, there was some diplomatic and political gain, for Pakistan now had more variegated options, no longer depending solely on decisions made in any one capital for whatever outside backing it might obtain.

Finally, the way the regime dealt with the crisis in East Pakistan in 1971 and the Indian military success thereafter left the remaining half of Pakistan in a far weaker position than it had been at any time since, perhaps, the early 1950s.

The futility of attempting to fill the gap between foreign policy goals as set in the 1950s and the foreign policy means available in 1970 was dramatically revealed. One result could be that the aim of gaining control over the disputed territory can now be abandoned with honor. It may also lead to a new quality of relationship between the two countries on the subcontinent. The outcome would depend as much on the style and objectives of Indian diplomacy toward Pakistan and the backing available to either from outside Major Powers as on internal dynamics with Pakistan itself.

How Useful a Model?

This account of Pakistan's efforts to balance the power of India provides one reasonably efficient interpretation of Pakistan's foreign policy behavior. It does not, however, account for a number of important aspects of Pakistan's approach to foreign policy.

It does not explain the costly Pakistan commitment to regain Kashmir, a commitment that has contributed so much to the heavy emphasis on military preparations and the intensity of hostility toward India. Nor does it explain India's reluctance to either make concessions in Kashmir or to take other steps to reduce Pakistan's anxieties. This approach does not explore long-standing Muslim-Hindu antagonism, nor the incompatible principles of statehood that provided a sense of moral self-righteousness to both parties to the Kashmir dispute. It does not consider the domestic political pressures that sustained the interest in the struggle in both countries. Accordingly, it does not provide an adequate reflection of the inwardness of this antagonism to policy-makers in both countries. But the logic of arms-race theory and of Kautilyan perspectives provides a good deal of understanding of this competitive hostility.

Many interesting and important questions have not been looked at. Most states are not monoliths in fact, but a congeries of competing and collaborating interests. What were the bureaucratic, professional, or economic interest groups within Pakistan that have been most important in shaping the concept of "national interest" and the making of foreign policy in Pakistan? Did domestic political support at any one time depend as heavily upon a high degree of hostility toward India as many Indians argue? How did the institutional structures of the Foreign Affairs and Finance ministries affect foreign policy choices?³⁵ Were economic interests as important in supporting the alliance relationship as is often alleged? Were there serious debates regarding the possible advantages (or disadvantages) to the economy as a whole, particularly of East Pakistan, if more constructive economic relations with India had been instituted, even at the cost of some reduction in hostility toward India?

Certain turning points were not inevitable, although the state-to-state model suggests they were. The gradual movement from close alliance with a distant Major Power to the "triangular tightrope" was to be expected at some point. The exact timing, however, may owe something to domestic politics in both Pakistan and the United States and to the styles and preoccupations of their respective leaders.

While the 1965 gamble that proved so consequential was in itself understandable enough, another leader or the same one in other administrative or political contexts might have weighed the chances differently and sidestepped that particular risk. This would surely have produced a different set of succeeding events. Nor was the separation of Bangladesh inevitable; or if it had to come, it did not have to be such a tragic and destructive affair. The competition between

35. For an interesting discussion of aspects of Pakistan's institutionalizing efforts, as they relate to other aspects of Pakistan's political development, see Ralph Braibanti, "Pakistan's Experiment in Political Development," *ASIA Supplement No. 1* (Fall 1974) pp. 25-42.

the two subcontinental states no doubt eased the advances of the Soviet Union into a position of influence on the subcontinent, but it would be wrong to argue that Indo-Pakistan contention is sufficient explanation for Soviet interest in South Asia, and that had the two been able to avoid conflict, Moscow would have had no opening. Kautilian logic would have led Moscow to seek an opening into the subcontinent as soon as the Sino-Soviet split became obvious, from the early 1960s forward at least. Nevertheless, India's concern about Pakistani irredentism in regard to Kashmir and Pakistan's military support from Washington no doubt made it easier for Moscow to follow the advice of Chandragupta's adviser.

State systems often set narrow limits to what statesmen can do. Scholars and observers tend to exaggerate statesmen's room for maneuver. But within these margins, there is nearly always a range of human choice. Close observation of the uniqueness of each state, the specific settings of statesmen and how they grapple with successive difficulties is necessary before one can presume to define more narrowly the range of their choice and how parsimonious or extravagant they were in the use of what foreign policy resources lay to hand. The detailed examination of the changing contours of the state system and the shifting flow of power within it can help us see these limits more clearly.

It is, however, only by careful and repeated observation of the linkages between the state system and the domestic setting, as mediated by political elites, that we are likely to improve our ability to generalize. And for that, we need a combination of the area specialist and the student of state systems.